Ethics can only be based on intuition.
The original title for this was [i]Are Moore's intuitions a form of Wittgenstein's hinge propositions?[/I], and it was in Epistemology. I'm re-naming, extended and moving it to attract a bit more attention.
An Ethical question that might just as well be placed in epistemology.
Hinge propositions are those on which a language game hangs. Ethics is a loose collection of language games...
For Moore an intuition is a proposition incapable of proof. "Here is a hand".
So is Moore's intuitionism compatible with Wittgenstein's view of language? What would it look like to treat intuitionism as Wittgenstein treated Moore's hands?
IN [i]On certainty[/I] Wittgenstein points out various issues with Moore's defence of common sense epistemology. Moore held up his hand and said "here is a hand".
I understand, from my lean reading of Moore, that he thought something similar about ethics; that we had a conviction that some things were good, others not, and that this conviction was fundamental.
I'm developing some sympathy for intuitionism; but I realise in calling it that I will immediately attract detractors (!) who will not give the notion due consideration.
An Ethical question that might just as well be placed in epistemology.
Hinge propositions are those on which a language game hangs. Ethics is a loose collection of language games...
For Moore an intuition is a proposition incapable of proof. "Here is a hand".
So is Moore's intuitionism compatible with Wittgenstein's view of language? What would it look like to treat intuitionism as Wittgenstein treated Moore's hands?
IN [i]On certainty[/I] Wittgenstein points out various issues with Moore's defence of common sense epistemology. Moore held up his hand and said "here is a hand".
I understand, from my lean reading of Moore, that he thought something similar about ethics; that we had a conviction that some things were good, others not, and that this conviction was fundamental.
I'm developing some sympathy for intuitionism; but I realise in calling it that I will immediately attract detractors (!) who will not give the notion due consideration.
Comments (76)
I think a moral fideism is reasonable. Have moral convictions, be resolute. Persuade others of these convictions when necessary.
The knights will not suffice. There should be more to a hinge proposition.
Why not?
That is oxymoronic. Logic is grammar. Grammar is not subconscious.
But I'm serious. What more can be added? What would it even look like? Any why does anything even need to be added? What kind of satisfaction is being pursued?
In the interest of furthering conversation, a question:
But Banno, if what is right is found by intuition, then there's no way for a person to distinguish between something actually being right and it merely seeming right to that person?
Quoting Banno
Or, more to the point : what if the puppys kicked as part of a ritual?
Is logic as arbitrary as grammar? Can we make our own rules?
I'm not sure that that follows. I'm also not sure that the alternative explanation would satisfy you. It can 1)be the case that what is right/good is found by intuition, and 2)intuition can be mistaken.
Intuition is thought/belief based. Those can be wrong. We can think/believe(intuit) that something or other is good, only to find out later that it was not. This happens all the time. People's thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour(about what's good/right) changes throughout their life(most people's anyway).
Human history shows this change as well.
If you means there’s no way to rationalize it, isn’t this evidence for intuitionism?
In studies of "moral dumbfounding" people have strong moral reactions but fail to establish any kind of rational principle to explain their reaction.
Seems quite plausible to me, at least or especially in a context of aesthetics or ethics.
More and more I’m beginning to doubt that ‘man is basically good’. Man is more self-centered, confused, vain, and a slave of emotions. His intuitions, although serving its purpose for survival and multiplication, cannot be trusted upon, judging by it’s tumultuous past and chaotic material-centered present. Religion should’ve been helpful in this regard, but it rarely ever was. And neither is abundance.
Ethics cannot be relied on if it is bent for an agenda. It must be objective and clean, in most situations anyway.
There are a variety of things that can render people blind to ethical truths. There must be something fundamental about ethics else how does anyone ever learn what good is? Something like Meno's paradox looms, right?
An alternative is to say that ethics is a matter of language use only. IOW moral nihilism.
One thing that happens for people to arrive at ethical stances is that most people have empathy. They observe Joey hitting Eddie, and they have a gut-level reaction against this--"Hey! Don't hit Eddie! That's not cool!"
