Ideological Evil
I assert that the commonly portrayed image of ideologically driven evil is somewhat specious; I do not think that, say, jihadism is the greatest evil on earth - although it is very significant - but rather that those types of ideologies that tend towards manifesting in positions of power and causing mass suffering are indeed the most salient evils because of that suffering and certain inherent qualities they possess. Many consequentialists seem to maintain that intent matters in moral considerations of good or evil at least as a way of predicting or analyzing outcomes, and I will continue with reasoning along these lines.
To begin, I propose a stratification of ideologies in terms of their structures and will provide examples of these categories:
Tier (1) ideologies are those that “spontaneously” radicalize individuals. This is through media not originating from, not legitimized by, and that do not sustain concentrations of political power as much. A good example of this is the arising of IS and their subsequent violent rampages and insurgencies, which, according to various iterations of IS, were attempts, at least in part, to fight social injustice and marginalization (which is, of course, ridiculous, but no one ever thinks they are the bad guys, and this claim helped them recruit many fighters). Their propaganda efforts in general are excellent examples of the kind of media I'm referring to.
Tier (2) ideologies are those that occupy nexuses of power, openly legitimate that occupation, and manifest in governmental power structures. They tend towards sustaining concentrations of political power. Think ideologies like Zionism, neoconservatism, fascism, etc. The example of Zionism, in its modern-day form, is relatively straightforward: many Israeli Jews believe they are justified in stealing land in the West Bank. They likely would not have these beliefs if not for the decisions made by politicians and powerful people that resulted in the decision to create a Jewish ethnostate. The very existence of this state, and the propaganda it puts out, encourages the attempted vindication of Zionism through governmental channels.
One might argue that Tier (1) ideologies inevitably, or are likely to, morph into something resembling a Tier (2) ideology as they gain adherents and power. After all, IS is intent on ushering in a Caliphate or whatever. I think this is true, but we will be considering the likelihood of ideologies attaining power as part of this analysis.
Given we define the evil an ideology is capable of causing as being a function of both the intent of its adherents and the consequences of their actions, and we demarcate tier (1) ideologies from tier (2) on the basis of the definitions provided above, the evil of ideologies in either tier is thus determined (at least in part) by:
(1) The level of intent to cause destruction and suffering propagated by an ideology.
(2) The actual suffering and destruction reliably caused by adherents of an ideology.
(1) clearly affects (2), and perhaps vice versa, but it is a little harder to pull these two things apart and see the exact relationship than to just consider (2) to be a function of (1), which is how I'm going to treat it.
My question is this: if Tier (2) ideologies do not propagate as much bad intent, but they result in larger numbers of deaths, more suffering, etc., then can we actually say that certain Tier (1) ideologies are more evil than Tier (2) ideologies even given that if a certain Tier (1) would result in more suffering and death if it enjoyed as much power as other ideologies that do tend more often to manifest in positions of power? Given that Tier (2) ideologies can actually result in more suffering because they reliably manifest in power structures, and not just because of the efficacy of the associated propaganda of a given government and its content, it seems to me we must accept that Tier (2) ideologies are usually inherently more destructive according to a consequentialist criterion. That is to say that the capability of being more likely to manifest in power structures, nexuses of power, etc. is fundamental, and this capability affects the consequences of the actions of adherents of a given ideology - which is the bottom line. So, we could add the criteria that evil is also (conditionally) determined by an additional factor inherent to Tier (2) ideologies if we frame this input purely in terms of one-way, predicted consequences much like how (2) is a function of (1):
(1.5) The tendency towards originating from, legitimizing, and sustaining concentrations of political power.
I say that (1.5) conditionally determines evil because an ideology could also be a source of good depending upon the ideology and context. If one wants to maintain consequentialism while also condemning certain ideological actors as being a significant, or perhaps the most significant, evil based upon their intent, one might need to consider this critique.
Also: please don't fixate on the examples too much. I just used what was convenient and would allow for something concise. IS and Zionism don't need to be what is actually discussed, and I'm not even totally sure how they would measure up against each other in terms of bad consequences.
To begin, I propose a stratification of ideologies in terms of their structures and will provide examples of these categories:
Tier (1) ideologies are those that “spontaneously” radicalize individuals. This is through media not originating from, not legitimized by, and that do not sustain concentrations of political power as much. A good example of this is the arising of IS and their subsequent violent rampages and insurgencies, which, according to various iterations of IS, were attempts, at least in part, to fight social injustice and marginalization (which is, of course, ridiculous, but no one ever thinks they are the bad guys, and this claim helped them recruit many fighters). Their propaganda efforts in general are excellent examples of the kind of media I'm referring to.
Tier (2) ideologies are those that occupy nexuses of power, openly legitimate that occupation, and manifest in governmental power structures. They tend towards sustaining concentrations of political power. Think ideologies like Zionism, neoconservatism, fascism, etc. The example of Zionism, in its modern-day form, is relatively straightforward: many Israeli Jews believe they are justified in stealing land in the West Bank. They likely would not have these beliefs if not for the decisions made by politicians and powerful people that resulted in the decision to create a Jewish ethnostate. The very existence of this state, and the propaganda it puts out, encourages the attempted vindication of Zionism through governmental channels.
One might argue that Tier (1) ideologies inevitably, or are likely to, morph into something resembling a Tier (2) ideology as they gain adherents and power. After all, IS is intent on ushering in a Caliphate or whatever. I think this is true, but we will be considering the likelihood of ideologies attaining power as part of this analysis.
Given we define the evil an ideology is capable of causing as being a function of both the intent of its adherents and the consequences of their actions, and we demarcate tier (1) ideologies from tier (2) on the basis of the definitions provided above, the evil of ideologies in either tier is thus determined (at least in part) by:
(1) The level of intent to cause destruction and suffering propagated by an ideology.
(2) The actual suffering and destruction reliably caused by adherents of an ideology.
(1) clearly affects (2), and perhaps vice versa, but it is a little harder to pull these two things apart and see the exact relationship than to just consider (2) to be a function of (1), which is how I'm going to treat it.
My question is this: if Tier (2) ideologies do not propagate as much bad intent, but they result in larger numbers of deaths, more suffering, etc., then can we actually say that certain Tier (1) ideologies are more evil than Tier (2) ideologies even given that if a certain Tier (1) would result in more suffering and death if it enjoyed as much power as other ideologies that do tend more often to manifest in positions of power? Given that Tier (2) ideologies can actually result in more suffering because they reliably manifest in power structures, and not just because of the efficacy of the associated propaganda of a given government and its content, it seems to me we must accept that Tier (2) ideologies are usually inherently more destructive according to a consequentialist criterion. That is to say that the capability of being more likely to manifest in power structures, nexuses of power, etc. is fundamental, and this capability affects the consequences of the actions of adherents of a given ideology - which is the bottom line. So, we could add the criteria that evil is also (conditionally) determined by an additional factor inherent to Tier (2) ideologies if we frame this input purely in terms of one-way, predicted consequences much like how (2) is a function of (1):
(1.5) The tendency towards originating from, legitimizing, and sustaining concentrations of political power.
I say that (1.5) conditionally determines evil because an ideology could also be a source of good depending upon the ideology and context. If one wants to maintain consequentialism while also condemning certain ideological actors as being a significant, or perhaps the most significant, evil based upon their intent, one might need to consider this critique.
Also: please don't fixate on the examples too much. I just used what was convenient and would allow for something concise. IS and Zionism don't need to be what is actually discussed, and I'm not even totally sure how they would measure up against each other in terms of bad consequences.
Comments (68)
Going to visit an isolated or uncontacted people because you want to give them money, yet end up introducing a modern bacteria that 99% of people are immune from that ends up reducing their population to a few dozen, and had no idea, probably wasn't evil, or at very least wasn't "as evil" as if you wanted to visit them to steal from them, or otherwise were fully aware of biology and had such intentions in mind, and ended up doing the same.
Reason I mention such, is it seems your flagship example of religion hinges on not only the idea that a god exists or does not exist, but whether or not the people who perform actions or inaction under the ideological mindset of such genuinely believe a god exists or not. Theoretically speaking, if they were right, and we were all wrong, they would be preventing us from eternal damnation (or whatever) and therefore, despite acts of violence that would normally be considered evil, are actually the greatest good one could ever perform. Theoretically speaking, of course.
In short, imagine an isolated, ultra-religious family believing their 6-year-old child is the devil incarnate and so they drown him to "save the world" or what have you. They'll sleep soundly at night, and never perform any other act of violence again. Take real actual examples of history. Botched exorcisms for example. Giving people the benefit of the doubt (things were much, much different back then, superstition wasn't the exclusive domain of fools and the mentally unwell as it is often considered today) that they actually believed they were doing the right thing and preventing evil, one should clearly be able to draw a line between unfortunate, misguided deeds and intentional misdeeds.
Say your child really wanted to go to summer camp by the lake, and you know he or she cannot swim, yet didn't have that item of knowledge in your mind at the time, and you permit him or her to go, and they drown, resulting in your entire family disliking you, calling for your arrest, and basically putting you on par with the likes of a murderer. Or more simply, falling asleep while your kid is swimming in your backyard pool and the same fate befalls him or her. Are you evil? Did you perform an evil act? Well, did you?
Yes, I agree, thus I included that even many consequentialists have use of the concept of intentions even when all that fundamentally matters is consequence.
Quoting Outlander
I don't know what "flagship" example you are referring to exactly (Zionism?), but yes, the issue of divine command is a quagmire for anyone making any meta-ethical claims at all that don't rule it out. However, I could make up any God I want and act according to their supposed divine wisdom, but that doesn't mean other people can't be concerned with the real world; religious claims don't necessarily disprove human-based ethics.
