Knowledge is just true information. Isn't it? (Time to let go of the old problematic definition)
Gettier cases and various other issues related to knowledge (as justified true belief) arise because of the definition. And the definition is problematic because it unnecessarily combines the act of knowing with information being true.
Instead we should split the two.
Knowledge is information that is true.
For example ''Superman can fly in the fictional realm of DC''. Is true if stated as such and thus is knowledge. It doesn't require a belief to be true. It just is.
''I am writing my first post on this board'' is true and is knowledge (true information).
''God exists'' is either knowledge (true information) or it isn't and then it's false information. Can we know whether it is knowledge or not? That depends on what you mean by know. But that's a separate issue.
By splitting the giant into simpler tasks we can at least get rid of the gettier problems. At least in it's current form
Because now in the case where one comes down the stairs and sees the broken clock give the correct time. But one isn't aware the clock is broken. In this case the person has knowledge (true information). So the problem is solved.
But a new problem arises namely, can that person know whether they have knowledge? But it seems more easy to hold the world in this way. It seems we'd kot have just shifted problem. We'd have resolved one. So we can focus on just the act of ''knowing''.
Do you agree? If so why? If not why not? What's your best counter argument. Is it a practical one or one of definition?
Short EDIT: I currently hold the most concise yet descriptive definitions is ''knowledge is belief assumed to be true'' . If more descriptive is more accurate then that's the one
(Long EDIT) Which I include to avoid being misinterpreted in my current position.
We use the word knowledge to refer to things we use in the world. For example "something exist because this whatever this is is something" so we ask what is that ?
For ages the proposition ''green is something innate to the object" was deemed true. So we can say we thought it was knowledge (true information or JTB) or we could say it was knowledge (justified belief) .
Which is an accurate proposition as wether it was knowledge or not at the time to say' ''green is innate to the object'' will depend on what y
your definition of the word knowledge is.
Knowledge=justified belief (x)
Knowledge=justified true belief (y)
Knowledge=(true) information (z)
Knowledge=a belief assumed to be true (m)
What we can do for example is
something like. (and to be clear we wouldn't add x y or z. We'd just naturally talk using the word knowledge and the definitions and as a result we'd get confused.
''knowledge (y) is not true information (z).
Knowledge (y) is justified true belief (y) (JTB= short version of what you said). And I could say ''no, knowledge (z) is true information (z)''.
Which would basically be like.
''no, it's not the case that y is z. Obviously y is y
And then I can say "no, z is z"
So then we are really just confused by language and arguing about definition. And one isn't necessarily true and the other false. They will only be more, less or equally useful depending on context and a desired metric and measuring method or goal.
In other words a definition of a word can't be false or true just be more or less useful.
If a proposition is true then it is true information. So if we'd use the word knowledge for that then sure. If a proposition is true but we prefer to say knowledge is tied to a belief and must be JTB then we could equally say it's knowledge. Because it is a JTB.
If we say that that proposition is justified belief and we want to use the word knowledge to describe it. Then since the proposition is a justified belief it would be knowledge if such defined.
Instead we should split the two.
Knowledge is information that is true.
For example ''Superman can fly in the fictional realm of DC''. Is true if stated as such and thus is knowledge. It doesn't require a belief to be true. It just is.
''I am writing my first post on this board'' is true and is knowledge (true information).
''God exists'' is either knowledge (true information) or it isn't and then it's false information. Can we know whether it is knowledge or not? That depends on what you mean by know. But that's a separate issue.
By splitting the giant into simpler tasks we can at least get rid of the gettier problems. At least in it's current form
Because now in the case where one comes down the stairs and sees the broken clock give the correct time. But one isn't aware the clock is broken. In this case the person has knowledge (true information). So the problem is solved.
But a new problem arises namely, can that person know whether they have knowledge? But it seems more easy to hold the world in this way. It seems we'd kot have just shifted problem. We'd have resolved one. So we can focus on just the act of ''knowing''.
Do you agree? If so why? If not why not? What's your best counter argument. Is it a practical one or one of definition?
Short EDIT: I currently hold the most concise yet descriptive definitions is ''knowledge is belief assumed to be true'' . If more descriptive is more accurate then that's the one
(Long EDIT) Which I include to avoid being misinterpreted in my current position.
We use the word knowledge to refer to things we use in the world. For example "something exist because this whatever this is is something" so we ask what is that ?
For ages the proposition ''green is something innate to the object" was deemed true. So we can say we thought it was knowledge (true information or JTB) or we could say it was knowledge (justified belief) .
Which is an accurate proposition as wether it was knowledge or not at the time to say' ''green is innate to the object'' will depend on what y
your definition of the word knowledge is.
Knowledge=justified belief (x)
Knowledge=justified true belief (y)
Knowledge=(true) information (z)
Knowledge=a belief assumed to be true (m)
What we can do for example is
something like. (and to be clear we wouldn't add x y or z. We'd just naturally talk using the word knowledge and the definitions and as a result we'd get confused.
''knowledge (y) is not true information (z).
Knowledge (y) is justified true belief (y) (JTB= short version of what you said). And I could say ''no, knowledge (z) is true information (z)''.
Which would basically be like.
''no, it's not the case that y is z. Obviously y is y
And then I can say "no, z is z"
So then we are really just confused by language and arguing about definition. And one isn't necessarily true and the other false. They will only be more, less or equally useful depending on context and a desired metric and measuring method or goal.
In other words a definition of a word can't be false or true just be more or less useful.
If a proposition is true then it is true information. So if we'd use the word knowledge for that then sure. If a proposition is true but we prefer to say knowledge is tied to a belief and must be JTB then we could equally say it's knowledge. Because it is a JTB.
If we say that that proposition is justified belief and we want to use the word knowledge to describe it. Then since the proposition is a justified belief it would be knowledge if such defined.
Comments (109)
A solution would be to define what it means to be "true".
Another solution would be to dispense with the word, "true" as a descriptor of knowledge. Knowledge would be justified beliefs, and beliefs are justified by both observation AND logic. Beliefs would only be justified by one or the other, or neither. Knowledge requires confirmation from both.
The belief that god exists would not be based on logic or reason as we have never observed god and the gods as defined in many religious texts are contradictory.
There is also the distinction of the types of information that is man-made vs natural information. Man-made information, like "Superman flies" will always be justified because Superman is an idea and by thinking of Superman and his powers one is directly accessing what it means to be Superman. The same cannot be said of natural occurring phenomenon, like stars, atoms, etc.
I've had a similar view on knowledge to hold it has justified belief. As it automatically entails epistemic humility and explains contradicting instances of knowledge. But when they do arise. The concept of ''truth'' is still useful and not to be discarded.
If country 'a' says that x happened and country 'b' says that ''not x'' happened. Then both claim the propositions are knowledge (justified belief). But since they contradict it begs the question. So which knowledge (JB) is true? The word is just useful altough but not necessary in the definition of knowledge.
