The meaning of Moral statements
Quoting Terrapin Station
If philosophy is good at anything, it is good at publishing multiple tracts and other media on the exact same topic.
(1) My beliefs about what people are doing with language or what they mean does not determine what is the case with how the people are using language.
(2) My beliefs about what people are doing with language or about what people mean does not determine what is the case with respect to the ontology of utterances.
Though I have to admit that statement (2) seems a little fuzzy to me, but I think I'd agree with it. In particular I think the ontology of utterances is a bit of a funny phrase, and I'd draw a distinction between utterances, statements(or more broadly, sentences), and propositions.
Meaning, from my standpoint, is something of a mystery, but only on account of its simplicity. I know what various sentences mean. One could almost say that the characteristic of language is that it means. Does meaning stand for something? Not always. Language is put to many uses.
And moral language is no different from any other sort of language. It doesn't deserve to be put in a class by itself as some super-special language with its own set of interpretive rules. It, like any statement, means what it means -- and can be put to many uses, from admonishment, expression, description, and so forth.
Sometimes people say moral statements in the exact same way they say statements of fact. So these sorts of moral statements are truth-apt, just as statements of fact are truth-apt.
We've already done a bunch of threads on meaning.
If philosophy is good at anything, it is good at publishing multiple tracts and other media on the exact same topic.
At any rate, so your interpretation of what people are doing with language--your beliefs about what they mean, without bothering to ask the people in question--doesn't determine what's the case with either how they're actually using language or with what's going on ontologically with utterances such as "x is good (morally)."
(1) My beliefs about what people are doing with language or what they mean does not determine what is the case with how the people are using language.
(2) My beliefs about what people are doing with language or about what people mean does not determine what is the case with respect to the ontology of utterances.
Though I have to admit that statement (2) seems a little fuzzy to me, but I think I'd agree with it. In particular I think the ontology of utterances is a bit of a funny phrase, and I'd draw a distinction between utterances, statements(or more broadly, sentences), and propositions.
Meaning, from my standpoint, is something of a mystery, but only on account of its simplicity. I know what various sentences mean. One could almost say that the characteristic of language is that it means. Does meaning stand for something? Not always. Language is put to many uses.
And moral language is no different from any other sort of language. It doesn't deserve to be put in a class by itself as some super-special language with its own set of interpretive rules. It, like any statement, means what it means -- and can be put to many uses, from admonishment, expression, description, and so forth.
Sometimes people say moral statements in the exact same way they say statements of fact. So these sorts of moral statements are truth-apt, just as statements of fact are truth-apt.
Comments (185)
Meaning is subjective. It's something that occurs in individuals' heads. It's the inherently mental act of making associations. It can't be literally shared, but we can tell others what we're associating in many cases. You can't know how an individual is doing this without asking them.
Also, I also think "the ontology of utterances" is a bit funny. What I had said is "what's going on ontologically with utterances (such as 'x is good (morally).')" In other words, what's "functionally" going on, or what's going on in terms of real, or practical, or observable things, which can be quite different than beliefs that people have about what they're saying, what they're doing, etc.
Cool. I'm just making sure I'm covering my bases.
Quoting Terrapin Station
So, on your view, can meaning occur without language?
When I associate a spout with its vase and see a teapot, is that perception a meaning even if I do not have any linguistic capabilities (like, say, a dog)?
Quoting Terrapin Station
Alright. I had done my best to parse what you meant. But now it is clarified.
Yes, definitely. I do this as a musician all the time, for example.
"When I associate a spout with its vase and see a teapot, is that perception"--that's not a perception, by the way. Perception refers to you taking in data about things external to you. Your association isn't that. It's an activity your brain is performing, and activity that isn't performed by the outside world. So you're conceiving it, not perceiving it.
Anyway, sure, you could do this without any linguistic capabilities.
Meaning is created by both interpretations from the speaker, the listener and the ignorant.
Which meaning is the true meaning is also a result of interpretation.
There is no "the" meaning.
Well, perception requires a brain -- a sort of association but one which is being applied to what you call the outside world. It's not so much "taking in data" as it is applying conceptual content to the abundant wash of experiential chaos. Even things so basic as object permanence are developed and learned.
So, alright. Meaning occurs within the brain, and does not require language. Any old mental association will do -- and, as I understand perception at least, that would include perception.
So what is language, then? Obviously language is not meaning, because we can certainly share a language. What we usually call meaning, the sort of thing that language does -- what would you call that?
The act of explaining what something means. The important thing is that it is a verb.
If interpretation is the act of explaining what something means, and the explanation of what something means requires words, then we need an interpretation of the interpretation in order to have meaning.
But if we need an interpretation of the interpretation to know what the interpretation means, then we need and interpretation of the interpretation of the interpretation . . .
You get the idea. If the words require more words in order to have meaning, then by the fact that the "more words" are also words you basically get an infinite regress.
Yet you know the meaning of what I'm saying right now.
Again, the world itself, outside of minds, doesn't make associations. That's an activity that brains perform. So you can't perceive an association.
You do need to interpret meaning for it to have meaning and the loop this creates is no different than asking "why" to every answer a person gives.
If I say "X means Y" and "Y means Z" and "Z means X" this creates a loop. You can do this with many things in language.
If I define a chair and define the words I used to define a chair and define the words I used to define the words I used to define a chair and then define those words and define those words then we create a loop. The loop only stops when you stop asking for new definitions because you think you understand what I mean.
Call that what you want but it's just how language works.
Are you arguing that the meaning of words is not interpreted? Do you understand the larger ramifications for that?
I suspect that the difference between what I think your words mean and what you think those words mean is trivial or non-existent. That's what allows language to function. This has not demonstrated objective meaning any more than an objective truth would be demonstrated to be true if it were shown that all souls on Earth believed it was.
Not interpreted [i]for what[/I]? We interpret meaning in order to gain an understanding. I'm not disputing that.
My point was simple and easily understood. It takes your claim and points out what is a paradox at best and a contradiction at worst.
Quoting Judaka
There is objective meaning when it comes to language, because linguistic meaning is rule based, and rules do not require rule followers. We've already set the rules, and they would persist without us. If we went extinct tomorrow, these linguistic rules would continue to apply.
You're making the common idealist confusion of muddling up what it takes for something to be understood, and what it takes for something to have meaning. Or, more broadly, epistemology and metaphysics.
Quoting S
Funny, I would say the same thing to you. You are trying to argue that rules which have been created for the sake of making a language functional have created objective meaning because they are independently coherent and established.
Your underlying argument comes back to lots of people agreeing on it.
Why?
Because you wouldn't recognise a dictionary I wrote as being of equal validity to all other dictionaries.
Not only that but definitions aren't sufficient to translate meaning in all contexts by themselves.
If I told you I was going to build a great pyramid. You could tell me what every word in the sentence meant but that doesn't mean you understand what I'm talking about.
Because what does the word "great" mean when I use it in the context of talking about a pyramid?
What do the established, coherent rules of language tell you about that?
But it wouldn't apply to me. I've clearly distinguished the criteria between the one and the other.
Quoting Judaka
Yes. And?
Quoting Judaka
No it doesn't. You and I could agree on the rules for our own made up language, and it would be no different. You and I aren't lots of people. The meaning, once set, would be independent of us.
Quoting Judaka
Translations rely on preexisting rules. The rules are certainly enough in most cases, notwithstanding some ambiguity in some cases. This is demonstrable by the fact that you're understanding what I'm saying. It would be a performative contradiction and disingenuous of you to suggest otherwise. You're able to do this because you know the rules of the language well enough.
Quoting Judaka
That you can point to some degree of ambiguity in some cases isn't enough to refute my argument. I know the meaning of the word "great", just not the specifics of what you had in mind when you used that word. I never made any claims about [i]complete[/I] meaning. You would be the rule setter in your example. If you had left a record of your rule, such that, for example, "In this instance, 'great' is to mean 'larger than the average pyramid'", then this wouldn't be a problem.
I grant that we do this operation. But the operation eventually terminates. If meaning were identical to other words then there would never be a terminus -- we'd just continue to iterate the process. But, in fact, we do terminate said operation. So we can conclude that meaning is not identical to words. There must be some other aspect to language aside from words, some nugget we call "meaning" in order for us to stop infinite regress -- because we do, in fact, actually stop iterating and come to know what words mean.
But then, at least if by "interpret" we mean use more words to explain words, there must be more to meaning than interpretation.
It's more than this. Interprétation is how being expériences reality. Every moment of existence passes through a filter unique to the individual. That filter is multifaceted: mind, associations, senses, emotions, etc. To exist is to hold a particular comportement towards reality. All we do in life, in every moment, is interpret.
Expérience is interprétation.
Meaning is the jostle of difference. It resides neither in one place nor another, but flows in-between events of encounter (other meets other). Meaning belongs not to me or you (reading this), but it is shared in-between.
I would call that more "association". The word "apple" means something to you because you have physical experience of apples. Eventually, words refer back to the experiences they are associated with.
You do not distinguish between what is required for understanding and objective meaning, you call them the same thing unless I am missing something. When I asserted this you have replied "Yes, and?".
Where based on an established criterion, a particular judgement is necessarily reached., objective validity is achieved. Which says if premises this means conclusion. When the premises are subjective so is the conclusion. Morality is always going to have subjective premises and so is the same with language.
The dictionary I write is not for a "made up language" it's for English. There are already many dictionaries for English and they don't all say exactly the same things.