Another thing that happens is that people observe or imagine behavior and then they intuit not only whether they're okay with letting Joey and Eddie act that way towards each other in itself, but they also can think about things like, "Okay, if we let Joey and Eddie behave that way towards each other, it's likely to lead to x (which is likely to lead to y (which is likely to lead to z etc.)), and then they intuit whether they're okay with x (and/or y (and/or z etc.)).
Usually people don't just think these sorts of things about Joey and Eddie. They apply them to a much broader population. They generalize how they feel.
And of course, society has a lot of influence on these things, as other people express the results of their own intuitions, whether individually or per the statistical norm in some culture, and as people react to behavior, including your own . . . but moral stances, to be moral stances someone actually holds, are still going to be the result of intuitions about behavior and its upshots.
So this is why I think that acts like changing one's mind, repentance, forgiveness, and redemption are strong indicators for moral intuitionism. Sure, we can be wrong. In fact in the face of our own evil we often acknowledge our error and try to make amends. In a similar way in the face of our own falsity we often acknowledge our error and try to amend our beliefs. If we can be wrong then there is something we can be wrong about, unlike our preference for ice cream of which it is silly to say you can be wrong about.
But this set up is the sort of set up which denies our ability to tell someone else what is right or wrong, because it depends on intuition. And then depending on how much tolerance we are allowing the argument from a difference in ethical beliefs either does or does not get off the ground.
A bit of an afterthought -- I first wrote on this, but then thought it better just to mention instead -- If anyone can tell others what is right or wrong, it would be the ubermensch: breaker of tablets, master of the self, inspirer of slaves to write future tablets. But the ubermensch is not an ideal, nor is it something we even could aspire to -- she cannot even help but to be an ubermensch.
Tangetial, but definitely related (I think.) Its interesting that when Wittgenstein is introduced in a conversation, its rarely to reference a formal argument of his. He's almost always brought in to try to communicate a superior mode of philosophical valuation. An idiosyncratic - but powerful - way of selecting which philosophical problems are worth posing, and which aren't.
Its funny how the good, the true, and the beautiful run together here. It seems almost a law that things work like this. A new time, a new figure (or group of figures) and then a lot of working out implications. and filling in gaps. Ethical progress definitely seems to follow this pattern too.
People say that they were wrong about their previous music tastes all the time. Do you believe that there are really factually correct/incorrect assessments of music?
Factually? No. There is a difference between facts and values.
But I'll use an example. I grew up watching Star Wars. I love watching Star Wars. I have good memories of it and a soft spot for the fantasy world that inspired me as a kid.
But as I grew older and developed a taste for film I could come back to Star Wars and see its flaws.
Now, knowing its flaws, I still love Star Wars. But I would not argue that Star Wars is a good film.
To go with music -- preferences can change over time. But there are still ways of evaluating music that do not reduce down to mere preference. Beethoven, regardless of your preference, is a good composer. You may not have a taste for classical music, or prefer to listen to electronic dance music, or some such. But in spite of your or my preference he is still a good composer.
To take a page out of the Critique of Judgment -- we treat objects of art as if our matters of taste were in some respect "objective". For Kant this had to do with purposiveness and the effects that some work of art had on our faculties. But there are other aesthetic theories out there -- and with them we can say why this or that work of art is good or not good. We can articulate an argument about our judgments, rather than simply saying "Hurrah, Beethoven!" or "Boo, Beethoven!"
Start with this. Do you believe that what you're referring to are flaws factually? Or are you just saying that they're flaws in your later opinion, given how your preferences have changed?
Neither. Values differ from facts, so they are not factual. But it is not just an opinion or preference either.
Don't you think things like forgiveness, redemption and repentance are applicable to particular actions that would be entirely ignored by other religions, cultures or relationships? Is the wrongness of those actions really innate if this were the case?
I have been thinking about this topic a lot since I looked at this thread. I think that impetus for morality comes from within, it is biological and interpretation always leads back to the source eventually. Still, that impetus can be directed... how much can you twist and bend something until what it's based on changes? Very peculiar question. I still need to think about it.
Yes. I think there is a relative element to values. I also think there is a relative element to facts -- as in, other religions, cultures, or relationships ignore certain facts.
