Giving someone a burden they didn't need to experience is wrong
Let us say someone was in some blissful Buddhist like state for long periods of time. In fact, their whole day is the experience of emptiness that comes with 8 hours of meditation. Let us say this person can indefinitely keep this blissful state going.
Now let us say someone else comes along and sees that this person isn't experience any adversity or struggles in life. They just sit there seemingly doing nothing. This person decides that the meditative Buddhist needs to stop navel-gazing and start living a "real" life, one where the struggle is real, until one can cope or overcome the challenge. Now, this person decides that the handful of rice the Buddhist navel-gazer was getting through begging wasn't challenging enough. He decides to tell all the suppliers of the navel-gazer's rice to stop doing this and provides some reasoning that convinces them not to feed the navel-gazer anymore. The navel-gazer now has to venture out of his usual routine and needs to work for a living. At this work, the navel-gazer (whose whole life has thus far been meditation on nothingness) is exposed to managers, coworkers, demands, and challenges of tasks that he never had to do before. He has to learn the ropes of dealing with the manager, the coworkers, the demands of the job, accomplishing the task so not to get hassled or fired. He learns to do this but starts experience the usual stresses of the average non-navel-gazing citizen. His techniques don't work on this new form of strife. He only knew how conquer his own boredom when left alone and allowed to beg for food, but this kind of dealings with others is not in his repertoire and his usual coping techniques aren't working.
The adversity builds and he learns more or less how to deal with it, in the normal fashion. He hasn't overcome the adversity of his everyday life, but simply deals with it. Goes to work, tries to find some accomplishment there, tries to avoid negative situations (though sometimes unavoidable), finds entertainments of the mind to fill his time. He feels loneliness for the first time, and the need for companionship.
Okay, this situation is obviously a very contrived situation. But you can probably tell where this is going in regards to being an analogy for antinatalism. What is the point of exposing another person to adversity when a new person doesn't have to be exposed to adversity in the first place? Is that a good thing to do for someone else, being they don't exist to care about any benefits that might arise from adversity? Even if benefits arise from adversity, when none exists for a particular person in the first place, is it good to create someone so they can experience adversity in order to gain the benefits from adversity?
Now let us say someone else comes along and sees that this person isn't experience any adversity or struggles in life. They just sit there seemingly doing nothing. This person decides that the meditative Buddhist needs to stop navel-gazing and start living a "real" life, one where the struggle is real, until one can cope or overcome the challenge. Now, this person decides that the handful of rice the Buddhist navel-gazer was getting through begging wasn't challenging enough. He decides to tell all the suppliers of the navel-gazer's rice to stop doing this and provides some reasoning that convinces them not to feed the navel-gazer anymore. The navel-gazer now has to venture out of his usual routine and needs to work for a living. At this work, the navel-gazer (whose whole life has thus far been meditation on nothingness) is exposed to managers, coworkers, demands, and challenges of tasks that he never had to do before. He has to learn the ropes of dealing with the manager, the coworkers, the demands of the job, accomplishing the task so not to get hassled or fired. He learns to do this but starts experience the usual stresses of the average non-navel-gazing citizen. His techniques don't work on this new form of strife. He only knew how conquer his own boredom when left alone and allowed to beg for food, but this kind of dealings with others is not in his repertoire and his usual coping techniques aren't working.
The adversity builds and he learns more or less how to deal with it, in the normal fashion. He hasn't overcome the adversity of his everyday life, but simply deals with it. Goes to work, tries to find some accomplishment there, tries to avoid negative situations (though sometimes unavoidable), finds entertainments of the mind to fill his time. He feels loneliness for the first time, and the need for companionship.
Okay, this situation is obviously a very contrived situation. But you can probably tell where this is going in regards to being an analogy for antinatalism. What is the point of exposing another person to adversity when a new person doesn't have to be exposed to adversity in the first place? Is that a good thing to do for someone else, being they don't exist to care about any benefits that might arise from adversity? Even if benefits arise from adversity, when none exists for a particular person in the first place, is it good to create someone so they can experience adversity in order to gain the benefits from adversity?
Comments (98)
And here, I disagree. We don't live in fascist or authoritarian governments. The Buddhist is free to do what they choose is best for them. And, since they feel no pain or adversity, then what they're doing is productive for their own good.
I see a lot of musterbation, proceeding from that assumption that what he is doing is wrong and unjustified.
Did you read the whole post? The point of it is if someone feels the Buddhist needs to go through adversity, and thus exposes him to a situation of adversity, is this wrong? Then I connected this with the idea of antinatalism. Clearly the idea of Buddhist navel-gazer is an analogy for the potential person that has the ability to exist if procreated into existence.
Yes.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Yes, it is. You are imposing your of some fictitious entities (twisted and sadistic) will on someone that does the things they do for the very reason you don't want them to do it? Isn't the contradiction apparent enough?
I do not get what you are asking.
I'm not asking anything. I'm merely asserting that it is wrong to say that the blissful and happy Buddhist is unjustified in their simple existence. Demanding that they experience pain and suffering is some kind of twisted logic.
Yes, I agree it is. That is the whole point of the analogy.
So, what's the point with it? That existence consists only of pain and suffering? That's not true, given your fictional Buddhist living peacefully. Perhaps, taking my own interpretation here, that the Buddhist is indicative that we ought to pay more attention to how they lead their own life's if one wants peace and contentment in life.
What do you think?
If the navel-gazing Buddhist is likened to the potential child that does not need to exist (to be exposed to suffering/adversity) in the first place, then the person who comes along and figures that this navel-gazer needs to overcome adversity is like the parents procreating a new human into existence where they surely will experience adversity, and they will have to overcome it. Then, in Nietzschean fashion will claim that the point of living is to get stronger by overcoming life's challenges. This makes little sense if no one existed to need adversity in the first place. Don't take the analogy too seriously- it is simply to show the illogic of it.
I think it's a good analogy; but, based on faulty assumptions, as I've already stated. In general, life is getting easier nowadays. We tend to have more psychological problems nowadays than addressing fundamental needs like water, food, and shelter. So, this is where the Buddhist has all his or her needs met at a whim and can live a peaceful life. Are you thinking of becoming Buddhist? I would like to join an ashram; but, am somewhat unsure if I can just leave my mother. I like living with her. It's a pleasant state of affairs, to have someone that unconditionally loves you.
Who are you to judge for someone else what is "adverse" enough for them, psychological or not? How do you know to what extent that person would want to experience adversity? How do you know there won't be more than small adversity but perhaps the possibility of undo suffering will occur?
The point is, is it wrong to create adversity for someone else if they didn't need to experience it in the first place?
We're you the first to commit this error with the Buddhist living happily, and some twisted entity telling them they ought to suffer more?
Quoting schopenhauer1
Well, I can't really say that they ought not to feel adversity. Without it I think it would be hard to achieve affective states like appreciation, compassion, and empathy. If I could I would like to be a kid again. It was such a happy time in my life.
Quoting schopenhauer1
I don't; but, isn't that just life for you?
I don't get what you are saying here. This is an analogy- it is just a story to show a point.
Quoting Wallows
Why does affective states, compassion or empathy need to be obtained for something that didn't exist to need it in the first place? And why put someone through adversity in order to achieve these states, if this needn't be the case in the first place? (These are basically the same question).
Quoting Wallows
The question is if it is right to procreate a new person who will experience adversity. Thus, it isn't just a matter of shrugging the shoulders if adversity can be prevented in one decision in regards to future people being born.
Isn't that a tautology. If life consists in adversity, and no utopia can be achieved, then there really isn't any alternative for the unborn child. Some Spartan societies encouraged adversity and strife, along with Nazi and even communist societies with brutalism and stuff like that. That just goes to show you that some people think that suffering is an inescapable part of life. If due to this, you think that a better future is one where one doesn't exist is the right one, then I can't really persuade you otherwise. It's just it's based on a faulty logic of assuming what's right under circumstances that can't be fundamentally altered, such that life is.
No. If you are saying is it a well-known fact, yes.
Quoting Wallows
Well, correct. That is the whole point. The child doesn't need to exist to experience adversity, period. It would be wrong to expose someone to adversity, just so they can experience overcoming it. Even if the premise was true that, "overcoming adversity makes one stronger", no one needs to be exposed to adversity in the first place. It is wrong to make someone overcome adversity when they didn't need to.
So, does that make me an antinatalist? What if we lived in a world where every problem could be solved at the whim of science? Wouldn't such a life be mundane and boring to the point of not wanting to exist anymore? Isn't the whole premise of evolution about overcoming adversity? What becomes of "life" when we eliminate all adversity? We wouldn't be talking about "life" in the ordinary sense of the term anymore.
None of this matters to me. I don't use future people as vessels for making life interesting, I don't use futuer people so that "life" can have a certain meaning that we have always known it. I don't use people so that life won't be boring. Rather, what matters in this claim is that future people will not be exposed to adversity when they don't need to. I am not claiming anything about how existence should be, other than that.
Well, that is a lie, based on your OP. Life consists fundamentally of adversity. And, you have demonstrated with the Buddhist analogy that you don't think he or she is justified in living without any adversity.
You completely misinterpreted the analogy in the OP. That person who forced the Buddhist into adversity was not doing the right thing.