Talking about language just seems like a tangent from the perspective of validity, the problem with English is that the rules don't achieve objective validity and the existence of rules doesn't necessitate certain interpretations. I haven't argued that the differences in our interpretations might not be trivial or non-existent, perhaps we have different rules for calling something "objective".
That's part and parcel with language, we will have different understandings for words and the concepts they refer to.
Emancipate is expanding my definition in a way which may bring greater clarity to how interpretation works for us all. I have focused on language but this may have been to the detriment of my argument and I will need to think of a better definition for interpretation which encompasses more aspects of it.
There can be no non-reaction to a word you haven't encountered previously. Even if you hadn't the physical experience of apples, the word itself would generate an interpretive experience.
A neologism: qwerpaz. You have had no physical experience of this word, yet it might induce a feeling of confusion or irritation. Perhaps the utterance is euphonic or unpleasant.
Nothing can be encountered without invoking a process of interpretation. This is meaning.
Can you expand further on what you mean by this?
Quoting Judaka
Within a language that's how it goes. From one language to another...
Davidson's project was to take English and interpret it in first order logic. It had some interesting results.
That's not convincing to me. The sound of a string of letters might invoke some reaction, but that is not "interpretation" of a "word". I am not interpreting the meaning of a car horn when I am being startled by one. I might afterward try to interpret it, but this process isn't similar to the initial reaction.
Quoting emancipate
This means "meaning" is equivalent to "experience". Why define terms this way?
'Many people have a tree growing in their heads, but the brain itself is much more a grass than a tree.’ (Deleuze/Guattari)
Meaning is what arises when a conscious entitiy encounters anything other to itself. This is a constant process of experiencing reality. Meaning would not be possible without rhizomatic connections between difference.
Quoting Echarmion
How do you experience reality, but through a filter that allows you to make meaning (interpret) of it all? Meaning is not just linguistic.
You experience the car horn which startles you and then you retrospectively apply analysis to the situation. Meaning has flowed through sense (sound), emotion (fear) and intellect (analysis). Really it is much more than this, the situation (initial experience) is complete morass of meaning. But in retrospective analysis meaning has been reduced by the intellect to a speck of what it was during experience.
A bit more on circularity, then. @Judaka explained how interpretations are circular. Let's take it a step further. If the only way to understand a word is in terms of other words, then how is it that one can learn a language? How does one get inside the looping interpretations, in order to start looping?
Language is learned. Therefor it must be learnable.
Not really. When a baby hears a sound for a first time, a word from his mother. He attempts to repeat it. The interpretation is the way it sounds when he hears it, the way it moves his tongue as he articulates, the reaction of his doting parent, the way he feels when he sees his parents reaction. It is later that he learns to associate words with things, but the initial experience is full of interpretation.
So what you are calling an interpretation is not more words that say the same thing - see @Judaka.
What you are calling an interpretation is the results of the use of language.
Quoting emancipate
Not all words are names.
I don't argue that meaning is just linguistic, but you're essentially using "meaning" as a catch-all term for every form of processing, which seems unnecessarily broad and confusing. This thread is about the meaning of moral statements, after all, not the basic epistemology of human experience.
Quoting emancipate
But my initial reaction is a completely different mental process from the later analysis. My fear doesn't "lead to" analysis.
Quoting emancipate
You need to define your terms a bit before I can make much sense of this.
I do think that Emancipate has a point.
My definition is incomplete and while interpretation can work the way I described it doesn't have to.
As an example. we might think about psychological things like empathy, fairness, fear, anger, jealousy and such, which are far more ancient than words but serve as expressions of interpretations.
Interpretation goes far deeper than language, I knew this but gave a half-assed definition and got called out on it.
One difference that might be worth noting is the direction of fit of different sentences. In "The door is closed", the sentence is perhaps used to set out what it the case - the words are made to fit the world.
But in "Shut the door!", the sentence is perhaps used command something to become the case - the world is made to fit the words.
You drew attention to the worthwhile use of interpretation as interpreting one set of word in terms of another set of words.
It's that which is inadequate to explain language learning.
You're certainly missing something. A key difference between what's required for there to be understanding and what's required for there to be meaning is that the former requires there to be a subject and the latter does not, and obviously you can see here that I'm not calling them the same thing.
Quoting Judaka
No, that's clearly not what you asserted before. Go back and see for yourself. You didn't even use the word "understanding". You just seemed to put to me a rephrased version of my own point about a rule based independent meaning, which I obviously agreed with and questioned what your point was.
Quoting Judaka
Sorry, but what are you talking about? You've lost me. If you think that you can refute my argument, then go ahead and try, but you can't just say some tosh about it being subjective without properly explaining how that's allegedly the case. Understanding requires a subject, whereas meaning as I've described it does not. In this sense, the latter is objective. Can you explain why there would need to be subjects subsequent to the language rules being set for there to be meaning, as opposed to understanding? (Setting aside some degree of ambiguity, which would only be a problem for my position if I had implied complete meaning, which I haven't). Over to you.
Quoting Judaka
My point was about a made up language, not English. You seem to be missing my point and quoting me out of context. I'm not sure why you've done that.
I see.
Quoting S
You're right, my apologies.
Quoting S
So what you actually said "Yes, and?" to was this.
Quoting Judaka
As such I will take this as your argument for objective meaning which doesn't require interpretation in language.
I have two questions.
1. Where would you advise one to find the established rules for English?
The example of me writing my own dictionary is pointing to this problem. Dictionaries are different from each other, let alone something I might write. Language evolves over time and I think if your argument is that there IS established rules for English, you should be able to point me to some source of where to find them. My follow up question if needed will be why you choose that over something else.
2. Why isn't the lack of objective validity in English a problem for your position?
Objective validity means the premises necessarily lead to the conclusion. This is the bare minimum requires for an argument of meaning not requiring interpretation. If the premises don't necessarily lead to a conclusion then how do you know which conclusion is correct? Someone needs to make a choice.
English is filled with words that describe values, concepts, ideas, feelings and so much more without the required specificity to know exactly what is being talked about. "Justice" could just as easily be killing people as it is saving people, why isn't interpretation needed here? What do the established rules tell us about what is being talked about when people use the word "justice"?
Context matters in English too, if I say "I really need to go", you could understand what I mean differently based on the context. Do I mean to the toilet? Or do I have some kind of appointment? What did I mean when I said I really need to go? Why do I need to go?
The words "I need to go" may have communicated those things but I don't know how the rules of English allow for this.
I would say "I need to go" is a fairly trivial statement but let's find an even more trivial statement like "I am a man".
What does that mean? Why am I saying that? What am I referring to? The lack of objective validity is a problem as far as I can see, this is at least one problem for the idea language carries objective meaning.
Okay. Normally "perception" is reserved for (the notion of (ideally) accurately) processing external information.
Very odd question. I would advise them to learn the language in the usual ways, and use the usual resources, such as a dictionary or a language learning app. We've all learnt a language as children through to adulthood, and that entails learning language rules. A great deal of it is automatic for us, of course. We learnt the rules long ago. You understand what I'm saying without any need to learn the rules.
Quoting Judaka
I've already addressed this. Once again, some degree of ambiguity is not sufficient to refute my argument. In these cases, the speaker presumably knows what he meant to a higher degree of accuracy. The speaker would be the rule setter. So the rule would be that this particular word in the speakers statement has this particular meaning. Once the rule is set, the speaker is no longer required. Why would it be otherwise? This is what you must account for if you intend to argue against me. I'm still waiting for a proper response to this from you. Are you going to attempt to justify your idealist premise?
If the exact meaning cannot be understood from the statement itself, then so be it. That would merely mean that, without knowing the rule that the speaker set, then there would be an objective meaning which couldn't be understood. But we already know that in a scenario where there are no subjects, nothing can be known or understood, because knowing and understanding obviously require a subject. So, here we are once again, with the very problem that I pointed out from the start: this is to once again confuse understanding and meaning, epistemology and metaphysics. This is where your problems stem from. You keep reverting back to epistemology, when I'm making a point about metaphysics. You keep missing the point. Questions such as how the meaning could be known or understood are beside the point. It couldn't without a subject. But that doesn't mean a thing with respect to my argument for objective meaning. The meaning is there, irrespective of whether or not it can be understood. It has already been set.
I mean, even by your own notions of subjectivity, it's not like I can observe your perception.
And so, given that meaning happens in the brain, and perception happens in the brain, and meaning does not require language, it would seem -- at first blush, though I am open to being corrected by you in understanding your position -- that dog perception has meaning.
Can such statements be true?
And, if true, do they or do they not have a fact? (Or is a fact just a true sentence?)
My premise for question 1 was that you agreed with that your position was that language has rules sufficient to create objective meaning but now you are saying I can understand you without rules. If there aren't rules for English then I don't understand your position any more.
Your counter-argument for question 2 is that you aren't arguing for complete objective meaning. You initially said that because I could understand you, you may have demonstrated either a paradox or a contradiction, now you say that there is no complete objective meaning just partial.
If you can understand the meaning of my words when they lack objective meaning, what's outlandish about you understanding the meaning of my words (at least enough so to allow language to function) if all of them lacked objective meaning?
I don't know what you mean when you use the word "objective" but I can't think of a definition that makes sense with what you're saying. I don't understand what your argument is and I don't understand what I need to prove/disprove to further my case against yours.
What I know is that without objective validity, objective meaning can't exist.