Quoting Judaka
Well, it could be. If the cat stands up and walks off the mat, the cat is no longer on the mat -- and "the cat is on the mat" is false. Facts change, and for all that we do not say that our preference dictates what is true or false.
Quoting Judaka
A bit of a different question, but still a good one.
What would you say it is that's different from facts or opinions/preferences?
Wouldn't there be many things that are different from those?
Let's take knowledge. Under a simple theory of knowledge it involves belief and justification as well as facts. And it isn't right to say that knowledge is merely opinion.
The question is about the status of flaws in a film--wasn't that what I was asking you about? It's not a fact that there are flaws in a film, and it's not simply a result of preferences/opinions, but it's what?
It's a value.
Sure. And what are values?
Do they occur external to our thinking? If so, why wouldn't we be talking about a fact?
But, from my perspective at least, determining whether a phenomena is external or internal to our thinking isn't a productive question. It's a metaphysical set up that gets in the way of looking or "going back to the things themselves", as Husserl put it.
Whether you determine that values are strictly internal to thought or external to thought, regardless of how you interpret the phenomena -- values are distinct from facts, and they are not just preferences.
Let's try this, then: how do we discover values?
But there are stories I can give you. With Star Wars I'd say that I discovered it was not good by watching more movies, reading more scripts, taking classes on acting and script writing, engaging with the history of storytelling and further developing my knowledge of the movie artform. In comparing Star Wars to other movies I could see how Star Wars was primarily plot-driven, that the characters were two-dimensional, and the dialogue came out because of the storyteller had a plot they wanted to tell and it drove that plot.
In general -- engaging with the history of an artform, in its production and as audience, is how you discover aesthetic values.
So something shouldn't be primarily plot-driven, dialogue shouldn't just be there to drive the plot, characters shouldn't be "two-dimensional" because . . . I don't know. You're saying that whether they should be that way or not doesn't have anything to do with anyone's opinion, right? So maybe they shouldn't be that way because other films you watched/studied weren't that way? Because most films are not that way? Or . . . ? (It can't be something like "because most films considered 'good' by cinephiles, film professors, etc. don't have those features, because that has to do with those folks opinions)
Let's take an extreme example.
Have you ever watched The Room?
Now compare that to Guardians of the Galaxy.
Which would you say is a better movie?
I've seen many thousands of films, but unfortunately I haven't seen either of those two yet. I'm familiar with both to some extent. I just haven't gotten around to watching them yet.
We could pick other examples, but the one I'm going to say is the better movie is the one that I like better overall, due to a combination of my tastes in plots, scripts, acting, cinematography, editing, scoring, production design, etc.--all of the elements that make up a film.
With matters of preference there isn't anything more to judging something other than whether or not it pleases you. But with matters of aesthetics there is -- we provide reasons for others to consider in making their own judgment about whether such and such is good or bad.
Which is why I was trying to drive the point home with Star Wars. There is a difference between my saying "I like Star Wars" and my saying "Star Wars is a good movie" -- and I'd say that the primary difference is in whether we can reason about something. It wouldn't make sense to debate whether I like something. But it does make sense to debate whether this movie is better than that one -- we have this, that, and the other reason.
That our preferences influence our judgments doesn't matter and is obvious. What matters is that these two things are not the same sort of judgment.
I couldn't more strongly disagree with this, though.
The sort of reasons one gives are things like "it's primarily plot-driven." It's not good or bad for something to be primarily plot-driven. You can like or dislike (or be neutral towards) something primarily plot-driven, but there's no right answer regarding whether something should be primarily plot-driven or not.
It's no different than saying, "I like Casablanca more than Star Wars because Star Wars is primarily plot-driven, and I don't like things that are primarily plot-driven as much as things that are primarily character/relationship driven."
There are plenty of facts about films, facts that are not at all opinions. For example, "Star Wars is set on other planets than the Earth." None of those non-opinion facts are at all indicative of anything being good or bad, better or worse than anything else.
Values ARE just ways that people feel about things.
