Review an argument
I understand that the subject matter of this argument can be controversial and might prompt discussion, but my interest here is more about the formal aspects of the argument and not the soundness of the premises. If there is an interest to discuss the soundness of the premises, I can create a spinoff thread elsewhere.
My concern is with P8, which strikes me as an out of place assumption but I can't quite articulate the problem. Does anyone have any insight and/or solutions? Does that premise render the argument circular or is it ok to have an assumption like that in the argument for the purposes of validity? I'm not invested in the argument, I drew it up quickly just as an interesting exercise.
P1 If any gratuitous suffering is preventable and known , it is wrong to allow said gratuitous suffering.
P2 If some nonhuman animals are sentient and food production practices would constitute gratuitous suffering in humans, then food production practices constitute gratuitous suffering in some nonhuman animals.*
P3 Some nonhuman animals are sentient.
P4 Food production practices would constitute gratuitous suffering in humans.
C1 Food production practices constitute gratuitous suffering in some nonhuman animals. (from P2, P3 and P4)
P5 If food production practices constitute gratuitous suffering in some nonhuman animals, we know of some gratuitous suffering.
C2 We know of some gratuitous suffering. (from C1 and P5)
P6 Gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if a vegan diet is adopted.*
P7 If a vegan diet is adopted, gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable.
P8 A vegan diet is adopted.*
C3 Gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable. (from P6, P7 and P8)
C4 It is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices. (from P1, C2 and C3)
P9 If it is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices, and gratuitous suffering caused by food productions practices is preventable if and only if a vegan diet is adopted, then a vegan diet ought to be adopted.
C5 A vegan diet ought to be adopted. (from P6, C4 and P9)
My concern is with P8, which strikes me as an out of place assumption but I can't quite articulate the problem. Does anyone have any insight and/or solutions? Does that premise render the argument circular or is it ok to have an assumption like that in the argument for the purposes of validity? I'm not invested in the argument, I drew it up quickly just as an interesting exercise.
P1 If any gratuitous suffering is preventable and known , it is wrong to allow said gratuitous suffering.
P2 If some nonhuman animals are sentient and food production practices would constitute gratuitous suffering in humans, then food production practices constitute gratuitous suffering in some nonhuman animals.*
P3 Some nonhuman animals are sentient.
P4 Food production practices would constitute gratuitous suffering in humans.
C1 Food production practices constitute gratuitous suffering in some nonhuman animals. (from P2, P3 and P4)
P5 If food production practices constitute gratuitous suffering in some nonhuman animals, we know of some gratuitous suffering.
C2 We know of some gratuitous suffering. (from C1 and P5)
P6 Gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if a vegan diet is adopted.*
P7 If a vegan diet is adopted, gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable.
P8 A vegan diet is adopted.*
C3 Gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable. (from P6, P7 and P8)
C4 It is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices. (from P1, C2 and C3)
P9 If it is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices, and gratuitous suffering caused by food productions practices is preventable if and only if a vegan diet is adopted, then a vegan diet ought to be adopted.
C5 A vegan diet ought to be adopted. (from P6, C4 and P9)
Comments (53)
I take issue with this. I don't think free range husbandry followed by the swift killing of animals would constitute gratuitous suffering. Therefore any gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable by changing those food production practices to free range husbandry followed by the swift killing of animals – which is consistent with a meat-eating diet.
I would take issue with that premise as well. I've denoted questionable premises with an (*). They're not necessarily bad premises, but require a lot of support.
I understand this to mean that you believe that killing an animal does not violate morality. (pointing out the difference between suffering and gratuitous suffering instead of saying killing animals is wrong)
The first thing to note is that C3 does not actually use P6 (also, your current P7 isn't completely independent since it follows from P6). That's good news because it means you don't have to worry about it when wording P7 and P8. Therefore, you can change them to:
P7 If it is possible to adopt and maintain a vegan diet, then gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable
P8 It is possible to adopt and maintain a vegan diet.
And these two together get you C3.
Essentially, C3 says that the gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable, while P6 says that veganism is the only way to prevent the gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices.
(P.S. If you are trying to patch up this argument, you're going to have to address the slide from "some non-human animals" to "all non-human animals" that is implicit in adopting veganism. Also, are you interested in shorter and/or simplified versions of the argument?)
Perhaps you could take an approach which is based on preserving a diversity of animals rather than preventing animal suffering but would still conclude with veganism. You can arrange it in P/C form, but...
IF human activity is destroying the basis for diverse life on earth--including human life--(global warming) we should adopt sustainable patterns of life.