If we categorised all of the types, colours, sizes, shapes, textures and so on which exist under the umbrella term of "apple". In English, what is an apple? It's all of those things and none of those things. It could be any of the viable characterisations in any arrangement. The premise of "an apple" doesn't lead to a conclusion of what precisely is being talked about.
We could go around and take every word that I'm using and demonstrate further that the possibility for interpretation is rather extreme although potentially infrequently utilised by anyone. The end result would be a near non-existent set of rules, words which can have a variety of meanings and contexts, intentions and etc which can change the meaning of the words/phrase.
I said objective validity is the bare minimum for an argument in favour of objective meaning but it's not the ONLY requirement. There are further hurdles to contend with but I don't see the point in bringing them up.
You act like I've presented no evidence worth contending with and I feel like you basically have nothing left to talk about in your favour which may signal it is better to agree to disagree than continue arguing.
So, we could say that the meaning of moral statements lies in their direction-of-fit, and in their truth-aptness. And, perhaps some notion of universality that includes all responsible moral actors, or something along those lines, if our notion of truth doesn't happen to include some requirement of aiming at what everyone should do in a specifically moral sense.
Then we might say something like -- "Though shall not kill" is true
And we might say that all true statements are facts -- redefining what I had said a fact was in my attempt at defending moral error theory.
SO rather than there being some empirical element to facts we are just relying upon the notion that facts are true statements -- and we are being liberal enough with the notion of statement to include commands as statements.
This is the part that gets kind of funny, I think. We are no longer correspondence theorists at this point, at least -- which might be too much for some people, though I'm willing to go along with it because I take it that correspondence theory is not a universal theory of truth, but an apt description of how we commonly think of truth. It's just worth noting that here.
At which point I might ask -- is naturalism preservable under other notions of truth? I suppose if by naturalism we mean something along the lines that statements like "Everything that exists is a part of nature" are true then, sure, naturalism is preserved.
But is that was naturalists actually mean, or are they correspondence theorists? I guess that would depend upon the naturalist.
But, to bring this back to Moore, there might be something to his notion of non-natural facts after all.
Would it be outdated to talk about internal and external to something like a refrigerator? Because that's more or less similar to the distinction. It's a locational distinction primarily.
Quoting Moliere
Mentally processing it, you mean? Obviously that's a mental activity.
Quoting Moliere
Sure, and the relevance of that is?
Quoting Moliere
Dogs and many other animals may have very similar mental phenomena to us, and there's no reason to believe that we're the only animals with language.
The closer other animals' brains are to our own the more reason we have to believe they experience similar mental phenomena.
I doubt that anything that he says will bring greater clarity. On the contrary, it will compound the problem by creating a greater [i]need[/I] for clarity. I am not a member of his cult, and I am unfamiliar with his cryptic language. If only there were a filter here which could automatically translate what he says into ordinary English.
I didn't say that there aren't rules for English, and there is no contradiction between it being the case that language has rules sufficient to create objective meaning, and it being that case that you can now understand me without relying on the language rules because you've already learnt them, such that your understanding of what I'm saying is second nature. You couldn't have done that without the necessary earlier stage of learning the rules.
Quoting Judaka
I've changed my mind since I made that point about incomplete objective meaning. I unwittingly fell into your error of confusing meaning and understanding. The meaning would be complete. It would be the understanding which would be incomplete. The latter is irrelevant to my position on objective meaning.
And I stand by the evident paradox/contradiction I demonstrated earlier. I'm curious as to how you think you can resolve it.
Quoting Judaka
They don't lack objective meaning.
Quoting Judaka
What I mean by "objective" in this context is that the meaning of a language, once set, is independent of any subject. My claim is about what it takes for there [i]to be[/I] linguistic meaning, not what it takes for linguistic meaning [i]to be understood[/I]. This entails that if all subjects ceased to exist this very moment, there would continue to be linguistic meaning. This is because meaning is rule based, and the rules have been set. The rules wouldn't cease to apply just because there are no subjects. That makes no sense. It would still be the case, for example, that, in English, the word "car" means a road vehicle, typically with four wheels, powered by an internal combustion engine and able to carry a small number of people.
My position is a form of realism, and the other position is a form of idealism. Idealism is a load of twaddle.
Quoting Judaka
What's the supposed relevance of precision? You seem to be committing the continuum fallacy. Wittgenstein was right with his point about family resemblance. We understand what an apple is, even if we cannot come up with a definition capable of covering every single variation of an apple.
Quoting Judaka
Interpretation is irrelevant to my point. Again, the specific language rules are set by the speaker, and once they have been set, then there is a specific meaning, irrespective of whether that specific meaning is, or can be, interpreted precisely or even at all. Incomplete understanding does not mean incomplete meaning.
Quoting Judaka
What you're calling "objective validity", based on the definition you gave earlier, is basically just logical validity. A logically valid argument is an argument of a form whereby if the premises are true, then the conclusion is necessarily true.
If you think that you can demonstrate that my argument is not logically valid, then be my guest. You have failed to do so thus far, and you have failed to support your apparent idealism for which you have a burden of proof. If you reject my realism, then what's your alternative, and where is your demonstration of it?
It just has a Cartesian ring to it -- but It's not like I am in here and the world I experience is out there. I am a part of the world. Further, it's not like the world is composed of sense-data.
But if you're being more literal, as in, inside the space within my skull is where the perception is, then OK.
I think I can get along well enough with the terminology that it shouldn't be a problem.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Sure.
Quoting Terrapin Station
That perception is mental -- since I thought subjectivity and mental were pretty well linked for you.
I'm mostly just trying to get a hold of your terminology here. So when you say --
Quoting Terrapin Station
That makes me think that perception is also meaningful, since perception requires the mental act of making associations, which seems different than what I'd say but I can go along with it. Also I'd say that meaning is tied to language, but you say it is not -- that it is something primarily mental, and not necessarily linked to language.
Quoting Terrapin Station
I'd say that this is language in the broad sense, but not in the narrow sense -- dogs do not speak English. We speak English. English is just one type of language, as there are many languages, but it doesn't matter which (human) language you choose a dog will not learn how to speak it.
Perhaps dogs speak dog. But even if that is so surely you can see the difference between dog and human language? Or is there none?
:lol:
So rather than "Thou shalt not kill" you might say "Killing is wrong"? And the same sort of analysis should then apply?
Seems so.
"Killing is wrong" can be re-parsed as "don't kill". If "Killing is wrong" is true, then one ought follow the imperative "Don't kill".
Seems OK. Counterexamples, anyone?
If meaning is something in one's mind, and your mind is distinct from my mind, then the meaning in my mind is not the very same as the meaning in your mind.
For example, "Paris" will have one meaning for you, and a different meaning for me.
SO when we talk about "Paris", we each mean the term in a different way.
That is, when we each talk about Paris, we are not talking about the same thing.
And yet, in a very real sense, we do both talk about Paris.
Sense and reference, intension and extension, that sort of thing.
Refrigerators are a part of the world. But aren't some things inside of refrigerators and some things outside of them?
There was mention above, in the discussion between @S and @Judaka, of language as following rules. Now a rule is another set of words... So rule-following as an explanation of language use involves the same sort of circularity as is found in looking up words in a dictionary.
The answer?
There is a way of understanding a rule that is not found in reciting it, but in actually following the rule.
"Stop at a traffic light" can be parsed in terms of saying one must press the brake until all motion stops and place the car in first gear ready to move off if the light is red; or one can actually demonstrate stopping at the red light. Both express the rule.
But it's the demonstration of rule-following that is most important.
You're perhaps conflating the referent and meaning?
If meaning is all inside one's head, how is it that you and I can talk together about Paris?
You say "blah blah blah Paris."
I hear it.
I assign the meanings I do to those sounds, and as long as I can make sense, per my meanings, concepts, etc., of what you said, especially in the context of other things you've said (and will say), that amounts to understanding you.
I say, "Yeah, bleh bleh bleh Paris."
You hear it and assign the meanings you do to those sounds, and as long as you can make sense, per your meanings, concepts, etc. of what I said, especially in the context of other things I've said (and will say), that amounts to understanding me.
That's how we communicate.
Keep in mind that quite often people say things that don't make sense, per individuals' meanings, concepts, etc. That happens often on this board, for example. (And there are some people who post here frequently who I can never make sense of. They tend to be the people who are the most fond of continental philosophers . . . well, and/or some of the Aristotle fans.)
But much of the time, especially with simpler, more common utterances, we can make sense of what other people say.
It's not that complicated. It doesn't at all require that we have the same meanings in mind.
It's not that it is wrong, so much as that it is misleadingly incomplete.
Quoting Terrapin Station( my bolding)
What's hidden here? As it stands, meaning is explained in terms of meaning.
Again, that's basically the sort of distinction I'm making. It's a locational distinction.
Almost every sentence of PI has some problem. I was detailing that in my comments on the PI thread.
Quoting Banno
What's hidden? I have no idea what you're asking. So here's an example where the sounds (or marks) you're making can't be given coherent meanings from my perspective.
Quoting Banno
I don't bother with criticisms about "explanations" unless someone gives their demarcation criteria for explanations.
Just some thoughts.
It looks to me like 'One ought not kill' and 'One ought follow the imperative 'do not kill'' might actually work through different modalities. The first is a modality that applies neatly to events, as if we are predicating 'ought not' to the event 'killing'. The second might actually be relational - between a speaker S uttering a command C and an agent A - in my book there either needs to be an utterer or some other structure S which applies C to A. Perhaps the first modality O might be interpreted as universal quantification over S and A - IE that an arbitrary A ought to follow C as uttered by an arbitrary S (aRcs). I don't trust that this would seamlessly lead to the equivalence between O(x) and (aRxs) as it seems to me there will be ambiguous cases between, say, the boundary of killing and the prevention of death. So it might be, say, permissible to divert the tracks in the trolley problem but 'one ought not kill' could still be true.
