Naming and identity - was Pluto ever a planet?
Pluto isn't a planet, but it once was. Or was it? How are we to understand a thing's identity (in this case, as a planet), and its (in)dependency on(/of) naming?
On the one hand we might want to say that the (current) definition of "planet" is such that Pluto doesn't satisfy it, and never has satisfied it, and so would have to conclude that Pluto has never been a planet. To be a planet, then, is to have certain (material, for simplicity) characteristics. But on the other hand it seems quite acceptable to say that Pluto was once a planet but now isn't, even though nothing (material) about Pluto has changed (in a relevant way). To be a planet, then, is to be named a planet.
Which approach (if either; is there a third solution?) is correct? Was Pluto ever a planet?
On the one hand we might want to say that the (current) definition of "planet" is such that Pluto doesn't satisfy it, and never has satisfied it, and so would have to conclude that Pluto has never been a planet. To be a planet, then, is to have certain (material, for simplicity) characteristics. But on the other hand it seems quite acceptable to say that Pluto was once a planet but now isn't, even though nothing (material) about Pluto has changed (in a relevant way). To be a planet, then, is to be named a planet.
Which approach (if either; is there a third solution?) is correct? Was Pluto ever a planet?
Comments (103)
I don't see the problem; we agree that Pluto hasn't changed, so we - meaning they - have decided to talk differently to make talk more self-consistent. Sometimes one might have to go into how Pluto was considered a planet and now is not - which you have done quite clearly enough.
And then we are all clear about what a planet is and how many there are, until they tell us they have changed our minds again.
That doesn't really answer the question. Is there a difference between being a planet and being called a planet? If so, what is required for a thing to be a planet, and was Pluto ever a planet?
Then when it comes to the formal properties, we would need to make a further distinction between the natural form (what constitutes "a planet" as a naturally self-organising object/structure/process) and the human classification of forms (which can pick out natural form, but also picks out aspects of our own human scale interests).
So their are mountains, hills and molehills. As tectonic processes, they may have very similar formal causes. But in terms of reflecting the further thing of our human scale interests, there is an extra weight of information that a name would refer to.
I happen to be a composition-as-identity theorist, so whatever Pluto is, I see as dependent on every single part of whatever is seen as Pluto. A single change, changes the identity of Pluto from Pluto1.0 to Pluto1.1, for example. In fact I'm not even sure if I'm committed to objects in reality; I'm leaning towards conceptualist anti-realism or mereological nihilism.
A thing's identity is, for example, being a planet. What sort of conditions must be satisfied for a thing to be a planet?
On the one hand we might want to say that to be a planet is to have material characteristics A[sup]1[/sup], B[sup]2[/sup], and C[sup]3[/sup]. It then follows that to have been a planet is to have had material characteristics A, B, and C. Given that Pluto doesn't have material characteristic C, it isn't a planet. And so given that Pluto has never had material characteristic C, it was never a planet.
But on the other hand it seems quite acceptable to say that Pluto was once a planet. If Pluto was once a planet then to have been a planet is not to have had material characteristics A, B, and C, and so to be a planet is not to have material characteristics A, B, and C.
So what's the answer? Was Pluto never a planet, or is being a planet not reducible to having material characteristics A, B, and C?
[sup]1[/sup]is massive enough to be rounded by its own gravity
[sup]2[/sup]is not massive enough to cause thermonuclear fusion
[sup]3[/sup]has cleared its neighbouring region of planetesimals
Pluto was considered a planet according to a standard of measure from a different time. Now we don't consider it a planet due to a refinement in that standard of measure.
Pluto still is... but what it is a relative to our standard of measure and the time in which we apply it.
Is there a difference between being a planet and being called a planet?
For whom or what? Me or Pluto?
What is required for a thing to be a planet?
I suppose this:
[i]The definition of planet set in Prague, Czech Republic in August 2006 by the International Astronomical Union (IAU) states that, in the Solar System, a planet is a celestial body which:
1) is in orbit around the Sun,
2) has sufficient mass to assume hydrostatic equilibrium (a nearly round shape), and
3) has "cleared the neighborhood" around its orbit.[/i]
* Now if you are watching a episode of "Rick and Morty" and you're Morty's dad, well...
Was Pluto ever a planet?
Well... it was considered a planet prior to this definition, so prior to 2006 I suppose we considered it a planet.
I sort don't think there is an fundamental intrinsic "planetness" that is a priori to the term planet. Any definition is bound by standards of measure and assumptions/attributions of value, so honestly definition are relative.
Sorry this probably doesn't help, but I'm not really sure you asked a question. What is a planet and what is considered (correctly according to the accepted definition) a planet are indeed both planets... until we decide to invent a new term or a new standard of measure; thus changing the definition. Pluto is still Pluto... unless we decide to change that, but I feel my point is drgging on here so I'll let it go.
Meow!
GREG
But this is a bad way of thinking about identity because it only names particular states of being, not general states of being. It is far too restrictive a form of classification for the act of naming to be informationally efficient.
Naming seeks to strike a balance between generality and particularity. You want to be able to point to the things you have in mind with the least communicative effort. So if you talk about "my cat", you don't want to have to talk about the great amount of molecular turnover that goes on so that my cat is - even a few seconds ago - was a materially different cat.
So your take on naming is based on the ontic commitments of a mechanist/reductionist view of things. You implicitly take stability for granted, making even the slightest change as something that could be rightfully named. It is presumed there are stable parts which have a particulate claim to identity. The world is a composite of such material/efficient causal particulars.
But a naturalistic metaphysics instead sees reality in terms of balances of plasticity and stability. And flux or change is basic if anything - when we are talking about the material causes or being, the constituting degrees of freedom.
So that is why - in a process or systems view - it makes more sense to focus on formal/final cause as the source of object/process/structure identity. We want to name whatever it is that maintains a consistent identity through time and can either weather change, or indeed, actively maintain a state of identity.