Using animals for food production contributes to unsustainable patterns of life by aggravating global warming.
A vegan diet would be a more sustainable than a diet containing meat.
Therefore, we should switch to a vegan diet.
A vegan diet would improve life for humans and animals alike by making life more sustainable and maintaining a diversity of life.
This will eliminate our involvement in gratuitous suffering from animal husbandry and fishing. (It will increase my suffering, because I like meat, but we all have to make sacrifices for the greater good.)
Yes! I like this proposal. Thank you!
I said C3 follows from P6, P7, and P8 because P7 is an elimination of the biconditional. The biconditional adds a robustness in the ought claim, if it can be maintained with a defense of the soundness.
Quoting Postmodern Beatnik
This is a simplified version where other versions I've drawn up offer additional conditional claims for the moral claim of eliminating gratuitous suffering (e.g., a reasonable cost condition). I thought for the sake of analysis of the formal aspect of the argument, the simple argument was the best so people don't get wrapped up in the content of the premises.
*edited*
Right. I was being a trigger happy, argumentative ass.
Adopted by whom? The obvious answer 'if it's adopted by everyone' is problematic as then P8 would need to be a strong statement 'it is possible for everyone' something that you probably don't want the argument to hinge on.
For the sake of discussion, do you have any suggestions to solve the problem you brought up, or do you think it's beyond repair?
Quoting SoylentFair enough!
Quoting darthbarracudaNo problem. I was being a hypercorrective ass. ;)
Quoting shmikBy anyone who is in a position to, I would think. There are two ways to go about this: rewording the argument to make it explicitly apply only to those who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet, or to leave it as is and accept that it is only applicable to those who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet. Moreover, I do not think that "adopted by all" is the natural reading here in part because the elimination of all suffering cannot possibly be the goal here. In fact, considering this might lead us to think that the "by those who are in a position to" condition is already built into the argument: it may not count as known and preventable gratuitous suffering if one is not in a position to avoid inflicting it.
Quoting Postmodern Beatnik
The problem is that P6 is not necessarily true depending on the subject. As far as I can tell it comes closest to being true when everyone adopts a vegan diet. There is no direct link between the person who eats the animal and the treatment of the animal. It could well be that my going vegan does not have any effect on the animals that are farmed, chances are my super market is not going to order less meat because I am no longer buying from them.
That would be something that needs to be addressed before P6 can be assumed unless P6 does mean 'by everyone'. One method to go about this that I have seen is to say that there is a small chance of your particular purchase effecting the super market purchasing, but if it is the one then it will cause a large change in the purchasing i.e. if a supermarket buys chicken in lots of 1000 kg then your 1kg will almost certainly not cause the supermarket to by an extra 1000, but it might. Relying on an argument like that would loosen the argument in the OP.
Quoting shmikBut the choice is not between reading P6 as meaning "by everyone" or "just by one person." If the reading is "by anyone who is in a position to," as I suggested, that is going to be a very large number of people. So the fact that you cannot change your local supermarket's buying patterns alone is irrelevant. And if it were true that a vegan diet ought to be adopted by anyone who is in a position to do so, then it wouldn't matter whether or not other people will in fact do so. All that would matter is whether or not any given individual was in a position to adopt a vegan diet.
(The argument could also be rearranged to be more explicitly about participating in the production of gratuitous suffering. But that would get us into issues of deontology vs. consequentialism.)
Which is my point, it depends on the subject.
Quoting Postmodern Beatnik
I disagree that this follows from the premises. I think it very much does matter what whether or not other people adopt a vegan diet. We are claiming in 6 that if every element of the set of people who can go vegan, do go vegan, then we will achieve a desired outcome. This speaks about one specific situation and says nothing about the outcome of any other distribution of veganism within the set. Effectively we have a statement like: if X&Y&Z then T. Nothing is said about X&Y&~Z.
So with P9 and C5 all we can say is that the set of people who can go vegan should go vegan (as a set). The argument can almost never claim that any individual should go vegan. The only claim the argument could legitimately make is that if everyone else who could go vegan, did go vegan then I should participate in it. Otherwise there is a slide from then group as a whole to individuals which cannot be justified without extra premises.
As an example: if it were the case that my going vegan now increased the suffering of animals, the argument would be unaffected.
My other issue is the formal one about the argument. If as Postmodern Beatnik suggests P6 is the set of all people for whom its possible to go vegan, then you cannot conclude that any individual ought go vegan.
Looking at it closer the problem is with P9.
Quoting Soylent
If P6 refers to a set, then P9 should be:
P9 If it is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices, and gratuitous suffering caused by food productions practices is preventable if and only if a vegan diet is adopted (by the set referred to in P6), then one ought to ensure that a vegan diet is adopted by the set referred to in P6.
There is no justification in any of the argument which would allow us to conclude in P9 that one ought to ensure that a vegan diet is adopted by a subset of the set described in P6.
Edit: Both of these objections apply before the ought is encountered in the argument. It's not tragedy of the commons if I object to P6 by saying that it is false if it is referring to a single subject, or that the argument is invalid if P6 refers to a set of subjects. Are you making the claim that P6 is sound for an individual subject?
Quoting shmikIt's unclear what you think doesn't follow. The point I was making was very simple: "some" follows from "all." So if the argument succeeds in getting "anyone who is in a position to adopt veganism ought to do so," it can get "S, an individual who is in a position to adopt veganism, ought to do so" as well. It's the same way that you don't get to murder someone just because you live in a place where someone else will do it if you don't.
Quoting shmikBut that's going to depend on the nature of the wrong. I mentioned before that the argument could be rewritten depending on whether one is addressing deontologists or consequentialists. For instance, P1 could just as easily be "If any gratuitous suffering is preventable and known, it is wrong to participate in said gratuitous suffering" (and mutatis mutandis throughout).
Even on the consequentialist reading, though, I don't think one gets to opt out just because one's effect is minimal. At best, you have shown only that vegans have duties beyond merely abstaining from the use of animal products. They might have to write to their grocer, discuss the issue with other people, and so forth. But it seems a mistake to judge the impact of an individual person's abstinence solely in terms of the short term effect on a local supermarket's bottom line. If consequentialists only looked at the short term, they'd never go to the dentist either. But that's clearly a straw man version of consequentialism.
Quoting shmikSure. But the biconditional is not the end of the story. It's a premise, and all that matters for the topic of this conversation is whether or not it does its job as a premise. Strictly speaking, worrying about whether or not it is true is a topic for the associated discussion. Nor does it matter that nothing is said about (X & Y & ¬Z). The point of P6 is just to be part of the antecedent in P9 (and, originally, to get us P7).
Quoting shmikBut again, "some" follows from "all." If all x ought to P, then x1 ought to P.
What about this amendment (and subsequent amendments to premises and conclusions to include this amendment)? It doesn't address the soundness of P6, but it makes the individual obligation explicit and not dependent on the entire set adopting veganism. It might weaken the soundness claim of P6, but that's a topic for elsewhere.
I find this amendment addresses a rather pedantic and uncharitable reading where you seem to be looking for a "technical" out by feigning ignorance of whom the argument is referring.
Quoting shmik
This takes a degree of special pleading and denial about one's actions to hold as justification for eating meat. In essence, it seems to argue that because the amount of suffering caused or alleviated by an individual's actions is miniscule and negligible, the individual can carry on with the immoral behaviour.
The problem with P6 is about thresholding. Repeating from my earlier post. There is a high chance that any individual purchase of meat I make from a supermarket will have literally zero effect. This is because in order for my purchase or lack of purchase to have an effect the supermarket must realize that it needs more or less meat. If they are selling 1000 kg a day, they won't even notice that I have stopped purchasing, therefore they won't change their order from the butcher and the butcher won't purchase less from the farm etc. We can think of this in thresholds, lets say the supermarket us purchasing an order of 7000kg per week. If they sell more than 6500kg of that then the next week they purchase 8000kg, if they sell less than 6500 then the next week they purchase only 6000kg. In this system, in order to make a difference to the animals your steak dinner must be the one that causes the supermarket to surpass the 6500kg mark.
We can treat this by introducing probability, by saying something like there is a very small chance that your small purchase will cause the supermarket to exceed it's threshold, but if it does cause that then it will be responsible for the super market making a very large extra purchase of meat.
P6 does not work for an individual without something like this.
I honestly do believe that the subject of the argument is significant, if it was referring to everyone then there would be no issue with thresholding. But then, as I mentioned P8 may end up being too strict for your taste.
'Gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if a vegan diet is adopted by anyone who is in a position to', specifically excludes some (only if). If you mean it in the way: let X be the set of anyone who can go vegan, and V the set of vegans, ? x ? X, gratuitous suffering is preventable iff x ? V. Then that isn't true if there is a single individual whose capable of becoming vegan but whose contribution does not have an effect, which was the original concern.
I agree that some follows from all generally.
Essentially this is what I see as happening here. Let's take a situation where Brian has 21 friends and soccer is 'the good'.
I can say 'Brian you ought to go to the park to play soccer'. To which Brian replies that no one is in the park and he needs another 21 people to play the game. He claims that the good is not achieved unless there are 22 people in the park to playing soccer. I then reply, 'Brian you ought to go to the park and all your friends ought to go with you'.
Now with some trick we can say Brian ought to go to the park, even though none of his friends are there and the situation is unchanged.
That's the same move I see happening, you require the group in order for P6, then switch back to the individual in P9. But P9 is only justified if it is fulfilled by the group as per P6.
Quoting shmikAnd if you said this, you'd be wrong. Brian ought to go to the park (if and) only if 21 of his other friends are going and they are willing to play soccer (with him). What you might suggest to Brian, then, is that he bring 21 friends with him to the park. Furthermore, this is not the same move if my previous point (that the short term impact on a local supermarket is not the proper measure of whether someone is in a position to reduce the gratuitous suffering of food animals) is correct.
But again, the purpose of this discussion is to investigate the validity of the argument, not the truth of any given premise. Here is the current version of the argument in propositional calculus:
Let:
A = some gratuitous suffering is preventable
B = some gratuitous suffering is known
C = it is wrong for someone in a position to prevent gratuitous suffering to allow it
D = some nonhuman animals are sentient
E = food production practices would constitute gratuitous suffering in humans
G = food production practices constitute gratuitous suffering in non-human animals
H = it is possible to adopt a vegan diet
I = a vegan diet ought to be adopted by all who are in a position to adopt it
Argument:
P1. (A & B) --> C
P2. (D & E) --> G
P3. D
P4. E
C1. G
P5. G --> B
C2. B
P6. A <=> H
P7. H --> A
P8. H
C3. A
C4. C
P9. (C & (A <=> H)) --> I
C5. I
As far as I can tell, this is a valid argument. Therefore, it seems to me your objections must be about the truth of the premises (which is a subject for the other discussion). I agree that P6 is false. I just disagree that its falsity has anything to do with whether or not the argument is valid.
There are 2 interpretations.
1) Gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if a vegan diet is adopted by anyone who can adopt it.
2) For each individual who can go vegan, their contribution to gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if they adopt veganism.
I initially though that you meant 1, which has the analogue of the soccer argument. This is because the bi-conditional here means that the entire group needs to adopt veganism for the gratuitous suffering to be preventable.
If you meant 2 then I agree there is no problem going from all to some and the argument is fine (besides for the many premises I disagree with).
Can we agree to that? Do you see where I have been coming from?
One reason I wanted clarity in the first place is that I think the argument can easily sneak in logic such as: if everyone does X it will be good, therefore everyone should do X, therefore each individual should do X regardless of what others do. I'm guessing we agree that this would be invalid we just disagreed about whether it was happening (because of different readings of P6).
Also, I don't think you have formulated the first option correctly. What you've written is the ambiguous formulation itself. Your (1) should be: "Gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if a vegan diet is simultaneously adopted by everyone who can adopt it." But of course, it is obvious that this is not what the argument intends to assert once this interpretation is made explicit. So while I can agree that this interpretation would cause problems, I don't see any reason to read it into the argument.
Quoting Postmodern Beatnik
Interesting that you frame the discussion like this considering my first and second posts state that there is an ambiguity, assume that interpretation (2) is the one that Soylent means and suggest a way to patch up the argument so that interpretation (2) works.
It's true that in my conversation with you I have taken (1) as your interpretation but this is the most charitable interpretation (of your posts).
Quoting Postmodern Beatnik
This is clearly false under interpretation (2) being that interpretation (2) is false if there is one person whose independently going vegan has no effect. As such instead interpretation (1) is the charitable one. If you can find a way to make this quote work for interpretation (2) I'm happy to hear it.
Quoting Postmodern Beatnik
The way I have written it is unambiguous, the only thing that could be ambiguous is the timing of each persons adoption.
Quoting shmikThen you are definitely confused because I haven't endorsed (1) or (2). Your argument only works if we are taking P6 to be "gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if a vegan diet is adopted by anyone who is in a position to do so" (which is the original version of P6 with my suggestion about who is involved tacked on). But from the beginning, I have been suggesting an alternative P6 (along with an alternative P7 and P8): "gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet." This alteration already incorporates the "anyone who is in a position to" suggestion in virtue of adding a modal term to the claim.
(I have also suggested that "contribution" should be interpreted broadly such that it involves more than a short-term decrease in the amount of suffering that exists. The one giving the argument could then claim that there is not one person for whom going vegan would have no effect. We might wonder about the truth of such a claim, but this thread is about the argument's validity.)
Quoting shmikThen you seem to be contradicting yourself. Your original complaint was that the original version of P6 is ambiguous. You then claimed that P6 with the "anyone who is in a position to" clause tacked on is also ambiguous. But P6 with the "anyone who is in a position to" clause tacked on gets us "gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if a vegan diet is adopted by anyone who is in a position to do so." If this is ambiguous—and your entire argument is based on the claim that it is—then "gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if a vegan diet is adopted by anyone who can adopt it" is also ambiguous (as it is essentially the same claim).
Quoting Postmodern Beatnik
OK for now this part doesn't really matter as we have been talking past each other. We could argue about how legitimate my belief was that you were using one interpretation instead of another but it's pretty pointless.
Quoting Postmodern Beatnik
Maybe I have somewhere, who knows?
P6. gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet. Is ambiguous. Writing that this applies to anyone who is in a position to do so is also ambiguous.
P6. gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if a vegan diet is adopted by anyone who is in a position to do so. Is unambiguous, it means that gratuitous suffering... iff everyone who can go vegan does go vegan. The fact that you implied that you were endorsing a P6 with 'anyone who is in a position to do so' tacked on was one of the main reasons I thought you were using the interpretation that implied that collective action was necessary. I actually addressed this point in:
Quoting shmik
To which you didn't reply.
Edit: The reason I asked you to explicitly rewrite P6 was to see if you were just tacking it on to the end since knowing if you were would clear up the ambiguity.
Quoting shmikNot directly. I chose to write up the entire argument in propositional calculus instead as that seemed the most direct way to prove my point that the argument is valid. My indirect reply can be seen in how I represented P6 in that rendition: A <=> H (where A = "some gratuitous suffering is preventable" and H = "it is possible to adopt a vegan diet"). The preventable gratuitous suffering referenced in my abbreviation is that caused by food production practices, so this gives us "gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet."
I'm not sure. Consider:
X ought be saved iff X can be saved.
X can be saved iff all Ys donate.
Therefore all Ys ought to donate.
But if one Y doesn't donate then no other Y ought to donate because their donations cannot save X. So each Ys obligation to donate is dependent on every other Y donating.
This is the claim. It follows that if all Ys have an obligation, then some Ys have an obligation. It doesn't do to argue that the argument is invalid (it's not) or unsound (it may not be) because some Ys do not fulfill the obligation, it just means that some are immoral and need to do better to fulfill an obligation that all Ys logically have.
Consider:
Donating is obligatory iff it will save X.
If one person doesn't donate then X cannot be saved.
Therefore if one person doesn't donate then the others are not obligated to donate.
That argument isn't even close to being valid.
Where in the argument is the conclusion contained?
I am obligated to donate if my donation will help towards saving X.
If you don't also donate then my donation will not help towards saving X.
Therefore if you don't also donate then I am not obligated to donate.
Or let's imagine that two pilots are obligated to fly a plane. If one refuses (or becomes unable) is the other obligated to fly the plane alone, despite the fact that two are required and he'd crash without aid? No. The refusal (or inability) of the first pilot relieves the second of his obligation.
It's not a variation, it's an entirely new argument. But this argument is invalid because it denies the antecedent (note: this is likely a pedantic comment and possibly just an typographical oversight):
If my donation will help towards saving X, then I am obligated to donate (rearranged first premise to be in logical form)
If you don't donate, then my donation will not help towards saving X.
You don't donate
My donation will not help towards saving X
Therefore, I am not obligated to donate.
Yes, I meant iff rather than if.
The obligation is this:
If two pilots are present, then all pilots would be obligated to fly.
It follows that from that obligation that;
If two pilots are present, then some pilots would be obligated to fly.
You can't deny the antecedent to deny the consequent, because the obligation in both cases only holds as long the as the antecedent is affirmed (i.e., two pilots are present). If some pilots are not obligated to fly, it must be that the antecedent condition has not been satisfied, but that also holds for all pilots since that was the obligation that allowed us to say some are obligated. Some necessarily follows from all.
The obligation is this:
If two pilots are present, then all pilots would be obligated to fly.
It follows that from that obligation that;
If two pilots are present, then some pilots would be obligated to fly.[/quote]
That doesn't work. In the example two pilots are present; it's just that one refuses to fly. Is the other obligated to fly alone (despite it being a futile suicide)? No. So what's the alternative phrasing? "If two pilots agree to fly then all pilots would be obligated to fly"? But then, of course, their obligation to fly is dependent on them agreeing to fly which doesn't quite seem right, does it?
Quoting MichaelThis argument is invalid.
Quoting MichaelI have already dealt with cases like this above. They are not counterexamples to the rule because they are not cases where it is simultaneously the case that all X ought to P and not the case that some X ought to P. Instead, they are cases where x[sub]1[/sub] ought to P iff x[sub]2[/sub]–x[sub]n[/sub] actually P. At best, the obligation of x[sub]1[/sub] in such cases is to show up prepared to donate (and to donate iff x[sub]2[/sub]–x[sub]n[/sub] show up).
(I have also suggested that the argument in the OP is best understood as not involving such contingent responsibilities.)
X ought be saved iff X can be saved.
X can be saved iff all Ys donate.
Therefore all Ys ought to donate.
— Michael
This argument is invalid.[/quote]
Yes, you're right. This is what I meant:
All Ys ought to save X.
X can be saved iff all Ys donate.
Therefore all Ys ought to donate.
If all of these 11 players make a full football team then do some of these 11 players make a full football team? No, because a full football team requires 11 players.
So I think a distinction needs to be made between "the set of people S is X" and "each member of the set of people S are X". The former assigns X to the set as a whole and not to a subset, whereas the latter assigns X to each member of the set and so also to a subset.
With respect to the OP, is C5 to be understood as "the set of people who can adopt a vegan diet ought adopt a vegan diet" or as "each member of the set of people who can adopt a vegan diet ought adopt a vegan diet"?
But if the prevention of gratuitous suffering depends on contingent responsibilities (i.e. that a sufficient number of people adopt a vegan diet) then the obligation to adopt a vegan diet depends on contingent responsibilities. If one person can't make a difference then you can't conclude that so-and-so ought to adopt a vegan diet even though nobody else will. I think that was @shmik's point.
A solution to this would be to argue that one ought do that which if done by enough people would prevent gratuitous suffering.
Quoting MichaelIt depends on whether you mean "all" in the logical sense or not. If you really mean that each player makes a football team (which is what it means in the language of logic to say that all of these 11 players make a full football team), then it would follow that some of these 11 players make a full football team. We would have a valid—but unsound—argument. But what you actually mean is "the combination of these 11 players makes a full football team," which does not involve the logical "all" and therefore does not entail the logical "some." Surely you know this, so surely you realize that this attempt at a counterexample is fatuous.
Quoting MichaelI've already made this point myself, so I'm not sure how this constitutes a response to anything I've said.
Quoting MichaelThe latter. This is clearer if one bears in mind the revisions I suggested—and Soylent accepted—early on in the thread (which transformed C5 into "a vegan diet ought to be adopted by all who are in a position to do so").
Quoting MichaelBut my point here, where the topic is validity, has been that the argument does not make the obligation contingent. And my point elsewhere has been that the argument should not make the obligation contingent. In order to succeed, the argument needs to be framed in terms of individual duties. And the most charitable way of reading the argument requires us to understand it as doing exactly that. So the objection is irrelevant. It basically says, "if we change the argument in such-and-such a way, it's invalid!" But of course, any argument can be made invalid if we're allowed to fiddle with the premises however we like.
Maybe things would be hurried along somewhat if we can agree that all the sentences bellow mean the same thing.
Quoting Michael
Quoting shmik
Quoting Postmodern Beatnik
@Postmodern Beatnik
We all agree that: All birds can fly -> some birds can fly.
Neither me nor Michael are arguing that this is not the case. The examples we are presenting are not meant to be counter examples to this. They are meant to be analogous to Soylents argument. So when you say that the examples have errors you are just agreeing with the point.
The problem comes when speaking about the elements of the set and the set itself. As in Michaels example:
Quoting Michael
As mentioned this is problematic and it's not meant to be a counter example to some following from all. It's meant to be analogous to a version of the argument which from looking at Soylents posts, he upholds, even though you yourself think the version is problematic. The problem of switching between talking about the set X and talking about the elements of the set i.e the set of all natural numbers is infinitely large does not imply that some of the natural numbers are infinitely large.
Quoting Postmodern BeatnikBecause this is the motivation behind the discussion against Soylents version of the argument. Again, you are fighting an invisible battle to prove that all -> some while we are speaking about the distinction between the set and the members of the set.
Just for extra clarity, if you look back on the thread after this quote:
Read the responses to this as if I had interpreted it to be maintaining a version of the argument. The version that used the incorrect move from speaking about the set as a whole to speaking about the elements.
Then when you said all implies some, I took that as you reaffirming that incorrect version.
Maybe then you'll see why people have responded to you by bringing up this issue, and get a different picture of how the thread progressed.
The issue is that if one Y refuses to donate then this relieves the others of their obligation to donate because their donations alone cannot save X, and their donations were only obligatory on the premise that it would save X.
The point is that P6 needs to be more specific in light of this. Is it saying that gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if a vegan diet is adopted by the combination of those who are in a position to adopt one, or is it saying for each person who is in a position to adopt a vegan diet, gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if that person adopts one?
Then for the obligation to be framed in terms of individual duty it must be the case that an individual can prevent gratuitous suffering by adopting a vegan diet. The argument must be something along the lines of:
If I can prevent gratuitous suffering caused by food production by adopting a vegan diet then I ought to adopt a vegan diet.
I can prevent gratuitous suffering caused by food production by adopting a vegan diet.
Therefore I ought to adopt a vegan diet.
But as you said to @shmik earlier, "So the fact that you cannot change your local supermarket's buying patterns alone is irrelevant." Except it isn't irrelevant. If I can't change my local supermarket's buying patterns alone then the second premise above fails.
The current argument seems to be saying something like "the combination of these people ought to adopt a vegan diet because gratuitous suffering caused by food production is preventable if and only if the combination of these people adopt a vegan diet (and one is obligated to prevent gratuitous suffering), therefore this individual ought to adopt a vegan diet" which is analogous to "the combination of these players makes a full football team ... therefore this individual makes a full football team".
Quoting shmikBut as I have pointed out several times, Soylent's argument is not committed to anything like what you and Michael have accused it of, particularly after my suggested revisions were accepted. So if the examples were meant to be analogous to anything in the argument, they have failed at that.
Quoting shmikExcept the main error I am pointing out is that they aren't analogous to anything in the argument. I can agree that the sun rises in the east while continuing to maintain that this has nothing to do with whether or not Socrates is a man.
Quoting shmikWell, Soylent is free to correct me if I am wrong, but I don't think the proper interpretation of his posts has him committed to "if the set {x, y, z} is S, then x is S, y is S, and z is S." I think he has been saying the same thing as me, albeit in different terms: "if all x's are S, then x[sub]1[/sub] is S, x[sub]2[/sub] is S, x[sub]3[/sub] is S..."
(So how about it, @Soylent? Which do you mean?)
But in any case, I have only been defending the logical validity of the argument with my suggested revisions. No one, even Soylent seems to have ever thought that the original version presented in the OP was free of problems.
Quoting shmikFor one, I'm not trying to prove it. I have no need to prove it. It has long been proven, and I am just pointing it out that fact to two people who have denied it (whether they meant to or not). For another, I'm pretty sure the "battle" isn't invisible. I can see it, you and Michael must be able to see it in order to respond, and I suspect anyone else reading the thread can see it as well. And finally, if you and Michael have been trying to talk about the distinction between the set and the members of the set, then you have done an incredibly bad job of it. I made the same point at the outset of the discussion, and you've both been directing your objections at me. Moreover, you've been presenting those objections as responses to my statement of the logical fact that "all" entails "some." Only now has either of you come out with what you were supposedly saying all along. It's like putting the blank space on a tape at the beginning instead of at the end.
Quoting shmikI understand how your error came about. I just don't understand why you are so keen to defend it.
Quoting MichaelWhat both you and shmik seem to have missed is that P6 is one of the premises that was modified right away. You keep going after the version in the OP, missing the point that the version found there was discarded ages ago. The revised P6 says "gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet." The explicit statement of who is to be adopting a vegan diet then comes up in the revised P9 (and then the revised C5).
Quoting MichaelContext matters, Michael. The point of that comment was that changing your supermarket's buying patterns isn't the only way to reduce or eliminate one's contribution to gratuitous suffering, therefore the fact that you cannot change your local supermarket's buying patterns alone is irrelevant. Nice try, though.
Quoting MichaelAnd my point has been that it doesn't say this, no matter how many people want to misread it that way.
P1 If any gratuitous suffering is preventable and known, then it is wrong to allow said gratuitous suffering.
P2 If some nonhuman animals are sentient and food production practices would constitute gratuitous suffering in humans, then food production practices constitute gratuitous suffering in some nonhuman animals.
P3 Some nonhuman animals are sentient.
P4 Food production practices would constitute gratuitous suffering in humans.
C1 Food production practices constitute gratuitous suffering in some nonhuman animals. (from P2, P3 and P4)
P5 If food production practices constitute gratuitous suffering in some nonhuman animals, then we know of some gratuitous suffering.
C2 We know of some gratuitous suffering. (from C1 and P5)
P6 Gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet.
P7 If it is possible to adopt a vegan diet, then gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable.
P8 It is possible to adopt a vegan diet.
C3 Gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable. (from P6, P7 and P8)
C4 It is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices. (from P1, C2 and C3)
P9 If it is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices and gratuitous suffering caused by food productions practices is preventable if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet, then a vegan diet ought to be adopted by all who are in a position to do so.
C5 A vegan diet ought to be adopted by all who are in a position to do so. (from P6, C4 and P9)
And here it is (again) schematized in propositional calculus:
Let:
A = some gratuitous suffering is preventable
B = some gratuitous suffering is known
C = it is wrong for someone in a position to prevent gratuitous suffering to allow it
D = some nonhuman animals are sentient
E = food production practices would constitute gratuitous suffering in humans
G = food production practices constitute gratuitous suffering in non-human animals
H = it is possible to adopt a vegan diet
I = a vegan diet ought to be adopted by all who are in a position to adopt it
Argument:
P1. (A & B) --> C
P2. (D & E) --> G
P3. D
P4. E
C1. G
P5. G --> B
C2. B
P6. A <=> H
P7. H --> A
P8. H
C3. A
C4. C
P9. (C & (A <=> H)) --> I
C5. I
Since the topic of this thread is the validity of the argument, I would like to know where the invalid move is made in this schematization.
Shouldn't that read "gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is prevented if and only if a vegan diet is adopted"?
Furthermore, this is still unclear, and my point still stands. Is it that gratuitous suffering is prevented if and only if everyone adopts a vegan diet? Then if one person doesn't then the others can't prevent gratuitous suffering by adopting a vegan diet, and so they have no obligation to adopt a vegan diet. Or is it that for each person gratuitous suffering is prevented if and only if that person adopts a vegan diet? Then if we accept that I can't prevent gratuitous suffering by adopting a vegan diet then I have no obligation to adopt a vegan diet.
If you want to frame the obligation in terms of individuals then you have to frame the justification in terms of individuals. So I think the argument needs to be like this:
P1. ?x: C(P(x)) ? O(P(x))
P2. ?x: P(x) ? V(x)
C1. ?x: C(V(x)) ? O(V(x))
Which is to be read as:
For any person, if that person can prevent gratuitous suffering then that person ought prevent gratuitous suffering.
For any person, that person prevents gratuitous suffering if and only if that person adopts a vegan diet.
For any person, if that person can adopt a vegan diet then that person ought adopt a vegan diet.
C5 in the OP's (revised) argument seems to be the same as C1 in the above argument, but is P6 in the OP's (revised) argument the same as P2 in the above?
It was (and still is) true that all Ys ought to save X. It's just that donating won't save X unless all Ys donate. If my obligation to donate is dependent on it saving X, and if my donation saving X is dependent on others donating, then my obligation to donate is dependent on others donating.
And so by analogy, it was (and still is) true that all people ought to prevent gratuitous suffering. It's just that adopting a vegan diet won't prevent gratuitous suffering unless all (or enough) people adopt a vegan diet. If my obligation to adopt a vegan diet is dependent on it preventing gratuitous suffering, and if my adoption of a vegan diet preventing gratuitous suffering is dependent on others adopting a vegan diet, then my obligation to adopt a vegan diet is dependent on others adopting a vegan diet.
But I wasn't addressing the logical validity of the argument. I was addressing your exchange with @shmik on the ambiguity of the argument, specifically regarding whether or not something which is true of all X is also true of some X, and how such a thing might entail that one's obligation is dependent on what others do (as explained in the last two paragraphs of my last post).
I'm somewhat puzzled why you think this is a problem, since you have set aside any discussion about the validity of the premises.
It seems to me perfectly easy to me to construct false or contestable premises to draw ridiculous or dubious conclusions.
eg.
1 Jews are evil
2 Evil must be destroyed
3 Therefore Jews must be destroyed.
You could even shorten your argument to remove reference to humans, by simply claiming that animals can suffer and that suffering is to be avoided at all costs.
You could also attack the entire argument on what it ignores; the gratuitous suffering caused to humans by the fact that a universal vegan diet would deprive the world of domesticated animals, and the loss of the pleasure of thousands of gourmet recipes that involve meat, and admit to no substitute.