But if we can hold multiple definitions (perspectives). It could be more practical to use what most aligns with common understanding. And that is (I belief) that knowledge is information that is true. (But it could be that in some circles (minority) it would be justified belief. But that's just my intuition. Not sure could be the other way around.
Welcome to the forum. Justified true belief is a perennial subject of discussion here. It never gets resolved. Nobody is ever convinced. Here’s my take - get rid of the requirement for truth.
I agree. Justified belief is probably what knowledge is if we take a descriptive approach.
But it's just a way of holding it , but we can define 'knowledge' in many ways that align with potential natural uses.
But one things seem quite clear and in need of little convincing.
If someone points to the gettier cases. And says that 'x' had a JTB 'y'. And then says "But surely we wouldn't say 'x' knew 'y'. He was just lucky. So JTB isn't knowledge.
Basically they're saying two things or we could derive. 1. That for them knowledge requires absolute certainty and godlike direct awareness of reality (so knowledge is then impossible for humans) so that there's no luck involved nor any doubt.
2. They say JTB isn't knowledge. i.o.w. (using their requirements as definition) JTB isn't such that it is direct awareness of reality in a godlike manner
No, that's just accurate information. It doesn't become knowledge until you compare it with previous information you're gathered, test it for logical dissonance, evaluate it in light of your own sensory input and integrated it with a network of data on the subject that you've accumulated through a combination of reliable information from external sources, personal experience, reflection and memory. (You can't know anything you've forgotten, no matter how true it was or how convinced you were.)
Quoting Jack2848
That's a factoid. It becomes knowledge if you're already conversant with the realm of comic books, so that you're aware of what Superman is (obviously, not what one think from the name) and can place it in the context of American culture. Only then can you use it on Jeopardy. Quoting Jack2848
Sez you, who made it true by Direct experience. I have no way of testing the statement. (You might have had 18 different online personae over the years.
(Welcome, or welcome back, whichever applies.)
Quoting Jack2848
No, it doesn't. It depends on on whether you're a theist. For them, the answer is obviously yes; for an atheist, it's just as obviously No; for an agnostic, it's a wobbly Maybe.
Quoting Jack2848
No, it can't be. It's a central issue. All this knowing and learning takes place in a human brain, imprisoned in a human skull, while the bearer of that skull lives in a physical world, in a society, a time and a culture. In order to topple early indoctrination, propaganda, self-delusion and long-held convictions, one must be presented with more than factual information, be open to contradictory input and bring to bear his own critical faculties.
Quoting Jack2848
Certainly: compare, test, reflect, evaluate, integrate.
Quoting Jack2848
It's not an act; it's a continuing state of mind. You can focus on it, so long as you understand that knowledge is analogous to love: it's not an emotion but a complex of emotions, sensations and beliefs. Just widen your lens aperture a couple of f-stops.
And neither account can explain what it is to know how to ride a bike.
:grimace:
If knowledge doesn't require belief, then i can know Superman can fly even if I've never heard of Superman?
So we have two things:
A = justified true belief
B = justified belief
You propose we assign the word "knowledge" to B ( instead of to A).
What word do you now propose we assign for A?
That's the formula for Truth because K=JTB.
Your suggestion to redefine knowledge as simply “true information” is understandable—it sidesteps Gettier problems by removing belief and justification from the equation. But I think the cost of doing so is too high. What we lose is the whole human dimension of knowing.
To know something, in any meaningful sense, is not merely to possess a piece of information that happens to be true. It’s to grasp it, to stand behind it, and if needs be to to act on it. That’s why belief and justification were part of the traditional definition: not because they’re philosophically tidy, but because they reflected what it means to know in actual life. We’re not passive containers of truths—we’re engaged agents who must assess, trust, challenge, and risk loss in the pursuit of knowledge.
That’s why Gettier cases are troubling. They show that something can check the boxes—justified, true, believed—and still feel wrong. The problem isn’t just with the definition; it’s with how knowledge is entangled with our perspective, our stakes, and our vulnerability to error. You can’t just treat it like a Boolean switch.
Consider real cases, like the Boston Globe’s investigation of abuse in the Catholic Church (Spotlight, 2015), or the exposure of toxic chemicals by whistleblowers (Dark Waters, 2019). These were not about sorting information into “true” or “false” categories. They were prolonged struggles against doubt, suppression, and institutional deception with large likelihoods of failure. In these cases, the truth mattered because the truth had been hidden, and people had to believe in it, justify it, and fight for it. That’s not just “true information” but also deeply meaningful (indeed, we’re learning we’re all likely to have PFAS chemicals in our bloodstream as a consequence of the latter.)
So yes, your revised definition may dodge Gettier problems. But it does so by eliminating the very thing that gives knowledge its urgency and its value. It’s like solving a paradox in ethics by redefining “good” to mean “pleasurable”—it may simplify the problem, but it abandons what was at stake.
Sure. When I'm talking about "knowledge," it's usually in terms of how it's generally used in normal discussion. Knowledge is actionable belief - adequately justified belief. Since I can never know for certain it's true, I have to make a judgment based on the uncertainty of my information and the consequences of being wrong.
When I get involved in a discussion such as this one, I usually make it explicitly clear the kind of knowledge I'm talking about - specifically excluding knowing how to do something.
I normally use the term "adequately justified belief" to describe knowledge as it is used in daily life. "Justified true belief" doesn't mean anything, at least nothing useful.
But that's not what I asked.
This is my cross examination, not your chance just to share.
Nah, it has to involve belief. It's not "knowledge" unless someone knows it, there's already a word for truth without belief and that's called "fact".
The truth? You can't handle the adequately justified belief!!!
I object Your Honor. The counselor is badgering the witness.
I object. That's incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial.
I rest my case.
More to the point, I wasn't sharing, I was defining my terms, providing context. Now you can agree or disagree with that.
We use the word knowledge to refer to things we use in the world. For example "something exist because this whatever this is is something" so we ask what is that ?
For ages the proposition ''green is something innate to the object" was deemed true. So we can say we thought it was knowledge (true information or JTB) or we could say it was knowledge (justified belief) .
Which is an accurate proposition as wether it was knowledge or not at the time to say' ''green is innate to the object'' will depend on what y
your definition of the word knowledge is.
Knowledge=justified belief (x)
Knowledge=justified true belief (y)
Knowledge=(true) information (z)
Knowledge=a belief assumed to be true (m)
What we can do for example is
something like. (and to be clear we wouldn't add x y or z. We'd just naturally talk using the word knowledge and the definitions and as a result we'd get confused.
''knowledge (y) is not true information (z).
Knowledge (y) is justified true belief (y) (JTB= short version of what you said). And I could say ''no, knowledge (z) is true information (z)''.
Which would basically be like.
''no, it's not the case that y is z. Obviously y is y
And then I can say "no, z is z"
So then we are really just confused by language and arguing about definition. And one isn't necessarily true and the other false. They will only be more, less or equally useful depending on context and a desired metric and measuring method or goal.