I guess the contrast here is between composition-as-identity theory and constraint-as-identity theory. ;)
To be a planet would be to talk about the natural process that "makes planetary objects". So we could narrow that to gravitationally produced lumps of heavy matter that are large enough/fluid enough to assume a gravitationally spherical shape (but not so large that they then collapse into black holes).
So if science is trying to decide if something is "really a planet", it would have to be a judgement in light of some theory that defines a natural process.
But humans then can add their own interests to a definition. Is it a planet if it is a gas giant with no where solid to land? Is it a planet if it is so small that you can walk around it too quickly, and it lacks enough gravity to hold you down properly? Is it a planet if it doesn't orbit a sun, but instead either wanders or perhaps is a moon that orbits a planet?
So naming always has this dual aspect - our attempts to speak of the world objectively, and then the degree to which we really want to work our own personal perspective into the naming of things.
Again, it is the assumption that real things get reduced to lists of material particulars that causes the confusion.
If material properties are important to the form of some thing, then the formal properties will be the constraint that ensures the right materials are being used.
Is it necessary from a natural perspective that a planet is made of rock and not frozen gas? Well not if gravitationally compact and fluidly spherical are deemed key aspects of specifying "a planet" in naturalistic terms.
And gravity and spherical are formal properties, rather than material properties, in a physical description (even if folk still tend to think of gravity as a "material force" rather than spatiotemporal geometry).
... but regardless of how objective we try to be, we are still fielding a value assertion according to an accepted standard of measure. Who fields the assertion and who fields the value assertions?
Indeed I will accept the definition of an authority and not just accept any position by anyone on the street. (I'm not a post-modernist, but like to use it as a check now and then.)
I suppose if I take to to the regress we all wish to avoid, what exactly makes a thing a thing?
As I understand this, a thing is a recognizable (by us) collage of strings (or loops or atoms or whatever is the smallest thing is found in everything... we're still refining that, so I'll drop that now) or an action/event that is in a pattern perceived consistancy context with a collage of strings (or whatever) that WE give a lable to as to make reference to this collage or event/action in context of a collage in the hope of having some sort of shared communication and conveying of ideas.
I know I can do better than that (it's late and I need to go to bed), but the point is WE define things... WE assert value. We can also misdefine things and assert value that is not really accurate... BUT accuracy and definition are still according to a standard of measure WE put into motion according to OUR experiences. As we experience more or refine knowledge of experience defintions, value assertions and standards of measure change/adapt/refine.
I don't ever rule out the possibility that our physics of today will be looked upon in the future as being near child's play. We've come a lot way, but certainly have a much longer way to travel. Definitions will continue to evolve as the standards of measure become more and more evoled.
So...
... what is a planet?
We can only answer this according to the current collection of knowledge we have and according to the best possible standard of measure in respect to this knowledge. As for an absolute answer... "please stand-by"... more informaton will be collected; thus refinement will occur.
... what is called a planet?
Actually the same thing, but also what one understands to be a planet, even if it happens to be outdated information, knowledge and standards of measure. Indeed this can be adapted as well, but sometimes it isn't. Not everyone really cares to be that exact and indeed it really might not make any difference to their lives, but hey... there's a lot of stuff out there to know and not a lot of time to get it all in one's head.
Meow!
GREG
The point remains that our naming has the choice of either striving to talk about reality in a mind independent fashion, or in a fashion that is unabashedly subjective and seen from the point of view of our own interests.
So there are polar choices to be made. And we don't have to treat one as being then right, the other wrong. It is just important that there is this basic conflict in naming things - which then becomes a source of paradox if it is philosophically skated over, after the fashion of the OP.
Pluto has suffered enough. Return it's dignity as a planet. FAIR PLAY FOR PLUTO!
'Pluto' the sound design has not changed
The only change is how we categorize it, its meaning has changed categorically.
Now we place it in the company of other similarly sized objects out there, which is where it should have been categorized if we had known its size when it was originally classified as a planet.
I think that the discourses of science, of technology are being continually mediated into culture. Its gone on this way since Copernicus. But then again, the sun still rises and sets.
I was very dismayed when, after much hard work and many scrumpled pieces of paper, I had to give up. IIRC the problem that finally stopped me was the question of at what point an oxygen molecule in space somewhere near the Earth stops being part of the Earth. No matter how hard I tried, I could not find a way to answer that which didn't involve drawing an arbitrary boundary, eg at a specified distance from the Earth's centre of mass. And I couldn't discard atmosphere because then a gas giant like Saturn would not be a planet.
I think these days I would - if challenged to do something like that - instead try to define a planet as a phenomenon (not an object - to avoid the problem of the atmosphere) and set different sufficient and necessary conditions for it. For instance a necessary condition might be that somewhere in the phenomenon there is a spherical region whose average density is greater than that of balsa wood, with a radius greater than 100km and less than the radius of the sun. But a sufficient condition might be that the radius is at least half that of Mercury. There will be a huge fuzzy region between that encompassed by the necessary conditions and that encompassed by the sufficient.
Pluto would be in that fuzzy region.
The ancients noticed that some stars did not conform to this motion; demonstrating a retrograde motion. They were dubbed WANDERER, and that is how we come to have use of the word "planet". I see no good reason to down grade Pluto because of its size.
Pluto is a "dwarf planet", which would make it sound like a kind of planet. The characteristics of Pluto make it unlike most other planets. Its orbit is elongated so it often comes closer to the sun than Neptune. It's the only solid surface planet outside of gas giants. It is more like distant objects in the Oort cloud than anything in inner rings. But it is smaller than most moons, including our own. It may sound like an arbitrary distinction, (you must be this tall to ride the roller coaster), but based on properties and characteristics important to astronomy.
It was once a "planet" under the old system. Probably partly because it was discovered at a time when astronomers were looking for a planet and did some publicity about discovering and naming it. They originally thought it was larger than Earth and they were looking for a "9th planet". Around the time Pluto was demoted to "dwarf planet", was when hundreds of new bodies in other solar system was being discovered and the question of what defines a planet was raised.