The water there is quite muddy, as it seems to require an analysis of the relationship of speech acts to the norms they require and establish (which presumably what all this rule following talk is working towards). But the ability to evaluate aRcs using norms; they may fail for some and obtain for others; lends aRcs a contingency not afforded to the raw statement 'one ought not kill'.
Another difficulty I can see is how we would extract propositional content from 'one ought not kill', say that we've abstracted 'ought' to an operator O on propositions, what proposition x would you write to translate 'one ought not kill' to the form O(x)? It looks to me like the easiest translation would be just to take 'not kill', but that is not a proposition - rather it's the negation of a verb, so it is not the negation of a proposition - what is the truth value of 'not kill'?. So rather than operating on propositions, O should be able to range over events and somehow the 'negation' of events. The easiest path I see here is to make O operate over stipulated events which either occur or do not occur, interpreting negation as nonoccurence of the event.
Edit: just to be particularly perverse, we might be able to imagine O as a mapping from events and non-occurrences to propositions; which are thus true or false. Ought-language and moral reasoning seems to be done with much the same moves as we would expect from logical discourse, even if the domain of O were not propositions.
Let's go with it. Does that perception have a meaning, or not? That, after all, is what I'm trying to understand -- your boundaries for the usage of the term "meaning".
So it's important to understand that meaning is an activity that we perform. It's not something that external things have or not.
Can we perform that activity (the meaning activity) in response to our perceptions, sure. But it's not identical to the perceptions. It's something additional to them.
'One ought not kill': Killing is an element in the group of things we ought not do.
'One ought follow the imperative 'do not kill'': 'Do not kill' is an element of the group of things we ought do, and is an imperative.
Roughly. Plenty of errors there. Reminiscent f Davidson's attempt to parse English in a first order language.
Sure, it can be, but that doesn't mean that it's appropriate to do so. And it wouldn't be appropriate if one only meant to make a descriptive statement.
Quoting Banno
Doesn't follow. You need an additional premise which works, but the first quote doesn't work as a premise tying this together, because what about when it's inappropriate?
Nice try, but the is/ought problem remains a problem.
And that activity is mental association, right?
So if I associate tea with crumpets then I have a meaning, let's just say that I put them in any relation together (be it in space, as a meal, or within time) then that is the meaning-activity.
Where does language enter in this picture?
Meaning is the associative act, not what you're associating (just to make sure you're clear on that).
Language enters the picture because it's one of the primary things we assign meanings to.
And is language somehow then outside of meaning?
I wouldn't say that it's possible to "put something not into a relation with something else."
So yeah, it's a kind of relation.
Quoting Moliere
That would just depend on how you want to think about it/what you want to focus on. You could just look at a text as marks on a page or utterances as soundwaves--those are aspects of what we commonly call language. If you just want to focus on that stuff, you can.
Well, we disagree profoundly here.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Quoting Terrapin Station
It's just that your explanation needs some more - you explain "sense"in terms of meaning.
A better approach for you might well be Davidson's triangulation. As it stands there is nothing that your two participants hav in common. Their shared world can provide that. Then you might have something like "As long as I can make sense per my understanding of our shared world".
Otherwise, if all you have is more meanings and concepts all located in your refrigerator, you will be stuck inside.
You cannot pick up the meaning. It's not that it has no meaning, and it's not that it needs to be given one, it's that you need to pick it up. Banno can help with that. He can share his language rule. [I]This[/I] is to be interpreted like [i]this[/I], and not like [I]that[/I]. That sort of thing.
So let's hash it out in the PI thread.
Quoting Banno
Again, I'm not going to bother at all with anything based on a critique of whether anything is an "explantion" or not without you setting out your general criteria for explanations. (Which I'd then have to test to make sure that it's really your criteria.)
Quoting Banno
If that were so, then what of it?
Ah, someone else who confuses understanding and meaning. My distinction can help you with that problem. What you're describing in your first sentence is understanding, not meaning. Meaning is something that external things can have, like a written sentence.
No need. Others will help you.
I think I have to be picky here and say that it's quite a lot different to have 'ought' ranging over activities like killing and commands like 'Do not kill'. The grammar's quite a lot different. Imperatives have a structure something like the below account (for imperative speaker S, an agent H and an event E). Taken from here, I'm sure there are limitations of the account I won't understand.
a. S refers to an event (stipulated) E that can potentially be brought about by H
b. S takes an (affirmative) stance towards the actualization of this potential (S affirms that E should be brought about by H)
c. S presents this stance as relevant to H’s decisions about H’s future course of action.
Whereas activities aren't even language stuff. The deed isn't the promise or command to do it. Letting the domain range over imperatives and activities without an eye for their differences removes the distinctions between them. Relevant distinctions are that imperatives are performative relational triads, words for activities (in the context we're using them anyway) are singular and constantive. We can evaluate imperatives by substituting in S's E's and H's, 'killing' is always just killing and 'not killing' is always just not killing. You could view them from the same vantage point with the same (modal) operator, but this means that 'ought' actually ranges (partly) over speech acts!
Having said that, there are some interesting aspects of the grammar of moral language that can be cleaned up. Moral statements have a direction of fit that distinguishes them from some other sorts of statements; they are unlike mere statements of preference, in that they set out what others should do, not just what the speaker should do; and they have their import in providing justification for what we do.
I hope this wasn't directed at me, I tried so hard to put my analytic philosophy goggles on!
To be sure, speech acts are acts, and hence subject to moral interpretation. I think we agree on this.
Quoting fdrake
Triad? just to make sure we are on the same page - speaker, hearer and state of affairs? Words for activities have their use, perhaps, hen placed in such triads.
There is wisdom to that.
But it's so much fun. ;) :D
Aye. I figured that 'triad' would be less obscure than 'ternary predicate'. I don't have any goals here other than to brainfart into the thread, and I don't care so much about whether ethical statements are truth apt, about emotivism or cognitivism or the usual meta-ethical fare, I care more about paying attention to what we do with norms and imperatives and so on.
Well, for reasons I set out elsewhere, that convinces me that what you have said is insufficient to explain how we understand each other. Hence the need for some sort of triangulation.
Using words presupposes a shared world, which those words are about.
SO it's not only in the head.
I agree with this, yes. But I think there's a pretty big distinction between the function of an imperative - how it imparts a norm and that it imparts a norm - and saying one ought to follow the same thing as a moral maxim. Having a single modal operator will not allow you to parse this distinction. It's important, as attending to the function of an imperative is not endorsing the act that imperative takes an affirmative stance towards.
“Even if we had a perfect way of observing exactly what a brain was doing, we would never be able to understand how it made us have the kinds of experiences we do. The experiences just aren't happening inside our skulls. Trying to understand consciousness in neural terms alone is like trying to understand a car driving down the road only in terms of its engine. It's bad philosophy masquerading as science.”
“But the view that the self and consciousness can be explained in terms of the brain, that the real us is found inside our skulls, isn't just misleading and wrong, it's ugly. In that view, each of us is trapped in the caverns of his own skull and the world is just a sort of shared figment. Everything is made interior, private, rational and computational. That may not pose a practical danger, but it presents a kind of spiritual danger.”
Alva Noe
https://www.salon.com/2009/03/25/alva_noe/
Let me clarify a few things, this is what you called me "idealistically" failing to distinguish between understanding and meaning.
Quoting Judaka
This is a quote which really shows that I recognised the difference between the two from the start. I would advise you that your assumptions about me are incorrect. You don't see it perhaps but I am saying what allows language to function is some level of understanding and not objective meaning. This is achieved through small enough differences in our interpretations to allow communication.
It is from the start that it was, in fact, you who has argued for objective meaning by demonstrating understanding is possible. I don't consider this "idealism" but it is something you've admitted to doing.
It is also not the case that we are debating to see whether or not you can be satisfied that you are wrong and I am right. I said earlier that you think my arguments have no merit and I think I've pretty much proven the idea of objective meaning to be false at this point. I don't really agree that the onus is on me to disprove objective meaning if you thought it existed then you must prove it. I only wanted to prove that objective meaning doesn't exist because I think I can.
I think for me to continue talking to you, I'd have to go back and revise all of your arguments for objective meaning and try to dismantle them in front of you. Whether I could or not, who knows? It just doesn't strike me as a very interesting concept and I get worried when debating people who seem to have a low opinion on me. You are the "realist" and I am the "idealist", I don't want to argue with someone who sees the debate being framed in that way.
Is meaning green or red?
Same argument.
It becomes more dubious when we ask what entire speech acts, or even larger things like novels or symphonies, 'mean'.
I have been reflecting recently on the Intentionalist vs Anti-Intentionalist perspectives in aesthetics, and find myself tending towards the view that it is an argument over nothing - that novels and symphonies do not have any meaning.
With speech acts, I find Wittgenstein's perspective intuitive and satisfying: the relevant question is not what did somebody 'mean' by a speech act but rather, why did they do it? - what were they seeking to accomplish?
'What do you mean?' is often an aggressive debating tactic, used to imply that one's interlocutor is spouting nonsense. In rare cases it is said in a friendly way because the speaker did not understand the speech act they have just heard, and are hoping the speaker will rephrase it in a way that they can then understand. Here I use 'understand' in the Wittgensteinian sense of 'realising what the speaker was trying to achieve'.
