Spin-off of Vegan Argument
***This argument is out-dated. Please limit your responses to the most up-to-date version found here***
This thread is to address the content of an argument I posted elsewhere. As mentioned in the progenitor thread, this argument is a simplified version of an argument, but I thought it might be an interesting launching pad for discussion to see if it leads to the same places my more complex argument takes. The argument is as follows (with revision prompted by Postmodern Beatnik):
P1 If any gratuitous suffering is preventable and known , it is wrong to allow said gratuitous suffering.
P2 If some nonhuman animals are sentient and food production practices would constitute gratuitous suffering in humans, then food production practices constitute gratuitous suffering in some nonhuman animals.*
P3 Some nonhuman animals are sentient.
P4 Food production practices would constitute gratuitous suffering in humans.
C1 Food production practices constitute gratuitous suffering in some nonhuman animals. (from P2, P3 and P4)
P5 If food production practices constitute gratuitous suffering in some nonhuman animals, we know of some gratuitous suffering.
C2 We know of some gratuitous suffering. (from C1 and P5)
P6 Gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet.*
P7 If it is possible to adopt a vegan diet, gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable. (elimination from P6)
P8 It is possible to adopt a vegan diet.
C3 Gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable. (from P6, P7 and P8)
C4 It is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices. (from P1, C2 and C3)
P9 If it is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices, and gratuitous suffering caused by food productions practices is preventable if and only if a vegan diet is adopted, then a vegan diet ought to be adopted.
C5 A vegan diet ought to be adopted. (from P6, C4 and P9)
I will now address comments in the other thread directed to the content of the argument. I am arranging it backwards to the chronology (i.e., oldest comment at the bottom).
Quoting Bitter Crank
I chose gratuitous suffering as the moral premise because I considered it to be (relatively) uncontroversial that permitting gratuitous suffering when one is able to prevent it is regarded as immoral. The argument is not to eliminate all suffering but rather just not be the author of gratuitous suffering by our (preventable) food production practices.
Quoting Postmodern Beatnik
This is problematic but I would make a semantic distinction and a risk-averse assumption. The semantic distinction is this: veganism can be defined as the practice of not using sentient animals in our food production. Non-sentient, non-human animals aren't contained in the argument. But the risk-averse assumption would say we are poor at discerning sentience in other animals, so for risk-aversion, we can assume all animals used in food production are sentient. I would say the knowledge of some is sufficient to error on the side of caution with all.
Quoting Michael
This rebuttal is addressed by P2 wherein the measure of gratuitous suffering is whether it would be considered gratuitous in humans. In that light, imagine humans in place of the animals in your proposal: free range humans followed by a swift killing would not constitute gratuitous suffering. It's not clear to me that a swift killing or the free range aspect makes the suffering any less gratuitous. The human/animal suffers less in a quantitative measure by being free range, but the swift killing undermines the quantitative reduction by the qualitative gratuity of killing them. We would object to that treatment as being extraordinarily cruel (to family and friends as well the interests of the human) to kill a human in that way.
This thread is to address the content of an argument I posted elsewhere. As mentioned in the progenitor thread, this argument is a simplified version of an argument, but I thought it might be an interesting launching pad for discussion to see if it leads to the same places my more complex argument takes. The argument is as follows (with revision prompted by Postmodern Beatnik):
P1 If any gratuitous suffering is preventable and known , it is wrong to allow said gratuitous suffering.
P2 If some nonhuman animals are sentient and food production practices would constitute gratuitous suffering in humans, then food production practices constitute gratuitous suffering in some nonhuman animals.*
P3 Some nonhuman animals are sentient.
P4 Food production practices would constitute gratuitous suffering in humans.
C1 Food production practices constitute gratuitous suffering in some nonhuman animals. (from P2, P3 and P4)
P5 If food production practices constitute gratuitous suffering in some nonhuman animals, we know of some gratuitous suffering.
C2 We know of some gratuitous suffering. (from C1 and P5)
P6 Gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet.*
P7 If it is possible to adopt a vegan diet, gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable. (elimination from P6)
P8 It is possible to adopt a vegan diet.
C3 Gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable. (from P6, P7 and P8)
C4 It is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices. (from P1, C2 and C3)
P9 If it is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices, and gratuitous suffering caused by food productions practices is preventable if and only if a vegan diet is adopted, then a vegan diet ought to be adopted.
C5 A vegan diet ought to be adopted. (from P6, C4 and P9)
I will now address comments in the other thread directed to the content of the argument. I am arranging it backwards to the chronology (i.e., oldest comment at the bottom).
Quoting Bitter Crank
If suffering is inherent in all compounded beings, you can't devise a plan to eliminate suffering.
Perhaps you could take an approach which is based on preserving a diversity of animals rather than preventing animal suffering but would still conclude with veganism. You can arrange it in P/C form, but...
I chose gratuitous suffering as the moral premise because I considered it to be (relatively) uncontroversial that permitting gratuitous suffering when one is able to prevent it is regarded as immoral. The argument is not to eliminate all suffering but rather just not be the author of gratuitous suffering by our (preventable) food production practices.
Quoting Postmodern Beatnik
If you are trying to patch up this argument, you're going to have to address the slide from "some non-human animals" to "all non-human animals" that is implicit in adopting veganism.
This is problematic but I would make a semantic distinction and a risk-averse assumption. The semantic distinction is this: veganism can be defined as the practice of not using sentient animals in our food production. Non-sentient, non-human animals aren't contained in the argument. But the risk-averse assumption would say we are poor at discerning sentience in other animals, so for risk-aversion, we can assume all animals used in food production are sentient. I would say the knowledge of some is sufficient to error on the side of caution with all.
Quoting Michael
I take issue with this. I don't think free range husbandry followed by the swift killing of animals would constitute gratuitous suffering. Therefore any gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable by changing those food production practices to free range husbandry followed by the swift killing of animals – which is consistent with a meat-eating diet.
This rebuttal is addressed by P2 wherein the measure of gratuitous suffering is whether it would be considered gratuitous in humans. In that light, imagine humans in place of the animals in your proposal: free range humans followed by a swift killing would not constitute gratuitous suffering. It's not clear to me that a swift killing or the free range aspect makes the suffering any less gratuitous. The human/animal suffers less in a quantitative measure by being free range, but the swift killing undermines the quantitative reduction by the qualitative gratuity of killing them. We would object to that treatment as being extraordinarily cruel (to family and friends as well the interests of the human) to kill a human in that way.
Comments (116)
What exactly counts as gratuitous suffering? I'd have thought gratuitous suffering is to be understood as strong and not short term physical or psychological pain. I don't think free range living and a swift death meets this criteria.
Gratuitous suffering is any suffering that is not justified, whether it is unjustified by quantity (i.e., is of excessive intensity) or quality (i.e., is inflicted for no purpose or unnecessarily). Suffering that is inflicted as an unavoidable consequence of a necessary action is not gratuitous since it is not preventable. This definition alters the argument in this way:
Definition: If suffering is known and preventable, then said suffering is gratuitous (i.e., unjustified and wrong).
The antecedent condition of P1 follows from this definition.
What counts as a necessary action? Is me turning down a girl necessary? If not then, according to your definition, I would be inflicting her with gratuitous suffering and so I ought to accept her proposal (despite my desire not to).
What about adult insects? It is thought that insects have neither the complexity nor the organization of an animal nervous system to experience suffering, gratuitous or otherwise. Suppose we eat adult insects?
How about brainless sea cucumbers? Oysters? clams? Neither of these have CNS.
Eggs? Milk?
I ask because I am wondering whether strict veganism is the goal of your argument. Global warming is causing and will cause far more gratuitous suffering to all animals, whether they are eaten or not, than carnivory.
Quoting Soylent
What about the trolley problem? Surely allowing the trolley to kill five people would result in gratuitously more suffering than if you flipped the switch and killed one person. And yet many people, including myself, would find this immoral.
There's room for some flexibility from this argument. A condition of the moral claim is epistemic (i.e., known suffering) and if there is sufficient understanding to be confident that killing an animal does not produce suffering (I.e., no CSN) than it would not fall under the obligation of this argument. If eggs and milk come from a sentient non-human animal and using eggs and milk taken from humans would constitute gratuitous suffering in humans, it constitutes gratuitous suffering in non-human animals. I used veganism because I considered it a broad obligation supported by this argument. A narrowing of the obligation requires a justification in itself, and I considered that any narrowing was arbitrary. I could be wrong, but that remains to be seen.
In terms of the environmental argument, it could be another way to come about this issue, and certainly bolster the cause, but I would worry the prevention premise (i.e., gratuitous suffering caused by global warming can be prevented if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet) is defeated by a reduction proposal (i.e., if we restrict eating meat and greatly reduce food production practices using animals as food, gratuitous suffering caused by global warming can be prevented.)
Do you find it immoral for good reason or by appeal to emotion? Maybe you just need to align your emotions with the moral requirement. For instance, it could be that it's a no-win situation and you can assuage some guilt by justifying inaction rather than action.
Quoting SoylentIf the risk-averse assumption goes through, then we might not need the semantic distinction. You could argue that veganism (standard definition) is entailed by the main argument (which covers all sentient animals) plus the risk-averse assumption (which extends the argument to all animals, just as the "standard" vegan wants).
