So, it would follow that all opinions about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette are moral [RELATIVE TO THEM]
Yes, given the implicit bracketed part you choose to deliberately ignore.
Don't raise your eyebrow when you're the one begging the question by deliberately leaving out the essential bracketed part and assuming your own interpretation which the moral relativist doesn't accept.
Do unto others as they would have you do unto them"
This presupposes you know how they want you to treat them. Be ok after you get to know them, but beforehand, you could be all kinds of embarrassed.
Do you think Eisenstein’s rendition is right?
Agreed...no formulation can cover all the bases. That’s exactly why the C.I. is only the form a command would have, if it was possible in reality. Hypothetic imperatives cover the others; one can make those up as he goes along, depending on the circumstance.
More art than science....hell yeah. More fun too. Unless you’re a hard scientist.
Terrapin uses the term "personal preference". Are you prepared to say that 'individual moral judgement' is anything more than personal preference? Terrapin apparently doesn't believe it is anything more. If you think it is more, then what does that "more" consist in?
I don't use that term at all because it isn't as accurate as the terms I use, and it adds fuel to the fire of misunderstanding. It has connotations of triviality and arbitrariness, and this is exploited. It plays into the hands of some of those against it. It is not a simple matter of liking or preferring. It is ultimately a matter of individual moral judgement. That we can speak of groups of individuals, instead of any individual in that group directly, doesn't change that. And moral judgement itself is founded in the moral emotions, like sympathy, guilt, approval, disapproval, outrage, righteousness, and so on.
To me a promise is something you sincerely state and sincerely intend to act upon... — Janus
As is a threat.
No, it is not inherent in a threat that it is something you sincerely state and sincerely intend to act upon. That condition is inherent in a promise, though, because a statement of intention that does embody sincerity it is not a promise, but a false promise.
A promise to cause bodily harm is a threat, there can be no doubt. It is still a promise none-the-less. Clearly. Some promises are a kind of threat.
All promises understood and believed by the listener create and build the listener's expectation that the world will be made to match the words. That holds good from promising to plant a rose garden to promising to cause harm. All expectation about what will one day happen is thought/belief about what has not happened but is expected to. Knowing what a promise means in addition to believing that it was sincerely uttered(or not) is more than sufficient/adequate reason to believe that it will be kept(or not).
I cannot agree with saying that all promises ought be kept.
A threat may be thought to be a "promise to cause bodily harm" according to a certain definition of 'promise' or even according to the ostensible 'bare bones' conventional definition of the word; but the point at issue as I see it is whether such a definition is really apt. I say it isn't because promises, as they are most commonly and appropriately understood, are made in the context of mutual trust and concern. If you promise to harm me, then not only do I not care if you keep your promise, I positively wish you not to keep it!
I think any sensible definition of 'promise' necessarily includes the idea that the person to whom the promise is made wishes, or at least acknowledges, that it should be honoured. Why try to incorporate threats with promises, rather than adhering to the very clear moral distinction between them? What would be gained by a blurring of these distinctions?
So this "All promises understood and believed by the listener create and build the listener's expectation that the world will be made to match the words. That holds good from promising to plant a rose garden to promising to cause harm. " I see as completely wrongheaded because the sincerity involved in trusting that someone will keep a promise to do something for you that you desire is completely lacking in the case of a threat. The threatened person may or may not believe that the threatener will carry out the threat, but they do not want to enter into any kind of pact of mutual trust with them. The only circumstance in which a threat could be a promise in the sense I mean is if two people entered into a freely chosen, that is uncoerced, pact of mutual trust from the very beginning. Promises are primarily understood, I maintain, as pacts of mutual trust.
And moral judgement itself is founded in the moral emotions, like sympathy, guilt, approval, disapproval, outrage, righteousness, and so on.
Is moral judgement founded in those 'moral emotions' or are those emotions occasioned by moral judgements? You haven't said yet what "more" than personal preference moral judgements are according to your understanding. I could also ask what more than personal preference, according to you, are the 'moral emotions" you cited here.
This presupposes you know how they want you to treat them. Be ok after you get to know them, but beforehand, you could be all kinds of embarrassed.
Do you think Eisenstein’s rendition is right?
Agreed...no formulation can cover all the bases. That’s exactly why the C.I. is only the form a command would have, if it was possible in reality. Hypothetic imperatives cover the others; one can make those up as he goes along, depending on the circumstance.
More art than science....hell yeah. More fun too. Unless you’re a hard scientist.
True, but I don't see that formulation so much in relation to particular instances " He wants me to make him feel the lick of leather" or "she wants me to go to bed with her", as in relation to generalized human wishes like "People generally do not want to be deceived, robbed, raped, murdered, tortured, exploited, humiliated, beaten, and so on".
So, I remain unconvinced that there can be a truly universal command or that the C.I. in particular is the "only form a command could have" because there are insurmountable problems with it as I pointed out much earlier in this thread in relation to lying to protect the innocent.
This has become a very long thread, which would seem to indicate just how important ethics are to people (at least those who are not participating merely to "win" the argument, anyway; and thankfully there are not many of those!).
So, I remain unconvinced that the C.I. is the "only form a command could have" because there are insurmountable problems with it
It could be the only possible form and have insurmountable problems. It is rather insurmountable to act in accordance with a universal law, when there’s no such thing. It’s merely a guide, how to be the most morally worthy, even though nobody ever really is.
LuckilyDefinitiveApril 07, 2019 at 00:01#2733750 likes
Being moral and being kind,in my opinion are mutually exclusive.
Reply to LuckilyDefinitive It would be counterintuitive to say that to act morally could be to act unkindly or that to act unkindly could be to act morally. To say that just would be a "misinterpretation" of the word 'kind' and/or the word 'moral'.
tim wood- Forgive me for being blunt, but I feel like you are trying to defend anyone who does or believes anything at all, as potentially thinking that it is "morally right" to do that thing or to have that belief. I feel like you are saying that anything that anyone says or does is simply what they believe or how they feel, which is essentially downplaying the severity of certain actions or beliefs that may or may not be a result of what a person has been conditioned to believe, or what they actually feel is "morally right." Granted I am NOT saying that some people may not do or believe things that actually are a result of what they feel is morally right, but I feel like on some level this is being used as an excuse to explain why some or all people believe what they do or do what they do, when this is in fact not the case for everyone. Believe it or not, there ARE people out there who do bad things despite feeling that it is morally wrong to do these things, and so it is not fair accurate to assume that everyone's actions have been based on their morals, because that simply isn't the case.
So, it would follow that all opinions about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette are moral.
— creativesoul
Yes. Hence why I wrote that.
So...
All opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette are moral opinions(of the kind we call "moral").
So, on your view, no matter what unforeseen circumstances may arise, no matter what false pretense led to the promise... if one promises to do something, then they ought do it out of moral obligation alone.
— creativesoul
I did say I am relieved of my moral obligation immediately upon discovery of false representation of the predicate under which the promissory proposition was made. Otherwise, yes, to be morally worthy one ought to act in accord with his moral obligation, in this case do what he promised. Won’t be long before he becomes quite careful in what he promises.
Ah. For whatever reason, I interpreted the opposite... perhaps it is because what follows below seems to contradict what's directly above...
I think that there are a number of different situations/circumstances in which I would not say that one ought keep one's promise.
— creativesoul
Then he has no business making one. Remember, you said....voluntarily obligates himself. A guy promising to commit murder, again, as you say, hasn’t actually done it, so he is just speaking threateningly.
If the discovery of false representation of the predicate under which the promissory proposition was made relieves one of the moral obligation to make the world match one's words, then that is an example of an extenuating circumstance.
It is most certainly the case that promise making always includes a voluntarily entered into obligation to make the world match one's words. There are any number of different unforeseen scenarios, situations, and or otherwise possible circumstances that may arise and warrant careful reconsideration of whether or not it is best to keep a promise previously made.
I understand the foundational need for being able to take another on and/or at their word. The keeping of promises builds confidence in such. All promises are overt expressions of what one intends to do. Promises to cause injury notwithstanding.
The 'quality' of changes that are specifically promised varies tremendously but does not bear upon the fact that one can sincerely promise to cause harm...
To me a promise is something you sincerely state and sincerely intend to act upon... — Janus
As is a threat.
— creativesoul
No, it is not inherent in a threat that it is something you sincerely state and sincerely intend to act upon. That condition is inherent in a promise, though, because a statement of intention that does embody sincerity it is not a promise, but a false promise.
Insincerity is not equivalent to falsehood.
In the last statement... I think you meant to write "That condition is inherent in a promise, though, because a statement of intention that does not embody sincerity it is not a promise, but a false promise."
When one speaks sincerely about the way things are, they believe things are that way. When one promises, they believe that they will keep it. If they do not believe that they will do what they say, then sincerity is lacking. On my view a promise is not the sort of utterance that can be true/false.
A speaker who does not intend to make the world match their words is dishonest, insincere, and/or lying. The promise is a deliberate misrepresentation of the speaker's own thought/belief about what has not happened(the changes promised).
A promise to cause bodily harm is a threat, there can be no doubt. It is still a promise none-the-less. Clearly. Some promises are a kind of threat.
All promises understood and believed by the listener create and build the listener's expectation that the world will be made to match the words. That holds good from promising to plant a rose garden to promising to cause harm. All expectation about what will one day happen is thought/belief about what has not happened but is expected to. Knowing what a promise means in addition to believing that it was sincerely uttered(or not) is more than sufficient/adequate reason to believe that it will be kept(or not).
I cannot agree with saying that all promises ought be kept.
— creativesoul
A threat may be thought to be a "promise to cause bodily harm" according to a certain definition of 'promise' or even according to the ostensible 'bare bones' conventional definition of the word; but the point at issue as I see it is whether such a definition is really apt. I say it isn't because promises, as they are most commonly and appropriately understood, are made in the context of mutual trust and concern. If you promise to harm me, then not only do I not care if you keep your promise, I positively wish you not to keep it!
People in this world actually promise to cause injury and then deliver on that promise. This happens everyday across the globe regardless of individual particulars. Denying that they are making a promise is the result of the speaker not having the same notion of what counts as promise making as you do.
Ask them if they are making a promise. They'll say yes, assuming they've no reason to lie about it. The distinguishing aspect of promise making as compared to merely saying what one intends to do, is that the promise is a sort of unwritten spoken additional guarantee. This holds good regardless of what changes are promised to be made.
I think any sensible definition of 'promise' necessarily includes the idea that the person to whom the promise is made wishes, or at least acknowledges, that it should be honoured. Why try to incorporate threats with promises, rather than adhering to the very clear moral distinction between them? What would be gained by a blurring of these distinctions?
This presupposes that the meaning inherent to promise making is somehow existentially dependent upon the listener's wants/wishes/desires. No one wants to be threatened with bodily injury. It is promised nonetheless.
So this "All promises understood and believed by the listener create and build the listener's expectation that the world will be made to match the words. That holds good from promising to plant a rose garden to promising to cause harm. " I see as completely wrongheaded because the sincerity involved in trusting that someone will keep a promise to do something for you that you desire is completely lacking in the case of a threat.
Promises to cause harm are made and kept everyday.
The threatened person may or may not believe that the threatener will carry out the threat, but they do not want to enter into any kind of pact of mutual trust with them. The only circumstance in which a threat could be a promise in the sense I mean is if two people entered into a freely chosen, that is uncoerced, pact of mutual trust from the very beginning. Promises are primarily understood, I maintain, as pacts of mutual trust.
Mutual trust is imperative. Mutual understanding is as well. One can trust that another means what they say even if and when it involves a promise to cause injury. Not all promises are made with good intention.
If they do not believe that they will do what they say, then sincerity is lacking. Insincerity is not equivalent to falsehood. On my view a promise is not the sort of utterance that can be true/false.
Promises are not true or false in an empirical propositional sense of course. but what may appear to be a promise that is insincerely made is not a true promise, or in other words it is not truly a promise.
The rest of what you say consists in disagreeing with me about what should be termed 'promise'. My position is that a promise should benefit the one to whom it is made, and consists in entering into a mutual pact of trust that the benefit will be afforded by the promiser. Threats, which usually take no account of the moral entitlements of the one threatened, are not like that, so why bother insisting that they should be termed 'promises' rather than merely 'threats'? Both promises and threats are better thought of as subsets of assurances; they are different kinds of assurances. A threat may be insincere and still be a threat; whereas what might appear as a promise cannot be insincere and still be a promise.
For example if I threaten to beat the shit out of you if you don't give me a hundred dollars without having any intention of actually beating the shit out of you, it is still a threat which is designed to intimidate you into giving me the money. In fact if you give me the money I would not have beaten the shit out of you regardless of whether I really intended to or not; which means my intentions are irrelevant to the efficacy of the threat.
On the other hand if I promise to give you my old guitar if you give me a hundred dollars, then it will be apparent whether it was a true promise or not when you discover after giving me the hundred dollars that I do or do not give you the guitar. So my intentions are not irrelevant to promises as they to threats.There is a different logic in threats and promises: can you see the difference now?
Of course it's true that if you don't give me the hundred dollars and I beat the shit out of you, then you will know that the threat was sincere; and it is in this sense that it could said that threats are kind of negative promises; it is only if you don't do what I want that you will discover whether the threat was sincerely intended. In the case of the promise you discover its sincerity only if you do what we agreed upon; if I will honour the pact or not. In the case of threats it is only if you already "dishonour the pact" (I put that in scare quotes to indicate that there really is no honour or pact in the case of threats) that you discover whether I will "honour" it. There is always honour and virtue involved in promising; whereas there is no honour or virtue in threatening.
As an aside; if lying is always wrong as Kant asserts, then if I have threatened to beat the shit out of you if you don't give me a hundred dollars, I am morally obligated to beat the shit out of you. This just cannot work with the C.I.
Of course I will agree that the way you want to frame the terminology is in broad accordance with some ordinary usage, but I am trying to get at something deeper; a moral dimension in promises that threats do not partake of. If you still want to insist on your terminology, that's fine, you are entitled to use whatever terminology you like, but I remain convinced that mine is more useful because it incorporates a valuable distinction between acts (promises) which involve virtue and honour and acts (threats) which do not.
To put the distinction another way, threats, regardless of whether they are sincere or not ,can never be considered to be morally good, whereas promises may be considered to be morally good if they are sincere; that is, if they actually are promises. In any case, if you remain unconvinced I'm quite content to agree to disagree on this, I have no intention of arguing further about it, that's for sure.
I'd be interested in your setting out of the a priori concepts...
— creativesoul
From deontological metaphysics, the key is understanding there is a freely determinant will that both prescribes a law and subjects itself to it. For that to have any sustainable power, a moral agent must hold with respect for law in itself. Otherwise, morality can never be grounded in that which is universal and necessary, which are the criteria of law, and our private conduct would know no ground. Duty is the consciousness of respect for law, and consciousness of the will that determines it. Obligation is acknowledgement of duty in the form of judgement, when it comes to acting in conformity to an imperative.
I have serious very well grounded objections to the notion of freely determinant will(free will). I'll leave those aside and address what I see to be unacceptable consequences following from the above account...
One who has not yet begun to doubt and/or otherwise think about their original worldview cannot have consciousness of their own respect for law, and/or the will that determines it. If obligation is acknowledgement of the consciousness of respect for law and the will that determines it, then one who has not thought about their own worldview could not possibly have any of these a priori necessary elements.
So, according to this terminological framework(conceptual scheme) one who has yet to have begun to question his/her own worldview does not - dare I say cannot - have moral duty and/or obligation.
I do not think it serves us well to simply chalk this difference up to what we (arbitrarily?)think counts as being a promise. I'm simply pointing out that that is not up to our definitions if what we're describing already exists in it's entirety prior to our account of it. What a promise means is determined by the correlations drawn between the speech act and imagined future events stoked by the making of that promise. What counts as a promise is not determined by us. Our definitions can be wrong and/or inadequate for taking proper account of what actually happens.
I think I understand your concerns about the logically possible consequences of what I'm presenting here. I want to try to ease those, for I do not find that such problems are inevitable.
By my lights we agree upon much more than we disagree.
"Insincerity" does not equate to "false".
Agree?
One can say "Joe killed Jane" and believe otherwise, even if Joe killed Jane. "Joe killed Jane" is both insincere and true.
As an aside; if lying is always wrong as Kant asserts, then if I have threatened to beat the shit out of you if you don't give me a hundred dollars, I am morally obligated to beat the shit out of you. This just cannot work with the C.I.
I would not assent to such an account. We agree here.
For example if I threaten to beat the shit out of you if you don't give me a hundred dollars without having any intention of actually beating the shit out of you, it is still a threat which is designed to intimidate you into giving me the money. In fact if you give me the money I would not have beaten the shit out of you regardless of whether I really intended to or not; which means my intentions are irrelevant to the efficacy of the threat.
The listener believed you... clearly. You were paid off as a means to avoid danger. That is a large part of the efficacy aspect. The promissory intent is openly guaranteed. It has been emphasized.
The efficacy of the threat includes the listener's belief about that threat. Your intentions(to enrich yourself by means of physical intimidation/threat to injure) effected/affected the listener. Surely we all know this to be true.
On the other hand if I promise to give you my old guitar if you give me a hundred dollars, then it will be apparent whether it was a true promise or not when you discover after giving me the hundred dollars that I do or do not give you the guitar. So my intentions are not irrelevant to promises as they to threats.There is a different logic in threats and promises: can you see the difference now?
Sincerity does not equate to truth. Sincere statements can be false. Promises are not the sort of things that can be true/false.
Your intentions are not irrelevant to how well threats work. All it takes to work is the listener believe that the world will be made to match the words. You intend to make them believe that. That is entirely relevant to how well the threat works.
You're conflating sincerity with truth and insincerity with falsehood.
Of course I will agree that the way you want to frame the terminology is in broad accordance with some ordinary usage, but I am trying to get at something deeper; a moral dimension in promises that threats do not partake of. If you still want to insist on your terminology, that's fine, you are entitled to use whatever terminology you like, but I remain convinced that mine is more useful because it incorporates a valuable distinction between acts (promises) which involve virtue and honour and acts (threats) which do not.