In other words a definition of a word can't be false or true just be more or less useful.
If a proposition is true then it is true information. So if we'd use the word knowledge for that then sure. If a proposition is true but we prefer to say knowledge is tied to a belief and must be JTB then we could equally say it's knowledge. Because it is a JTB.
If we say that that proposition is justified belief and we want to use the word knowledge to describe it. Then since the proposition is a justified belief it would be knowledge if such defined.
The truth value we can imagine not depending on your perception otherwise we'd have contradictions galore. Surely we can make a distinction between truth assumption by person x vs our recognition that x could be false anyway. (In a practical way)
And would you say the theist, atheist and agnost each have different ideas as to what we can claim to know? And that this then affects their being a theist/agnost? And would you say that that confirms rather then refutes my position that whether we can know first depends on what we mean by 'know'
Since if we mean by 'know' 'having absolute certainty even beyond often assumed ridiculous doubt'. Then in that case we can't know. If defined differently (fallibilist type definition) then we can know.
Incorrect.
I separate knowing from knowledge. (In the case I originally used knowledge to be Translated as true Information)
So let's say something like ability knowledge. With propositions people explain how to ride. Eventually you manage to do so. I'd claim that the person who knows how to ride a bicycle is someone that can fulfill the task after having understood the true information that explained how to do the task and was able to enact the true information into action.
So I can know how to ride a bicycle. Some things I can know. Some things I can't know. Both with a stringent epistemological approach and a more practical one.
And my ability to know in the bicycle case is because I have applied true information and am aware that it is true because if it wasn't I'd not be able to ride the bycicle.
If you told me ''the way to ride a bicycle is to sit on your buttocks and wave your hand at random people and then you'll do what x does (points at x who's riding a bycicle). Then the information would be false in that definition of knowledge it would thus not be knowledge. And would not result in me riding a bycicle.
If we translate/define knowledge as ''true information'' and separate it from knowing as I said. You get this.
''you can have true information and not know that you have it. You can have true information and know that you have it but in order to know you have to be aware of the truth of the information"
Or the same but without translation
"You can have knowledge and know it or have knowledge and not know it. And if you know you have knowledge then you have to be aware of the truth of the information otherwise you don't know you have knowledge.
An example of being aware of the truth of the information in your possession being true information is "this what we are doing, is something, whatever its true nature might be, so something exists"
Or pre translation.
An example of knowing you have knowledge is "this what we are doing, is something, whatever its true nature might be, so something exists"
So can you be aware of whether the information is true (know) that Superman can fly even if you haven't heard of Superman? No. You'd need knowledge (true information) and awareness that the information is knowledge (true information).
So just because true information (knowledge) doesn't require a belief, doesn't mean that you can be aware of the truth value (know) of 'superman can fly' even if you don't know him.
Can you explain in virtue of what a belief would be "justified" without any reference to truth? How does logic "justify" a belief without reference to logic's relationship to truth in particular?
It seems to me that this will be difficult.
Can you define "information" here? It seems to me that you are presenting something like: "knowledge is truth's presence in the mind?"
Presumably information can be false, right? So in virtue of what is "true information" true?
Funny, I thought it sounded similar to classical formulations of knowledge, which imply understanding. I guess it depends on what "information" is supposed to mean.
When I use knowledge defined/to be translated as true information
Then I'd not say that is just ''truth in the mind'' if by that you mean an assumption of truth.
Rather more abstract. If we write a letter. "Something exists because this letter, and the writer, whatever their actual nature is they obviously exist in some form or other.''
And that letter somehow gets made such that is encased in a nearly indestructible substance.
Surely ''truth value'' isn't something physical or magical in the letter. But we can use the word to understand that what the proposition states is the case regardless of belief. We can understand that it is or isn't so.
So information would be something like that proposition example. Whatever it is that complex entities eventually could decode even alien races given enough time and maybe some luck. (Like we'd decode stuff).
So knowledge defined as true information is just like that proposition + it being true regardless of opinion.
The earth is flat or it isn't. Regardless of opinion. So knowledge for me would be ''the earth is not flat'' (if it is not flat).
We use axes and bassoons in the world, too and they're nor knowledge. They were made by people who knew something about materials and processes.
I know the words, but cannot parse the sentence.
Quoting Jack2848
Exactly, which is why a piece of information, however true and correct, is not knowledge until it's verified by comparison to previous experience, tested against logic and probability and incorporated into a personal data-base. When you experience and remember something, it becomes part of your knowledge. When you communicate it to someone else, it doesn't necessarily part of their knowledge.
Quoting Jack2848
But I'm not using one word when I mean a different word. Why should I?
Quoting Jack2848
That's part of it. More comprehensively, you can say that we interpret evidence differently, according to our previous experience, conviction and disposition, and thereby arrive at different conclusions.
Quoting Jack2848
Neither. You interpret knowledge one way; the theist and I interpret it a different way. You make all those little word equations; the true believer has an epiphany; I have a critical approach to whatever I read.
Quoting Jack2848
Sure: we can be 100 sure that we know how to brush our teeth; many know how to drive a car; some people know how to make an axe. Doctors generally know that vaccinations protect against contagious disease; astronomers know, to a reasonable level of certainty which of the visible suns have planets; those who have read the reports know that climate change is clear and present danger. Whether there are gods or ghosts is a matter of personal conviction, simply because there is too little objective, testable and verifiable information.
Yep. Not an uncommon move. Is it justified? Is there a difference in kind here? You know that there is water in the tap. You can show that you know this by saying "There is water in the tap", or by going and getting a glass of water. Going and getting a glass of of water is something you do. But so is saying "There is water in the tap".
Indeed, if we came across someone who said "I know that there is water in the tap", but became confused when asked to locate and turn the tap on in order to obtain a glass of water, we might well conclude that they said they knew but really didn't.
There seems to be a pretty good argument that "knowing that" is a type of "knowing how".
I'm not convinced that you can neatly slice knowing how from knowing that.
What do you say?
They have all the information.
But they can't do it.
Hence knowledge is more than information.
Knowing how to use a faucet is not the same thing as knowing that any particular faucet is working. A person demonstrates that they know how to use a faucet and that they believe a given faucet is working when they try to fill a cup with it. Whether or not they know [I]that[/I] this particular faucet is working prior to filling their cup is a different question.
For instance, wolfing down horse dewormer to prevent yourself from getting COVID-19 is not the same thing as knowing that horse dewormer is a good treatment for that disease. Knowing [I]that[/I] something is true is not equivalent with knowing how to behave as if something were true.
A priest having a crisis of faith about the Eucharist and one who isn't might behave in identical ways during the Mass, yet they have different beliefs. Further, their beliefs are one thing and the truth of transubstantiation, the existence of God, and other related questions, are yet another thing.