So, you're creating a straw-man out of the Buddhist in that they are leading their life the way they are due to adversity?
No you're still not getting it. The Buddhist is like the non-existent/potential child. There was no need for it to be forced into experiencing adversity when they didn't need to.
So, life is the person or entity telling the person that they need to experience life "in reality"?
If by entity you mean the person who is forcing the Buddhist into adversity, and by life you mean the people who are procreating the potential person into existence, then yes.
So, I see we boiled down the issue.
Then isn't that a straw-man or a simple overgeneralization to state things that way?
I don't see how it was not boiled down from the beginning. The analogy wasn't meant to be hard to make between the two ideas of the Buddhist/adversity potential person/adversity.
Quoting Wallows
Not really, the story was to illustrate the point. The point has always been, there is no need to create adversity for someone else when that person did not need to experience adversity in the first place.
Forgive my slowness. At least I finally got the point.
Quoting schopenhauer1
We don't know that. That's a presumption. If that is how you feel about it, then so be it.
Do you think it is right to expose another person to adversity when they didn't need to be exposed to it? What exactly would be the reason? Would that reason be justified in light of the fact that you are creating adversity on behalf of someone else.
The first: Why would anyone wish for another to experience adversity and struggle? This seems like a profoundly malevolent act, unless one believes the struggle and adversity will benefit the person. Even then, it is not up to the instigator to decide what is good or bad for another, unless one is asked specifically for their advice.
The second: The instigator does not let the Buddhist suffer. The instigator merely brings about a change of circumstance and the reaction of the Buddhist is to make himself suffer. In Buddhism, all suffering is seen as a result of attachment to wordly matters. In this case, the Buddhist was attached to life and feared death and starvation.
It is said Buddha once fasted for a long period of time, during which he consumed no food except that which by circumstance came to him. This naturally weakened him and when during his travels he attempted to cross a river he nearly drowned. This is when he experienced enlightenment.
Yeah, it's suggesting that prior to birth, there are people in some state. Even though you keep denying that you're suggesting that.
This analogy would be nonsensical to you if you didn't think that prior to birth, there are people in some state. You rationally realize how absurd that idea is, maybe, but emotionally, you keep returning to it. Hence this analogy.
I completely agree. Hence why it is wrong to procreate. Procreation exposes adversity for someone else on their behalf. A new person didn't need to be exposed to adversity in the first place. No harm, no foul, no person (as in no actual child that will be born), right?
Quoting Tzeentch
While I agree perhaps the Buddhist principles only worked for this individual in the very confined space of begging for food and meditating all day routine, the point of the story was not how to be a better Buddhist but whether it is good to cause adversity for another. It is exactly like procreation. Now that someone is born, they have to cope and deal with the situation. They have to struggle at it, just as the Buddhist must learn to do in his changed circumstances.
Quoting Tzeentch
Interesting.
But you didn't pay attention to the whole argument. The argument is that no one needs to give someone else a burden if they didn't need to be exposed to it in the first place. That is to say, a potential child (a person that could exist if a parental actors decide to go ahead and procreate), does not need to be exposed to adversity (by being born in the first place), if there was no need for that potential person to be exposed to adversity in the first place. Just because there is no actual person who will benefit from not being born, this does not mean that it is then acceptable/right to go ahead and procreate a new person whereby it will de facto experience adversity from being born into a world with adversity.
Nope, I am not. I am just saying to prevent adversity, not that some actual person is benefiting from it. Preventing adversity for someone else is all that is needed to be acceptable/right.
Quoting Terrapin Station
It is not absurd at all. No actual person needs to be in the equation for it to be wrong to create adversity for someone else. The action of creating a new person will expose an actual person to adversity, hence it is wrong and therefore, it is good to prevent an actual person from being exposed to adversity. You are making a strawman or a red herring, either wittingly or unwittingly. It sounds good to Terrapin Station but has no impact on the argument at hand.
But you're not. The whole point of the analogy is that you're comparing it to an actual person.
You don't need to keep denying that you're saying that there's a person prior to birth whom we're doing something to. I know you'll deny that you're saying that.
The problem is that you keep writing things that suggest that despite the denials,. that's really how you think about it.
This is incorrect sir.
Quoting Terrapin Station
No, that is your little spin. Where did I say that? All I am saying is it is wrong to create conditions of adversity to someone else, when it wasn't needed in the first place.
You are having a problem with "wasn't needed in the first place". You think there needs to be a person who didn't need it in the first place. But look at where that leads... That would be a performative contradiction. In order for the statement to be true for you, someone would have to be born in order to be an actual person who will already be exposed to the very adversity that is not good that they were exposed to in the first place. But that needn't be the case that they have to exist. All that need to be the case is that adversity is wrong to give to someone, even if there was no actual person (with some identity) who will benefit from not being exposed to adversity.
I don't understand what your argument is here. You seem to be saying that from a negative utilitarian perspective, bringing new children into the world is bad? But you've not addressed the opposing arguments within your metaphor. Are you wanting to discuss those opposing arguments from within negative utilitarianism, or are you trying to support negative utilitarianism itself by this metaphor (in which case I don't see the argument, you'll have to spell it out for me).
I did pay attention. It's a silly argument. Of course there's no need for it. You think I'm unaware that, generally speaking, no one is forced to procreate? It's obviously a choice, just like educating children is a choice, and like I said, the justification in both cases can be made on the basis of a greater good, which can be in the form of a life worth living or an improved life.
The whole point of antinatalism is "Life is terrible". I think "Life was terrible" and also "Life will be better".
Perhaps I'm being too optimistic or may be you're being too pessimistic.
Again, why are we creating scenarios that aren't necessary in the first place, so that someone has to go through the gauntlet of adversity for the reason of "getting stronger". If no one exists, no one exists to need to get stronger. What's the point of creating someone so they have to go through adversity to get stronger? Why are we using indivdiuals for your notion of a "greater good". Greater good for whom? The species? So individuals need to be born now to go through adversity to enhance the species? That is its own silly argument. What justification would you have to expose someone to adversity/harm in order to improve the species as a whole? What gives you the right to make someone go through adversity for your agenda for what is "good" for them, if they don't exist in the first place to need that "good" for them? What gives you the right to say that someone should be born to experience adversity, to get stronger, to improve the species?
Your point about necessity is really weak. I could spend all day listing actions that aren't necessary but acceptable nevertheless. So that aspect is irrelevant and your emphasis of it misguided.
Skipping past that, all that's left is basically your, "I don't think it's ever worth it", versus my, "I think it often is". And the latter is more credible because, unlike the former, it is attested to by a majority of people.
Quoting schopenhauer1
And no one to live a life worth living. :roll:
Quoting schopenhauer1
I never said anything about getting stronger. The point is so that they can live a good life, which would be impossible otherwise.
All of this is obvious so far, and you've been given the answers to these kinds of questions hundreds of times, so going over this yet again seems pretty pointless.
Quoting schopenhauer1
The person themselves.
Quoting schopenhauer1
That's not my argument, just like that stuff about getting stronger being the point of it all.
Quoting schopenhauer1
If they don't exist, then they can't be bothered or affected by any decision I make. :lol:
And if they do exist, then they have a chance of living a good life.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Straw man. You can't live a good life if you aren't alive in the first place. And a good life is... well... good.
Necessity part GOES with the if no one is around to need adversity part. In other words,why are we creating situations where someone should go through adversity, since there was no one there to need it in the first place. That is not weak. That is valid point to consider. Why create people who are exposed to harm, when they don't exist to be harmed in the first place? If as people claim, adversity is necessary to make one stronger- a non-existent person never needed adversity as they never existed to need to be stronger in the first place.
Quoting S
And who exactly is feeling the negative affects of not living a life worth living?
Quoting S
No one who does not exist needs to live a good life, especially with the fact that you are exposing new people to adversity, when THEY DIDN'T EXIST TO NEED IT. A good life is only necessary for those who are already alive. To make someone be born so they can live a "life worth living" you are also exposing a new person to adversity when there wasn't anyone there that needed to go through adversity. Thus, your agenda of making new people so they can "live a life worth living" makes no sense in light of also creating adversity for a new person.
Quoting S
That make no sense. Is there some sort of Platonic calculator in the sky that will be unsatisfied if someone doesn't exist to score points in the "greater good calculator machine". Rather by not being born, one is prevented from adversity, and nothing is lost for any actual individual. Nothing is harmed, especially not some "greater good calculator" that you think will not be satisfied by maximizing greater good.
Quoting S
Correct
Quoting S
That is a moot point. They only need to try to live a good life if you make them so that they need to follow this agenda. Otherwise, no one needs anything.
Quoting S
That makes no sense. Why do people need to be born for the chance of leading a good life in light of the fact that you are also creating someone who will experience adversity where there didn't need to be someone who will experience adversity. Why is it some divine will or law that people need to be born in order to experience a good life anyways? This is on top of the obvious argument that not everyone will achieve this (that is its own good argument).