Not all promises are good. Not all threats are bad.
Doesn't that wrap it up in the simplest, but more than adequate, terms?
Is moral judgement founded in those 'moral emotions' or are those emotions occasioned by moral judgements?
Why the scare quotes? Those emotions clearly fit the moral category, unlike others. Each has an explanation relating to moral judgement, such as that you feel guilty when you judge you've done something wrong, and that you have feelings of disapproval when you judge someone else has done something wrong. You don't get that with shyness or embarrassment, for example.
And moral judgement is founded in moral emotions because they are essential and they make moral judgement what it is. Under current technology, a robot couldn't make moral judgements, because we don't have technology advanced enough to replicate emotions. If we built it such that it would respond in a certain way, such as to say, "No, murder is wrong", when asked to murder someone, then the robot wouldn't be making any moral judgements, in spite of appearances.
You haven't said yet what "more" than personal preference moral judgements are according to your understanding. I could also ask what more than personal preference, according to you, are the 'moral emotions" you cited here.
Are you deliberately not taking into account my response, or are you making this error accidentally? I'm not going to answer your loaded question in the way that you want me to. They're not "more than" personal preference because it's inappropriate to call them that to begin with.
The personal part is inappropriate, because one definition of that is, "belonging to or affecting a particular person rather than anyone else", and the preference part is inappropriate because one definition of that is, "a greater liking for one alternative over another or others",
([I]"her preference for white wine"[/I]). Those are the first definitions that came up on a Google search. We don't tend to say, "My personal preference is not to murder children, because I like children when they're going about their lives, not petrified that I'm attempting to murder them or lying on the ground in a lifeless bloody heap". That's not the best way to word it, as "personal preference" and "like" don't quite do it justice. It sounds like an understatement, too trivial and inappropriate.
So, according to this terminological framework(conceptual scheme) one who has yet to have begun to question his/her own worldview does not - dare I say cannot - have moral duty and/or obligation.
What you mean is, one not cognizant of these a priori conceptions probably isn’t a deontological moral agent. There is nothing herein to say he may not be some other kind of moral agent.
The ongoing is a perfect example why moral philosophy and psychology and anthropology are and should be separate disciplines.
As an aside; if lying is always wrong as Kant asserts, then if I have threatened to beat the shit out of you if you don't give me a hundred dollars, I am morally obligated to beat the shit out of you. This just cannot work with the C.I.
You do see, don’t you, that in making that threat you’ve already violated two of the three forms of the C.I., which makes you morally unworthy. You’re acting as if it was universally lawful to coerce a pay-off, cause pain or both, and, you’re using a fellow human as means to your own ends. If you make the threat but don’t follow up on it because you chickened out, which implicates you in a false truth, you’ve still acted as if causing fear of injury in a fellow human is universally lawful. Not to mention, the guy you threatened fears his possible injury will prevent him from doing his job and thereby supporting his family, so he might lose his house, his ol’ lady dumps him for not providing her standard of living, kids don’t text him anymore but still want their birthday money......so he beats the snot outta you first.
The 'quality' of changes that are specifically promised varies tremendously but does not bear upon the fact that one can sincerely promise to cause harm...
Nowhere is it said human nature is subsumed necessarily under moral agency, such that a moral agent is prohibited from operating under the rationale of a momentary greater good. While he is freely autonomous in his determinations towards his morality, he is nonetheless just as freely autonomous in substituting a lesser version of it.
———————-
This is just an instance of moral relativism. Promising itself follows a procedure grounded in a law of willful choosing, which is always morally good. Just because promising is always morally good, it does not follow that which is promised must also be good, as measured by the relativism of the law chosen to ground it. This is what allows us to say, well, he did what he had to do, which would be true no matter what he actually did.
Terrapin StationApril 07, 2019 at 11:53#2735260 likes
as we laboriously lay down some kindergarten-level material: There are different senses of the term opinion. One sense is how a person feels about something. Whether they like or dislike the thing in question, whether they approve or disapprove, etc. That sense can only be true or false re whether the person is honestly reporting how they feel, and insofar as the sentences are framed more or less as "I feel . . . ," "I think . . . ," "In my opinion . . .," which they often are not. (For example, people often say "Beethoven is the greatest composer," rather than "I feel that Beethoven is the greatest composer." The former can't be true or false.)
The second sense of "opinion" refers to a person's view on a factual matter, where there's often an emphasis on the views of persons with some expertise in the area in question, and on matters that are still up in the air if not outright controversial epistemically. So, for example, we might query a cosmologist's opinion on dark matter--query exactly what the cosmologist believes dark matter to be. This is not querying how the cosmologist feels about dark matter, whether they like or dislike it, etc., which is unlike the other sense of "opinion." And unlike "Beethoven is the greatest composer," something like "Dark matter is simply an issue of having an incorrect model of physics, so that our gravitational formula are wrong at least in particular circumstances" can be true or false without needing to add "In my opinion" to it.
There are different senses of the word "opinion." Only one sense can be true or false when stated without an "In my opinion" (or equivalent) clause. You should have at least learned this in school as a little kid--by second or third grade, say.
as we laboriously lay down some kindergarten-level material: There are different senses of the term opinion.
Indeed. This goes back to my earlier remarks that this is not by any means a discussion of equals. I know that that might sound arrogant, but it's true.
And I think you've got me crossed-up with terrapin and S. They believe, and have made plain in this thread, that all moral judgments are strictly, merely, relative, matters of personal preference.
Can you pay closer attention, please? That's not asking for much, and it is a fair request. It is tiring correcting you all the time repeatedly. Try harder.
It is rather insurmountable to act in accordance with a universal law, when there’s no such thing.
— Mww
About this no argument from me!
Me neither. But further to that point, the imperative to act [i]as though[/I] such-and-such is a universal law can be ineffectual and redundant. I go direct to my conscience, so for me, Kant's categorical imperative is a useless waste of space.
That sums up your "argument", I think. You could have saved yourself a lot of time and effort if you had simply said that from the beginning and left it at that.
So, according to this terminological framework(conceptual scheme) one who has yet to have begun to question his/her own worldview does not - dare I say cannot - have moral duty and/or obligation.
— creativesoul
What you mean is, one not cognizant of these a priori conceptions probably isn’t a deontological moral agent. There is nothing herein to say he may not be some other kind of moral agent.
I asked what counts as being "moral" in kind. Moral agents are a kind of agent. You answered by offering a criterion. The satisfaction of that criterion requires thinking about one's own thought/belief(original worldview).
I meant what I wrote.
I'm fairly certain that you're using more than one sense/definition of the term "moral" in the same argument.
Ok. The derogatory remarks are rather unbecoming. I'm wanting to confirm and/or ensure that I have your position correct.
So, on your view, all opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette are moral opinions in kind(the kind we call "moral"), and none of them are capable of being true/false.
Do I have this much right?
Terrapin StationApril 07, 2019 at 18:38#2737460 likes
Maybe if you spent less time and effort on "correcting" and more on being correct, or at least clear, I wouldn't be revisiting this. Terrapin has been clear. I attempted to ask a simple question; he got it and answered, which I appreciate. From him, clarity and communication. From you, same old same old. Failure to answer and engage; indeed you seem to be careful not to. But much admonishment, mock, and all the time hand-waving to the effect that whatever is asked of you has always already been answered. In my post above I wrote, "Let's see what we get." And from you I got what I expected, which is nothing enlightening, really nothing at all. Thank you, then, for your nothing.
So you don't recall what I've said on "mere", even though it was one of the first things I said to you almost 70 pages ago, and I've repeated it innumerable times since, and elsewhere? You are oblivious to my comments on "personal preference", even though they're right under your nose? And, as usual, this is all my fault.
Of course it's true that if you don't give me the hundred dollars and I beat the shit out of you, then you will know that the threat was sincere; and it is in this sense that it could said that threats are kind of negative promises; it is only if you don't do what I want that you will discover whether the threat was sincerely intended. In the case of the promise you discover its sincerity only if you do what we agreed upon; if I will honour the pact or not. In the case of threats it is only if you already "dishonour the pact" (I put that in scare quotes to indicate that there really is no honour or pact in the case of threats) that you discover whether I will "honour" it. There is always honour and virtue involved in promising; whereas there is no honour or virtue in threatening.
I understand the importance of interdependence. I understand, as well, that academic philosophy has had ongoing issues - seemingly irresolvable - for centuries about many topics, morality notwithstanding. I understand that many of the brightest and well intended minds have studied and came to varying conclusions about it. I would think that if the problems were resolvable - given any of the methods of approach - then they would've been resolved. They're not.
If there is ever good reason to be particularly critical of the methods at work, it would be in such circumstances as these.
There is always honour and virtue involved in promising...
So, this gets to the problem in a hurry...
People promise to cause injury. Assuming such promises cannot be honourable and virtuous...
Either there is not always honour and virtue in promising or not all people who say "I promise..." are making promises.
So what do we do here?
Do we say that those kinds of promises aren't promises, simply because we want to be able to say that all promises are honourable and virtuous? Or do we realize that not all promises are honourable and virtuous, and adjust our thought/belief and/or worldview accordingly?
Looks like a true statement about a particular kind of speech act to me.
Promising itself follows a procedure grounded in a law of willful choosing, which is always morally good. Just because promising is always morally good, it does not follow that which is promised must also be good, as measured by the relativism of the law chosen to ground it. This is what allows us to say, well, he did what he had to do, which would be true no matter what he actually did.
So, promising to kill another's family is always morally good.
Moral judgment. Moral consideration. Moral discourse. Moral conceptions. Moral worthiness. Moral admonition. Moral thought/belief. Moral understanding. Moral argument. Moral position.
What makes all these different things moralin kind?
What do they all have in common such that any and all things having that common denominator counts as being moral.
Terrapin StationApril 07, 2019 at 20:23#2738000 likes
Is there anything - on this view - that counts as immoral?
So morality is opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette.
S has an opinion that x is permissible. X is thus moral to S.
S has an opinion that x is not permissible. X is thus immoral to S.
Is there anything - on this view - that counts as immoral?
— creativesoul
So morality is opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette.
S has an opinion that x is permissible. X is thus moral to S.
S has an opinion that x is not permissible. X is thus immoral to S.
Moving the goalposts.
Terrapin StationApril 07, 2019 at 20:24#2738030 likes
So, on your view, all opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette are moral opinions in kind(the kind we call "moral"), and none of them are capable of being true/false.
So morality is opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette.
Morality is moral opinion?
Terrapin StationApril 07, 2019 at 20:32#2738060 likes
I don't understand what you're asking. Morality is opinion-based. There's no reason to repeat the word "moral" (a la "Morality is moral opinion"). You can't be asking me if I think it's opinion-based. How many times do we each need to repeat me saying that the nature of morality is "opinion(s) about the relative permissibility . . . " before you'd know that I'm saying it's opinion-based?
S has an opinion that x is not permissible. X is thus immoral to S.
If all opinions about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette count as being moral opinion, and S has an opinion that x is not permissible, then it is S's moral opinion that x is not permissible, and that statement "X is not permissible" cannot be true/false.
Is this right?
Terrapin StationApril 07, 2019 at 20:36#2738090 likes
If morality is strictly delineated and/or defined as being moral opinion, which it is on your view - then it makes no sense to say that morality is opinion-based. In order for something to be based in/upon something else, there must be a difference between the two. According to the position you're arguing for, there is not - cannot be.
You've used the exact same definition for what counts as being moralin kind and what morality is.
Morality is opinion about X. Opinion about X is moral in kind. Morality is moral opinion. That is what you've claimed. There is no difference. There must be in order for one to be based in the other.
I'm ok with the equivalence, so long as you at least acknowledge it here, and realize that something cannot be based upon only itself.
Terrapin StationApril 07, 2019 at 20:48#2738150 likes
So, being moral is being about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette, and being immoral is not?
You don't believe that "No moral stance is true or false" is a moral stance, do you?
If it is about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette, it is a statement reflecting a stance that is moral in kind - by your own definition.
This is just an instance of moral relativism.
— Mww
Looks like a true statement about a particular kind of speech act to me.
Have we got to the stage where simply calling something an instance of moral relativism is supposed to be some kind of slur or criticism? Or was that said with indifference, in a matter of fact sort of way?
Either way, for once I agree with you both. It is indeed an instance of moral relativism, and it does indeed, at least to me, look like a true statement about a particular kind of speech act.
If they do not believe that they will do what they say, then sincerity is lacking. Insincerity is not equivalent to falsehood. On my view a promise is not the sort of utterance that can be true/false.
Do we say that those kinds of promises aren't promises, simply because we want to be able to say that all promises are honourable and virtuous? Or do we realize that not all promises are honourable and virtuous, and adjust our thought/belief and/or worldview accordingly?
Earlier I responded to your first statement above by saying that promises are not true or false in a propositional sense, but that they may be true promises or false promises depending on whether the one promising sincerely intends to keep the promise. I said further that so-called false promises are not truly promises at all, they just appear to be promises.
Thinking about it further it occurred to me that promises can be understood to be true or false propositions in two ways:
First, if we think of promises as statements of intention, then promises will be true or false depending on whether they correspond or fail to correspond to the intention they state. If I promise to pay you for the work you carried out on my behalf, and I have no intention of paying you for the work, then the so-called promise, as a statement of intention to pay you, is false.
Second, if we think of promises as statements about what will be, then promises will be true or false depending on whether the states of affairs they claim will obtain do or do not obtain. If I promise to pay you for the work, and I do not pay you for the work, then the promise, understood as a statement about what will come to pass, is false.
So, being moral is being about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette, and being immoral is not?
The nature of morality is that it's opinions of the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette,
S has an opinion that x is permissible. X is thus moral to S.
S has an opinion that x is not permissible. X is thus immoral to S
Why in the world do we have to keep posting the same thing over and over?
Terrapin StationApril 07, 2019 at 22:19#2738620 likes
If it is about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette, it is a statement reflecting a stance that is moral in kind
Sure. So do you believe that "No moral stance is true or false" is that?
Why in the world do we have to keep posting the same thing over and over?
We're not. You are.
If what counts as being moral in kind is being about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette, and what counts as being immoral in kind is being about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette, then there's no difference between the two.
Did you read "The nature of morality is that it's opinions of the relative permissibility. . ." For example. When I answered what "moral in kind" is, I was saying what morality is.
Maybe you don't understand the phrase "relative permissibility"? Relative permissibility includes "permissible" and " impermissible" for example, right?
It's ridiculous that I'm having to explain any of this to you, by the way, because it would indicate a near-imbecilic level of reading comprehension, understanding and reasoning abilities.
It's ridiculous that I'm having to explain any of this to you, by the way, because it would indicate a near-imbecilic level of reading comprehension, understanding and reasoning abilities.
It's an opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette.
So, it would follow that all opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette are moral in kind.
— creativesoul
Yes. Hence why I wrote that.
If all opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette are moral in kind then no opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette are immoral in kind.
Hence, I asked what counts as immoral on your view. The answer contradicted what you've already argued.
You're using the two terms "moral" and "immoral" both as opinions about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette. Hence, I said you were moving the goalposts.
There's also this...
Being moral relative to S is about S's judgment.
Being moral as a result of being about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette is not.
Earlier I responded to your first statement above by saying that promises are not true or false in a propositional sense, but that they may be true promises or false promises depending on whether the one promising sincerely intends to keep the promise. I said further that so-called false promises are not truly promises at all, they just appear to be promises.
Thinking about it further it occurred to me that promises can be understood to be true or false propositions in two ways:
First, if we think of promises as statements of intention, then promises will be true or false depending on whether they correspond or fail to correspond to the intention they state. If I promise to pay you for the work you carried out on my behalf, and I have no intention of paying you for the work, then the so-called promise, as a statement of intention to pay you, is false.
Second, if we think of promises as statements about what will be, then promises will be true or false depending on whether the states of affairs they claim will obtain do or do not obtain. If I promise to pay you for the work, and I do not pay you for the work, then the promise, understood as a statement about what will come to pass, is false.
Again, well done.
This second parsing is similar to what I'd been thinking all along... At the time of utterance, a promise is not the sort of thing that can be true/false. The first is interesting and seems apt as well. There need be some sort of commonality between the two ways if we are to say that promises can be true in two ways. Correspondence to the actual intention, and correspondence to states of affairs(what's happened). Seems the former could be rendered as a kind of the latter, but not the other way around.
Seriously, though, if this is that difficult for you, we need to concentrate on tackling stuff like the Cat in the Hat first.
:rofl:
Dr. Seuss utterly failed to distinguish between green eggs and the reporting of green eggs. Green eggs are distinct to and/or from that which is prior to green eggs. Green eggs are existentially dependent on ham.
Moral judgment. Moral consideration. Moral discourse. Moral conceptions. Moral worthiness. Moral admonition. Moral thought/belief. Moral understanding. Moral argument. Moral position.
What makes all these different things moralin kind?
What do they all have in common such that any and all things having that common denominator or set thereof also counts as being moral by virtue of having it? Is it just by virtue of having been called such?
A promise can be sincere and true at the time of utterance(the expressed intent corresponds to the speaker's intent).
A promise can be sincere and true at the time of utterance(the expressed intent corresponds to the speaker's intent), but the promise never be kept.
This would be to say that such a promise could be both true and false, no?
Perhaps it is because promises are not a single proposition, but two? I think so. The one to make the world match the words, and the other is the overt guarantee(the statement of intent).
Promising itself follows a procedure grounded in a law of willful choosing, which is always morally good. Just because promising is always morally good, it does not follow that which is promised must also be good, as measured by the relativism of the law chosen to ground it.
The second sentence above states "just because promising is always morally good"...
Are you saying that promising to cause injury aren't promises, or do not follow a procedure grounded in a law of willful choosing?
Seems that you must admit/claim that all promises are morally good even when what's being promised is not. That seems to follow from what you've been arguing...