Moral statements are more easily understood in a Wittgensteinian framework. If someone says 'pre-marital sex is immoral', then likely their purpose is to influence, however slightly, the amount of pre-marital sex in the world in a downward direction. But in some cases it may be that they wish somebody to like them, who they know to have that wish about pre-marital sex. Or it might be said to somebody in order to dissuade them from trying to seduce them.
When a politician says that XYZ group of people is untrustworthy, violent, dangerous, lazy or whatever other moral insult, it is likely because they want people to support their drive for a war or other aggressive attack on that group.
No luck. A lot of people here seem to have the impression that "reading groups" should be somewhere between an apologetics strategy meeting and a cheerleading squad for the author.
But I had just explained what understanding amounts to. What part of that did you disagree with, or what did you think it didn't cover?
Oops. Nope.
Quoting Judaka
This is where the problem began. It began with you making a claim about meaning, when really it would make more sense as a claim about understanding. That there is meaning is not a result of interpretation, it is a result of setting a language rule. Interpretation relates to understanding. We understand as a result of interpretation.
As a result of this problem, I began to discuss both meaning and interpretation, and the distinctions between them.
Quoting Judaka
This is what I demonstrated to be paradoxical or false.
Quoting Judaka
This question didn't make sense to me as worded, because it's incomplete. I tried to get you to clarify by asking for what purpose:
Quoting S
Then you said something about what it is that allows language to function, which to me, is missing the point. When you entered this discussion, you began by talking about what it takes for there to be meaning, then you switched to what it is that allows language to function, and then you made a further point against an argument which I never made relating to objective meaning, saying that it doesn't demonstrate objective meaning:
Quoting Judaka
So, in response, I gave you my argument for objective meaning:
Quoting S
Then I reiterated the problem I picked up on from the beginning.
Quoting S
I could go back over the whole discussion in this manner, but I really don't want to. I've tried to get you to clarify throughout, but without much luck. The way I see it, it's a really simple issue. You're either talking about something I consider trivially true, namely that we need to interpret meaning in order to understand it, or you're talking about something I consider fundamentally flawed, which is what I think of as the idealist position on linguistic meaning, namely something along the lines that for language to have meaning, there must be a subject there interpreting it.
I really don't know why it has been so difficult throughout our discussion for you to simply let me know, clearly, where you stand on this. Hopefully your last reply will enable us to finally make some progress on this. I'll get back to you on that one.
Even if that were the case how would that not involve interpretation?
Let's say that it does involve interpretation. Does it follow that linguistic meaning is not objective (which is where the discussion lead)? No, it does not. Not as I defined objective. Only irrelevant conclusions follow, such as that the meaning couldn't be understood.
And it still wouldn't be quite right to say that meaning is the result of interpretation. It would be more right to say that it's the result of setting a language rule (and setting a language rule involves interpretation).
Please explain what you mean by the function of language, and please explain why you started going on about what it takes [i]for language to function[/I] in response to what I said. If you're just going to reveal a premise which necessarily implies something requiring a subject, like communication or understanding, then I have zero interest in that, as I consider it trivially true, and missing the point. My point was about something else, namely what it takes [i]for there to be linguistic meaning[/I], and why linguistic meaning is objective.
This point relates back to your very first sentence of your very first reply in this discussion, namely that meaning is a result of interpretation. I looked at that in terms of what it would take for there to be meaning, and my related point was that, even if interpretation was involved at an earlier stage, it is not required at a later stage for meaning to persist. Once again, it is in this sense that meaning is objective, and not subjective, by which I mean, once again, that it is not metaphysically dependent, at this stage, on there being subjects or subject-dependent activities like interpretation. That's only relevant epistemologically, and once again, I'm not making a point about epistemology.
Quoting Judaka
?
Quoting Judaka
Wow, I'm genuinely flabbergasted that you think you have shown the idea of objective meaning to be false. Please quote your refutation of my argument. You don't even seem to have addressed it. As far as I can tell, you addressed a straw man, and you have pretty much ignored my argument.
Quoting Judaka
I presented my argument long ago, back on page one. Where is yours? And if my argument refutes it, then where is your attempted rebuttal?
Quoting Judaka
That's what you should have been attempting to do from the beginning! But it's as though you got lost in your own confusion.
Quoting Judaka
Jesus Christ. It's nothing personal. Although admittedly I have found arguments utilising idealist logic to be abysmal, so if I think that you're relying on the same sort of logic, then yes, that is likely going to affect how I think of you to some extent. There's no need to get all melodramatic about it. If I'm wrong, you can set me straight. Well, you can try.
I've been trying to make sense of what you've been saying, and with little cooperation from you on that front, it's possible that I've assessed your position incorrectly. That's why I've been repeatedly trying to get you to clarify your position. But if you think that you've "pretty much proven the idea of objective meaning to be false" then you must surely be an idealist, or at least an anti-realist, with respect to linguistic meaning. Call your position whatever you like, I'm just trying to make the conversation easier by giving our distinct positions names.
Objective (as I've defined it).
Quoting Banno
Um, no. Just no.
So my understanding of a relation is derived namely from ordered pairs, where you have two sets and some kind of operation from one set to the other that gives you an element in the other set.
So my thought here is that we have two sets -- and because this is language that we probably don't want to use the relation of a strict ordered pair, but it gets the idea across of what we might mean by a relation -- a sort of table where things are grouped together. The elements of one set are the phonic substance, as Saussure called it -- or the digital shapes that we are using now. I imagine that we must be going from the phonic substance to something in the refridgerator. Now, meaning is just this association, so my question is -- what are the elements of the set within the refridgerator to which the phonic substance, scribbles, or digital shapes are relating to?
How are you defining objective so that interpretation (and meaning) could be objective?
First, I'm not a realist on mathematics, and especially not on sets.
Relations are simply any way that two things are related to each other. "To the left of (from perspective x)" is a relation. "Cause" a la "x caused y" is a relation. "Is the parent of" is a relation. "Is located on the same planet as" is a relation. Etc.
The relation in question with respect to meaning is that some individual is performing the act of making an association between x and y, where the association isn't just arbitrary for them, but is at least periodically, in particular contexts, brought to mind for them when they think about x and/or y.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/254350
Not sure why you're repeating that. I addressed all of that.
Okay, let's try this again since you gave such a reasonable response.
Let me tell you just a tiny bit about myself; I am a hardcore pragmatist, who's generally never interested in epistemology or metaphysics unless it's absolutely necessary. I'm also a moral relativist and I reject the idea of objective meaning as a concept. This is an important point to me in many different areas, religion, politics, morality, language and so on.
If I didn't think the objective meaning would be problematic as a concept, I probably wouldn't bother talking about it or thinking about it at all. This isn't a discussion about whether we want objective meaning or not - but whether it exists but I think it's important to understand my motivations here. I consider it to be a dreadful thing, when the concept of objective meaning is invoked, I am less concerned by the falseness of the claim but with how this idea threatens many things I hold to be of great value. That's another thread though.
Understanding vs Meaning
Let me clarify my position, understanding requires interpretation or "this means that". Understanding is not the same as meaning but meaning also requires interpretation. To understand language, we need to have some idea of the meaning of words and phrases, obviously, so I'd argue understanding requires meaning and meaning requires interpretation.
My understanding is that your position is that language has a coherent ruleset, the meaning of words is defined in the language and there are correct ways to use the language and incorrect ways. The language no longer requires interpretation, you simply need to follow the rules.
Now we're talking about language without anyone to speak it, so there's no "you" and the rules will persist regardless of whether or not anyone is there to interpret or use them.
The first really important thing we needed to clarify is what are the actual rules for English you're referring to. I don't think you ever appreciated how big of a hurdle this is. I am going to limit myself to talking about English in a universe where no humans exist so I hope you'll do the same since that's what we're talking about.
Quoting S
Let me rephrase the question then, in a universe where there is nobody. Where are the rules for English? You're saying English has these rules that will exist regardless of people but I don't know what rules you're talking about. I don't know what you think I'm trying to prove by asking this from you so let me clarify.
My position is that English does have some basic rules, these rules are insufficient to argue for objective meaning, like not even close. They don't even attempt to do that, they are just some basic rules of which half of them a lot of people just ignore anyway. I use Grammarly to help me with my punctuation and half the time I ignore its advice because I disagree with it.
If you want to argue English has rules to an extent that creates objective meaning then you need to clarify what they are. If you take this exercise seriously, I hope this in itself will disprove the idea that English has rules sufficient for objective meaning. If not then, we can continue to debate once we have some rules and talking about what they can and can't do.
It will not be an easy task to show any ruleset you provide is some kind of official ruleset for English. Dictionaries are not the same, common use of English bypasses some of its rules and new words are created, definitions change and the language is not being used the same way by everyone. However, I will not make this an issue, just bring up some rules and we can examine them.
If you can't do this, then at least rephrase your argument. It's preposterous to argue that the rules of English do this or that without even explaining what the rules for English are and just telling me "You know them" when this whole exercise assumes I don't even exist.
Yes I think so. There are occasional exceptions. For instance I may be wrestling with a moral decision about my own potential future actions, and seeking advice from others. I may put forward a moral statement and ask others what they think about it, as a means of exploring what decision I really feel I ought to take. In that case my purpose in making the statement is to try to resolve my own bout of indecision.