Nouns seem to cluster around a family resemblance of canonical qualities, with a prototype and a fuzzy tolerance principle for how distant from that prototype an individual is willing to be before it no longer falls in the extension of the predicate. Language is sensitive to both the qualities required of the prototypical case and the level of tolerance allowed – as has already been adumbrated, the attitude verb consider is sensitive to this latter dimension without being sensitive to the former.
My answer would be, therefore, that what was changed was the tolerance allowed from the prototypical planet, which became more restrictive in such a way that Pluto now falls outside of the extension (though only for a technical community – I'm sure many people still consider Pluto a planet and there seems to be no scientistic reason to say they're wrong, after all the language has the say, not the scientists; the effect only happens to the extent the language puts up with the scientists and decides to obey them). This does not mean that the naming of Pluto as a planet or not has some power to make it a planet or not (which is obviously absurd), nor does it mean that Pluto, or the core characteristics of a planet, have changed in some appreciable way (with e.g. Jupiter remaining a canonical example as it ever was).
That depends on what it means to be a planet. If to be a planet is to have certain material characteristics then the claim that naming Pluto a planet makes it a planet is the claim that naming Pluto a planet makes it have certain material characteristics, which of course is absurd. But if to be a planet is to be named a planet then the claim that naming Pluto a planet makes it a planet is the claim that naming Pluto a planet makes it named a planet, which of course is a tautology.
So to be a planet is to fall within the tolerated extension of the word "planet"? Wouldn't we then say that in naming Pluto a planet we are making it the case that Pluto falls within the tolerated extension of the word "planet"? And so that in naming Pluto a planet we are making it the case that Pluto is a planet?
But calling something a planet doesn't make it so; therefore it can't be that to be called a planet is to be a planet.
Quoting Michael
To be a planet is to fall within a tolerated distance from a fuzzy prototype whose conglomeration of qualities is that which is currently referred to by the word 'planet.' Being a planet has nothing to do with being called by a certain word. The fact that the right prototype or selection of qualities happens to be referred to by that word is purely accidental. In naming Pluto a planet, we are making the case that it is a planet, but not that it is called a planet or that it falls within the extension of a certain word, which is absurd (although the two will extensionally, not intensionally, overlap in worlds in which 'planet' refers to the property of being a planet, which it need not).
Whether or not calling something a planet makes it so is the very question I'm asking (so obviously to address it you can't simply beg the question and assume otherwise). The case that could be made is that a) 20 years ago, Pluto was a planet, that b) today, Pluto isn't a planet, and that c) the only relevant change between 20 years ago and today is in what things we name "planet". It then seems to follow that to be a planet is to be named a planet.
So if you reject the conclusion then you must reject one of the premises. You seem to accept b) and c), so do you not accept a)? Was Pluto not a planet 20 years ago?
And what has to change for a thing that once fell within the tolerated distance to fall out of it (or vice versa)? Presumably a change in material characteristics is one. But that's not what happened to Pluto. What changed was our use of the word "planet". So our use of the word "planet" influences whether or not Pluto falls within this tolerated distance, and so influences whether or not it is a planet.
Pluto was a planet when we used the word "planet" to describe things like it and it's now not a planet given that we don't use the word "planet" to describe things like it.
There is a threshold of mass above which gravity ensures that agglomerated celestial objects become, at least in appearance, spherical. I think that would be the best criterion for planethood.
Under this crierion alone, though, many moons would be counted as planets; so another criterion, "that to be counted as a planet, a celestial body must orbit around no other body than a star", would need to be added.
But this is obviously false. If I call a stove a planet, it is not therefore a planet; it's just a stove, that I'm calling a planet. So I'm a little confused as to how this is even a question for you.
Are you proposing that this is a realistic definition of 'planet'?
For all x, x is a planet iff x is called a planet
I want to get this clear, because this the above definition has some pretty obvious flaws. I think it's self-evidently wrong, but if you aren't convinced, we can hash it out.
Quoting Michael
Using my own English idiolect, I would still call Pluto a planet. A technical community has deemed that it isn't, by some standard. By that standard, it never was a planet. According to the ordinary use of the word, at least as I use it, Pluto always was, and still is, a planet, and the decisions of a technical community don't change that. (Words, generally, do not have their extensions based on council decisions).
Quoting Michael
As I said, nouns are sensitive both to a cluster of properties instantiated by the prototype (for a planet, plausibly material properties), and a tolerance allowed in the consideration of at which distance from that prototype the property ends, based on a fuzzy tolerance principle. 'Planet' is sensitive to both simultaneously, and different attitude verbs pick this out. Thus, if I say, 'I believe Pluto is a planet,' I plausibly mean that Pluto has some physical characteristic that falls near enough to the prototype. But if I say, 'I consider Pluto a planet,' I do not mean that Pluto has any material qualities but that given the material qualities it actually has, the tolerance principle of the property of being a planet admits Pluto within it.
Our use of the word 'planet' governs which property the word 'planet' refers to. It does not govern the property itself, nor whether any individual bears that property. To think otherwise is a deep confusion.
I agree with what you say, against the idea that naming is totally arbitrary and determinative of the ontological status of things; but the criteria for deeming a thing to be a table are perhaps more readily obvious than the criteria for contending that something is a planet.
I agree. But the question is; is to be a planet to have this property?
If to be a planet is to have this property, and if Pluto has never had this property, then Pluto has never been a planet. But if Pluto has been a planet, and if Pluto has never had this property, then to be a planet is not to have this property.
It's not that a stove is a planet if I call it a planet; it's that a stove is a planet if the wider linguistic community uses the word "planet" to refer to stoves. Because in such a world the words "planet" and "stove" would mean the same thing (and so the word "planet" wouldn't mean what it does now).
Obviously I'm not saying that if I call a stove a planet then it is therefore a celestial body moving in an elliptical orbit round a star. As I agreed before, it would be absurd to claim that the act of naming can change the material characteristics of the thing named.
Yes. To be a planet is to be a planet; not to be called a planet.