I said promising itself follows a procedure grounded in a law of willful choosing, which is always morally good.
The procedure is morally good, from a deontological point of view.
The last bit is not about what is morally good. It is about what is considered such from a deontological framework.
I was asking clearly, what makes something moralin kind. I took the answer to be about that. Now you're saying that that answer is from a particular point of view.
is an instance of moral relativism. I should have said subjective moral relativism, because the good of a promise is always internal.
Your “not all promises are good” is a judgement made on a morality not belonging to it, and is merely a continuation of an objection to a promise-making procedure, and is moral relativism proper.
Your “not all promises are good” is a judgement made on a morality not belonging to it, and is merely a continuation of an objection to a promise-making procedure, and is moral relativism proper.
Given my view on truth and meaning, that's an interesting assertion. Judgment? Sure.
On my view, we can be mistaken. What we thought was good ends up being not. You? How does being mistaken fit into this deontological schema?
Being right, or its complement, mistaken, is a rational judgement; being good, or its complement, not good, is a moral judgement. The former is legislated by reason with empirical predicates, the concepts of which are from experience; the latter is legislated by reason with pure practical predicates, the concepts of which are from understanding, better known to Everydayman as conscience.
Being mistaken doesn’t fit into the deontological schema. It is common to think that which is predicated on law is thereby susceptible to having those laws “broken”, hence arises the idea of mistake. While that is all true, such is not the true implication of law in moral philosophy, it being more the natural inclination of rational agents to respect the intrinsic properties of any law. Because humans generally respect law, it follows that if moral laws were shown to be possible, it is reasonable to suppose humans would respect them as well. Hence the ground of deontological moral philosophy.
Terrapin StationApril 08, 2019 at 11:37#2741530 likes
Re "you're not reading what I'm writing, what happened to reading this:
"Did you read 'The nature of morality is that it's opinions of the relative permissibility. . . ' For example. When I answered what 'moral in kind' is, I was saying what morality is."
You misunderstood my response to "moral in kind" as only being about moral permissibility per se, because it turned out that that's what you had in mind. It's curious that you read my response that way, though, because among other things, it implies that you didn't understand the phrase "relative permissibility." Relative permissibility includes "x is morally permissible* as well as "x is morally impermissible" (as it would include other points on the permissibility continuum, too). "Moral in kind" I read as "the nature of what we call morality," not just limited to moral permissibility contra moral impermissibility, etc. ("etc." for the similar metrics, which I also wasn't attempting to produce an exhaustive list of; it was just a quick list of examples of the relevant sorts of metrics).
I've identified and corrected this misunderstanding at least a handful of times now, but you don't seem to be reading, or at least you don't seem to be comprehending any of this. Maybe you are, maybe you don't really have so much difficulty with reading comprehension, and you're just having some "fun" instead, but I don't know about that. If the idea is to make this place seem that over the top learning-disabled it might be working.
the ‘good’ of a promise is contingent upon integrity as always morally good,
Good thought, and would be justified, if it could be shown that integrity is itself irreducible. It’s the difference between what a man has as opposed to what a man is, and whether what a man has is sufficient to fully describe his moral disposition.
Being right, or its complement, mistaken, is a rational judgement...
That is to conflate being mistaken with being called "mistaken" and/or awareness/knowledge thereof. The difference pervades this thread in the form of empty charges of such. The irony, of course, lies therein.
Earlier I almost quoted Bob Dylan regarding conscience... it is most certainly not always a reliable guide to good behaviour.
conscience... it is most certainly not always a reliable guide to good behaviour.
— creativesoul
Gotta go with what ya got, doncha know.
Very good point. Entirely agree. Gotta start somewhere.
The problem of course is that the only one satisfying one's own conscience is the one who has it. Rationalization comes easy to some... regardless of the behaviour they are self-justifying.
That is to conflate being mistaken with being called "mistaken"
— creativesoul
As...the promising and the making of a promise?...
Not what I was getting at.
Judging something as being right is not equivalent to being right. Judging something as being mistaken is not equivalent to being mistaken. Here, I'm not using the term "right" as a synonym for morally acceptable. Rather, it is better put as "true", for it is in comparison to being mistaken, which amounts to forming, having, and/or holding false belief.
Here again... is a consequence of neglecting to draw the actual distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief. Judgment is existentially dependent upon the latter. Being mistaken is not. Neglecting to draw and maintain the distinction can lead to conflating what it takes to think/believe(and thus render judgment) that X is mistaken and what it takes for X to be mistaken. Two remarkably different criterion.
It is humanly impossible to make a mistake on purpose. All by ourselves, we are incapable of recognizing our own mistakes. Strictly speaking... that always takes an other. If it is indeed the case that Kant's framework(deontological ethics) cannot take proper account of being mistaken, then there is a very big problem. Perhaps it stems from Noumena?
What I understand - all too well - is that you have voluntarily offered the exact same definition for three different things. In addition, you've been using the term "moral" in both a descriptive sense(as a kind) and in a prescriptive sense(as a sign of approval). That is a prima facie example of equivocation. The result is self-contradiction and/or incoherence.
It's a bit of a leap from, "What's morality? Is it anything other than how people feel, whether they approve or disapprove, etc. of interpersonal behavior that they consider more significant than etiquette?", to, "What's a promise, and do they matter?".
Moral judgment. Moral consideration. Moral discourse. Moral conceptions. Moral worthiness. Moral admonition. Moral thought/belief. Moral understanding. Moral argument. Moral position.
What makes all these different things moral in kind?
What do they all have in common such that any and all things having that common denominator or set thereof also counts as being moral by virtue of having it? Is it just by virtue of having been called such?
It all boils down to thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. How one comes to terms with their own behaviour matters. The consequences of one's own behaviour, notably how others are affected/effected, surely matters.
It is a kind of thought/belief, and like all other kinds... it is determined solely by the content of the correlations being drawn. In this case, being moral in kind, always involves acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour.
Morality is codified rules about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. Belief about those rules involves coming to terms with them. Coming to terms with them involves common language use. Belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour is existentially dependent upon neither; thinking about morality, nor the language necessary to do so.
Moral belief is prior to language. That which is prior to language cannot be existentially dependent upon it. Moral belief is not existentially dependent upon language. Morality is existentially dependent upon both; pre-linguistic moral thought/belief and language.
Terrapin StationApril 09, 2019 at 10:36#2746350 likes
Right, so I'd have to figure out why you're incapable of understanding that I was answering, "What is the nature of morality," even though I keep making this explicit to you. But diagnosing why you can't read, comprehend and learn something so simple is too much of a task for me to bother with given the resources at hand (where all I have to work with is posts you choose to make), especially without more motivation for it (because I don't really care enough to try to figure out just what the problem is; I mostly just find it amusing that you present yourself as you do despite such fundamental and obvious reading and learning deficiencies . . . although it's kind of sad that it's symptomatic of the board overall, with maybe a handful of exceptions).
Terrapin StationApril 09, 2019 at 10:37#2746360 likes
Yes, quite, and the ground of the intrinsic circularity of pure reason. And why the idea of law is incorporated into the moral condition, insofar as respect for law becomes the regulatory agency for such rationalization. Not to dispose of unwarranted rationalization, but to recognize it and attempt to circumvent it, by which a moral worthiness is established.
It is humanly impossible to make a mistake on purpose.
This is catastrophically wrong. To make a mistake purposefully is an instance of immorality, of disrespect for a moral law in the form of negligence of duty proper. Knowing the good thing to do and reasoning oneself to not doing it, is a purposeful mistake, readily apparent to any moral agent with what is conveniently and conventionally regarded as “a guilty conscience”, which is a knowledge and no ways a mere feeling.
In a rational system, judgement is nothing more than the faculty of uniting the concepts of understanding to the intuitions of sense, from which an external object is cognized without contradiction, and is called experience.
In a moral system, which is rational but with different means and ends, employment of the faculty of judgement responsible for uniting a freely determined law with a willful volition, from which an act is cognized as good, and is called morality.
Coming to terms with them involves common language use
Show me how my common language use facilitates me coming to terms with my codified moral rules.
“...But to explain how pure reason can be of itself practical without the aid of any spring of action that could be derived from any other source, i.e., how the mere principle of the universal validity of all its maxims as laws (which would certainly be the form of a pure practical reason) can of itself supply a spring, without any object of the will in which one could antecedently take any interest; and how it can produce an interest which would be called purely moral; or in other words, how pure reason can be practical-to explain this is beyond the power of human reason, and all the labour and pains of seeking an explanation of it are lost....”
You think, with a handful of exceptions, that this board is full of people with reading and learning deficiencies?
I doubt he does, but it certainly does seem to have more than its fair share of people who can't tell the difference between rhetoric and factual claims.
In a rational system, judgement is nothing more than the faculty of uniting the concepts of understanding to the intuitions of sense, from which an external object is cognized without contradiction, and is called experience.
In a moral system, which is rational but with different means and ends, employment of the faculty of judgement responsible for uniting a freely determined law with a willful volition, from which an act is cognized as good, and is called morality.
Need be no more complicated than that.
Oh great. Well if its that simple... Just the small matter of translating any of that into language that actually means anything and we're done.
So let's make a start.
"The faculty of uniting the concepts of understanding to the intuitions of sense". Care to explain what that actually means? Faculty (a capability or power of the mind), concepts of understanding (totally lost as to what they might be), intuitions of sense (I know what intuitions are, I know what senses are, but not sure why you've specified intuitions related to these), cognized without contradiction (lost again).
Have you tried writing in English, it really is a perfectly adequate language.
Lol, I see what you did there.
The reason why im asking HIM to clarify, is because its not obvious it IS rhetoric considering the exchanges Ive seen between the more prolific posters.
In other words, I cannot tell if he was joking or not because it might actually be a case someone could make.
Oh great. Well if its that simple... Just the small matter of translating any of that into language that actually means anything and we're done.
So let's make a start.
"The faculty of uniting the concepts of understanding to the intuitions of sense". Care to explain what that actually means? Faculty (a capability or power of the mind), concepts of understanding (totally lost as to what they might be), intuitions of sense (I know what intuitions are, I know what senses are, but not sure why you've specified intuitions related to these), cognized without contradiction (lost again).
Have you tried writing in English, it really is a perfectly adequate language.
considering the exchanges Ive seen between the more prolific posters.
In other words, I cannot tell if he was joking or not because it might actually be a case someone could make.
Fair point. Some of them are a bit borderline hebephrenic.
I think it unlikely either of us are fully sane. We do afterall continue to post as if our words might actually be taken account of, despite the evidence to the contrary. You know what they say about the definition of insanity...
Why did you include me in that? Did I say something about it and forget?
Anyway, there is a simple point in amongst the run on string of thinly veiled attempts to sound intelligent, but its not very interesting. You are easily impressed.
I would not boast about not understanding this bit of text; it would be nothing to boast about. Can it be, S., Isaac, Dingo, that you really do not understand it?
"These new clothes look wonderful!" exclaimed the emperor.
And then a child called out from the crowd, "But he's wearing nothing at all!".
And Tim Wood asked of the child, "Can it be, child, that you really do not appreciate the splendid wonder of the emperor's new clothes?".
Terrapin StationApril 09, 2019 at 20:12#2748020 likes
How do we compare/contrast as a means to determine which is best?
Which what? Law? Little bit experience, little bit heredity, little bit personality, whatever the moral agent thinks best for him. Subjective moral relativism; the moral consequences can be taught, the moral choices available to make can be taught. The actual choices made cannot be taught, for they are made in the moment.
This second parsing is similar to what I'd been thinking all along... At the time of utterance, a promise is not the sort of thing that can be true/false. The first is interesting and seems apt as well. There need be some sort of commonality between the two ways if we are to say that promises can be true in two ways. Correspondence to the actual intention, and correspondence to states of affairs(what's happened). Seems the former could be rendered as a kind of the latter, but not the other way around.
I missed this response of yours. I remember reading something by Bertrand Russell where he claimed that statements about what will happen in the future are true or false now depending on what happens in the future; it's just that we obviously can't tell which.
So, for example, according to this line of thought the statement "The Sun will go supernova in 2 billion years" is true or false now. That seems odd to me, and I'm not sure what to think about it. For example, would that statement being true or false now presuppose rigid determinism?
Perhaps it is because promises are not a single proposition, but two? I think so. The one to make the world match the words, and the other is the overt guarantee(the statement of intent).
I agree with this answer. A promise could be both true and false in different senses. But we are still left with the issue about whether a promise, understood as a statement about what will come to pass, could be true or false now depending on whether or not it will come to pass, or whether it is only true or false when its coming to pass or not is decided. I think I favor the latter.
Morality is codified rules about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. Belief about those rules involves coming to terms with them. Coming to terms with them involves common language use. Belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour is existentially dependent upon neither; thinking about morality, nor the language necessary to do so.
Do I really need to? Can't you see that for yourself?
— creativesoul
No. Yes. (Ok...only partly)
Humor me, for comparative purposes. Besides, you’ve asked me to expound, and I did. Now I’m calling fair play.
Well. There's much that I've set aside. One who understands Kant ought not have issue understanding what I'm arguing here. I mean, even the Everydayman understands that coming to terms with anything and/or everything that one can come to terms with involves common language use.
This second parsing is similar to what I'd been thinking all along... At the time of utterance, a promise is not the sort of thing that can be true/false. The first is interesting and seems apt as well. There need be some sort of commonality between the two ways if we are to say that promises can be true in two ways. Correspondence to the actual intention, and correspondence to states of affairs(what's happened). Seems the former could be rendered as a kind of the latter, but not the other way around.
— creativesoul
I missed this response of yours. I remember reading something by Bertrand Russell where he claimed that statements about what will happen in the future are true or false now depending on what happens in the future; it's just that we obviously can't tell which.
Well, I respect Russell tremendously. If what you say is true then he and I have different positions regarding what sorts of things can be true and what makes them so. I'm fairly settled on the idea of correspondence to fact where facts are actual events; that which has happened; what has happened. There can be no such correspondence between a statement and that which has not happened. Prediction are about exactly that. They're complex 'forms' of expectation. All expectation is grounded upon thought/belief about what has happened, but expectation is always about what has not.
So, for example, according to this line of thought the statement "The Sun will go supernova in 2 billion years" is true or false now. That seems odd to me, and I'm not sure what to think about it. For example, would that statement being true or false now presuppose rigid determinism?
Good question. Off the cuff, because that is a new line of thought for me, it seems it could be a consequence thereof. Not sure though.
I think predictions are about what has not happened. Being true requires corresponding to that which has. At least, that rendering seems to be working fairly well for me.
Perhaps it is because promises are not a single proposition, but two? I think so. The one to make the world match the words, and the other is the overt guarantee(the statement of intent).
— creativesoul
I agree with this answer. A promise could be both true and false in different senses.
I grant the case you've made for it. I'm glad I followed it to your liking. I would not assent what you're saying here though, for reasons already given.
If this marks the end of this discussion, it also marks an appropriate time for giving thanks...
I missed this response of yours. I remember reading something by Bertrand Russell where he claimed that statements about what will happen in the future are true or false now depending on what happens in the future; it's just that we obviously can't tell which.
So, for example, according to this line of thought the statement "The Sun will go supernova in 2 billion years" is true or false now. That seems odd to me, and I'm not sure what to think about it. For example, would that statement being true or false now presuppose rigid determinism?
Yes, it seems so. And I reject that, being influenced in my thinking on such matters by Hume. And Russell himself made a point in agreement with Hume:
The turkey found that, on his first morning at the turkey farm, he was fed at 9 a.m. Being a good inductivist turkey he did not jump to conclusions. He waited until he collected a large number of observations that he was fed at 9 a.m. and made these observations under a wide range of circumstances, on Wednesdays, on Thursdays, on cold days, on warm days. Each day he added another observation statement to his list. Finally he was satisfied that he had collected a number of observation statements to inductively infer that “I am always fed at 9 a.m.”.
However on the morning of Christmas eve he was not fed but instead had his throat cut.
I would not boast about not understanding this bit of text; it would be nothing to boast about. Can it be, S., Isaac, Dingo, that you really do not understand it?
Where did I say I didn't understand it? I mocked it for being vacuous, implied that there was no substance there to understand in the first place and called @Mww out on that. The issue of my actually being able to understand the words never arose.
How do we compare/contrast as a means to determine which is best?
— creativesoul
Which what? — Mww
Which moral belief. I say we begin with the universally formed and/or re-formed ones... You know, the ones we all have? Point of view invariant.
Great idea. Let's have the list then, of all these universal, completely invariant objective morals with which no one but the mentally damaged disagree.
I'll start you off.
1. Murder... But what about wars... OK murder of innocents... But who qualifies as innocent... Murder of children then... Infanticide... Oh, how about murder of innocent children who are healthy... Damn, back to 'innocent' again... Right, this time I've got it, we're all universally opposed to the murder of healthy children... Slaves, indigenous genocides in the colonial era, 'shame' killings in Islam...
Perhaps we need to start smaller.
Everyone like puppies right....? (shit, don't they eat puppies in Indonesia?)
How do we compare/contrast as a means to determine which is best?
— creativesoul
Which what? — Mww
Which moral belief. I say we begin with the universally formed and/or re-formed ones... You know, the ones we all have? Point of view invariant.
— creativesoul
Great idea. Let's have the list then, of all these universal, completely invariant objective morals with which no one but the mentally damaged disagree.
I'll start you off.
Nah. You cannot start off explaining what I'm referring to by virtue of saying something remarkably different and then talking about that.
Great idea. Let's have the list then, of all these universal, completely invariant objective morals with which no one but the mentally damaged disagree.
No, no, no. You give him too much credit. He didn't even make that qualification. You know, it's the ones [I]we all[/I] have. There's not a single person out of around 7.5 billion people who doesn't have them, apparently.
No, no, no. You give him too much credit. He didn't even make that qualification. You know, it's the ones we all have.
Ah yes, perhaps that is the "remarkably different" aspect I so carelessly introduced. If so, I look forward to hearing what Harold Shipman and I share with regards to our moral outlook. I think we both quite like crosswords... Maybe that's what he means.
even the Everydayman understands that coming to terms with anything and/or everything that one can come to terms with involves common language use.
