Empty names
Examples of empty names are; Santa Claus, Harry Potter, and Pegasus. Even me, Posty doesn't denote anything in particular in the world or does it?
Yet, those empty names don't refer to any person or object in the world.
Hence, how can they have meaning? And since they do have meaning, then how is that possible or otherwise how do they obtain?
Here's the Wiki entry on 'empty names'.
Yet, those empty names don't refer to any person or object in the world.
Hence, how can they have meaning? And since they do have meaning, then how is that possible or otherwise how do they obtain?
Here's the Wiki entry on 'empty names'.
Comments (236)
So your name is not totally empty. It refers to you yourself.
You have simply chosen to rename yourself.
Aristotle is Anglicized for the Greek name Aristoteles, a man who lived and philosophized during the 4th Century B.C.E. In Greek it means "best of all" or more literally "best end". Aristo- was a common Greek prefix anciently. I do not particularly recall any other Aristotle's besides the philosopher.
But, what "Posty McPostface" or "hks" refers to is surely not the same person or obtains to the same person in reality. Does it? Superman and Clark Kent are two different [s]entities[/s] (names) even though they "refer" to the same person. One is an alter-ego and the other is just a journalist.
And Posty McPostface is your moniker. It is not empty.
It denotes my personal motto:
"Everyone should believe in something.
I believe I will have another drink."
I disagree. Posty McPostface is simply an online personality I have created. It doesn't denote anything apart from the contextual definition derived through my interactions with you on this forum.
I wish I could have some. I like vodka sometimes. Tequila isn't my first choice at the liquor store.
But, surely we don't live on this forum (maybe apart from me). This online persona is just a fiction of your imagination of sorts. The name "hks" is someone who is posting on an online forum, not the same thing as the person who is posting under that moniker?
Tequila has a distinct natural flavor to it which I like. I like gin also. It also has a distinct flavor to it.
But, they aren't actual people. They're just constructs of one's imagination, both yours and mine through online interactions and stuff like that. I mean, I don't want to resort to referring to solipsism; but, online life is insulated and detached from the world in many regards.
Personally, all I can afford nowadays is beer. Some cheap malt liquor does the trick; but, I try and stick with something not as cheap as that. I think my next visit at the liquor store will be for some sweet wine.
Example: Harry Potter. The name "Harry Potter" may refer to the successful-book-franchise-turned-movie. Or maybe the boy himself: the fictional child of James and Lily Potter. Either way, "Harry Potter" is given meaning by the concept, idea, character, or story entailing it.
This further backed by the fact that the said name is "creative and unique". Your names (hks, Posty McPostface, Nathaniel) are all creative. Like a username, if this name is repeated, find another one. this ensures that the name can only MEAN one character.
Now, are there empty names with no meaning? Yes. For example, Liliabeth. You don't know who Liliabeth, therefore you are incapable of ascertaining its meaning. In your perception, Liliabeth could be anything. A name for a town, a name for a girl, a name for anything at all. Due to this vagueness and your inability to know what the meaning of Liliabeth is, then you could call it an "empty name."
Put simply, in my reasoning, an empty name can have meaning, if one knows what the name denotes or if the name denotes something at all with absolute certainty.
You could well ask about the meaning of Degas’ ballerinas or other works of art. Gleaning meaning makes life gleam. Perpetual gleaning makes life mean/mean. So then we have to glean some more meaning and admire a new gleaming wonder.
The difference, inasmuch as there is one, lies in our behaviour, and not 'in language'. One can treat names like a set of condensed instructions - the name 'Santa Claus' dictates, to some extent, a set of behaviours - both linguistic and extra-linguistic - which we enact when uttered in this or that context. Similarly with the name Earhart. That one refers to an actually existing person and another to a fictional feel-good figure makes not one bit of difference. So-called 'empty names' are paradigmatic of the function of naming in general, and not an exception to the rule.
Re your username, it's simply an alternate way of referring to you, so that's a different situation.
That philosophers have ever treated this as a mystery is completely absurd.
The question of "how they can have meaning" would only be about having a very wonky theory of how meaning works. Meaning doesn't work via it being necessary that any term refers to non-mental items.
This is reposting two things I recently posted, one just this morning:
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What philosophers have historically said about nonexistent things is a bit of a pet peeve of mine, because I'm of the opinion that historically, they've said mostly stupid things in this regard, where they would have been much better off if they'd understood fiction, daydreaming, etc. better, and had a semantics and philosophy of language that didn't foolishly try to avoid psychologism.
One major category of nonexistent objects (and actions, etc.) occur as something we imagine. The "nonexistent" adjective applies to the question of whether they also occur as something in the world external-to-minds. Speaking "truthfully" in this case is only a matter of (a) whether we're accurately reporting how someone was imagining whatever it is, or (b) whether we're getting right what would logically follow from what someone was imagining, per the ideas, concepts, they're employing, as they're employing them; however, when we're talking about someone's imaginings other than ourselves, qua their imaginings, they're always going to be the final arbiter.
So re (a), for example, we can say true or false things about Sherlock Holmes via looking at what Doyle wrote about Sherlock Holmes--it's something true or false about his imagining per se, and re (b), we can say something true or false about Sherlock Holmes a la, "About the Brown Lady of Raynham Hall, Sherlock Holmes would . . ." (keeping in mind that to my knowledge, no one has ever written a Holmes story about the Brown Lady of Raynham Hall) , via extrapolating from what Doyle and others (including ourselves) have imagined about Holmes, so that we're positing something consistent with that, though the imaginings of particular individuals will always be the final arbiter there. (As again, its simply true or false about their imagining.)
The other major category of nonexistent things, events, etc. is possible things and events, where "nonexistent" refers to the fact that they're possible but not actualized. The arbiter there is simply whether those things could happen given the facts of what the physical world is like, or what logic is like, etc. (There are different sorts of possibility--logical, metaphysical, practical/contingent-to-our-physical-universe, etc.)
There are also was-existent-but-no-longer-are-existent things, or historical things, and what makes a true statement there is, at least hypothetically, uncontroversial.
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And re what meaning is/how it works:
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Meaning is the mental phenomenon of making what are basically conditional, implicational associations--in other words, both connotational and denotational assocations that mentally function in the manner of "if this , then that
Meanings, as something inherently mental, the inherently mental act of associating, can't literally be made public. They're not identical to sounds we make, gestures we make, strings of letters or symbols, etc. And they can not literally be shared, either in the sense of display, or in the sense of two or more people possessing the same one.
This only makes sense if, for some unknown reason, you have a belief that people are "only one way." That's hard to even make any sense of conceptually, but it would somehow amount to a belief that people only have one constant aspect to their personality, that they interact with everyone in just the same way, they're always in the same mood, etc.
What would be the unknown (hopefully only to us) reason that you'd believe anything like that?
I don't at all have a different personality online than I do offline, by the way. That doesn't mean that I'm "just one way" all the time, but I'm not "just one way" online all the time, either.
Beer is safe and effective when used as directed. But then, so is gin, vodka, whiskey, bourbon, wine, schnapps, ale, rum, benzodiazepines, cannabis, poppy in its various forms, etc.
Really cheap beer, and 3.2 beer just isn't worth the calories. I like a pilsner or lager. IPAs are just too hoppy for my taste. Too bitter for old crank.
But doesn't our naming behavior result from the behavior of what is perceived? President Trump's behavior is different from Santa Claus', and for that reason we consider there to be an actual referent to the word "Trump," thus causing us to behave in a way that one has an actual referent and the other not. Since we behave differently when we consider the word "Santa Claus" then we do when we consider the word "Trump," it seems reasonable that we offer different words for them, namely "imaginary" and "actual." To say there's no distinction between imaginary and actual is itself a metaphysical statement. Quoting StreetlightX
This is an overstatement, as it speaks to the noumena. Just because all names can be explained through behavior doesn't mean that there might not actually be a reason our behavior varies when speaking about one sort of thing versus the next. That is, we may treat "Trump" different from "Santa Claus" due to a true metaphysical difference between the two. The best you can say under your theory is that metaphysics is irrelevant to the analysis, not that there isn't a true distinction between what the terms refer to.
But, surely "Terrapin Station" or "Posty McPostface" don't denote the same person posting under that name? I am Posty, but, I am not Posty. Does that make sense?
Ah, but only to you, Mr. Sushi. It's not a shareable meaning that you or I can discuss at leisure. The meaning is hidden from plain sight.
So, it's all mental? Otherwise, what is an "object in our perceptions"?
I'm not disagreeing, but, you seem to have thrown the baby out with the bathwater. Some names have a direct reference. Nonsensical, sensical, and senseless propositions derive their meaning from what reference they have. Think, the present King of France is bald.
No. :razz:
Hmm, what's the difficulty in stating that I am not Posty McPostface? Posty is just a moniker. The direct referant is lacking. I'm just a figment of your imagination.
What name wouldn't be "just a moniker"? That's what names are.
Direct referants?
Maybe try an example, because it seems you're forwarding pure nonsense on the face of it. What's an example of a "direct referent" that wouldn't be just a name/just a moniker?
Proper names are direct referants. Like, France, the planet Pluto, and others.
Two big problems a la you just talking bs.
One, "Posty McPostface" is a proper name. Here's the definition of "proper name:" "a name used for an individual person, place, or organization"
Two, "France," "Pluto," etc. are "just a moniker." Moniker is another word for "name." Proper names are names.
The difference between a proper name and a name that's not a proper name is, for example, "Socrates" (proper name) and "philosopher" (not a proper name, though still a name)
Posty McPostface doesn't denote me. It denotes your interactions with me on this forum through a form of contextualism. That's all I can say.
Just for fun, let's imagine that you're really Ned Block.
In what way does "Ned Block" denote you and not just various people's interactions with you via however they're interacting with you, but "Posty McPostface" doesn't denote you?
Maybe you don't know the conventional definition of "denote"?