No, interpretation isn't objective. By objective I mean independent of any subject or subjective activity. Interpretation is a subjective activity. Obviously it requires a subject. Linguistic meaning, however, once it has been set, does not require a subject or any subjective activity at all times for it to persist. In this sense, it is objective. If all of us were to go extinct right now, it would still be the case that words like "car", "bike", "cat", and so on, mean what they mean in English. The language rules have been set. Why would they suddenly cease to apply, just because no one is there to understand them?
I'm a metaphysical realist. There's a similar argument for why truth, reality, as well as things like cars, bikes, and apples, are objective.
So the meaning becomes what in your view, a set of sounds, or text marks, or behaviors, or what?
Interpretation is a brain process. It is not the same as "this means that", which is a language rule. Understanding definitely requires interpretation and the kind of mental associations which that entails. [I]But this is a tangent.[/I]
Quoting Judaka
You have twice above asserted that meaning requires interpretation, but, thus far, as far as I can tell, you have yet to provide a logically valid demonstration of that. Perhaps you will do so further down. We'll see.
Quoting Judaka
No longer requires interpretation [B]FOR WHAT?!?!?[/B]
This is that same problem you have with incomplete sentences. How can I agree or disagree if your sentence is incomplete, and your meaning isn't clear?
If you're talking about interpretation being required for understanding, then please try to remember that [i]this is completely beside the point[/I]. From very early on, back on page one, I clearly stated that I'm not disputing that.
And if you're talking about interpretation being required for there to be linguistic meaning, then [i]I am still waiting for you to present a valid argument.[/I]
Quoting Judaka
Yes, if we all went extinct right now, that's the hypothetical scenario which demonstrates objective meaning. What of it?
Quoting Judaka
I've given examples. There are innumerable examples, and it is very easy to come up with them. You could do so yourself. For you or I to deny the rules of the English language would be a very obvious performative contradiction.
Quoting Judaka
To ask where the rules are doesn't make sense to me, so I can't answer it. Unless you're just asking for a physical display, like a poster or a page in a book. Otherwise it seems like asking what time the colour red is.
I already gave you specific examples, like the general language rule for what the word "car" means in English, and I already showed you the general form that they take: [I]this[/I] means [i]that[/I].
Quoting Judaka
Still no valid counter argument. Still no valid refutation. Merely asserting that it's insufficient won't do.
Quoting Judaka
I've already given examples, and you are more than capable of providing examples yourself, so over to you. Stop trying to shift the burden all the time.
Quoting Judaka
I already have. I told you that it doesn't even have to be English, you can make up your own language if you want to. It will necessarily involve language rules, and that's all I need. The burden is on you to attempt to refute my argument, and if you keep failing to even attempt it, then eventually I will give up trying and take that as a win by default. You are trying my patience, and I am warning you that if you continue down this path for much longer, then I will give up through exasperation and bring our discussion to an end.
Quoting Judaka
It's not my fault if you're not paying sufficient attention and feigning ignorance. And it would be very silly to even expect us to be talking to each other if we're to actually act as though neither of us exist throughout this whole exchange. You do evidently already know enough of the rules of the English language, as this discussion we're having undoubtedly demonstrates, so you don't need me to tell you them for the purpose of progressing this discussion. That's just an excuse. Are you buying for time or what? You have much to explain. I recommend you at least make a start.
[B]This ought to be [I]quid pro quo[/I]. That's the deal if you want to continue this. Over to you. Don't disappoint me.[/b]
So basically here's what I got from you.
1. English (or any language) has objective meaning
2. However, not all of the language, just some of it
3. There are rules for the language that create this objective meaning
4. But we don't know exactly what they are, they are just floating around somewhere and you shouldn't have to explain what they are, it's a trivial point really
Quoting S
5. Speakers create some rules when needed (which seems to be often), they become part of the English ruleset and fix the problem of lack of rules.
6. Demonstrating that definitions are insufficient for specificity is not a problem.
7. All of this is purely hypothetical and English clearly is interpreted when being used, however, I'm being idealistic by thinking English lacks objective meaning (something which would invalidate interpretation) when it's not being used.
I talked a lot about logical validity but apparently, you thought I was saying your argument lacked logical validity rather than me saying objective meaning requires logical validity so idk, we'll just leave that out.
I'm going to be honest with you, I've already presented a lot of counter-arguments and I've gone back and read some of your responses. You either don't see them as arguments, you misunderstood what I was saying or you waved them off as irrelevant by adding new information to your position not previously disclosed. I just have no idea how to argue against your position in a way that will make you happy. You seem to think we're having this understanding and I'm just being difficult, I assure you, there's very little understanding going on here, for both sides.
I actually think your argument could be blown over by the wind. It's vague, it's not clear how to disprove it and it's fairly dishonest. You also aren't really understanding anything I say. I mean you've quoted me here saying "English lacks rules sufficient for objective meaning" and called it not an argument. This is basically my experience talking to you.
If I really am bringing up arguments that don't refute your "argument" it's because I legitimately have no idea how to disprove your argument. I have no idea what logic you're leaning on, no idea what evidence you have and I really don't understand what you are talking about with "rules". Your argument seems to me just "it's obvious my stance is right, disprove me".
That's fine. Then we have xRy, where y is the phonic substance or scribbles on a paper or digital shapes. x is whatever is in the fridge.
Can you specify what x or R are?
Well, both x and y can be anything, really. You can make the associations between scribbles on paper and other scribbles you'd make on paper, or a sign (as in a literal sign) and and action, or whatever.
As for R, that's the associative act, which you can't "specify" in words or anything, because it's not words. It's the activity of making an association, which is inherently mental. We can't make that into something else.
And so while we would call these associations meaning, what then would we call the meaning when we're talking about the English language? How does that relate to this associating?
It doesn't become anything other than what it already is: a language rule, as in [I]this[/I] means [I]that[/I]. You can categorise that however you like, but in the scenario where we go extinct in, say, an hours time, it would still be the case that [I]this[/I] means [I]that[/I]. Why wouldn't it be? No one is presenting any counter arguments against me.
The associative act. That's different than the scribbles.
Where is the language rule?
So how do we go from this activity -- which I'd say is common to many cognitive systems, which is evidenced by Pavlov's dog -- to knowing English? Since it is this sort of meaning that is of interest here, given that we're building towards moral statements.
So conventionally, you know English in an individual's estimation if you can coherently (to the person judging) formulate sentences (usually we require many different sentences in many different contexts) utilizing words conventionally (at least per some subpopulation) named "English."
No, of course it's not the same. Language doesn't just involve meaning, but it does involve meaning (at least at some stage).
But I'd also say that you and I know the meaning of all the sentences we have thus far used in spite of that.
Do you agree with me?
Well, "knowing the meaning" refers to the fact that we're making associations for the words, phrases, sentences, etc., with an implication of understanding, so that everything is going along coherently (in our views) in context of the overall conversation.
So yeah, keeping in mind that that's what it is, we agree.
I'd just say that there's not much more to knowing the meaning than exactly what's said -- if I talk to a dog using English then the dog does not know the meaning of my sentences. If I talk to someone who doesn't know English they, too, do not know the meaning of my sentences.
But if a person speaks within said conventions, seems to respond to statements, questions, commands, and so forth in the manner I'd expect a person who knows English to speak -- and to act, more widely -- then they know what I mean.
And that we do this very successfully.
Where is the time? I can show you a clock, if that helps, but that only displays the time.
In my view nothing exists without a location, including time. Time is located at every change or motion in the universe.
You believe that some things exist without a location then?
I don't buy that there are any real abstracts.
If what's said is the meaning then you'd say that meaning is a property of sound waves for example?
These are the possibilities: a) it has a location, but I don't know where it's located, b) it has a location, but no one knows where it is, c) it doesn't have a location, d) it doesn't even make sense to ask where it's located, as that would be a category error.
I find d) the most plausible, but whatever possibility is true, there's objective linguistic meaning. I stand by that, and I think that my argument is logically sound. No one here thus far has proven themselves willing and able to refute it.
So, where is what's the case located? Where are facts located? That seems like nonsense to me. If you're going to say that it's in our heads or something, then I think that that's a seriously flawed position. Even if we all went extinct tomorrow, this or that would be the case. There would still be facts. For example, it would be the case that there are planets. That would be a fact, even if there was no one around to grasp that fact.
If we all went extinct right now, what would happen to linguistic meaning? For example, it is the case that the word "cup", in English, means a small bowl-shaped container for drinking from, typically having a handle. Or, you don't even have to think of that as a rule of English. Let's just say that it is my rule, in English, for what the word "cup" means. If you don't accept that as a rule of English language, then let's say that it's a rule of my language, which is based on the English language.
Now, can you simply tell me why "cup" would cease to mean a small bowl-shaped container for drinking from, typically having a handle, in my language, in this scenario? That strikes me as illogical. Because no one would be there to understand it? Why would that be necessary for there to be linguistic meaning? Why would that be necessary for "cup" to mean what it means in the language? That is baffling to me. Idealist logic in general is baffling to me. [I]To be is to be perceived[/I] is codswallop.
Facts refer to some set of physical phenomena, so wherever the phenomena in question are located. Locations can be complex, scattered, non-contiguous, etc.--for example, the fact that there are multiple mountains on Earth isn't one contiguous location; it obtains in the locations of all the mountains. Nevertheless, those are locations.
I find that view peculiar and unconvincing. But anyway, if that is so, then language rules must have a location or multiple locations in one of those ways.
Do you buy the notion of real (non-mental) abstracts?