Yeah, that seems to be all the rage these days, from Pinker, Fodor, Crane, even Dennett, fercryinoutloud....with this LOT theory. Language is far and away one of the more spectacular aspects of the human condition, and is certainly indispensable for general communication. But I don’t communicate with myself, and even granting something like modern versions of cognitive architecture, the theories leave much to be desired, and when push comes to shove, I find them no more satisfactory than good ol’ Enlightenment epistemological speculation. No one knows for sure how this stuff happens, but it does happen, so we are free to speculate as much as we want, within the confines of logical possibility.
If coming to terms with everything necessarily involves common language use, how did we come to terms with common language;
Nine times out of ten, there just isn’t time for common language use;
As a young human with limited experience, being informed of “2” does use common language, but he hasn’t come to terms with anything. He will use “2” by rote in expressions or operations that include it, but without any concept of quantity;
Specific task-oriented cognition uses imaging, not common language;
If I do use common language when I think to myself, maybe it is only because such would be absolutely necessary iff I were to then tell you about it. Maybe it’s merely a sub-conscious anticipation that I use common language in thinking *BECAUSE* it may be henceforth so communicated. Maybe, because I need language for you to understand me, I need language to understand myself;
What is happening in a deaf person’s head, who has no access to common language *use*. He is still a rational human, so it is logical to suppose he thinks as a rational human, which implies common language use is not necessary for *his* coming to terms with anything;
Given the human brain has innate capability for logical inference....somehow.....naturally.....and is equally representational....ditto....it stands to reason that common language use is merely what we say we’re doing when the underlying mechanics is at work. We’re not conscious of our basic cognitive faculties, so we insert what we know into the logical form of our mechanisms. But that doesn’t explain the how of knowing, which leaves room for speculative epistemological theory.
So, yes, coming to terms involves common language use, but that coming to terms doesn’t describe what exists a priori that needs coming to terms with.
Which moral belief. I say we begin with the universally formed and/or re-formed ones... You know, the ones we all have? Point of view invariant.
OK. Good place to start. To stipulate point of view invariant relegates experience to irrelevance because of the concept of invariant cancels it, but allows room for pure reason because of a point of view requires it. To stipulate the principle of universality implies that which every otherwise rational agency has naturally incorporated in his mental being. If we allow these the name of innate ideas or notions, we are naming something common to all humanity.
It is logically impossible to name anything whatsoever from a particular, re: my innate idea of a moral belief, to a universal, re: my innate idea of a moral belief residing in every similar agency, and have sufficient means to prove such must be the case. I can think there are some that should reside, that ought to reside, but I cannot have the knowledge that they do reside. If it is impossible to know a thing, and any supposition about it is the sole remainder, then it follows necessarily that any qualification as to its relative good is merely another supposition.
No supposition in and of itself can be proven to be the case. If all that exists with respect to point of view invariant universal moral beliefs is innate ideas, and the exposition of innate ideas are given from pure reason because experience is irrelevant here, and pure reason is itself a point of view with great variance amongst moral agencies, then we have contradicted the major premise.
There may be point of view invariant innate ideas of a universal moral beliefs, but we won’t ever indubitable conclude what they are. Even the relative worth of them is not point of view invariant, and I don’t see how we can say any of them should be without infringing on the the right of pure reason to testify for its respective owners.
I think it safe to say universally we are each moral agents, but the kind of moral agent we each are, is strictly a function of our own point of view. Still, we can without contradiction think a moral belief better or worse than some other moral belief, but only to ourselves, simply from the ones we each hold, but that serves no other universality than the “as if” of deontological doctrine.
Nevertheless, I’d be interested in what you think a possible universal moral belief would be, and how its relative benefit can be manifest.
Reply to S Fair enough I suppose, but I can't see what the "point in agreement with Hume" that Russell made has to do with the nature of truth or determinism. If it's an abstruse association you are making, then further explanation may help.
Which moral belief. I say we begin with the universally formed and/or re-formed ones... You know, the ones we all have? Point of view invariant.
— creativesoul
OK. Good place to start... I’d be interested in what you think a possible universal moral belief would be...
Thought/belief about unacceptable/acceptable behavior that grounds all morality.
It is logically impossible to name anything whatsoever from a particular, re: my innate idea of a moral belief, to a universal, re: my innate idea of a moral belief residing in every similar agency, and have sufficient means to prove such must be the case.
What are you talking about?
Are you denying knowledge of pre and/or non-linguistic thought/belief? Are you denying the actual distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief?
If coming to terms with everything necessarily involves common language use, how did we come to terms with common language...
By thinking about our thought/belief and the utterances/expressions thereof. We named it. There is no reason whatsoever to think that our language is not capable of taking proper account of that which existed in it's entirety prior to our awareness and/or account of it.
What are you doing here... now? Do you believe the things you write?
There is no such thing as an innate idea of a moral belief. There are ideas of moral belief. Those are existentially dependent upon language. There are pre-linguistic thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. Those are not.
Drawing a connection between another's behaviour and ourselves does not require common language acquisition. These kinds of thought/belief are moral in kind as a result of the content of correlation.
Morality consists entirely of thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. Morality consists of moral belief. All moral belief is belief about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. Some belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour is formed prior to language acquisition.
No pre-linguistic human likes being hurt by another. Every one dislikes it. These are not innate thought/belief about experience. They are formed after conception, after birth... the result of experience.
These experiences - including the thought/belief formation within them - are universal in that they are common to all humans that go on to use common language.
This report is of that which exists in it's entirety prior to our awareness of it(universally held moral belief), regardless of the individual particulars.
Which moral belief ought be prioritized and/or valued most?
Which ought be legitimized, nurtured, and/or enforced?
Fair enough I suppose, but I can't see what the "point in agreement with Hume" that Russell made has to do with the nature of truth or determinism. If it's an abstruse association you are making, then further explanation may help.
I suppose it was more of a related point to do with knowledge. I was just trying to think how we could know that theory to be true, and test out how it would work, and what the logical consequences would be. If a statement about what will happen has a truth-value, could we ever know what it is, prior to the event? Prior to the event, it seems susceptible to the problem illustrated with the Turkey example. It does seem to make some sense to say that it would become true or false after the event, but anything that seems to imply rigid determinism seems problematic to me. To me, it seems to make sense that, at the time, any outcome isn't absolutely set in stone. An outcome can be predicted, but can go this way or that way or another way, out of a number of possibilities. I find it more acceptable to consider such statements to be truth-apt than that they actually have a truth-value, i.e. that a statement of that sort is true (or false) at the time.
Are you denying the actual distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief?
Yes. I’ve said before, to me they are the same thing. Or, I see no good reason to think they are not the same thing, and I get no help from you as means for granting the distinction.
—————————
It is logically impossible to name anything whatsoever from a particular, re: my innate idea of a moral belief, to a universal, re: my innate idea of a moral belief residing in every similar agency, and have sufficient means to prove such must be the case.
— Mww
What are you talking about?
He who says it first usually says it best:
“....When they propose to establish the universal from the particulars by means of induction, they will effect this by a review of either all or some of the particulars. But if they review some, the induction will be insecure, since some of the particulars omitted in the induction may contravene the universal; while if they are to review all, they will be toiling at the impossible, since the particulars are infinite and indefinite....”
(Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism)
I’m both surprised and disappointed you failed to connect your point-of-view invariant universal moral belief to my counter-argument against it. You must have failed to connect because you asked what I was talking about, instead of showing what I was talking about is wrong, or at least does not apply.
You’re always saying we do this stuff, but never say what we’re doing it to. I suppose we name that which exists in its entirety as thought/belief, and the method for that naming is thinking about though/belief. That still leaves me wondering how the thinking in thinking about though/belief comes about, if we need it in order to explain what already exists. You’re using what you’re trying to explain the use of.
The intrinsic circularity of pure reason has been known for centuries. It is inescapable when reductionism is taken too far, which leads inevitably to illusions and manufactured contradictions. But it’s your theory; you’re more than welcome to expound it until the common understandings finally see the light.
That which is prior to language. In it's entirety.
If it sounds like nonsense, then that's probably because it is. Like I said earlier, he is trying real hard to make sense of nonsense, which is quite amusing.
But WHAT is a jabberwocky, my son??? WHAT 'twas brillig, and the slithy toves???
I’d be interested in what you think a possible universal moral belief would be...
— Mww
Thought/belief about unacceptable/acceptable behavior that grounds all morality.
I reject the notion that behavior grounds morality. Behavior may be said to ground ethics, which in turn may be said to be representative of subjective moral dispositions. But even if this idea of ethics is itself rejected, it still leaves open the claim that morals are subjective determinations, from which certain actions are chosen and which may or may not obtain as a physical behavior.
If you mean thought/belief grounds morality, I would say you’re closer to the basic idea. I’m more inclined to say morality is something we have, not something we do. It seems much more parsimonious to grant humans certain inherent abilities, perhaps your thought/belief or something like it, sufficient to inform us of how we must behave, and still be in accordance with the kind of person we have already determined ourselves to be.
Nevertheless, if you’re saying thought/belief about acceptable behavior is a possible universal moral belief, that doesn’t say anything. If it be granted every rational human is a moral agent, and we grant practical reason as thought/belief, than universal moral belief is given. Better said as universal moral believing, maybe, because every moral agent thinks about his moral beliefs. But that says nothing about that which is contained in the beliefs, what would be an actual universal moral belief, which is what I asked you about.
Are you denying the actual distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief?
— creativesoul
Yes. I’ve said before, to me they are the same thing. Or, I see no good reason to think they are not the same thing, and I get no help from you as means for granting the distinction.
Are your thought/belief about Empiricus' the same as Empiricus'?
He who says it first usually says it best:
“....When they propose to establish the universal from the particulars by means of induction, they will effect this by a review of either all or some of the particulars. But if they review some, the induction will be insecure, since some of the particulars omitted in the induction may contravene the universal; while if they are to review all, they will be toiling at the impossible, since the particulars are infinite and indefinite....”
(Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism)
I’m both surprised and disappointed you failed to connect your point-of-view invariant universal moral belief to my counter-argument against it. You must have failed to connect because you asked what I was talking about, instead of showing what I was talking about is wrong, or at least does not apply.
So, because we might be wrong... we are?
All statements of thought/belief come via language.
Nobody knows how what appears to be mind comes from what the brain does.
— Mww
Do you know what everyone knows?
I don’t have to know what everybody knows to know there is at least one thing nobody knows. As bad as when I said, “It doesn’t have to be any more complicated than that”, and I get back, “if it’s that simple....”.
Are your thought/belief about Empiricus' the same as Empiricus'?
I don’t think about Empiricus. I think about what Empiricus thought, and as our thinking systems are identical, whatever he thought I could think just as well. In no other way can humans understand each other.
———————
Assuming you’re not joking, it’s not my burden to show you a black swan, but it wouldn’t be difficult to show you that which falsifies the notion of universal moral belief. You would have to prove a universal moral belief is possible without considering a particular example of what one would be, in order to circumvent the induction principle.
Reply to S OK, I think I see where you are coming from with the 'turkey thang' now. You seem to be relating the idea of truth to the idea of our knowing of it. Leaving aside the question of our knowing, the idea that a statement about the future could be true now would seem to depend on the idea that either rigid determinism or eternalism with regard to time is the case.
Also, truth in that view would be understood to be totally independent of our knowing of it. So the objection you presented to the idea: Quoting S
If a statement about what will happen has a truth-value, could we ever know what it is, prior to the event?
is based on thinking that our knowing or believing does have some bearing or purchase on truth, which is the basis of pragmatism.
Reply to Janus Well, not quite. It [i]could[/I] be true (or false) [i]regardless[/I] of our knowledge of it, but when it comes to making sense of it all, I think in terms of, "How could we know that to be the case?". And I can't think up an adequate answer to that question. So I accept the possibility, but that's as far as I can get. I can't get to the conclusion that it [i]actually is[/I] true (or false) [I]now[/I]. Truth-apt? Okay. But actually true (or false)? Can't accept. The best I can come up with is, "Could be, but I just don't know".
Reply to S We are addressing only the logic of our own thinking about truth. And the logic of our thinking about truth tells us that a statement about the future which it seems must become true or false one day, for example "The Sun will go nova in 2 billion years" may or may not be true now. That just is "making sense of it all" as best we can, as far as I can tell anyway. I think the "How could we know that to be the case" has already been ruled out as irrelevant in this thinking of truth as being independent of our knowing or believing.
Just a footnote...rhetorically speaking....thought you might be interested. If you didn’t already know. Peirce’s pragmatic maxim, first put to print in 1878 is taken directly from the form developed as the hypothetical imperative by......you know who.
We are addressing only the logic of our own thinking about truth. And the logic of our thinking about truth tells us that a statement about the future which it seems must become true or false one day, for example "The Sun will go nova in 2 billion years" may or may not be true now. That just is "making sense of it all" as best we can, as far as I can tell anyway. I think the "How could we know that to be the case" has already been ruled out as irrelevant in this thinking of truth as being independent of our knowing or believing.
Okay, so we're in agreement that it's a, "Could be, but don't know".
Kant called hypothetical imperatives “counsels of prudence”, whereas the categorical, or moral, imperative is a “command of reason”, both grounded in maxims. Peirce knew both The Metaphysics of Morals, from which came the imperatives and maxims, and CPR, from which came the term “pragmatic anthropology”. There is no record of him saying as much, but apparently he took each of those ideas and constructed the beginnings of a new philosophy out of them, with the pragmatic maxim as a tenet.
“....Pragmatism. The opinion that metaphysics is to be largely cleared up by the application of the following maxim for attaining clearness of apprehension: Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object....”
Reply to Mww OK, that's interesting. I knew that Peirce accepted the constraints on knowing; the 'counsels of prudence' that evolve out of the understanding of our situation re noumena, although I had thought that he favored a greater range of speculation than Kant did; speculation always grounded on what he called "phaneroscopy" (equivalent to 'phenomenology'), which he understood to consist in, perhaps inter alia, the sciences 'the disciplined studies of phenomena'.
I do kind of like his formulation of truths as being the beliefs that the community of inquirers will come to hold at the very end of inquiry, but I think he also held that absolute or objective truth is unknowable. I said "kind of like" because that formulation seems to be more idealistic than realistic; as if we could ever know that the end of inquiry had been reached, or as if the very last beliefs that humanity held in common the 'moment' before their extinction could count as final truths in anything more than a temporal sense.
Assuming you’re not joking, it’s not my burden to show you a black swan, but it wouldn’t be difficult to show you that which falsifies the notion of universal moral belief. You would have to prove a universal moral belief is possible without considering a particular example of what one would be, in order to circumvent the induction principle.
Why suppose a need to circumvent that which is untenable/self-contradictory? It is itself a universal claim based upon particular examples thereof.
I think I'm done here. It's getting way too ridiculous for my tastes. You win. I've shown how the framework you're using is inherently flawed. You've offered nothing more than distractions, and failed to directly address valid objections, but instead just keep on denying what is obvious. That simple true statement that has such far-reaching consequences when combined with a few other ones...
The intrinsic circularity of pure reason has been known for centuries. It is inescapable when reductionism is taken too far, which leads inevitably to illusions and manufactured contradictions. But it’s your theory; you’re more than welcome to expound it until the common understandings finally see the light.
You're confused.
My position refutes the very notion of 'pure reason'. The inherent flaws of that conception have no bearing upon my position.
My position refutes the very notion of 'pure reason'.
I'd like to see the reasoning to support that. I'd say there is pure reason, but it consists only in tautologies and 'contentless' formal logic. Some people, Kant among them, claim that there is synthetic a priori reasoning (as well as the tautologous analytic a priori kind) but I'm pretty sure that should not be accepted.
How do you arrive at your distinctions between thought and thinking about thought? Are they tautologous or something more than that? If you say they are more than that what kind of evidence do they rely on to justify them?
That which exists in entirety prior to language. Utterly fail to distinguish between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief. Existentially dependent on the latter.
Just want to note that there is most certainly a conception called "Pure Reason". Much if not most of Western Philosophy holds to it.
Let me guess. You think/believe that it consists in/of thought/belief, and the whole of Western philosophy utterly fails to distinguish between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief.
I am tired of being combative, S; I want to adopt a different approach, give everyone the benefit of the doubt, and if I find valid well-reasoned arguments and no inconsistencies, then I will accept anyone's philosophy as an expression of their own unique individuality, even if I disagree with its presuppositions,
Your subjective relativism should allow for no less.
I am tired of being combative, S; I want to adopt a different approach, give everyone the benefit of the doubt, and if I find valid arguments and no inconsistencies, then I will accept anyone's philosophy, as an expression of their own unique individuality, even if I disagree with its presuppositions, ..
I disagree with that approach. I think we should combat nonsense and garbage, not encourage it. He's under the illusion that what he's saying is credible, and not crackpottery. That's a serious self-harming illusion.
Reply to S But if it is based on valid reasoned arguments and is not inconsistent then it's only nonsense and garbage according to someone's judgement, according to your own lights.
Why is there any need to combat those you might, rightly or wrongly, think of as crackpots, or those you just disagree with, when no one is forced to read anything anyone else writes?
But if it is based on valid reasoned arguments and is not inconsistent then it's only nonsense and garbage according to someone's judgement, according to your own lights.
I've engaged it myself before. I haven't just jumped right in to attacking it in this way. I doubt much good will come of seriously engaging it.
Why is there any need to combat those you might, rightly or wrongly, think of as crackpots, or those you just disagree with, when no one is forced to read anything anyone else writes?
Because crackpottery is bad, and crackpots need help. I don't want to see crackpottery on this forum, because I think it should have a higher standard. I'm trying the stick approach, others are trying the carrot approach. I hope that one of these approaches works, but I doubt they will.
He is far, far too invested to be helped. He won't change. He won't take on board any criticism and suitably adapt his position. He has dedicated ten years of his life to this claptrap, and it has driven him insane. He is far too confident in his own abilities. He has unswerving faith in his own pet theory. There is no getting through to him. We've all tried.