Quoting Michael
I do not think that at any point in human history Pluto became, or ceased being, a planet. Part of the confusion here I think is we're trying to treat linguistic practice as if it rested on decisions made by experts, which it doesn't. The Pluto decision is interesting in that a lot of people heard about it via the media and at least nominally in some cases defer to it. I think if you pressed people enough they'd say that the notion that Pluto stopped being a planet at some point doesn't make sense. What happened was that a group of scientists decided that Pluto wasn't a planet; since they did this by appealing to physical aspects of Pluto, not what Pluto was called (which would make no sense), their position is that Pluto was never a planet, so if the authority is deferred to, one would have to agree with it on this score. I think you might be treating your initial purported data a little too seriously, and that when pressed it falls apart. As I said above, I personally would still say Pluto is a planet, since my idiolect isn't governed by the decisions of scientists.
Quoting Michael
So you think that a stove can become a planet if everyone uses the word 'planet' to refer to it?
Doesn't that strike you as an absurd position? If not, we may have to dig a little deeper into why you think this. It strikes me as completely insane. I'd say myself it's still just a stove, and obviously not a planet; but now the word 'planet' can be used to refer to stoves, is all.
For all x, x is a planet iff x is called a planet
As I said in my previous post, I'm not saying that a stove can become a celestial body moving in an elliptical orbit round a star if everyone uses the word "planet" to refer to it (which is the misinterpretation that I assume you're making).
Quoting The Great Whatever
Who does it rest on, then? The wider linguistic community? Then consider an analogous situation where it wasn't a small group of experts that redefined the word "planet" but every English-speaking person.
But wait, didn't you just describe a planet? Something doesn't add up here. If it can't become a celestial body...then it can't become a planet. That's what a planet is, after all.
So tell me whether you assent to the above schema or are taking it seriously as an option; otherwise, I don't see how we can move forward.
I'm saying that if we use the word "planet" to refer to stoves then the meaning of the word "planet" would be such that "stoves are planets" would be a tautology.
After all, a planet is a celestial body; since as you admit stoves would not become celestial bodies by virtue of being called 'planets,' it follows that they would not thereby becomes planets.
Suppose it was my goal to turn a stove into a planet. Would a reasonable way of going about this be to ask everyone to call it a planet?
Are you proposing the above formula?
What I'm drawing attention to is the fact that Pluto was a planet but now isn't, even though nothing material about Pluto has changed – only our use of the word "planet". Therefore there is a connection between a thing's identity (as a planet) and our naming of that thing.
But, since a planet is a celestial body, you can't change something into a planet without changing it into a celestial body. But you seem to be claiming that if everyone calls a stove a planet, then it will become a planet; but since it will not become a celestial body, this is wrong. Hence your position is incoherent, and merely protesting against the fact that I'm pointing this incoherence out will not help you, since the problem lies in your position and not any misunderstanding I have of it.
Quoting Michael
Nonsense. According to my idiolect, Pluto was a planet and still is; according to the scientists, it isn't and never was. If it was the case that they determined whether Pluto was a planet based on the use of the word 'planet,' then they would have appealed to linguistic data in their decision, not data about Pluto's physical qualities.
I reject your datum; it's not the case that Pluto's planethood changed recently.
Again, do you accept the above schema, or are you proposing it? It's difficult to criticize your position if it can't be pinned down.
And according to my idiolect, Pluto was a planet and now isn't.
I've explained it quite clearly:
a) Pluto was a planet,
b) Pluto isn't a planet,
c) The only relevant change has been in our use of the word "planet"
d) Therefore our use of the word "planet" influences a thing's identity as a planet
I'm questioning the notion that to be a planet is to be a celestial body. I'm suggesting that to be a planet is to be named a planet. Therefore, since a planet is a thing named a planet, you can change something into a planet by changing it into a thing named a planet. If everyone names a stove a planet then it will become a planet, since it will become a thing named a planet.
It's quite coherent.
Edit: You referring to an old topic on horses?
Oh, God, I hope not! :-d
In any case, I still don't know exactly what your position is, and you've ignored my question over and over; but clearly the schema I outlined above is wrong, so I'm guessing that's not what you're saying. And it still makes no sense to say that you can turn a stove into a planet without turning it into a celestial body; that is like saying you can turn a stove into a chipmunk without turning it into an animal.
I think you are deeply confused about the way in which words denote properties, and that your position basically amounts to thinking that all properties denoted through language are themselves meta-linguistic, that the use of language must mean that what the language talks about must itself be linguistic. I think this is wrong, and that I can demonstrate to you the way in which it is wrong, and that possibly after seeing this you'd be willing to abandon your original purported datum. But I can't say anything else unless you clear up your position with regard to the proposed equivalence schema.
So, the atomists would say that meaning is established by a causal chain back to something like Kripke's "initial baptism".
This is obvious in the case of proper nouns. I was once Yahadreas and now I'm Michael (so not Yahadreas). Muhammad Ali was once Cassius Clay. I'm simply extending this principle to common nouns (a real-life example of this is the pre-op transexual who newly identifies as a different gender; "I was a woman but now I'm a man").
I don't know what you mean by, 'a thing's identity.' Do you mean, whether it is a planet or not? But this is just not so; things were planets before anyone called them anything, and in those cases their physical properties were relevant and not to the extent we talked about them at all. In fact, we can counterfactually say, even if there were no language at all, there would still be planets.
This again seems to commit you, also, to saying that we can make things planets by calling them by a certain word, which is manifestly false (and again, your objection does not work, as I've outlined above).
Consider: suppose that to be water, something only needs to be called 'water,' and must be. Now, suppose I'm an alchemist, trying to transmute wood into water. According to your account, merely changing its physical properties is not enough: I cannot change wood into water, for example, by rearranging its molecular structure. Rather, the fact that I've done this will only be efficacious to the extent I've made something that people then go on to call 'water.' But this is absurd; to complete the transmutation, I only change the wood's physical qualities, to make it water. No one needs to then call it water to make it water. It was already water; we call it water because that's what it is, it is not water because we call it that. Likewise, there are plenty of planets out there that no one ever has, or ever will, call anything. Yet planets they remain, in virtue of their physical qualities, and not because of the tendency of these qualities to make us call them by a certain word. To put it simply, nouns denote properties; they do not denote the property of being called by the very word. A little thought will show you that this is circular and impossible to institute in practice (but we can go over that too if you want).