Nothing needs anything. Nothing needs to live a good life, if it doesn't live in the first place. However, not exposing someone to adversity is a good thing, especially if there no one needed the adversity-strengthening experience in the first place. Adveristy can be good if it makes you stronger...a person need to practice such and such to be better at it, let's say. But if there is no person that exists to need adversity (to be stronger, better, or whatever "positive" comes from this), then it is wrong to create situations just so a person can go through adversity to become stronger. Thus, it is best not to procreate, as this is creating new people who will feel adversity that wasn't necessary to feel in the first place.
Now, if he is causing harm (which he isn't) then he needs to experience a wake up call and experience some nasty consequences. Learning can be uncomfortable so that's just going to happen. That adversity is good.
For those pushing him to "get with the program" are immoral because they feel they know him better than he does. Adversity isn't always positive. If I were him, I'd hopefully stand up against oppression.
EDIT: You are saying it is better to not be born and face no hardships, while it's dumb to be made into this world and face unnecessary hardships? Well, it depends on a lot of circumstances. A mother has to weigh the chances of survival, it would be irresponsible to just pump out babies without any conscious. At the same time, I'll go with DMX on this he says, "To live is to suffer, but to survive? That defines the meaning in the suffering."
Many agree that life has redeeming qualities, however.
Let's do one thing at a time. Need always hinge on wants. X is only needed when S (some subject) desires x, or desires something else, y, that can not obtain without x.
So whether creating adversity is needed solely hinges on actual persons' wants.
Because that's the only way to live a good life. You can't live a good life if you don't exist.
Quoting schopenhauer1
You aren't on the side of people, yet you act as though you speak in defence of people. Most people affirm that they prefer their lives over never having been born. So let's get it straight that you don't care about people, you care about extinction.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Who cares about nonexistent people and their nonexistent needs? Not I.
Quoting schopenhauer1
No one, of course. But since most people affirm that they prefer their lives over never having lived, the odds are in favour of it being a good decision that the baby will grow up thankful instead of resentful.
Quoting schopenhauer1
It's funny that you think that that matters when it doesn't. Nonexistent people have nonexistent problems, which isn't something anyone needs to be troubled over, and existent people have a chance of living a good life, which obviously matters - or at least it should do. There's no need to apologise for enabling someone to live a good life. My mum doesn't owe me an apology, and I wouldn't accept one from her on that basis.
Quoting schopenhauer1
That's a truism.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Justified as a net benefit.
Quoting schopenhauer1
It makes perfect sense because it's worth it in light of the net benefit.
Quoting schopenhauer1
It makes perfect sense to say that me being alive and living a good life is a greater good than the alternatives of living a bad life or not having lived at all.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Then don't bring up the nonexistent as if they're comparatively better off for being need free. That's a nonsense.
Quoting schopenhauer1
So a needless life is better, and all that needs to be done to achieve this needless life is to never come into existence? Yeah, that makes so much more sense! And you can't say that nonlife is better for anyone, because there wouldn't be anyone alive to reap the rewards.
Quoting schopenhauer1
It's obvious that being born is a perquisite of living a good life, and it's obvious that a good life is one where there's a net benefit in spite of the adversity that you keep rabbiting on about.
Quoting schopenhauer1
What a funny thing to question! Are you really asking why you need to be born in order to live a good life? I would love to know how else you think that that's possible.
Quoting schopenhauer1
It's a crap argument because it doesn't apply to most people, as most people attest.
People should live life because it has "redeeming qualities". Is this enough reason to procreate people who will face adversity, if they otherwise never needed to exist in the first place to face adversity? Why should people be born only to be redeemed by various qualities of life? Why put people through the gauntlet of life if there didn't need to be a person at all in the first place?
No actual person needs adversity prior to his/her birth. Why make an actual person in the first place who needs to experience adversity?
No one needs to be born. A good life doesn't need to be had by anyone. No one loses out by not living out a good life. Certainly it is good though that no actual person was exposed to adversity that needed to be overcome. You put a value on "the good life" needing to be carried out by someone in the first place. Why does this need to be carried out by an actual individual? What is wrong with no actual person obtaining "the good life"? What, besides the parent who is projecting a future person, actually loses out form this? However, preventing adversity where it didn't need to be experienced by any particular person is a good thing. It would be wrong to create someone in order for them to experience the burdens of adversity, because perhaps, there is some goal of a good life, that that person can obtain. Who are you to expose people to harm/adversity in order for your agenda to be carried out (which it may not)- that someone needs to live in order for a "good life" to be obtained by that person?
Because life is a wonderful experience, despite the fact that there is also struggle and adversity. These things teach us how life works. They give us insights into the nature of ourselves and into the nature of reality. When we choose to ignore the lessons life is trying to teach us, struggle, adversity and pain will turn into suffering.
The idea that life is nothing but suffering is rather melodramatic. There would be no suffering without things that we are fond of that could be taken away from us. Death makes us suffer, because we are fond of life. Unanswered love makes us suffer, because we are fond of another person. Etc.
In other words, the reason we experience suffering is because there are so many good things about life, which we are afraid to lose. Every time we experience adversity or suffering, life is trying to teach us not to grow too fond of matters which are ultimately fleeting.
That wasn't what you originally questioned, and these are just more truisms. At the risk of stating a truism myself, I feel it prudent to remind you that stating the obvious and preaching to the choir is not productive in discussions such as this.
Quoting schopenhauer1
That is far from certain when taken as a whole with all of the implications that it carries, one of which is that no actual person had the chance to reap all of the rewards that are attained through life - joy, laughter, friendship, happiness, love, exploration, wonder, and so on and so forth. But you will always purposely withhold or underplay this aspect so long as you have your agenda to push, because it renders your position less persuasive. It can only ever be good in the much weaker sense that, for example, it is good that when I broke my neck, I got some time off of work. Hurrah! Let's all break our necks!
If it was certain, then why do you think that this is a discussion topic, and why do you think that so many people disagree with you? It's not that we're all just incapable of seeing this "certainty" for what it is, it's that it is a controversial and largely unconvincing stance to take.
Quoting schopenhauer1
It doesn't need to be carried out. I'm just saying that it has pros and cons, and sometimes - oftentimes even - the pros outweigh the cons. (That's your cue to harp on about how bad life supposedly is. Yawn.)
Quoting schopenhauer1
It doesn't. If you actually look carefully at what I've said, you'll see that that is not something that I've claimed or implied. On the contrary, I actually said that this necessity aspect is irrelevant and the focus on it misguided. Remember?
Quoting schopenhauer1
Not wrong as such. But actual people living good lives is a net benefit. So a possible world full of people living good lives is better than a possible world devoid of people living good lives.
Quoting schopenhauer1
There would be a loss in potential.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Not an overall good, only in the much weaker sense.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Not wrong in itself, but wrong in your opinion. You're entitled to your opinion, but that's all it is.
Quoting schopenhauer1
No one needs to live a good life, but obviously you need to live in order for that to be possible.
Who am I to not to rail against making it possible for people to live good enough lives - lives worth living - in a world where so many people affirm that they live good enough lives - lives worth living - and do not wish that they were never born?
Really? That hardly makes me a villain. If anyone's a villain here it's you. Maybe you should try listening more to what people actually think and feel about all of this and take that on board.
Yes, I understand that you are making these three assertions. What I was asking is whether you are interested in discussing the assertions themselves (for which I would need an argument as to how you arrived at them), or the consequences of accepting these assertions as axioms. Two pages in and it is still not clear which.
Actual people might need to create offspring, might need to create adversity, etc. It just depends on their wants.
But what is the negative outcome of no one living a good life? You haven't really answered that except with an elusive "it's a net benefit". Non-existent people don't cry over spilt milk. But it is true actual people will experience adversity if born. Thus Benatar''s asymmetry applies. Not experiencing good, does not matter if there is no actual person being deprived. However, it is always good that someone was not exposed to adversity or harm needlessly (or for a parents' agenda-- like your notion of someone has to live out a good life for some elusive idea of having a "net benefit" obtain in existence. Odd, but since it is not the usual way of looking at things, you automatically dismiss it.
Quoting S
And this matters why and for whom? No actual being to be deprived would care. It almost seems like in your universe, there is a hidden god that cries over potentials missed. Not experiencing good is neither good nor bad, if there is no actual person to be deprived. It is always good to prevent harm, especially if no one needed to be born to experience it in the first place. By the way, this is essentially just an elaboration from the book, "Better Never to Have Been" by David Benatar.
Quoting S
Why does a total matter here? If we are summing up bits of good from everyone in some grand total (in what, a calculator in the sky?) then one can conclude that billions of lives only barely worth living would be the best outcome, but that would make no sense. This idea called the "Repugnant Conclusion" by Derek Parfit, is the kind of outcome you get with utilitarian notions of simply summing up net positive and negative the way you seem to explain it. Rather, it should be looked at on the level of harm to the individual, not how an individual somehow adds to the grand total of some universal utilitarian calculation.
Quoting S
Granted, my opinion comes from the idea of the asymmetry. No person will be harmed, and it is not good or bad if someone is not born to experience good.