Granted I only went through the first few posts, and I did follow them, I feel like they missed the mark.
I immediately thought of language, and the words we use, and their meanings.
They evolve, you know.. And it is generally dictated by popular usage. Looking at cultures throughout history
We see staggering differences.. it reminds me of A remarkable statement was made by a nine year old Susy Clemens, Mark Twain’s Daughter, after she learned the natives believed in many gods. She told her mother that she had changed her evening prayers, because “Well, mamma, the Indians believed they knew, but now we know they were wrong, by and by it can turn out that we are wrong, so now I only pray that there is a God, and a Heaven, or something better..”
I do kind of like his formulation of truths as being the beliefs that the community of inquirers will come to hold at the very end of inquiry, but I think he also held that absolute or objective truth is unknowable. I said "kind of like" because that formulation seems to be more idealistic than realistic; as if we could ever know that the end of inquiry had been reached, or as if the very last beliefs that humanity held in common the 'moment' before their extinction could count as final truths in anything more than a temporal sense.
Why do you think that you're so attracted to going with the crowd? That's a disposition I run into frequently--it seems to be the whole nut of getting on board with both objectivism and "intersubjectivism" on anything--a disposition to consider something right because it's common, but I don't really understand what the attraction is. I'm always instead reminded of the "if everyone were jumping off of a bridge" thing.
he also held that absolute or objective truth is unknowable.
I’m not sure any respectable philosophy advocates knowledge of anything absolutely. The closest the Masters dare to say is that of which the contradiction is impossible is as near absolute as they care to venture, re: the thinking subject, logical laws of thought....stuff like that. I guess this could be called objective truth, if one grants everybody thinks, and has his own “I”. Certainly not an empirical objective truth, however.
Quantum mechanics, on the other hand, is currently in the throes of seemingly irreducible indeterminism, which would be a negative absolute, insofar as there seems to be things we can never know, at least with respect to current understandings, re: Planck scale observations, the size and/or volume of the Universe. But Peirce, et.al., wasn’t aware of any of that empirical science, at least at first, so that probably doesn’t count.
Disclaimer: I’m not familiar enough with pragmatism to talk too much about it.
Why do you think that you're so attracted to going with the crowd? That's a disposition I run into frequently--it seems to be the whole nut of getting on board with both objectivism and "intersubjectivism" on anything--a disposition to consider something right because it's common, but I don't really understand what the attraction is. I'm always instead reminded of the "if everyone were jumping off of a bridge" thing.
Me too. It would be quite alarming if he actually thought that way, but he doesn't. He is inconsistent. He only goes with the crowd when the crowd happen to agree with his own judgement. He wouldn't actually jump off a bridge, and that is sufficient to refute his argument.
He can't seem to bring himself into accepting that his argument has been refuted.
In closing, I’ll give you two of four. Humans reason, and the fullest use of reason is logic. Th only way you can refute the notion of pure reason, the kind common to most of western philosophy, metaphysics and science itself, is to call it something else, and then stab at it recklessly until you’ve convinced someone you’ve accomplished something. I must say, I don’t know what a notion of pure reason would even be, that wasn’t itself pure reason.
Now I must grant that your thought/belief theory may be valid. Just because I don’t understand it speaks either to my lack of ability or your lack of sufficient explanation. No matter which, you haven’t shown me the flaws in my framework, and because you’re talking to me, as far as I’m concerned, you haven’t refuted anything having to do with some notion relevant to most western philosophy.
Reply to Mww Thanks for your thoughts Mww. I won't be posting here for a while. I am moving soon, and have much to do to the house before selling it, and my mind is now turning to practical matters. I've enjoyed our exchanges.
Reply to tim wood I was just saying that if my memory serves, Peirce, like Kant held that absolute truth is unknowable. I could be mistaken about that, though.
My position refutes the very notion of 'pure reason'.
— creativesoul
I'd like to see the reasoning to support that. I'd say there is pure reason, but it consists only in tautologies and 'contentless' formal logic. Some people, Kant among them, claim that there is synthetic a priori reasoning (as well as the tautologous analytic a priori kind) but I'm pretty sure that should not be accepted.
I reject both 'kinds' of a priori reasoning/knowledge set out by Kant and both 'kinds' of reasoning set out by Hume. That said, what you're asking me for is groundwork that is book-worthy in it's own right, to say the least. I'll do what I can to convince you that of the possibility that pure reason is a (mis)conception. During this, I'll try to summarize and briefly cover both, Hume and Kant, since their philosophies are closely related. They both stem from the same convention, particularly the conventional 'understandings' of causation, knowledge, and belief.
It is worth mentioning what was driving Hume's philosophy at the time. Much like today, there were many assertions, many incommensurate and/or incompatible positions all of which were equally valid/consistent... So, the question was/is what and/or who to believe and by what standard ought we assent? Hume chose Empiricism.
Hume was not alone when he focused upon the truth conditions of propositions. He was an empiricist. Propositions are empirical - I suppose. However, truth conditions are not equivalent to truth, and neither truth conditions nor truth is equivalent to a proposition. Propositions are nothing more and nothing less than complex thought/belief. Setting out the truth conditions for a proposition says nothing at all about what the proposition itself consists in/of. Propositions do not consist of truth conditions, and yet truth conditions are crucial when considering the difference(s) between the two kinds of reasoning coined by Hume. The truth conditions are the only difference he focuses on. He fails to take account of the similarities. That is the fatal flaw.
The very notion of 'pure reason' is a consequence of Hume's framework/taxonomy; his dividing 'all the objects of human inquiry' into two categories, "relations of ideas" and "matters of fact"; aka Hume's Fork. These are/were held to be the mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories of all human inquiry. The former - "a priori" - presupposes that reasoning can be somehow independent of human experience. That dubious presupposition has more than two centuries worth of being glossed over, but it is entirely false and based upon a gross misunderstanding, neglect, and/or outright willful ignorance of the existential dependency and/or elemental constituency of both 'kinds' of reason he delineates.
A priori propositions/reasoning(relations between ideas) and the reasoning that they support(according to Hume) have truth conditions that we determine - by definition alone. The things we're talking about are of our own invention. This is seen below...
Propositions concerning relations of ideas are intuitively or demonstratively certain. They are known a priori—discoverable independently of experience by “the mere operation of thought”, so their truth doesn't depend on anything actually existing (EHU 4.1.1/25). That the interior angles of a Euclidean triangle sum to 180 degrees is true whether or not there are any Euclidean triangles to be found in nature. Denying that proposition is a contradiction, just as it is contradictory to say that 8×7=57.
Here we see that he is talking about propositions that are true as a result of corresponding definitions and/or further descriptions of abstract conceptions of our own invention(relations of ideas). The demonstration of which comes by logical argument with definitions for premisses. A Euclidean triangle is what it is because we won't let it be anything else. The same holds good for 2+2=4. There is also the implicit assumption/premiss/presupposition that not all 'objects' of thought exist. We can only take this to mean that that which exists can be literally found and/or perhaps physically observed 'in nature', like trees and such. There is also yet another implicit premiss that draws a distinction between human thought/belief and nature such that thought/belief itself, along with being a result and/or product of human thought/belief excludes it(the 'object of thought/understanding) from being a part of nature - by pure definition alone. By this framework, thought/belief cannot be empirical or natural, save it's complex empirical manifestation via language(thought/belief in statement/propositional form).
Then there's the other kind of reasoning Hume delineates...
In sharp contrast, the truth of propositions concerning matters of fact depends on the way the world is. Their contraries are always possible, their denials never imply contradictions, and they can't be established by demonstration. Asserting that Miami is north of Boston is false, but not contradictory. We can understand what someone who asserts this is saying, even if we are puzzled about how he could have the facts so wrong.
Now seems an apt time to further expose the aforementioned fatal flaw...
The introductory phrase directly above is misleading. The only sharp contrast here is between two purportedly mutually exclusive categories of reasoning that are only found together in Humean thought. Humean thought corresponds to Humean invention. Humean invention does not correspond to fact.
In nature, as compared/contrasted to Hume's notion of nature, we invented cardinal directions. We invented math. We invented names for people, places, and things.
That is the way it is, because that is the way it happened.
There is no elemental, existential, and/or constitutional difference between the conception(s) of cardinal directions, the names of cities, and Euclidean triangles. Cardinal directions cannot be found in nature any more than a Euclidean triangle. Miami is certainly not something that exists independently of thought/belief(relations of ideas). To quite the contrary, "Miami" is the name we've given to an area. "Miami" picks out that area. That area may exist in nature independently of all human thought/belief, but "Miami" does not, and thinking about that area in terms of it's being Miami is existentially dependent upon our naming it such. What's north of Miami is determined solely by relations between our ideas of cardinal directions and names of cities. That is no less a relation of ideas than what we say/learn and/or conclude about Euclidean triangles.
There is no difference in elemental constitution between reasoning amounting to relations of ideas and reasoning amounting to matters of fact(Hume's notions) for - as just argued above - the latter consists of the former.
That doesn't even touch on the non-existent distinction between passions and reason. If I recall correctly, Mww and I thoroughly discussed that earlier in this thread, even if for clearly different purposes/reasons/motivations.
Reply to creativesoul I don't have a lot of time at the moment, so I will just comment briefly. I generally agree with most of what you say here.
The point you make about what's north of Miami is similar to points I have made in the past about facts like Paris being the capital of France. We define the boundaries of Miami and what's north of that (that is closer to the North Pole) is, in the less precise sense determined by the actual geography of the Earth, and in the most precise sense by where we draw the boundary of Miami. There is always a 'tautologous' or analytic element in such facts.
And the same goes for 2+2=4, in the opposite direction so to speak. It is often considered to be entirely analytic. But it is only because whenever we select two sets of two items and consider them altogether there are always four items. This is the general invariance of number, and it relies on the stability of objects in our world. If objects were not stable we could select two sets of two items and we might sometimes find that we had five, six, a hundred or any number of items. That would not be logically impossible, but counting and mathematics, and indeed probably life itself would be impossible in such a chaotically morphogenic world.
I've re-read Hume's Enquiry, and in doing so came across several issues that all seem to be consequences of not drawing the distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief. I'm not sure when I'll have time to expose these issues, but it needs to be done.
His notion of belief shows this nicely, I think. The interesting thing to me is the similarity between some of his justifications and my own.
Is your book going to be full of distinctions that no one is unclear about, and which don't need to be made? You do this often.
Indeed, and for good reason. It's called groundwork. It's something that people actually doing philosophy find necessary. The interesting part comes when one holds them all in consideration at the same time while looking at the consequences.
Some people sit in the safest seats around the arena criticizing actual participants in battle. There's no vulnerability there. Nothing to defend, because no firm stance is taken on anything.
Comments (2226)
Yes, given the implicit bracketed part you choose to deliberately ignore.
Quoting creativesoul
Don't raise your eyebrow when you're the one begging the question by deliberately leaving out the essential bracketed part and assuming your own interpretation which the moral relativist doesn't accept.
This presupposes you know how they want you to treat them. Be ok after you get to know them, but beforehand, you could be all kinds of embarrassed.
Do you think Eisenstein’s rendition is right?
Agreed...no formulation can cover all the bases. That’s exactly why the C.I. is only the form a command would have, if it was possible in reality. Hypothetic imperatives cover the others; one can make those up as he goes along, depending on the circumstance.
More art than science....hell yeah. More fun too. Unless you’re a hard scientist.
I don't use that term at all because it isn't as accurate as the terms I use, and it adds fuel to the fire of misunderstanding. It has connotations of triviality and arbitrariness, and this is exploited. It plays into the hands of some of those against it. It is not a simple matter of liking or preferring. It is ultimately a matter of individual moral judgement. That we can speak of groups of individuals, instead of any individual in that group directly, doesn't change that. And moral judgement itself is founded in the moral emotions, like sympathy, guilt, approval, disapproval, outrage, righteousness, and so on.
No, it is not inherent in a threat that it is something you sincerely state and sincerely intend to act upon. That condition is inherent in a promise, though, because a statement of intention that does embody sincerity it is not a promise, but a false promise.
Quoting creativesoul
A threat may be thought to be a "promise to cause bodily harm" according to a certain definition of 'promise' or even according to the ostensible 'bare bones' conventional definition of the word; but the point at issue as I see it is whether such a definition is really apt. I say it isn't because promises, as they are most commonly and appropriately understood, are made in the context of mutual trust and concern. If you promise to harm me, then not only do I not care if you keep your promise, I positively wish you not to keep it!
I think any sensible definition of 'promise' necessarily includes the idea that the person to whom the promise is made wishes, or at least acknowledges, that it should be honoured. Why try to incorporate threats with promises, rather than adhering to the very clear moral distinction between them? What would be gained by a blurring of these distinctions?
So this "All promises understood and believed by the listener create and build the listener's expectation that the world will be made to match the words. That holds good from promising to plant a rose garden to promising to cause harm. " I see as completely wrongheaded because the sincerity involved in trusting that someone will keep a promise to do something for you that you desire is completely lacking in the case of a threat. The threatened person may or may not believe that the threatener will carry out the threat, but they do not want to enter into any kind of pact of mutual trust with them. The only circumstance in which a threat could be a promise in the sense I mean is if two people entered into a freely chosen, that is uncoerced, pact of mutual trust from the very beginning. Promises are primarily understood, I maintain, as pacts of mutual trust.
Is moral judgement founded in those 'moral emotions' or are those emotions occasioned by moral judgements? You haven't said yet what "more" than personal preference moral judgements are according to your understanding. I could also ask what more than personal preference, according to you, are the 'moral emotions" you cited here.
True, but I don't see that formulation so much in relation to particular instances " He wants me to make him feel the lick of leather" or "she wants me to go to bed with her", as in relation to generalized human wishes like "People generally do not want to be deceived, robbed, raped, murdered, tortured, exploited, humiliated, beaten, and so on".
So, I remain unconvinced that there can be a truly universal command or that the C.I. in particular is the "only form a command could have" because there are insurmountable problems with it as I pointed out much earlier in this thread in relation to lying to protect the innocent.
This has become a very long thread, which would seem to indicate just how important ethics are to people (at least those who are not participating merely to "win" the argument, anyway; and thankfully there are not many of those!).
It could be the only possible form and have insurmountable problems. It is rather insurmountable to act in accordance with a universal law, when there’s no such thing. It’s merely a guide, how to be the most morally worthy, even though nobody ever really is.
About this no argument from me!
A kind person has no moral disposition? And a morally inclined person is unkind?
How would that work?
Also, why is your friend posting in your name?
Some opinion can be true/false though. That's the way it is. If moral opinion can be true/false then it is most certainly relevant.
Quoting Terrapin Station
So...
All opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette are moral opinions(of the kind we call "moral").
Can moral opinions be true/false?
Ah. For whatever reason, I interpreted the opposite... perhaps it is because what follows below seems to contradict what's directly above...
Quoting Mww
If the discovery of false representation of the predicate under which the promissory proposition was made relieves one of the moral obligation to make the world match one's words, then that is an example of an extenuating circumstance.
It is most certainly the case that promise making always includes a voluntarily entered into obligation to make the world match one's words. There are any number of different unforeseen scenarios, situations, and or otherwise possible circumstances that may arise and warrant careful reconsideration of whether or not it is best to keep a promise previously made.
I understand the foundational need for being able to take another on and/or at their word. The keeping of promises builds confidence in such. All promises are overt expressions of what one intends to do. Promises to cause injury notwithstanding.
The 'quality' of changes that are specifically promised varies tremendously but does not bear upon the fact that one can sincerely promise to cause harm...
Not all promise making is good.
Insincerity is not equivalent to falsehood.
In the last statement... I think you meant to write "That condition is inherent in a promise, though, because a statement of intention that does not embody sincerity it is not a promise, but a false promise."
When one speaks sincerely about the way things are, they believe things are that way. When one promises, they believe that they will keep it. If they do not believe that they will do what they say, then sincerity is lacking. On my view a promise is not the sort of utterance that can be true/false.
A speaker who does not intend to make the world match their words is dishonest, insincere, and/or lying. The promise is a deliberate misrepresentation of the speaker's own thought/belief about what has not happened(the changes promised).
Quoting Janus
People in this world actually promise to cause injury and then deliver on that promise. This happens everyday across the globe regardless of individual particulars. Denying that they are making a promise is the result of the speaker not having the same notion of what counts as promise making as you do.
Ask them if they are making a promise. They'll say yes, assuming they've no reason to lie about it. The distinguishing aspect of promise making as compared to merely saying what one intends to do, is that the promise is a sort of unwritten spoken additional guarantee. This holds good regardless of what changes are promised to be made.
Quoting Janus
This presupposes that the meaning inherent to promise making is somehow existentially dependent upon the listener's wants/wishes/desires. No one wants to be threatened with bodily injury. It is promised nonetheless.
Not all promises are good.
What moral distinctions are being blurred?
Quoting Janus
Promises to cause harm are made and kept everyday.
Not all promises are good.
Quoting Janus
Mutual trust is imperative. Mutual understanding is as well. One can trust that another means what they say even if and when it involves a promise to cause injury. Not all promises are made with good intention.
Promises are not true or false in an empirical propositional sense of course. but what may appear to be a promise that is insincerely made is not a true promise, or in other words it is not truly a promise.
The rest of what you say consists in disagreeing with me about what should be termed 'promise'. My position is that a promise should benefit the one to whom it is made, and consists in entering into a mutual pact of trust that the benefit will be afforded by the promiser. Threats, which usually take no account of the moral entitlements of the one threatened, are not like that, so why bother insisting that they should be termed 'promises' rather than merely 'threats'? Both promises and threats are better thought of as subsets of assurances; they are different kinds of assurances. A threat may be insincere and still be a threat; whereas what might appear as a promise cannot be insincere and still be a promise.