From my perspective, by the way, it seems like either you're trolling or you're incredibly confused. (Although that almost seems to be the whole point to this board.)
I'm quite aware of the definition of 'denote'. But, Posty McPostface doesn't denote me as a person on these online forums. And, I'm not trolling.
Simply repeating that doesn't make it any less stupid.
Try answering the question I asked and maybe we can help you learn something.
What's the question again?
Just for fun, let's imagine that you're really Ned Block.
In what way does "Ned Block" denote you and not just various people's interactions with you via however they're interacting with you, but "Posty McPostface" doesn't denote you?
Posty McPostface doesn't denote me because I am not really Posty McPostface. It's just a nick not a name.
What makes someone "really" some name or other?
As much as I understand Kripke it's when a name is a direct referant to the object it denotes.
Kripke sucks, first off. No wonder you're confused.
You said that proper names are direct referents. "Posty McPostface" is a proper name per the definition of proper names.
You're claiming that it doesn't denote you . . . because denotation is when a name is a direct referent . . . --which is very shallowly circular.
No, because it doesn't denote me, the actual person posting under this nick.
Quoting Terrapin Station
It makes perfect sense to me. Is Superman the same person as Clack Kent? Yes, under an alter-ego name.
If you handle doesn't reference you, the actual person, then who is writing all those great posts?
My alter-ego, Posty McPostface. And, what wine do you suggest I buy this Friday? Hopefully something sweet and good.
I know who Frodo, Han Solo, Pegasus, Jack, Jesus, and you do too. You may not have met them, but you know who they are. You even know a thing or two about them. They are real because they exist in the memories and thoughts of many people, including yours. You don't know who Xcwevw is. I don't either. He, she, it, or nothing doesn't exist in my mind or anybody else's.
Every shared name, handle, referent, moniker, or image that identifies an author connects to something real.
Yes, I realize there is no one named Posty McPostface and Posty McPostface stand in-between me and thee. And your handle isn't the same as Frodo's handle, because Frodo is a fictional character. Try as you might, YOU are not a fictional character. Somebody living in 1k. CA disguises himself as Posty. Somebody else in the now freezing northland disguises himself as Bitter Crank.
This is a post from Posty McPostface, right? So are you, Posty McPostface, claiming that Posty McPostface is the alter ego of Posty McPostface? If the theory of the person behind Posty McPostface is correct than that person can't use "my" for anyone else than Posty McPostface. And when I say "you", I'm talking to Posty McPostface, and not that person. Therefore Posty McPostface can't be your alter ego, it's that person's alter ego. However, I have this - perhaps far-fetched - theory that the person whose alter ego is named Posty McPostface slipped and attempted to refer to himself with a first person pronoun, not properly realising that the pronoun must refer to Posty McPostface in a post by Posty McPostface.
This post might be flippant, but I'm actually sincerely curious how you explain usage of first person pronouns in a post where the referent is necessarily ambiguous between proper and alter ego, if the two do not refer to the same real world referent. First person pronouns are not names; they're indexical expressions, and their referent is whoever is uttering them. According to your theory that is... who or what? Who or what do first person pronouns in Posty McPostface's posts refer to, so that the quoted reply above makes sense in the way that we both presumably understand it?
So, you concede that Posty McPostface is just an empty name for someone disguised as Posty McPostface?
Yes, a fictional entity denoted by the name "Posty McPostface" has posted this. I am not the same as Posty McPostface.
Posty McPostface is my alter ego. That claim ties into a direct referant claiming to be who I indeed am.
Hope that wasn't too ambiguous.
I follow you here but Posty McPostface is just an alter ego of my true self.
Yes, no disagreements apart from the fact that I am known on these parts by the nick I go by. My usage of "my" is indicative of showing that I identify with my nick. But, again it doesn't denote my true self.
My opinion of dry, tart wines is that nobody actually likes them, but people pretend that dry, sour slop is a sign of sophisticated taste. It isn't. It's a sign of incipient alzheimers. Plus, if you're putting on a reception you don't have to buy as much because nobody will ask for a refill. Now, if you serve a slightly sweet champaign, people will hover around the serving table until they are quite tipsy, or can barely walk.
I generally drink too much at receptions where there is something drinkable and a generous pour, but that's what is required for me to socialize with strangers. I always needed two beers at the bar before I could start chatting up prospective tricks for the night. Two beers, good. Three beers, great. Four beers, divine. Five beers, express to danger zone. Six beers stumbling drunk oblivion. No point in taking me home cuz I won't be able to do anything anyway. So I aimed for four.
I concede nothing. A real person is writing your posts.
I wonder... do I even have enough processing power and band width to create and maintain an alter ego? I'm pretty much what you see is what you get.
Yes, I'm not arguing over that. What I an arguing is that I'm not the same person as my alter-ego known as Posty McPostface...
Quoting Bitter Crank
Are you still a Bitter Crank? No. My musings with you on this forum indicate that you are no longer a bitter crank.
But your usage of personal pronouns doesn't differentiate. Neither does mine. I've been Dawnstorm online forever, with only two exceptions, once preceding the name, and another having to do with forum etiquette on that particular forum. I also have a name given to me by my parents, and I share a family name with them. All those names have the same referent (i.e. real world object), and that referent is simply me, not anything as specific as a "true self", which is a good thing, too, since I have no such thing and couldn't be referred to at all. I'm a horrid compartmentaliser: different personae for every social context, even one for when I'm alone in my head. It would be impossible to name my true self. But it's rather easy to name myself - with different names for different context. If someone were to approach me in real life and ask me whether I'm Dawnstorm, I'd be rather surprised. I'd have to ask which Dawnstorm, before answering, too, since it could be a rather strange coincidence, and the other person could have arranged to meet with someone under a code name. In the age of doxing it might be a good idea to walk away instead, though, to be safe. In any case, under the alternat-ego interpretation, "Not right now," might be a possible answer to "Are you Dawnstorm," in that context. Right now, as far as I'm typing, I'm definitely Dawnstorm, though. I'm also still going by my given name, and I'm not using that here. "I" as the origin of first-person experience is the only constant, here. And in the end it doesn't much matter what name I go by. Pleased to meet you. Hope you guessed my name.
That's because a real person is behind the Bitter Crank conspiracy and the real person changed. A test: If you, or I, were to write under our real names, would we say the same thing? I would, because I don't have an alter ego. What you see is what you get. Is your real self better at wallowing than Posty? Is Posty smarter than you? I doubt it.
I have thought about creating an alter ego, an imaginary Me, who would be quite a bit different than me. Suaver, cleverer, smarter, taller, handsomer, better read, fluent in German and French, more athletic, younger, sexier, etc. But it's very hard to pretend to be smarter than one is. One has to actually have more brains to understand how to be smarter. Until the upgrades come out, I'll just have to put up with as many smarts as I have.
I think that's what I'm getting at here. I think the point here that I'm making is that contextualism is the only way to go about discerning meaning present in empty names. There really doesn't seem to be any other alternative.
Pleased to meet you too. I'm Posty but not really Posty. Hehe.
At the very least I would put more effort into my posts if it was under my real name. But since nothing is at stake here for me to wallow or post about depression in my other threads, then it makes little to no difference.
Thanks for the wine suggestions BTW.
I believe you. I think we switch into a certain mode when we publicly talk about heavy ideas. Even just being polite is a transformation of the interior monologue.
Yes, that's all true. In a figurative sense we only have access to our conscious persona, when in reality we're much more complex than just our day to day conscious aspect of being. Think unconscious, super-ego, ego.
Bear in mind that I rarely drink wine, so take it with several grains of salt (the advice, not the wine).
I don't really have anything against that, except framing it like this I agree with StreetlightX: all names are empty. It's sort of like the move from Ogden/Richards to Saussure and eliminating the referent. The problem is that no-matter what meanings you attach to them real world referents aren't really divisible in any other way than analytically.
The tripartite idea at least introduce complexity. I'd say that we are mostly flowing and reactive as we move through life. We 'live' the 'unconscious.' It's hidden in plain sight. It's our retrospective narrow accounts that betray that complexity.
Same denotation. Different connotation.
What do you mean by that?
Yes, I think that empty names refer to concepts and ideas. But, does that make meaning only mental? Isn't there cases when we have sensical, nonsensical, and senseless propositions?
And?
And that's it. Same denotation.
I don't think saying meaning is only mental address the phenomenon exhaustively. We share meaning. So the mental is somewhat public. All these terms are connected. They are caught up in that same field of shared meaning. 'Mental' has no fixed meaning apart from context. The shared meaning space is 'one' in some sense, and all the usual dichotomies are threatened by this semantic holism. I can only talk about the in-explicit ground by constantly distancing myself from the atomistic dichotomous thinking that is so natural for us and exactly what I am trying to point beyond. [And I'm really just paraphrasing interpretations of the folks who really made these leaps, so I don't claim some novel philosophy here.]
But, you aren't posting under your REAL name, are you?
Why "somewhat"?
I'm not denying that some names have a 'direct' reference. Of course some names do. The question is over the nature of this directness. And the point is that such 'direct reference' does not differ in kind from 'non-direct' reference. The idea that reference determines sense is balderdash. 'The present king of France is bald' is a perfectly sensical proposition, to which one can sensibly reply: 'there is no present king of France', and not just sit there looking quizzically.
What's the answer to that question then?
Are we talking now about modalities and necessity?
If I give you a proposition like 'the mental is public,' then that suggests an explicitness that betrays my own message. That suggests that I want to do math with concepts that have significant meaning crammed into cute little tokens like 'mental' and 'public.'
That said, I'd they there is something like a continuum. If the mental were purely public, then you would have no need to ask me to elaborate. If the mental were not at all public, then you would not bother to ask, since we would share no meaning space in which such an elaboration were possible.