The best source is David Benatar's "The Harm of Coming into Existence" and his idea of an asymmetry between benefit and harm when it comes to the question of birth. See here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antinatalism
From the article:
[quote=Antinatalism article in Wikipedia]David Benatar argues that there is a crucial asymmetry between pleasure and pain:
the presence of pain is bad;
the presence of pleasure is good;
the absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone;
the absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation.[38][39]
Scenario A (X exists) Scenario B (X never exists)
(1) Presence of pain (Bad) (3) Absence of pain (Good)
(2) Presence of pleasure (Good) (4) Absence of pleasure (Not bad)
Regarding procreation, the argument follows that coming into existence generates both good and bad experiences, pain and pleasure, whereas not coming into existence entails neither pain nor pleasure. The absence of pain is good, the absence of pleasure is not bad. Therefore, the ethical choice is weighed in favor of non-procreation.
Benatar explains the above asymmetry using four other asymmetries that he considers quite plausible:
We have a moral obligation not to create unhappy people, and we have no moral obligation to create happy people. The reason why there is a moral obligation not to create unhappy people is that we believe the presence of pain is bad for those who are hurt, and the absence of pain is good also when there is no someone who is experiencing this good. By contrast, the reason for which there is no moral obligation to create happy people is that although the feeling of pleasure would be good for them, the absence of pleasure when they do not come into existence will not be bad, because there will be no one who will be deprived of this good.
It is strange to mention the interests of a potential child as a reason why we decide to create it, and it is not strange to mention the interests of a potential child as a reason why we decide not to create it. That the child may be happy is not a morally important reason to create it. By contrast, that the child may be unhappy is an important moral reason to not create it. If the absence of pleasure is bad even if someone does not exist to experience its absence, we would have a significant moral reason to create a child, and to create as many children as possible. If, however, the absence of pain wouldn't be good even if someone would not experience this good, we would not have a significant moral reason not to create a child.
Someday we can regret for the sake of the good of a man whose existence was conditional on our decision, that we created him – a man can be unhappy and the presence of his pain would be a bad thing. But we will never feel regret for the sake of the good of a man whose existence was conditional on our decision, that we did not create him – a man will not be deprived of happiness, because he will never exist, and the absence of happiness will not be bad, because there will be no one who will be deprived of this good.
We feel sadness by the fact that somewhere people come into existence and suffer, and we feel no sadness by the fact that somewhere people did not come into existence and in this place there are happy people. When we know that somewhere people came into existence and suffer, we feel compassion. The fact that on some deserted island or planet people did not come into existence and suffer is good. This is because the absence of pain is good even when there is not someone who is experiencing this good. On the other hand, we do not feel sadness by the fact that on some deserted island or planet people did not come into existence and are not happy. This is because the absence of pleasure is bad only when someone exists to be deprived of this good.[40][/quote]
Not much of an argument. Does he say any more about how he arrives at this conclusion?
Yes he wrote a whole book on it. Ironically your argument for it not being much of an argument is not much of an argument.
It must be possible to say how something can be good even if it's not good to anyone in a length shorter than a couple hundred pages.
Heck the vast majority of arguments in philosophy are just a few lines, really.
A few lines of stupid, normally (I'm not picking on antinatalism there--most arguments in philosophy wind up seeming pretty stupid--for example, Anselm's ontological argument, the p-zombie argument, etc.), but still usually just a few lines.
The reason I say it's a whole book is that all I'm going to end up doing is copy pasting long passages which I've already done enough of.
I don't know if I've ever seen you paste something that I'd consider part of an argument for how it's possible for something to be good despite not being good to anyone though.
I'd only consider something that directly addresses that idea to be an argument for that.
Look at the Global Antinatalism thread.
I've answered that loaded question without playing into your hand.
Quoting schopenhauer1
If it's a choice between a neutral option and a better option, then obviously the better option wins. And the better option is obviously the one with a net benefit.
Quoting schopenhauer1
That argument doesn't work, in spite of my agreement with you that a nonexistent person cannot be deprived of anything. It doesn't work because as moral agents we are capable of making decisions for better or worse, and if we consciously refrain from making a better decision, then we bear the responsibility for that. So, if we consciously decide to refrain from procreation, knowing that the chances are that procreation will lead to a life worth living, then, without good reason not to, that's the least moral option of the two.
Quoting schopenhauer1
But you don't have a better alternative. A lifeless world can't be a benefit for anyone.
Quoting schopenhauer1
I'm not automatically dismissing it, as anyone following our dialogue can see, I've been providing a reasoned basis for rejecting your position.
Quoting schopenhauer1
It matters to anyone who cares about the topic, and it matters because, arguably, it counts against your favoured option.
The rest of your paragraph misses the point. So I'll skip past it.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Of course it matters! Why on earth wouldn't it? Because it works against your selectively narrow parameters?
Quoting schopenhauer1
Sure, lots of contented people, a better alternative to lots of miserable people or a world empty of life... completely bonkers suggestion.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Right, we should instead look at it in a way that completely clashes with the testimony of the majority of individuals themselves, and leads to valuing extinction over and above people, and over and above proportional solutions to problems. (E.g. you don't blow up a school to avoid going to maths class).
Quoting schopenhauer1
Neutral vs. good is an easy choice, and that's [i]my[/I] justification.
I participated in that thread, and I'll give a second, closer look at posts there, but I'm not sure what to look for. Many posts contain comments like this of yours:
Nothing there argues for how it can make sense to say that something can be a good thing regardless of the good not being enjoyed by anyone. An argument for that is going to explain just what we're referring to by "good"--it's going to have some meta-analysis of what good even is, and then provide some some sort of support for how it's possible to have a "good" that's independent of what anyone thinks about it.
In other words, it's not going to be an argument for a specific thing being a good that no one enjoys. It's going to be an argument for how it is coherent to suggest that anything could be a good that no one enjoys.
So what should I look for in the thread re where to find the relevant post(s) arguing that?
Really?
Quoting S
In the scenario of whether it is good to start life vs. good to continue it once born, I believe these to be separate situations. Once born, it makes sense to perhaps try to gain net benefits. In the situation where NO ACTUAL PERSON EXISTS YET, the ALWAYS good outcome is to not allow harm to occur. The neutral (not bad) outcome is whether someone might experience good. So the "obvious" option to you, is not that obvious to me, considering the asymmetry of the scenario of whether to reproduce.
Quoting S
Capable on behalf of someone else, to create a whole life for them, where they will experience adversity because they might experience the "good life" according to the parents' version of such a concept? Rather, adversity is always a bad when it is not necessary to foist on a new person. I've explained to Terrapin Station that it is a matter of what we value. Do you value bringing forward people so that they can experience the goods of life at the cost of bringing about situations of adversity? What matters in this scenario is always prevention of adversity/harm without any cost to an actual person. It would be wrong to create situations of adversity on the behest of someone else, PERIOD. It is quite arrogant to think that it is your job to create this for someone else and then tell them to post-facto "deal with it" because it provides for a chance of the good life, and brings a net benefit to the universe somehow.
I don't have time to find them.. but there are plenty of copy pasting from the book in that thread. Maybe later I'll try to find them for you.
Are you engaging in a discussion or providing book recommendations? It doesn't matter if David Benetar wrote a whole book about it. Ethicists like Phillipa Foot, Alistair MacIntyre, John McDowell, Lucy Allais, to name just a few have all written books with opposing arguments. Julio Cabrera has written directly opposing Benetar's position. So just saying "he's written a book about it" is not an argument. Summarise his reasoning and submit it for criticism or else there's little point in raising the matter.
Okay, thanks.
Perhaps you should read a little of it. I presented his main point. If you don't like it, then explain why other than that you want me to put more explanation on it than I already have for three pages of this thread.
I will testify to this. I've been reading this thread since the beginning (though I am trying to stay out of the fray) and it is clear to the outside observer that you are arguing in good faith.
Quoting Isaac
Had to quit lurking and post just to ask this: Does John McDowell ever discuss anti-natalism or the "value of existence" or anything of the sort directly in any of his papers? Can you point me to something?
No, nothing directly about Antinatalism. I only meant that, for example, his anthropocentricising of moral value would have prevented there from being a moral value in the event of non-existence and so would oppose any view which sees a moral virtue in ending the human race. This is outlined in his 'Mind, value and reality' and but I guess you'll already know that much in order to have been interested enough to ask in the first place. Nothing more exciting than that I'm afraid.
Personally I find McDowell and MacIntyre a lot more persuasive on meta-ethics than the anti-natalists being discussed in this thread, though I'm a hopeless dilettante w/r/t moral philosophy.
It's meant for both. Ideally the axiom would be taken at face value as true, but of course, it is always me defending the asymmetry that while it is person-independent that no person was harmed (whether there is actually someone there to benefit), it is person-dependent whether it is bad for pleasure/benefit to have been deprived (to someone).
I think this thread might be arguing against something that doesnt really exist. That is, the notion that people are rationally creating children for these grand meanings or purposess (eg, so that they may learn, or grow, or face adversity and "overcome") My observations are that its all far more mindless, simple and irrational than that. A man wants to have sex with a woman, and then a baby happens. A couple gets drunk, then a baby happens. A woman wants to be a mother, so she gets her husband to impregnate her. Maybe when asked, these people retrospectively give reasons for having the child (eg, "I wanted to give the gift of life", "so that the child may learn and overcome", etc), but these are essentially just lies the parents tell themselves to mask something that was so mindless and irrational. People have sex for various reasons, babies follow and by consequence human misery and suffering proliferates.
Is it wrong? Yes I think its wrong to *rationally* create human embodiment, but the more I actually see the way in which children are so mindlessly and irrationally created, the less I think reproduction is really even in the realm of moral judgment at all. Sometimes it seems like sex, pregnancy and reproduction can be treated entirely as biological functions, much like eating or sleeping. Does it make sense to question the moral value of your stomach digesting its food? Perhaps questioning the morality of reproduction is along the same nonsensical lines.
Case in point, I am myself solidly antinatalist. I think it is wrong to create human embodiment and the suffering it necessarily entails, and it ought not be done. But at the start of this year me and my girlfriend had a pregnancy scare. Thankfully she ended up miscarrying but still, it just really brought home how mindless and crudely biological it all is. We were drunk and (to put it crudely) wanted to fuck, didn't bother with protection and she became pregnant. At the time of sex, the moral weight of what we were risking couldn't have been further from my mind. If she didn't miscarry, human suffering would have mindlessly proliferated itself. And perhaps when the child was old enough to question its predicament I'd tell him or her that life is gift, and overcoming and learning from its struggles and miseries makes it all worth it. Maybe the child will question and argue against these reasons for its creation, but these were not actually why it was created, it was all so much more mindless and biological than that.
One thing Ive noticed while reading the (scant) antinatalist literature, is just how little has been written on the actual means of human reproduction. There's a whole bunch of talk about potential persons, consent, and moral asymmetries, but essentially nothing on how it all actually happens; sex, fucking, cumming inside a woman, knocking up your partner or wife. Maybe its all too crude to write about, but reproduction is whats crude. You can argue all you like about the morality of bringing a child into the world, about the moral assymetries and the nonconsensual infliction of harm, but at the end of the day advocating for antinatalism is really nothing more than an intellectual round about way of expressing angst about your own birth, lamenting your own existence. Barely a single child has been prevented by an antinatalists argument. If you truly want to prevent births, you need to convince people to stop fucking each other. Good luck with that. You'll probably have about as much success as convincing stomachs not to digest its contents.
You have some very well-stated points. I often think the same thing. There is a mindlessness to procreation, which is so at odds with the immense philosophical stakes of creating a whole new being. People rarely stop to rationally reflect on it being that the process itself is so embedded in the messiness of sexual relations, and the ever-intertwined socio-biological lens through which it is viewed. Thus, people who would otherwise gladly debate some abstract ethical logic in regards to the Trolley Problem or Prisoner's Dilemma, or wax on about the Categorical Imperative and lying and murder, will look with contempt at questioning procreation as a whole. Perhaps it is seen as so natural that it cannot be questioned in its entirety.
Quoting Inyenzi
Great case in point. Most people are procreated through mindless actions related to pleasure and emotions related to affection. Lofty reasons like "overcoming and learning from struggles" are just post-facto answers for a much more basic reason. So what do we conclude from this?
I have some questions for you.
Q1. Whose side do you think you are on? As in, whose interests do you think you're defending?
Q2. Do you accept that a variation of your argument can be used against you?
Q3. Are you against any kind of activities where you might - or are likely to - face adversity, which would include countless activities like reading a book, playing a game, going to school, playing an instrument, participating in a sport, engaging in debate, and so on and so forth?
I ask the first question because the answer isn't clear to me, and the possible answers seem peculiar to me. You can't be on the side of most people, because you're against the wishes of most people. Are you on the side of a minority of people? If so, why should the wishes of a minority supersede the wishes of a majority? Or are you on the side of no one? In other words, people themselves are the problem, and only a world devoid of people is what matters.
I ask the second question because it seems clear to me that the tables can easily be turned on you by imagining a hypothetical person who wants to live a good life and is willing to face adversity in the hope of achieving that. Like your scenario with the monk, one can imagine an innocent prisoner who wants to be freed in order to live a better life, and you have the key. Would you keep him locked up? Would that be ethical?
And I ask the third question because if adversity is such a problem - apparently so much of a problem that it's not even worth the possibility of starting a life and living through it to reap the rewards - then, for sake of consistency or in other words so as to avoid a double standard, shouldn't you be endorsing the avoidance and minimisation of adversity in life? And if so, that would seem to rule out [i]a lot[/I] of activities.
I only do things for people or to people with their consent as consent is impossible here life is an imposition.
It is down to the individual how they view life or react to life. People have different preferences.
But someone who does not exist does not have interests that can be furthered.
If someone is unconscious and you help them that could be against there interest if they wanted to commit suicide. if you say that it is in someones interest to be born before conception you can equally say it is against their interests and they could have reverse preferences.
On the issue of burden I find it absurd and cruel to create someone and then attack them when they complain about a life they didn't chose.
I think there are good reasons to think life is unethical or bad thing even if someone has a preference for it. So even if you don't think consent is important you can still make an unethical choice on someone else's behalf.
The only situation where consent might not be an issue if one far far removed from this reality where absolutely everyone was deliriously glad to be alive and lived in total equality.
However being glad to be a live still does not tell us whether the context is a good one. You could engender this delirium by a drug.
The future person. Preventing harm and adversity for them. Guess what though? No one needs be deprived of the flipside of the benefits :D. In the scenario of uniquely preventing all adversity for a future person, without any deprivation to that individual, then one should prevent adversity. That is the argument. There is not even a person that I have to promote their "welfare" or "happiness". What counts in the scenario of birth is prevention of harm only, as the downside is nothing to no one. I have no divine command to promote someone's future "good life" in the scenario or any other agenda I might have for the future person, simply to prevent unneeded adversity or harm.
Quoting S
I'm not sure which one you mean other than something along the lines of, "If you are thinking of potential children, why not think of their net benefits rather than just preventing adversity? Why should that be the only thing to worry about?". Again the response is that preventing pleasure/good is not bad when there is no one there to be deprived. It is always good to prevent harm however.
Quoting S
Not in an absolute "this is a definite" way. Once born, we can choose all sorts of adversity that we would like to challenge ourselves with. That is not the scenario of birth where there is uniquely no one there to be deprived of pleasures in the first place, and no one that needs to overcome challenges to get to a "better" place (whatever that might mean metaphysically speaking).
Quoting S
I'm on the side against creating adversity for people for whatever reasons are projected onto the new humans.
Quoting S
This is silly. No person existed prior to birth who wants anything. You would literally be creating the desire for the good life out of nothing by creating the person. The creation happens first. However, there is no need to want to overcome diversity prior to birth. Adversity also includes non-desired adversity too, don't forget.
Quoting S
I explained earlier I think there is a different decision for starting a life and continuing a life. Once we are alive we do whatever utilitarian things we must to prevent adversity. But we cannot avoid most adversity, I'm aware of that. The real world demands it. I am opposed to making people go through it, even if people are enculturated that some of the adversity is good for them. We can get into the psychology of what people say, but I'd rather not. But if you think that is needed beyond the simple axiology of preventing all adversity, I will be glad to provide it for you.
But I do think in general, giving others adversity unduly is not good. However, sometimes it "has" to be done. So that is another ethical dilemma. Now we must put people in adverse situations and that is the "best" scenario for them. Sure, that is the real world, but someone was brought into the real world.
Whoosh! I see it's that time again. All aboard the truism train! By the way, a train is a number of carriages, cars, or trucks which are all connected together and which are pulled by an engine along a railway.
We both know that someone who does not exist does not have interests that can be furthered, cannot be burdened by anything, and cannot consent to anything. That is beside the point I was making.
Quoting Andrew4Handel
So you wouldn't help, or...? Answer the question. Let's face it, you're either a bad person or you have a double standard.
Quoting Andrew4Handel
Oh please. Where have I endorsed attacking people? Try to make your points without twisting words or exaggerating.
Quoting Andrew4Handel
Yeah, well I don't. Not without qualification anyway.
Quoting Andrew4Handel
Yeah, you can. So what? That's by no means a sufficient basis for any kind of justification. Should parents just stop being parents and leave their kids to fend for themselves? Ludicrous! Have you even [i]begun[/I] to think through what you're saying?
Quoting Andrew4Handel
Cloud Cuckoo Land? What's it like there? You'd know all about that, I presume. But anyway, back here in reality, we tend to judge the issue of consent more sensibly than your what your fringe view maintains.
Quoting Andrew4Handel
Alright, then simply add an appropriate context.
Quoting Andrew4Handel
That's a personal problem, and a problem with some - [i]but not all[/I] - parents, and an ongoing problem for society. Taking it out on humanity as a whole is a little extreme. Extinction is taking it a little bit too far. Perhaps - just perhaps - you should climb down from such dizzying heights and think about this more sensibly.
No, that's not possible. You can't be on the side of the future person because a consequence of what you're advocating is that there would be no such person to benefit from our actions.
And what we know about present people makes it more likely that you would be acting against the wishes of the future person, which is another reason why you can't be on their side.
So, with that in mind, and thinking about this rationally, I ask again: whose side do you think you're on?
Quoting schopenhauer1
They cannot possibly benefit from that. They cannot benefit from anything at all if they don't exist, and your position makes it impossible for them to exist.