However, I do not think that the risk-averse assumption goes through. Even if the border between sentient and non-sentient animals is blurry, it does not follow that we cannot rule out certain species. Dogs, cats, cows, and dolphins are all sentient. Lobsters? I don't know. But there are all sorts of insects that I am quite confident do not have sentience in the relevant sense, and I have no reason to think that I'm just bad at discerning their sentience (not least because my confidence is based on the fact that they lack the requisite physiological structures).
Quoting SoylentThe trouble here is that humans have different capacities for suffering than animals. So it does not easily follow that an act which would cause gratuitous suffering in humans would also cause gratuitous suffering in non-human animals. Not all animals get attached to particular toys, for instance. Yet a young child may be terribly upset if you take away a toy and replace it with a different one (even a newer version of the old one).
Quoting SoylentYou're going to need at least one more clause here. When my father goes to the dentist for a root canal, it is known that he will suffer from it. That particular suffering is also preventable (he could opt out of the root canal). Yet we do not consider the suffering gratuitous. One reason is that we take it to be known that the root canal will prevent even worse suffering.
You might think your existing premises already cover that case (if the known and preventable suffering from the root canal is less than the known and preventable suffering of the dental problem, then the latter negates the putative gratuitousness of the former). But what about elective surgeries? Or how about dangerous hobbies? Is the suffering these things bring justified by the pleasure we hope to receive from them or by our choosing them?
I also worry that the plausibility of the premise rests on the general assumption that gratuitous suffering is excessive in some way (whether quantitatively or qualitatively). If one allows a chicken to live a decent life (for a chicken) and then kills it as quickly and humanely as possible, there is very little loss associated with the chicken's death (not least because of its limited capacity to formulate desires). Principles that ask us to minimize suffering without eliminating it (which, as @BitterCrank notes, is impossible) always have problems with figuring out what counts as minimizing—particularly if we have to balance it with whatever suffering humans are made to endure by not having access to certain food items.
I don't think it would go through either, at least not as rigorously as I would like. There will always be the hard-line skeptics that will demand proof rather than accept a principle on an assumption. The argument relies on a risk-averse assumption of some sort, whether the strong one I claimed earlier or a weaker version introduced to account for BitterCrank and your own objections.
Quoting Postmodern Beatnik
This is precisely what the risk-averse assumption aims to overcome. The assumption is that humans are not biologically special to a degree and that if the capacity for sentience is present in non-human animals, that faculty is also minimally necessary and sufficient for gratuitous suffering of a higher order. If we want to single out humans as special we need a strong claim why they are, without relying solely on introspection. The argument makes room for discovery to add or remove animals as needed, but during our state of ignorance, as it were, we can use the assumption as a guide for ethical treatment.
Quoting Postmodern Beatnik
I think part of your objection is covered by my reasonable cost condition not yet mentioned here.
The reasonable cost condition states:
If any gratuitous suffering is preventable, known and the cost to prevent it is reasonable, then it is wrong to allow said gratuitous suffering.
One does not have an obligation to prevent gratuitous suffering if the cost of prevention is an onerous burden on the agent (e.g., risk one's life to save another). The reasonable cost condition is vague, but as a minimum I kept it as obligations of omission rather than commission. We have obligations to prevent gratuitous suffering in a limited sense, if the prevention requires only that we abstain from actions that cause gratuitous suffering and not perform actions that alleviate or eliminate gratuitous suffering. Obviously, if we abstain from some action then we must choose another to take its place, but we have no specific obligation for the replacement action or any other further actions.
One might choose to inflict or risk gratuitous suffering on oneself (e.g., elective surgeries), if the prevention is considered to be an unreasonable cost (e.g., further harm, either psychological or physical).
I promised to address the issue of the ambiguous subject (i.e., adopted by whom, an individual or collectively as a society) as mentioned in the parallel thread. Upon reflection, this is a much more substantial objection than I previously considered, in particular because several of my premises adopt the plural pronoun "we". The inclusion of "we" negates the ambiguity and the truth of the conclusions as entailments rely on subject consistency throughout. I am forced, as it were, to come down on one side or the other in terms of the subject.
I am inclined towards the individual obligation contingent on the conditions of the moral obligation (i.e., known, preventable, and a reasonable cost). It doesn't make much sense to me to say, "we know" because "we" is an undefined group and not necessarily a homogeneous group with shared knowledge or beliefs. Some people know, and others don't. The obligation only applies to the class of people that satisfy the conditions of the moral obligation.
[reply=shmik;5284], I believe, objected that the prevention condition is more robust as a collective obligation, which is true, but comes at the cost of weakening the knowledge condition and the new reasonable cost condition. For the argument to go through, the prevention condition only has to be maintained in even a weak form (although this might make the argument less persuasive as a behaviour modifying argument).
The P6 premise relies on whether gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet (in the individual). That is a dubious claim. Two objections come to mind: i) the individual obligation is ineffective at preventing gratuitous suffering and ii) the collective obligation is effective at preventing gratuitous suffering. If either is true, the biconditional is defeated. A charitable reading can grant that i) is false, the individual obligation can prevent gratuitous suffering, but the denial of ii) may require asserting the truth of i). If the collective obligation is ineffective at preventing gratuitous suffering, it is not clear how the individual obligation could possibly hope to be effective. On the surface this commits a division fallacy, but I'm not sure it is an error in reasoning in this case. Any thoughts? Am I missing something?
Quoting SoylentI realize that, but I don't think that either version succeeds in doing so even if we accept it. What the risk-averse assumption tells us is that non-human animals are sentient. But even if sentience is a necessary condition for experiencing any form of suffering, it is not a sufficient condition for experiencing all forms of suffering. Sentience makes certain kinds of suffering possible, but other kinds of suffering require additional cognitive functions. Mere sentience, for instance, does not bring with it the ability to have long-term expectations or the risk of harm that comes from having such expectations dashed. So even if I were to accept that all non-human animals were sentient, it would not follow that they were all capable of suffering in the exact same way as humans. But if not everything that constitutes suffering in humans constitutes suffering in non-human animals, then the direct correspondence between human and non-human animal suffering has been broken. Therefore, we cannot assume that everything that constitutes gratuitous suffering in humans constitutes gratuitous suffering in non-human animals.
Furthermore, there seem to be clear counterexamples to the claim that everything that constitutes gratuitous suffering in humans constitutes gratuitous suffering in non-human animals. Here's a stupid one: watching someone being tortured. Not all non-human animals have the empathic capacity for this to cause suffering. But most humans do. Therefore, watching someone being tortured would constitute suffering in humans, but it would not constitute suffering (and thus could not constitute gratuitous suffering) in certain non-human animals. Here's a less stupid example: miscarriage. Not all non-human animals have the capacity to understand what pregnancy is or to have hopes and expectations about child rearing. But a human can learn about pregnancy, get pregnant on purpose, prepare their home for a child, and dream about their own future as a parent and the child's future as it grows into an adult. A human can also experience incredible heartbreak at the loss of a pregnancy and the subsequent loss of those hopes and expectations. Humans can even experience this sense of loss if they find out that they weren't actually pregnant—or that they are not capable of becoming pregnant.
So not only can we not assume that everything that constitutes gratuitous suffering in humans constitutes gratuitous suffering in non-human animals, we have good reason to reject it. But I also worry that your own examples might not work even if we accept the principle. For example, you mentioned egg harvesting. Yet it is not clear to me that sifting through the menstrual discharge of human women and extracting unfertilized eggs from it would cause them gratuitous suffering. Yet this is precisely what we are doing when we collect chicken eggs for food. So long as the chickens are given proper food, proper amounts of space, and anything else necessary for a decent life, it's unclear why harvesting unfertilized eggs discharged through a natural process constitutes any sort of harm at all.
Quoting SoylentThis seems implausible, especially once the reasonable cost condition is in place (which I agree is helpful, particularly against the specific case I brought up previously). If gratuitous suffering is such a problem, and if it costs me very little to perform some action that would alleviate, eliminate, or reduce some gratuitous suffering, why am I not obligated to do so?
Quoting SoylentIs this the only condition on which we can inflict or risk gratuitous suffering on ourselves? And if so, I wonder how wide a gap this creates. Is freedom too high a cost to pay for not being able to get elective surgeries? Let's say we were trying to convince someone to wait until they were 21 to get a full body tattoo despite 18 being the age at which people are generally considered adults (and thus capable of making their own decisions on matters like these). Tattooing isn't exactly pleasant, particularly a full body tattoo. This is a known risk of getting a tattoo (so there's some known suffering involved). Not getting the tattoo spares them from a certain amount of physical harm for a short period of time (so the known suffering is preventable), and the psychological harm is arguably minimal given the fact that they only have to wait three extra years to get the tattoo (so the cost to prevent the harm is reasonable). Should the 18-year-old wait? Is it obligatory that they do so? Should they wait longer?
Your response it excellent, thorough, and probably too much to overcome. You've done a very good job of undermining the knowledge claim of gratuitous suffering, on which this particular argument hangs together. I was intrigued to construct this argument by a throw-away line in forgettable article that made precisely that claim. I have no particular interest to defend this argument beyond what I feel is intellectually honest, but I will address some comments for which I feel I can offer a response.