Of course, with a very broad definition of "doing" or "behavior," we can accommodate all sorts of knowledge to "knowing how," since we can simply refer to "knowing" or "thinking," or even "experiencing" as "things we do" or "behaviors/acts." But praying does not demonstrate knowledge of God in the way that riding a bike demonstrates knowledge of bike riding. Not all knowledge is of an art; some is speculative.
I do think there’s a difference in kind, but to tell the truth, I don’t really care about what it means to know how to do something. At least not in the context of philosophy.
Sure.
The point made is that in order to be said to know something, it's not usually enough to have the information; one also should be able to act on that information.
That seems to have little to do with being able to carry on a ritual without having faith in the accompanying theology.
So what do we conclude?
Quoting T Clark
A shame. Fine.
If information is inapplicable to the physical world, it can't be tested for veracity or relevance. You can only know for certain that which you have observed, experienced, tested and verified. Actual knowledge can't be divorced from the whats, hows and whys of the physical world.
Untestable information can be believed, accepted because it's probable in light of actual knowledge you already possess or it fits in with your world-view and expectations, or because the source is someone you trust. That's belief. It is often correct, but it's not knowledge.
Yep. Very much so. Knowledge is embedded in what we do, in ways well beyond the place of information.
It seems to me that any proof that logic provides must be confirmed by some observation. 2 + 2 = 4 are just scribbles on a page. What do the scribbles refer to in the world to make 2 + 2 = 4 useful and true? 2 + 2 = 4 is true, but why is it true? It's because we observe and categorize similar objects into groups so that there can be more than one of some thing. If everything were unique and there were no categories then there would only ever be one of anything and 2 + 2 = 4 would be meaningless. The idea of quantities is dependent upon the idea that things share a particular "essence" or "substance" to be grouped into similar categories to then say that there is a quantity of that particular "essence" or "substance", like cows, rocks and stars.
The information one possesses could be memories where one used the information before and was successful in accomplishing some goal with that information, and would probably solve the present problem as well being that both circumstances are similar.
If one cannot know how to ride a bike, then how does one learn to ride a bike? Don't forget that possessing information doesn't necessarily mean ones is conscious of the information as learned information is typically stored unconsciously until needed. Once one learns to ride a bike all the movements required are handled subconsciously. But this cannot be said while learning to ride a bike as one is fully conscious of every movement and one's balance as one observes one's actions and the effect of those actions, and repeat. This is what the learning process is. Once the task is learned most of the actions are governed subconsciously allowing the mind to tend to other things.
Do you take the assessment of the truth value of a proposition as knowing-how knowledge, equivalent to juggling balls? Seems evaluating statements requires cognitive grasp of concepts.
It is enough for "knowing that." Someone who wakes up during an operation, but finds themselves immobilized , is obviously aware of the fact that their anesthesia is not working and that they are in pain regardless of their ability to do much of anything.
At the end of Braveheart, the prince's wife tells evil old King Longshanks, who has just had a stroke and is immobilized, that she plans on deposing his weak son and that the child she is pregnant with was sired by another man and that his line ends with him. But he can't really do anything about it, because of the stroke.
It can hardly be that he has to act in order to know though. For one, this would imply that we don't know things until we act on them, and yet why would we act on things we don't yet know? This would place the uninformed will prior to the intellect. We would "know by doing."
Knowing is an act of thinking though and thought does not necessitate any particular outward action.
That not all knowledge is of arts. Knowledge of sculpting is revealed in sculpting. Knowledge of sailing is revealed in the art of sailing. Knowledge of shipbuilding is exercised in building ships. But this is not true of all forms of knowledge.
If it's a detailed instruction on how to juggle balIs, yes. I can believe that a statement or instruction or description is true, but I can't know it unless I test it by some independent means. Verify the statement through other sources, follow the instruction and succeed in the endeavour, examine the described object through my own senses.
Quoting Hanover
Yes. And how are cognitive grasps formed? Sensory input+experience+learning+memory+reflection. They're made in the web of knowing the world.
Our lovely, sweet, passive-aggressive Banno.
I agree with the first sentence. With the rest of it, you lost me a bit.
But aren't concepts an aspect of engaging the world? Even if I was beheaded and one last concept passed through my noggin, the meaning of that thought is inextricable from my better days of seeking and finding, trying and failing, etc.
That is, you're going to suggest now that I know of the counterfactual possible world based upon the actual world despite the fact that the possible world is defined as the non-actual not experienced world?
This is just to say propositional truth need not be how-to truth, and taking the position it must be in 100% of the cases seems a task that will fail given the creativity of your opponent in offering counters. If though, as I suspect, there is a hidden tautology here, meaning I am searching for the white penguin when you define penguins as black, I'd like to fast forward to the big reveal so I can see where it ends.
I don't think we can say cognition and behavior are identical. That makes no sense.
What do you think is happening when a person grasps a concept?
Understanding occurs. It's within the mystical parameters of consciousness which AI lacks yet seems to outperform us on.
I don't demand language for conceptual grasp. That strikes me as contrived to eliminate metaphysical messiness.
Good answer.
Revealed to witnesses by the product, yes. But the sculptor's knowledge was acquired gradually, by learning the concept of sculpture, assimilating information about the potential, properties, vulnerabilities and hazards of the medium, the tools and the processes, perhaps watching someone else do it, integrating this multitude of facts (true information) into his neural network, with tags for retrieval at need, and then practicing the required actions on real materials, until finally a sculpture emerges.
Quoting Hanover
Lots of things are 100% true that I can never know. More things are true that I believe with 90-99% certainty, but don't know. There is an even greater number of facts of which I am in possession, which are at some stage of the verification and integration process on their way to becoming knowledge... unless I forget them before the process is finished.
My objection is not to the truth value of a proposition, but the assumption that true information is knowledge.
Knowledge doesn't need to be about how; that's just one kind - practical knowledge. The input of one's own senses and internal functioning is another kind - direct internal knowledge. The second kind doesn't need further study, since it's already integrated: it's established in the material body as well as in the mind. Sensations are known without reference to language or concept.
Statements about the mechanics of a bicycle and how riding one is done may all be true information, and you may grasp the concepts and believe the statements. You can justify that belief by checking whether the source has been reliable (memory), comparing it with other independent sources (validation) and examining an actual bicycle for congruence with the description given and watching people ride bicycles (observation). You can know that bicycles exist, are intended for transportation and powered by a rider. You still won't know how to ride a bike until you learn the necessary physical actions. They're different categories of knowledge.
Theoretical knowledge doesn't require the last step, but any information that cannot be verified physically still does require checking against background information (what you already knew), the credentials and possibly the motivation of its source (judgment based on knowledge of external factors) plausibility (prior familiarity with the concepts, logic and context) and then integration into one's cranial data-base before it's one's own knowledge.
We can define the word knowledge in various ways.
Let's say someone x tells someone z , say Jane with all the right details (true information and thus propositional knowledge) how to ride a bycicle.