Quoting Outlander
I'm just talking about instances in which bad intent lines up with bad actions as analyzed from a broadly consequentialist view. I acknowledge that misguided actions are not as clearly evil as intentional ones, and that the two can be considered separately. If I have an ethic, as applied with the critique in the OP, that says there is a difference along the lines you provide for two different actions, then I don't see a problem.
Quoting Outlander
I'm not entirely sure how this relates to the OP. Could you explain it to me? I might be being obtuse.
Oh, I see. You are referring to how I used religious examples for both tiers of ideology. It doesn't have to be that way; that these people believe in their ideologies because of God is not that relevant to the OP.
edit: also, Zionism can be secular
I just want to be clear: Judaism is not equivalent to Zionism. Zionism is substantially secular and makes normative claims that are not necessarily tied to any religion.
I personally agree with your first assumption, that "ideological evil" is superficial (or as you put it, "somewhat specious"). Ideologies do not exist outside of the historical framework where they are created, the ideologies by themselves are inert artifacts, not necessarily doing harm to anyone or behaving in a violent manner...because I would assume that your judgements about "evil" are mostly concerned with both the ambitions and actual completions of some sort of violence?
So by this set of assumptions I'm laying out, you can be a Nazi or Jihadist, but both are just ideas until groups of people start putting plans together to achieve the ends of Nazism or Jihadism.
I think your tiers are bunk: various ideologies influence "the nexi of power", none are inherently more or less powerful. Just using islamic fundamentalism as an example (a broader term for the ideology that motivates jihadies), there are already muslim governments, examples being saudi arabia, oman, and Iran. I'd bet you there are people who associate with jihadist movements in or closely associated with those governments, the connection between jihadist militancy and iran being fairly obvious, yet also not something the Iranian government, Hezbollah, or Hamas would speak openly about. However, it would be impossible to have a government dedicated purely to one ideology, without associating with some of the others.
The means to an end is what we judge as morally reprehensible or morally good regardless of whether they are committed through the concentrated, legitimate power, or a boorish accumulation of blind adherents.
This probably won’t surprise you, but reading your post reminded me of a personal experience.
Some time ago, while browsing job postings, I stumbled upon one from a well-known local blogger who teaches business skills and “personal development.” The blogger needed a philosopher. Among the requirements were things like “ability to create meaning” and “ability to construct a methodology.”
It struck me because about ten years ago I watched this person, listened to him, and genuinely believed what he was saying. Only later did I realize how deliberately those messages were crafted and how strongly they shaped people’s thinking.
How does this relate to your topic? Your distinction between levels of ideology made me think that many ideologies are not merely spontaneous or “organic.” They are often created, refined, and maintained by people who are quite skilled in philosophy, communication, and narrative-building. Concepts like good and evil become tools in that process — instruments used by those who design and legitimize the ideology.
So your framework resonates with my experience: what looks like a natural emergence of beliefs often turns out to be the product of intentional work by experts who know how to shape collective meaning.
Adolf Hitler himself did this; history has it that he practiced his messages and act as an authoritative speaker/politicians for years before he was able to seize power. In his earlier years of doing this, some people saw him looking overly awkward and strained in his mannerisms.
These examples show that ideologies themselves are tools used to benefit certain individuals or groups, and i guess the more interesting and harder to answer question is to what extent their advocates "believe the ideology". Do Islamic extremist leaders really think they are putting forth the will of God, or is it just a way to produce a short-sighted adrenaline rush?
My understanding is different. It's neither adrenaline nor pure religion; it's both, plus ten other factors. It's a multifactorial phenomenon that can be grasped within the context of multiple layers.
I'll give you a philosophical example. Imagine you're observing a shopper in a supermarket filling a large basket with groceries. Your task is to determine what they're planning to cook. Now the question is: did they buy olives for solyanka (a soup made with olives) or did they simply want to eat them?
Any discussion of these topics is speculative, a priori. What can we do about all this? My answer to this question is to find our own subjectivity, outside of any ideology. How can this be achieved? By exactly the same method that ideologies operate: if they use the individual as a tool, then why can't the individual use ideology as their own tool?
This is, imo, such an important point that almost all comers to moral discussions (in modernity, and outside of 'centrist' thinkers) miss entirely, which prevents civil discussion: If you are Catholic, your desire to put your child through conversion therapy is patently loving.
The result being (almost invariably, and almost always intense) harm is a side-effect of you being a bozo, not you being evil (assuming you're wrong, obviously). No one wants to give people their flowers in this sense, because no one wants to see their own beliefs as contingent.
That's one of the reasons my moral position on ever applies to me (other than discussions about my opinions on other things). Other people's motivations are, for hte overwhelmingly large part, good but misguided.
Quoting ProtagoranSocratist
I'm unsure this quite captures the relevant issue, although I already buy into the premise so this is a little "for fun": If you're a Nazi or committed Jihadist, your thoughts are Evil. Its almost a side-effect whether something harmful plays out in the 'real world' but that's where everyone else finds out, and has something to discuss. But that intention (say, to ethnically cleanse Germany of Jews and Romanis) can, itself, be considered Evil under some framework. I do agree its 'just an idea'. But ideas are where actions come from, so it's not like they vary independently in this context. Quoting ToothyMaw
I think its more interesting (and important, in my view) to ascertain where 1. fails but 2. obtains. That seems more regular, and more pernicious.
BLM could be used as an example, but I can't bring myself to wade into that as a discussion topic - but it should be clear where I'm going simply mentioning it. Repatriation is often a similar thing, or the reformation of religions.
Yeah, but what i was getting at was that it's important to investigate where "true evil" begins and ends. I don't think it can possibly come from the thoughts and ideas themselves, as a philosophically minded person can use them to learn and make rational decisions.
For example, lets say for a minute we consider whether genocide can ever become a real solution to a problem...one quickly runs into several issues right away if they remain skeptical...like, are Jews really a source of political power? Do they work against against other groups to enslave them? And for the jihadist, to what extent do liberal western temptations cause sin and disharmony? It's actually a pretty big debate in modern muslim communities to talk about which kinds of transgressions of doctrine merit violent punishment. The nazis and jihadists are the same in the sense that they see "evil" as a justification for what others see as horrendous and truly evil.
To truly confront anti-semitism and other forms of bigotry, one needs to start from the point of view that having bad or prejudicial thoughts is not evil, and the beliefs/tenants are not to be feared lest we want to fuck up our thought process. Perhaps true evil just reflects a failure to be skeptical rather than the specific ambitions, ideas, or actions of ideologues...
So would you say that some things are not merely misguided but truly evil, and that thoughts can be one of those things? ...The trick here is that I believe you see yourself as a moral subjectivist, and therefore in these discussions you often end up talking about what other people think rather than what you yourself think.
Quoting AmadeusD
Yes, but I think the deeper issue is the embrace of moral non-naturalism beginning in the modern period. For the moral non-naturalist moral reasoning can be nothing more than taboo-based reasoning (). On that view true philosophical arguments for moral positions are impossible, and when the philosophical intelligentsia hold to such a view unthinking prejudice and taboo is inevitable, especially among the common people.
So your own quandary with "moral subjectivism" (my word) is very similar to the broader quandary of society. We might say that the general view agrees with you in saying that moral positions are not rational or arguable, but many people nevertheless wish for their moral position to "win out," and this leads to all sorts of behavior that is different from rational argument. It leads to the question, "How do I get what I want without relying upon rational argumentation?"
---
Quoting ProtagoranSocratist
I think there is something right about what you say here. It relates a bit to my thread, "Beyond the Pale," which is about when (if ever) it is permissible to dismiss someone, failing to rationally engage their position.
In the first place we have two options if we want to say that dangerous beliefs should be rationally engaged. We could either say that the beliefs themselves are not evil and therefore can be rationally engaged. Or we could say that the beliefs are evil but nevertheless should still be rationally engaged and treated with respect during that rational engagement. At the end of the day we will need to say what we mean by 'evil'.
Quoting ProtagoranSocratist
There are two unconnecting arguments here. @AmadeusD's argument:
1. What is in the effect is in the cause
2. Some actions are evil
3. Actions are caused by thoughts
4. Therefore, some thoughts are evil
And your argument:
1. That which can be used to learn and make rational decisions is not evil
2. All thoughts can be used to learn and make rational decisions
3. Therefore, no thoughts are evil
Clearly, most of those who think they are serving reason or truth, God or science believe they are doing good, no matter how harmful their actions may be in practice. Which reminds me that the most dangerous people in the world are probably those who think they have reason and destiny on their side.
Is it really that simple, though? The partially-disrobed homeless dude on the corner believes he has reason and destiny on his side. So, respectfully, it's far more complex and substantial than that one requirement of self-confidence or self-delusion.
It takes two to tango. Human nature resulted in every crime against humanity. The front men or perpetrators, merely pawns of fate and catalysts of the darkness that churns within every man.
Why are libraries full of lifetimes of wisdom and virtue empty yet arenas of combat and near-death cheap entertainment full at any given moment? Ask yourself that. And you'll find out something about yourself you did not wish to know.
No. I am not arguing that delusion is an issue. I said reason and destiny. Not madness and destiny.
By the way, Hitler was a homeless dude (in your words) in Vienna for some years and used to rant in public spaces, much to the embarrassment of others (Ian Kershaw's great book Hubris). Amongst other things, it was his reasoning that eventually made him attractive to others.
Quoting Outlander
It's best not to presume what others here know or don't know about themselves on a forum. My local library is massively busy, and I am not sure what you mean by an 'arena of conflict'. But the idea that people prefer circuses to intellectual pursuits is perfectly reasonable and conventional notion. How does this relate to my point?"
You also said "those who think" they have reason and destiny on their side. Which is precisely who I was referring to when I referenced "self-confidence" (or possibly self-delusion). Essentially, we all think we're unique, in some ways. That we have purpose and our actions are justified by our beliefs. No? Is this not the breeding grounds for the inevitable state of mind you describe?
Quoting Tom Storm
That's correct. However I give people the respect and benefit of the doubt to assume they post honestly and are describing their worldview and sentiments to the best of their ability. Analyses in line with generally-accepted psychology and proven patterns of human behavior is just one step above mere presumption. Meaning, if someone expresses a sentiment of how "all roads are two lanes", this would lead an observer to conclude said individual is ignorant of the existence of freeways. Maybe they're not. But if one is expressing their view of the world and how they see it honestly and to the best of their ability, it's a fair [s]presumption[/s] analysis.
Quoting Tom Storm
Just that it takes two to tango. People, especially desperate people, can be led to believe anything. If people were more educated, or yes, perhaps just intrinsically better than how they are, those leaders who ended up committing crimes against humanity and other human rights abuses (who were not born into cemented power and so had to become such from the ground up, of course) never would have been anything more but unknown figures. The average person likes things that are not conducive to enlightened societies (primal pleasures, violence, and conflict) more than things that are (highly cultured entertainment, operas, plays, higher learning, and such). It's not that these preferences are the mark of an evil majority, it's just that the former is "easier to understand" and therefore one who peddles the former is more likely to be taken seriously and elevated to power or social worth than one who truly believes in the latter.
In a sentence: it's not that a person who "thinks they have (whatever it may be) on their side" that's dangerous, it's the fact that the majority is easily convinced of anything so long as you push the right buttons. As far as believing in one's self (having "reason" or "destiny" on "one's side"), sure, hard work tends to pay off. Dedication tends to result in, well, results. "Confidence is key", I suppose? Is this some sort of revelation? Come to think of it, I'm not sure what your point is, really. :razz:
And that's quite alright. :grin: We both, in our own complementing ways, made this discussion just a bit more broad and insightful than it was previously, just a bit more "worth one's perusal" to those who will read and participate in it after us, I'd say. Bravo, to the both of us.
Everyone behaves according to some ideology or influence, whether it is an ancient book, common law, their own ideas, common sense or a Superman comic.
The intentions of a person involved in the implementation of any ideology is usually, from their point of view, are for the good of humanity according to their beliefs. Taking this into account, terrorists would not be classified as evil. The results of their actions would be ridding their world of the evil as defined by their ideology.
Consequentialism says that only the ramifications of the actions are judged. If the methods used in the implementation of any ideology are then to be taken into account to define it as evil, we would then be able say with a certain amount of surety that terrorists are evil.
Un-connecting? Not sure what you mean; they still appear to be related subject matter, but the arguments are different...maybe they are just contrary opinions.
It seems you're saying there is nothing that can be called evil. Given that actions are guided by motivations, it seems wrong in law and in concept to call an act evil which does not carry a malicious intention. I can't really see how we could reject that the ideas/thoughts/motivations are evil but maintain that the acts are. Partially because of some of hte other stuff i said, that it looks like I'll be going on for Leon just now..
Quoting Leontiskos
For me, personally, I find "evil" pretty empty. In terms of how personally arrange my moral judgments, yes. But I don't think this means much at all. It's just hte convenient semantic way I work out how I feel about things (or more properly, whether I should feel that/some way or not). An action which is aesthetically/prima facie disgustingly malicious and inhumane, let's say, whicih accurate reflects the actor's intention and ..i don't know.. world view? Could be considered evil to me. That's a practical notion, though, so I think I may not be saying what you're asking for unfortunately lol.
Quoting Leontiskos
To some degree, i think this. I don't see any possible coherent basis for moral thinking which isn't entirely relative. The best call I've heard from anyone is mass agreement. But we know that mass agreement is essentially culture-bound. Carlo Alvaro wrote an absolutely horrible paper outlining the basic premises of current moral realism and its.... as if a first year student was tasked with defending an illogical position. But that's just my take. I think the Law does well-enough when it comes to moral regulation. Its often wrong, and it can't please everyone, but its better than everyone doing what they think is right, imo.
Quoting Leontiskos
Yes, definitely. I think this is one of the unsolvable problems of modern, pluralistic society. I, at least, remain humble in my moral positions and don't pretend that they need apply to anyone else. I will try to enforce mine where i am not obviously violating rights (which are a legal institution) but otherwise I don't feel 'right' trying to convince people to my point of view (although, there is the obvious caveat that if it has to do with others violating rights, I'm likely to say something. Boot licking? Not imo).
You may be right about the disconnect between those arguments.
close, but what i'm trying to say is not quite as dogmatic. There very well may be evil -- there are certainly things that are horrible or very bad. It doesn't take much effort to find these things, especially in human activity and behavior. Ideas themselves hardly fit the bill for being the absolute worst, because clearly people say and think a lot of things just as an emotional reaction, and emotional reactions are too pure for such heavy-handed blame and moralization implied when calling something "evil" in my opinion.
However, I personally choose not to describe things as evil, because it's very emotive, and it's a common concept used by very dishonest (or maybe just stupid/delusional) people. That doesn't mean i think anyone who believes in evil has less intelligence than me, but I personally don't feel I benefit from describing anyone or what they do as such.
For example...you could say Donald Trump is evil, some people say that he is, some people compare him to adolf hitler...but i prefer "extremely dishonest" and "xenophobic" because these are more descriptive. Some people call Caligula (one of the early Roman emperors) and John Wane Gacy evil, but I prefer "sadistic" and "psychopathic" because those are also more descriptive of these individuals.
Okay, and is there a particular ethical system you hold to in this? Am I correct in recalling that you are an Emotivist?
Quoting AmadeusD
Okay, but let's probe your claim that you don't pretend that your moral positions need to apply to anyone else:
Quoting AmadeusD
So you will try to enforce your moral positions, as long as you are not violating civil rights? Wouldn't enforcing your moral positions involve applying your moral positions to other people?
It's been awhile since I read it, but C. S. Lewis' argument against moral relativism in Mere Christianity is quite good. He points up the way that people who claim not to impose any morality on others are very often doing just that.
Seems appealing to me, as my personal grudge with moral relativism is how even though it makes moral judgments relative to a situation instead of abstract absolutes (categorical imperatives...), it's still boiling decisions down to "right and wrong", which is still simplistic.
So would you say that "evil" means "the absolute worst," and one must be careful about calling something "the absolute worst" given the way that emotion often misleads us? Nevertheless, you do think there are things which are bad, and knowably so?
For my part, I think that's fine. The older understanding of "evil" is not as extreme as "the absolute worst" (and 'bad' has a curiously recent etymology). Still, the common English meaning does differentiate bad and evil in something like the way you indicate.
Mostly, but i don't equate evil and "absolute worst" in how i understand the terms. "evil" almost 100% of the time in modern english indicates some extreme moral wrong. For example, rarely does anyone say something like "that couger attacked the man on the hiking trail, that couger is evil!" because we all seem to assume that a couger cannot make moral decisions of right and wrong, but people use "evil" all the time to describe serial killers, politicians, and business men. While I don't like the term evil, I would have absolutely no problem with saying "Hitler, John Wayne Gacy, and Caligula acted in some of the absolute worst ways imaginable", but the thing i don't like about calling them evil is that we assume they could have acted in a different way with better morals, which is something I disagree with.
Quoting Leontiskos
huh, that's really quite interesting and i bookmarked the website...who knew that "bad" was derived exclusively from a work used to insult homosexuals and less-masculine men?! It's not surprising, but to me the word is more abstract and less loaded than that...
i guess in modern english, "evil" has it's moral and satanic overtones since the medieval era was more thoroughly christian in europe...but that etymology example you showed me illuminates how little i know...
If it is not your ideology, then you will probable never understand it. But it has been practiced since the beginning of human history. The only difference is that thousands of years ago small groups of humanoids killed off other small groups to make sure that their resources were not taken by them. Now it is by the thousands.
Quoting Tom Storm
What else could it be, if they thought that by killing others that they could survive then that was their point of view. It might help to think about the other group having the same point of view.
Quoting Tom Storm
Evil is a moral judgment of something that is believed by one group or another to be bad for them. Judgment of good or bad can only be made about actions, not thoughts, because they are the only things that can be proven through physical evidence. Even if I tell you what I am thinking, you still have no proof that it is true.
Right, okay, that makes more sense, thanks.
I personally find the "if but for" type of reasoning helpful here. "If but for the belief that negroes are inferior to whites, the defendant would not have carried out X, resulting in the wrongful death of a"
I think this applies to almost all actions that could be considered evil. The problem, as I see it, is that some wont fit
Action 1 = ostensibly evil (appearance of a hate crime, for instance)
Motivation 1 = ostensibly non-evil: true self defence, in an awkward circumstance
NOT EVIL
Action 2 = ostensibly evil (appearance of a hate crime, for instance)
Motivation 1 = ostensibly evil (actual hate crime, by admission)
EVIL
Action 3 = ostensibly evil (illegally refusing service to a Black person)
Motivation 3 = ostensibly non-evil (the Black person in question was ornery, unruly, couth and threatening but in some nuanced way not obvious on the face of it)
NOT EVIL
Action 4 = ostensibly non-evil (refusing service to an apparently obtuse/unruly/threatening Black person)
Motivation 4 = ostensibly evil (by admission: hates Blacks and so refused service at hte first possible chance of justifying it).
EVIL
The wrong-maker appears to be the thoughts. However:
Quoting ProtagoranSocratist
Absolutely. I think its essentially empty, because it can only mean whatever the person using it describes when asked. We have difference descriptions, i'd say (all of us, not you and I). Not because I thikn people are dumb for using it. I do think dumb people use it wrongly, as you say, though.
Quoting ProtagoranSocratist
Hmmm. I appreciate that this may be the best we can do as people - but those descriptions certainly wont hit home for many. I, for one, while agreeing with dishonest, can't see it in the "extreme" category. Neither do I see him as xenophobic - so, there's the descriptive thing I mentioned above.
Quoting Leontiskos
More-or-less correct, yes. I imagine there's edges to it, as there are with almost all claims to a moral system, that don't quite fit into a description of same, but yeah overall. Hence this being a system of figuring out what I (or what to, depending on whether action is required) feel about X, Y or Z.
Quoting Leontiskos
No, not at all. If people resist my attempts to 'enforce' my moral take *on that specific thing that I have deemed action is required in response to* then that's fine, and I can't say they're 'wrong'. Just that they are counter to what I think is best. I don't think my wanting to take the action I feel is 'right' goes against accepting that it is subjective and i can't justify getting anyone else to agree with me (although, when they do, it's good. That might be harder to explain). My reasoning is what I am trying to get other people to assent to in those situations. If they do not, my moral position becomes irrelevant. UNless there's a "The Sky is yellow" type of thing going on, my reasoning is unlikely to move anyone expressing a moral belief. Which is fine. But I suggest those "sky is yellow" cases are covered by rights violations.
Quoting Leontiskos
I cannot imagine this mattering to our discussion. Imposition is quite, explicitly different to carrying on ones life as they see morally fit. Charlie Kirk would be an example of someone imposing their moral beliefs on others (and I still see no problem with that, personally.. Which is part and parcel of my not imposing my beliefs on others). That i personally would want to see X happen or not happen, and carry on my life under those beliefs doesn't seem to me to run into any obstacles insofar as claiming I don't impose on others.
Maybe there just needs to be a concession/caveat that carrying on ones life will implicitly, "accidentally" impose ones morals on those around them. I can accept that. But i active attempt not to do this, where ever there is no clear legal rights violation. Even some situations where there is, I don't feel that simply believing A or B is a better response gives me any truck in trying to get other people to do so.
Quoting ProtagoranSocratist
There are several possibly origins of the term. Thiis is one of three that seem to ahve serious thought behind them. The other two make far, far more sense:
Old English baedan = "to defile" roughly
Proto-Germanic bada = "difficulty, trouble/damage" roughly.
The first seems to be the original of the suggestion Leon's given. I would probably hold off on concluding one or the other.
Okay, thanks for researching that more carefully than i did...
The question is how to justify this claim:
Quoting AmadeusD
This is because but-for causation casts a wide net. We would not want to conclude that knives are evil from the claim, "But for the knife, he would not have murdered." Nevertheless, what I think your argument does demonstrate is that thoughts constitute an important causal aspect of acts.
Quoting AmadeusD
Okay.
Quoting AmadeusD
Focusing on the bolded, I would ask 1) why is it good when you convince someone to agree with you, and 2) why would you try to get other people to assent to your reasoning if moral issues are not susceptible to rational assent?
Quoting AmadeusD
Okay good, and you state your position clearly and cogently.
I will just stick with the question I've already asked rather than complicating it further. If you don't think moral positions are susceptible to rational inquiry, then I don't understand why you would try to rationally persuade another person to adopt your own moral position.
---
Quoting ProtagoranSocratist
Okay, so it sounds like part of what you are saying here is that someone's act can only be evil if they were able to do otherwise than they did in fact do. You don't believe Hitler could have acted otherwise, therefore you wouldn't call him evil.
Yes to your second interpretation, but "can only be evil if they were able to do otherwise than they did in fact do" is how i perceive the more common perceptions of good/evil, i'm sure my interpretation is both true and false in that regard...
The seem to constitute the origin of acts. As I laid out, plenty of horrid acts are not motivated by something bad. But some decent acts are. We can't quite make that work unless the thought it was made the act wrong by virtue of its intention. I don't know how strongly I want to argue this, but that seems the case to me.
Quoting Leontiskos
It makes me feel good (emotivism). Again, hard to explain that - but I think this answers the question you're asking. The 'why' is kind of a private, for-me thing to figure out and that's the semantic system I alluded to earlier.
Quoting Leontiskos
To feel better.
Quoting Leontiskos
This is what I was getting at earlier - I don't. I try to get them to understand my reasoning. They might still morally disagree, but accept that, perhaps their act is likely to land them in prison, and so resile. That would be a result for me. Sometimes its fun to try to put the moral argument ot people, but its make me personally uncomfortable as I don't feel I have the right. These discussions are where I get most of my 'talk' out in the moral realm. It should also be clear that I only ever try to get people to either act or not act. I don't care much what their moral position is. I just either want A to happen, or A to not happen. I want them to do that. Not accept why I'm uncomfortable as their reason to do so (well, sometimes that's the case - my wife often does or doesn't do things for my comfort and vice verse but we share morality in that way so sort of moot).
True, but I think you need something more than but-for reasoning to establish such a thesis.
Quoting AmadeusD
Okay.
Quoting AmadeusD
I feel as if you're trying to hold back the tide with a sand castle. The water creeps in at every point, and therefore so many different questions pop up:
Each answer you give makes three more questions pop up like weeds.
Part of the crux is that every reflective person cares about the way that other people act, given that we are social beings who live in social arrangements. So I don't think a move like, "I just don't care what other people do" holds water (whether or not you have been claiming that per se). Now take a second premise: coercion is generally inappropriate (or immoral, if you like). With those two premises in hand, obviously we would like to be able to use rational persuasion in the moral sphere, because it would allow us to influence the actions of others without coercing them.
I don't know if you disagree with much of that? Perhaps you would just say that moral persuasion would be nice but it is not possible?
I've scratched my head over this one a bit...
So do you mean that Donald Trump is just saying/doing that anti-immigrant stuff to placate voters and grasp at power? He's certainly after both of those things, but he has been complaining about Chinese people and Latin Americans for years, i just don't buy into the perception that he doesn't believe his own xenophobia and/or racism.
I don't think so myself.
Quoting Leontiskos
There are no questions popping up for one who understands the position. The answer to all of them:
It makes me morally comfortable. However, your first bullet point is, I think, absurd. I said I would use explicitly rationality to try to get people to act in certain ways, rather htan moral reasoning. I am quite sure I fail constantly, lol.
Quoting Leontiskos
Yeah pretty much all of it. Inappropriate doesn't say 'wrong' to me.
Quoting ProtagoranSocratist
I would need to see something you think its 'xenophobic' rather than enforcing reasonable immigration laws (no comments (yet) on enforcement tactics). You say 'hes been complaining about'. I don't quite know what you're talking about yet, so I'll wait for examples.
Okay so i see it's because you agree with his immigration policies, so i'll just leave it at that as i don't think we'll get anywhere if i try to argue about this with you.
It seems to me that would be an unavailable argument. But I would be fine hearing why I'm wrong. I suggest that copping out in the way you have is essentially ignoring the question. Which isn't about Trump. It's about how you get to 'xenophobic' with any given data (i.e speech, acts, policies etc..).
You're more than welcome to the cop out. I am not trying to goad you, but letting this slide on the grounds of 'we're talking past each other' is not tenable.
alright, put that way, i think i can explain what i mean: the immigration policies by Obama and Biden are also xenophobic, but the official campaign rhetoric with liberal presidents tends to be less so. I also found that Biden acting against tiktok was also xenophobic and i personally thought it was just stupid and divisive...my understanding of the word is that it either means fear of outside influence or foreigners, this is the etymn online deconstruction:
borders themselves are also xenophobic, Trump just makes people describing him as such easy just because his over-simplifications and dishonesty about immigrants themselves obviously appeals to a fear of immigrants. "They're eating the cats, they're eating the dogs...", he has made it easy for people to call him xenophobic, and i see no issue with calling a spade a spade.
Overall, i find such notions to be unfounded because clearly more predatory and criminal activity is committed by people who are already living in the country.
Hmm, ok, cool thank you. That's hugely clarifying.
Is your issue that there are secure borders? I 'm not trying to corner you there; I take 'secure' to mean enforced as per immigration laws. I guess I'm wondering where in that there xenophobia comes from - and I'm having to take it back to the fact that entrants must be legal? I assume that's wrong, so would appreciate correction.
Quoting ProtagoranSocratist
This is key, so thank you. We do not have any common ground here. This now says all we need in terms of disagreement, but the discussion is fun anyway to me.
Quoting ProtagoranSocratist
That's fair. But if there is a policy which would prevent X type of offence being committed (or offences by X group), I want that policy (generally). And if that policy is simply enforcing existing laws, I can't complain about it. We do not have males in female spaces largely because that group commits certain crimes. Not all, not even most. A sliver, at best. But we stil have that policy and enforce it heartily. Most people just do it. Not illegally entering a country should be the same.
For me, the issue was that a huge swathe of hte public decided to rally to prevent the enforcement of existing laws and that was for decades. Despite the policies of Obama and Biden. I absolutely agree the rhetoric and political delivery is softer in those administrations - Im unsure that's good. As noted though, if this goes back to borders being 'xenophobic', I cannot understand that and we're good :) lol
Hello PS,
What we are seeing globally in terms of immigration is vastly different than what was happening even 5-10 years ago. Here in Canada, hundreds of thousands of immigrants whose visas have expired have simply disappeared, expected to self-deport.
Huge processing backlogs are costing governments millions to store newcomers in hotels, worldwide. Certain demographic groups are committing a vastly higher percentage of certain kinds of crimes - witness the decades-long grooming gang scandal in England.
Do you honestly think an open-border policy that is happy to absorb, say, thousands of unattached young men fleeing conflict and war is going to have no negative impacts on a nation?
I agree Trump makes it 'easy' for people to view him as xenophobic, but don't think borders are xenophobic. This stance seems wildly naive, given the increasingly globalized nature of human life, and the pervasiveness of tech which further shrinks the distance from one place to another.
Not to mention the fact that many immigrants who use legal channels find the open-borders stance, or the civil-disobedience stance, noxious.
this is something i actually think about a lot, and i haven't come to any absolute conclusions: i think borders, national identity, race, and gender all contribute to confusion when it comes to just doing basic things during the day. I understand that these concepts exist for various reasons, and doing away with them entirely is impossible and doesn't have any clear benefits...but it doesn't have to mean i like them.
With borders, i would prefer it if i didn't have to carry around a passport when traveling, or show identity to authority figures, but i can fully admit that i don't know how it would be possible to get rid of borders to everyone's satisfaction. I also don't think it really makes any sense to morally judge someone who violates a country's immigration laws if they are only trying to improve their situation peacefully. There are ways to immigrate to the united states legally, but clearly a lot of illegal immigrants are not able to complete those procedures, or don't know how.
that's not how it plays out in the united states, in the united states, most of the crimes are committed by people who already live here. However, it's tricky to tell the difference between a crime and non-crime, which is why I included "predatory behavior" in my analysis, because it doesn't have to be illegal to be harmful.
Quoting ProtagoranSocratist
That's fair. I just don't think that's the USA's problem. They should come in legally. I don't think its at all fair, or reasonable to post-hoc ignore your laws to be 'nice'.
DACA was good. But its been weaponized. If you're in the US illegally, get your shit together. I can't see any argument that would deny the US the right to remove a criminal who's been there for 40 years and never got their papers together, despite DACA.
Now comes comments about enforcement tactics. I presume we're closerr there than anywhere else in this. But I also assume we have different 'facts' due to informational bottlenecks, echo chambers etc.. (i'm joking - it may not be worth wading into that, lol).
Okay, so then your whole position is apparently that you would attempt to rationally persuade people to act in certain ways, but you would not call that sort of rational persuasion a moral argument? If that's it, then I think this goes back to our old conversation where you were unable to define what you mean by "moral." In my book if you are rationally persuading someone to behave in a particular way, then you are offering a moral argument by definition.
Morality is trying to make decisions based on 'right' and 'wrong'. That's it. There isn't anything more interesting to be said. I said this at the time (and several other places) as best I can recall. What you were trying to get out of me is what I think constitutes those two things. I also gave a direct response (as i have here) to that. It is simply what makes me feel good or bad (which is 100% subjective... ending the discussion (although, it is describable or reportable)). It doesn't apply to other people. I've been consistent about that too.
Moral reasoning is trying to convince something their act is good or bad. That is entirely different from rational reasoning which is about what will achieve the stated goal or not (in this context).
I think you're inventing problems.
P.S as not that important, but worth knowing: I don't often do this with people who I don't know well. I find it absolute folly to try to discuss anything that relies on emotional reactivity with anyone for the most part. People I know well; we can navigate together and find a way out of hte emotionality into something practical and helpful in the real world. Others are extremely reticent to allow any level of letting the guard down incase I am able to invalidate their emotional response to a situation. Which is a 100% reasonable, but a sign of human nature I quite abhor. That is why this forum is such an interesting place to me. People who, for the most part, can do the discussion without becoming insufferable, yet who I don't know.
Moral reasoning attempts to convince others to behave in particular ways, and that is what you are engaged in. I don't know of any academic emotivists or non-cognitivists who would disagree with me on this. For example, both Ayer and Stevenson would see your attempts at behavioral persuasion as moral acts. There is nothing else they could be. Hare would be even more explicit, in that if you are not describing then you are prescribing. There is no such thing as trying to convince someone to behave in a certain way, and thereby arguing non-morally. Emotivists understand this as well as anyone else. Your idea that, "I am trying to persuade them to behave in a certain way, and I am doing so non-morally," is simply ad hoc, and this would be recognized even by the academics who take up the same meta-ethical position that you do.
Then we have nothing to talk about. I have explicitly, reasonably laid out why reasoning someone to a behaviour on practical terms is not moral reasoning.
"You want to change the tyre? Ok, well stop using a screwdriver, you're going to neeed a tyre iron. Pick that up and bring it here."
Nothing moral about that. Quoting Leontiskos
Well, there is. I've just shown it. What a bizarre line to take my man.
I do not, ever, try to convince people to do things because i want them to. I only ever rationally persuade people to do what will best achieve their stated goal. The morality of this is that I care to help another person toward their goal. *this with the carve-out for those I know well, and that I do not deny is moral reasoning ever*. There is a direct, strict delineation between this, rational, goal-oriented persuasion, and moral, good/bad oriented persuasion (There is an internal moral logic to what goals I would be motivated to help achieve though, for sure).
Your unfounded assumptions noted and rejected. You aren't particularly good at this part of the exchange. It hampers us discussion these things often, which is a shame - I really enjoy the exchanges. They just always end like this. I'm not sure how to get around it with your persistently being convinced you are right.
You've obviously gone beyond hypothetical imperatives in this thread. For example, see these posts:
Quoting AmadeusD
Quoting AmadeusD
Quoting AmadeusD
And we've already been over this with respect to my thread on non-hypothetical ought-judgments.
Even in the case where you call the police to prevent someone from violating your or another's "rights", you are engaged in classic moral behavior. You are attempting to get someone to behave in a particular way regardless of any goal they might have. There is nothing special or non-moral about the legal sphere.
Quoting Leontiskos
1. This is my telling you how I behave. Nothing about convincing other people. I, for instance, will refrain from such and such, or choose to do such and such, often on moral grounds. That's all. If you'd like to import more to that statement, that's fine, but not what I said or mean. If you need to take this reply as a clarification, feel free to do so. I don't think it was unclear, myself.
2. And in those situations the reasoning is "what will get you toward your stated goal". Which has almost nothing to do with me or my opinions. It is a-moral (again, unless we import discussions about the goal. And that's where I'll make a moral decision whether or not to engage - as above).
3. Forgive me for not quite understanding the thread here - That statement was a fairly different conversation than the previous two statements pertain to (on review as well as from memory). In any case, assuming you're trying to pin me down to some moral claim: yes, actions which are considered 'immoral' are made so by their intention in most cases. I think I made a case for that, and If you want to go in to it feel free. It seems that was left by the wayside going into other grounds.
Quoting Leontiskos
I don't. I have literally never called the police in my entire life. Not once.
Quoting Leontiskos
As above, no I'm not. I am trying to get them toward their goal. I have been quite clear about this - I suggest the mildly-mind-reading aspect of your thinking is doing some lifting here that it shouldn't be. That isn't derogatory - we have to fill gaps to come up with decent responses most of the time. I would just say in this case, it's better not to because these are nuanced concepts and you are not in my head when I do these things. You may also want to bear in mind I spent several years sociopathic. I know hte difference between moral and practical reason.
Quoting Leontiskos
I don't know where you think our conversation is at, but this is not pertinent.
:lol:
:clap:
Okay, fair.
Quoting AmadeusD
So you would say that when you tell me that, "I will try to enforce [my moral positions] where i am not obviously violating rights," this act of enforcement is not moral in nature?
Quoting AmadeusD
So all you have ever done in this thread is spoken about how to help other people achieve their goals? Don't you think you've also spoken about how to get other people to achieve your goals?
Quoting AmadeusD
And you never would? Similarly, why would you stop enforcing your own moral positions "where I am not obviously violating rights"? Why would rights prevent you?
Earlier when you said things like this it seemed like you at least partially perceived an inconsistency in your own approach:
Quoting AmadeusD
-
Quoting AmadeusD
Well look at quotes like these:
Quoting AmadeusD
Quoting AmadeusD
I don't think it requires mind-reading to understand that you try to persuade people to act in certain ways in order to achieve ends that you desire. But you think this doesn't really count against your position because you dub it "rational" rather than "moral."
Quoting AmadeusD
Can you tell me what the difference is? Is it based on what you said ?
My general point here is that it is hard to believe that you are a thoroughgoing moral subjectivist (or emotivist). The more particular point is that many of the things you said early in the thread militate against such an idea. To take one example:
Quoting AmadeusD
How does a moral subjectivist claim that the law is often wrong when it comes to moral regulation? Are you saying, with the emotivists, something like, "Often, 'boo law!' "? If not and you actually think that the law can be (and often is) wrong, then how is that supposed to work on moral subjectivism?
This is tricky to give a yes or no to. The answer properly is 'yes'. But what i've said there is about how I behave, Not what I try to have others do around me, if you can grok the difference. I wil behave in ways that appear morally righteous to me. The world around me will go on. But my behaviour in the world is a form of enforcement on my account. Perhaps my terms are just shoddy.
Quoting Leontiskos
I think you're being a little callous in your capturing of the situation, but in a significant sense, yes, that's right. When I speak about how i interact with other people, i try my best to help people toward their goals. The decision to do so is moral. The activity of, lets say, educating someone as how best to achieve their goal in my view, is entirely practical as I see it. I could just as easily leave off and nothing would be different morally.
Quoting Leontiskos
Not that I can imagine, no but I wont stand too strongly behind that. I don't know the future. It seems wrong, in most cases, to me. I just understand the efficiency for social cohesion so I'm not railing against police as an institution.
If my behaviour violates other people's rights, that's counter to an overarching moral intention to maintain social and cultural cohesion. This is a legal argument rather than a strictly moral one, but to be sure, I am making a moral call to resile from a behaviour once I note it may be violating another's rights of some kind.
Quoting Leontiskos
There's no inconsistency. If I am trying to get someone to act, its on practical grounds due to a moral decision to help them. You must clearly delineate the two modes. A moral decision is made in my mind - I then behave without moral reasoning in persuading the other to act toward their own goal (not mine. That's incorrect). My (moral) desire is to help the person. Not their goal, per se. The how-to is somewhat arbitrary.
Quoting Leontiskos
It simply doesn't., because it simply is. I understand if you feel those things can't come apart. That's fair, but not my position and I don't see it as required to make sense of all this.
Quoting Leontiskos
The quote you use there is let's call it unfinished, as a response to this quesiton. Roughly moral reasoning is that which gets us to do something because of its rightness or wrongness. Practical reason is trying to do things which will achieve an arbitrary goal. So, in my example, if my moral position was that it's good to help anyone whatever then you might find me teaching a racist how best to gut Chinese children. But my moral reasoning tells me not to help that person toward their goal. The reasoning-to-act issue never arises. Had it, the moral problem would be in my decision to help them, not my reasoning on how best they could achieve their barbaric (i presume moral) outcomes.
Quoting Leontiskos
I think most people have this trouble; particularly the theologically inclined. For instance I don't need answers to 'why are we here' or 'what does it mean to be human' or whatever to get on with my life all hunky dory. I don't care. We are here. We are human. What the 'means' is made up stuff we do for fun, basically. I get that its tough to understand, but there's a massive difference between being a subjectivist when it comes to morality, and being either a-moral, or dismissing morality entirely. Alex O'Connor does a good job of discussion emotivist in these terms imo.
Quoting Leontiskos
As an example, with wills and estates there is generally a 'moral duty' to provide for one's children after death (if one has anything to pass on, anyway). I think this is wrong, overreach and inapt for a legal framework that doesn't interfere with people's personal affairs. So, that's my personal moral view. I don't think that's going to be true for the next guy. So i don't care to do anything about the policy. I have to enforce it regularly, actually (well, I have a part in doing so regularly).
This is why I think the Law does a pretty good job. For the most part, its been 'democratically' hammered out over time, through common law, into something resembling a "close-to-consensus" and I'm happy to live with that.
They may mean when Trump calls immigrants "garbage" and "vermin" and says they are "poisoning the blood of the country" and the "country is being ravaged by migrant crime" and that foreign countries are "emptying out their prisons and mental institutions" and sending all their worst people to the US. And oh yes, "They're eating the cats, they're eating the dogs."
Would you call this ideologically evil?
They were Trump's words
Quoting AmadeusD
No, they weren't. But what is interesting is your compulsion to defend such language.
Quoting AmadeusD
If only that was all he were.
The rest of my comment matters. Like.. really matters. It seems you're quite good at losing nuance in service of clearly (and reasonably) emotional takes on things.
Quoting Questioner
This is why the rest of my comment mattters:
Quoting AmadeusD
I don't think you're doing this in anything close to good faith. Twice, in one post, you have ignored the context in service of your emotionally-derived response. So be it.
Quoting Questioner
Fair position. I don't take it.
That wasn't the rest of your comment. Indeed, you followed that with a "but" - and this being a philosophical forum - we perhaps should turn to the philosophical use of "but" - which is used to show that the second clause is in opposition to the first
I like oranges, but the colour is odd.
Well, I guess the word "but" has other uses, but in your case it went like this:
I don't defend Trump, but here are the reasons I defend him
Well this whole thread revolves around forms of behavior that also influence others' behavior, so I don't think it makes much sense to try to make it merely about one's own behavior. For example, I am talking about the way that "try to get people to either act or not act," and those acts are not merely about how you behave. The matter is about how you intentionally influence the behavior of others. If it were just you, standing alone, behaving as you like without any influence or effect on others, then none of my points would have any weight.
Quoting AmadeusD
Well you literally said that you "try to get people to either act or not act," and you also acknowledged the importance of intention. This seems to indicate that when you are merely trying to get people to act or not act (regardless of any intention), you have your own goals primarily in mind rather than their own. If we want to help someone then we have to focus on something more than a material act or omission. So I think my phrasing follows from your own words.
Quoting AmadeusD
But are you saying that your decision to help people towards their goals is moral, or not? Because in your third sentence that's what you said, but then in your fourth sentence you said it was "entirely practical" (which presumably means non-moral). Isn't that a contradiction?
Quoting AmadeusD
Okay good, and we agree on this. Your behavior in cases such as these is moral in nature, or in your words, it requires "making a moral call."
Quoting AmadeusD
Okay. Let's take just one part of this. You seem to be saying that you make a moral decision to help someone do something, and then you go on to "behave without moral reasoning in persuading the other to act toward their own goal." Is the idea that helping others is moral, but the thing that the other person is being helped to do need not be moral? It seems to me then that in the interaction you would be acting morally throughout (insofar as you are helping), and the person would be achieving some practical end with your aid. Thus from the perspective of the person being helped, you are acting morally insofar as you are helping them, but you are only acting practically insofar as the means-end intelligibility is being discovered. Is that right?
(If this is right, then when you earlier said that you are only helping them act, what you must have meant is that you are helping them act and think and understand, but the behavior that you call forth in them is not something that you deem moral.)
Quoting AmadeusD
Okay good, and I will probably come back to this definition.
Quoting AmadeusD
But why is your unspecified decision to help someone moral, as you earlier said it was? Were you relying on a syllogism like this: <It is right to help people; I decide to help because it is right; therefore my decision to help is moral>?
Quoting Leontiskos
Quoting AmadeusD
A simple case is your point about how you respect others' rights, and that this respect is moral in nature. If you were a subjectivist or an emotivist I'm not sure how that would work. It's helpful that you reference O'Connor, but I also find him muddled (even though he seems to improve with time). (Note that a lot of these themes overlap with a new thread on the topic).
Quoting Leontiskos
Quoting AmadeusD
But how does the subjectivist claim that the law is right or wrong? You give an example where you think the law is wrong, but then go on to say, "I don't think this is going to be true for the next guy. So i don't care to do anything about the policy." This is utterly strange to me. It's like saying, "This law is wrong but there is no reason to change it," or, "This law is right but there is no reason to keep it."
If you really think a law is wrong, then by definition it would seem that you want it to be changed. If you have no desire that it be changed, then I'm not sure you can say that it is wrong. And if you are a subjectivist then I think that would be consistent. Yet you say it is wrong.
Quoting Leontiskos
So you don't grok the difference? Or what? It's somewhat hard to get more than "you're a little offtopic" here. Which seems totally true, tbf lol.
Quoting Leontiskos
I have explicitly, and in detail addressed this. You are wrong. I probably shouldn't be required to go over it again at this stage. Suffice to say my goal is to do what I think is right. Their goal is whatever it is. They are not interdependent. The moral reasoning is inside my head and has no part in the discussion with old mate.
Quoting Leontiskos
You could just read the quote you quoted. There are two activities. One is moral. One is not. This isn't rocket science my guy - its really, really hard to see how you're not getting this.
My decision: Moral.
What I say to old mate: practical.
Nothing unusual or inconsistent here.
Quoting Leontiskos
Clearly not. It seems you're about to address this (which is odd as these prior responses act as if you're not going to.. just as an explainer for why it might seem weird that I either repeat myself within this reply, or ignore some things within it).
Quoting Leontiskos
Yes. It is specifically morality that would prevent me from, for instance, instructing someone on how best to harm a child.
Quoting Leontiskos
Roughly, yes. I think difference cases would be phrased slightly differently, but that's the delineation I am illustrating. It's 'good' in my view to help my younger son build legos. Building legos has absolutely no moral valence at all (to me. Maybe someone finds morality in building legos, I don't know. That's kind of the point).
Quoting Leontiskos
Now this is totally reasonable, but I think it's simply a requirement you need to maintain your position and no one whcih can be illustrated. Explaining how to put together a packing box for groceries isn't moral. That I am helping someone is moral. You may disagree, but you've asked for why my position is what it is - and this is it. They are different things. When i was sociopathic I often "helped" other people. Largely out of boredom. There was no moral decision. At all. The difference is my internal intention (I think we've been here and you disagree - i'm just trying to answer the objections).
Quoting Leontiskos
If I getting this right, from you, then yeah pretty much. I guess it would be cleaner to say that i act is morally, but what my action is is not, in this case. Contrasted with perhaps dragging a struggling kid from a pool - I'm not going to check if the kid wants to drown or not. My morality tells to do a moral act, in that case and the moral act is the entire act in that case. In our example here (helping someone put a box together lets say) only the decision to act, or more closely, that I act is the moral element. The actual instruction could've just been handing a sheet of paper over and walking away in disgust at how inept old mate is.
Quoting Leontiskos
Well, maybe, but you've got this the wrong way around: that is a result, not an act on my part. I don't actually care whether the person listens to me to be honest. My decision was simply to help. If that's rejected or misunderstood, I don't care a lick. It would certain be better for their goal if they listened, though. But it doesn't move me because (i presume) its their morality or intention creating that fact rather than mine.
Quoting Leontiskos
Because in making the decision, i am weighing explicitly where it sits ion my internal spectrum of right ad wrong. Once i've made the decision, the moral lens is put down (unless something further comes up that requires a moral decision - like finding out they have an ulterior motive or whatever that I do have a moral issue with).
Quoting Leontiskos
I don't see an issue, other than from the perspective of someone who requires an outside arbiter of their morality. Violating others rights (although, that then begs the question of what rights I consider moral and not... that notwithstanding...) makes me feel shit. So I do my best not to. It doesn't actually matter too much what effect it has on the other person unless I've done it unintentionally. Then, their reaction is what makes me feel shit because it was unintended. If i intended to do something I knew would violate a right that i feel is immoral, why would I care about them being hurt? Thanks for the link - i've been following some of it.
Quoting Leontiskos
I don't. I wont speak for others. I'll say it works for the most part. I then have personal views on particular aspects that tend not to come into a legal discussion for me. The only times I make moral claims about legal issues is such as above. But if i were to take the view that what I personally considerally morally this or that should be reflected in law, I would be a nation of one fightining against my brothers (metaphorically) to enforce a set of feelings I think are essentially unhelpful in the wider world (i.e outside of regulating my own behaviour and choices).