Quoting Postmodern Beatnik
A case could be made that there are obligations for action to be taken to alleviate, eliminate, or reduce some gratuitous suffering, but abilities to perform actions vary from person to person and the strongest obligation is one where no special skill or ability is required. I am disabled, so if an obligation for action falls outside my scope of ability I am not obliged to act on it (i.e., ought implies can). When I construct an argument for an obligation I want to cast the widest net possible, which means reducing the number of people falling outside the scope of ability. It's not that there may not be further obligations for people to act, but at the basic level I want to focus on the most general obligation applicable to the most/all people.
Quoting Postmodern Beatnik
I'm inclined to say yes, but the nature of this condition is very fuzzy and problematic. It leaves room for the individual to risk harming oneself with the justification that the prevention cost was unreasonable only later to decide that they were wrong about the cost or the harm. That's the nature of life. In order to know the balance of the costs, one needs experience or the appropriate moral leaders that can offer insight.
Hey Soylent, much of the posts in the other thread are taken up with the point that P6 must be speaking about the result of individual action rather than collective action for the argument to work. It needs to mean that each individuals (from the set of people who can go vegan) adoption of veganism has an affect on the gratuitous suffering. I'm pretty certain both me and Postmodern Beatnik agree on that but it seems that we misunderstand each other often enough that I can't be sure.
Quoting Soylent
When written like this, which is the way P6 is written (ii) is not a problem. As long as each persons adoption of veganism is effective at preventing suffering the biconditional holds (here the collective can be viewed as a group of individuals).
Quoting Soylent If you go by this then I think this 'issue' with P6 is solved.
I don't really understand what that has to do with a charitable reading though. I view P6 as stating a fact about the world which can either be true or false. I believe it is false because the biconditional is too strong. That said there are ways to fix it up, I've mentioned one using statistics. Another could be to hold that an individual has an obligation even if he doesn't know whether his specific actions will have an effect. Either of these allow you to replace the biconditional with something weaker and still get an obligation as your conclusion.
I'm not sure I understand what you mean by "too strong". It's strong insofar as it establishes a one-to-one relationship between the means and ends of an action. If another action can be substituted for the adoption of veganism by the individual, the bi-conditional is defeated since it explicitly states the only means for preventing gratuitous suffering is the adoption of veganism by the individual (hence objection ii). Statistics and individual knowledge of the outcome is irrelevant to the scope of this argument. The individual doesn't need to know the specific mechanism or the statistical outcome of the adoption of veganism, only that there is a causal chain (albeit weak) between the adoption of a vegan diet in the individual and the prevention of gratuitous suffering, which is not that outlandish.
There is grounds for P6 that holds regardless of the ambiguity of subject (i.e., adoption of veganism by the individual or collectively). The only way to prevent the gratuitous suffering of the intentional killing non-human animals caused by food production practices is to refrain (directly or indirectly) in the intentional killing of non-human animals (i.e., adopting a vegan diet) The obligation to prevent that specific gratuitous suffering cannot be achieved in any other way, even by improved treatment prior to the killing. I picked a vegan diet because I thought the broader argument was more defensible than a narrowing to vegetarianism.
Quoting SoylentRight. This is the point to focus on. You let me push you into a corner before by saying that we don't have certain obligations, but you had no need to make that concession. All you needed to say was "regardless of whatever other obligations we may have, we have this obligation of omission" (which is where you have now landed). After all, the argument loses nothing by remaining silent about what other obligations we may have.
Quoting SoylentAgain, I think this is the correct response (strategically, at least). You didn't answer the tattooing question directly, but I take it from your response that you think the concern about freedom is covered by the "unreasonable cost (due to psychological harm)" clause. Is this correct?
Quoting shmikOr at least, you misunderstand me enough that you can't be sure. But in this case, you are correct that we are in agreement here.
Too say that some people have an effect is a weaker claim that all people have an effect.
Quoting shmikP6 isn't about gratuitous suffering simpliciter, though. It's about gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices. Letting the cows out one afternoon doesn't stop them from being slaughtered and processed for food. And while it may give them some pleasure, it doesn't prevent their eventual suffering. This is particularly important given that the argument is concerned with eliminating our contribution to the gratuitous suffering of non-human animals caused by food production practices (and not just reducing it). Just finding another way to reduce the suffering doesn't affect the claim that one might have to adopt a vegan diet to eliminate one's contribution to the suffering.
Moreover, the argument seems to be concerned with getting individuals to refrain from personally contributing to the gratuitous suffering of non-human animals. In that case, P6 should be understood as saying something like "if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet, then (your contribution to) gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable; and if it is not possible to adopt a vegan diet, then (your contribution to) gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is not preventable." This might be glossed as "you can't prevent your contribution to gratuitous suffering without adopting a vegan diet."
I agree that this is false. If a non-human animal can be given a decent life and a humane death, I think it becomes much harder to argue that its suffering is gratuitous (though this would get us into issues with the definition of gratuitous suffering on offer). But nothing about the biconditional requires veganism to eliminate one's contribution to gratuitous suffering of non-human animals on its own—which makes sense as it would be rather odd if the argument allowed one to work as a butcher so long as their diet was vegan. (Indeed, this is one reason that veganism is traditionally defined as going beyond diet alone.)
I'm not unsympathetic to the point about changing our farming practices. I've already stated that I think everything that counts as gratuitous can be separated from the fact of an animal's eventual slaughter. I've also stated that I think P6 is false. I just don't think you've hit on the reason that it's false. You're still worried about the logic of it and missing the fact that the premise doesn't say that adopting a vegan diet is the only way to reduce your contribution to the gratuitous suffering of non-human animals caused by food production practices.
Nothing in P6 says there is no other way to reduce the gratuitous suffering of non-human animals caused by food production practices or even your contribution to it. All it requires is that one's contribution cannot be fully eliminated without adopting a vegan diet. Again, I think this is false. But it's not false due to the ability of the farmer to let his cows out from time to time.
This is pretty weird, trying to separate your contribution from the farming practices. So I am buying my meat from a local farm that uses factory farming practices. I contribute to demand from this farm which causes animals gratuitous suffering. The farm then decides to go organic and try to create an environment without gratuitous suffering, meanwhile I continue to buy meat from it. Are you arguing that at first I had a contribution, then that contribution disappeared, but also that it was not my contribution it was the farmers? Doesn't really add up. Your contribution is contributing demand in a farm that causes gratuitous suffering. You can't detach the personal contribution from the practices of the supplier.
If you argue that letting a couple cows out one evening isn't part of farming practices, just the farmers whim, then you are going after the example, not my main point.
So there are numerous ways to read P6 (again, because it was created in such a vague way). You here are presenting a reading that all of the personal contribution is preventable iif a vegan diet is adopted. I was interpreting it as some of the personal contribution is preventable iff a vegan diet is adopted.
Again there is a trade off between these two positions. If you read it as all then P6 will be false for any person that has a non vegan practice which does not contribute to gratuitous suffering. The example I gave earlier was of a person who dumpster dived all their meat, this is relevant if P6 means some. If you read P6 as all then it is enough for someone to dumpster dive only 10% of thier meat and it will still be false when talking about them as they only needs to reduce the other 90% (the practices that contribute to suffering) for their entire contribution to be preventable.
But yeh I don't disagree that if you read it as all then its not a problem if some of the contribution is preventable without her going vegan.
Quoting shmikNo.
Quoting shmikOf course I am going after the example. The example was your evidence, so the point doesn't stand if the evidence for it isn't any good. But that doesn't mean I think letting the cows out isn't part of farming practices. The point is that there is a difference between the farmer letting the cows out because we convince him to and the farmer letting the cows out because he does so on a whim. If he does so on a whim, then our actions didn't cause it. That seems pretty straightforwardly true. Therefore, unless the example is modified to make it such that our actions are leading to the cows being let out, it seems strange to attribute to us any reduction in their suffering that letting them out causes.
Quoting shmikIf you're not concerned with reading it correctly, then yes.
Quoting shmikNo, I am not. In fact, I am saying that we should understand P6 as claiming that so long as we have not adopted a vegan diet, some of our preventable contribution to the gratuitous suffering of non-human animals caused by food production practices remains. Such a reading leaves open the possibility that there are other ways of reducing the gratuitous suffering of non-human animals caused by food production practices and that we may have other duties regarding the gratuitous suffering of non-human animals caused by food production practices. It is a minimal strategy: whatever our other duties may be, we are at least obligated to adopt a vegan diet.
What does cruelty have to do with it? The issue was that it caused gratuitous suffering. So you'd need to show that animals suffered gratuitously by being swiftly killed. Furthermore, I think the comparison with humans fails as it seems unlikely that the friends and families of the to-be-killed animal would suffer.
How many vegan diets would need to be adopted to make food production practices preventable? Just one? If more than one then my obligation to adopt a vegan diet is dependent on others adopting a vegan diet as my obligation to adopt a vegan diet is dependent on it making gratuitous suffering preventable, and my adoption of a vegan diet making gratuitous suffering preventable is dependent on others adopting a vegan diet.