If what I've said counts as that, then yes. I buy that if we all went extinct right now, then language would still have meaning, and I don't buy that it makes sense to ask where that meaning would be, as though it has a location. Likewise with facts. It would still be the case that there are planets, and I don't buy that it makes sense to ask where what's the case is located.
This seeking a location for everything, to me, is peculiar, like seeking what colour time is, or seeking what kind of beliefs rocks have, because this simply must apply to everything without exception. I think you'll inevitably end up grasping at straws.
I can point to locations of related stuff, like written language and planets, but not to a location of linguistic meaning or facts about planets.
This is not what a cup is, there are all kinds of shapes in cups. There are also things which fit this description which are not cups like bowls, pots etc.
It'd be easier if you just made up your own language. "ifhefihefo fiohewofi feo9fupojqpo fnewofi".
Which would in your language, perfectly describe what a cup is in a way that can't be achieved in English. It is perfect from all perspective, no problems whatsoever at all and this is an immutable fact. Excellent work, there's nobody who can dispute it so therefore you must've created objective meaning.
Quoting S
All we could say about language is how it used to be used. Without anyone there to interpret what the words meant, they would mean nothing.
What does 1+1 = 2 mean? No interpretation, no meaning.
Interpretation literally means to determine (consciously or subconsciously) "this means that", it's something only a living creature can do. You can write things down, make up your own rules and do whatever you want but these things only have meaning so long as you're around to interpret their meaning.
You've gone wrong straight away. That's what a cup is in my language. You don't get to make the rules. It's my language, not yours. And if you're talking about a different language, then you're changing the subject without warrant.
Quoting Judaka
I just did. It is my language, based on how the English language is commonly spoken.
Quoting Judaka
I see no reason to switch to a different language which looks how you want it to look. But sure, why not? In my second language, a cup means ifhefihefo fiohewofi feo9fupojqpo fnewofi, which, when translated into my first language, means a small bowl-shaped container for drinking from, typically having a handle.
You haven't successfully disputed what a cup is in my language. What makes you think you have? :lol:
Quoting Judaka
Why would the language rules cease to apply? The rules don't depend on constant use of the language. Why would they suddenly stop applying, just because we all suddenly died?
Quoting Judaka
That's absurd. So, because no one is there to [i]understand[/I] the meaning, there [i]is[/I] no meaning? Surely you can see the error here?
There is linguistic meaning. For example, the word cup means what it does. Now, this linguistic meaning that is there, is not understood. Therefore, this linguistic meaning that is there, is also not there. There is meaning, but there isn't. :chin:
This is clearly the same awful logic of an idealist, and you should at the very least own up to it. [I]To be[/I] is [i]to be perceived[/I]? I don't think so.
Quoting Judaka
It means one plus one equals two. No interpretation, no [i]understanding[/I]. Nothing of relevance follows regarding meaning. It means what it means, regardless.
Quoting Judaka
No, [i]linguistic meaning[/I] is determined by setting language rules, which take the form: "this means that". This is [i]not[/I] the same thing as interpretation, so stop muddling it up with interpretation.
Language rules, [i]once set[/I], do not require language speakers hanging around, doing whatever, in order for the rules to apply, and thus for there to be meaning. That makes no rational sense whatsoever.
[I]Interpretation[/I], on the other hand, is what we do to try to understand language, to try to ascertain what the meaning is. It's a mental process, and it obviously requires capable beings.
You don't seem to understand this distinction at all, despite my sincere efforts. I am beginning to lose hope.
Quoting Judaka
Interpretation? No shit. Unfortunately, that's completely irrelevant, as I've said multiple times. Why on earth would you think that I am so idiotic as to fail to realise that interpretation is something that only a living creature can do? I explicitly acknowledged this ages ago at the very beginning. Aren't you reading what I'm saying? Wake up for Christ's sake.
Quoting Judaka
That is simply illogical. Maybe we should just leave it at that, because you're just not getting it.
Yes! Good times. I picked up a thing or two from that discussion, as you may have noticed. :grin:
Fair point.
Quoting S
The problem with talking to you is that you decide what my positions are based on what you think is reasonable.
If I talk about meaning, I mean it's coming from interpretation. That's my position. I haven't talked about understanding and I'm getting tired of being misrepresented, I appreciate that from your perspective what I'm saying seems irrelevant but if you don't take what I am saying as I'm saying it then we can't have a conversation.
I can't talk about meaning as though it just exists in the universe like it's matter. To me what you're saying is like love exists without intelligent life, it's like saying confusion exists even if life disappears.
If someone writes down what love is, perhaps the concept is immortalised but the thing love doesn't exist anymore.
You can write down "this means that" but the actual thing of meaning, which is created by intelligent life, isn't present anymore. It's gone.
But yes, let's agree to disagree. There was a lot of miscommunication between us which was unfortunate but it's pretty common in conversations I have with people where they are making assumptions about me from the get-go.
It's kind of to be expected that someone who calls me an idealist with irrational contradictory positions within a few paragraphs of meeting me, isn't going to treat the rest of what I say as though I might have reasonable reasons for thinking the way I do.
I think you've framed this whole debate like you have the standard, acceptable position and I'm over here preaching like a madman about doomsday.
I genuinely have no idea what you're talking about. I've been going around forums like this for 2-3 years and posting somewhat regularly and I've disagreed with a lot of people but this is the first time anyone has ever called me an idealist.
I don't think you've thought very deeply about this topic at all. I feel like I'm debating a 12-year-old.
Oh well, that's enough.
And by the by, I've been going around forums like this for at least ten years, posting far more regularly than you, amassing posts totaling [i]over 9,000[/I], and I've seen much of it all before. I've spent more time thinking about these things, whereas you've probably spend more time watching anime. That's why I'm drawing these philosophical links which you do not recognise.
It seems equally weird to me that it wouldn't seem obvious that facts are located wherever the things they're "facts of" are located.
Obvious?! It's extremely weird that you presumably believe that, for example, the fact that I'm alive is actually located somewhere, presumably somewhere nearby me at all times, wherever I go, like an invisible tracking device or something.
That fact that you're alive is located wherever you are, as (long as) you continue to breathe, metabolize, undergo cell division, etc. How in the world would you think that fact is located nowhere or everywhere or whatever you think?
It's the third option in your question, as I previously made clear to you. I do not think that it's located everywhere, nor do I think that it's located nowhere, I think that it's a category error.
I reject your position because, firstly, it seems completely inappropriate to assume that there must be a location from the outset, which is to put the cart before the horse. And secondly, this leads to absurdity in innumerable cases. And by absurdity, I don't mean the strict logical sense, but rather that it forces you to come up with terrible and unconvincing explanations, whereas I don't have that massive problem. I think that my position has greater intuitive appeal, and makes more sense. Your position is counterintuitive, makes no sense, and severely lacks evidence, because all of the evidence that I'm alive is not evidence that there is a fact located nearby me at all times whilst I'm alive. You don't seem to have any evidence for that at all. It's just a bizarre, unsubstantiated belief. But you seem committed to it because of your broader commitments.
If you think that it doesn't have a location, then you think that it's located nowhere. The only way to think that it's not located nowhere is to think that it has a location. "It's located nowhere" is another way of saying "It doesn't have a location."
Quoting S
The idea of extant things with no location is incoherent.
Quoting S
Why are you saying "a fact located nearby me"?
The fact is located at you. It's the fact that you're breathing and metabolizing etc. You have a location. Your breathing has a location. Your metabolism and cell division etc. have a location.
Facts are states of affairs. Ways that the world is. There's a state of affairs that you exist, that you're breathing, etc. Those states of affairs have a location.
Are you thinking of "fact" linguistically? In other words, some people call true propositions "facts." I don't use "fact" that way (a la analytic philosophy, stemming from Russell, Wittgenstein, etc.) If you're asking me about "true propositions," my ontology of that is very different than what I'm saying about facts.
I think I'd describe my beliefs about meaning in analogue with intuitionists on moral matters or mathematics, minus some tendencies in intuitionism to believe in stability -- since clearly words do change their meaning with time and usage.
And if that were true then it would follow that we'd all be able to pinpoint the meaning of words, moral or otherwise.
Where I think I agree with you, @andrewk, is in looking at usage to determine meaning -- I'd just say that meaning exists, and it is not identical to usage. Looking at usage in context is the method for determining meaning. And there are shades of meaning, too, in most phrases -- so you might focus on how the meaning of a moral phrase is meant to influence others, and someone else might focus on another aspect like how a moral phrase expresses one's sentiments about some action or another, and I'd just insist that some moral phrases are also -- not opposed to either of these previous theories but in addition to them -- truth-apt, because of the way some moral phrases are said are said in a descriptive sense.
What sophism! Do please pay close attention to my wording of the following: I [i]don't[/I] think that it has a location, and I [i]don't[/I] think that it doesn't have a location, because I [i]think[/I] that it's a category error. There's no contradiction in that. It's not the kind of thing which does or doesn't have a location.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Bare assertion.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Fine, whatever, it's still a whacky and implausible theory.
Quoting Terrapin Station
I accept that. That's an irrelevant point which doesn't lead to your conclusion without some illogical tinkering which I have good reason to reject.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Facts are what's the case. If you are going to claim that what's the case has a location, then you have a burden of proof for that. Nothing you've said so far has convinced me in the slightest.