Quoting Leontiskos
Yah. I've picked up on that :P This seems to be the boilerplate for the disagreement, as I see it. And that's all good - it seems to support my view (tongue-in-cheek).
Quoting Leontiskos
No. The law is not a moral institution. It may appear that way, because collective moralities over time have shaped it - but in a pluralistic society it is a practical guide to disputes of morality in most cases. This is why there are courts that allow what we in the West would call murder - because those cultures have hammered out law with a different moral lens to the majority of the West. This is something like a smoking gun against the Alvaro-type moral thinkers. There is no universal sense of morality (running against 180s claim in the thread you linked, for instance).
Quoting Leontiskos
This seems to be cause you conflate law and morality. The law lives outside my head. It cannot be part of my morality. I can react to it morally, and that's all.
A committment to free speech would have us accepting plenty of 'immoral' things said by others, while not ever trying to have the law prevent them from saying it (or more recently, the reverse of this lol. Trying to instantiate tolerance for views I find immoral in pursuit of free speech).
Perhaps there's a theological bent to you thinking, as noted: laws are moral laws in religion (almost always). They aren't so in the secular land. Or at least, this is my view on the Law vs morality in the west. Law emerges from morality, as such, but is not itself a moral arbiter. It's just as best we can get to a "middle way" to decide issues for which people have strong moral beliefs. Probably good to understand that when I saw "that law is wrong" i mean "i would rather not". Not that there's some benchmark I can take you to to understand why it's wrong. You're just going to get my opinion if you ask.
I do note here that I hve given an example which is specifically a 'moral duty' but this is a specific beast within Law which is not representative of how Law works - its a bespoke family law issue. I think Family law should operate like all law, but it doesn't and that seems to work.
Okay, but I think you need to actually revise your rhetoric if you really want to avoid coming off as "short." It's a bit like the person who says, "No offense, but [now I'm going to say something that is offensive]." If someone really wants to avoid offense, then they have to actually stop saying offensive things. It doesn't make sense to say offensive things and then slap on the disclaimer, "No offense intended." What I'll do is limit myself to those parts of your post that are substantive rather than "short."
Quoting AmadeusD
Okay good, I understand what you are saying.
Quoting AmadeusD
So are you saying that when you were sociopathic you helped people without thinking that helping people was right, and now you help people because you think helping people is right? It's the "because it is right" that changed, and made the non-moral act a moral act. Is that right?
Quoting AmadeusD
See, I really don't know what that means, and I don't think you understand how unclear these sorts of claims are. There is nothing clean about the statement, "that i act is morally, but what my action is is not, in this case." Even if I try to clean up the grammar it still isn't clear to me: "that I act is moral, but what my action is is not moral, in this case." If you really think what you are saying is obvious, then it should be easy to express clearly and lucidly.
Quoting AmadeusD
I still don't understand what you are saying. So in your example of helping someone put a box together, you say that your decision to help them is the moral element. Or else "that I act" is the moral element. But those are two different things. Is it the decision or is it the "that I act," and what does "that I act" mean? Everything we do can be construed as an act. A decision is an act. Box-building is an act. Helping is a form of acting. So "that I act" is very vague given how broad the term 'act' is.
I should add that what you are attempting is quite difficult, philosophically speaking (i.e. the specification of moral acts or else human acts). It is not something which has easy or obvious answers. Tackling the problem requires a thoroughgoing application of one's mind. It requires careful thinking, and in turn, carefully constructed sentences.
Quoting AmadeusD
Eh, I don't believe you. If you "didn't care a lick" then you wouldn't have tried to help in the first place. No one speaks to someone without caring whether they listen. If you speak to someone then you already desire that they listen. If you have no desire that they listen to your words, then you will not speak.
Quoting AmadeusD
Okay, and I am glad to see that you're acknowledging that you have an internal spectrum of right and wrong, that you engage in moral activities and decisions, etc. That is different from conversations we have had in the past.
Quoting AmadeusD
But I think you do care what effect it has on the other person. The whole concept of "violating another's rights" has this built-in. Someone who cares about violating another's rights eo ipso cares about the effects of their actions on other people. It is not possible to recognize another's rights without caring about the effects of one's actions on others.
Quoting AmadeusD
I certainly disagree, and yet it's not even clear that what you say here is coherent. "The law is not a moral institution; it is a practical guide to adjudicating disputes of morality." Does that make any sense? I think it makes more sense to say that an institution that adjudicates disputes of morality is necessarily a moral institution. I'm not sure how one would adjudicate moral disputes while remaining non-moral.
Quoting AmadeusD
The same would apply here.
...But we don't need to get too deep into the nature of law, as it might make the conversation too long and unwieldy.
Well, I get you but disagree. I told you what you needed to know upfront. I am not obliged to come across particularly personable. I would say, particularly here. But I hear you, generally. It's better to get on. Personally, I'd have just read that and moved on with it in mind. Takes all kind
Quoting Leontiskos
I would say yes (phrased this way because I can't view myself from the outside with my own set of beliefs etc..). I can recall a couple of occasions on which I went to help someone, mucked it because I didn't know what I was doing and walked away laughing because it entertained me as best I could be entertained. One of these occasions was to leave a child without a parent at an event at which they were bound to get lost and likely hurt. I am not proud of this period of my life in any way, to be clear.
Quoting Leontiskos
As far as I'm concerned, I have. Thanks for cleaning up the grammar (i type quickly at work because of short windows for thinking about other things. I should probably use Drafts, but I'd probably never end up posting them). If you feel otherwise, that's cool and I respect you on that. The sentence you laid out seems clear as day to me in what it means (curse of knowledge perhaps).
Quoting Leontiskos
Okay, I'll try to clarify. This response tells me it's probably semantics and not concepts, which is encouraging. Up top, I would say that I hear you on "all agential events are acts". Seems reasonable and like you say, it's hard to distinguish these things. But it seems clear to me that a thought, or a decision to cross the road is not an act in, at the very least, the same sense as crossing the road. Could that be agreed? Our language may be different, but we're talking about materially and morally different things imo.
They (tend to)follow one another and are of different kinds "That I have decided to act" is probably better put for this discussion, but I see a clear and meaningful distinction between "acting or not acting" on the one hand, and what the act is on the other. An example might be the trolley problem. Doing nothing gives us one impression - and either of the choices gives us a separate, slightly askance impression. Dovetailing, to be sure and so I was wrong to be quite so stark about and thank you for that. Is "killing a child" immoral? Well, imo yes. Is "deciding to kill a child" immoral? Well, also probably yes but if then you are prevented from doing so, we're talking about different things as the 'act' (in my use) hasn't actually occurred.
Quoting Leontiskos
You are confusing whether i care to help, or whether i care to succeed. Remember, my form of morality is essentially narcissistic. I care that I tried. I don't care much about the success. I understand and don't fault you for not believing this. But I can tell you it's true as many times as you like.
Quoting Leontiskos
As with above, no, I care that I spoke. It's pretty self-interested. That's, as I see it, the discomfort with emotivist. It is by definition self-interested and not concerned much with outcomes other than insofar as they make one feel a type of way. I understand why people don't like it.
Quoting Leontiskos
Is it? I don't quite think so. If that's what you've gotten, I have far more work to do about the semantic issue To me, I obviously carry out moral evaluations and act on the result of that evaluation. If that hasn't come across, I apologise as you might be running along tracks I can't quite get on for a discussion. That'll be my bad. (I guess the novel aspect of my position is that once I've begun to act, the morality isn't involved until something changes in the context (noted with the ulterior motive comment in previous post)).
Quoting Leontiskos
Ah. It seems you've again confused law with morality. Some rights I couldn't give a flying F about. I would violate them all day long, because I don't care about the effect that has on someone else. I, personally, have deemed that right lacking/wanting/wrong or whatever on my internal moral compass and therefore do not act as if its a moral obligation. And, despite working in law, I often violate it for what I deem worthy outcomes. This rests on my rejection of rights as anything but legal positions. I do not think rights arise from anything but legal authority (or something analogous like religious authority).
So I can recognise that someone has right x, understand they enjoy that right at Law, and still not give a shit. Thought, I may enforce it for the moral reason of social cohesion, as earlier noted, because that overarching consideration may trump the fact that in case A I couldn't care less.
Quoting Leontiskos
That's totally fair, and this is an issue I would far, far, far prefer to say out loud rather than sit rewriting sentences about until I find exactly what hits hte nail. I shall have a go..
Moral systems have, over the centuries, existed and exerted certain power over people. Those systems are essentially incompatible (Catholic, Islamic, Secular, NAP, what have you..). So a system must be put in place to adjudicate between them. I do not think it a moral exercise to essentially mathematically work out (although, this is a little bit misleading, I do think it amounts to a calculation-over-centuries) what the most people would assent to and agree with. Given huge numbers of people disagree with laws and in fact, often violate them for specifically moral reasons, tells me that laws are not moral creatures (again, exceptions exist but they appear to operate different from lets say tax law and it feels like a bad move to me overall). Essentially, what I think is that a law of the land operates as a neutral arbiter between competing social interests. We do not cut off the hands of thieves in the west, but a small number of people in the west would love that to be the case. So law just goes "Well, mathematically, that's a small group so we wont take that into account - we've observed that most people prefer x outcome" not "cutting of hands of thieves is wrong, so we wont take that into account". And, you'll also note that as societies values change, the law catches up eventually on sort of critical mass basis, not on a response to moral argument basis.
Now, I may be overselling this - I can see good arguments for your point of view - they don't move me much as laws are not there for the purpose of making people feel good. They're there to maintain a mathematically(non-moral) deduced middle ground that most people will be ok with (moral). It is a very, very fine line and it's possible I am incapable of wording things correctly 'on paper'. I cop to that. The people are moral, the law is not. As I see it.
Quoting Leontiskos
Fuck. I should have read this first.. .LOL. Thanks man. Enjoying this one a lot.
Okay, that makes sense.
Quoting AmadeusD
Sure.
Quoting AmadeusD
Okay, this does help. Let's revisit that initial formulation that you maintain is clear, "That I act is moral, but what my action is is not moral, in this case." Taking the child case, you seem to say that the decision and the act are both immoral, albeit in somewhat different ways. If this is right, then your principle only holds in certain cases, namely the principle, "That I act is moral, but what my action is is not moral." That's not inconsistent, as you did follow it with, "...in this case."
Still, the problem is that if someone gives a principle and then follows it with, "...in this case," or, "...sometimes," then they have effectively nullified the principle. It is one thing to say, "Decisions to act are moral but physical action is not." It is quite another to say, "Decisions to act are moral and physical action is not, sometimes." The "sometimes" immediately raises the question, "Well when does your principle hold and when does it not?" Without that explanation the principle can't actually function in an argument.
Quoting Leontiskos
Quoting AmadeusD
You're telling me that you try to do things without trying to succeed at the things you do. I'm sure you understand why I don't believe you, given how strange your claim is?
Quoting Leontiskos
Quoting AmadeusD
The problem is that speaking and being listened to are "two peas in a pod." No one speaks to someone without wanting that person to listen to them. A cooperative activity cannot be purely self-interested in the sense you require. It's like saying, "I get on the teeter-totter and I push off the ground. I care that I pushed, I don't care whether the other person provides a counterweight. It's pretty self-interested." The problem is that teeter-totters make no sense without a counterweight.
Quoting AmadeusD
Here is an example from a previous conversation, where you critique the use of the words 'right' and 'wrong' in relation to morality:
Quoting AmadeusD
-
Quoting AmadeusD
Well, would you agree that all along you are running the "background process" of "helping," and that this "background process" is moral? The whole time you are helping him construct the cardboard box you are helping, and so if helping is a moral act then it seems to be operative throughout. If you stopped running that "background process" then you would also stop building the box.
Quoting AmadeusD
And I am obviously not speaking to those.
Quoting AmadeusD
Well you've literally claimed in this thread that there are certain rights of others that you would not transgress, so obviously there are some rights you give a shit about. Obviously my argument had to do with those rights rather than ones we haven't spoken about at all. Given that you are averse to transgressing some rights, you surely care what effect your actions have on other people (who possesses those rights).
Quoting AmadeusD
I do. In fact I think your "mathematical assessment" is itself a moral position, namely a quantitative form of democratic morality. If someone says, "This moral disagreement will be resolved by a majority vote," their method of adjudication is itself moral. There are other ways to resolve moral disagreements than a majority vote, or a mathematical assessment.
Quoting AmadeusD
That's an invalid argument. "This law can be broken, therefore it is not moral." The same is true with, "This law can be broken for moral reasons, therefore it is not moral." But the second claim rests on an equivocation on the word 'moral' (which I incidentally address in my OP, beginning with the third sentence of the introduction). Indeed, when someone breaks a law for moral reasons they are presupposing that the law itself is immoral, and an immoral thing is a "moral" thing in the broad sense (just as a murder is a moral act, albeit not a good act).
Quoting AmadeusD
How do you figure it's neutral? We literally argue over laws. How does the outcome of that vociferous argument become "neutral"?
Quoting AmadeusD
Again, you are appealing to a kind of majoritarianism, which is clearly a moral position. "We ought to do whatever most people want," is a moral claim.
Quoting AmadeusD
Fair enough. In a technical sense you are elevating a classically liberal notion of law as if it were the only possible or reasonable notion of law, and given that you have grown up in a classically liberal society that is totally understandable. Most societies do not consider their "normal" to be moral/idiosyncratic. Classically liberal societies assume that all societies function via a "mathematical" notion of law.
Quoting AmadeusD
Haha
I think its more than they can come together in some cases, but are not dependent on one another. I can concede this and, as i say, regret the starkness with which I had teased them apart. But they do come apart, it seems, which I guess was what I needed. I may just be a bit unique in how my brain processes those pieces of data.
Quoting Leontiskos
Ah, fair enough. This illustrates to me a mistake in what I've said, not my concept. What I am getting at is that the act following a decision need not be in the same category of 'event'. Some acts are 100% moral acts. I think i conceded this earlier by saying that pulling the kid out the water was a moral act following a moral decision on part ,and this does happen semi-regularly (probably less than most people). As best I can tell, what I've said works for my argument, i've just been clumsy. My initial point was just that deciding to so something and the thing have different valences. I maintain that, but you're right that they coincide often. I am just saying thats not a dependence, i guess.
Quoting Leontiskos
You may want to re-read the quoted, highlighting to yourself narcisisstic. Its definitely strange, and as i said, I get the skepticism. But it's the case. I would say though "without trying to succeed" is a step to far, and something you've imported. I try to succeed - that's what attempting to help is. If it doesn't work, i don't care. I can't quite see why its required I care about the success through the entire act. I simply stop caring if it's not going well (and I can't see a clear path to success). Perhaps a psychological foible. I'm not bothered.
Quoting Leontiskos
You may not. I often do. Again, perhaps a psychological foible.
Quoting Leontiskos
I disagree. Your view of them and what they are intended to do is colouring something. If the intent is simply to have gotten on a teeter-totter(we call them see-saws) and done my part, that's all i care for. In my line of work this mental state is a vocational necessity because it is not in my interest or my responsibility to chase the other side of a deal for their undertakings etc. If they give htem, we proceed. If they don't, I move on to another piece of work. Rinse, repeat. But almost everyone is self-interested in this line of work, so will do their part. Generally, when they don't they get in trouble as they have harmed their client. But that has nothing to do with me and I couldn't care less. I do my part.
Quoting Leontiskos
Hmmm. That's a difficult one. I can lean a millimeter that was and assent, or a millimeter the other way and reject. There's an underlying basis of the act, which is my want to help - but that want is devoid of content in a significant way. Would have to think, but it certainly could be so.
Quoting Leontiskos
Hmm. Once the decision is made new info is needed to change my course of action. You see this as strange. That's fine. But it's not incoherent. It's like keeping a promise you don't really want to keep, I guess, but I don't feel obliged in these circumstances, to another person - but to my prior decision. So, I don't htikn that's quite so.
Quoting Leontiskos
But that's key to the premise. If there are rights I don't care about, the fact there is a right to be violated is not really the crucial motivator in my resiling. It is that I personally consider that right morally correct to defend or some such.
Quoting Leontiskos
Yep. Not sure what you're not getting. Some rights that's going to be true about, some it isn't. Rights-violating (or defense) is something with reference to law, but resting on my moral compass.
Quoting Leontiskos
No, no. It is narcissistic: I care to not feel like i violated my own moral principle. That's it. That's where it ends. Lucky harming my child hurts me, huh? I might care about the effect on others even, but it doesn't factor into a decision as such. Whether or not i will care after the act, that I did or didn't do itis what matters to me. Recall the child I left at the festival - I still function somewhat that way, but I have an internal compass that would've still told me to get the child to safety - not to help the child, necssarily, but to satisfy my moral itch. I understand exactly how uncomfortable and offputting this is to other people. But I don't care.
Quoting Leontiskos
You think? I'm not quite seeing it. Its a mathematical event, not a moral one, to me. I think i know what you're saying though, which is that someone thought that method was "right" and so we're back in moral territory. I prefer to think it was considered 'best'. Which is not, to my mind, moral. Its practical. But I can see how your view goes through, so I won't argue hard.
Quoting Leontiskos
That's not the argument.
Quoting Leontiskos
I don't see why this is required, but I can see why its usually going to be true. I often violate laws for moral reasons that have nothing to do with the law itself. I don't think its immoral, for instance, to prevent harm to children. I think there is a mathematically sound consensus that slapping kids is bad for them. So much is true. The law itself reflects that attitude, but its a mathematical function of the consensus - not moral claim. I have slapped kids in circumstances where it was required to protect them from fire (the classic example) and in one case water (batting them away from an edge they were already past the precipice of). I violated a law for a moral reason, but do not think that law is immoral at all. Not sure where else to take that, sorry lol.
Quoting Leontiskos
Neutral roughly means 'in the middle'. I understand laws to be, at least attempts at getting to the middle point of competing interests in a pluralistic society (this meaning we can ignore anything 'from on high' as it were). I think the entire function of public law is to supercede the moral function of the human heart, let's say, and force people to socially agree to tenets which they may have moral reservations about, but are mathematically the overall, averaged preference. The preference is moral, to be sure (i,e politicians and the house are places for moral debate) but the resulting laws from this process are, again, mathematically representations of an average over centuries. I have a hard time seeing that as moral - but I wont outright say you're wrong here. It's a good point.
Quoting Leontiskos
Not appealing to it. Observing it. And given it's not intentional, it's just happened to be the 'working' outcome of a deliberative process, Its hard to see them in the same light.
I don't know how many judgements you've read, but they are decidedly a-moral. Judges are extremely, extremely reticent to use any moral terms. They generally use a form called ILAC.
Issues
Law
Application
Conclusion.
There is no room for moral debate, in the vast majority of cases. The law is what it is, we hold the facts up the law and existing guidance tells us what to do. Judges often opine that they'd prefer to do something else, but morality isn't hte arbiter in law. Toughie.
Quoting Leontiskos
I'm not sure this is hte case, but I'm also unsure I'm getting you fully. My notion of Law is one which looks like it works to me. That's about it. I'd change some things if I were a King, for instance.