Um, no it's not. It's a rhetorical device whereby the example given is very weak to show that the conditions for the claim being false are easily satisfied. It's the same as saying, 'even Brian could work out what I meant in that example'. A charitable reading would not argue that the example is false but rather look at what the argument is implying.Quoting Postmodern Beatnik
But this isn't a charitable way of reading the argument, it is false if I have any non vegan practices which don't contribute to gratuitous suffering caused by food production. I wrote this exact thing in the post above. For example dumpster diving some of my food, eating at a party; eating the leftovers that my housemate is about to throw out; eating some chocolate you find on the street; having a sip of your friends hot chocolate; chances are that buying meat from a supermarket doesn't have an effect either etc. (think of your own example if you think those are problematic). If I cut out everything but these behaviors then I am not vegan and none of my preventable contribution remains.
Quoting shmikYeah, that's called "evidence."
Quoting shmikI was doing both at the same time, whether you realize it or not.
Quoting shmikFirst of all, charity does not require us to interpret a claim in a way that makes it true at all costs. Second, you don't actually mean if you have any non-vegan practices. I sleep every night, and my sleeping at night does not contribute to gratuitous suffering caused by food production. But that clearly does not disprove (or in any way undermine) the claim. What you mean is something like "non-vegan food consumption practices."
Now, I agree that the pro-vegan is committed to either making an exception here or forwarding the (rather implausible) claim that these behaviors somehow contribute to the gratuitous suffering of non-human animals. But note that Soylent has already opted for the former strategy in dealing with other problems. In the OP, he makes what he calls a "semantic distinction." According to this, veganism is to be defined as "the practice of not using sentient animals in our food production." He introduced the distinction to avoid an objection I made regarding non-sentient animals, but presumably he could use it (with minor adjustments) against these cases as well. If the argument is not committed to "standard" veganism, then it might have room in its definition of "veganism" for these odd cases.
Nor is this unprecedented: Singer's vegetarianism allows for eating cows that get struck by lightning, for instance. Cora Diamond takes him to task for this, but the dispute ultimately comes down to whether vegetarianism is aimed at an external goal (e.g., reducing suffering) or an internal goal (e.g., improving one's character). The same could dispute could be replayed among vegans, and the content of Soylent's argument strongly suggests that he would take the Singer route.
(So again, @Soylent, what do you have to say here? If you won't carve out an exception for these cases, then it would seem that shmik's objection does, at last, succeed.)
Well I was speaking to Soylent who asked me to explain what I meant by too strong, so it makes sense to give a weak example. [quote=me]Well could you think of another possible way that some gratuitous suffering could be prevented? I could name many that would even have a closer relationship to the suffering of animals. A farmer letting two of his cows out into a field one afternoon, even though he normally doesn't do so, is enough to defeat the bi conditional. That's what I mean by too strong, it argues that the are no other ways to prevent any of the animals gratuitous suffering.[/quote]
Of coarse I didn't expect anyone to interpret me as saying that if a farmer letting 2 of his cows out into the field on one occasion doesn't reduce their suffering during the food production process, then my argument falls apart. It makes no sense to interpret it that way. Quoting Postmodern BeatnikOf course not, actually I think most the claims to charity in this thread are garbage, if an argument has 2 interpretations both of which are problematic (in much the same ways) then neither of them is considered the charitable one.
Quoting Postmodern BeatnikNow this is covered by the principal of charity, it's not even worth bringing up. Anyway I didn't realize that vegans don't sleep, that sleeping was a non-vegan practice.
So now that we have dispensed with the obligatory sparring, you agree that my point needs to be addressed in the context of this argument, good.
Quoting shmikNo one has interpreted it that way. If you think so, then you are thoroughly confused.
Quoting shmikWell, all of the claims about charity on this thread have been made by you and Soylent, with most of them made by you. So if you want to dismiss them as garbage, I won't object.
Quoting shmikEquivocation. Calling something a non-vegan practice is not the same as saying vegans don't do it. It is to say that it is not part of or entailed by the veganism.
Quoting shmikI'm not sparring. Perhaps you are. The fact that anyone had the gall to disagree with you on the other thread clearly set you off for some reason, and you've been trying to score points rather than make productive contributions ever since. But all I've been trying to do is get your objection expressed in a way that was both sensible and clear. We've finally achieved that, so I'm satisfied.
Quoting shmikWell, of course I do. Once deciphered, they're similar to the points I made a month ago. Again, this was never about disagreeing with you. This was about the clarification process that is central to philosophy. What you are saying now is much different in form and expressed content than what you started with, even if it reflects what you were trying to get at all along. And given your incessant claim that Soylent's argument wasn't clear enough, it seems odd to exempt yourself from the same sort of demands. Surely that is not your intention, in which case there should be nothing wrong with me trying to get clear on what exactly it is you are trying to say.
Quoting Postmodern BeatnikFine replace it with debeaking, I don't care, it doesn't effect the argument at all. Is it really relevant whether letting a couple cows out in the afternoon is considered a personal practice or a farming practice?
Maybe you see this as clarification, to me it comes off petty and irrelevant. There are productive ways of clarifying arguments and unproductive ways. If your going to write most a paragraph explaining how I was incorrect by not placing the words 'food consumption' in between the words 'non-vegan practices', when the actual point was entirely clear to you, well...
Maybe we will have better luck in another thread.
And yes, much of this particular thread felt like sparring.
Edit: Btw, in the other thread you pretty much didn't disagree with me at all.
I would respond in much the same way that Postmodern Beatnik has, insofar as this argument is limited to a particular type of gratuitous suffering that can only be remedied by abstaining from the behaviour that necessitates the eventual slaughter of nonhuman animals. If the intentional killing itself can be regarded as gratuitous suffering, then no matter what steps have been taken to reduce suffering prior to the slaughter, the obligation to prevent gratuitous suffering will be left unfulfilled. Indeed, some of the gratuitous suffering can be prevented through better treatment prior to slaughter, but if slaughter is gratuitous suffering then one will have assess the means by which the gratuitous suffering of the slaughter can be prevented, if at all.
There is room to doubt that the intentional killing of nonhuman animals constitutes gratuitous suffering. The knowledge claim aims to address that doubt; specifically: If some nonhuman animals are sentient and food production practices would constitute gratuitous suffering in humans, then food production practices constitute gratuitous suffering in some nonhuman animals.
This establishes the metric by which we can judge gratuitous suffering in nonhuman animals and is bolstered (or ignored as the case may be) by a risk-averse assumption. We don't know what is going on in the minds of animals, but it's possible that sentience is a necessary and sufficient condition for the capacity to experience gratuitous suffering. If the moral obligation holds (i.e., If any gratuitous suffering is preventable, known and the cost to prevent said gratuitous suffering is reasonable, then it is wrong to allow said gratuitous suffering) then the next step in ascertaining moral obligation is to identify where the conditions are satisfied.
Knowledge: Is there any reason to think that food production practices are capable of producing gratuitous suffering? Well if it would constitute gratuitous suffering in humans, then it is possible that the practices constitute gratuitous suffering in nonhuman animals and by the risk-aversion principle we say that it does constitute gratuitous suffering in nonhuman animals.
Quoting Michael
This comment is out of place because a built-in condition of the argument is to consider what would be gratuitous suffering in humans. That comparison is[/I] the basis for the knowledge claim, and part of the gratuitous suffering of intentional killing is the suffering felt by the animals that have relationships with the slaughtered animal (and they do have relationships). If the cruelty of the intentional killing is [i]part of the judgement of why it would constitute gratuitous suffering in humans, then that same judgement applies in some degree to nonhuman animals (with the proviso that the nonhuman animal has a minimal physiological and neurological capacity for said suffering). The appeasement of our moral conscience by claiming it "unlikely" is too weak to ignore a serious moral obligation. I would take the risk-averse assumption over the "unlikely" assumption in case it turns out we reached too far with the obligation and aimed to eliminate suffering that wasn't present rather than not reach far enough and continue to cause preventable gratuitous suffering because of limited understanding or wishful thinking.
Reasonable cost: I have limited the cost to be acts of omission rather than acts of commission as previously stated. I feel that's a fairly reasonable cost.
Prevention: The gratuitous suffering of food production practices includes but is not limited to the intentional killing of nonhuman animals (see knowledge). The prevention must aim at all gratuitous suffering and may require multiple obligations, As it turns out, the argument states that gratuitous suffering can be prevented by a single (in)action: gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet. Other actions can reduce gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices but only one is capable in itself of preventing the gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices.
And I question your claim that what would cause gratuitous suffering in humans would cause gratuitous suffering in non-human animals.
A human doesn't suffer simply because their relative or friend has been killed. They suffer if they're of the understanding that their relative or friend has been killed. So even if we were to grant that what would cause gratuitous suffering in humans would cause gratuitous suffering in non-human animals, for the comparison to work it must be the case that the animal is of the understanding that their relative or friend has been killed. So one must show that a) an animal is capable of such an understanding and that b) the animal has such an understanding. The second can be avoided simply by ensuring that the slaughter happens out of sight and hearing of other animals (and so the first wouldn't be relevant, even if true).