And re the other comment we didn't get to yet, the only way that Beethoven is a better composer than anyone else--Chuck Berry, say, is to a particular individual, if that individual likes Beethoven's writing more.They can give reasons why they like his writing more. Anyone should be able to do this if they've introspected just what it is they like and dislike in any detail. But none of that translates to anything other than their likes/dislikes. It's just telling us what specifically they like/dislike.
There are extreme cases. So Chuck Berry and Beethoven -- that's a hard case to judge. They are good in their own ways, and which we prefer listening to is likely a matter of preference. But Beethoven compared to the garage band next door? They are just beginning. They haven't learned much about music. They are mostly playing covers, and they aren't able to play together in unison - they are often playing different beats and aren't listening to one another.
Just to keep the analogy cleaner -- comparing them to the New York Philharmonic to the garage band next door, the New York Philharmonic is better.
And then there are middling cases for which it makes sense to differentiate between what I like and what is good. In one case I know I just like it. In another I can provide reasons why you should like it too. Kant makes a similar distinction when talking about aesthetic judgment -- that though there is no fact to the matter we hold aesthetic judgments as if others should conform to our judgment.
It's the reasoning part that differentiates matters of aesthetics from mere liking -- for you can reason to the ends of the earth and I will like or dislike something just because I like or dislike something. There is no reason to it. But something is good because of such and such reasons which have to do with comparison between artworks, context, history, the elements of art, and the principles of art.
I agree, and think the fundamental principle translates to moral issues, such as abortion. No one likes abortion. It doesn't 'feel' good and we have the intuitive sense is that it's bad. Nevertheless we can have good reasons for being pro-choice.
Quoting Terrapin Station
We can value abstract principles, however, which can override our intuitions.
The only thing "extreme" about cases like that are whether an opinion would be popular or unusual. Some people tend to be swayed popularity of opinion, especially when we're talking about a popular opinion among specialists. But that's an example of the argumentum ad populum fallacy. It's not correct in any way, shape or form that Beethoven is a better composer than a 2-year-old who just started banging on some pots and pans five minutes ago. It's simply a matter of what someone likes versus dislikes, where most people can give some details about their likes and dislikes.
Quoting Moliere
You can compare etc. all day long and it doesn't amount to anything re good/bad aside from people liking whatever they do. No comparison, no context, nothing about history, nothing about "principles" has any bearing whatsoever on whether anything is good or bad, better or worse than anything else outside of people liking whatever they do.
The only way to know if you value an abstract principle is via your intuition.
Re the earlier comment, it's the same rudimentary misunderstanding people make all the time when discussing this stuff. It's not that you necessarily value every aspect of something equally. You often assign different values to different aspects and weight each differently.
And I do not expect you to agree with me. This is, after all, philosophy. However I think we can both see that we're at the point where we basically believe or do not believe a proposition, and we're kind of at the part where we're just asserting our belief -- we have tried to show the other what we mean, but failed.
With enough conditioning an abstract principle can become intuitive, I'm sure, but initially they are learned or reasoned out and may have no personal value at all. People can adopt principles on faith.
You said that we can value an abstract principle. I was saying something about that--about valuing abstract principles. I wasn't saying aside from that about abstract principles. Just about valuing them, since that's what you had mentioned.
Isn't there any way to discover which side is correct?
Meaning essentially that we can value both our intuition and our reasoning and may have a choice in how we respond to circumstances, given the luxury of time anyway. We may be forced to rely on intuition when time is in short supply.
Interpretations aren't preferences, on this, we agree but nonetheless, interpretations are fundamentally arguments and not based on anything that can be used to as a premise for demonstrating an objective truth, would you disagree with that?
I tend to see philosophy as not having correct answers -- but there are good answers and bad answers.
The part that had me thinking from you was your last sentence. I'm not at all certain about ethical progress -- though the good, the beautiful, and the true do seem to have a certain familiarity with one another when it comes to meta- issues.
But I believe that good philosophy is like that @Terrapin Station. We can see how the hinge can be flipped, and we might have reasons why we believe it should be this way or that way -- but in the end there is no method for determining which one of us is correct. The best we can do is provide our reasons for why we are satisfied this way or that way, and at least check for things like consistency or undesirable consequences. But in the end every theory can "bite the bullet", so to speak.