Jane can't ride. Not ever. She just can't learn it. (Just like an ant couldn't or some other creature with different cognitive abilities or physical restraints) She is the extremely rare human being that can't ride a bicycle. Yet most humans that take the propositional knowledge (true Information) are able to use it in order to ride the bycicle. And if we'd give purposefully incorrect information. This non propositional knowledge would have most people unable to learn how to ride a bicycle (at least when applying the incorrect knowledge, such as waving at strangers while sitting on the curb)
So what we learn is not that propositional knowledge or true Information isn't true information.
What we learn is that applying propositional knowledge which is the conceptual attempt to describe ability knowledge. But that for most it is close enough if the task isn't too difficult, to reach ability knowledge with the initial propositional knowledge combined with enactment over time.
And we learned that propositional knowledge won't necessarily lead to ability knowledge because 1. Prop knowledge is conceptual so just like a map isn't the land but can still help (for those that can read maps and so on) and 2. Ability knowledge is probably some kind of neuronal connection. And the learner has to have the physical ability both cognitively and qua physique to perform it.
So we learn propositional knowledge or true information exists. And that because it is different from the physical thing (neuronal connections of ability knowledge) it can cause issues for some. The exception that can't learn to ride a bicycle shows their inability to perform it. And the ones (most) that follow the wrong instructions and fail and then follow the right instructions and succeed over time confirm that propositional knowledge for learning how to ride a bicycle can often lead to ability knowledge because it is close enough to ability knowledge for most.
See. Earlier you said something is made true by direct experience. In other cases in short translation you say that we need justified true belief for knowledge. But since from what you said it follows that you're position at least how it's presented here is that 'the truth maker' is not something like 'p if p'. But rather direct undoubtedable experience. Or justified true belief.
But then the belief would become true because of justifications and belief rather than that you'd have good justifications for believing that x is true, or is the case.
I get that there's no physical property called 'truth'. But it serves a function. The function is to understand something like p if p. Regardless of whether I have a direct experience of p or wether you have justifications and a belief that p.
So either you stick to the idea that truth is made by justifications and belief or direct experience. Or truth is a tool we use to conceptually understand that a proposition can 'be true'' regardless of opinion. (So what you said in the later post). Or you keep both in the exact way as presented and contradict yourself. Since then you'd say that information x is true regardless of opinion. And that it's only true if you have good reasons to believe it. But surely people often thought from a 1st and collective 1st person perspective that they had good reasons to believe it. And surely that didn't make it true. Surely the earth wasn't flat just because people had good reasons to believe it at the time.
You missed the point of the whole text.
I meant to show how people use the same words with different meanings. If you'd say that knowledge is justified true belief. Then that's objectively not a descriptive correct statement in that case you're equally choosing a definition per your preference. As others would.
To be descriptive and claim to be more accurate. You'd have to look at instances of when people say they have knowledge. Now and across time. And you'll see that it's belief assumed to be justified and assumed to be true.
Why? Knowledge (beliefs assumed to be justified and assumed to be true) have often be wrong.
You might say that those people only thought they had knowledge (and here you could have in mind JTB)
And that's true. But then you've intorduced a new definition and are no longer descriptive. This is what I tried to explain but you seem to not have fully understood it. Perhaps that's because I was being too vague.
Anyway. Once we move away form the descriptive the claim that you have the correct account dissapears. Since now I can claim equally that knowledge is to be defined as ''true information'' . Or something other
And then I can say that people only thought they had true information (knowledge) but didn't.
And it would be useful a definition but equally incorrect in a descriptive way.
No more than
Quoting T Clark
By ignoring knowhow you are protecting your ideas from critique, rather than willingly exposing them to analysis. As I said, that's a shame.
Pretty much. Working out what is true and what isn't, is an activity, something we do. We look around, we do the calculation.
Quoting Hanover
...not so much...
Quoting Hanover
"cognitive grasp of concepts..." You are said to grasp a concept if you can show that you understand it. You show that you grasp the concept of bike riding by riding a bike, or at least by recognising a bike rider.
To grasp a concept is being able to act in certain ways.
Good to see you doing some analysis.
We might require of a definition that it explicitly sets out what is and what isn't included in the definends. Sometimes we can do just that. For some definends, all we can do is set out a family resemblance, listing the things that are sometimes included, sometimes not, and understand that there may be exceptions.
Treating knowledge as strictly Justified True Belief will have as a consequence the contradictions that result in threads such as this.
Better then to look at the sort of things that are and are not included in knowledge, at how the word is used, rather than just stipulating a definition. Our use of words tends to exceed any such stipulation.
So sure, Longshanks knew what would happen, and yet couldn't act on that knowledge. It's the abnormality of his not being unable to act in this case that makes it startling and exceptional; and dramatic.
If you prefer, while knowledge doesn’t logically require the ability to act (as Longshanks shows), it normatively and ordinarily includes that capacity.
To know something and not be able to act on it is the exception, and a performative contradiction.
Quoting Vera Mont
This is also good. Wittgenstein pointed out that we do not know we have a pain, we just have a pain - and here he is using "know" as justified true belief, and pointing out that it makes little sense to talk of justifying to oneself that one is in pain - since what counts as the evidence is just the pain itself.
And yet it also makes little sense to say that one is in pain yet doesn't know one is in pain.
This fits in with knowhow. One is said to know how to ride a bike once one rides a bike. The justification is the act.
The upshot? Folk sometimes supose that knowhow is an exceptional case of knowing that; that propositional knowledge is central. It's the other way around. Propositional knowledge is s special kind of knowhow.
:grin: Meta is in worse shape, thanks to you.
Suppose I know P, but I never act on it. How am I different from a person who knows P, but can't act on it?
This is an old philosophical problem with the concept of potential energy.
The justified true belief account comes from Socrates in the Theaetetus, and even he wasn't happy with it.
You're on the right track, I think, in looking to the way we use the word "knowledge". But here's a puzzle for you: must there be one statable phrase that covers all our uses of "knowledge"? Could it be that we use the word in different ways, such that no fixed definition is both accurate and compete?
Moreover, will we say is the correct uses of "knowledge" are only those that conform to some stated definition?
At the least, that rules out any novel uses. Do we want to do that?
Potential energy is creative accounting for physicist. They invented it in order not to falsify the principle of the conservation of energy. :wink:
Quoting frank
You're not.
Perhaps we can assume honesty, and you said that you know, while the person who doesn't know also says that they don't know. But saying you know amounts to acting on your knowledge...
So that question might not be as simple as it at first seems.
Not that much earlier, and not quite as you put it. The experiencer of a sensation knows that sensation to be true, without making any statement. It's not made true and it's not information; it's true because it's inside of the experiencer. It's not true for anyone else. It can be communicated to others and they may believe it, but they cannot know it.
Quoting Jack2848
Truth-maker? No, I never referred to any such thing. What I said was that a statement may be true and we can believe it, which makes it our belief. But information doesn't become knowledge until it's been verified and incorporated with our data base.