As I've said before, this is unclear. Consider, "the boulder is movable if and only if it is possible to remove the obstacle". Let's assume that it is wrong to allow the boulder to remain unmovable. Does it then follow that everyone who can remove the obstacle must remove the obstacle? What if the strength of one is sufficient? Surely once that one person has removed the obstacle then no other person is obligated to remove the obstacle? Or what if the strength of everyone is necessary? But if one person refuses to help remove the obstacle then are the others obligated to try to remove it alone, despite the fact that it's a futile gesture?
If you want as a premise "for any person, if that person can prevent gratuitous suffering then that person ought prevent gratuitous suffering", and if you want as the conclusion "for any person, if that person can adopt a vegan diet then that person ought adopt a vegan diet" then you must have as the second premise "for any person, that person prevents gratuitous suffering if and only if that person adopts a vegan diet". Is this the premise you're willing to use?
I question it too. As mentioned to Postmodern Beatnik, I'm not prepared to defend this claim beyond what I believe is intellectually honest but I would prefer to have grounds to defeat it rather than a mere unsupported assertion that it is dubious. What can you point to that would indicate a divergence between the capacity to experience gratuitous suffering in humans and nonhuman animals? More specifically, is that divergence significant to gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices such that what would constitute gratuitous suffering in humans should not be considered to constitute gratuitous suffering in nonhuman animals in relation to food production practices.
Quoting Michael
I'm not sure this is the cause of the gratuitous suffering or if it has to be that strong. Is it conceivable a human would still suffer without the specific understanding that a relative or friend has been killed? In humans it's sufficient to recognize that the relationship has ended (by some unknown mechanism) and that recognition per se causes suffering. The suffering of the loss of a relationship that we can identify by virtue of our humanity can in turn be categorized as gratuitous (i.e., unjustified) if the suffering is caused by the intentional actions of moral agents without sufficient warrant. The nonhuman animal doesn't need the capacity to recognize its own suffering as gratuitous, the judgement of gratuitous comes from moral beings on the basis that the suffering is not morally permissible (as per the conditions of the moral obligation). The nonhuman animal doesn't have to identify the cause of or be able to articulate the deep emotional attachment that causes suffering in order to recognize that the nonhuman animal is suffering.
That's not the way the burden of proof works. If you use a premise to make an argument then you must defend that premise; it is not the burden of the other person to disprove it.
The issue isn't over whether or not there is a divergence between the capacity to experience gratuitous suffering in humans and non-human animals; the issue is over whether or not there is a divergence between the cause of gratuitous suffering in humans and non-humans.
As an example, feeding capsaicin to a human will cause the human to suffer but feeding it to a bird won't cause the bird to suffer. Therefore that it is wrong to feed capsaicin to a human (on the grounds that it causes suffering) is not that it is wrong to feed capsaicin to a bird (on the grounds that it causes suffering).
But does it suffer at all, let alone gratuitously? Is the animal capable of recognizing this lost relationship, and if so, does it care?
Furthermore, this highlights another issue with your argument. You define gratuitous suffering as "suffering that is not morally permissible". This then means that premise 2 amounts to "if food production practices would constitute morally impermissible suffering in humans then food production practices constitute morally impermissible suffering in sentient non-human animals". But where's the justification for this? Even if you can show that humans and non-human animals have the same capacity to experience suffering, and even if you can show that food production practices cause non-human animals to suffer, you haven't shown that such suffering in non-humans animals is morally impermissible.
I might say that the suffering caused to humans by food production practices is only morally impermissible (i.e. gratuitous) because they are human, and obviously this reasoning can't apply to non-human animals. So what, aside from our humanity, would make such suffering morally impermissible?
That's only true if i) I feel like the argument needs to be defended and ii) the person opposing the argument hasn't issued a claim that itself needs defense. I have no interest in defending the argument but I am curious what reasons a person gives in response to the argument aside from, "I don't like it". The rebuttal is more interesting to me than the support (unless someone feels compelled to support the argument). I've pondered this argument for a while and I have rejected it too, but that doesn't mean I was right to reject it unless I have reasons for that rejection.
Quoting Michael
This might be splitting hairs but your counterexample of capsaicin is duly noted. Is it fair to say a capacity is the potential and the cause is the capacity realized?
Quoting Michael
Suffering is morally impermissible and gratuitous if it is known, preventable, and preventable at a reasonable cost. The argument itself aims to show that the suffering of nonhuman animals by food production practices is gratuitous suffering and morally impermissible. P2 is a hypothetical premise introduced with the intention to demonstrate that conclusion and taken along with the other premises shows that food production practices is morally impermissible and obliges a vegan diet.
I take your objection to be the use of "gratuitous" to describe the suffering in the early premises and the appearance of begging the question. I used the term gratuitous to distinguish it from other suffering, where only gratuitous suffering obliges (in)action. It doesn't make much sense to construct a moral argument to talk about non-gratuitous suffering because such suffering is outside the scope of knowledge, potency or too burdensome. I consider it a bit of a trivial distinction, but useful to remind the reader that the only suffering I am talking about falls within that range. If the argument succeeds (and I suspect it doesn't), it only applies to gratuitous suffering.
This is confusing. Are you defining "gratuitous suffering" as "morally impermissible suffering" or as "known and preventable (at a reasonable cost) suffering"? Or is its meaning something else?
Gratuitous suffering = morally impermissible suffering. Suffering is morally impermissible by the following conditions: known and preventable (at a reasonable cost).
Definition of gratuitous suffering: If suffering is preventable (at a reasonable cost) and known, it is wrong to allow said suffering. Suffering that is wrong to allow is gratuitous suffering.
Gratuitous suffering is morally impermissible by virtue of being gratuitous suffering, and established by the conditions above. By the transitive property:
P1 If any gratuitous suffering is preventable (at a reasonable cost) and known, it is wrong to allow said gratuitous suffering. (trivial moral claim)
If gratuitous suffering is preventable by definition then the premise "gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet" fails. Gratuitous suffering does not depend on something else (e.g. the possibility to adopt a vegan diet) to be preventable.
It's like saying "bachelors are unmarried men if and only if it is possible to X" (where "bachelors" is defined as "unmarried men").
Perhaps you meant to just say "suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet"?
Huh?
It's defined as preventable only insofar as it has some means that satisfies the condition of prevention. Whether food production practices is gratuitous suffering relies on whether there is a means for the prevention of said suffering (e.g., a vegan diet). Food production practices is gratuitous suffering because the suffering can be prevented iff it is possible to adopt a vegan diet. If it was impossible to prevent the suffering of food production practices, that suffering would be considered unpreventable and morally permissible.
Quoting Michael
I think it's more akin to the following:
bachelors are called such iff they are men and remain unmarried. (where "bachelors" is defined as "unmarried men").
Maybe you're right though. I regarded the constant back and forth with the definition of gratuitous suffering at each stage needlessly cumbersome, but it might be helpful for clarification.
bachelors are called such iff they are men and remain unmarried. (where "bachelors" is defined as "unmarried men").[/quote]
So by this you mean "those men who are called bachelors are called bachelors if and only if they are unmarried men"?
Then consider: "that suffering which is called gratuitous is called gratuitous if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet". How does one then conclude "one ought adopt a vegan diet" from that?
One doesn't, that is only a single premise and the claim that "one ought to adopt a vegan diet" follows from many premises and conclusions when taken together.
"If it is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices, and gratuitous suffering caused by food productions practices is preventable if and only if a vegan diet is adopted, then a vegan diet ought to be adopted."
I'm questioning how "it is wrong to allow preventable suffering caused by food production practices" and "that suffering caused by food production practices which is called gratuitous is called gratuitous if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet" imply "a vegan diet ought to be adopted". It certainly doesn't seem to be the case that "a vegan diet ought to be adopted" is derived from the other two sentences.
P9 /P10 should read something like: "The only way to prevent the gratuitous suffering caused to animals in the food production practices is to take animals out of food production. "
"The only way to remove animals from food production is to eat a diet which doesn't require them to be part of the process (i.e vegan)."
C5: "If it is wrong to allow the gratuitous suffering (of animals) in the food production practices, a vegan diet ought to be adopted.
I would caution against reducing gratuitous suffering to "preventable suffering". That suffering is preventable is a necessary but not sufficient condition for suffering to be judged as gratuitous.
P9 is a hypothetical so I'm not sure why you're trying to read it as several independent claims absent the hypothetical operator. It's more of a hypothetical move from the trivial moral claim in P1 to the specific means established by P6. More succinctly, if it morally impermissible to allow some outcome and the only way to prevent that outcome is performing or abstaining from a specific action, then it is morally impermissible not to perform or abstain from the specific action.
Where gratuitous suffering does not have a one-to-one relationship with the means of prevention, the prevention does not oblige a specific performance or abstaining of action. A vegan diet (i.e., the means of prevention) is only obligated if it has a one-to-one relationship with the prevention of gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices. The conclusion that "one ought to adopt a vegan diet" follows from the entire argument before it and not a single premise taken in abstraction.
It's in the form "if X and Y then Z". I'm questioning this material implication. If the material implication fails then the premise fails, and if the premise fails then the argument fails.
But the actual phrasing is "X is preventable iff Y is possible". Did you actually mean "X is prevented iff Y"?
I'm not questioning C5. I'm questioning P9. In P9 you say that "one ought adopt a vegan diet" is implied by "it is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering" and "gratuitous suffering is preventable iff it is possible to adopt a vegan diet". I'm questioning this.
Then if it can be shown that I can't prevent gratuitous suffering by adopting a vegan diet then I am not obligated to adopt a vegan diet.
So, if I adopt a vegan diet will gratuitous suffering be prevented? Well, no. The premise "If Michael adopts a vegan diet then gratuitous suffering will be prevented" is false (my adoption of a vegan diet won't entail a change in food production practices), therefore one cannot derive "Michael ought adopt a vegan diet" from it (in conjunction with the premise "Michael ought prevent gratuitous suffering").
Then what are the necessary and sufficient conditions?
No, preventability is the condition of the moral obligation and not actual prevention. It only matters if the action renders the outcome preventable and not actually prevents the outcome (although acting on the obligation should prevent the outcome if it is accurate and a malicious agent is not acting against your efforts, the actual prevention need not be demonstrated for the obligation to hold).
Quoting Michael
Those conditions are outlined in the definition and contained in P1:
Gratuitous suffering is suffering that is
1) Known
2) Preventable
with the later addition of
3) At a reasonable cost
Each condition is necessary, but only taken together are the three conditions sufficient for gratuitous suffering.
Quoting Michael
More or less, but you should be careful with what you mean. I would state it as, "gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is not preventable if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet". The obligation only holds if the means (i.e., a vegan diet) is suitable or renders the outcome (i.e., gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices) preventable. If multiple actions render the outcome preventable, there is no strict obligation to act on any specific action. Veganism is obligated because it is only means to render the outcome preventable (as per P6).
Quoting Michael
Perhaps. There are complex chains that will be played out by your adoption of veganism that may (or by some chance may not) prevent gratuitous suffering. The specifics of how much, where or the mechanisms of prevention are beyond the scope of this argument.
...
More or less, but you should be careful with what you mean. I would state it as, "gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is not preventable if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet". The obligation only holds if the means (i.e., a vegan diet) is suitable or renders the outcome (i.e., gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices) preventable. If multiple actions render the outcome preventable, there is no strict obligation to act on any specific action. Veganism is obligated because it is only means to render the outcome preventable (as per P6).[/quote]
As I said before, this doesn't work:
One ought prevent X
X is preventable iff Y is possible
Therefore one ought do Y.
The conclusion doesn't follow. Premise 2 must be "X is prevented iff one does Y" if the argument is to work.
Therefore P9 fails if it's supposed to be defended as a syllogism.
And if it's not supposed to be defended as a syllogism then some other reasoning or evidence is required to defend the material implication. So what do you have to defend the premise that if "one ought prevent gratuitous suffering" is true and if "gratuitous suffering is preventable iff it is possible to adopt a vegan diet" is true then "one ought adopt a vegan diet" is true?
So the first premise is "one ought do that which makes gratuitous suffering preventable" rather than "one ought do that which prevents gratuitous suffering"?
But that's not P6. P6 says "gratuitous suffering is preventable iff it is possible to adopt a vegan diet". It doesn't say "gratuitous suffering is preventable iff a vegan diet is adopted".
So if we're only obligated to make gratuitous suffering preventable then we're only obligated to make the adoption of a vegan diet possible.
I'm glad you left the premise in a formal notation because formally it is valid. I have shown X and Y in the argument and I am trying to arrive at Z so the material implication holds by modus ponens. I take your objection to be directed at the content of the terms, and that is supported by an ancillary meta-ethical argument about the entailment of obligations.
Quoting Soylent
Can be read in deontic logic as ¬P? (It is not permitted to ?)
¬P? is equivalent to O¬? (One is obligated to not ?)
If ¬P? and (¬? iff ?), then O?
¬P? and (¬? iff ?)
O?
No it's not.
P1: X
P2: Y
C1: Z
It's not modus ponens. The premise "If X and Y then Z" can't be defended as a valid syllogism.
This is not my argument though, the first premise is too strong since "One ought to prevent X" is beyond the potency of finite beings. Ought implies can, such that one ought act in such a way that X is preventable by their actions. I cannot be held responsible for the outcome if it is beyond my potency so my responsibility is to my action (i.e., acting so as to render X preventable). *my Kant is showing*
Quoting Michael
That's not the argument, the argument is:
P1 If X and Y, then Z
P2 X and Y
C Z
P1 If X and Y, then Z[/quote]
And I'm asking you to defend P1 (which in the original is P9). What reasoning or evidence shows that X and Y implies Z?
Then the argument is:
One ought make X preventable
X is preventable iff Y is possible
Therefore one ought do Y.
Again, it's invalid. The conclusion would be "one ought make Y possible" (i.e. "one ought make the adoption of a vegan diet possible").
If you want the conclusion to be "one ought do Y" (i.e. "one ought adopt a vegan diet") then the argument must be:
One ought make X preventable
X is preventable iff one does Y
Therefore one ought do Y
One ought make gratuitous suffering preventable
Gratuitous suffering is preventable iff one adopts a vegan diet
Therefore one ought adopt a vegan diet
Is this what you're arguing?
As per my post above, I think this is what you're after or am I missing the meaning of your request?
it is wrong to allow said gratuitous suffering
Can be read in deontic logic as ¬P? (It is not permitted to ?)
¬P? is equivalent to O¬? (One is obligated to not ?)
If ¬P? and (¬? iff ?), then O?
¬P? and (¬? iff ?)
O?
Quoting Michael
That's not a charitable reading. The second premise can be stated as X is preventable iff Y (where Y is "it is possible to adopt a vegan diet"). There's no reason to place the possibility outside Y. It is possible that the amendment of Y as suggested by Postmodern Beatnik has changed the conclusion and I haven't properly adopted the premise throughout. It's a remnant of an older version of the argument, but you're quite right to bring it to my attention as being out of place in the current form.
I'll review the argument to see if it is salvageable in light of your criticism or if the amendment has weakened the argument beyond repair.
Sure. But then the conclusion is "one ought make it possible to adopt a vegan diet". If the conclusion is supposed to be "one ought adopt a vegan diet" then the second premise must be "Gratuitous suffering is made preventable iff one adopts a vegan diet".
You can't have Y as "it is possible to adopt a vegan diet" in the premise and then have Y as "adopt a vegan diet" in the conclusion.
I'm curious if there is a move to be made from Y¹ to Y, where Y¹ is "it is possible to adopt a vegan diet" and Y is "to adopt a vegan diet". Perhaps another ancillary argument of the nature of "if it is possible to Y (Y¹) then one ought to Y iff Y is the only means to Z and one ought to Z".
That works. But what's Z? "Make gratuitous suffering preventable"? Then "Y is the only means to Z" is "adopting a vegan diet is the only means to make gratuitous suffering preventable", which is the revised premise I offered: "gratuitous suffering is preventable iff a vegan diet is adopted".
It seems Postmodern Beatnik is more keen than I am, anticipated this problem and performed the heavy lifting here.
The argument seems valid, so I'll address the issue of soundness.
Quoting Soylent
False. It's not true at any cost. If the cost of prevention is too great, or even if the risk is too great, then it's not necessarily wrong.
Quoting Soylent
False. There are possible means of prevention which do not require the possibility of adopting a vegan diet. For example, some such suffering would be prevented if the level of production was reduced, and all such suffering would be prevented subsequent to the cessation of all non-human sentient life.
Therefore, the argument, in it's present form, is unsound.
By the way, I noticed the asterisks at the end of certain premises, but I haven't seen any corresponding notes.
Edit:
Quoting Soylent
Why didn't you include that explicitly in the argument in the first place? If your objective here is not to put an argument in what you know to be it's best formulation to scrutiny, but just some sort of test of our critical thinking skills, then I don't agree with your purpose here, and wish to take no further part. I don't feel like playing a game of 'spot the shortcomings in my knowingly inadequate argument'.
Stipulative Definitions:
Veganism is any diet that does not include sentient animals as the end product in food production practices. Veganism is qualified by the omission of food products In a diet and as such is an act of omission.
Gratuitous suffering is morally impermissible suffering. The necessary and sufficient conditions of morally impermissible suffering is any suffering that is: known, preventable, and preventable at a reasonable cost.
P1 If any gratuitous suffering is preventable and known and the means to make the gratuitous suffering preventable are reasonable, then it is wrong to allow said gratuitous suffering. (from stipulative definition)
P2 If some nonhuman animals are sentient and food production practices would constitute gratuitous suffering in humans, then food production practices constitute gratuitous suffering in some nonhuman animals.
P3 Some nonhuman animals are sentient.
P4 Food production practices would constitute gratuitous suffering in humans.
C1 Food production practices constitute gratuitous suffering in some nonhuman animals. (from P2, P3 and P4)
P5 If food production practices constitute gratuitous suffering in some nonhuman animals, then some agents know of some gratuitous suffering.
C2 Some agents know of some gratuitous suffering. (from C1 and P5)
P6 Gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if it is possible for some agents to adopt a vegan diet.
P7 If it is possible for some agents to adopt a vegan diet, then gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable. (elimination from P6)
P8 It is possible for some agents to adopt a vegan diet.