To be clear, I don't know exactly what 'meaning space' is. One of my theses is that we can't make certain things explicit without betraying them. As we try to make them explicit, we find that our spiderwebs are fragile. They don't play nice with other such spiderwebs. For instance, I think we live in a shared world. What is it for something to be true about this 'world'? I'd say something like 'true-for-us and not just true-for-me.' But I'm not saying 'X' is in everyone's head. That's too explicit. Too much baggage comes along with it. Because we could debate about my theory of truth to find out whether it was true for us without anyone having an explicit theory of this other kind of truth used in-explicitly to judge my conceptualization. We 'live' a faith in this elusive sense of truth. Or 'truth' doesn't have a crystalline meaning, despite its importance to us.
I think I do. It's a state space for atomic propositions to be understood. Wittgenstein referred to it as 'logical space'. The ontology of it is still a mystery to me; but, understanding the world as the totality of facts and not things, is illuminating to my mind.
IMV, that is a beautiful spider-web, one more attempt to grab the phenomenon in concepts. How do you make sense of Wittgenstein himself abandoning his youthful vision?
A few things. First, I didn't say that there is no distinction between imaginary and actual. All I would say is that language is indifferent to any such distinction. Second, our 'naming behaviour' results from our learning how to use names. That's it. If we find out tomorrow that Santa Claus is real, or if tomorrow, Trump turns a new leaf and becomes the Nicest, Bestest, most Lovely person in the universe, we would still use those names to refer to each respective person. That's why proper names are so-called 'rigid designators' - they reflect a fact about language and its use (our practices of using language), and not about 'the thing itself'.
Quoting Hanover
I did not say there is no reason why our behaviour varies when speaking about one sort of thing versus the next. I would emphatically agree there is such a reason. But that reason is to be found in our use of language, and not in the 'thing'.
And would you elaborate on what it means for you?
I'm an astute Wittgensteinian, meaning that I believe that the Tractatus was a preface to the Investigations. One is supplementary to the other. Wittgenstein wanted for both works to be published alongside one another. I think I'm on point in this regard.
I don't know why you start dragging in words that were not even mentioned in my post. You do this often, and it's really quite annoying.
I agree that he wanted them together and that they are part of a continuous journey, but I think that journey is dialectical. It's exactly because Wittgenstein thirsted for a sort of perfection that he was also one of the first to come up against its limits (just a theory I'm tossing off, offered non-authoritatively). He ran fastest and found the obstacle earlier than most. Don't get me wrong. The TLP has great value. At least for me it's no big deal if part of an approach seems wrong, especially if it's the 'mistake' of a genius. And much is not cancelled out by further reflection.
Logical space means a state space where meaning is shared. That's all I can say without sounding metaphysical. This goes to the heart of some of my earlier posts about how facts obtain in reality and the world.
Okay, then I'll stop doing it. But, as you mentioned, rigid designators alone have no meaning. Only contextually do they make sense to us.
I didn't say this either!
Well, I'm glad we agree that there is some kind of shared space, however we elaborate upon it.
Okay, then I'll refrain from engaging in posts that are irrelevant in your view.
Yes, logical space is just a two-dimensional coordinate system where relations between objects designate their meaning, contextually speaking. But, obviously we don't live in a two-dimensional world, hence the Investigations.
I guess my concern is that I don't believe in objects.
I left that exaggeration by itself for dramatic effect. I mean that objects get their being from the network gets its being from the objects. Kinda-sorta-something-like-that.
Exhaustive explain/describe the house next door to me and you have explained/described all of reality. Why? You will need history, and also to give an account of your own explanation's possibility. And maybe even then the mystery won't have been touched.
Well, when you use a word you have a meaning in mind, and when I hear the word I have a meaning in mind, too. Those meanings don't have to be the same; they just have to be compatible in a way that they don't cause problems in our interactions (or that they cause problems that don't lead to the termination of the interaction, or whatever). What connects us in communication is a real world, and the assumption that we're to one degree or another talking about it.
So when I'm taking a bath, I'm not Dawnstorm, but when I'm typing a forum post I am. In the real world, there's really only one me, and if I'm typing a forum post and someone interrupts, I'm both Dawnstorm and not Dawnstorm at the same time. All that is analytic nonsense, though. There's only one of me. I can want to save that distinction, because it matters in one way or another, but I - as the referent - don't change no matter what name I go by.
So here's the problem: if what name applies to me depends on activities, the name refers to a bundle of activities or maybe a related and perceived identity: that's a concept, though, and not a thing. That's the reference and not the referent. I'm really only talking about the difference between signifier and signified. But if a name names a person than that referent would have to be me, no matter what I'm doing. I can't exclude Dawnstorm from the more comprehensive person and say only the more comprehensive person is real. That's nonsense.
Insofar as names are bound by context, names have no direct referent. The reference, the meaning of the word, is always a layer we push over real things.
Insofar as names refer to things, I'm the referent of both the name "Dawnstorm" and "XXXX", because there's nothing else that applies. Clearly, the concepts, the reference, the signified, differ in its properties to one degree or another, but there's only one real world object that is me, no matter with how many concepts I might frame it.
It's possible that I, Dawnstorm, am lying, and that the person currently typing this post is part of a collective who alternately handle this account. In that case, the me typing this post is not the whole Dawnstorm, but only part of Dawnstorm. In that case, the difference between "Dawnstorm" and "XXX" would be a difference in referent: I'm not Dawnstorm, I'm part of it.
It's also possible (no it's not, but humour me), that I'm one of the infinite number of monkeys on an infinite number of keyboards supposed to be produced Shakespear, but failing and coming up with this instead. In that case, no only am I not who I claim to be, this isn't really a conversation, and none of this is meaningful on my end, though it might be on yours. In that case, Dawnstorm would be fictional, and so would be the "XXX" I keep referring to, but they'd still putatively be the same real-life referent, if that referent had a physical reality.
So when you say that "Posty McPostface" doesn't refer to your true self, you're talking on the level of concept, not on the level of thing. The concept of "referent" is genrally the thing-level (I'm not 100 % confident about that, but that's how I've always seen it). The person typing your posts is no less real than the person eating dinner. Whether either of them has a true self is a completely different question whether they have a name. And the same person can have two names at once - which one to use is a matter of convention, not reference. Or differently: if I were to address you as Posty McPostface during dinner, and you say that you're not Posty McPostface right now, I'd read that as an appellative rather than as a descriptive speech act, because I assume you know that I know that you're not engaged right now with a forum post. (You don't have to worry about me suddenly showing up in real life; I'm speaking hypothetically. I don't even really know if your proper ego usually eats dinner. That's just a non-absurd assumption of mine.)
Can you expand on this? It's quite interesting...
Well, then I don't know what to say. Objects are what populate logical space.
Well, I come from linguistics, not philosophy, here. In linguistics, there are (at least) two major ideas of meaning:
The first is the semantic triangle: We talk about the real world. We see a thing, we associate a conept with it, and then we encode that in a word - then the word is decoded into a concept and the concept related back to a thing. (That's Ogden/Richards.)
The second is the structuralist approach, where a word consists of signifier (a sign) and a signified (a concept). The structuralist approach keeps reference within the word, and words derive meaning from the difference between words rather than the real world. The common way to illustrate is that if you point to a tree and say "tree", you can't possibly know that what the other person actually means is "tree". He could be saying "big," or "plant", or "look!"...
Both approaches have their limitiations, but I find them both useful. Neither of them go deeply into what constitutes real life, though. And that's what's sort of difficult here:
When we use words to define other words, we're firmly in the structuralist territory. You say "Posty McPostface" is your alter ego, but by saying that as Posty McPostface you imply some level of overlap. That overlap is an overlap of signfireds, though, of concepts. We can play a game: "Posty McPostface is a person." Ture or false? A series of such questions can make the meaning more clear, but all the while I have no access whatsoever to any referent - there's only my imagination. And while you do have access to the referent, it doesn't seem like you care much about it: in fact, you seem to be taking it for granted and try to make some difference that you can't count on others going along with. But that's only possible because there's a body out there that carries both tags (according to social levels of appropriateness).
Now when it comes to the thingly layer, I find Husserlian phenomenology attractive: it's unaccessible in pure form; all we know are phenomena. That complicates things for the current issue:
Back to the structuralist pointing at a tree: he's seeing a phenomenon, something that presents itself as a tree. It's not that the tree isn't a tree, and while others might not know whether he says "tree", he himself does. My "tree" may not be your "tree", but there's a referent out there, a thing, that arbitrates between us. We can run into trees, for example, they're solid. We should have similar experiences.
So the question is: Is this putative referent, the thing behind the phenomenon that serves as referent, relevant to "naming"?
A name is also a type of phenomenon: it's a tag. When I read a post by "Posty McPostface", I contrue a continuity there - a person behind the post. I have no other access whatsoever to you, nor do I seek one. But because of the meaning I attach to "person" I assume that there is a phenomenon out there that correlates to Posty McPostface in the same way that Dawnstrom correlates to "me" (which is the only fist person experience I have access to). As such, "Posty McPostface" is primary to me, and if we were ever to meet by accident and uncover our mutual identies (alter-egos, if you will), then that's the only shared history we have, and it should dominate our real-world interactions, too. It's all about day-to-day relevance structure: which name applies does not change according to who we are; it changes according to who we are with or in what context we move. Meanwhile, there is no other body who can bear the label of "Posty McPostface" and no other body than mine who can bear the lable of "Dawnstorm". The names say nothing about us; they just identify us phenomena. Because we know the meaning of a name, and because we apply the name, a persony thing becomes a bit more of a person.
Your "Posty McPostface" persona may differ from your other personae in many ways; but it's no less what you're doing with your body. And that's what makes negotiating when to use what name possible in the first place. It's a perspective game: if I meet you in real life, Posty McPostface is the only label I have for you, and you have to decide whether you're fine with that, or whether you don't want that name in that context. But none of that is a question of whether or not I have the right referent. Similarly, if I meet you in real life, and I refer to you as Posty McPostface, I'm clearly not reducing you to your online posts. I can't meet your online-posts in any other way than on a computer screen. The only thing that the name would imply is that this person before me at one point in the past made those posts. You're Posty McPostface if that's true, and you're not Posty McPostface if that's not.