Quoting Terrapin Station
No, facts are simply what's the case. True propositions just [i]correspond[/I] with facts. But it still makes no sense to ask where [i]they're[/I] located, rather than, in at least some cases, where [i]what they're about[/I] is located. If we take a fact about me, then I can give you [i]my[/I] location, but that does nothing whatsoever for your crackpot theory about [i]facts[/I] having a location.
What counts as a moral statement?
Are we limiting the scope to moral judgments? "X is moral/immoral"? "X is good/bad"? "One ought do/not do X"?
I like the direction of fit notion that Banno invoked. It involves the meaning of the statement but not solely in terms of moral judgments.
Promises come to mind.
Without expressing my approval/disapproval, but rather just acknowledging what the making of a promise is...
When one promises to do X, then X ought be done.
Whether or not I approve of X is irrelevant to what it means.
If that is a command, and commands are not truth-apt, then neither is that utterance of ought.
Just saw this response now.
"What's the case" is ambiguous to me, because people often use it to refer to, for example, stating propositions. Otherwise, what's the difference between "what's the case" and "state of affairs" a la there being some dynamic physical things in particular relations to other dynamic physical things?
If someone were to say, "When one promises to do X, then X ought not to be done"--so they were to claim that that's the "meaning" of a promise, what would we appeal to if we want to claim that they're (objectively) incorrect?
Some aspects seem to include claims to universality across all responsible moral actors, the notion that one's belief does not change whether something is good or evil, and that the subject matter is of particular import to living life.
Further, while I grant subjectivity, I also think there's also similarity in our subjectivity. How do I know? Because when someone relates to me their experience I can feel that experience based upon what I've felt before -- I can feel someone else's pain, I can relate my life to another's. They are not identical, but similar. This relating happens a great deal of the time, too -- so while it is important to recognize we are different, I think it's also important to recognize our similarities too.
It's in this way that we might be able to argue that morality is a factual, if not empirical, matter. But the more I think of it the more I think that we would be abandoning naturalism in so saying -- which may be just too much for some to go along with.
Misunderstanding accompanied by a dichotomy that is inherently incapable of taking proper account of morality.
I think that I know. However, what I think I know does not always match up to conventional understanding/notions. I asked not to be intentionally obtuse, but rather to perhaps seque into reasoning that leads us to scrutinize the conventional notion of moral statement.
Quoting Moliere
See, right there is something queer to me. I mean, don't get me wrong. I totally agree with what you said above. I would readily concur.
However...
Moralizing is thinking about one's own thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. Thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour is prior to thinking about it. On my view, not all thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour is moral thought/belief, but all moral thought/belief is thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. Moral statements have the same conditions/criterion as moral thought/belief.
Here, of course, I'm not using the term "moral" to denote value, or approval. Rather, it is a kind of thought/belief and statements thereof.
I don't understand the bit about unchanging belief...
Misunderstanding of what and a proper account of morality per what?
I'd invite you to present some reasoning, if you wish. If it sparks a comment or thought in me then I'll share. But I'm failing to see where you're going with this.
Quoting creativesoul
I just mean that the following conditional is false:
If I believe that "kicking puppies is wrong" is true then "kicking puppies is wrong" is true
"Kicking puppies is wrong" may be true, but my belief, or lack thereof, in said statement does not change its truth-value.
Quoting creativesoul
This seems to cloistered in one's own thoughts, to me. When we moralize we are addressing others. When Ted moralizes on the evils of adultery, he is not talking about his beliefs, he is talking about adultery.
A point I use because we can often moralize about what I don't think is within the domain of morality. You can rationalize why adultery is wrong by making some notion about promises, but to me it just doesn't come on the same level as, say, ensuring the hungry are fed or preventing murder.
But even when we moralize about what I believe is not morally significant, we're talking about actions, dispositions, or character -- not our own beliefs.
Gotcha. I would concur.
Quoting Moliere
Drawing and maintaining the distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief is imperative to understanding all sorts of things about us and the world we find ourselves within. It's crucial for the ability to discriminate between conceptions/notions, including but not limited to morality. Academia has failed here, and still does as far as I can tell. The relevance to moral philosophy and doscourse would include allowing one to be able to distinguish between moral thought/belief that is informed by language, and moral thought/belief that precedes language. Again, the term moral denotes a classification and/or kind of thought/belief.
I am of the very strong opinion that everyone is involved in the same process, in the same set of circumstances, regarding forming and/or having our initial worldview, which includes belief about what's good/bad, right/wrong, moral/immoral. By and in large one's, initial worldview is adopted via language acquisition and it's subsequent use.
We're all in the same boat in this way. Unpacking what that is existentially dependent upon gleans knowledge of morally relevant common denominators. Trusting the truthfulness of the teacher being an important one.
And ourselves...
I would concur that this is often the case. Ted is expressing and/or presenting his beliefs about adultery, via language use. That's an overly simplistic account though.
When we begin to explain our reasoning, our ground for our belief, or when we begin to compare/contrast... we are most certainly talking about our belief. Knowing the difference is crucial to understanding the world and/or ourselves.
I get what you're saying here Moliere. It is interesting that you've chosen to invoke promises, giving one's word. I would sharply disagree regarding the moral significance of making a promise, but do not look to argue this point here, as the thread is about the meaning of moral statements/claims.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Misunderstanding of the role that meaning plays in making a promise, particularly regarding truth conditions setting that out. That's what I was discussing.
Proper account of morality cannot involve the objective/subjective dichotomy. I've already offered more than adequate argument against that idea. You've neglected those offerings and continue on unabated.
You've jumped to questions about how to discriminate between competing utterances of ought, regarding a previous promise.
If you know what making a promise means, then the utterance of ought in question simply confirms that. It is what one expects to happen, solely as a result of knowing what making a promise means and believing that the speaker is sincere.
I've explained this numerous times in the other thread we're both involved in. Care to address what I've asserted?
In other words, you'd be saying that they have the meaning wrong. But that's just what they're saying--that you have the meaning wrong. So when I ask you what we'd appeal to, I'm asking you what we can look at to figure out who is really right or wrong.
Quoting creativesoul
I said absolutely nothing about that in my reply to you that you're addressing. I asked you "proper account of morality per what?" You're supposed to tell me per what.
Quoting creativesoul
I got to make clearer some of my thoughts on meaning.
And I think this grammar is interesting that you provided:
Quoting Banno
(switching topics here, thinking of @andrewk)Something about saying moral statements are meant to influence others doesn't quite sit right with me -- not that I'm unfamiliar with the phenomena. Of course people say these things to influence others. But it seems that we say things we believe are right or wrong not to influence others -- at least when thinking about what is the right thing to do -- but because it is the right thing to do.
I'm not sure how to put it, though, without sounding like I'm basically just running in a circle.
Turns out @Terrapin Station doesn't think mathematical statements have a truth value. I can't see how that could be made to work.
The direction of fit stuff is from Searle, and Anscombe; so it stretches across both Oxford and Cambridge. I think it very useful.
Unless - and this is a very different way to proceed - one's purpose is the will to power. Then, morality being subservient to will, all moral statements are ways of making things as you will.
And there is something to be said for that approach too, I think. Something that's been niggling at the back of my mind in thinking through all this is that another approach that hasn't been mentioned is to say that debating the truth or falsity of this or that statement or theory misses the point entirely -- that we are the ones who have to make these decisions regardless of whether such and such is true or false.
And that seems to open the door to existential ethics.
Though, for myself at least, I don't think I am the sort of person who could fully commit to a will-to-power ethos. It's quite lonely, and seems to make some people masters while others are slaves (to morality, but thereby making them useful to the masters) -- and that just seems like a sad life to me. (not that all existential ethics are like the Will to Power -- heck, even Nietzsche doesn't always agree with himself here, I think.)
Yeah, someone could stipulate that they're only going to use the word "moral" when people have in mind something like a categorical imperative--and if that's the way they insist on using the term, there's probably little we could do to change their mind, but people think about what they call morality in a much broader way than that.
I have a subjectivist theory of truth, anyway, so it's not going to amount to what you want it to amount to if I think a sentence has a truth value.
I actually would say that mathematical and other claims that are subjective do have a truth value if we're talking about someone who uses a relation other than correspondence for the truthmaker relation, and my theory allows for various relations, but I use correspondence and I didn't want to get into a big tangent on truth theory, so I simplified this.
And actually even the above is a simplification. Truth value could also work for these claims under a correspondence relation depending on how an individual interprets/assigns meaning to the proposition in question.
The problem for what you want, however, is that on my view, all of this stuff is subjective.
I've actually read some of that before re Searle etc. but I sure didn't remember it. I don't agree with some of aspects of it re what I'm reading now to review it (like the assumptions that are made about the criteria for a desire to be satisfied), but the distinction at least makes some sense. At that, a moral whatever-we-want-to-call-it per se can't be made to obtain "in the world." Only what we'd prefer could be made to obtain. In other words, the moral part of it can't be made external.
I should have quoted you above. I was basically agreeing with this comment.
I wrote a short thesis on this once, relating it to organisational leadership and bringing in Feyerabend. The point was to explain organisational irrationality in terms of the need to act: "We need to do something; this is something; so we'll do this".
I thought so, too. But apparently not. You see, the upshot of the argument is that rational leaders in an organisation ought do as little as possible. Whenever I tried to implement this approach, instead of a promotion I got a reprimand.
What's the case are facts. The two are no different. It's the case that today is Sunday. It's a fact that I'm at home.
I just reject your, "It must be about dynamic physical things in particular relations to other dynamic physical things!".
It's just about stuff. I'm not committed to that stuff necessarily being physical. Is Sunday physical? Weird.