C3 Gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable. (from P6, P7 and P8)
P9 If the means of making the gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices preventable is an act of omission and does not present harm to some agents, then the means to make said gratuitous suffering preventable is reasonable.
P10 Adopting a vegan diet is an act of omission (from stipulative definition)
P11 If some agents do not have health concerns (mental or physical) that can only be remedied by adopting a non-vegan diet, then a vegan diet does not present harm to some agents.
P12 Some agents do not have health concerns (mental or physical) that can only be remedied by adopting a non-vegan diet (*edited January 6, 2016 @ 13:06 est by adding P12 and renumbering subsequent premises)
C4 A vegan diet does not present harm to some agents. (from P11 and P12)
C5 The means to make said gratuitous suffering preventable is reasonable. (from P9, P10, and C4)
C6 It is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices. (from P1, C2, C3, and C4)
P13 If some agents belong to the sets of "some agents" contained in each of C2, P8, and C4 respectively, then there are those agents who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet.
P14 Some agents belong to the sets of "some agents" contained in each of C2, P8, and C4 respectively.
C7 There are those agents who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet. (*edited January 6, 2016 @ 10:21 am est* from P13 and P14)
P15 If it is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices and gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet, and there are those who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet, then a vegan diet ought to be adopted by all those who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet.
C8 A vegan diet ought to be adopted by all those who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet (from P6, C6, C7 and P15).
This was written on my phone and may contain typographical errors or omission. The above is subject to revision once I have access to a desktop computer to correct obvious errors. I will mark edits as such including a time stamp.
It is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices
Gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet
Therefore a vegan diet ought to be adopted by all those who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet
It doesn't work as a syllogism so the material implication must be defended some other way.
If you want it to work as a syllogism then you need the following:
One ought make gratuitous suffering preventable iff one can make gratuitous suffering preventable
One makes gratuitous suffering preventable iff one adopts a vegan diet
Therefore one ought adopt a vegan diet iff one can adopt a vegan diet
I submitted a stripped down version of a similar argument I prepared elsewhere for advice on a formal/logical issue, and so my intention was limited only to a formal analysis. In my estimation the full version was unnecessary for the purposes of the formal issue for which I wished to receive input. In that discussion issues of soundness arose, which prompted me to create this spin-off thread to address those issues. So as to encourage and not invalidate concerns already mentioned in the previous discussion I left the argument the same as the stripped down version presented in the logic section. You give me far too much credit, I don't presume to know much. Any shortcomings I had previously identified may have been given novel attention, including objections and solutions, by the very capable individuals on this forum.
I added another term to the implication for the purpose of addressing this issue. I currently stands as:
i) It is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices
ii) Gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet
iii) There are those who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet.
Therefore, a vegan diet ought to be adopted by those who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet.
Where, "there are those who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet" are specifically those agents that satisfy the conditions of the moral obligation contained in P1 (see P12 - C7)
The new P14 satisfies the conditions of the objection you raise in terms of the valid syllogism and material implication, which was missing in previous versions.
i) It is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices
ii) Gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet
iii) There are those who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet.
Therefore, a vegan diet ought to be adopted by those who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet.[/quote]
That still doesn't follow:
It is wrong to allow X
X is preventable iff Y is possible
Some can Y
Therefore those who can Y ought Y
Either the conclusion must be "those who can make Y possible ought make Y possible" or the second premise must be "X is preventable iff Y".
As I said before, if you want the first premise to be "one ought make gratuitous suffering preventable iff one can make gratuitous suffering preventable" and if you want as the conclusion "one ought adopt a vegan diet iff one can adopt a vegan diet" then you must have as the second premise "one makes gratuitous suffering preventable iff one adopts a vegan diet".
I've edited the OP to request that all comments are to respond to the revised (most current) version. That is the one I will be responding to and will not mention premises contained in any other versions unless they are contained in the revised version as well. As far as I can tell, the revised version is the strongest form of the argument I have ever conceived and there is no longer any conditions or information omitted.
It is wrong to allow X is logically equivalent to ought not X.
not X = Y
And some can Y (Z)
Therefore, ought Z
Yeah, maybe there's something still missing.
I don't know why I'm resisting this so much. Let me think on it a bit.
So "it is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering" is logically equivalent to "one ought not gratuitous suffering". Obviously that makes no sense. Previously I interpreted this as "one ought prevent gratuitous suffering" but you didn't like this one. Is "one ought make gratuitous suffering preventable" not the correct interpretation? If not then could you rephrase that first premise in a "one ought X" form (so that the conclusion "one ought Y" is properly derived).
But Y in "not X = Y" is "adopting a vegan diet is possible". So "some can Y" is "it is possible for some to adopt a vegan diet".
And if "Z" is "it is possible for some to adopt a vegan diet" then "one ought Z" is "one ought make it possible for some to adopt a vegan diet". Which is the conclusion I said follows and which differs from "one ought adopt a vegan diet".
The latter interpretation is preferable.
I was imprecise in my notation. The correct form is: It is wrong to X is logically equivalent to ought not X, and X is "allow gratuitous suffering" where "allow gratuitous suffering" means "to act in such a way so as to not make gratuitous suffering preventable".
Further versions of the argument may have to include some form of that, which might be best stated as your "one ought make gratuitous suffering preventable" as per your suggestion.
Let:
a = allow gratuitous suffering
b = it is possible for some agents to adopt a vegan diet
c = there are those who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet and those that are in a position to adopt of a vegan diet are those for whom it would be wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices
d = those who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet ought not allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices
If ¬Pa (= O¬a)
and ¬a = b
and c
then, d
Therefore, d.
Another step is still needed to get back to "ought adopt a vegan diet".
and ¬a = b
and c
then, d[/quote]
You can't derive d if d isn't in the premises. Consider:
P1. A ? B
P2. A
C1. C
Notice that it doesn't work.
Yeah. And as I said above, you can only derive "adopt a vegan diet" if it appears somewhere in the premises. Specifically, you need "if one doesn't adopt a vegan diet then one allows gratuitous suffering". Then if one has an obligation to not allow gratuitous suffering then one has an obligation to adopt a vegan diet.
That's not the form though, it's:
P1 (A & B & C) ? D
P2 A
P3 B
P4 C
C1 D
C6 It is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices. (from P1, C2, C3, and C4)
P6 Gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if it is possible for some agents to adopt a vegan diet.
C7 There are those agents who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet. (from P12 and P13)
C8 A vegan diet ought to be adopted by all those who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet (from P6, C6, C7 and P14).
P1 (A & B & C) ? D
P2 A
P3 B
P4 C
C1 D[/quote]
And I'm questioning P1. What justifies the material implication? D certainly can't be derived from A, B, and C. So it must be something else.
I'm not sure I understand your objection. D is derived (entailed?) from A, B, and C as per modus ponens.
P1 isn't an example of modus ponens.
Using your example above, let A be "2 > 1", let B be "3 > 2", let C be "4 > 3", and let D be "5 > 6".
P1 (A ? B ? C) ? D
P2 A
P3 B
P4 C
C1 D
So:
P1. If 2 > 1 and 3 > 2 and 4 > 3 then 5 > 6
P2. 2 > 1
P3. 3 > 2
P3. 4 > 3
C1. 5 > 6
Have I shown that 5 > 6?
And I'm questioning this hypothetical premise. I want you to justify this hypothetical premise. You can't use your argument to justify the premise if your argument depends on the premise. That's question-begging.
So forget the argument. Show me that P1 (or P14) is true.
For clarification, you're questioning the soundness and not validity; because it seemed to me that you were questioning the validity by questioning the form as you did here:
Quoting Michael
And other comments regarding "valid syllogism".
I'm questioning the truth of P14, and so by extension the soundness of the argument. When I first asked you to defend P14 (when it was P9) you said that the material implication is defended as a deduction, but of course it isn't.
So you're still yet to show that P14 is true.
Yes you have, by modus ponens.
If it's raining then circles are square
It's raining
Therefore, circles are square
Is a valid argument by modus ponens.
P1 may be false and so the argument is unsound, but nevertheless valid.
If you want me to justify the soundness of the premise then that's fine, but acting as if the argument is invalid is silly.
I'm not acting as if the argument is invalid. I asked you to defend P14 (when it was P9). You said that the consequent is deduced from the antecedent. So I pointed out that if we take P14 as an argument then it fails.
So, again, I'd like you to defend the material implication in P14.
P14 is NOT an argument, it is a premise.
And how do you defend that premise? How do you defend "(A ? B ? C) ? D"? How do you defend "If it is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices and gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet, and there are those who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet, then a vegan diet ought to be adopted by all those who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet."?
The point I have been making is that you cannot defend that premise by saying that D is deducible from A ? B ? C.
Side note: Looking back I see I've got my numbers wrong. It's P15. Is that a recent edit?
You're being very difficult here.
Please defend premise 15.
Let:
a = allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices
b = it is possible for some agents to adopt a vegan diet
c = there are those who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet and those that are in a position to adopt a vegan diet are those for whom it would be wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices
d = those who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet ought not allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices the means to which is only by adopting a vegan diet
If ¬Pa (= O¬a)
and ¬a = b
and c
then, d
Therefore, d.