Your online name and your offline name(s) have only one thingly referent - there can be no other.
Indeed. What are "thinglys" as you describe them?
But, ontologically I exist as a concept in your mind made possible through our context of my interactions with you on this forum. The thingly is a concept as you have noted, no?
Yes. Since it's perceptive after all.
So, then, how is meaning obtained from examples like Pegasus, Harry Potter, Luke Skywalker? Context, yes? This also touches on how is meaning shared?
Yes. It becomes perceptive because these contexts may vary from one individual to another.
So, then Posty McPostface is just another empty name, no? The meaning as per other examples is derived from associating the name with a concept in your mind...
Why should a name have to refer to a concrete entity in order not to be considered "empty"? I mean what possible effective difference could the concrete, as opposed to say fictional, existence of an entity have on the name itself? What if a name refers to someone everyone thinks really exists/existed but in fact does not/ did not; would that mean that the name is "empty" (whatever that might mean) even though no one knows that its referent is fictive? Or is the name "full" unless and until it is discovered that its referent does not concretely exist or has not concretely existed, whereupon it suddenly becomes 'empty'. That would seem to make no sense at all.
"Thingly" is merely an adjective that means "of or related to things". I'm not sure philosophers use the term; I don't read a lot.
Quoting Posty McPostface
Yes. And that's the only mode of your existance that's accessible to me. I do think that's not the full extent of your existance, though.
Well, the divisions between concept/thing and between phenomenon/thing are themselves concepts, but within that concept, things are things, not concepts, and only accessible as phenomena.
Phenomena are things as they appear, and the as-they-appear part is what connects things to concepts, though concepts exist even if no things appear. It's a little messy.
The name "Posty McPostface" denotes you, a person whom all of us are having an intelligent conversation with. I argue that if you never had that name I couldn't quote you. It maybe "empty" but not necessarily meaningless.
Well, if we're on the same page, meaning that we are 'realists' in some sense, then that would mean that proper names have to have rigid designators to be called proper names in the first place.
Quoting Janus
None, with respect to the name itself. Just an issue if we're trying to discern meaning derived from empty names, that are contextually bound to have meaning and not as a 'fact' or 'proposition' that one could analyze and claim is valid.
Quoting Janus
Yes, that's the Santa Clause paradox in a nutshell. Children genuinely believe in Santa Claus as the old man that gives presents for being a good Samaritan.
I agree, and think that Posty McPostface is just a persona on these forums. Nothing more to it given the limitations of this form of communication between us. If I were to meet you in real life, I could tell you my real name.
Quoting Dawnstorm
I think I'm getting it. If you were a direct realist and didn't believe in any homunculus or representative realism, then that would be true. But, given the nature of thought, which makes me assume a indirect realist position, then I don't think this person known as Posty McPostface is my real character or personality. It's just an alter-ego.
Yes, so we're stuck at square one. How do empty names have meaning?
It's really circular from what you can figure out by now.
Do names "have" rigid designators or are they not themselves thought to be rigid designators? As I understand it ( which is not much!) the alternative to rigid designation is definite description: and I have sometimes wondered how what is designated by any proper name could, in the absence of direct ostension, be determined at all without the aid of definite description.
Depends on how you view things. Again, if I were an indirect realist (which I am), then objects are akin to noumena, and their representations or 'concepts' are what actually integrate their meaning from. Borrowing from Wittgenstein, if I lion could speak, we wouldn't be able to understand it, even. Dunno if that was irrelevant but felt like the right thing to say in this regard.
A direct realist would assert that we have immediate access to objects in the world, and the phenomenology of their perception is irrelevant. I don't agree with this for the matter.
In my opinion, it's basically perceptive and opinionated. Empty names have meanings based on the contexts they were taken from. If there was no context or previous knowledge, then the name is meaningless. Like how the name "Santa Claus" would not bring up the image of a fat red dude bringing presents for a young child who did not learn about him.
So, the alternative to names being rigid designators is that they have rigid designators? Since what is designated by a name cannot itself be the designator of a name, then what could the rigid designator the name is held to have be? Also, I can't really see what the noumenal could have to do with naming, since it is defined as that which lies beyond the limits of language altogether.
The distinction isn't apparent in my mind. Care to expand on what you have said?
I'm not sure what distinction you are referring to.
About this is what I'm having trouble understanding. Are you saying they're distinct or the same?
Okay, let's say I lie so convincingly that you end up thinking my hobby is polishing tomatoes. Since that's a rather unusual hobby you remember it. So we meet, and you say "Ah, you're that guy who's hobby it is to polish tomatoes." You'd be wrong, but you'd be referring to the right person.
Proper names work like that. They identify unique things; they don't describe them. Sure, I can ask the question with the meaning you have in mind, too: "Are you Posty McPostface?" But that's a derived usuage that means something "Is that really how you are?" It's a philosophical question about identity and little to do with naming. "Are you Posty McPostface?" is equivent to the question "Are you the person who posts on thephilosophyforum.com under the name Posty McPostface?" It has no other meaning. That you can add a nomen-est-omen layer to the question and transform it into something else isn't relevant for determining reference.
Well, I am trying to understand whether you think there is a difference between names "having rigid designators" (your phrase) and being rigid designators (the usual locution). Personally, think the logic of the two expressions precludes them from being the same, so they must be distinct. But what matters is what you think since it was you used the unusual phrase.
In my mind there's no difference between the two. Although, now I'll refrain from using having where being is more appropriate.
I'm a tomato polisher too. How awesome to meet someone with the same hobby. :)
But you just created meaning right now by referring to the place where I post under the guise of "Posty McPostface".
While it's fascinating to try to pin down what proper names are, I think it's at least noteworthy that seems to be like trying to pin down the infinite system of language down in a few finite paragraphs. Can we exhaust what it is to name? No doubt we can brighten the space of the question.
Sometimes discussions on language remind me of a knight who goes to fight a dragon without his shield, thinking he has only to deal with a chameleon. With language we get massive complexity and flexibility, mostly automatic. Somehow the words pour out and somehow we understand this pouring. We understand 'proposition' in context. We can replace it with other words ('statement','judgment'). But if we keep going we find that we are chasing the meaning of 'one' word across the vast space of the language as a whole.
Rather than "it has no other meaning," I should have probably said, "it has no other type of meaning," or something like that? It's not that easy to talk about - names identify, they don't describe. That would be pretty straightforward, if you didn't need some sort of description to identify things.
The point is this: as long as I have enough information to identify you, it doesn't matter how accurate my picture of you is.
Also, I just squished a tomato a little, and now it's got a rather ugly brownish spot. I need to get better at judging pressure.
Hmm. I think the correspondence theory of truth fails us here. What does Pegasus correspond to?
I don't know about that. You can always be wrong about me being a nice Posty McPostface and am evil instead. When is "enough information" accurate in forming a picture about someone?
That’s silly. You can say the same for any number of things. Personal preferences don’t make things completely oblique.
Every snigle word carries a personal weight to it. For example I’ve often used the word “mountain” to explain this to the point where my personal memories that surround that word give the word a unique meaning/sense to me. That doesn’t mean people don’t understand what “mountain” means and my understanding of Posty McPostface is cery likely shared by many others here. So you’re wrong.
That's a good question. I'd say to a shared image/notion. To me it's cleaner to just grant existence to all of these things(the horse and the horse with wings). They just exist in different ways, with different intensities of publicness, different possibilities in terms of our purposes.
But we can't talk about concepts in isolation. They exist as mental constructs that are mapped and described by language. Hence, Posty McPostface is just an empty name that you can attach meaning to through interactions with the real person posting under the guise of "Posty McPostface".
I think the point is that the correspondence theory of truth is bunk when talking about empty names. Therefore, what can we substitute to qualify empty names as meaningful content?
Does 'empty name' even make sense? Can there be a name that doesn't point at something? Would we still call it a name?
There is a difference, of course. I suspect that we could talk about this difference endlessly.
I'm with you on this one. Otherwise what would we be talking about? Does the name "two" denote anything?
In certain contexts it's the name of a number.
And what does that number denote?
Now you are feeling my vibe. Look for local meaning. Try to catch it. Fail. Discover that meaning is global or distributed and we can't even say what it is globally either --or we can never quite say it. We can't quite say what makes our doomed attempt to finally say it possible.
Hmm. So, does that imply some form of idealism? Reminds me of the problem of Universal's. But I think I finally get your nick.
'Idealism' is caught up in the storm. 'Idealism' has no more local meaning than 'two.' It's not false to find idealism in it but this 'idealism' would be one more failure to finally say it. It's the explicitness that brings with it fragility. A chandelier. All of our explicit attempts interfere with another. Hegel wrote somewhere that all philosophy was idealism. I think there's some truth in that. But don't nail that down as a kind of math.
What is most worth saying cannot be said clearly and ultimately. Thus spoke macrosoft --and who knows how many others.
I don’t see your point nor the point of “empty names.” Maybe I’m missing something.
Whereof one cannot speak thereof one must remain silent. My favorite quote by Witty.
What is “familiarly known” is not properly known, just for the reason that it is “familiar”. When engaged in the process of knowing, it is the commonest form of self-deception, and a deception of other people as well, to assume something to be familiar, and give assent to it on that very account. Knowledge of that sort, with all its talk, never gets from the spot, but has no idea that this is the case. Subject and object, and so on, God, nature, understanding, sensibility, etc., are uncritically presupposed as familiar and something valid, and become fixed points from which to start and to which to return. The process of knowing flits between these secure points, and in consequence goes on merely along the surface. [/quote]
This is the attitude I have toward the usual categories. They become bland and lifeless. They keep us on the surface, bickering over nothing really (at worst) and confusion earnest inquiry (at best.)