Quoting Michael
Proper nouns are semantically distinct from common nouns. The former are referential expressions that denote individuals; the latter are predicative expressions that denote properties.
There is a way of talking about name-bearing properties and using proper names as common nouns; we can say there are two Michaels, for example, by which we mean there are two people named 'Michael.' And then, yes, I agree, there is nothing to being a Michael other than being called 'Michael.' That is because name-bearing properties are metalinguistic, but other properties, like being a planet, are not. And there are principled reasons for this, I think, but I don't want to get into it (I work on name-bearing and proper names, which is a fascinating subject in its own right). In many languages, proper names used as common nouns are marked differently from ordinary common nouns, showing quotative marking that highlights their metalinguistic character. This is because, I hold, they are derivative of the corresponding referential expression, much as, say, the common noun 'she,' meaning 'feminine individual,' is derivative of the pronoun.
Then, if such a causal chain could be definitely established, it might work for a particular planet; but it seems it might still get into difficulties over the category 'planet'.
Yes, exactly, I had forgotten it was 'horses', but that is the one I had in mind.
Sure, and which properties they denote depends on how we use the noun. If we use the noun "planet" to refer to stoves then the noun "planet" would denote those properties that stoves have (and so not those properties that Jupiter has). And given that a planet is whatever thing has the properties denoted by the noun "planet", a planet is whatever thing is referred to by the noun "planet", which in this hypothetical situation is stoves.
That is correct.
Quoting Michael
That is not correct. Extensionally, these two things happen to coincide because of linguistic practice. Intensionally, they come apart. If 'planet' were used to refer to stoves, planets would still be planets, and the property of being a planet would not change. All that would change is that 'planet' would now refer to stoves, and refer to the property of being a stove.
If we call stoves 'planets,' then they are called 'planets.' That is tautological. But they are not planets. They are stoves; planets are celestial bodies, which stoves are not.
In any case I am not seeing how this relates to what I said above. Yes, counterfactually the word would refer to a different property. But that's just it -- it would relate to the property of being a stove, not of being a planet. Stoves would still be stoves, not planets. If anything, this underscores my point.
Roughly, your confusion is to think that because our linguistic practices can alter which property a word refers to, therefore it must follow that the words themselves reference the language itself in their definition: roughly, that for any noun N, its meaning is 'that which is called 'N''. And this is not so. Kripke has a great bit on this, how we cannot get off the ground assuming that by 'horse,' what we mean is that which people call 'horse.' It would result in all sorts of absurdities: for example, you could not say truly of any animal that it was a horse, unless someone had called it that before (and at some point someone would have had to have said it erroneously!), and so we could never identify new animals as horses.
No, I would say the identity of a thing is not the same as the name of a thing. The name is merely a placeholder. When Pluto was considered to be a planet it was thought to be a certain kind of thing, and later when it was considered to not be a planet it was no longer thought to be that kind of thing. Its identity however, as the unique object it is (with whatever set of characteristics it has) remains unchanged.
In any case, as I said in a previous post:
Quoting John
I think Pluto, by the most reasonable criteria, still qualifies as a planet.
But the identity of planethood changed. So one thing that had the identity of being a planet no longer has the identity of being a planet.
Also, apologies for the deleted post. Meant to edit it but it's 3:15am here and I'm a little spaced so clicked the wrong button.
It's true that something may be identified, for example, as a planet, but I don't think identification equates to identity; the former is more a matter of characteristics and definitions. Pluto's identity is as that unique entity, Pluto, whatever it characteristics might be, or however it might be defined, or even however it might be properly as opposed to categorially named (say, variously due to change of name, or in different languages and so on).
In fact I find your views kind of fascinating, almost to the extent that I would give them to undergraduates as essay prompts as examples of linguistic confusions for them to untangle in the Wittgensteinian mode.
Ooooohhhh...
Yes, I know what you mean, and I do tend to agree...
OK, so I am saying being of a certain kind is a matter of identification, and not a matter of identity. What category we place things in has no effect on the things. Being a planet is not a matter of identity, but identification, whereas being a unique entity (whatever kind of entity that might be) is a matter of identity. Looked at this way, the apparent puzzle dissolves, I think.
Of course, if like TGW you want to say that Pluto is still a planet then the problem doesn't arise.
On the contrary, I would say that if Pluto isn't a planet then either it was never a Planet, or being-a-planet can be reduced to having certain material characteristics. I think the former alternative is incoherent, so I would go for the latter.
I look at it like this:
Why is "triangles are three-sided shapes" true? Because "triangle" and "three-sided shape" mean the same thing. Why do "triangle" and "three-sided shape" mean the same thing? Because we use "triangle" and "three-sided shape" in the same sort of way. Therefore if we used "triangle" and "three-sided shape" in incompatible ways then they would mean different things, and so "triangles are three sides shapes" would be false. The way we use the word "triangle" influences the truth-value of the sentence "triangles are three-sided shapes".
And so by the same token, the way we use the word "planet" influences the truth-value of the sentence "Pluto is a planet".
The problem with this analogy is that planets are entities with much more complex sets of properties than triangles, so the fact that it seems semantically straightforward in the case of the latter does not justify any demand or assertion that the case of the former must be similarly straightforward.
If Pluto isn't a planet and if being a planet can be reduced to having certain material characteristics and if the material characteristics of Pluto haven't changed then Pluto was never a planet.
If Pluto isn't a planet and if Pluto was a planet and if the material characteristics of Pluto haven't changed then being a planet cannot be reduced to having certain material characteristics.
So if we accept that Pluto isn't a planet and if we accept that the material characteristics of Pluto haven't changed then either a) being a planet can be reduced to having certain material characteristics and so Pluto was never a planet, or b) Pluto was a planet and so being a planet cannot be reduced to having certain material characteristics.
One of the following must be false:
1. Pluto isn't a planet
2. Pluto was a planet
3. Being a planet can be reduced to having certain material characteristics
4. The material characteristics of Pluto haven't changed
I don't think I've misunderstood at all. It is not simply a matter of being a planet; it is a matter of being considered to be a planet. If the word 'planet' comes to preside over a different set of characteristics than it did formerly, then Pluto was indeed never a Planet under the new definition, but was and still is a Planet under the old different definition. There is no contradiction in this; either way Pluto will never cease to be an entity, so its identity is safe.
In the case of triangles it is not conceivable that the set of characteristics that define them could ever change; so the analogy is simply not a good one.
Agreed.Quoting Michael
Correct.
Quoting Michael
Yes.
Quoting Michael
But from this it does not follow that the way we use the word 'planet' influences which individuals are planets. Your conclusion simply does not follow from your premises, which is what I am trying to get you to see. Whether you are ultimately right or not, which I still think you are not, your current position rests on a conflation and a misunderstanding, and your position can't be investigated until you understand that.
I think a more accurate rendering of how the words are used is to say:
1. When people referred to Pluto as a planet (not a planet) in 1980 they were correct (incorrect); and
2. When people referred to Pluto as a planet (not a planet) in 2015 they were incorrect (correct).
What has changed is simply what the wider linguistic community - in this case heavily under the influence of public announcements by astronomers - considers to be correct use of the word 'planet'.
The key point is that, in assessing a statement for correctness, we often need to know who is saying it, and where and when. Statements don't exist outside of space and time. Context is (almost) everything.
Given that framework, it's only if one wants to take an essentialist or Kripkean view that there is some 'essential nature' of a planet (or a rigid designator) that gets dilemmatised.
There is another significant and problematic difference that is fatal for your analogy and argument here. 'Triangle' means "three angled shape" and an enclosed three angled shape must have three sides. So, by logical extension 'triangle' must mean 'three-sided shape'; it is a non-arbitrary meaning due to the concepts that are joined together in the word 'triangle'. The same kind of semantic conditions do not obtain in the case of 'planet'.
The question, though, is whether or not it is correct now to say that Pluto was a planet. If it was a planet then being a planet cannot be reduced to having certain material characteristics and if being a planet can be reduced to having certain material characteristics then Pluto wasn't a planet.
Of the 4 statements I accept 1, 2, and 4, and so I must reject 3.
N(x,t1,n,d) is true iff object x at time t1 qualified to be described as noun (category) n according to definition d. But definitions change over time and place, so d actually is itself a function of two arguments: time t2 and location l. Let's use a function def of three arguments such that def(u,v,w) refers to the definition of word u that was generally accepted in the vicinity of v at time w.
So we write our applied predicate more fully as
N(x,t1,n,def(n,t2,l))
In words:
'x was at time t1 an n according to the definition of n that was generally accepted at time t2 in the vicinity of l.
In the Pluto planet case we substitute 'Pluto' for x and 'planet' for n so the expression is, in precise form:
N(Pluto, t1,planet,def(planet,t2,l))
and in words:
'Pluto was at time t1 a planet according to the definition of planet that was generally accepted at time t2 in the vicinity of l.
A statement like 'Pluto was a planet in 1980' is neither correct nor incorrect. It is simply ambiguous speech, because it has not specified what definition of planet is to be applied. Two time coordinates are required in order to avoid ambiguity. Only one has been supplied, and it is not clear whether the 1980 is supposed to serve as t1, t2 or both.
In ordinary speech we usually do not supply all the necessary arguments to the implicit predicates and functions in our sentences, because they can be readily inferred by the context. But not infrequently, ambiguity arises because the context does not allow all the missing inputs to be uniquely inferred.
It's like when my partner says 'can you help me with this?'
And the answer is that it is correct now to say that under the present definition of 'planet' it was, and is, not a planet, and that under the past definition of 'planet' it was, and is, a planet.
I think there is no significant philosophical problem here, and that you are merely confusing yourself with words.
That would be correct. If Pluto = x, y, and z and a planet = x, y, z, and a, then Pluto was never a planet. We just thought it was because we didn't realize it lacked the "a" element.
I suppose there can be some ambiguity here which leads to confusion, but as long as we keep our terms clear, I don't see a problem. That is, if we define Planet in two different ways: (1) a common usage way, and (2) a scientifically prescribed way, then I can see where there is a problem, but that's just an equivocation fallacy. If in year -5 we called Pluto a planet, it was a planet insofar as definition #1 was met, but it was not a planet insofar as definition #2 was met. In year +5, we have changed our #1 definition to comport with the #2 definition, so we don't consider Pluto a planet either in the vernacular or in the scientifically prescribed way.
My father always thought himself to be an identical twin. There was never any genetic testing. If he had been tested, and it were determined he was a fraternal twin, then it would be accurate to say he was never an identical twin despite the fact that he previously considered himself to be. How's this controversial, and how's this different from the Pluto question?
This conclusion is demonstrably absurd, so there must be an error in the reasoning leading up to it.
Quoting Michael
Obviously.
There may well be more controversial aspects to this issue, but let's at least start with what we know.
I'm with TGW on this one, as, I recall, I have been in past discussions on this topic. He's talking a lot of sense in this discussion.
If Pluto was a planet, and nothing about Pluto has changed in such a way as to render it no longer a planet, then Pluto is still a planet.
If Pluto wasn't a planet, and nothing about Pluto has changed in such a way as to render it a planet, then Pluto is still not a planet.
If Pluto was a planet, and nothing about Pluto has changed in such a way as to render it no longer a planet, but a significant group of people have removed "Pluto" from the category "planet", then Pluto is still nonetheless a planet, despite it having been recategorised. For those within the group, it is appropriate to identify Pluto as a non-planet (even though Pluto [i]is[/I] a planet).
I trivially disagree with TGW by going with the second option, because, somewhat arbitrarily, I adopt the current scientific classification, and so it follows that Pluto is not, and never was, a planet. It was merely considered as such for a significant period of time.
So, we could say that Pluto(1), which was what we thought to be a planet, is different than Pluto(2), which we now don't consider to be a planet. Pluto(1) occurred from T1 to T100 and Pluto(2) is occurring from T101 to current day. Obviously, Pluto(1) and Pluto(2) are the same physical object, but the former occurred at an earlier time, so we, for whatever arbitrary reason, can classify it separately based upon its occurrence time if we want to.
Here's my question: what is the philosophical import of all this? I think I see the puzzle, but I don't see any far reaching implications here.
Neither do I. I don't think there are any, if you, me and tee-gee are correct (which we are).
If, on the other hand, Yaha- I mean Michael, is correct, then stoves became planets if you call 'em planets, because a triangle is a three-sided shape.
Therefore, Banno is a red cup.
Yes, I agree with this, since you are saying basically exactly what I said in my last post.
You are equivocating on what it means to be "philosophically significant"; of course if someone spends their time concerning themselves with issues that are of no philosophical significance the fact they do that may be of great consequence to their life and their interactions with others. If a whole culture does that, then....Only in that sense, such time-wasting may be said to be of ethical (and by extension philosophical) significance.
Well, I can see where stoves will become "planets" if we call stoves "planets," but I can't see how a stove can become a planet. An object can't morph into another object based upon our classification, but an object can be reclassified however we want to do it.
Am I missing something? Can someone restate Yahadraes/Michael/Mr. Awesome's view?
And someone somewhere no doubt said "basically exactly" what you and I both just said before we said it, but I'm glad you agree. I have probably already said more or less the same thing in one of the many past discussions on this topic, although I don't remember the one about horses.
I'm a bit confused as well. I half-jokingly presented that view and ascribed it to Michael, but although he denies it, it does seem to be implied by some of his claims. It seems to be a case of wanting to have your cake and eat it. It's problematic to break down these important distinctions between classification and actuality, between what something is and what something is called.
Yes, no doubt they did! And I'm sure I also have made just this kind of point many times in the past. It's a fairly commonsensical point, I think.
The exchange in the thread about horses between Michael and TGW was even longer and sillier than the one here, if I remember. Like you, I thought TGW was making the more sense there.
I don't think the question is "serious and interesting". The fact it can be answered so easily by common sense attests to that. Judging by your own responses I had thought you also thought that. Of course, that is only my opinion about what is philosophically interesting, everyone is free to spend their time however they like, and I would never presume to tell some one they are wasting their time, unless I believe their inquiry is based on a conceptual confusion or category error, such as in this case confusing identification with identity. Personally if I was wasting my time on such a category error or confusion I would be pleased to be set right about it, so that I could get on with more fruitful pursuits. But others are free to disagree and to continue to, as I see it at least, cling to their errors if they want to.
What's interesting about problems such as these is that they can indeed be answered by common sense, and are done so in many cases, at least initially; but then philosophy comes along and induces puzzlement, and it then becomes a superficial problem which can persist unless one snaps out of it and realises what they already knew in the first place.
My view is that identity might be a linguistic/conceptual imposition, and not something that is to be simply reducible to having certain material characteristics. Common nouns like "planet" might work in the same sort of way as proper nouns like "Michael" – the only difference is that one is plural and the other is singular. There might be material facts that influence what sort of identities we impose on what sort of things, but the connection is merely contingent, not necessary.
So in saying "if everyone calls stoves 'planets' then stoves are planets" I'm not saying "if everyone calls stoves 'planets' then stoves are celestial bodies", just as in saying "if everyone calls you 'Hanover' then you are Hanover" I'm not saying "if everyone calls you 'Hanover' then you are a German city". It seems to me that the criticisms against my position have actually been against this misinterpretation (despite the fact that I've rejected such an interpretation multiple times).
This isn't really clear, especially with your hedging word "might" thrown in there. "Michael" is not descriptive, but it's just a random group of letters assigned to you as an identifier. "Planet" is a descriptive term, indicating that the item identified has certain qualities. It makes sense to say England is not a planet. It means that England lacks the characteristics of a planet. On the other hand, if you told me that you were Michael and I told you that I've spoken to you long enough to know you are not a Michael, you might be curious as to what I meant, as if there were something required in your personality or constitution to be a Michael.
You seem to want to avoid categorization of objects for some reason. If every object in a group has certain consistent characteristics, why can't I offer a single word (like "planet") to describe them? If later I figure out that I had miscatagorized a particular object, why would it be wrong to then remove it from that bucket?
Anyway, tell me why you want to go to such mental gymnastics here to avoid the straightforward position I've taken? Is there something deeper here I'm missing, as if you've got to go down your twisting road to avoid some other problem?
And Hanover isn't a German city. Hannover is. I missed the train in Hannover once. I just got on a different train that I didn't have a ticket for. I thought the Germans would care, but I explained to the train guy who looks at your ticket what happened, and he didn't care. They were weirdly flexible, very unGerman like. Maybe he stopped being "German" that day, sort of like Pluto stopped being a "planet" that other day.
I'm not saying you can't. I'm saying that it doesn't then follow that being a planet is reducible to these consistent characteristics. These consistent characteristics might simply be contingent influences on our decision to impose the planet-identity on these things.
Furthermore, there might not be any consistent characteristics. As Wittgenstein said "How should we explain to someone what a game is? If we don't have a common thread running through everything we call a 'game' it seems very chaotic! How on earth do we teach people to use this term 'game'?
I imagine that we should describe games to him, and we might add: "This and similar things are called 'games'".
Trying to describe being a game by listing some set of material characteristics is a mistaken endeavour. You have to address our use of the word "game".
That's the notion I'm questioning. It's problematic, as shown with the example of games, and also of planets (the point of this discussion).