Quoting schopenhauer1
That argument is nonsense on stilts. It is not rational to maintain, on the one hand, that a future person would benefit from the prevention of adversity, yet, on the other hand, that they would not lose out from the prevention of joy.
Quoting schopenhauer1
There doesn't need to be for my argument to work. And I'm guessing that you think the same about your argument. So why even bring that up?
Quoting schopenhauer1
No, either both count or neither count. Take your pick. Or, perhaps you already have in effect. If the prevention of joy means nothing to no one because no one is around to lose out, then the prevention of harm means nothing to no one because no one is around to benefit. You can't have your cake and eat it. And if you think otherwise, then you've abandoned reason.
Quoting schopenhauer1
That's a red herring. You don't need a "divine command" to do anything that I'm arguing in favour of. You don't need to do anything at all, really, because hundreds of babies are born every minute.
Quoting schopenhauer1
I mean the one that I typed up and submitted as part of my reply.
Quoting schopenhauer1
No, if preventing pleasure isn't bad because there is no one there to be deprived, then preventing harm isn't good because there is no one there to gain.
Quoting schopenhauer1
You've kind of skimmed over the point without really addressing it. I know that, once born, we can act so as to either increase or reduce the chances of encountering all sorts of adversity, such as that which would inevitably be encountered in the activities that I listed. The question is, given that this adversity can be avoided or minimised to the extreme, why aren't you endorsing this? It's because you don't really believe that adversity is as big a problem as you make it out to be when the context is your pet topic. That's a double standard.
You're just using adversity as an excuse for extinction. Extinction is what you really care about, and extinction is against the wishes of most people, and the wishes of most people are a likely reflection of what the wishes of a future person would be, which means that in all likelihood you're not going to be on the side of a future person, which is a good reason for rejecting your claim that you're on their side.
Quoting schopenhauer1
It's a matter of likelihood, not projection. If, for arguments sake, three out of every four people feel that life is worth living, then that makes it very likely that a future person would feel the same way.
And I [i]already know[/I] what your stance is in terms of being against creating new humans because of the adversity that they would face. I wasn't questioning what you're [i]against[/I]. You've purposefully answered in a way which reveals nothing new and evades what I was trying to get out of you. So I ask again, whose side are you on? Or is it that you are in fact on nobodies side, but you're either in denial about that or you're reluctant to come out and say that that is so because you know that it would make you look bad (and rightly so!).
Quoting schopenhauer1
Then so is your analogy with the Buddhist.
Quoting schopenhauer1
You don't seem to realise here that the same kind of criticisms can be made against your own argument, which uses a similar set up. You're just providing the template for doing so. You see, there was no person who existed prior to birth who was just sitting around undisturbed in peaceful bliss like a Buddhist. There would literally be no one there to disturb. The creation happens, then there's someone, and this someone is privileged with the opportunities that only life can bring. There is no need to want anything prior to birth, and there is no need to face adversity, but that is neither here nor there. In that scenario, no one can benefit, whereas in the real world, people can. Standing a good chance is better than standing no chance. So the real world is better than your hypothetical world devoid of life (which doesn't even compete).
Quoting schopenhauer1
A double standard.
Quoting schopenhauer1
But we frequently don't. [I]You[/I] frequently don't. You put yourself in situations which count as examples of easily preventable adversity all the time! You're doing that every time you decide to engage in debate on here. You do that whenever you go to the gym, or play a game of chess, or read an intellectually challenging book, or whatever it is that you do in your spare time - there's bound to be something else that counts for you beyond this forum. Why the hypocrisy? You must really take after your namesake.
Quoting schopenhauer1
We can't avoid it completely whilst we're alive, but that wasn't what I was challenging. I was challenging why you presumably don't do more to at least avoid it where possible or minimise it to the extreme, as one would reasonably expect if adversity is a problem so severe that it warrants nothing less than the extinction of humanity!
Quoting schopenhauer1
Yeah, well, I am opposed to using a sledge hammer to crack a nut. That's not a sensible way to approach the problem either way.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Adversity is a consequence of life, and life for most people is worth living. If you're not like most people, and you don't see it that way, then that's too bad, but you shouldn't take it out on humanity. I worry about people who think like you. You're not so different from an incel.
Doesn't bother me. Oh, and it doesn't bother "him" either ¯\_(?)_/¯.
Quoting S
Doesn't bother me. Oh, and it doesn't bother "him" either ¯\_(?)_/¯.
Quoting S
The future person.
Quoting S
But admitted as such. That is the asymmetry. Preventing harm is always good and that is person independent. It is just always good to prevent harm, but it is not bad if you prevent pleasure (unless there is someone who already exists to be deprived).
Quoting S
Again, I believe it is always good to prevent harm (even if there is no one to benefit from being prevented from harm), but it is not always bad to prevent pleasure unless there is someone there to be deprived of the pleasure. That is the terminus of this ethical axiom. I've always stated that beyond that, what one values is really up to the emotional resonance of the ethical agent. If you think that bringing a good life into the world trumps preventing suffering, in a situation that would uniquely not deprive any actual individual of said good life, then you value that agenda (of the possibility of a person living a good life) over the complete prevention of harm. That is where we cannot go much further. I can give you my reasoning, and I have. You can decide you are not convinced. There is no air tight slam dunk in ethics, just a back and forth of the arguments and rebuttals. You can go on and do some ad hocs, or try to entice me with some insults to how bad the arguments are, but that is how these go. Some people will just not find them convincing. I'm not going to jump off a cliff because S is unsatisfied with schopenhauer1's argument on antinatalism.
Quoting S
No get the argument right first. Rather, I don't think a person has to exist for preventing adversity to be good. I DO think a person has to exist for prevention of pleasure/good to be bad. Otherwise, it is not bad (or good).
Quoting S
Because you have to create the person (with all the negative effects on that person) in order to create happiness. Meanwhile, no one needed nothing, and no negative effects were incurred in my formulation. That goes with the Buddhist analogy.
Quoting S
Not on their own. And you are right, I can't do anything about it. It's not a red herring. Other than harm, anything else does not need to take place, it i the desire or result of the parent for a child to be born to fulfill X reason.
Quoting S
Already explained the asymmetry that I think is the case.
Quoting S
Adversity can be used as a form of entertainment or trying to test resolve. It can also be something that is undesirable- and this would be perhaps considered not just adverse, but harmful. The point though is not about whether I would take on self-imposed adversity, but whether it is right for someone else to force someone to be exposed to all adversities that will befall that person. Now once born, we do have psychological survival instincts and attachments, but that is a difference scenario with never coming into existence in the first place. I think they are separate scenarios, which is what I've said all along in this argument. Continuing to exist and starting existence for someone else are two different scenarios. One is more or less symmetrical with good and bad (prevention of good is bad, prevention of bad is good), where the other is not (prevention of good is not bad in respect to no actual person experiencing it, prevention of bad is good, even if there is no actual person around).
Quoting S
I've already explained the unique scenario of starting a life, vs. the scenario of already being born.
Quoting S
That is simply an analogy.
Quoting S
Why is it good to create someone who can "benefit"? What right do you have to expose someone to adversity just because you want to give an opportunity to "benefit"? That is the point of the whole thing.
Quoting S
A different standard.
Quoting S
Harmful adversity. Also, creating situations of adversity for OTHER people, is perhaps a necessity, but a double bind. To CREATE someone for the SAKE OF making them go through adversity FOR THEIR BENEFIT is still a contradiction to me. I don't believe in making obstacle courses for others because we think it is best for them at the end of the day. This may be a corollary of the initial asymmetry, if you will.
Quoting S
I did say we can try to minimize harms and maximize benefits, etc. once alive.
Quoting S
The problem only exists for the already born obviously. No reason to create scenarios of adversity for someone else, pace the corallary to the asymmetry, that is to say " creating situations of adversity for OTHER people, is perhaps a necessity, but a double bind. To CREATE someone for the SAKE OF making them go through adversity FOR THEIR BENEFIT is still a contradiction to me. I don't believe in making obstacle courses for others because we think it is best for them at the end of the day."
Quoting S
That is an extreme accusation I gather for rhetorical point-making. I don't know much about "incels" but what I've heard in the media is they are extremely misogynistic and want to harm specific groups of people. I would obviously say that both those things are bad and unethical.
I am not saying you are endorsing this but this is but this is what many people experience when they make valid complaints about the life they didn't choose. It is not just complaints people don't like but open suffering. They prefer to celebrate stoicism.
Why stoicism? Because that way you don't upset other people with you suffering and they do not have to feel disturbed or guilty. They also prefer to portray life as a gift and not a burden.
Quoting S
Once you have unnecessarily created a child then I believe you have a responsibility towards them, although not all parents accept this responsibility.
You can never give your child full freedom but you can ameliorate the situation by giving them as much control over their life as possible. But even the most generous parenting cannot stop bad outcomes.
A parent will always be the primary cause for their child's existence and the essential cause for the child's later outcomes and if people saw this more and its ramifications maybe they would rethink things.
We would usually do something without someones consent if we were almost certain it was in their interest. I don't see how this world is good enough and ethical enough to be in someones interest accept maybe on a case by case basis for someone who is privileged and mentally well. Mental distress can quickly make any scenario highly undesirable.
Nope. You'd prevent their existence, remember? Hence they couldn't possibly benefit. So you can't possibly be on their side.
That's a sound argument. You need to have a rethink and come back with a different answer. Repeating the same answer as before doesn't resolve the problem.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Wrong. It does no good for anyone if no one exists to benefit. Capiche?
Quoting schopenhauer1
Nope, what you're calling asymmetry is a double standard. The same reasoning you use against the prevention of pleasure applies to the prevention of harm.
Quoting schopenhauer1
It's not an axiom. It's not widely accepted, it hasn't been established uncontroversially, and it's not self-evident.
Quoting schopenhauer1
I understand your argument, and it doesn't make sense because of your conception of what's good, so that was my interpretation of your argument where it makes sense. But then it becomes irrational. So you're stuck between a rock and a hard place: nonsensical or irrational.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Net benefit, so not a real problem.
Quoting schopenhauer1
No one can benefit, so not a real solution.
Quoting schopenhauer1
The Buddhist analogy is cancelled out by the prisoner analogy, and you can't reasonably object on the basis that no person actually exists, because that can be turned back on you.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Divine command, which is what we were talking about here, is an obvious red herring. If you disagree, then please clarify what you think the relevance of it is.
Quoting schopenhauer1
The motive doesn't matter in light of the consequences, and the consequences are a net benefit.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Already explained why the asymmetry argument fails.
Quoting schopenhauer1
That's a hand-wave which doesn't address the substance of what I was saying there.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Yes, and it is simply cancelled out by my analogy, and you have no reasonable means of rejecting mine without inadvertently rejecting your own.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Benefiting is inherently good. A world where benefiting is possible is better than a world where benefitting is not possible. A rational outside observer would chose the former over the latter.
Quoting schopenhauer1
The ends justifies the means. Look at all of the people who benefit, then imagine the alternative of no one benefitting, then compare the two.
Quoting schopenhauer1
A different standard for a similar enough situation, i.e. a double standard.
Quoting schopenhauer1
You keep wording this wrong. No one, typically, is creating anyone "for the sake of" making them go through adversity for their benefit. Rather, typically, parents are creating people for the benefit of those people, and for the benefit of themselves, and for the benefit of others, and the adversity plays no part in their motivation despite it being an inevitable consequence.
I don't go to work "for the sake of" being tired and bored to get paid. I go to work for the sake of getting paid, and I just happen to get tired and bored whilst I'm there.
Quoting schopenhauer1
The obstacle course is already there. We don't make the obstacle course, we make the person, and then it's up to them how they proceed. Lots and lots of people find obstacle courses worthwhile, yet you want to shut them down. Obviously, you are not on the side of obstacle course enthusiasts. You are not on the side of all of those people.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Lots of people not only try, but succeed. You would prevent this from continuing beyond the lifetime of the current generation, which would result in a scenario which is less ideal than what would otherwise happen.
Quoting schopenhauer1
The problem of using a sledgehammer to crack a nut - that being a metaphor for using extinction to eradicate adversity - exists for the already born, but the consequences extend [i]far beyond[/I] the already born. It would mean that, for example, all else being equal, there would be no people living worthwhile lives one hundred and fifty years from now. And that scenario is less ideal.
Quoting schopenhauer1
No, it's not merely rhetorical, there are clear similarities. For example, incels blame their problems on women, and anti-natalists blame their problems on humanity.
Look, I am not going to do this back and forth anymore for a fourth round. I can answer every individual point, but this would never end, and the debate would quickly lose its main focus and my interest. I'm not going to change your mind. You are not going to change mine. We can get some value from this perhaps by strengthening our arguments, but I have no pretensions that either you or I will magically realize the other one has the "true" insight into this matter. Rather, I see this going in a dismal ad hominem way, which I already see with your accusations that my antinatalist arguments are equivalent to the "incels". [That analogy is quite spurious. I liken most antinatalist arguments to vegan arguments. That is to say, antinatalists present their case non-forcefully and it is up to the individual to decide. There is no malicious intent, there is no condemnation. The philosophy does not advocate violence towards anyone, but ironically, the opposite- it is trying to prevent all harm and in a passive way.]
I'd like to sum up what I see to be the main differences in our core values, as that is the heart of the matter. What this comes down to is a difference in values. My main value is that the moral obligation lies in not creating/exposing someone else to harm. There is no moral obligation, however, to not prevent good. Compassion for the individual who will experience harm, the injustice of forcing someone into adversity are part of the reasoning.
Connected to the above is the idea that exposing the individual to harm cannot be justified by some net calculus that this person might bring into the world (for himself or society). Exposing another individual to harm should be avoided, and preventing birth prevents exposing another person to all of life's harms. Any harm that's been done cannot be rectified (post-facto) by the hope/fruition of a future benefit either by reports of an individual (as you think the outcome will be), or by somehow adding to society's net benefit (if that kind of measurement is even commensurable or reliable).
To further explain the above, I will provide the analogy that this is like forcing someone to run an obstacle course because they can get some benefit from it, or be strengthened by it. However, this does not take back the fact that that person was created and exposed to adverse/harmful conditions in the first place. It's almost like some people have a quasi-messianic notion that they need to bring other people into a world with adversity/harm so that then they can be delivered or transformed into some "better" person (i.e. the good life). Or they are expected to experience the good despite being exposed to adversity/harm. Rather than this exposing people to harm to overcome something they didn't need to in the first place, I am saying it is always good/best not to force someone, on their behalf, into the adversity/harm of life in the first place. The obligation is on the prevention of harm, not on the promotion of pleasure/good. Whether good obtains for an individual in the future, does not take back the fact that a person is exposed to harm in the first place. It was not bad to be prevented from good experiences, if no actual person is deprived, but it was certainly good that someone was not forced into adverse/harmful experiences.
You are aware, I presume, that there are different meta-ethical positions, yes?
You are aware that the anti-natalist stance relies on a particular meta-ethical position, yes?
You are aware, presumably, that David Benetar is not God, he's just a man of the same epistemic status as any of the other philosophers who've arrived at different meta-ethical theories, yes?
Considering that these meta-ethical theories cannot all be true/right, it follows that all but one of them must be wrong.
Given that the philosophers who derived them are of the same epistemic level as David Benetar, it follows that it must be possible, no matter how clear it seems, for someone of David Benetar's epistemic level to be wrong, yes?
If Phillipa Foot is wrong, then decisions made by virtue may mislead us, where they should have been made by consequence. Likewise if Peter Singer is wrong, then we will have given to charity more than we need have and the economy may suffer.
If David Benetar is wrong we will have exterminated the entire human race needlessly.
Do you see why people are lumping you in with extremists?
Your main focus here doesn't significantly differ from any of your other numerous discussions on the topic, yet the back and forth continues, albeit with a break here and there, with no end in sight. I thought that that's what you liked. Going back over well trodden ground. This is your favourite subject, isn't it? You're the antinatalism guy, much like the nuclear weapons guy and the animal rights guy. :grin:
Quoting schopenhauer1
It's not spurious at all. I could keep going with what the two have in common, but I don't mind letting it go. I'm impartial enough to accept that there are similarities with your position and both that of the incels [I]and[/I] that of the vegans. But you don't like the former, hence you've put forward an alternative.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Whereas my justification isn't even deontological, it's consequentialist.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Compassion for the individual who will experience harm is countered by empathy for the individual who will have worthwhile experiences, and the alleged injustice of forcing someone into adversity is countered by the unjustified opposition to the opportunity of someone having inevitable worthwhile experiences and most likely a good enough life, the latter of which most people attest to.
Your objections to my counters typically involve a double standard, so they don't count and your problem lingers unresolved.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Yes, that's a big difference. I think that it can. And I also think that you're like most people in that you wouldn't even hesitate to apply this reasoning in many other contexts. You reject it here because it doesn't lead to your desired conclusion. In other words, you put the cart before the horse.
Quoting schopenhauer1
It should indeed be avoided, but not unconditionally, not at any cost. It should be avoided, setting aside the exceptions, and this is one of them. Your principles here are far too simplistic, and they lead to your adoption of ridiculously disproportionate "solutions" (using a sledgehammer to crack a nut).
Quoting schopenhauer1
Yeah, that's another difference. I think it can, and I think that your arguments just don't work. Sure, you can piece something together for yourself and the relatively tiny number of people who share your views, but they have very little wider appeal. They're largely unconvincing. You're not too bad at this debate thing, but you don't stand a chance against someone of equal or superior skill (and I obviously fall under the latter category :strong: ) because your position suffers from a much weaker foundation. You're bringing a knife to a gun fight, mate. :wink:
And with regards to the net benefit thing, we frequently appeal to and rely on this kind of methodology and these kind of judgements. It's practically impossible to avoid. I get that you have motive to question it in this context, but meh. It makes a lot of sense to myself and many other people - to most people probably.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Yeah, I think I'm done with these analogies. It's a weak tactic in my assessment, because I can just as easily come up with analogies of my own to counter yours effectively, as I've demonstrated at least a couple of times already.
Although actually, this one's not [i]anywhere near[/I] as bad your Buddhist analogy, which formed the basis of your argument in the opening post. I can work with this set up at least, and I already have. I've said my piece about the "obstacle course", the people who go through it, and why I disagree with your take on it.