Yeah, he's on to something. That's what I love about him. He was grossed out by people trying to make a science of the highest things. That approach betrays them. He really wanted these things given some respect with silence. (?) To me the endlessly mechanical approach to life in its fullness is somewhat small and sad. 'I am correct-bot 2040. Please input facts. There are no interpretations, only facts. Thank you. '
It's a utilitarian grasping with no openness. Instead it's obsessed with power, correctness, language policing, etc. It tries to fit the object (God or the transcendent or the unnameable or the mystery or love or beauty) to the method. The method is too small, and the method is maybe even a form of cowardice. We are terrified of being wrong, or being mortal. We want to invent a machine that keeps us safe on the surface. [This is an oversimplification, etc. But everything is....]
Well my entire point is that Posty McPostface is like a fictional character like Homer or Harry Potter. Thus, it's an empty name that denotes me; but, is not really me.
You may never have enough information to form an accurate picture of a person. Luckily, that's not a requirement to connect a person to a name. But if I at least get the name right, I can tell who it is that I have an incomplete or even wrong picture of. Finding the referent of a proper name is a lot easier than making a list of all referents of a less exclusive category. (There are different people with the same name, I know, which can cause confusion.)
Imagine what a fun forum this would be if we were all posting anonymously.
Yeah, the seventh proposition of the Tractatus is intense. Does it lead to philosophical quietism?
Yes, but haven't I already proven that we are posting anonymously with my silly nickname?
No, you haven't. Your posting under an alias, which is different.
All post written by the user "Posty McPostface" are attributed to that user. No other user is called "Posty McPostface". If ALL users would change their name to "Posty McPostface", then we'd all be posting practically anonymously (of course, we'd also have to choose the same avatars, or have the board disallow avatars.)
I see how it could. On the other hand, I find an ecstasy in that which I feel I have come to understand. Not all the time (life has its ups and downs) but again and again. So for me it's a beautiful thing to try to find liberating words, words that open situations instead of closing them, words that point beyond getting trapped in words. IMV this stuff was already in the tradition mixed with other elements. What was Hegel pointing at? Something dynamic and alive. Something that always moved beyond categories toward the whole. Why did Diogenes mock the cobwebs of the dialecticians? Why did Democritus laugh? Who was Pyrroh really? (Behind the goofy myths.) And what were the negative theologians trying to say?
This is one of my favorite 'spiritual' passages of philosophy that connects a certain understanding of language with more than just conveniently avoiding the waste of time.
[quote=Nietzsche]
This faith does not formulate itself—it simply lives, and so guards itself against formulae. To be sure, the accident of environment, of educational background gives prominence to concepts of a certain sort: in primitive Christianity one finds only concepts of a Judaeo-Semitic character (—that of eating and drinking at the last supper belongs to this category—an idea which, like everything else Jewish, has been badly mauled by the church). But let us be careful not to see in all this anything more than symbolical language, semantics[6] an opportunity to speak in parables. It is only on the theory that no word is to be taken literally that this anti-realist is able to speak at all. Set down among Hindus he would have made use of the concepts of Sankhya,[7] and among Chinese he would have employed those of Lao-tse[8]—and in neither case would it have made any difference to him.—With a little freedom in the use of words, one might actually call Jesus a “free spirit”[9]—he cares nothing for what is established: the word killeth,[10] whatever is established killeth. The idea of “life” as an experience, as he alone conceives it, stands opposed to his mind to every sort of word, formula, law, belief and dogma. He speaks only of inner things: “life” or “truth” or “light” is his word for the innermost—in his sight everything else, the whole of reality, all nature, even language, has significance only as sign, as allegory.—Here it is of paramount importance to be led into no error by the temptations lying in Christian, or rather ecclesiastical prejudices: such a symbolism par excellence stands outside all religion, all notions of worship, all history, all natural science, all worldly experience, all knowledge, all politics, all psychology, all books, all art—his “wisdom” is precisely a pure ignorance[11] of all such things.
[/quote]
So far no one else has ever said to me: Yeah, that speaks to me too! This passage has always just hung there when I posted it. But I feel this music in good moments. And I think Nietzsche's Christ is very close to Nietzsche's own transcendence. Beyond all his penetrating paragraphs there is a thrust into the beyond of all that has become dead and fixed for him. We might say that he reaches for beings in order to never-really-say becoming.
Is this philosophy, mysticism, religion? The words break down. The categories fail, especially if we add to this portrait a familiarity with sophisticated thought that doesn't get trapped in it. This 'ignorance' is an ignorance revealed by striving against ignorance. It is a mystery painfully-at-first revealed to those who would demystify.
But it is not like “Harry Potter” or “Pegasus.” Those names have a meaning shared by many, many people. I might call my chair Alan The Kangaroo, which from now on I think I will (seriously!)
Obivously if I refer to Alan The Kangaroo people will think it is either a Kangaroo, or more likely a friend of mine called Alan who’s either from Australia, able to jump quite high or some othr connection.
The name “Posty McPostface” refers to that part of you presented on this forum. “Harry Potter” refers to some aspect of the authors imagination. It is nothing more than that. The whole business of some philosopher of language coming up with this is nothing more than someone attempting to say something new yet doing no more than expressing something we’re all readily aware of - at least in terms of psychological identity and symbolism.
You may as well say your “real name” is an “empty name.” This is because your real name is an umbrella under which “Posty McPostface” exists - not that we care here which then presents the illusion of some other individual being (it’s just you whoever you are.)
Ok, no disagreements on my end.
I would say in the positive that it is mysticism of sorts. Often interpreted as sophistry!
:smile:
Yes, and maybe it is both. The words alone can only point. My question for you: do you think philopshy seeks something higher ? Do you feel any sort of [s]religious[/s] passion in your thinking? One wants truth not to pay the bills but just because. Something is trying to articulate itself. Life is being lived in a high way in the conceptual realm, unfolding itself, finding words for a vision of the world....of itself as this finding of the world in the world. Whatya think?
To me, "Empty Names" can also mean "A Vocabulary without a definition or target".
Santa Clause, your username, and Harry Potter are not "Empty Names" because is referring to something/Concept.
Now that I think about it, as long as you call it "Empty Names" it's almost impossible to be Empty, because a name is always referring to something/concept.
Somethings that you might call "A Vocabulary without a definition or target" are
1) "awuhawuhuiashduihasuiod"
2) "awkkasjdiasdhashfuiasdhfui"
3) "awkjkajksdasjdoasjdoijasd"
even, "wkwkwkwwkwkwkwkwkwkkw" As WEIRD as it is, does have value... it's how an indonesian people laugh it seems :D
I find philosophy therapeutic to a large degree. I've always been a sort of believer in reason, contrary to Hume I don't think reason is the handmaiden to the passions. There's something divine and mystical about reason and logos, noesis, and such.
The limits of my language are the limits of my world; but, then I learn something new and expand on those limits.
Quoting diesynyang
What is that something you are referring to? Is it just a mental constructs of sorts?
^ example "Santa Clause" refer to the story of an old man who give present to good children on Christmas. That concept is indeed real, and the name "Santa Clause" is indeed have meaning (Even though the person don't). When we said "I want to dress up like santa-clause on christmas" and ZERO people know what we are talking about like "Who is Santa clause?" you can say, that name have "Empty Meaning". But people now what Santa Clause is, the person it's not real, the concept are.
get the gist of it? It's the same with Harry
But to me that's the passion! Passion is not just sexual lust and hunger. There is a passion for something lofty, call it what we will. That's why pragmatism can be such a turn off, though some pragmatists found a way to grasp at the higher with it. (For me the higher is mostly a feeling that we strive to attain and hold onto.) Philosophy is from that perspective a music of concepts.
I agree. The circle. We push against its limits and stretch it.
Yes, so it's all mental constructs then and webs of belief, yes? Meaning that is.
^Yes :D, I think when we said "Empty Names" just because there are no value in the mix of alphabet is not helpful. EXCEPT you believe the concept of "Oh we want our child to be a great ruler so we want to name him "Kaiser" and not "Bob"
Quoting Posty McPostface
^Btw, if you are hateful toward the definition of meaning, be careful to not fall to nihilistic trap k :D
There are things that we derive meaning from that are and never will be subject to appraisals. Like the Mona Lisa or Bach's Sheep May Safely Graze. I used to be a utilitarian; but, setting up the criteria upon which we could appraise value is a hopeless and soullessness task.
Yeah, well said. Trying to fit everything into a scheme and calling that the height of being human seems wrong to me. Or not wrong but just an inferior music. For me the goal is vaguely to turn the music up, light more candles, live with more depth and flow. Philosophy is just one way to do that better, a way focused on the conceptual aspect of existence. Since I love the conceptual, it's at the very top --right next to music and of course being with others in the best kind of way.
Amen.
Amen indeed. I have these little moments in my life. People I work with. Friends-at-work. There is a restrained tenderness in smiles exchanged. 'Love hides.' The world ain't so dead. We just have learned caution, those who are tuned in in some kind of vague way to what it vaguely is all about. And I think that is all of us sometimes. And that maybe there is a natural tendency toward getting better at that. 'Philosophy...is an activity.' It's not a set of dead propositions, etc. Books are treasures, but the First Book is life itself.
One thing I must throw in is that this is no denial or what is evil or terrible about existence. Blah blah. We love in spite of that, and not without hating at moments too. Obvious things, but any kind of positive spiel looks naive to those not currently plugged in to a sense of wonder. Sometimes it's not cool to not know and to know that one doesn't know in a knowing way. Complex stuff, and people are devilishly complex, too complex for their own understanding of themselves except in terms of a few general principles perhaps.
One name isn't more "real" than another.
Rather than "real," some distinctions that make sense are whether it's your legal name, whether it's your birth name, whether it's your married name, whether it's a dba name ("doing business as"), whether it's an assumed name or alias (those are more general "known as" names where there has been no legal name change), whether it's a pseudonym, etc.
Those are proper names, not descriptions. Proper names aren't types or tokens of a type.
A type is something like a music CD--it's a category of things, there are many different music CDs. A token is an individual CD.
Ah, I'm sorry for the mistake. I meant to imply that 'proper names' (if they can be called that without a denoting token) such as "Posty McPostface" is an entity that exists on these forums or that "Harry Potter" is the main fictional character of the Harry Potter franchise.
Does that make better sense?
It doesn't make sense because you're trying to make proper names fit an idea that they don't fit. Proper names are neither types nor tokens of some type.
Think of it this way. Types are kind of like sets with many members. So you have something like the set of all trees, or the set of all computers, or whatever. Tokens are particular members of one of those sets. So a particular tree, a particular computer, and so on.
Proper names aren't sets or members of a set. They're more like simply sounds that we grunt out in response to a particular thing. "Plunard"--and you point that that particular thing so that whenever you see it, you're going to make that sound to represent it to yourself and others, to call it, etc.
Just because a name isn't the name that someone goes by in every situation, or just because it's the name of a fictional character or whatever, that doesn't mean that it's not a proper name or that it's a type of thing or a token of a type.
Interesting point. I wonder what other members think.
The can be rigid designators that denote an "object that instantiates concepts", though.
Which wouldn't be proper names, however.
Then what are objects that instantiate concepts?
It seems almost like you're not even reading what you're writing. The answer here is tokens.
I'm basically asking you why aren't proper names also referred to as tokens for things? Is this an issue?
It seems clear to me that types are the descriptive content of tokens. So why not include token under the monkier of proper names which would designate that descriptive content?
Re proper names as tokens, what set would you say a proper name belongs to?
It's simply just the label of a/the set. Not the set itself.
What? Did you understand what i said earlier about how types/tokens are similar to a set and members of a set?
Yes, I did. But what is the name of a set? Its proper name or rigid designator?
Consider the following exchange:
A: Am I speaking with John Smith?
B: Yes. How can I help you?
A: Please sign this receipt for...
B: Oh no, you want my uncle.
A: No, I want John Smith. That's you right.
B: I'm also a John Smith, but the John Smith who sold....
In this exchange, A uses "John Smith" exclusively as a proper name, but B, in the last line of the exchange, uses "John Smith" as type/token word with the meaning "people named John Smith".
Words generally have meanings, and then you check whether an object qualifies for those meanings.
Proper names don't work like that. There's a 1:1 relationship of reference between the name and a single object. The object can change completely; what matters is that it retains the name, and that's a matter of social convention and not meaning. You don't have to fulfill any sort of semantic criterea to qualify for any proper name attached to you; the continuity of the relationship between the name and the ting itself is what matters, and it's also what's invoked when you say the name.
Because there's no descriptive content in a proper name. "Harry Potter" describes nothing - it's just the name assigned to a fictional character. I assume there are Harry Potters in real life, and they don't have to be anything like the fictional character. I could call my favourite coffe cup "Harry Potter", if I wanted to. The act of assigning a name is all that matters for proper names. That you henceforth associate the proper name with the person/thing in question and expect certain features of the person/thing to remain constant has little to do with the name itself.
I'm not sure the example gets to the difference between type/token and proper names. It seems to me that both speakers there are using proper names. the only possible type/token implication is that one could see the lexical entity 'john smith' as a type for the two token names "John Smith [1]" and "John Smith [2]" given the name is a homonym. I think the more nature description though would just be say there's any ambiguity in the name: they just sound alike but in fact reference two different things, like a river 'bank' vs. a financial 'bank'.
I haven’t read the entire thread, so I apologize if someone else talked about this. I recommend reading “Naming and Necessity” by Saul Kripke. He is seen as the preeminent authority on this subject.
I will jump in without reading the entire thread. Sorry for being lazy and sorry if someone else mentioned this.
You should read "Naming and Necessity" by Saul Kripke. He is widely recognized as the preeminent authority on this topic.
I have considered reading that book but don't have the ability to read long books. Can you summarize what you think is pertinent to this topic with respect to that book?
It's really not a long book. Just a series of lectures. Weren't you considering majoring in philosophy?
It's been years since I've read it myself, and I don't remember his arguments any more, but I DO know that you would be well-served reading Kripke if you truly want an understanding of the topic.
I am. But, I don't know how to deal with my apathy and anhedonia. It's a deep issue of ADHD also. I can't focus for shiet.
Quoting Noah Te Stroete
I'll give it a try. Thanks.
I've dealt with apathy and anhedonia for years. It was just a matter of getting on medication that my body could metabolize (my doctor gave me a genetic test for favorable medications), and changing my perspective on life.
PM me if you want to talk further. I can relate.
two points:
1) the gist of naming and necessity is that Kripke argues that you can have analytic a posteriori truths. His famous example is the claim that 'water is H2O', which can't be known a priori but is analytic in the sense that what we mean by the conventional term "water" - what water is - is just the material identified scientifically as H20 and not any of the numerous possible descriptions of water (such as being "wet" or "clear" etc.)
2) Don't major in philosophy. it's a waste of an education. You can pursue it just fine as a hobby. If you're going to drop big bucks on an education study something useful to society and the economy. I'd recommend engineering, bio sciences, comp sci, or business...unless of course you have a trust fund, in which case do whatever you want.
Naming and Necessity also deals with the contingent a priori, but those weren't the parts I was referring to. I was referring to the parts where he deals with the referential theory of language, namely the historical/causal relationship between names and their referants.
An analytic truth is a necessary truth knowable a priori. Kripke talked of necessary truths knowable a posteriori. For example, it is necessarily true that water is H20 in that in no possible world could water be anything but H20. It is knowable a posteriori because it is knowable through experience, i.e. you have to do tests on water to determine that it is indeed H20 and not something else.
Harry is an idea, and an idea is a real, if non-material, object in the world, n'est ce pas?
For example, asking 'what is the meaning of the word "Pegasus"?' is like asking 'what is the hardness of a salt molecule?' (NaCl). A salt crystal has a measurable hardness, but a molecule does not, because hardness is a feature of how tightly molecules are bound together.
It is easy to infer an uncontroversial meaning for the statement 'Pegasus was white with grey dapples on the sides', in the context of a story involving Pegasus, or a class in which ancient myths are being discussed. Given that, trying to infer a meaning for the word 'Pegasus' in isolation is unnecessary, and also doomed to fail.
My e-book reader has a German-English dictionary with the unusual feature that for many words there is no direct definition given. Instead it gives a number of phrases that use the word, and the meanings of each phrase. It was disconcerting to use at first and took some getting used to. But now I see the point and I find it more helpful than the usual dictionary style.
When two or more people have the same name, there's ambiguity. You're right about that. But the hint, here, is in how language treats words syntacticly:
A proper name doesn't take articles; semantically, it doesn't need to, because a proper name is definite by itself. Normally, ambiguities are resolved pragmatically rather than through syntax: "Joe" is far from a unique name, but if you say "I'm talking to Joe," people usually know who you mean through context. (It's, of course, possible to miss parts of the context and create an ambiguity that your conversation partner doesn't automatically resolve.)
If you resolve the ambiguity syntactically, by adding articles (either indefinite, or definite), you make a shift from a proper name to regalur noun: "a John Smith" does not have the same meaning as "John Smith", even though the same person can be the referent for both (more precisesly "a referent" in the former case and "the referent" in the latter case). In the case of "a John Smith", he's part of a class (all people named "John Smith" are "a John Smith" - being named like that becomes the meaning of a type, and having that name makes you a token); in the case of "John Smith" he's uniquely named (and it doesn't matter that other people have the same name).
What's philosophyically difficult here, I think, is the precise relation between semantics, pragmatics and syntax (and theoretically morphology - but not in this case).
Generally I don't have an issue with your claims about how syntax can operate with proper names, and even think the type/token distinction could be useful for explaining the non-definite use of the proper name vs. the definite. I took my claim about the "lexical entity 'john smith'" to be basically consistent with that. However, my concern is exactly with what the actual context of the situation is here and the intentional state of the postal carrier. The package carrier not standing at the door wanting to give the package to anyone who happens to be named John Smith so he can happily walk off feeling like he did his job competently. Rather, he wants to give the package to the John Smith to whom the person who sent it addressed it to, he just doesn't know who that is. In other words, s/he isn't just looking for "a" John Smith, he's looking for "the" John Smith the package is addressed to. So, I just don't see that the syntactic distinctions you bring up - while legitimate in and of themselves - apply to this particular situation here since, in fact, given the context, it does not seem to me that either of the names are empty in the example given.
Re, the last paragraph, does that simply sidestep the issues the correspondence theory of meaning has wrt. to empty names and instead advocate a contextualist/pragmatic approach to meaning?
In the correspondence theory what objectifies, through denotation or maybe descriptions, meaning? Contextualist or pragmatic interpretations give rise in my view to what @andrewk has posted about the topic.
2) I wasn't ultimately addressing the larger issue of empty names, only how the example of @Dawnstorm was not necessarily analogous to that of "Pegasus", "santa claus" or whatever. A correspondence theorist might agree those latter names are empty, but deny that either of the "Joe Smiths" in @Dawnstorm 's example were.
3) In terms of the larger issue of empty names, the original question merely asked how supposed empty names can have meanings. One possible way they can have meanings is under a correspondence theory of truth, according to which, strictly speaking, the truth value of any such name will always be false because there is no such actual thing in the world like "Pegasus" or "santa claus". (I take it generally that a consequence of any correspondence theory is that there are really only two possible meanings for any proposition: true or false)
But, doesn't the fact that Pegasus or Santa have meaning without material ontological significance in some way refute the strictly material correspondence theory of truth?
I didn't say it was. It is uncontroversial that 'salt', which in common parlance refers to a crystal of many millions of molecules, or a collection of such crystals, is hard. The category error is to ask whether a molecule of NaCl, or a molecule of any compound, is hard.
I think so. It finds them to be non-problems. The problem is 'dissolved', to use a popular, but not inappropriate, term.
Yes, sorry, I did misquote, but still don't think it's a category error. It doesn't seem to me impossible to assess the hardness of a molecule in the same way it would be impossible to assess whether a molecule was 'odd' or 'even', which was the point.
What would hardness refer to on the level of a single molecule?
I'm actually a little unclear as to why people think molecules wouldn't, in fact, be hard in some relevant way in the first place.
But a lexical entity "John Smith" being different from a proper name "John Smith" or not is highly relevant for the type/token distinction. (I've had some minor linguistic education, but I know most about syntax and less about semantics, so there's that to bear in mind when reading my posts.)
Yes, there's an ambiguity with the names. But to talk about the ambiguity you need a word that encompasses both names.
With respect to empty names, ambiguity matters, too. "Harry Potter" is not itself an empty name. You need to know who it refers to (i.e. a fictional character) to know whether it is empty.
We have three cases, here:
1. "John Smith is a common name." -- Referent of "John Smith": a name
2. "This parcel is for John Smith." -- Referent of "John Smith": a specific person.
3. "This parcel is for a John Smith." -- Referent of "John Smith": a group of persons defined by holding the name "John Smith"; Referent of "a John Smith": a specific (but not specified) person.
"Harry Potter is an empty name," uses "Harry Potter" in the first meaning, but there's an implicit assumption as to the identy:
The sentence "The Harry Potter from Rowling's book is an empty name," is a category error. The Harry Potter from Rowling's books is a person, not a name. You'd have to say "Harry Potter is an empty name when it refers to Rowling's character." When I'd be arguing that "Harry Potter" is not an empty name because my neighbour is called that, I'd have misunderstood the concept.
Now, it is actually possible to create a concept of "empty names" such that an "empty name" is only an "empty name" if there are no real entities with that name. "Harry Potter (= 1) is an empty name because there is no Harry Potter (= 3)" is a different concept from "Harry Potter (= 1) is an empty name because Harry Potter (= 2) does not exist", and it's useful, if at all, in different contexts.
I think it's an important distinction, because it's easy to slip, and there may be contexts in which it's not clear what's being talked about, or in which the distinction is meaningless.
In my scenario, there is no empty name. But if someone played a prank and there is no "John Smith" at that address, then one of the names would be empty. (Or formulated for people who don't like the homonym theory: The name would only be empty if it referred to the non-existent recipient of the prank parcel.)
[For what it's worth, this thread is the first I ever heard of "empty names". My intuition was that it's about names that really don't refer to anyone. Maybe an author has made up a name, but is undecided if he'll ever use it and certainly has no character in mind. Such a name would exist, but it'd be "unused" and have no reference - i.e. the name can't be traced to any person fictional or real.]
I think I basically agree with you. If one is working with a theory of naming based loosely on the notion of a Kripkean rigid designator (which I am) or anything similar then there will never be "empty" names since by definition every name rigidly designates one and only one object in the world. In the case of fictional entities like Harry Potter, etc. what is designated is not some actual object/person, of course, but something else, whether you want to say the collective description of Potter in Rowling's works or the ideas people have about those works or whatever, you're right the name is not empty. The name refers to and designates something, just not an actual person.
Also, I agree that if you alter the postal carrier scenario such that it might involve a prank, or however else you want to change it, that changes the interpretation of the situation. But I think until such qualifications are noted, you have to assume people's intentions will follow reasonable expectations under the circumstances. It was for that reason the scenario didn't seem to me to get at the issue of "empty" names as well as other examples.
That said - and this is a parenthetical issue - I still don't think calling references to fictional entities "empty names" constitutes a category error. It's not the correct use of the concept of a name to be sure, but it's not a category error. It's just wrong. Not everything that's wrong is a category error.
The reason it's considered a category error is because "hardness" doesn't actually make much sense if we get very microscopic. The initial concept (just what hardness is, just what counts as it) grew out of our "medium-sized dry goods" interaction with the world, but those sorts of properties don't translate to what we know about the world on an atomic or molecular level.
Like I said above, it might not be a scientifically interesting question, but it's not a question that implicates a category error. I still don't see anything in your account that justifies calling the question about NaCl and hardness a category error. Maybe if you explained what you think a category mistake is, that might make me understand your use a little better.
The category error is in the "doesn't make much sense" and "doesn't translate" parts.
That's not what a category error is.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category_mistake
In other words, the reason it doesn't make sense or doesn't translate is that an individual molecule is the "wrong kind of thing" to have hardness.
So you don't think molecules are physical objects?
I think everything is a physical object*, including numbers. Yet we agree that it's a category error to assess numbers for hardness
*understanding that I'm using "object" loosely, so that it can refer to dynamic interactions of parts, such as molecules..
I used the scenario in response to a question why the holder of a name isn't the token of a type (or so I understood the question). It wasn't meant to get at the issue of empty names.
Quoting Mentalusion
Of course referring to fictional entites as "empty names" is a category error. A fictional entity is not of the category "name", therefore your What am I missing here?
I'm also not quite sure how you see the relation between what a person intends to say, and what that person actually says. Grammar is something you learn as you go; it's something you can get wrong. At the same time, if enough people get the same thing wrong for a long time it changes. The category error is on the language level, not on the concept level.
? Not that I agree with the idea of "empty names" in the first place (as I stated earlier, I think the whole notion of there being a problem stems from misconceived theories of reference), but names for fictional characters are often given as an example. Why would that be a category error then?
If you think all that stuff is physical, then do you think hardness is a possible predicate/property/etc. of all physical objects or just some or none?
I just saw your earlier post, including the comment that this thread is the first you've ever heard of the idea of "empty names."
Here's the beginning of the Wikipedia entry on this:
Just to clarify a couple things there. There has been at least a rough consensus in philosophy that the meaning of a proper name is its referent--the object to which a proper name refers (where "object" is used pretty loosely--Paris is an object in this sense).
Traditionally (and much to its folly in my view), philosophy has treated fictions as if they can't be addressed in this way. Hence why the Wikipedia entry says that re Pegasus--there is nothing to which it refers. Obviously, in terms of fiction, there is a Pegasus with all sorts of properties.all sorts of facts re interactions, etc.--for example, with Bellerophon, but philosophy has historically had a difficult time dealing with such things, partially due to some things that philosophers have tried to avoid, to an extent where fiction is both basically dismissed out of hand (so that it's "nothing") and so that it finds names such as "Pegasus" perplexing in many ways. (When really, they're quite simple to deal with, but that means a major paradigm shift for philosophy of language, semiotics, etc.)
Just some.
So there are some physical objects for which it is impossible that they ever be hard, whatever we decide it means to be "hard"?
I think it would be more accurate to ask whether referring to names that reference fictional entities as "empty" constitutes a category error. And, as I said, it may be wrong to say that, but it's not a category error. Even if what you mean by "empty name" is a name that designate nothing and further assume that, by definition, all names designate unique objects (leaving aside paradoxes about referring to non-being), it's still not a category error. It would be like asking "are all primes are divisible by 2?" The statement is wrong analytically, but it's not a category error because "being divisible by 2" is still a property that belongs to numbers and so is within the same category as primes. Similarly, talking about empty names is wrong - and wrong analytically - on certain reasonable assumptions about how names work, but it is still in the category of a linguistic claim so not a category error.
I don't know why you'd think that's mysterious. Presumably you believe that temperature is physical, for example. Can temperature be hard? What would that possibly mean?
I wasn't asserting anything, just trying see where your belief that molecules are categorically not hard stems from. Claiming that you think numbers are physical objects does help to understand a bit where you might be coming from. I disagree with that claim, but if it's what you think it could explain what seems like an eccentric use of "category error" to me. It also seems to me that if you think numbers are physical objects, you shouldn't assume (as I do) that asking whether they are hard constitutes a category error. Rather, that seems like it could be a legitimate property to ascribe to numbers given your beliefs about them. I am assuming that it is a sensical question to ask about any physical object, whether it is hard or not. The answer may be "no" - it could be a soft or gaseous or liquid physical object - but asking the question isn't categorically mistaken.
W/re to temperature, what I understand it to be essentially is the measure of molecular motion under different conditions and so would not call it either an object or physical. In fact, strictly speaking, as a type of measurement, it's by definition conventional, even if what it's measuring is (let's assume) not the product of convention.
All objects, aside from elementary particles at least, are dynamic--they're things in motion. And even elementary particles are in motion relative to each other So that something is dynamic doesn't preclude it from being physical.
That's why I wrote this above: "*understanding that I'm using 'object' loosely, so that it can refer to dynamic interactions of parts, such as molecules."
Saying that temperature is a non-physical property or quantity doesn't make much sense--especially given that temperature is often important in physics, astrophysics, etc.--you don't think of physics as dealing with stuff that's not physical, do you? Not that I want to promote a conflation of "physical" and "the content of physics" necessarily, but there is definitely a connection there.
Further, I didn't claim temperature was a property or quantity, physical or otherwise. As a type of measurement it is simply a conventional way of designating states of affairs. For example 75 F = 23.8889 C. Both are temperatures and both describe the same state of affairs. Neither is more accurate than the other and neither is a property of the object(s) being measured, although they do signify that the objects being measured are in a certain kind of unique state. The state the objects are in that generates the temperature is not itself "temperature" though.
In addition, it seems to me that to think of objects as dynamic by nature is going to lead to a lot of confusion. Something is dynamic because it constantly changes, which in terms of physics usually means that it's in motion. However, by definition motion is the measure of the change in the position of an object over time. If an object by definition is in motion, then you can't measure its change, which means it won't have motion, which is a contradiction...but that is maybe a discussion for a different thread.
Wel, you think that molecules are physical, right? Do you think that motion is physical?
Quoting Mentalusion
What's the difference between the unique state of the objects being measured and a property of the objects being measured?