¬Pa is true by definition
b is true by empirical evidence
c is also true by empirical evidence
d follows from the transitive property applied to O¬a wherein ¬a = b and some b is c.
and ¬a = b
and c
then, d[/quote]
You're just repeating the premise. I want you to defend the premise.
Notice how you're trying to defend the premise by treating it as a syllogism, saying that the consequent follows from the antecedent? As I've pointed out before, it's an invalid syllogism. D can't be deduced from A, B, and C.
I have no idea what you're looking for so until one of us figures out what the other is trying to say, we might be at an impasse.
If London is the capital city of England then it is raining
No, I said "d follows from the transitive property", which is not the same as saying "d follows from the antecedent". d has a unique feature which makes it a consequent. The defense of d specifically and not the entire premise is the transitive property applied.
But it doesn't. Nowhere in "¬Pa (= O¬a)", "¬a = b", or "c" does "d" appear.
d is a term and not a predicate statement. The predicate statement contained in d follows from the transitive property. The content of d is contained in "¬Pa (= O¬a)", "¬a = b", or "c" wherein the application of the transitive property on those terms is the term unique term d (i.e., the consequent).
Still not making sense. I understand the transitive property as saying if 2 > 1 and if 3 > 2 then 3 > 1, or as saying if a = b and if b = c then a = c. I don't see how your example relates to this in any way.
Let:
a = 2>1
b = 3>2
c = 3>1
If a and b, then c
What justifies c?
Either modus ponens (the affirmation of the antecedent terms).
Or the transitivity of the content of the terms.
If ¬Pa (= O¬a)
and ¬a = b
and c
then, d
¬Pa is true by definition
b is true by empirical evidence
c is true by supportive argument and empirical evidence
[i]d follows from the transitive property applied to O¬a wherein ¬a = b and some b is c.[/I]
P6 remains unchanged, as therefore does my criticism, which you have yet to address.
Also, given your stipulative definition, P6, P7, and C3 are redundant. If, by definition, gratuitous suffering is preventable, then all you'd need to do is show that something causes gratuitous suffering, and it logically follows that it's preventable.
On second thought, given your 'if and only if' in P6, it must be false, since gratuitous suffering is preventable simply by virtue of being gratuitous suffering, not conditionally.
Other parts of your argument might be similarly effected. For example, P9, in which you talk about "the means of making gratuitous suffering... preventable", which wouldn't make sense.
I've addressed your criticism of P6 elsewhere and since P6 remains unchanged my response elsewhere is still applicable. If you feel your objection to P6 is different than the one already presented in this thread, I would gladly address your objection specifically and would appreciate it you could explain how yours is different.
I agree that there is an appearance of redundancy or begging the question by use of the term "gratuitous suffering" early in the argument, but the use is only to make the distinction between gratuitous suffering and other forms of suffering not obliged by the success of the argument. P6, P7 and C3 are useful to show that food production practices are preventable and fit into the larger argument to show that food production practices constitute gratuitous suffering as per the definition.
Considering your comment that one only needs to show that something causes gratuitous suffering and it logically follows that it's preventable, but to show that something causes gratuitous suffering one must show that the suffering is preventable, is there any way to avoid the redundancy?
Well, the converse is invalid, i.e. if something causes preventable suffering, it doesn't following that it's gratuitous suffering, because gratuitous suffering, as per your definition, requires more than that. It doesn't work both ways. So, showing that something causes preventable suffering wouldn't be redundant; it would satisfy one condition, but not all conditions, for something to count as gratuitous suffering.
The strongest criticism of your argument in it's current form is that P6 is necessarily false, and your argument is therefore necessarily unsound:
1. Gratuitous suffering, by definition, is preventable by virtue of being gratuitous suffering (and therefore not conditionally).
2. P6 contradicts (1.).
C. P6 is false.
You must either change the definition or change P6.
The bolded is false. An instance of gratuitous suffering is conditionally true (i.e., the instance satisfies the conditions).
Consider:
P1: a bachelor is, by definition, an unmarried man simply by virtue of being a bachelor (and therefore not conditionally).
P2 Mike is a bachelor on the condition that he is an unmarried man.
P3 P2 contradicts P1
C1 P2 is false
This doesn't overcome my criticism. Analogously, your argument incurs the following contradiction:
1. If a man is unmarried, then he is a bachelor.
2. A man is a bachelor if and only if he drinks wine.
If there's one condition, then "therefore not conditionally" is false.
I would say it's more akin to:
1. If one is a bachelor, then one is an unmarried man.
2. One is unmarried if and only if one never marries.
2. One is unmarried if and only if one never marries.[/quote]
I noticed that I inverted the antecedent and the consequent. I apologize. The correct version is below:
1. If one is an unmarried man, then one is a bachelor.
2. One is unmarried if and only if one never marries.
Yes, well done, I concede, but that is not what I meant, and is beside the point.
Your argument results in contradiction, because if gratuitous suffering is preventable [i]if and only if[/I] it is possible for some agents to adopt a vegan diet, then that rules out the possibility that gratuitous suffering is preventable simply by virtue of being gratuitous suffering.
You are committed to both:
1. X is gratuitous suffering, and is therefore preventable.
2. X is gratuitous suffering, and is preventable if and only if Y.
Can you not see the contradiction?
You are also special pleading if you're claiming that the gratuitous suffering resulting from food production practices is somehow an exception to (1.).
I see your point now and will take some time to give it proper consideration.
A preliminary thought is that 1 and 2 are functionally indistinguishable and by the principle of identity of indiscernibility I need not commit to the position that 2 precludes 1. In other words, P6 satisfies both 1 and 2 because they are identical.
I don't understand how you can think them identical. They are different and distinguishable, they are not logically equivalent, they do not have the same function, nor do they have the same meaning. P6 has the logical form of 2 (well, not exactly, but it could put that way), and contradicts 1 (which is implicit in your argument).
No it doesn't.
Look:
One ought make gratuitous suffering preventable
Gratuitous suffering is preventable iff it is possible to adopt a vegan diet
It is possible for some to adopt a vegan diet
Therefore one ought adopt a vegan diet.
There's no modus ponens. There's no transitivity. As I've said before, the conclusion must be "one ought make it possible to adopt a vegan diet". However, now that you've introduced P3, even this conclusion doesn't work; instead, the conclusion "gratuitous suffering is preventable" is deducible from P2 and P3. And if gratuitous suffering is (already) preventable then there's nothing left for us to do. The condition of our obligation has already been satisfied.
As I have repeatedly said, if you want the conclusion to be "one ought adopt a vegan diet" then premise 2 must be "gratuitous suffering is preventable iff a vegan diet is adopted". Nothing else will work (with premise 1).
You need to get rid of the word "gratuitous" and have:
One ought make known suffering preventable at a reasonable cost
One makes known suffering preventable at a reasonable cost iff one adopts a vegan diet
Therefore one ought adopt a vegan diet
I'm going to try a different approach since I think I partially see what you're saying.
This is what I want P15 to say, and it may or may not depending on how it's unpacked:
It is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering cause by food production practices
The only means to prevent gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is to adopt a vegan diet (I think you deny the statement says this)
There are some for whom it is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices.
Those people for whom it is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices ought not allow gratuitous suffering caused by food procuction practices.
It is wrong to allow is logically equivalent to ought not allow.
If not allow gratuitous suffering is equivalent to adopt a vegan diet.
Then "those for whom ought not allow gratuitous suffering" is logically equivalent to "those for whom ought to adopt a vegan diet".
The only means to prevent gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is to adopt a vegan diet (I think you deny the statement says this)
There are some for whom it is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices.[/quote]
To clarify, the first premise is "one ought prevent gratuitous suffering"?
That's not a conclusion. That's a tautology.
No it's not:
P15 If it is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices and gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet, and there are those who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet, then a vegan diet ought to be adopted by all those who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet.
I'm trying to understand what you mean by "it is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering". Can you rewrite it in a "one ought X" format?
Usually I'd understand "it's wrong to allow so-and-so to steal" as "one ought prevent so-and-so from stealing", so I'd understand "it's wrong to allow gratuitous suffering" as "one ought prevent gratuitous suffering".
P1. ?x: C(P(x)) ? O(P(x))
P2. ?x: P(x) ? V(x)
C1. ?x: C(V(x)) ? O(V(x))
Which is to be read as:
For any person, if that person can P then that person ought P.
For any person, that person Ps if and only if that person adopts a vegan diet.
For any person, if that person can adopt a vegan diet then that person ought adopt a vegan diet.
So what sentence is "P"? "Prevents gratuitous suffering"? "Makes known suffering preventable at a reasonable cost"?
The logical equivalence must not introduce new terms.
"wrong to x" is only logically equivalent to "ought not x". The introduction of prevention is implied by the word "allow", but not logically contained.
1. X is a bachelor, and is therefore an unmarried man.
2. X is bachelor, and is unmarried if and only if X never marries.
By your contention, 2 is false because 1 also satisfies the conditions of what it means to be a bachelor and one must be committed to say that the mere name "bachelor" is sufficient to make one a bachelor, if even one has married or not.
*edit* 2 is false, please disregard this comment.