For example if I threaten to beat the shit out of you if you don't give me a hundred dollars without having any intention of actually beating the shit out of you, it is still a threat which is designed to intimidate you into giving me the money. In fact if you give me the money I would not have beaten the shit out of you regardless of whether I really intended to or not; which means my intentions are irrelevant to the efficacy of the threat.
On the other hand if I promise to give you my old guitar if you give me a hundred dollars, then it will be apparent whether it was a true promise or not when you discover after giving me the hundred dollars that I do or do not give you the guitar. So my intentions are not irrelevant to promises as they to threats.There is a different logic in threats and promises: can you see the difference now?
Of course it's true that if you don't give me the hundred dollars and I beat the shit out of you, then you will know that the threat was sincere; and it is in this sense that it could said that threats are kind of negative promises; it is only if you don't do what I want that you will discover whether the threat was sincerely intended. In the case of the promise you discover its sincerity only if you do what we agreed upon; if I will honour the pact or not. In the case of threats it is only if you already "dishonour the pact" (I put that in scare quotes to indicate that there really is no honour or pact in the case of threats) that you discover whether I will "honour" it. There is always honour and virtue involved in promising; whereas there is no honour or virtue in threatening.
As an aside; if lying is always wrong as Kant asserts, then if I have threatened to beat the shit out of you if you don't give me a hundred dollars, I am morally obligated to beat the shit out of you. This just cannot work with the C.I.
Of course I will agree that the way you want to frame the terminology is in broad accordance with some ordinary usage, but I am trying to get at something deeper; a moral dimension in promises that threats do not partake of. If you still want to insist on your terminology, that's fine, you are entitled to use whatever terminology you like, but I remain convinced that mine is more useful because it incorporates a valuable distinction between acts (promises) which involve virtue and honour and acts (threats) which do not.
To put the distinction another way, threats, regardless of whether they are sincere or not ,can never be considered to be morally good, whereas promises may be considered to be morally good if they are sincere; that is, if they actually are promises. In any case, if you remain unconvinced I'm quite content to agree to disagree on this, I have no intention of arguing further about it, that's for sure.
I have serious very well grounded objections to the notion of freely determinant will(free will). I'll leave those aside and address what I see to be unacceptable consequences following from the above account...
One who has not yet begun to doubt and/or otherwise think about their original worldview cannot have consciousness of their own respect for law, and/or the will that determines it. If obligation is acknowledgement of the consciousness of respect for law and the will that determines it, then one who has not thought about their own worldview could not possibly have any of these a priori necessary elements.
So, according to this terminological framework(conceptual scheme) one who has yet to have begun to question his/her own worldview does not - dare I say cannot - have moral duty and/or obligation.
I do not think it serves us well to simply chalk this difference up to what we (arbitrarily?)think counts as being a promise. I'm simply pointing out that that is not up to our definitions if what we're describing already exists in it's entirety prior to our account of it. What a promise means is determined by the correlations drawn between the speech act and imagined future events stoked by the making of that promise. What counts as a promise is not determined by us. Our definitions can be wrong and/or inadequate for taking proper account of what actually happens.
I think I understand your concerns about the logically possible consequences of what I'm presenting here. I want to try to ease those, for I do not find that such problems are inevitable.
By my lights we agree upon much more than we disagree.
"Insincerity" does not equate to "false".
Agree?
One can say "Joe killed Jane" and believe otherwise, even if Joe killed Jane. "Joe killed Jane" is both insincere and true.
I would not assent to such an account. We agree here.
The listener believed you... clearly. You were paid off as a means to avoid danger. That is a large part of the efficacy aspect. The promissory intent is openly guaranteed. It has been emphasized.
The efficacy of the threat includes the listener's belief about that threat. Your intentions(to enrich yourself by means of physical intimidation/threat to injure) effected/affected the listener. Surely we all know this to be true.
Quoting Janus
Sincerity does not equate to truth. Sincere statements can be false. Promises are not the sort of things that can be true/false.
Your intentions are not irrelevant to how well threats work. All it takes to work is the listener believe that the world will be made to match the words. You intend to make them believe that. That is entirely relevant to how well the threat works.
You're conflating sincerity with truth and insincerity with falsehood.
Not all promises are good. Not all threats are bad.
Doesn't that wrap it up in the simplest, but more than adequate, terms?
Why the scare quotes? Those emotions clearly fit the moral category, unlike others. Each has an explanation relating to moral judgement, such as that you feel guilty when you judge you've done something wrong, and that you have feelings of disapproval when you judge someone else has done something wrong. You don't get that with shyness or embarrassment, for example.
And moral judgement is founded in moral emotions because they are essential and they make moral judgement what it is. Under current technology, a robot couldn't make moral judgements, because we don't have technology advanced enough to replicate emotions. If we built it such that it would respond in a certain way, such as to say, "No, murder is wrong", when asked to murder someone, then the robot wouldn't be making any moral judgements, in spite of appearances.
Quoting Janus
Are you deliberately not taking into account my response, or are you making this error accidentally? I'm not going to answer your loaded question in the way that you want me to. They're not "more than" personal preference because it's inappropriate to call them that to begin with.
The personal part is inappropriate, because one definition of that is, "belonging to or affecting a particular person rather than anyone else", and the preference part is inappropriate because one definition of that is, "a greater liking for one alternative over another or others",
([I]"her preference for white wine"[/I]). Those are the first definitions that came up on a Google search. We don't tend to say, "My personal preference is not to murder children, because I like children when they're going about their lives, not petrified that I'm attempting to murder them or lying on the ground in a lifeless bloody heap". That's not the best way to word it, as "personal preference" and "like" don't quite do it justice. It sounds like an understatement, too trivial and inappropriate.
What you mean is, one not cognizant of these a priori conceptions probably isn’t a deontological moral agent. There is nothing herein to say he may not be some other kind of moral agent.
The ongoing is a perfect example why moral philosophy and psychology and anthropology are and should be separate disciplines.
You do see, don’t you, that in making that threat you’ve already violated two of the three forms of the C.I., which makes you morally unworthy. You’re acting as if it was universally lawful to coerce a pay-off, cause pain or both, and, you’re using a fellow human as means to your own ends. If you make the threat but don’t follow up on it because you chickened out, which implicates you in a false truth, you’ve still acted as if causing fear of injury in a fellow human is universally lawful. Not to mention, the guy you threatened fears his possible injury will prevent him from doing his job and thereby supporting his family, so he might lose his house, his ol’ lady dumps him for not providing her standard of living, kids don’t text him anymore but still want their birthday money......so he beats the snot outta you first.
Fine community member you’d make. (Grin)
Nowhere is it said human nature is subsumed necessarily under moral agency, such that a moral agent is prohibited from operating under the rationale of a momentary greater good. While he is freely autonomous in his determinations towards his morality, he is nonetheless just as freely autonomous in substituting a lesser version of it.
———————-
Quoting creativesoul
This is just an instance of moral relativism. Promising itself follows a procedure grounded in a law of willful choosing, which is always morally good. Just because promising is always morally good, it does not follow that which is promised must also be good, as measured by the relativism of the law chosen to ground it. This is what allows us to say, well, he did what he had to do, which would be true no matter what he actually did.
The second sense of "opinion" refers to a person's view on a factual matter, where there's often an emphasis on the views of persons with some expertise in the area in question, and on matters that are still up in the air if not outright controversial epistemically. So, for example, we might query a cosmologist's opinion on dark matter--query exactly what the cosmologist believes dark matter to be. This is not querying how the cosmologist feels about dark matter, whether they like or dislike it, etc., which is unlike the other sense of "opinion." And unlike "Beethoven is the greatest composer," something like "Dark matter is simply an issue of having an incorrect model of physics, so that our gravitational formula are wrong at least in particular circumstances" can be true or false without needing to add "In my opinion" to it.
There are different senses of the word "opinion." Only one sense can be true or false when stated without an "In my opinion" (or equivalent) clause. You should have at least learned this in school as a little kid--by second or third grade, say.
Quoting creativesoul
No.
Indeed. This goes back to my earlier remarks that this is not by any means a discussion of equals. I know that that might sound arrogant, but it's true.
Can you pay closer attention, please? That's not asking for much, and it is a fair request. It is tiring correcting you all the time repeatedly. Try harder.
Me neither. But further to that point, the imperative to act [i]as though[/I] such-and-such is a universal law can be ineffectual and redundant. I go direct to my conscience, so for me, Kant's categorical imperative is a useless waste of space.
That sums up your "argument", I think. You could have saved yourself a lot of time and effort if you had simply said that from the beginning and left it at that.
I asked what counts as being "moral" in kind. Moral agents are a kind of agent. You answered by offering a criterion. The satisfaction of that criterion requires thinking about one's own thought/belief(original worldview).
I meant what I wrote.
I'm fairly certain that you're using more than one sense/definition of the term "moral" in the same argument.
Ok. The derogatory remarks are rather unbecoming. I'm wanting to confirm and/or ensure that I have your position correct.
So, on your view, all opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette are moral opinions in kind(the kind we call "moral"), and none of them are capable of being true/false.
Do I have this much right?
Yes, that's right.
Is there anything - on this view - that counts as immoral?
So you don't recall what I've said on "mere", even though it was one of the first things I said to you almost 70 pages ago, and I've repeated it innumerable times since, and elsewhere? You are oblivious to my comments on "personal preference", even though they're right under your nose? And, as usual, this is all my fault.
I see how it is.
I understand the importance of interdependence. I understand, as well, that academic philosophy has had ongoing issues - seemingly irresolvable - for centuries about many topics, morality notwithstanding. I understand that many of the brightest and well intended minds have studied and came to varying conclusions about it. I would think that if the problems were resolvable - given any of the methods of approach - then they would've been resolved. They're not.
If there is ever good reason to be particularly critical of the methods at work, it would be in such circumstances as these.
So, this gets to the problem in a hurry...
People promise to cause injury. Assuming such promises cannot be honourable and virtuous...
Either there is not always honour and virtue in promising or not all people who say "I promise..." are making promises.
So what do we do here?
Do we say that those kinds of promises aren't promises, simply because we want to be able to say that all promises are honourable and virtuous? Or do we realize that not all promises are honourable and virtuous, and adjust our thought/belief and/or worldview accordingly?
Looks like a true statement about a particular kind of speech act to me.
So, promising to kill another's family is always morally good.
I cannot agree with that.
As you wish.
Quoting creativesoul
Hardly anybody does.
What makes all these different things moral in kind?
What do they all have in common such that any and all things having that common denominator counts as being moral.
So morality is opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette.
S has an opinion that x is permissible. X is thus moral to S.
S has an opinion that x is not permissible. X is thus immoral to S.
Moving the goalposts.
?
(In other words, maybe you could explain the "moving the goalposts" comment?)
Quoting Terrapin Station
Quoting creativesoul
Quoting Terrapin Station
Morality is moral opinion?
I don't understand what you're asking. Morality is opinion-based. There's no reason to repeat the word "moral" (a la "Morality is moral opinion"). You can't be asking me if I think it's opinion-based. How many times do we each need to repeat me saying that the nature of morality is "opinion(s) about the relative permissibility . . . " before you'd know that I'm saying it's opinion-based?
Quoting Terrapin Station
If all opinions about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette count as being moral opinion, and S has an opinion that x is not permissible, then it is S's moral opinion that x is not permissible, and that statement "X is not permissible" cannot be true/false.
Is this right?
Yes, obviously. No moral stance is true or false.
If morality is strictly delineated and/or defined as being moral opinion, which it is on your view - then it makes no sense to say that morality is opinion-based. In order for something to be based in/upon something else, there must be a difference between the two. According to the position you're arguing for, there is not - cannot be.
You've used the exact same definition for what counts as being moral in kind and what morality is.
Morality is opinion about X. Opinion about X is moral in kind. Morality is moral opinion. That is what you've claimed. There is no difference. There must be in order for one to be based in the other.
I'm ok with the equivalence, so long as you at least acknowledge it here, and realize that something cannot be based upon only itself.
You don't believe that "No moral stance is true or false" is a moral stance, do you?
Yes. What does "in kind" refer to if not what something is/what its nature is?
So, being moral is being about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette, and being immoral is not?
If it is about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette, it is a statement reflecting a stance that is moral in kind - by your own definition.
Have we got to the stage where simply calling something an instance of moral relativism is supposed to be some kind of slur or criticism? Or was that said with indifference, in a matter of fact sort of way?
Either way, for once I agree with you both. It is indeed an instance of moral relativism, and it does indeed, at least to me, look like a true statement about a particular kind of speech act.
Quoting creativesoul
Wait, what? You're being sensible. Are you feeling alright?
Yes. It's called common sense.
Quoting creativesoul
Earlier I responded to your first statement above by saying that promises are not true or false in a propositional sense, but that they may be true promises or false promises depending on whether the one promising sincerely intends to keep the promise. I said further that so-called false promises are not truly promises at all, they just appear to be promises.
Thinking about it further it occurred to me that promises can be understood to be true or false propositions in two ways:
First, if we think of promises as statements of intention, then promises will be true or false depending on whether they correspond or fail to correspond to the intention they state. If I promise to pay you for the work you carried out on my behalf, and I have no intention of paying you for the work, then the so-called promise, as a statement of intention to pay you, is false.
Second, if we think of promises as statements about what will be, then promises will be true or false depending on whether the states of affairs they claim will obtain do or do not obtain. If I promise to pay you for the work, and I do not pay you for the work, then the promise, understood as a statement about what will come to pass, is false.
The nature of morality is that it's opinions of the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette,
S has an opinion that x is permissible. X is thus moral to S.
S has an opinion that x is not permissible. X is thus immoral to S
Why in the world do we have to keep posting the same thing over and over?
Sure. So do you believe that "No moral stance is true or false" is that?
We're not. You are.
If what counts as being moral in kind is being about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette, and what counts as being immoral in kind is being about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette, then there's no difference between the two.
Nicely done. I'm going to reply... I promise! :wink:
You don't seem to be reading what I'm writing.
Did you read "The nature of morality is that it's opinions of the relative permissibility. . ." For example. When I answered what "moral in kind" is, I was saying what morality is.
Maybe you don't understand the phrase "relative permissibility"? Relative permissibility includes "permissible" and " impermissible" for example, right?
It's ridiculous that I'm having to explain any of this to you, by the way, because it would indicate a near-imbecilic level of reading comprehension, understanding and reasoning abilities.
This made me laugh out loud...
Still grinning.
Yeah, austere gum-flapping and Socratic dialogues each have their place, but....helps not to take this stuff too seriously.
Seriously, though, if this is that difficult for you, we need to concentrate on tackling stuff like the Cat in the Hat first.
Let's look again, shall we?
Quoting Terrapin Station
Quoting Terrapin Station
If all opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette are moral in kind then no opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette are immoral in kind.
Hence, I asked what counts as immoral on your view. The answer contradicted what you've already argued.
You're using the two terms "moral" and "immoral" both as opinions about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette. Hence, I said you were moving the goalposts.
There's also this...
Being moral relative to S is about S's judgment.
Being moral as a result of being about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette is not.
You're equivocating the term "moral".
Again, well done.
This second parsing is similar to what I'd been thinking all along... At the time of utterance, a promise is not the sort of thing that can be true/false. The first is interesting and seems apt as well. There need be some sort of commonality between the two ways if we are to say that promises can be true in two ways. Correspondence to the actual intention, and correspondence to states of affairs(what's happened). Seems the former could be rendered as a kind of the latter, but not the other way around.
On the bright side, at least he has stopped going on about thought/belief, existential dependence, and that which is prior to language.
I can now take the shotgun out of my mouth.
:rofl:
Dr. Seuss utterly failed to distinguish between green eggs and the reporting of green eggs. Green eggs are distinct to and/or from that which is prior to green eggs. Green eggs are existentially dependent on ham.
The Cat/Feline in and/or around the Hat.
Eggs/ham is distinct from eating about eggs/ham.
Would you two kindly stop talking about me?
What makes all these different things moral in kind?
What do they all have in common such that any and all things having that common denominator or set thereof also counts as being moral by virtue of having it? Is it just by virtue of having been called such?
Do you?
Something here is troublesome to me...
A promise can be sincere and true at the time of utterance(the expressed intent corresponds to the speaker's intent).
A promise can be sincere and true at the time of utterance(the expressed intent corresponds to the speaker's intent), but the promise never be kept.
This would be to say that such a promise could be both true and false, no?
Perhaps it is because promises are not a single proposition, but two? I think so. The one to make the world match the words, and the other is the overt guarantee(the statement of intent).
The thing you’re not agreeing with, and now asking me if I agree with, is derived from an improper understanding of what I said.
What I categorically, and hardly anybody else by my supposition, and you by admission, wouldn’t agree with, is your statement, rather than my comment.
Fair enough, I suppose.
I'm unclear still.
You did say "...promising is always morally good".
I wouldn't agree with that.
Is it the relationship between green eggs and ham?
No. I said promising itself follows a procedure grounded in a law of willful choosing, which is always morally good.
The procedure is morally good, from a deontological point of view.
The second sentence above states "just because promising is always morally good"...
Are you saying that promising to cause injury aren't promises, or do not follow a procedure grounded in a law of willful choosing?
Seems that you must admit/claim that all promises are morally good even when what's being promised is not. That seems to follow from what you've been arguing...
Yes?
How is stating that "Not all promises are good" an example of moral relativism?
I wasn’t asked that, so no, that wasn’t what I was saying.
An insincere promise is a deceit, so I would say it isn’t following the lawful procedure.
The last bit is not about what is morally good. It is about what is considered such from a deontological framework.
I was asking clearly, what makes something moral in kind. I took the answer to be about that. Now you're saying that that answer is from a particular point of view.
And a promise to injure?
I said Quoting creativesoul is an instance of moral relativism. I should have said subjective moral relativism, because the good of a promise is always internal.
Your “not all promises are good” is a judgement made on a morality not belonging to it, and is merely a continuation of an objection to a promise-making procedure, and is moral relativism proper.
I don’t hold with the concept of “moral in kind”. One is moral or he is not, and either only with respect to himself.
Who’s the Philebus here, and who’s the Socrates?