Quoting Mentalusion
What is temperature in addition to the state in your opinion?
Quoting Mentalusion
No idea why you'd think that. You measure it relative to something else.
Above is a definition of what I take motion to be: change in an object's position over time.
I don't see anything in the definition that commits one necessarily to believing that motion is something physical or itself an object.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Depends which property your referring to. Maybe no difference at all.
Quoting Terrapin Station
As I said, the measure of the state, i.e. a unique designator of the state of affairs relative to other possible (similar) states of affairs
Quoting Terrapin Station
How can you measure an object's change in time if by definition its always changing? As soon as you try to say where it is at time t1, it's already gone!
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The word 'physical' often gets thrown around in philosophy, without it ever being made clear what it means. The word has a clear meaning in things like medicine (to distinguish from psychological) and finance (to distinguish from financial derivatives) and has a practical use in those disciplines. But I have yet to see either a clear meaning or a use for it in philosophy.
What does the word mean to you, in a philosophical context?
Or, to align with my general position that words on their own often have no meaning, what does the sentence 'Temperature is not physical' mean to you?
Quoting Mentalusion
You're both skipping ahead of what I'm actually saying. The piece about "category error" was part of bigger and more complex point I was trying to make, and it was about type/token not "empty names". I wish I remembered why the type/token distinction has come up. I wasn't part of that conversation until it was nearly done, and none of the original participants ever engaged me on that. What I'm saying is about names in general, not "empty names" in particular.
The sample sentence I gave was:
"The Harry Potter from Rowling's book is an empty name." (I should have said "books".)
The category error is this: "Harry Potter's" name is an empty name; Harry Potter himself is a character.
This is so obvious that it's normally not worth saying. I think I may not have made my point very well, if you think I mean to say that "Harry Potter's name is an empty name." You probably haven't picked up why I think it's worth it's saying in this context.
A name that's not assigned yet is still a name. It follows that names must have meanings as themselves, too. If I type sample sentences, like "Joe likes to sing in the shower," then you recognise "Joe" as a name. But the person behind the name is even less real than Rowling's Potter, since I just typed a random sample sentence, without any reference in mind. The sentences gains its meaning from the fact that we all know how naming works, and how we use them. Just using the name in not even a fictional context conjures up the expectation that there's a person (how ever hypothetical its existance). What's more, we recognise the name as a name other real or fictional people held.
"Joe", as a name, is one name in a list of names we might choose for our children, and this is the meaning we inwoke when we attach articles to the name.
On the other hand, this very meaning implies that there are person who are referents for those names: when used for individuals (without an article) the name actually starts functioning as a name: in a way it becomes active.
"A Joe" in "A Joe has eaten your cake," and "Joe" in "Joe has eaten your cake," work differently with respect to the type/token distinction: it exists in the former case, but not in the latter.
A thought experiment: A group prepares pseudonyms for participants at a meeting who wish to remain anonymous. Those names are assigned at random. Fewer people than expected show up. Some names have not been assigned. In what ways did the meaning of the unassigned names differ from the assigned ones during the meeting?
For me, there's a disjunct. If I talk about the names themselves, they don't really differ. They're all different from each other and they were potentially to be assigned to people (some were, others were not). But they're all names.
When we look at the transcript of a meeting, only the assigned names show up, and when they do they refer to the person in question. This is what they're supposed to do. But the connection is unique. If they re-use the names for the next meeting with different people involved, again assigned at random. The name, considered as a name, has now the property "Provided twice, assigned once" or "Provided twice, assigned twice", but that's something we know about the name. The relation between person and name, though, resets. The facts about the name itself are irrelevant, except when we look at the person as a token of the type "has been assigned the name".
Or do situationally assigned (or chosen) names differ from names who have all your life? (That's been an issue is in this thread.) The question of "real names".
Basically, if you insist on physical objects as the referents of names (as I understood the concept, and as the wikipedia link seems to suggest), how do you conceptualise the difference between a name that's been assigned to a fictional person, a name that is neither assigned nor used (see my thought experiment), or a name that is never assigned but used anyway (e.g. in a sample sentence)?
Out of those three situations, the name of a fictional character seems the least empty. However, a name that isn't used doesn't actually work like name. And invoking the name in a sample sentence can invoke the idea of a person, even though the name has never been assigned.
I'm not sure how to deal with this, but my hunch is that a name is something a person "has" not something a person "is". Referring to an individual entity is the function of a name, but unlike regular words, they confer no meaning unto the entity who's assigned it.
That's different from regular words, where a word confers meaning: a [word] is something that you are, not something that you have.
The problem with this is that a lot of this is dependent on the how any society organises the institution of naming. Telling names aren't impossible, but in general names need to be meaningless in themselves so that they can refer to individual entities continously (impervious to change). Basically, to be an idiot you have to behave like an idiot, and if you stop behaving like an idiot, you stop being an idiot. Similarly, to use a name you need to have that right (however that's organised), and if you lose that right, you no longer have that name.
In the case of words, the assignation of the sign to the thing is extrinsic to the meaning behind the sign. In the case of a name, the assignation of the sign to the thing is instrinsic to the meaning behind the sign. Beyond that, any real life behaviour of the object creates connotations, not denotations.
I think my conclusion would be: all names are empty when considered as names; no names are empty when used as names. Or something like that. I'm not sure.
That's fine. But I'm asking you if you think that it's physical.
Quoting Mentalusion
You're thinking that changing = disappearing???
An interesting discussion can be had in that direction, given wave-particle duality and that the closer we look at things, the more they are waves or fields rather than 'stuff'. But it's not that close to the issue under discussion so, on reflection, perhaps it's better left for another thread.
Where this came up was in discussing whether it is always meaningful to ask what is the meaning of a word, given that many words have multiple different possible meanings, and some have enormous numbers of meanings. This is recognised by some dictionaries that give a series of sample sentences containing a word, with the meanings of the sentences, rather than a meaning of the word on its own.
Now many words have only one possible meaning or referent and we can sensibly talk about that meaning or referent. But I don't see why we should invent hugely complex, metaphysically cumbersome theories like Kripke's just to deal with the fact that some words have no meanings or referents when considered in isolation.
My current opinion is that it is easy to explain the meaning of any sentence containing the word Pegasus, as long as it's a sentence that is likely to be said in ordinary conversation. And one doesn't need to load up on metaphysics or possible worlds semantics in order to do so.
Given enough context, we can say the same for Godel and Smith, another favourite example from N&N. In that case we need more than a sentence. We need to know what the speaker knows about Godel and Smith, in order to know shat she meant by her statement. But again, learning the context dissolves the problem. It just needs to be a somewhat bigger context.
Well, maybe in some sense, yes. Here's the reasoning:
1. To be dynamic is to be in motion.
2. Motion is defined as an objects change in position from time t1 to t2.
3. Assume objects are dynamic, i.e. that they are by definition in motion.
4. Assume then that at some time t1 object O1 is at position x1.
5. However, because objects are in motion by definition, that means that at time t1 O1 will be in position x2 at t2, since motion is defined as an objects change in position over time.
6. So, at time t1, O1 is actually at x2 at t2 which contradicts the assumption in #4.
7. In other words, at t1 O1 will have disappeared from position x1 if it is the case that by definition objects are dynamic.
Start it up!
That part is nonsensical.
First, objects aren't in motion "by definition," They're in motion by empirical fact.
Next,"at time t1 01 will be in position x2 at t2" is just an ungrammatical mess that reads incoherently.
Finally, "Motion is defined as an object's change in position over time" is fine--that's how it's defined, but what time is in the first place is motion or change. "Motion is an object's change in position relative to some other motion/change that we use as a base" is what's really the case there.
Empirically, objects are in motion relative to other objects.
A time-slice being a "point" is just an abstraction we make.
The argument in the first place was related to the above where you appear to identify objects with dynamic interactions, in effect signaling that what objects are is to some extent dynamic. This would be in contrast to interpreting "objects are in motion" as predicative so that motion is just a way in which objects behave, not part of their nature. My reply was
Quoting Mentalusion
And I think I've given reasons to believe that claim is true, if you believe objects include as part of their definition "interactions," i.e. motion.
Consequently - Quoting Terrapin Station - the fact that it is nonsensical is exactly my point. That's how a reductio works.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Admittedly the formatting could be improved. However, pedantic stylistic concerns aside, this is a very common way of describing events not only in philosophy, but in scientific disciplines as well. If something was unclear, ask. The fact that you understood what was generally being communicated is clear from your comment about "time slices" that follows. Consequently, the grammatical criticism seems slightly disingenuous.
Quoting Terrapin Station
True, but it seems to be useful and implicit the definition of motion. Since there's no alternative definition of motion on the table, it would appear we're stuck with time slices
Quoting Terrapin Station
A chicken-and-egg problem that doesn't need to be resolved because the issue isn't about the nature of time or motion per se, but only of how the motion of an object is determined, and it is determined by the object being in one position, x1, at one time, t1, and at another position, x2, at another time, t2. Interestingly, in any such case, the change the object undergoes will not be "dynamic" since the only change relevant is the "being" in one place rather than another.
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No--"so that it can"="so that this is not excluded"
The grammatical comment was because the sentence didn't really make any sense to me, overall, as written.
Quoting Mentalusion
Motion is simply movement relative to something else--in other words, differing positional relations. Again, time is simply motion or change. So I'm saying that time is simply movement relative to something else. There's no reason to treat that as if it's dividable into (literal) "points." The mathematical approach to this stuff is just an abstraction we create.
Quoting Mentalusion
?? "Dynamic" refers to changing. So if it's changing somehow (from one place to another), it's dynamic.
circular: "Motion is movement..."
Quoting Terrapin Station
fair enough
"in other words, differing positional relations"
Weren't you asking for explanations and not asking me to write dictionary entries? (And if you're asking me to write dictionary entries rather than asking me to explain something to you, why?)