Truth is not the issue. The issue is the difference between belief and knowledge. When you say "justified true belief", that's the same as a belief that has been verified so that it can become knowledge. That's far beyond a simple fact "true information".
Quoting Jack2848
I'm all too keenly aware of that. If it gets much more lax, we might as well give up on verbal communication, since any word can mean whatever anyone chooses.
If you understand the relationship between rationalism vs empiricism then all I am saying is that knowledge is supported by integrating both rather than treating them as a dichotomy. Beliefs are supported by only one or the other or neither.
Thanks.
To be fair, it is often difficult to understand what you are saying. Perhaps a language issue. For example, I am not sure that I understand what you are trying to say in the following paragraph:
Quoting Jack2848
Do you mean to say that JTB does not correctly describe all common usages of the word "knowledge"? That would be a fair criticism, but then I don't see how your own proposal would address it.
Quoting Jack2848
But here you seem to be saying the opposite: that JTB is how people generally use the word "knowledge."
So, which is it? Does JTB capture the meaning(s) of "knowledge" or does it not?
And if JTB does reflect the current use, then what is that point of your definition? Do you wish to reform language? Clarify an ambiguity? But defining "knowledge" as, essentially, fact, true proposition, is not only redundant, but confusing as well. According to the usual meaning, knowledge requires a knower, naturally enough. But with your proposal, most of what qualifies as "knowledge" is not known to anyone!
Quoting Jack2848
Knowledge claims are sometimes disputed, disclaimed, or proven wrong, as the case may be. The JTB proponent would deal with this issue by emphasizing the distinction between knowledge claims and knowledge as such. Justified Belief is sufficient for a knowledge claim. The Truth requirement is what is supposed to certify that the claim is merited.
I'm not sure if verification is necessary. It seems like a very strict requirement. If a stranger tells me that their name is John, do I have to verify this (e.g. by checking their ID) before I can be said to know their name?
I know that in a few billion years the Sun will expand and consume the Earth.
Not really sure how to make use of this information, but I know it all the same.
You just did.
You're going to have to elaborate. Otherwise it seems that you're just saying that knowing that p is equivalent to knowing how to write "I know that p". Which would be such a cop-out.
To sincerely say "I know that P" is to assert that P, while it would be exceeding odd to assert that P while claiming not to know the P.
That's been the line all along: "Knowing that" is a form of "knowing how".
Far form being a cop out, it's the central point here. Bits of knowledge fit in with our form of life, and so with what we do. Our knowing that the sun will expand is a part of our broader knowledge of the nature of the sun, built from our looking around and interacting with the world. It's not an isolated factoid.
Notice that it's not knowing how to just say P that is salient, but how to assert P. That involves knowing how to make use of the speech act of making an assertion, along with all the paraphernalia of truth, justification, reference and so on.
Which is what is not captured by saying that knowledge is true information.
From here you said:
So given that I say "I know that in a few billion years the Sun will expand and consume the Earth" what is the "knowing how" (comparable to using the tap to fill a glass of water) that demonstrates that I do in fact know what I claim to know?
But on the example of the tap:
1. I know that the tap is working
2. I know that the tap isn't working
3. I know how to use a tap
4. I know how to prove that the tap is working
5. I know how to prove that the tap isn't working
6. I know how to assert the English sentence "(I know that) the tap is working"
7. I know how to assert the English sentence "(I know that) the tap isn't working"
It's entirely possible that (3)-(7) are all true but that (1) and (2) are both false. Therefore (1) and (2) are distinct from (3)-(7).
Information is everywhere causes leave effects. Which information is relevant is dependent upon the present goal in the mind. If you had the goal to ensure the human race continues to exist beyond the Earth being consumed by the Sun you might start building and testing rockets to make humanity a multi-planetary, or multi-solar system species.
I re-read my comment and I could have made some bullet points or something. I hope you at least got the gist of it. But moving on to answer your questions
1. As I added in the edit in the OP and in some comments to others. I am acutely aware of different ways that we could hold the word 'knowledge'.
I've determined at least a few.
A. Knowledge= a belief assumed to be true and assumed that we (or I) have good justifications for it
B. Knowledge= justified true belief
C. Knowledge= justified belief
D. Knowledge= true information
Any of these can be work. And I'd say given the issues with language it might even be better to bypass it and just say what we mean at times.
(Take the word 'woke' how for some it entails radical behavior whereas for other awareness of social issues)
That is vastly different. And just the use of the word rather than just saying what one dislikes directly had caused much unnecessary issues.
Now from all of these options. I think 'A' is the only one that we can claim is objectively the most accurate of the four because it describes.
It can't be JTB, or true information or justified belief that is more descriptive. Because individuals or groups have called things 'knowledge'. That either wasn't true or wasn't justified. (Not really). Even our justifications at some point assume they are justified.
But in the case of A. Which acknowledges that it's an -assumption- of a belief being justified and true. This is rock solid as a description. Since then the lack of truth or lack of proper judgment of justification doesn't break the definition since it is merely an assumption.
2. Is there a definition that could help us limit whether some definitions for knowledge are acceptable and some aren't?
We could consider the negative effects of trivializing definitions. Any definition should seek to be clear. If the definition is highly inspired by psychological introspection. Then it should make clear the distinction between personal truth assumption and practical recognition of actual 'truth' .
Do you have a definition for your answer?
3.
I wouldn't rule out novel uses.
It would possibly limit new ways of understanding the process of putting out there our understanding of what is. As maybe someone has an insight we don't yet have
I wouldn't say most common people would say knowledge requires a knower. If you ask someone on the street and as them. ''Can I put knowledge onto a piece of paper. whilst not knowing for myself it is knowledge?"
I imagine many saying something like this. "Yes because if it is knowledge as you say. Then since it is true (information). Then whether you know it or not doesn't matter. It is still true."
I've the luck in this case that I have a very ordinary job. And yet when I tell people knowledge is defined as ''justified true belief''. It doesn't sound like the first thing they think of.
Ofcourse if you ask people. Do you have knowledge? And then ask them how do you know you have knowledge? They might say . Because I have good reasons to believe it.
So knowing then is 'personally assumed justified belief' that they have knowledge (true information).
Hmm.
''belief assumed to be true and assumed to have justifications for"
''information assumed to be true''
''Information assumed to be true''
Those seem like the most descriptive options for what knowledge ultimately is.
Whereas JTB and ''true information'' would be more (useful) inventions rather then descriptions.
With JTB.
'the earth is flat' would have been assumed to be knowledge. But then layer turned out to be justified belief. So not knowledge.
With 'true information' as definition the same would have happened.
It would have been wrongfully (but understandably) assumed to have been knowledge (TI) but then later shown wrong.
The same happens really. It's just that TI there's a clear distinction between knowing and knowledge. Knowing requires (if one is less stringent) justified belief.
And if more stringent, direct awareness of said true information.
I'm definitely not advocating (although in my initial post I seem to have had a different mood) for it having to be defined differently. But I felt like maybe we have strayed to far from a more simple definitional approach. (And this also further from applying Occam's razor)
By recognizing that for knowing we require justifications or direct awareness or x. So that we can know or reasonably assume that we have knowledge (TI). We simplify the definitions.
The idea is that we can talk about our family, despite not being able to give a strict and explicit definition that includes all and only those members we want; and this can be generalised to claim that for some terms there is no explicit definition that sets out all and only those things that are to be included. The other example is "game" - without resorting to mere stipulation, can we provide a rule that includes all and only those things that we have described as a "game"? Not all games involve winning, nor competition, nor amusement. And yet despite this we make good use of the word.
Point being that we do not need to be able to present a definition as a prerequisite for using the word.
We use the word "knowledge" quite adequately, and widely, and yet when we try to tie it down we end up in these interminable philosophical meanderings.
So, do we need to provide a definition of knowledge at all? Perhaps it would be better to just map out the different ways we use the word, as you have begun to do.
One thing we can do is to mark the difference between knowing an believing. We can believe something that is not true. We can't know something that is not true. If you thought you knew something, but it turns out you were mistaken, then you didn't know it at all.
"relationship" has a particular baggage - f(a,b) is a relationship.
But the proposition isn't related to the knowledge, so much as part of it's content.
This can be set out again in terms of substitution. if it were a relation, then substitution should be allowed - if f(a,b) and c=b then f(a,c).
But if you know that Cicero wrote De Officiis, it does not follow that you know that Tully wrote De Officiis, despite Tull=Cicero.
So knowing is substitutionally opaque. Relations, not so much.
- :up:
- :up:
Knows is an intensional operator. That knowledge has this intensional aspect puts weight to the idea that knowledge is about a relationship between a knower and an object of thought.
"Object of thought" is loaded. "Content" might be preferred.
But also, what is a "thought"? A proposition in one's mind? Is it distinct from a feeling, or an intuition, or a belief?
These are the problems with the classical approach - might call it the cognitive theory of knowledge, that are addressed by treating knowledge as embodied, as an activity.
The reason I would not want to use "relationship" is because it reifies propositions. It is something a Platonist might like.
But riding a bike is partly a matter of muscle memory. I don't see how the knowledge that Tully wrote X is something about the body. It seems to be about thought.
It's not not about the body either. Your body wrote the reply, making use of what you knew about Tully, in a way not that dissimilar to how you ride a bike, making use of what you know about peddles and wheels.
The classical approach is to divide "know how" from "know that", and treat of each with an utterly different account. I want to consider an alternative: that knowing involves doing, including doing speaking and thinking.
The problem is that a name is arguably an extrinsic quality. To know some object is not the same as knowing what name certain other people use to refer to that object.
Maybe you have a nickname, and only two of your friends use that nickname. To fail to know your nickname is not necessarily to fail to know you. Banno's, "Tully = Cicero," actually means something like, "What some name as 'Tully' others name as 'Cicero'." This isn't a particularly substantial point. It pertains to names, not to things. It pertains to predication, not to relationship. Banno says:
Quoting Banno
What he requires is something more like f(a, (b,c)), such as Knowledge(Frank, (Tully, De Officiis)). The quibble is actually over the propositional predication (b,c), not the relation between knower and known. After all, Knowledge(Frank, (Tully, De Officiis)) is arguably different than Knowledge(Frank, (Cicero, De Officiis)), if names are to be constitutive parts of knowledge.
There's a passage somewhere in the Old Testament that says there's no knowledge in the grave. Knowledge is about living, it's part of living, and that's not something anyone does inside their skull. I understand.
f(a, (b,c)) is of course malformed, and even if we charitably allowed some sort of well formed interpretation - perhaps f(a,b,c) - it doesn't even address the issue of extensionality.
According to what authority? The gods of Analytic Philosophy, who do not allow a 2-tuple within a 2-tuple? :wink:
Your whole presupposition is that one of the two relata is complex, and is therefore subject to substitution, for you are substituting a subject/part of a proposition, not one of the two relata that frank outlined. If the proposition-relata cannot be complex then your objection has no force.
Or three?
I know that the bicycle was invented by Karl Drais
I know how to ride a bicycle
I know the feeling of falling off a bicycle
Can you give an example of "factual knowledge" that is independent of "experiential knowledge"?
Quoting RogueAI
Why think that perception is knowledge at all?
I would say that intention should guide us, such that if someone purports to know something, then we can treat it as a knowledge claim. Someone might claim to know via perceptions, but claims of perception are not the same as claims of knowledge, because perception is not the same as knowledge. "I perceived that the house is red," is not the same as, "I know that the house is red."
Of course we can say that someone does not, "Know what it's like to see colors," but this is a semantically varied sense of "know."
...but I am digressing:
Quoting RogueAI
I think you are basically correct. I would phrase it this way, "Even if we consider know-how a kind of knowledge, it does not follow that all knowledge is of this kind."
.........
We don't always find it easy to have a clear definition yes. We teach kids what a tree and a car is by showing them pictures of different trees and cars. And then of toy cars and so on.
So we intuitively understand the pattern but it's much more difficult to explain it. However suppose someone called Jack says to his daughter: ''I'll give you a present next year and it will be a car''. Then since he means a car in GTA 6, he'd better mention to his daughter that he means a car in GTA 6. Otherwise she might assume from context that he meant an actual car. Similarly we use the word 'knowledge' in similar ways. Hence sometimes it's better to move beyond the word.
(Although the family description example begs to be vague. I would say a family is a descendant (or we can say descendant until x generations). Trying to define family by their attributes is pointless as mutations probably happen and culture effects individuals and so on. And for game. One could choose to only include games where one can win and have a different name for the others such as recreational activity that isn't a game. but I get your point and I did fairly address it above)
And I agree. We can map out different ways the word can be reasonably used. So we all are more aware that we are arguing on definitions to attach to a word rather than over what the actual thing is.
Although one pattern arises across them all. ''Knowledge is something assumed to be true by an individual or by a group''. And the something for some is JTB or it can be true information. Or something other. So it's the most likely descriptive candidate.
"The philosopher you're thinking of is David Lewis.
In response to Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument (the "Mary's Room" thought experiment), Lewis argued that what Mary gains when she sees color for the first time isn’t new propositional knowledge (knowledge-that), but rather knowledge-how—specifically, the ability to recognize, imagine, and remember colors. This position is called the ability hypothesis.
Lewis laid out this view in his 1988 paper "What Experience Teaches". According to him, Mary doesn't learn a new fact when she leaves the room; she acquires new abilities, like the ability to recognize red by sight. This way, he tries to preserve physicalism by denying that Mary learns any non-physical fact upon seeing color."