Given my view on truth and meaning, that's an interesting assertion. Judgment? Sure.
On my view, we can be mistaken. What we thought was good ends up being not. You? How does being mistaken fit into this deontological schema?
He still had to split-think.
Being right, or its complement, mistaken, is a rational judgement; being good, or its complement, not good, is a moral judgement. The former is legislated by reason with empirical predicates, the concepts of which are from experience; the latter is legislated by reason with pure practical predicates, the concepts of which are from understanding, better known to Everydayman as conscience.
Being mistaken doesn’t fit into the deontological schema. It is common to think that which is predicated on law is thereby susceptible to having those laws “broken”, hence arises the idea of mistake. While that is all true, such is not the true implication of law in moral philosophy, it being more the natural inclination of rational agents to respect the intrinsic properties of any law. Because humans generally respect law, it follows that if moral laws were shown to be possible, it is reasonable to suppose humans would respect them as well. Hence the ground of deontological moral philosophy.
Re "you're not reading what I'm writing, what happened to reading this:
"Did you read 'The nature of morality is that it's opinions of the relative permissibility. . . ' For example. When I answered what 'moral in kind' is, I was saying what morality is."
You misunderstood my response to "moral in kind" as only being about moral permissibility per se, because it turned out that that's what you had in mind. It's curious that you read my response that way, though, because among other things, it implies that you didn't understand the phrase "relative permissibility." Relative permissibility includes "x is morally permissible* as well as "x is morally impermissible" (as it would include other points on the permissibility continuum, too). "Moral in kind" I read as "the nature of what we call morality," not just limited to moral permissibility contra moral impermissibility, etc. ("etc." for the similar metrics, which I also wasn't attempting to produce an exhaustive list of; it was just a quick list of examples of the relevant sorts of metrics).
I've identified and corrected this misunderstanding at least a handful of times now, but you don't seem to be reading, or at least you don't seem to be comprehending any of this. Maybe you are, maybe you don't really have so much difficulty with reading comprehension, and you're just having some "fun" instead, but I don't know about that. If the idea is to make this place seem that over the top learning-disabled it might be working.
Just a thought...carry on...
Good thought, and would be justified, if it could be shown that integrity is itself irreducible. It’s the difference between what a man has as opposed to what a man is, and whether what a man has is sufficient to fully describe his moral disposition.
Me....carrying on.
I read it. That would be the third different thing with the exact same definition/criterion. Morality. Moral. Immoral.
Three very different things.
That is to conflate being mistaken with being called "mistaken" and/or awareness/knowledge thereof. The difference pervades this thread in the form of empty charges of such. The irony, of course, lies therein.
Earlier I almost quoted Bob Dylan regarding conscience... it is most certainly not always a reliable guide to good behaviour.
Gotta go with what ya got, doncha know.
Why almost?
————————-
Quoting creativesoul
As...the promising and the making of a promise? May I say I think I handled that well enough.
:lol:
Do you understand that I was answering "What is the nature of morality" rather than only "What is morally permissible (contra impermissible)"?
Very good point. Entirely agree. Gotta start somewhere.
The problem of course is that the only one satisfying one's own conscience is the one who has it. Rationalization comes easy to some... regardless of the behaviour they are self-justifying.
Not what I was getting at.
Judging something as being right is not equivalent to being right. Judging something as being mistaken is not equivalent to being mistaken. Here, I'm not using the term "right" as a synonym for morally acceptable. Rather, it is better put as "true", for it is in comparison to being mistaken, which amounts to forming, having, and/or holding false belief.
Here again... is a consequence of neglecting to draw the actual distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief. Judgment is existentially dependent upon the latter. Being mistaken is not. Neglecting to draw and maintain the distinction can lead to conflating what it takes to think/believe(and thus render judgment) that X is mistaken and what it takes for X to be mistaken. Two remarkably different criterion.
It is humanly impossible to make a mistake on purpose. All by ourselves, we are incapable of recognizing our own mistakes. Strictly speaking... that always takes an other. If it is indeed the case that Kant's framework(deontological ethics) cannot take proper account of being mistaken, then there is a very big problem. Perhaps it stems from Noumena?
What I understand - all too well - is that you have voluntarily offered the exact same definition for three different things. In addition, you've been using the term "moral" in both a descriptive sense(as a kind) and in a prescriptive sense(as a sign of approval). That is a prima facie example of equivocation. The result is self-contradiction and/or incoherence.
That is completely unacceptable.
Promise making is - by any and all accounts - relevant to moral discourse.
71 pages... small hops if you ask me.
What makes all these different things moral in kind?
What do they all have in common such that any and all things having that common denominator or set thereof also counts as being moral by virtue of having it? Is it just by virtue of having been called such?
Moral judgment, consideration, discourse, conceptions, worthiness, admonition, admiration, thought/belief, understanding, arguments, positions...
...always involve acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour.
It is a kind of thought/belief, and like all other kinds... it is determined solely by the content of the correlations being drawn. In this case, being moral in kind, always involves acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour.
Moral belief is prior to language. That which is prior to language cannot be existentially dependent upon it. Moral belief is not existentially dependent upon language. Morality is existentially dependent upon both; pre-linguistic moral thought/belief and language.
Right, so I'd have to figure out why you're incapable of understanding that I was answering, "What is the nature of morality," even though I keep making this explicit to you. But diagnosing why you can't read, comprehend and learn something so simple is too much of a task for me to bother with given the resources at hand (where all I have to work with is posts you choose to make), especially without more motivation for it (because I don't really care enough to try to figure out just what the problem is; I mostly just find it amusing that you present yourself as you do despite such fundamental and obvious reading and learning deficiencies . . . although it's kind of sad that it's symptomatic of the board overall, with maybe a handful of exceptions).
I asked you a couple times just what codification you're talking about, but you've yet to answer.
Yes, quite, and the ground of the intrinsic circularity of pure reason. And why the idea of law is incorporated into the moral condition, insofar as respect for law becomes the regulatory agency for such rationalization. Not to dispose of unwarranted rationalization, but to recognize it and attempt to circumvent it, by which a moral worthiness is established.
This is catastrophically wrong. To make a mistake purposefully is an instance of immorality, of disrespect for a moral law in the form of negligence of duty proper. Knowing the good thing to do and reasoning oneself to not doing it, is a purposeful mistake, readily apparent to any moral agent with what is conveniently and conventionally regarded as “a guilty conscience”, which is a knowledge and no ways a mere feeling.
In a rational system, judgement is nothing more than the faculty of uniting the concepts of understanding to the intuitions of sense, from which an external object is cognized without contradiction, and is called experience.
In a moral system, which is rational but with different means and ends, employment of the faculty of judgement responsible for uniting a freely determined law with a willful volition, from which an act is cognized as good, and is called morality.
Need be no more complicated than that.
Show me how my common language use facilitates me coming to terms with my codified moral rules.
“...But to explain how pure reason can be of itself practical without the aid of any spring of action that could be derived from any other source, i.e., how the mere principle of the universal validity of all its maxims as laws (which would certainly be the form of a pure practical reason) can of itself supply a spring, without any object of the will in which one could antecedently take any interest; and how it can produce an interest which would be called purely moral; or in other words, how pure reason can be practical-to explain this is beyond the power of human reason, and all the labour and pains of seeking an explanation of it are lost....”
Freedom. The idea of freedom as primitive causality.
Weaknesses: None noted.
That's the opinion of those reviewing the standardized intelligence testing that I've personal 'taken'...
Well...
I've come full circle to just about exactly where Terrapin is... aside from concluding that moral belief is prior to language.
Certainly law is necessary. Legitimized moral belief. How do we compare/contrast as a means to determine which is best?
Do I really need to? Can't you see that for yourself?
As if you've displayed nothing here. :confused:
You think, with a handful of exceptions, that this board is full of people with reading and learning deficiencies?
I doubt he does, but it certainly does seem to have more than its fair share of people who can't tell the difference between rhetoric and factual claims.
Oh great. Well if its that simple... Just the small matter of translating any of that into language that actually means anything and we're done.
So let's make a start.
"The faculty of uniting the concepts of understanding to the intuitions of sense". Care to explain what that actually means? Faculty (a capability or power of the mind), concepts of understanding (totally lost as to what they might be), intuitions of sense (I know what intuitions are, I know what senses are, but not sure why you've specified intuitions related to these), cognized without contradiction (lost again).
Have you tried writing in English, it really is a perfectly adequate language.
Lol, I see what you did there.
The reason why im asking HIM to clarify, is because its not obvious it IS rhetoric considering the exchanges Ive seen between the more prolific posters.
In other words, I cannot tell if he was joking or not because it might actually be a case someone could make.
I'm so glad you're around. You restore my sanity.
Fair point. Some of them are a bit borderline hebephrenic.
I think it unlikely either of us are fully sane. We do afterall continue to post as if our words might actually be taken account of, despite the evidence to the contrary. You know what they say about the definition of insanity...
Had to look that one up lol
“hebephrenic“. Good to know.
Why did you include me in that? Did I say something about it and forget?
Anyway, there is a simple point in amongst the run on string of thinly veiled attempts to sound intelligent, but its not very interesting. You are easily impressed.
"These new clothes look wonderful!" exclaimed the emperor.
And then a child called out from the crowd, "But he's wearing nothing at all!".
And Tim Wood asked of the child, "Can it be, child, that you really do not appreciate the splendid wonder of the emperor's new clothes?".
:wink:
Which what? Law? Little bit experience, little bit heredity, little bit personality, whatever the moral agent thinks best for him. Subjective moral relativism; the moral consequences can be taught, the moral choices available to make can be taught. The actual choices made cannot be taught, for they are made in the moment.
No. Yes. (Ok...only partly)
Humor me, for comparative purposes. Besides, you’ve asked me to expound, and I did. Now I’m calling fair play.
Nahhhh, let’s not. I don’t know how to write in English.
Well, you know what they say........mockery is the fool’s critique.
I missed this response of yours. I remember reading something by Bertrand Russell where he claimed that statements about what will happen in the future are true or false now depending on what happens in the future; it's just that we obviously can't tell which.
So, for example, according to this line of thought the statement "The Sun will go supernova in 2 billion years" is true or false now. That seems odd to me, and I'm not sure what to think about it. For example, would that statement being true or false now presuppose rigid determinism?
I agree with this answer. A promise could be both true and false in different senses. But we are still left with the issue about whether a promise, understood as a statement about what will come to pass, could be true or false now depending on whether or not it will come to pass, or whether it is only true or false when its coming to pass or not is decided. I think I favor the latter.
Which moral belief. I say we begin with the universally formed and/or re-formed ones... You know, the ones we all have? Point of view invariant.
Quoting Mww
Quoting Mww
Well. There's much that I've set aside. One who understands Kant ought not have issue understanding what I'm arguing here. I mean, even the Everydayman understands that coming to terms with anything and/or everything that one can come to terms with involves common language use.
Well, I respect Russell tremendously. If what you say is true then he and I have different positions regarding what sorts of things can be true and what makes them so. I'm fairly settled on the idea of correspondence to fact where facts are actual events; that which has happened; what has happened. There can be no such correspondence between a statement and that which has not happened. Prediction are about exactly that. They're complex 'forms' of expectation. All expectation is grounded upon thought/belief about what has happened, but expectation is always about what has not.
Good question. Off the cuff, because that is a new line of thought for me, it seems it could be a consequence thereof. Not sure though.
I think predictions are about what has not happened. Being true requires corresponding to that which has. At least, that rendering seems to be working fairly well for me.
I grant the case you've made for it. I'm glad I followed it to your liking. I would not assent what you're saying here though, for reasons already given.
If this marks the end of this discussion, it also marks an appropriate time for giving thanks...
Cheers!
Yes, it seems so. And I reject that, being influenced in my thinking on such matters by Hume. And Russell himself made a point in agreement with Hume:
The turkey found that, on his first morning at the turkey farm, he was fed at 9 a.m. Being a good inductivist turkey he did not jump to conclusions. He waited until he collected a large number of observations that he was fed at 9 a.m. and made these observations under a wide range of circumstances, on Wednesdays, on Thursdays, on cold days, on warm days. Each day he added another observation statement to his list. Finally he was satisfied that he had collected a number of observation statements to inductively infer that “I am always fed at 9 a.m.”.
However on the morning of Christmas eve he was not fed but instead had his throat cut.
Well, you know what they say... A proverb is a crappy argument. (I don't think that one's going to catch on).
:lol:
Where did I say I didn't understand it? I mocked it for being vacuous, implied that there was no substance there to understand in the first place and called @Mww out on that. The issue of my actually being able to understand the words never arose.
Great idea. Let's have the list then, of all these universal, completely invariant objective morals with which no one but the mentally damaged disagree.
I'll start you off.
1. Murder... But what about wars... OK murder of innocents... But who qualifies as innocent... Murder of children then... Infanticide... Oh, how about murder of innocent children who are healthy... Damn, back to 'innocent' again... Right, this time I've got it, we're all universally opposed to the murder of healthy children... Slaves, indigenous genocides in the colonial era, 'shame' killings in Islam...
Perhaps we need to start smaller.
Everyone like puppies right....? (shit, don't they eat puppies in Indonesia?)
Nah. You cannot start off explaining what I'm referring to by virtue of saying something remarkably different and then talking about that.
Not interested.
What... You mean I misinterpreted something you said? And you the master of erudite volubility. I feel such a fool!
No, no, no. You give him too much credit. He didn't even make that qualification. You know, it's the ones [I]we all[/I] have. There's not a single person out of around 7.5 billion people who doesn't have them, apparently.
Ah yes, perhaps that is the "remarkably different" aspect I so carelessly introduced. If so, I look forward to hearing what Harold Shipman and I share with regards to our moral outlook. I think we both quite like crosswords... Maybe that's what he means.
Yeah, that seems to be all the rage these days, from Pinker, Fodor, Crane, even Dennett, fercryinoutloud....with this LOT theory. Language is far and away one of the more spectacular aspects of the human condition, and is certainly indispensable for general communication. But I don’t communicate with myself, and even granting something like modern versions of cognitive architecture, the theories leave much to be desired, and when push comes to shove, I find them no more satisfactory than good ol’ Enlightenment epistemological speculation. No one knows for sure how this stuff happens, but it does happen, so we are free to speculate as much as we want, within the confines of logical possibility.
If coming to terms with everything necessarily involves common language use, how did we come to terms with common language;
Nine times out of ten, there just isn’t time for common language use;
As a young human with limited experience, being informed of “2” does use common language, but he hasn’t come to terms with anything. He will use “2” by rote in expressions or operations that include it, but without any concept of quantity;
Specific task-oriented cognition uses imaging, not common language;
If I do use common language when I think to myself, maybe it is only because such would be absolutely necessary iff I were to then tell you about it. Maybe it’s merely a sub-conscious anticipation that I use common language in thinking *BECAUSE* it may be henceforth so communicated. Maybe, because I need language for you to understand me, I need language to understand myself;
What is happening in a deaf person’s head, who has no access to common language *use*. He is still a rational human, so it is logical to suppose he thinks as a rational human, which implies common language use is not necessary for *his* coming to terms with anything;
Given the human brain has innate capability for logical inference....somehow.....naturally.....and is equally representational....ditto....it stands to reason that common language use is merely what we say we’re doing when the underlying mechanics is at work. We’re not conscious of our basic cognitive faculties, so we insert what we know into the logical form of our mechanisms. But that doesn’t explain the how of knowing, which leaves room for speculative epistemological theory.
So, yes, coming to terms involves common language use, but that coming to terms doesn’t describe what exists a priori that needs coming to terms with.
OK. Good place to start. To stipulate point of view invariant relegates experience to irrelevance because of the concept of invariant cancels it, but allows room for pure reason because of a point of view requires it. To stipulate the principle of universality implies that which every otherwise rational agency has naturally incorporated in his mental being. If we allow these the name of innate ideas or notions, we are naming something common to all humanity.
It is logically impossible to name anything whatsoever from a particular, re: my innate idea of a moral belief, to a universal, re: my innate idea of a moral belief residing in every similar agency, and have sufficient means to prove such must be the case. I can think there are some that should reside, that ought to reside, but I cannot have the knowledge that they do reside. If it is impossible to know a thing, and any supposition about it is the sole remainder, then it follows necessarily that any qualification as to its relative good is merely another supposition.
No supposition in and of itself can be proven to be the case. If all that exists with respect to point of view invariant universal moral beliefs is innate ideas, and the exposition of innate ideas are given from pure reason because experience is irrelevant here, and pure reason is itself a point of view with great variance amongst moral agencies, then we have contradicted the major premise.
There may be point of view invariant innate ideas of a universal moral beliefs, but we won’t ever indubitable conclude what they are. Even the relative worth of them is not point of view invariant, and I don’t see how we can say any of them should be without infringing on the the right of pure reason to testify for its respective owners.
I think it safe to say universally we are each moral agents, but the kind of moral agent we each are, is strictly a function of our own point of view. Still, we can without contradiction think a moral belief better or worse than some other moral belief, but only to ourselves, simply from the ones we each hold, but that serves no other universality than the “as if” of deontological doctrine.
Nevertheless, I’d be interested in what you think a possible universal moral belief would be, and how its relative benefit can be manifest.
That was hilarious, well done!
Thanks.
I think you could be the next Sokal, we're about due another.
You think? Oh. I’m happy for you.
Thought/belief about unacceptable/acceptable behavior that grounds all morality.
What are you talking about?
Are you denying knowledge of pre and/or non-linguistic thought/belief? Are you denying the actual distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief?
By thinking about our thought/belief and the utterances/expressions thereof. We named it. There is no reason whatsoever to think that our language is not capable of taking proper account of that which existed in it's entirety prior to our awareness and/or account of it.
What are you doing here... now? Do you believe the things you write?
There is no such thing as an innate idea of a moral belief. There are ideas of moral belief. Those are existentially dependent upon language. There are pre-linguistic thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. Those are not.
Ideas about pre-linguistic belief can be wrong.
Morality consists entirely of thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. Morality consists of moral belief. All moral belief is belief about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. Some belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour is formed prior to language acquisition.
No pre-linguistic human likes being hurt by another. Every one dislikes it. These are not innate thought/belief about experience. They are formed after conception, after birth... the result of experience.
These experiences - including the thought/belief formation within them - are universal in that they are common to all humans that go on to use common language.
This report is of that which exists in it's entirety prior to our awareness of it(universally held moral belief), regardless of the individual particulars.
Which moral belief ought be prioritized and/or valued most?
Which ought be legitimized, nurtured, and/or enforced?
Which ought be outright rejected?
Funny, but also sadly true.
I suppose it was more of a related point to do with knowledge. I was just trying to think how we could know that theory to be true, and test out how it would work, and what the logical consequences would be. If a statement about what will happen has a truth-value, could we ever know what it is, prior to the event? Prior to the event, it seems susceptible to the problem illustrated with the Turkey example. It does seem to make some sense to say that it would become true or false after the event, but anything that seems to imply rigid determinism seems problematic to me. To me, it seems to make sense that, at the time, any outcome isn't absolutely set in stone. An outcome can be predicted, but can go this way or that way or another way, out of a number of possibilities. I find it more acceptable to consider such statements to be truth-apt than that they actually have a truth-value, i.e. that a statement of that sort is true (or false) at the time.
Yes. Nobody knows how what appears to be mind comes from what the brain does.
—————————
Quoting creativesoul
Yes. I’ve said before, to me they are the same thing. Or, I see no good reason to think they are not the same thing, and I get no help from you as means for granting the distinction.
—————————
Quoting creativesoul
He who says it first usually says it best:
“....When they propose to establish the universal from the particulars by means of induction, they will effect this by a review of either all or some of the particulars. But if they review some, the induction will be insecure, since some of the particulars omitted in the induction may contravene the universal; while if they are to review all, they will be toiling at the impossible, since the particulars are infinite and indefinite....”
(Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism)
I’m both surprised and disappointed you failed to connect your point-of-view invariant universal moral belief to my counter-argument against it. You must have failed to connect because you asked what I was talking about, instead of showing what I was talking about is wrong, or at least does not apply.
A fair question, given his style of writing. Though hugely ironic coming from you.
Yes, reminds me of the joke. There's two cows in a field, one of them says "moo", the other turns to it exasperated and says "what do you mean 'moo'?"
Hmm. More like a duck and a parrot. One's a quack and the other just echoes whatever Kant said! :lol:
Quoting creativesoul
WHAT did we name? WHAT existed?
You’re always saying we do this stuff, but never say what we’re doing it to. I suppose we name that which exists in its entirety as thought/belief, and the method for that naming is thinking about though/belief. That still leaves me wondering how the thinking in thinking about though/belief comes about, if we need it in order to explain what already exists. You’re using what you’re trying to explain the use of.
The intrinsic circularity of pure reason has been known for centuries. It is inescapable when reductionism is taken too far, which leads inevitably to illusions and manufactured contradictions. But it’s your theory; you’re more than welcome to expound it until the common understandings finally see the light.
It.
Quoting Mww
That which is prior to language. In it's entirety.
If it sounds like nonsense, then that's probably because it is. Like I said earlier, he is trying real hard to make sense of nonsense, which is quite amusing.
But WHAT is a jabberwocky, my son??? WHAT 'twas brillig, and the slithy toves???
I reject the notion that behavior grounds morality. Behavior may be said to ground ethics, which in turn may be said to be representative of subjective moral dispositions. But even if this idea of ethics is itself rejected, it still leaves open the claim that morals are subjective determinations, from which certain actions are chosen and which may or may not obtain as a physical behavior.
If you mean thought/belief grounds morality, I would say you’re closer to the basic idea. I’m more inclined to say morality is something we have, not something we do. It seems much more parsimonious to grant humans certain inherent abilities, perhaps your thought/belief or something like it, sufficient to inform us of how we must behave, and still be in accordance with the kind of person we have already determined ourselves to be.
Nevertheless, if you’re saying thought/belief about acceptable behavior is a possible universal moral belief, that doesn’t say anything. If it be granted every rational human is a moral agent, and we grant practical reason as thought/belief, than universal moral belief is given. Better said as universal moral believing, maybe, because every moral agent thinks about his moral beliefs. But that says nothing about that which is contained in the beliefs, what would be an actual universal moral belief, which is what I asked you about.
The irony. Do you know what everyone knows?
Quoting Mww
Are your thought/belief about Empiricus' the same as Empiricus'?
Quoting Mww
So, because we might be wrong... we are?
All statements of thought/belief come via language.
Now... Show me the black swan.
I don’t have to know what everybody knows to know there is at least one thing nobody knows. As bad as when I said, “It doesn’t have to be any more complicated than that”, and I get back, “if it’s that simple....”.
(Sigh)
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Quoting creativesoul
I don’t think about Empiricus. I think about what Empiricus thought, and as our thinking systems are identical, whatever he thought I could think just as well. In no other way can humans understand each other.
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Quoting creativesoul
Assuming you’re not joking, it’s not my burden to show you a black swan, but it wouldn’t be difficult to show you that which falsifies the notion of universal moral belief. You would have to prove a universal moral belief is possible without considering a particular example of what one would be, in order to circumvent the induction principle.
Also, truth in that view would be understood to be totally independent of our knowing of it. So the objection you presented to the idea: Quoting S is based on thinking that our knowing or believing does have some bearing or purchase on truth, which is the basis of pragmatism.
Just a footnote...rhetorically speaking....thought you might be interested. If you didn’t already know. Peirce’s pragmatic maxim, first put to print in 1878 is taken directly from the form developed as the hypothetical imperative by......you know who.
Okay, so we're in agreement that it's a, "Could be, but don't know".
It's the first in quite some time. I recall that we agreed on much over linguistic meaning, but we disagree substantially over ethics.
Kant called hypothetical imperatives “counsels of prudence”, whereas the categorical, or moral, imperative is a “command of reason”, both grounded in maxims. Peirce knew both The Metaphysics of Morals, from which came the imperatives and maxims, and CPR, from which came the term “pragmatic anthropology”. There is no record of him saying as much, but apparently he took each of those ideas and constructed the beginnings of a new philosophy out of them, with the pragmatic maxim as a tenet.
“....Pragmatism. The opinion that metaphysics is to be largely cleared up by the application of the following maxim for attaining clearness of apprehension: Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object....”
That's true I had forgotten that.
I do kind of like his formulation of truths as being the beliefs that the community of inquirers will come to hold at the very end of inquiry, but I think he also held that absolute or objective truth is unknowable. I said "kind of like" because that formulation seems to be more idealistic than realistic; as if we could ever know that the end of inquiry had been reached, or as if the very last beliefs that humanity held in common the 'moment' before their extinction could count as final truths in anything more than a temporal sense.
Think about that at the same time you're denying the difference between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief.
What is it?
Why suppose a need to circumvent that which is untenable/self-contradictory? It is itself a universal claim based upon particular examples thereof.
I think I'm done here. It's getting way too ridiculous for my tastes. You win. I've shown how the framework you're using is inherently flawed. You've offered nothing more than distractions, and failed to directly address valid objections, but instead just keep on denying what is obvious. That simple true statement that has such far-reaching consequences when combined with a few other ones...
Sigh... Indeed.
Be well.
You're confused.
My position refutes the very notion of 'pure reason'. The inherent flaws of that conception have no bearing upon my position.
I'd like to see the reasoning to support that. I'd say there is pure reason, but it consists only in tautologies and 'contentless' formal logic. Some people, Kant among them, claim that there is synthetic a priori reasoning (as well as the tautologous analytic a priori kind) but I'm pretty sure that should not be accepted.
How do you arrive at your distinctions between thought and thinking about thought? Are they tautologous or something more than that? If you say they are more than that what kind of evidence do they rely on to justify them?
Thank goodness.
Quoting Janus
Please don't. Haven't we seen enough?
That which exists in entirety prior to language. Utterly fail to distinguish between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief. Existentially dependent on the latter.
This is crazy.
Sure. Later though. I promise. Tired. Terribly distracted. Real life calls for the next few days...
:wink:
Just want to note that there is most certainly a conception called "Pure Reason". Much if not most of Western Philosophy holds to it.
Toothpicks and eyelids...
Let me guess. You think/believe that it consists in/of thought/belief, and the whole of Western philosophy utterly fails to distinguish between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief.
I've picked up your crazy/insane talk.
I am tired of being combative, S; I want to adopt a different approach, give everyone the benefit of the doubt, and if I find valid well-reasoned arguments and no inconsistencies, then I will accept anyone's philosophy as an expression of their own unique individuality, even if I disagree with its presuppositions,
Your subjective relativism should allow for no less.
I disagree with that approach. I think we should combat nonsense and garbage, not encourage it. He's under the illusion that what he's saying is credible, and not crackpottery. That's a serious self-harming illusion.
Why is there any need to combat those you might, rightly or wrongly, think of as crackpots, or those you just disagree with, when no one is forced to read anything anyone else writes?
I've engaged it myself before. I haven't just jumped right in to attacking it in this way. I doubt much good will come of seriously engaging it.
Quoting Janus
Because crackpottery is bad, and crackpots need help. I don't want to see crackpottery on this forum, because I think it should have a higher standard. I'm trying the stick approach, others are trying the carrot approach. I hope that one of these approaches works, but I doubt they will.
He is far, far too invested to be helped. He won't change. He won't take on board any criticism and suitably adapt his position. He has dedicated ten years of his life to this claptrap, and it has driven him insane. He is far too confident in his own abilities. He has unswerving faith in his own pet theory. There is no getting through to him. We've all tried.
I immediately thought of language, and the words we use, and their meanings.
They evolve, you know.. And it is generally dictated by popular usage. Looking at cultures throughout history
You too.
Why do you think that you're so attracted to going with the crowd? That's a disposition I run into frequently--it seems to be the whole nut of getting on board with both objectivism and "intersubjectivism" on anything--a disposition to consider something right because it's common, but I don't really understand what the attraction is. I'm always instead reminded of the "if everyone were jumping off of a bridge" thing.
Yeah, we see this form of truth in jury-based judicial systems.
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Quoting Janus
I’m not sure any respectable philosophy advocates knowledge of anything absolutely. The closest the Masters dare to say is that of which the contradiction is impossible is as near absolute as they care to venture, re: the thinking subject, logical laws of thought....stuff like that. I guess this could be called objective truth, if one grants everybody thinks, and has his own “I”. Certainly not an empirical objective truth, however.
Quantum mechanics, on the other hand, is currently in the throes of seemingly irreducible indeterminism, which would be a negative absolute, insofar as there seems to be things we can never know, at least with respect to current understandings, re: Planck scale observations, the size and/or volume of the Universe. But Peirce, et.al., wasn’t aware of any of that empirical science, at least at first, so that probably doesn’t count.
Disclaimer: I’m not familiar enough with pragmatism to talk too much about it.
Me too. It would be quite alarming if he actually thought that way, but he doesn't. He is inconsistent. He only goes with the crowd when the crowd happen to agree with his own judgement. He wouldn't actually jump off a bridge, and that is sufficient to refute his argument.
He can't seem to bring himself into accepting that his argument has been refuted.
Quoting creativesoul
Quoting creativesoul
Quoting creativesoul
In closing, I’ll give you two of four. Humans reason, and the fullest use of reason is logic. Th only way you can refute the notion of pure reason, the kind common to most of western philosophy, metaphysics and science itself, is to call it something else, and then stab at it recklessly until you’ve convinced someone you’ve accomplished something. I must say, I don’t know what a notion of pure reason would even be, that wasn’t itself pure reason.
Now I must grant that your thought/belief theory may be valid. Just because I don’t understand it speaks either to my lack of ability or your lack of sufficient explanation. No matter which, you haven’t shown me the flaws in my framework, and because you’re talking to me, as far as I’m concerned, you haven’t refuted anything having to do with some notion relevant to most western philosophy.
Have a nice day.
Generous.
We still got unpacked boxes from cross-country move three years ago.
Tip of the pointy hat, and.....thanks....and......see ya later.
I reject both 'kinds' of a priori reasoning/knowledge set out by Kant and both 'kinds' of reasoning set out by Hume. That said, what you're asking me for is groundwork that is book-worthy in it's own right, to say the least. I'll do what I can to convince you that of the possibility that pure reason is a (mis)conception. During this, I'll try to summarize and briefly cover both, Hume and Kant, since their philosophies are closely related. They both stem from the same convention, particularly the conventional 'understandings' of causation, knowledge, and belief.
It is worth mentioning what was driving Hume's philosophy at the time. Much like today, there were many assertions, many incommensurate and/or incompatible positions all of which were equally valid/consistent... So, the question was/is what and/or who to believe and by what standard ought we assent? Hume chose Empiricism.
Hume was not alone when he focused upon the truth conditions of propositions. He was an empiricist. Propositions are empirical - I suppose. However, truth conditions are not equivalent to truth, and neither truth conditions nor truth is equivalent to a proposition. Propositions are nothing more and nothing less than complex thought/belief. Setting out the truth conditions for a proposition says nothing at all about what the proposition itself consists in/of. Propositions do not consist of truth conditions, and yet truth conditions are crucial when considering the difference(s) between the two kinds of reasoning coined by Hume. The truth conditions are the only difference he focuses on. He fails to take account of the similarities. That is the fatal flaw.
The very notion of 'pure reason' is a consequence of Hume's framework/taxonomy; his dividing 'all the objects of human inquiry' into two categories, "relations of ideas" and "matters of fact"; aka Hume's Fork. These are/were held to be the mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories of all human inquiry. The former - "a priori" - presupposes that reasoning can be somehow independent of human experience. That dubious presupposition has more than two centuries worth of being glossed over, but it is entirely false and based upon a gross misunderstanding, neglect, and/or outright willful ignorance of the existential dependency and/or elemental constituency of both 'kinds' of reason he delineates.
A priori propositions/reasoning(relations between ideas) and the reasoning that they support(according to Hume) have truth conditions that we determine - by definition alone. The things we're talking about are of our own invention. This is seen below...
The following is from the SEP article...
Here we see that he is talking about propositions that are true as a result of corresponding definitions and/or further descriptions of abstract conceptions of our own invention(relations of ideas). The demonstration of which comes by logical argument with definitions for premisses. A Euclidean triangle is what it is because we won't let it be anything else. The same holds good for 2+2=4. There is also the implicit assumption/premiss/presupposition that not all 'objects' of thought exist. We can only take this to mean that that which exists can be literally found and/or perhaps physically observed 'in nature', like trees and such. There is also yet another implicit premiss that draws a distinction between human thought/belief and nature such that thought/belief itself, along with being a result and/or product of human thought/belief excludes it(the 'object of thought/understanding) from being a part of nature - by pure definition alone. By this framework, thought/belief cannot be empirical or natural, save it's complex empirical manifestation via language(thought/belief in statement/propositional form).
Then there's the other kind of reasoning Hume delineates...
Now seems an apt time to further expose the aforementioned fatal flaw...
The introductory phrase directly above is misleading. The only sharp contrast here is between two purportedly mutually exclusive categories of reasoning that are only found together in Humean thought. Humean thought corresponds to Humean invention. Humean invention does not correspond to fact.
In nature, as compared/contrasted to Hume's notion of nature, we invented cardinal directions. We invented math. We invented names for people, places, and things.
That is the way it is, because that is the way it happened.
There is no elemental, existential, and/or constitutional difference between the conception(s) of cardinal directions, the names of cities, and Euclidean triangles. Cardinal directions cannot be found in nature any more than a Euclidean triangle. Miami is certainly not something that exists independently of thought/belief(relations of ideas). To quite the contrary, "Miami" is the name we've given to an area. "Miami" picks out that area. That area may exist in nature independently of all human thought/belief, but "Miami" does not, and thinking about that area in terms of it's being Miami is existentially dependent upon our naming it such. What's north of Miami is determined solely by relations between our ideas of cardinal directions and names of cities. That is no less a relation of ideas than what we say/learn and/or conclude about Euclidean triangles.
There is no difference in elemental constitution between reasoning amounting to relations of ideas and reasoning amounting to matters of fact(Hume's notions) for - as just argued above - the latter consists of the former.
That doesn't even touch on the non-existent distinction between passions and reason. If I recall correctly, Mww and I thoroughly discussed that earlier in this thread, even if for clearly different purposes/reasons/motivations.
The point you make about what's north of Miami is similar to points I have made in the past about facts like Paris being the capital of France. We define the boundaries of Miami and what's north of that (that is closer to the North Pole) is, in the less precise sense determined by the actual geography of the Earth, and in the most precise sense by where we draw the boundary of Miami. There is always a 'tautologous' or analytic element in such facts.
And the same goes for 2+2=4, in the opposite direction so to speak. It is often considered to be entirely analytic. But it is only because whenever we select two sets of two items and consider them altogether there are always four items. This is the general invariance of number, and it relies on the stability of objects in our world. If objects were not stable we could select two sets of two items and we might sometimes find that we had five, six, a hundred or any number of items. That would not be logically impossible, but counting and mathematics, and indeed probably life itself would be impossible in such a chaotically morphogenic world.
Is your book going to be full of distinctions that no one is unclear about, and which don't need to be made? You do this often.
Apples are not oranges. And neither apples nor oranges are animals.
Yeah, real profound. Real creative. I can't wait for the book. I'm going to be first in line.
I've re-read Hume's Enquiry, and in doing so came across several issues that all seem to be consequences of not drawing the distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief. I'm not sure when I'll have time to expose these issues, but it needs to be done.
His notion of belief shows this nicely, I think. The interesting thing to me is the similarity between some of his justifications and my own.
Indeed, and for good reason. It's called groundwork. It's something that people actually doing philosophy find necessary. The interesting part comes when one holds them all in consideration at the same time while looking at the consequences.
Some people sit in the safest seats around the arena criticizing actual participants in battle. There's no vulnerability there. Nothing to defend, because no firm stance is taken on anything.
Get in the ring.