Also, with philosophy the theories we're exploring are usually so totalizing that it can be hard to un-see what we're used to seeing. You see this a lot in ethics especially, where one normative theory re-interprets another normative theory into its own frame -- "Well, that's just basically a form of deontology/virtue ethics/consequentialism because...." -- but if we are sensitive to this totalizing habit then we can begin to sense how there are hinges beneath our big-picture views, and that there are differences that are subtle, but important.
I think I see our disagreement in that light @Terrapin Station -- though by all means we can of course continue to try to provide reasons which will allow us to refine our views and state them more carefully (which I think is a good benefit, even if we don't agree in the end)
If we're making empirical claims, how about making empirical observations? In other words, how about if we check the facts?
Sure, I'd agree with that.
But I suspect the devil is in the details.
Not a matter of language use only; but certainly a matter of language use.
Some portion of ethics can be discovered by taking your mashing machine apart.
My intuition wants me to slap you in the face for making what I perceive to be a ridiculous statement.
Seriously though, I like the premise and it sounds like it should be true. However, it presents us with a problem. How do we know when we are intuiting something vs when we are just assuming things will work out? Now, I've had successes that have been based off of perceived intuition, only for it to backfire later and be wrong. What if our intuition tells us to do one thing and someone dies or gets hurt as a result? Do Dictators believe in the power of intuition and do they utilise it?
So, what exactly is intuition and how are we defining that?
I don't think we can ever use reasoning without also using intuition. In those cases where we have we can certainly use inducution and deduction and check and recheck our assumptions and so on. However in the microsteps of reasoning there is always intuition. About semantics: the scope of our words in the reasoning, in variaous qualia ('there, I have checked enough' 'I would have noticed if there was a flawed step' 'my memories of earlier steps in the reasoning is correct' 'this is not an assumption built into grammar, but the way things are' and so on), given paradigmantic biases, our assessment that we are being 'open minded' and not biased in other ways, that our premises make sense, that our logical steps are logical and so on. IOW what on paper might look like some purely logical provess, purely reasoned process, when lived in the creation of it and in the rechecking of it thare are tiny, not so tiny and background assessments and conclusions that are based on intuition.
But he also held that there were truths in ethics and would not have accepted that his ethical claims were just one language game amongst others in a relativistic sense. He also made use of thought experiment to convince others of his ethical claims, and I don't think Wittgenstein would have attempted this for what he regarded hinge propositions.
PA
I also do not think that Wittgenstein regarded Moore's "here is a hand" and such as hinge propositions. Nothing hangs from or turns on them. They are examples of when language goes on holiday.
It is difficult to say to what extent Wittgenstein's views toward ethics changed after the Tractatus because it is not something he said much about, which is perhaps indicative of his having not changed his mind. In the 1929 Lecture on Ethics he maintains the inclusion of aesthetics. Two points follow: First, ethics is not a matter of language games, there are no ethical hinge propositions. Second, if one holds that moral intuition is based on self-evident propositions then Wittgenstein's view is not that of moral intuition. Ethics/aesthetics, as he claimed in the Tractatus, are transcendental. I take this to mean both transcendent, that is, beyond the limits of the world, and transcendental in the sense of the condition for the possibility of moral/aesthetic awareness, experience, and understanding.
With regard to moral intuition, I think it promises too much and disregards what seems to be the more likely basis on which we may form moral intuitions. Many today may hold it as self-evident that slavery is wrong, but if so then were slave owners blind to what is self-evident or did the choose to ignore it? Or closer to home, are the disagreements today over abortion and equal rights based on the failure of one side to see what it self-evidently true? Any answer to that question will have each side claiming the blindness of the other.
And this brings us back to hinge propositions. Moral judgment and deliberation are based on certain things that are, like hinge propositions, not brought into questions but are accepted. This does not mean that they cannot be brought into question. Sometimes they are. But if and when they are it is always in relation to other things that are not at the same time questioned.
If this sounds like a form of relativism that is because it is. Wittgenstein says in On Certainty: