An External World Argument
1. All thought/belief consists of mental correlation(s) drawn between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or the agent itself(it's own state of 'mind' when applicable).
2. Correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content.
3. Thought/belief presupposes the existence of it's own content.(from1,2)
4. 'Objects' of physiological sensory perception are external to thought/belief.
5. All thought/belief presupposes the existence of an external world.(from3,4)
6. All meaning is attributed by virtue of drawing mental correlation(s) between that which becomes symbol/sign and that which becomes symbolized/signified.
7. The attribution of meaning happens within thought/belief formation.(from1,6)
8. All meaning is existentially dependent upon presupposing the existence of an external world.(from5,7)
9. All philosophical positions consist of meaningful thought/belief.
10. All philosophical positions presuppose the existence of an external world.(from8,9)
2. Correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content.
3. Thought/belief presupposes the existence of it's own content.(from1,2)
4. 'Objects' of physiological sensory perception are external to thought/belief.
5. All thought/belief presupposes the existence of an external world.(from3,4)
6. All meaning is attributed by virtue of drawing mental correlation(s) between that which becomes symbol/sign and that which becomes symbolized/signified.
7. The attribution of meaning happens within thought/belief formation.(from1,6)
8. All meaning is existentially dependent upon presupposing the existence of an external world.(from5,7)
9. All philosophical positions consist of meaningful thought/belief.
10. All philosophical positions presuppose the existence of an external world.(from8,9)
Comments (171)
"The only thing which might be called an addition, though in the method of proof only, is the new refutation of psychological idealism, and the strict (and as I believe the only possible) proof of the objective reality of outer intuition. However innocent idealism may be considered with respect to the essential purposes of metaphysics (without being so in reality), it remains a scandal to philosophy, and to human reason in general, that we should have to accept the existence of things outside us (from which after all we derive the whole material for our knowledge, even for that of our inner sense) merely on trust, and have no satisfactory proof with which to counter any opponent who chooses to doubt it."
(Preface to Second Edition, Critique of Pure Reason, B XL)
Heidegger replies to the effect that the scandal is not so much that philosophy fails to prove the existence of the external world as that such proofs are expected and attempted over and over and over again.
Heiddy got in his own way...
Neither had a good grasp upon human thought and belief.
Nothing wrong with that.
"How, on your principles, could you know you have a true proposition?" ... or ... "How can you use your definition of truth, it being the correspondence between a judgment and its object, as a criterion of truth? How can you know when such correspondence actually holds?"
I cannot step outside my mind to compare a thought in it with something outside it.
Beck, L.W. & Holmes, R.L.; Philosophic Inquiry, p130.
'Truth, it is said, consists in the agreement of cognition with its object. In consequence of this mere nominal definition, my cognition, to count as true, is supposed to agree with its object. Now I can compare the object with my cognition, however, only by cognising it. Hence my cognition is supposed to confirm itself, which is far short of being sufficient for truth. For since the object is outside me, the cognition in me, all I can ever pass judgement on is whether my cognition of the object agrees with my cognition of the object'.
Kant, 1801. The Jasche Logic, in Lectures on Logic.
I think in both of these, 'corresponds' and 'agrees with' is synonymous with 'correlation' in the OP.
But you do, right? :rofl:
Well, actually yeah to some extent. However, there's still much work to be done in terms of setting out the content of correlations. Progress is coming along well though... Thanks for asking.
No one anywhere in philosophy proper has drawn and maintained the distinction between thinking about thought and belief and thought and belief. That distinction alone can shed light on all soirts of things...
I'm quite fond of Kant actually. My position is remarkably similar to his in many ways., which ought be of no surprise. He was one of the first philosophers I read after my interest in philosophy was piqued. I'm just not a believer...
Well, not quite actually...
Although my position - and this argument - situates the presupposition of correspondence within thought and belief formation, correlations are thought and belief.
It's interesting to me on several different levels. It was not made in order to arrive at the conclusion that all philosophical positions presuppose an external world. I didn't have that in mind...
Doesn't the argument set that out?
:wink:
Jesus, man, take your hand off it, it's disgusting!
You're just jealous of the size and scope of this novelty... It is quite problematic for you. Your posts are beginning to degrade into nothing but rhetorical ad homs and/or some application of para-consistent logic. It's kinda boring.
I've heard this before. We've discussed this before as well. My viewpoint hasn't changed much regarding it.
Why would we need to step outside our mind to compare our thoughts with something other than our thoughts?
Really? If you care to actually back one of your claims up, then quote something I wrote and show how it counts as an "application of paraconsistent logic".
Also, I have not employed a single ad hominem argument against any of your claims. If you think I have then quote away and show how it counts as an ad hominem argument.
This is an example of an ad hominem argument (or really more of an insinuation): Quoting creativesoul
The paraconsistent stuff is referring to all the times you'll say that you're not saying anything at all. That's paraphrasing of course. Surely you'll not deny that it is often the case that you will openly express that you haven't claimed X and that you haven't claimed not X. Anyway...
I'm not interested in all this focus upon you and me. I actually find your replies in many threads to be worthy of much consideration. With me, well... evidently you do not like my 'style'...
:smile:
Yeah, I've heard that argument in different forms before as well. Nagel is pretty good. I'll have to have a look at that. Thanks. However, here's what you're referring to...
Quoting creativesoul
This perspective doesn't require being outside of, or above, that which is being taken into consideration. It's the same story...
Thinking about pre-existing thought and belief. There is no need to be outside of anything at all. Why would there be? We can look at every and any example of human thought and/or belief as a means for determining what they all have in common that make them what they are... aside from our calling them all by the same name.
But to look at them *is* to treat them as objects of analysis. And we do that so instinctively that we don't quite see that this is what we are doing. It is 'the process of objectification'. Now this is not an easy point to make, and I'm going to have to make it in a fairly roundabout way, so bear with me.
I do happen to hold to an attitude rather like Kantian idealism, in this sense - that what we call “the world” isn’t something wholly outside ourselves, something we experience in a completely detached and objective way. It’s something that is created moment by moment in our minds, by piecing together the jumble of unconnected glimpses our senses give us—and we do the 'piecing together' according to a plan that’s partly given us by our biology, partly given us by our culture, and partly a function of our individual life experience. But attempting to understand that process of 'putting together' is very difficult because the very effort of understanding it is also part of that process. That's the sense in which we can't get 'outside it'.
Now I've been having these conversations on this and other forums for nine years now, and experience tells me that at this precise point, I will usually get: 'ah, so you're a solipsist. As far as you're concerned there's nothing outside your mind. Well, how come it is than when *you* go to sleep at night, or drop dead, the world continues just as it always has??' (triumphant crossing of arms.)
So my answer to that (and no, it hardly ever works :sad: ), is that that everyone's 'experience of the world' is just this way too; they, also, never can get outside of their own perceptual and cognitive apparatus to see things 'as they are in themselves', as if from no point of view. Discursive understanding is irremediably constituted by just such a process. But post-Enlightenment philosophy generally starts from an outlook of 'assumed realism'; it has bracketed out this kind of consideration of critical self-awareness at the outset, and is only concerned with what it construes as 'scientifically ascertained facts' (from whence you get positivism of the kind advocated by Pseudonym). But science itself assumes an attitude of methodological naturalism, i.e. us as intelligent subjects in a world of given objects; it takes the reality of an objective world as a given, but doesn't really ask the question about 'what actually is "objectivity"? in the way that philosophy does.
So in the kind of analysis you're working on, you're actually drilling down (or trying to) into questions that are epistemically prior to naturalism as such. When we think about thinking, there's a problem of recursion, i.e. of trying to objectively depict the subjective processes of understanding. And that's why, despite the fact that you seem to think 'the existence of an "external" world' can be proven in a series of ten propositions, it remains a thorny philosophical problem.
I love ya Jeep...
I agree that it remains a thorny problem.
On my view, much of the problem is/was the result of poor conception. The objective/subjective dichotomy being a prima facie example thereof. What I mean is that it cannot effectively take account of that which is both, and is thus... neither.
Thought, belief, meaning, and correspondence...
:wink:
I wholeheartedly agree with this...
Quoting Wayfarer
Here though, you take the equally extreme other end...
The world is not entirely outside of ourselves that we experience in a completely detached and objective way, nor is the world something that is entirely created by us, in our minds...
I'm in the middle of those two extremes. I think Kant was as well.
Right - but I'm not saying it is simply ‘dreamed up’ by us; it is not simply 'in the mind' but always has an irredeemably subjective pole or aspect - which is almost always 'bracketed out' by 'dogmatic realism'. And I also think that was Kant's view, and the crucial point of the CPR.
Yeah. My apologies...
We agree here. I've no problem with Kant's Noumena, as I understand it to be... a negative limit on our thoughts, and that's it! For me, it is equivalent to the unknown 'realm'. His Pure Intuition was also a mark of his genius!
See we're just making my point about the dichotomy... as we speak! It cannot take account of that which is both. Toss it and come to better terms.
Hey Marchesk...
One could deny any one of the premisses, I would think. Common sense prevails to me...
A correlation requires a plurality of things. As far as I'm concerned, that is a death knell to any and all solipsistic views. An idealist has his/her own issues to deal with. I just stumbled upon this argument while re-reading one of my older threads... Thought it was interesting. Could be better though.
Which makes it fallacious. Do you have an argument to support p4?
What's the formal fallacy?
On what ground do you disagree with p1?
I didn't say it was a formal fallacy. But as you noted yourself, you begged the question, which is a fallacy.
Understood.
I do not have an argument to support that. I thought it would be easy enough to invent one. I was wrong... at least for now.
:blush:
No? Thoughts/beliefs are what everyone has, but thinking about thoughts and beliefs is called "philosophy", no? :chin:
Quoting Michael
I thought there was such an argument, but (having just tried to describe it), I find I was mistaken. :yikes: The solipsist argument cannot be refuted or disproven. :wink: As long as this is the case, I don't think there can be an argument to support point #4. :chin:
If we want point #4, I think we must declare it as an axiom (assumption; guess).
This is not true on a plurality of levels...
The solipsist argument is false for it is impossible to arrive at such a complex high level of abstract thought and belief without an external world.
Solipsism is existentially dependent upon thinking about one's own thought and belief.
Thinking about one's own thought and belief is existentially dependent upon drawing correlations between different things. One mind is not different things.
Solipsism is existentially dependent upon precisely what it denies the existence of.
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Based upon all examples of thought and belief, including but not limited to solipsism:
1.)All thought and belief is meaningful.
2.)All meaning is existentially dependent upon something to become symbol/sign, something to become symbolized/significant and a creature capable of drawing correlations, connections, and/or associations between the two.
3.)All philosophical positions are existentially dependent upon something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized and a creature capable of drawing correlations, connections, and/or associations between the two.
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All philosophical positions are existentially dependent upon thinking about one's own thought and belief.
Solipsism is a philosophical position.
Solipsism is existentially dependent upon thinking about one's own thought and belief.
Thinking about one's own thought and belief is existentially dependent upon pre-existing thought and belief.
All thought and belief is meaningful.
All meaning is existentially dependent upon something to become symbol/sign, something to become symbolized/significant and a creature capable of drawing correlations, connections, and/or associations between the two.
All philosophical positions are existentially dependent upon something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized and a creature capable of drawing correlations, connections, and/or associations between the two.
Solipsism is existentially dependent upon something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized and a creature capable of drawing correlations, connections, and/or associations between the two.
Why could the thoughts in one mind not be different things?
What difference would that make? The thoughts in one mind are not one mind. The claim you're asking about says "One mind is not different things." It does not say the thoughts in one mind are not.
What's the relevance of the question?
Just before saying "One mind is not different things." you said:
Quoting creativesoul
If ones thoughts about "one's own thought and belief' (or anything else) consist in drawing correlations between different things (i.e. between one's different thoughts and perceptions, assuming for the sake of the solipsist argument that one's perceptions consist in nothing beyond one's feelings, thoughts, and beliefs) then your argument against solipsism fails. Your argument only carries through by assuming what it purports to prove, in other words.
This is not to say that I am convinced by solipsism, rather just that solipsism cannot be rationally disproved (or proved for that matter).
Sure it can.
If we know that solipsism requires metacognition, and metacognition requires cognition, and cognition requires an external world, then we know and have rationally proven that solipsism is false.
Just because there is not a logical(formalized) proof doesn't mean that there is no other kind.
This is neglecting the natural evolution of thought and belief, particularly regarding the complexity increase.
Thinking about one's own thought and belief is existentially dependent upon language. Language requires shared meaning. Shared meaning requires another mind.
How do you know that cognition requires an external world (as opposed to, say, merely the idea of an external world)?
Quoting creativesoul
I don't know what you are driving at here. 'The natural evolution of thought and belief" and "complexity increase" (if they are assumed to be real independently of your mind) already presupposes an external world; that is it rests on an assumption that it purports to prove.
Follow the argument being given. Neglectful rhetoric doesn't suffice. The questions you ask, if they are sincerely asked, can only be answered by me, since it is of me that you ask...
Read more. Yack less.
Again this assumes that the others you share meaning with are not products of your own mind, or for a more universal solipsism, products of the one mind.
You can't prove that solipsism is false, so as usual you resort to casting aspersions on the one who has shown you to be mistaken.
Of course I agree that solipsism is ridiculous and that no one in their right mind would sincerely believe it to be true, but I also think that no one in their right mind would believe they could prove it to be false.
Are you claiming that shared meaning doesn't require a plurality of minds?
Well, I'm certainly no angel here... However, you've shown no mistake. I'm more than willing to look at such a showing...
What sort of proof would it take for you?
Knowing what all thought and belief are existentially dependent upon is all it takes. Whether or not one chooses to apply that bit of knowledge is another matter altogether.
Shared meaning requires at least the illusion of a plurality of minds. I'm not claiming that the apparent plurality of minds is an illusion; I tend to think the plurality is real, but i acknowledge it cannot be proven. In fact nothing that is not deductively true can be proven; all inductive and abductive belief is fallible. That doesn't mean I think we have any good reason to doubt that there is a plurality of minds, but that might also depend on the metaphysical context in which we are considering the question. Context is everything.
Quoting creativesoul
I followed the argument perfectly well and showed it to be flawed because it assumes what it purports to prove. You have provided no counter-argument just the usual insulting insinuations. I actually don't know why I continue to bother responding to you.
Cause it can be fun and informative. Don't act like I'm the only one of us that's a dick sometimes...
An illusion of a plurality of minds is not a plurality of minds. Shared meaning requires a plurality of minds. An illusion of something necessarily presupposes the existence of that something. Otherwise, the term is utterly meaningless... an empty concept.
What sort of proof would qualify as proof for you?
So your objection is that shared meaning doesn't require a plurality of minds, all it requires is an illusion thereof, and illusions thereof do not require the real thing?
We think there is shared meaning. If there is no real plurality of minds then there is no real shared meaning. We experience an apparent plurality of minds and hence an apparent actuality of shared meaning. Since this is how it seems to us, the fact that we cannot deductively prove it to be so, that, logically speaking it could be that there is really only one mind and that the appearance of shared meaning and a plurality of minds could be just that; an appearance and hence an illusion, gives us no good reason to doubt that there is shared meaning and a plurality of minds.
This is because if there are two logical possibilities, and we have no way of proving which is true, I think we should default to the possibility that seems most plausible in the light of the whole of our experience. but plausibility does not constitute proof.
So, I agree with you that real shared meaning would require a real plurality of minds; but the two are of one piece.They are either both real or both illusory, and we cannot deductively prove which is the case. So in answer to your question as to what would qualify as proof; I will say again; deductively valid reasoning that is grounded on self-evident premises.
Quoting creativesoul
I enjoy arguing, to be sure; but I do find it annoying if my arguments are not engaged with directly, and if the interlocutor acts as though they have something to defend rather than wanting to get to the truth at all costs. I am quite prepared to change my mind and have done so several times on these and other forums when presented with arguments that I find to be more convincing than the one I have been convinced by.
When I act like a dick I believe it is not by being evasive or slippery but by being too impatient, too pissed-off and being perhaps too direct and telling the interlocutor just what I think of their tactics if it seems to me that they are evading or ignoring sound arguments. I try always to tell others what I honestly think of their arguments, and I would like others to do the same to me.
When someone provides a good explanation as to why it seems that way when it isn't then I would be willing to change my mind.
If there is no external world then why does it seem like there is? It would seem to me that, if there is no external world, there is a discrepancy between the way things are and the way things seem to be. Thats a problem for solipsism.
If there was an external, what would it be like to experience it? This is what it feels like, or else why come to the natural, instinctive inclination that there is? If there wasn't what would that be like? Surely there must be some difference that we can point to.
Unless one were to know what things would seem like were there an external world and what things would seem like were there not an external world then how can one infer that there seems to be (or not be) an external world?
Do we really "know" that there is an external world, or is it just instinctive? It seems instinctive to me. Are instincts a kind of knowledge?
If I've used the qualifier "contingent" in this thread it was inadvertently. I avoid that because I reject modality and severely restrict using possible worlds frameworks. Logical possibility alone isn't enough to warrant belief.
Ancient Aliens...
Existentially dependent is the notion I like. There are a few ways to determine what sorts of things are existentially dependent upon others and how/why...
The application of that knowledge is where the magic happens.
There can be no illusion of an X if there has never been an X.
So, there can be no illusion of a soul if there has never been a soul?
And exactly what premisses would you not say were assuming an external world?
Unicorn? :razz:
So there must be a soul. What is a soul?
Doesn't follow.
Is there an argument or objection in there somewhere? What of a unicorn?
What do you mean "doesn't follow"? It follows according to your own argument:
I said,
Quoting Janus
You replied,
Quoting creativesoul
Which means according to your own argument that since there has most certainly been the illusion of a soul, then there must be a soul. So, I asked you to tell me what a soul is.
The same argument could be applied to the self, God, free will and so on. Since there has undoubtedly been the illusion of all these things, then they must be real according to your argument. For another example, what about ghosts?
An illusion of a unicorn can only exist if it did actually exist?
What is an illusion?
Illusion involves the will to there being something
It seems that two out of three you're preaching to the choir here.
Edit: Although, having thought about it a bit more, I'm not so sure the unicorn is a good counterexample. Has there been the illusion of a unicorn as opposed to the mere imagining of a unicorn. Also a unicorn is an imaginary creature which is a composite of features of real creatures ( the Narhwal and the horse). This does not seem to be the case with the other examples: the soul, the self, God, free will, and ghosts.
Stop hand waving and show the argument.
It's not what it is an illusion of.... Hence... there can be no illusion of X if there has never been an X.
I've never argued that.
Exactly??? :roll:
Show the argument, I just did.
There is no such thing as an illusion of the soul.
Not if there really is a soul. But plenty of people have believed that it is self-evident there is a soul. Those people were under the illusion that there is a soul if there is not a soul, but of course not if there is; which is the obverse of what you have been arguing.
Right, so the illusion of an external world (in case there wasn't one) would not be a false belief that there is an external world? Rrigghhtt.....I think I've got ya now..... :rofl: :roll:
Right. An illusion of a dog is impossible without a dog. That is because an illusion of something is what it is as a result of it's resemblance to that which it is an illusion of. If there is no thing there can be no illusion of that thing.
One can believe that there is a dog when there is only an illusion of a dog. That belief would be false, but the belief itself is not the illusion.
Is this really that difficult for you to grasp?
That is rhetoric.
You just don't want to admit that you cannot deductively prove that there is an external world. Of course I think we should believe that there is, but that is not the point.
And presumably there's no such thing as an illusion of a ghost? Yet people claim to have seen and believe in ghosts. So at the very least you must accept that believing in something and believing to have seen something is not the same thing as there being the illusion of that thing.
In which case the simple response is that there isn't an external world and so isn't the illusion of an external world, even though people believe in and believe to see an external world.
The external world is a ghost.
Or a goat...
It's neither nonsense nor affirming the consequent. Gratuitous assertions are what rhetoric is. That's not good enough by my lights.
It makes no sense to say that I am assuming that the world is not an illusion.
If it is the case that all thought and belief are existentially dependent upon a plurality, and a plurality negates solipsism, then solipsism is negated by the way things are... which is the way it should be.
If it is the case that solipsism is a philosophical position, and all philosophical positions are existentially dependent upon thought and belief, and all thought and belief is existentially dependent upon an external world, then it is the case that solipsism is existentially dependent upon an external world.
Which argument would you like to discuss? Point out the premiss and offer a relevant and valid objection...
A solipsist is the one who's assuming that there is no external world.
The culprit - once again - is a piss poor (mis)conception of thought and belief(and thus of mind).
Well, at the very least I readily admit that believing in something and believing to have seen something is not equivalent to there being an illusion. That's not a problem.
So believing to see an external world and believing in an external world is not equivalent to an illusion of an external world.
I'm not following your logic to reach the conclusions you have.
The solipsist wants to neglect the fact that we know the difference between an illusion and what the illusion is of.
The notion itself is utterly meaningless if and when it does not necessarily presuppose both, the illusion of X, and X.
It's an abuse of language otherwise.
The fact of the matter is that such talk is an illusion of meaningful language use.
:wink:
Bewitched by nonsense.
If you honestly believe you can deductively prove the mind independent existence of an external world, then I'll leave you to your illusions.
If it is the case that all thought and belief are existentially dependent upon a plurality, and a plurality negates solipsism, then solipsism is negated by the way things are... which is the way it should be.
If it is the case that solipsism is a philosophical position, and all philosophical positions are existentially dependent upon thought and belief, and all thought and belief is existentially dependent upon an external world, then it is the case that solipsism is existentially dependent upon an external world.
Which argument would you like to discuss? Point out the premiss and offer a relevant and valid objection...
They weren't conclusions. They were the skeptic's response to your claim "if there is such thing as an illusion of an external world, then there is an external world." This conditional isn't helpful unless it can be shown that there really is an illusion of an external world. But as the example of ghosts shows us, it's not enough that people claim to see or believe in an external world to conclude that there is at least the illusion of one.
I'm not clear on why you would say that. It seems that if people claim to see or believe in an external world, that qualifies as there being an illusion of an external world, just in case there is no independently existent (that is apart from the seeing and believing) external world. If there were an independently existent external world then the seeing of and believing in an external world would not be an illusion. So @creativesoul has it backwards when s/he claims that for there to be an illusion of something that something must actually (and completely independently) exist.
On the other hand the seeing of and believing in an external world is not an illusion, unless the question of independent existence is raised. As far as I can see just the same logic applies to ghosts. I think we have every reason to believe in the external world we all see and believe in every day, and also to believe in the independent reality of something that constitutes the conditions for that seeing and believing. But I don't think it makes any sense to speak about an independently existing external world just like the one we see and believe in; the external world we see and believe in is most likely very much the product of human existence.
I'm accepting creative's claim for the sake of argument that a thing is an illusion only if that thing exists (somewhere else) and showing that his argument in favour of there being an external world is still lacking.
Quoting Janus
I think in the case of a brain-in-a-vat type scenario we can say that there is an external world but also that the world we experience is just an illusion of an external world.
Sure, but that just pushes the problem of whether there is a human (or whatever reflective percipient) independent external world back one step.
Wittgenstein's language argument is pretty good though.
Novelties indicate a larger world.
I'm not omniscient, since otherwise I'd know that I were (by definition).
A moral person will have to consider others real, cannot act as if others aren't living.
Whatever considerations like these point in one direction.
Well belief can be false, and that's another matter altogether, although it must be kept in mind here. So, people can be mistaken about what they believe and/or see. It would only follow that they can be mistaken in their account thereof as well.
So...
Claiming to see and/or believe in X doesn't warrant our belief in X.
Is that what you're saying, prior to going on?
That knife cuts both ways.
An argument for solipsism isn't immune. Therefore, it's an invalid objection. Or... at the very least... it applies equally to both frameworks. Therefore, when considering it's value as an skeptical objection, it is utterly inadequate for supporting either, and equally applicable in it's scope of damnation to both.
If it is the case that all thought and belief are existentially dependent upon a plurality, and a plurality negates solipsism, then solipsism is negated by the way things are... which is the way it should be.
If it is the case that solipsism is a philosophical position, and all philosophical positions are existentially dependent upon thought and belief, and all thought and belief is existentially dependent upon an external world, then it is the case that solipsism is existentially dependent upon an external world.
Which of the two outlined arguments above would you like to discuss?
That's an unnecessarily complex attempt at the justification of that which is unjustifiable.
The only sensible coherent use of "illusion" presupposes that an illusion of X is not X.
If it is the case that all thought and belief are existentially dependent upon a plurality, and a plurality negates solipsism, then solipsism is negated by the way things are... which is the way it should be.
If it is the case that solipsism is a philosophical position, and all philosophical positions are existentially dependent upon thought and belief, and all thought and belief is existentially dependent upon an external world, then it is the case that solipsism is existentially dependent upon an external world.
Which of the two outlined arguments above would you like to discuss?
So what? An illusion of an external world is not an external world; that much is obvious.
I asked before and I don’t think you explained, but what does it mean to be “existentially dependent” on something?
You need to go back to the texts and reconsider Kant’s remark about ‘the scandal of philosophy’. All you’re doing is begging the question, which means, assuming what needs to be proven. You’re simply stating that the reality of the external world is apodictic and then wondering why others aren’t agreeing with you. There’s nothing else at issue here.
Wow. Well put. This is my general view, too. We 'are' the sense-making, and this sense-making is 'tied' to a particular body and sees through particular eyes and seems to depend on a particular brain being lit up.
For me the scandal/absurdity is just that arguing/proving already assumes an other to be convinced.
While we can't compare the object itself with our cognition of the object, we can and do compare our cognitions of objects with one another. In short the 'object itself' is closely related with a notion of maximal intersubjectivity. I don't want to reduce one to the other. A person alone on an island might be trying to solve a technical problem to get food. Then he would test his cognitions against the results of his attempts to get the food. And on the other end there is the desire for someone to 'get' one's more abstract feeling-tinged cosmic visions (talk about God and love.)
Well, yes of course, there is obviously always the experience of others. I think this is really Heidegger's point: he saw "being-in-the-world' as the most primordial aspect of Dasein. But the point remains that no proof, in any deductive sense, can be given for the existence of the world or of others.
@Creativesoul purported to be offering a proof of the existence of a mind-independent external world, which is something else entirely than Heidegger's notion of "being-in-the-world"; the latter is purely phenomenological and as such "brackets" (as per Husserl) the question of the existence of an external world, or even more radically (as per Heidegger) considers the question to be secondary to, and parasitic upon, the primary experience of being-in-the-world.
Being in the world does not constitute an "external world" in any case; although obviously the experience of embodiment incorporates the sensation of the body, the skin as boundary and a world of things, events and others 'external' to the body.
Why not just address the argument?
Quoting Janus
Sigh...
When the existence of a thing requires the existence of an other thing.
I did already, right at the beginning (here). Not going to go through it all again.
You remain convinced that that objection made a difference of some sort or was valid in any way? I don't but...
I'm talking about the most recent two outlines...
Care to directly address them?
And yet you've distinguished between the two...
So you're saying that the existence of my thoughts require the existence of other things (other thoughts?) Why?
Why is a psychological question.
I'm convinced by virtue of knowing what all thought have in common that makes them thought.
I just outlined two of them.
Here's what I want to discuss...
If it is the case that all thought and belief are existentially dependent upon a plurality, and a plurality negates solipsism, then solipsism is negated by the way things are... which is the way it should be.
If it is the case that solipsism is a philosophical position, and all philosophical positions are existentially dependent upon thought and belief, and all thought and belief is existentially dependent upon an external world, then it is the case that solipsism is existentially dependent upon an external world.
Which of the two outlined arguments above would you like to discuss?
I asked you to defend this claim and your response was just that you're convinced by what you know. That's not an argument.
No. You asked for a deductive argument for an external world. I offered two separate outlines.
The claim you're now questioning is part of an argument you asked for. This kind of questioning could go on without stop, because that kind of skepticism can be insincere. I hope that you're 'arguing' in good faith here. To answer that last question...
All thought and belief is meaningful. All meaning is attributed. All attribution of meaning is existentially dependent upon something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant, and a creature capable of drawing correlations, connections, and/or associations between the two. That is a plurality of things.
If this is all you mean by "plurality" then it doesn't "negate" solipsism. The different kinds of experiences that the lone individual has is the plurality of things from which the thinking part draws its correlations, connections, and associations.
Nothing in your argument yet shows that my thoughts and beliefs depend on the existence of other individuals, or the existence of anything like a material world that is independent of sense data.
I'm not following you. I'm offering an outline of a deductive argument. I'm looking to discuss the merits of that argument(outline first actually). Either one will do. Both would be better,
Are you willing to discuss those outlines?
I am discussing those outlines by questioning its antecedent. Imagine if I were to offer this argument:
If my existence depends on solipsism being the case then if I exist then solipsism is the case.
It's a simple deductive argument. If we are to discuss it then what will we discuss? Most likely the truth of the antecedent. Does my existence depend on solipsism being the case?
And with your argument we should discuss the truth of the antecedent that thought/belief depends on a plurality (of things which solipsism denies).
Ok. So, what would it take for the antecedent to be true? If it is true, then solipsism is false.
It's not my job to defend your argument.
I think the 'object in itself' is associated with something like inter-subjectivity. It's more like a distinction between the object for us and the object for me.
As far as not being able to compare our cognition with the object to the object itself, this is mostly a matter of language. By 'cognition of the object,' we seem to mean the object as we have access to it. What would be left over is then precisely that part of the object that we cannot access.
We we can do is observe how others talk and act in the context of objects we think are there. If their speech and action is appropriate (fits the object being there), then we are confirmed in our perception. For the most part this is so automatic that it never crosses the threshold of consciousness.
I'm inclined to agree that no proof can be given. I suppose that would depend on a conception of logic and a set of axioms. In any case, such a proof would take place in an artificial game.
As far as being-in-the-world-with-others-caring-about-projects, I agree. I think our metalanguage is a groundless ground (Lee Braver.) I don't think that this last assertion is proven in an artificial game. Instead ones just gets better at looking at the flow of experience, around an artificial game whose artificiality is easily concealed and/or taken for the obvious way to do philosophy.
I haven't looked deeply into critiques of the phenomenological approach. I'm sure arguments can be made against the phen. approach, but I suspect that I would find them artificial in the way they understood and employed the metalanguage (the one we're using right now.)
think we have some common ground on this, given that you seem to know what I mean by 'artificial games.' What I have in mind for 'artificial games' is a kind of philosophy/thinking that starts from an unconsidered and unrealistic sense of how language works. This kind of philosophy is a fly trapped in a bottle because it will only be talked out of the bottle in terms of that bottle. It wants a proof that it's inside the bottle (a move in the bottled game) rather than a fresh seeing of its most basic and therefore ignored situation.
I'm not asking you to defend my argument Michael. To quite the contrary, I'm just asking if you agree that... if the premisses of the argument are true, then solipsism is not. I already know the answer to that question(what it would take for the antecedent to be true), and I suspect that you do as well.
We can look at any and all examples of thought and belief. We can see that they are meaningful. We can know what that(being meaningful) takes by looking at the common denominators of all thought and belief and eliminating everything irrelevant to that. It takes precisely what I've put forth in the OP...
I object to Kant's notion of Noumena.
In order to know that all of our thought and belief about the world and/or ourselves is incomplete in some way, there must be a comparative analysis performed between our thought and belief and the world and/or ourselves. To compare between the two requires having complete access/knowledge to/of both. If we have access and knowledge to and of both, then Kant is wrong. If we do not, then Kant is unjustified.
I suspect that Kant knew this as well. Hence, he took pains to point out that the only sensible, reasonable, and judicious use of the notion was as a negative limit to our thought. On my view, it offers nothing more than an unknown 'realm'(that which exists in it's entirety completely unbeknownst to us).
Quoting macrosoft
Ok. This notion of 'cognition of the object' conflates the object and our access. The phrase "the object as we have access to it" is loaded chock full of dubious presuppositions. You've duly noted an obvious one(indirect or mediated perception).
Replace 'cognition of the object' with thought/belief formation(drawing mental correlations between the object and something else) by virtue of using physiological sensory perception, and we will be using a notion that is fully capable of accounting for meaningful cognition(thought and belief). This notion welcomes evolutionary process, can foster understanding of non linguistic thought and belief, provide a framework that not only avoids anthropomorphism but offers a standard by which to identify it, employs the fewest number of unprovable premisses, posits the fewest entities, and it also offers the capability of exhausting everything ever thought, believed, written and/or otherwise uttered. It was designed that way and continues to strive towards that standard. It situates both the presupposition of correspondence with the world and the attribution of meaning precisely where they belong by virtue of effectively taking account of how they originate/emerge within thought/belief formation. The justificatory ground for my notion of thought/belief couldn't be any stronger. The criterion has no examples to the contrary.
That's very useful, but the pragmatists don't seem to like it much. Odd that.
Quoting macrosoft
Well...
This notion of 'being confirmed in our perception' relies heavily upon that counts as perception. I strongly disagree with most philosophical use of the notion. On my view, perception is autonomous, but perception is not informed by the language of the perceiving creature(assuming it has language).
Seems to me that you're packing thought, belief and perhaps even a worldview into it.
When speech and actions are appropriate, they've been regulated. In order for us to autonomously confirm something by others' actions and speech being appropriate, then all we've confirmed is our notion of what's appropriate. That's moral thought/belief.
What you've described above looks a lot like an example of language acquisition.
No, because as I said here, a "plurality of things" does not entail a "plurality of external things". The different kinds of experiences that a solipsistic mind has can be the plurality of things from which the thinking part draws its correlations, connections, and associations.
Quoting creativesoul
And where in any of this is it shown that meaning requires an external world?
Quoting creativesoul
We've already gone over the fallacy of the OP: the 4th premise begs the question.
I agree that we can find lots of dubious presuppositions therein, but for me this is a problem with all discussions of this issue. We understand well enough what we mean in our everyday interactions. But then we want to hold some meaning in an exact position to build an argument with it. If the argument succeeds, then we've really only shown something about our artificial use of the word. The results depend on and apply only to some idiosyncratic semi-fixing of the meanings involved.
I think it goes that deep. What could someone mean by 'it is not the case that there is an external world.'? To whom are they talking? To deny the external world they need something like an external world. As I see it, there is a kind of embeddedness in a community that makes conversation possible in the first place. We are we before we are me. The me emerges from the we. Only after the concept of something like the ego has emerged can we go back and try to make it a foundation. In short, we have to have all kinds of semi-conscious beliefs/practices in common before we are even intelligible to one another. It seems like a hopeless task to try to go back and justify all of this shared understanding rigorously. Of course it's good to clarify here and there (wisely picking our battles.)
If Socrates is a man and all men are mortal then Socrates is mortal.
Does this argument beg the question?
I think I understand and agree with the gist here.
It seems you're skirting around consistency/coherency in language use... or perhaps in the bigger picture - the rules of language games and their affect/effect in general. I agree that that approach is very useful and can be quite helpful in showing that a problem is nothing more than a consequence of language use. Bewitchment. It may be the best approach for reasonably and rightfully denouncing solipsistic thought/arguments.
However, Witt never seemed to properly account for that which exists in it's entirety prior to our account of it. Philosophy proper hasn't either so. Witt wrote, on more than one occasion, that much of his project involved whether or not there was such a thing as a priori knowledge and if so how we could attain/obtain it(how could we know). That starts off on the wrong foot to begin with, so to speak, by adopting an inherently inadequate framework.
Very well put.
"A plurality of things" entails whatever I say it does. A plurality is more than one. A thing is anything and everything. A plurality of things is more than one thing. One mind is not a plurality of things. Period.
Besides all that...
The notion of entailment is riddled with problems. It's bullshit anyway. A can entail B despite the fact that A and B have different truth conditions. Entailment does not constitute warrant for moving from A to B. Period. That's one of Gettier's footholds.
It's simple and easy to forget, but...
Logic is the rules of correct inference. Logic presupposes truth as correspondence by virtue of presupposing the truth of the premisses. The sole aim of logic is to preserve truth.
So...
If one can follow a so-called logical rule such as 'logical' entailment and fail to preserve truth as a result, then entailment is not rightfully called "a rule of correct inference".
I'm thinking about branching off of this topic and beginning a new one that focuses upon what all is involved with language acquisition. Care to join me?
This seems the wrong way around.
If something exists in it's entirety prior to our conception thereof, then we do not make it a foundation. We discover the foundation that is already there.
I don't know enough about Freud to know whether the ego can exist - as it is conceived - prior to our account of it.
This is like saying that one universe is not a plurality of things.
The mind isn't just some single, indivisible thing. My thoughts are distinct from the pain in my throat, from the ringing in my ears, from the microwave sense-data presented to me in the top-right of my vision.
I'm quite capable of deriving meaning from all of this without there being some external world that is causally responsible for my experiences.
I would like one example of the attribution of meaning that does not consist of something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized, and a creature capable of drawing correlations, associations, and/or otherwise 'connecting' the two.
Just one will do.
No, it's not.
Thoughts are not mind. Pains are not mind. Vision is not mind. Stars are not the universe. Etc...
Why? That has nothing to do with what I'm saying, which is that I can draw correlations and connections between a sign/symbol and something to become significant/symbolized without there being an external world.
There's the word "cat" and there's the cat that I see. I connect the two. There is meaning. But neither is an external world object.
Your conclusion that there is an external world is a non sequitur. You need to show that meaning requires an external world, but you don't do this just by using the term "plurality".
Sure, I'll join you. I'm only occasionally available at the moment though.
Quoting creativesoul
I think I've found a phrase I like for my take on all of this: meaning holism.
We speak from and listen with our entire soft network of interrelated concepts. And even the idea of an atomic or single concept is already a kind of useful but possibly misleading fiction. And it should be noted that 'meaning holism' applies to any description of meaning holism, so I can't analytically/atomically defend this approach. Pick on any particular word and pull and the tapestry unravels. But I think that's true for any position. In short, I think that any analytic approach (and I mean an approach that zooms on on individual words as if they were stand-ins for atomic concepts) is fundamentally misguided in a particular sense. On the other hand, analysis has its uses, so maybe I should just say that analysis has serious limitations, especially when trying to grasp the whole of reality.
Quoting creativesoul
Yes, I agree that we find a foundation that was already there, the same foundation we used in the first place in our hunt for yet another foundation (a groundless ground.) In my quote above, I was describing what I'd call the wrong approach. Basically there is a soft meaning of 'ego' that we 'know' or can use in ordinary language. Then some philosophers in a quest for absolute certainty or a theory of knowledge try to sharpen this concept into a kind of device. But the concept is only living as part of a network, and this network is more like a goo than a spiderweb. Meaning is distributed, so plucking words out of context and trying to cash them out as entities largely leads to confusion, though things like dictionaries do have some value. Words do have 'some' relative independent meaning (roughly speaking, as if I had a choice.)
The cat you see is not something external to you? Really now?
Not if there isn't an external world, which is what we were discussing. There's just the word and the experience.
So, again, the existence of meaning isn't evidence of an external world. You need a better argument.
Well no. The fact that meaning is existentially dependent upon an external world and meaning exists is all the argument that is necessary.
You've yet to show that this is the case. All you've said is that meaning requires a signifier and a thing to be signified, but that can be satisfied by the existence of a word and an experience. We don't need for the experience to be of an external world thing.
There is no evidence to the contrary. What more shewing could one ask for?
Arguing for the existence of an external world by saying that there is no evidence that there isn't an external world is a terrible argument.
Call it "terrible" if you want...
You’re begging the question. If there isn’t an external world then the world we live in is an example to the contrary.
If you just want to assert that there’s an external world then do that, but don’t try to pretend that it’s an argument.
If... is begging the question(in the sense that you're using "begging the question"). Double standard. Your own argument cannot meet your own standard.
The argument I've presented is if all examples of the attribution of meaning are existentially dependent upon an external world then solipsism is false. I offered a (universal)criterion for the attribution of meaning. There are no examples to the contrary. Thus, there is no stronger justificatory ground for assent. That is the case. Therefore... solipsism is false.
What you've said is that meaning requires a sign and a thing to be signified and that this can only happen if there is an external world, which is false. If there is the word "cat" and if there is the experience of a cat then even if there isn't an external world then there is a sign and a thing to be signified.
Even the external world realist can accept the example of the word "pain" and the experience of pain, or the word "ghost" and the fact that there are no external world ghosts (or ghosts of any kind). Meaning just doesn't require an external world.
I don't buy the first premise. I neither agree that all thought consists of correlations, nor do I believe that all thought is correlations between this mental stuff and that mental stuff. For one, you seem to be implying some sort of representationalism, as if it's a given that representationalism is correct. I don't agree with that.
I didn't get much past the first premise.
I haven't said that.
If... if... if...
Sigh...
The argument is more nuanced that this... if you cannot follow it, it's not my problem.
You could always simply offer one example to the contrary.
I'm always willing to consider an example to the contrary.
Got one?
Re not all thought being correlations, so for example I can think musically. I'm not correlating anything to anything else when I do that, but I am thinking. Rhythms, melodies or other sets of pitches, including chords, more abstract patterns, etc. might simply be "present-to-mind" for me when I'm thinking musically.
What's going on in your mind when you think musically?
I would argue that one cannot. All language consists of correlations.
All attribution of meaning consists of something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized, and a creature capable of drawing correlations between different things.
All meaning consists of correlation. Thinking musically is meaningful. Therefore...
Where there is no correlation there can be no thinking musically.
One example of the attribution of meaning to the contrary will suffice.
Got one?
There is a correlation between the notes to create the rhythms, melodies etc. Is there not?
Also, you use the word “might”, you have doubts?