Thanks. I should say the argument from epistemic peers is actually Peter Van Inwagen's, I just applied it here to highlight the seriousness of the issue. Although what I actually think I'm highlighting is the triviality of it, in that no one actually believes in this stuff to the point that they would seriously like to see it carried through. It's just an indirect way of complaining about how hard life is and its difficult sometimes to raise any more nuanced an argument than, "get over it!".
Well and/or a philosopher's way to get relatives and friends to stop moaning about them not having kids.
I get the rhetorical point but I don't know about this. I've always thought Peter Singer is the perfect foil for Heidegger's take on what pure nihilism-in-action would look like. An entire world of Singer taken to the extreme would be, in my opinion, less desirable than extinction. Seems relevant because Singer et al are every bit as nihilistic as the pessimists but without the refreshing transparency of aim and purpose.
Yes, absolutely. Bad example of mine. I was only referring to his utilitarian view of eleemosynary duties for, as you say, rhetorical purposes. His views on infanticide (which I presume you're referring to) are indeed pretty miserable. The difference I would like to wedge between Singer and Benetar though (I'm no fan of either) is that infanticide as an ethical principle is at least predicated on actual human beings, not on presumed ones. It's not much, but it at least gives something to bite on to in ethical decision-making. Singer is (even if wrongly) considering the actual fate of living humans in either case. Thus he could make the argument that matters might well prove worse for actual living humans by the birth of more living humans. His is not much more than a trolley problem, but, in my opinion, with rather too much uncertainty to apply consequentialist ethics to.
Absolutely it is. I just don't like being taunted and provoked. Also when it gets to a level where I have to look four strings back to get to he heart of the argument, it loses its focus. I will keep making posts as well, all from different angles on this subject. However, the one thing this forum lacks is a formality to the debate. Thus it would be better if at some point both parties would just decide to make a closing argument as happens in certain debate formats. Otherwise, it is about who gets the last word and it endlessly provokes and taunts rather than elucidates and allows for reflection or for onlookers to have time to consider the two sides. This is especially so if the debate is contentious rather than a dialogue.
Quoting S
You can find similarities with any two positions, but by purposely pairing it with this insidious philosophy you want antinatalism to have the same guilt by association. It is a good rhetorical trick. As far as I know incels are essentially a hate group and are violent, and they have little philosophical reflection behind their arguments. None of this applies to antinatalism. Antinatalism doesn't hate a certain group of people. There is no condemnation or calls for crazy actions. Now, if some individuals do have hatred, this is just like individuals in the animal rights or vegan communities who spew hatred etc. That is not representative of the philosophy, just the actions or character of those individuals.
Quoting S
Well, I did say it is a difference in value. Agreeing by using "where as" and then naming some of the differences doesn't make sense except to be contentious for its own sake. However, I would say Benatar is mostly negative utilitarianism due to his focus on preventing harm in the unique case of birth. In my own formulation, there is a deontological aspect of not using someone for another cause, or in other words, not creating someone on their behalf who will experience harm for X agenda reason. This of course tying into the idea that no one needs to be given an obstacle course in the first place, in order to find solace through "strength-through-adversity" or finding the good despite the obstacles, or even the fact that good experiences exist so ergo it is a parents job to be messiah-figures delivering people who are expected to find the good life. This isn't even to mention that some people don't think they live worthwhile lives. What is your threshold for collateral damage of those people? That isn't even the main argument though, though it can be bolstered using the empirical evidence, that even a small amount of collateral damage or unintended consequences is not a good outcome. I don't see people as small bits to be used in a big "good life" aggregator machine. That makes no sense to me.
Quoting S
No, my objections typically involve a nuance that you don't seem to compute. That is to say, while it may be worthwhile continuing a life once born, there is an asymmetry when we are dealing with the unique situation of whether to procreate a new person into the world. Since there is no loss to an actual person of "the good life", it is not bad that it was never incurred. However, all harm was prevented, which is good. Combine this further, with the notion that no one needs to be given an obstacle course on their behalf, that is no one needs to be given adversity and harmful experiences in the first place, if they didn't need it. This is a messianic complex, to think that one is delivering another person into the world as arbiters of "good life" for others when the collateral damage to is harm. No one needs to experience the good life, unless they were already created in the first place. No person, no need for it.
Quoting S
Again, different contexts may require different thinking. The context of birth is different than the context of already being born, thus a different standard can be applied.
Quoting S
But that's the point. There is always another nut to crack. There are always more problems to solve. There is always more adversity to overcome. Putting post-facto reasons that are often culturally necessary for people to have the strength to get through, no one needs to have more nuts to crack in the first place. No one needs to be given the "chance" to solve these problems for X teoleological purpose, or because one is an recognized Nietzschean who likes the idea of "strength through perseverance", and beyond good and evil. Why create these situations for someone else? Oh right, because there is an agenda that they have to carry out "the good life", that people have to deliver themselves from the adversity and harms to find the good from the adversity, or good despite the adversity. But why did they need to go through this in the first place? Oh right, it's just good for them to go through it.
Quoting S
Oh yes, if I declare myself King of the Universe, that must mean it is so. You can declare your argument to be stronger, but doesn't make it so. As for not having wide appeal, this doesn't hurt the argument. Being the right position and being the popular one are not necessarily/ nor should necessarily be the same thing. The knife to a gunfight is a nice little rhetorical gimmick though.
Quoting S
Analogies are just another tool in these arguments and can help illustrate a point.
Quoting S
Yes, and we differ on whether it is good to create someone on their behalf, that has to go through an obstacle course to find the good, or find the good despite it. See above paragraphs for more detail.
Exterminated is not the correct word though. Preventing people from coming into existence is passive. No one is forcefully doing anything to actual people. That is a big difference, though the outcome might be the same, that no people will exist if taken to its logical conclusion. I can see why at first, it seems unintuitive to most folks. They are used to the idea that life is good in and of itself, and people need to be born to experience this. They never question this notion. As I've said before, the idea of nothingness scares people. This also goes into the idea that people think that they are messianic-deliverers, bringing more X (put whatever you want, experience, good, technology, civilization) into the world by bringing more people into it. As if the individual who will be harmed, is being used for the cause of advancing some other agenda. Harms can be prevented, and goods will not be missed by any actual person in the case of birth. Again, these are non-intuitive ideas for most people, but just because something has never been questioned before, or thought about in a certain way, doesn't mean it is not correct.
I would also say these are at the level of normative theories and normative-as-they-are-applied scenarios. Meta-ethics goes one stop beyond normative ethics to understand how ethics obtains at all (is it subjective, objective, "in the world", in our species, intuition-based, logic-based, etc. etc.). So just wanted to clarify that you are discussing at the level of normative ethics (i.e. virtue theory, deontological, utilitarian, etc.), not meta-ethics.
So in the market place of ideas, you can decide which ideas make sense based on the arguments. As long as no one is forcing their ethical views on you, I see no problem following or not following Benatar. The individual may hold a view, but they shouldn't force the view. So I'm not sure where the problem is. Just because there are so many points of views, doesn't mean one shouldn't hold any view.
I don't agree that it is a big difference. That the human race will cease to exist is a big deal, the manner in which their extinction comes about is minor in comparison.
Quoting schopenhauer1
I think several thousand years of ethical debate rather contradicts this notion. Have you read Moore, for example, who seems to me to be pretty resoundingly questioning this notion, he just doesn't come up with the same answer Benetar has.
Quoting schopenhauer1
I'm saying that different meta-ethical positions have different normative implications, and whilst meta-ethical positions are not derived consequentially, some humility is warranted about the fallibility of our rational capabilities when they lead us to conclusions which carry an enormous and irreversible normative consequence.
That is the consequence yes. Your assumption is that there is somehow value to the perpetuity at the species level. Unlike other animals which we are making extinct through no fault of their own, we are self-aware. We can understand what harm is for a future person. We can choose to not expose future people to harm by procreating them. It is as simple as that. The universe itself doesn't cry over our absence. Either would any actual person, if it actually came down to no one having children. But remember, antinatalists don't force their views, so de facto, other views being at least neutral to mildly pro-natalist, it doesn't seem like the end consequence of antinatalism is going to happen any time soon, just like everyone accepting veganism won't happen any time soon.
Quoting Isaac
I never said that people weren't pessimists. Indeed pessimists can be seen through literature going back millennia. But would you say this would be MOST people? A small sub-set are pessimist, an even smaller sub-set are antinatalists. Also, most people don't really question procreation, and would rarely think of the specific idea of preventing harm without causing any deprivation of good to an actual person. It is non-intuitive because life is almost always assumed to just be good in and of itself, and must be carried out no matter what. The agenda of the procreative agent is always one that is assumed to override harm to the future person.
Quoting Isaac
I think again you mean, normative positions that have enormous applicable consequences. But I don't want to parse terms. Again, this delves into the idea I said before- just because there are a multitude of positions, doesn't mean one shouldn't hold a position. Lucky for you then, the marketplace has other ideas that counter the antinatalist. The humility is baked into the fact that no one is forcing this position on anyone else nor is it incumbent to condemn those who do hold different views.