There is something similar between the various objects. That is, objects A, B, and C all orbit the sun (for example). As such, we put A, B, and C in bucket X, and then we name bucket X "planet." If we realize that B doesn't orbit the sun, we remove it from bucket X. Quoting MichaelSure, but you're just pointing out the consequences of an equivocation fallacy. We today call bucket X "Planet" whereas tomorrow we call bucket Y "Planet" and so to say that B is Planet today doesn't mean it's a Planet tomorrow because we've now redefined "Planet." I see none of this as a problem as long as we remain consistent in our terms over time.
What I'm saying is that Pluto was never a planet as long as planet has been defined the same way over time. Of course, if we've changed our definition of planet, then we're not talking about the same thing at all, in which case our problem is lack of clarity and nothing else.Quoting MichaelThis is nonsense really. There may not be anything similar in the objects we call planets? Then why do I notice all these similarities?
I really am not concerned that I can't itemize with specificity what it means to be a boat, for example, as I truly have no problem whatsoever distinguishing boats from houseplants and the like. Quoting Michael
The problem doesn't appear to be in anything I've said, but it appears to be in what Wittgenstein said.
So you're saying that to be a planet is to belong in bucket X and I'm saying that to be a planet is to belong in whichever bucket we name "planet".
And my point is that being a planet is an identity that changes as our use of the word "planet" changes rather than an identity that's forever fixed to things in bucket X.
I'm not saying that nothing is similar in the objects we call "planets". I'm saying that it might be that there isn't anything that all things named by some common noun have in common. What is the thing that all (and only) games have in common (the thing that determines whether or not a thing is a game)?
I disagree. I think Wittgenstein was right. It's nonsense to look for some material characteristic that is the "essence" of being a game. All we can do is look to how we use the word "game". There is a family resemblance of material characteristics that influence our language-use, but being a game isn't reducible to these characteristics (such that if our use of the word "game" changed then being a game wouldn't change).
Your initial example did seem to treat Pluto as a question of it characteristics rather than our category. Pluto(1) was implied to be different than Pluto(2) in terms of the object of Pluto, even though the characteristic that resulted in Pluto's reclassification wasn't new.
I'd say there was only one Pluto (object) and then our categorising of Pluto(1) and our categorising of Pluto (2).
The Wittgenstein point is this disagreement is meaningless because we are using different languages. To say Pluto is a planet uses a different category or language than saying it's not. In a more general sense of "planet," Pluto does qualify. Under the more specific version defined recently, Pluto does not qualify. Both categories are truthful. All we can do squabble about is which language we ought to use. It doesn't affect Pluto or the meaning of Pluto either way. If we are arguing over it, all we are doing is trying to get people to use one language over another.
This really is just evasive and not even responsive. We must assume there is some object out there that we've identified as Pluto and there is another object we've identified as Neptune and so on. That these objects might behave similarly is a metaphysical fact. If we note this similarity and name it "Planet," then that's what it is and all objects that behave in that manner fall into that class. If we put hats into the planet bucket, we've not made hats planets, we've made them "planets."Quoting Michael
A planet is a thing in the sky. Pluto is "pluto" until we change the name.Quoting Michael
Ok, so if I have a blue lollipop and a blue chair, you're saying that they both might not be blue but that we've only named them both that way and when we rename them "green," they're no longer blue?
If no, please clarify. If yes, that's stupid.Quoting Michael
I don't think I've argued essentialism, and I don't think that any of what you say here affects my position. I agree there isn't some single component that can be identified that makes a chair a chair that could be sprinkled on a hat to make it a chair. There are likely a variety of things that make a chair a chair, some of which some chairs may have and some others don't. Perhaps it's a list of 100 criteria and if 40 are satisfied, it's a chair. Regardless, if the same chair criteria (or family resemblance or whatever) are satisfied at T-1 as at T-100, then it's still a chair. If we learn later that the object we were calling a chair at T-1 did not fit our criteria, it was not a chair at T-1.
Isn't that how language is meant to work? So it is the feature, not the bug.
A name is a symbol with no necessary connection to what it is meant to stand as a sign of. The word "pig" has no properties that are pig-like. So to call a pig "pig" is an arbitrary association.
But we then exploit that naming freedom in particular ways. Because we can thus give a name to anything at our whim, we can name those things that we believe are general, or are particular; that are fictional, or are real; that are contingent, or essential. Names can span the full gamut of possible ontic commitments by not being tied to any particular ontic commitments.
So the question of whether Pluto is a planet is understood as a language game with a particular ontic commitment. A planet is a real kind of object (or process) with nameable real properties - like being gravitationally spherical, and dominant in its orbit, big enough to clear a path of other contenders.
So yes, the act of naming is contingent in that clearly it we only bother to categorise the world in ways that reflect our epistemic interests. But then also, a major such interest is a comittment to ontic realism. We like to be able to classify the world into types of objects, and talk about the necessary qualities of these types, and the particularly significant instances of these types.
We develop a way of talking about reality that seems to get its reality right.
So while it can always be pointed out that names are arbitrary sounds coming out of our mouths, it is also the case that we are using this naming freedom to make a stronger ontic claim than it would otherwise be possible to make.
To call Pluto a planet is to assert it is a real object of that class, and so not some other class, like a moon, or an asteroid, or a planet-let. And in being real, that classification is open to being changed by empirical evidence. We can give names to a planet's essential qualities in terms of acts of measurement we might perform. It's all part of realism's particular language game.
So language organises naive experience into a structured place of ontic commitments. We can really develop a belief in real things because we also now know what it would be for them not to be real, but instead classified as fictions, ideas, faulty information, etc.
And that's one reason semantic holism is attractive. Is that how you look at meaning?
This seems to speak to the distinction I wanted to make earlier between identity and identification. Being a planet does not seem to consist in any ontological identity as your and jamalrob's "Fool" would seem to be thinking. It's really not a case of being a planet at all, but of being identified and designated as a planet. So Pluto can be thought to be a planet according to one set of criteria and not to be a planet according to a different set. Pluto's identity does not consist in its being a planet, though, but in its status as a unique entity; because we cannot suddenly, by any reasonable criteria, decide that it is no longer an entity, whatever we might think it is or is not otherwise.