The experience of being on the forum the first time can be put into information via a thought. It's equivalent enough. I agree that I have direct experience but it might be my memory is incorrect so it's not necessarily the case that me having the experience
a. The experience makes it true in my experience unless I don't have that critical thought so I can't necessarily know. As I said earlier (if that final statement is true depends on how you'd define "know")
B. It may be so that it isn't true in the perception of everyone else , but as I said earlier that doesn't make it actually true or not true
Whether or not you believe that a cat is on the mat. It is or isn't there.. or in other words it is true regardless of your or anyone's perception. Because it refers to a part of the universe that is a way that is different from the rest at some level of that universe.
Hence "the cat is on the mat is true" not if you believe or not believe it but if the cat is on the mat.
P if p
Well if you say :
It's true BECAUSE it is in the experiencer and not true for anyone else.
Then hopefully you mean that it is true regardless of anyone. And it is perceived of true or not true depending on a subject
How do we know if a word necessarily means what you say it means? How do we know this? Do we look at instances of knowledge? Because if so turns out as I said. That those instances are more "akin to information assumed to be true" or "beliefs assumed to justified and assumed to be true"
Definitely not justified true belief.
At least not if we are to take a purely descriptive account.
You did. I've tried as best I can to clearly layout what I mean when I use words like knowledge. (Even if implied this is problematic.
And I have stayed clear from mixing truth perception and actual truth).
Gettier cases show not that we can have "justified true belief" and still don't have knowledge.
If so define me the word you assume we don't have when we have a gettier case.
Ofcourse what we really intuitively grasp is that the gettier cases show us that having knowledge (having justified true belief) doesn't mean that you know you have knowledge (doesn't mean you know you have justified true belief.
Whereas if you said knowledge is true information.
Then in a gettier case. You'd have someone have true information. And of they then say that they know they have true Information. We could say you don't know even if you have a strongly justified belief.
It is not that the gettier cases show us that
A.
we can't have knowledge (justified true belief)
nor that
B. we can't have knowledge (true information) and know (have good justifications for it) we have knowledge (true information).
Gettier cases show us that even with extremely good justifications and true believe or true Information. Our claim that we -know- could still be false. If -know- means to have good justifications and true believe/information. It humbles our ability to know regardless of how you define knowledge as true information and add the requirement for justification to the act of knowing or of you add that requirement to both knowing and knowledge as with JTB.
This obvious since we don't have direct awareness which would be required for ultimate rather than practical knowing.
However I do agree with you that it wouldn't be practical to change the definition. And it seems more accurate to include justification requirement in the act of knowing AND knowledge assumptions. Even if one could easily separate the act of knowing from a piece of true information.
Why should I care how true it is for you? You made the statement and I had no reason to disbelieve it. That's where its importance begins and ends.
Quoting Jack2848
I don't see a cat or a mat. I have only your word. I have no reason to doubt your statement and, since its truth or unrtuth doesn't matter to me, I am not motivated to investigate further. Whether it's true or false, I don't know. However true the information may be, it is not part of my knowledge.
Quoting Jack2848
Yes, it's true for the experiencer. It may be absolutely true in the universe. I just can't know whether it is.
There is an infinite number of facts in the universe outside our direct experience that are absolutely true regardless of our apprehension of them. These facts include the experience of other sentient beings. When we receive information about one of these external facts - cats, stomach aches, the speed of trains or supernovae - we can interpret it, we can accept or reject it, we can use it to base further investigation on, we can compare untested information what we already believe, we can commit it to memory - but we cannot know it until all that has been done and the new information integrated with our body of knowledge. Even then, it is provisional; any 'fact' we know today may have to be discarded or revised later, in the light of fresh evidence.
Quoting Jack2848
We don't. Word meaning are by convention and consensus. If we wish to communicate, we must have a strong enough belief in our current understanding of words to use them.
I'm not arguing for the importance of whether I was on this forum before or whether you should care. That would be a strawman of my intent.I was arguing your idea that my proposition regarding me being new was "made true by direct experience"
To which I said that it isn't.
Whatever is the case is the case. Regardless of direct experience or justifications. That is what I was arguing for. And that was I brought up the example of the cat on the mat. Not to assume that you can know whether I am new or not.
Whether it's true or not, it's still your internal knowledge, unless and until you are convinced otherwise. You cannot communicate it by thought: you have to say it, write it, type it or send it as some kind of code. Correct or not, true or not, but it doesn't become anyone else's knowledge without belief, verification and processing by another intelligence. Quoting Jack2848
If it is true, it was made true by taking place in your consciousness. It still your knowledge, and no one else's, so stop dancing around that mulberry bush.
That's not the argument. The argument is that there is no "clear definition".
With the exception of merely stipulated technical terms, the way we use words precedes any definition. The word is used before it is defined. It follows that definitions are post hoc, with all the issues that involves.
Certainly this is true of "know", with it's etymology going back at least to the PIE root *gno- "to know."
Justified true belief was never going to be the whole of how we use "knowledge".
And even worse for knowledge as true information.
So you meant it like this then?
Me:
"I rode a bicycle"
You:
Sez you who made it true by direct experience. For all I know. You didn't ride a bycicle. (Added: I can have no knowledge of it even if it is true)
So you meant that if I rode a bycicle the riding (experience) made it true but it doesn't mean you can know.
If that is what you meant form the start, honestly. Then I misunderstood you. (To be frank there are those that would conflate truth perception with separate truth value) I thought that was you
I agree. We see something. We coin a new word. People ask us to define it and it will fall short. Over time we use the word in different ways. And we give different definitions. And the different definitions help us bridge some of the imaginary boundaries we create in our sense of reality.
So yes I agree it's useful to see different ways words are used then to argue about a definition being the absolute king. One definition won't describe everything the word game or knowledge is used to describe.
What we can do is map out the interrelations between our words, though. So we differentiate knowing and believing. We can say "I believed it was raining but I was wrong" but not "I knew it was raining but I was wrong". We can believe things and be wrong, but if we know something we are not wrong.
But what can we say about the difference between these and justice? Or information?
Justice initially arose as a feeling reflecting a sense of retribution. But later we started to feel that maybe retribution isn't so fair. Definitely if our will is not free or could be not free.
So some will say justice is an eye for an eye or an eye for a lifelong prison sentence or a humane death penalty or something like that.
And some will say justice is whatever you say it is (but does seems to forget the initial foundation completely)
And some might say justice is trying to find a middle path between humane retribution, avoiding future immoralities, teaching better beliefs and skills to change harmful beliefs (if said immoral behavior comes from habits that are engrained and we aren't so free than that is more just than mere retribution).
So I think there's an essence that we should respect. Not sure what it is. I sense I am on the right track going from the foundation to the more advanced notion of justice. "Solving problems related to morality in order to get a better society while doing so fairly and taking into account a lot of data and understanding"
Maybe that's the essence.
So how is justice different from knowing?
Knowing is an experience of conceptually being in line with reality in a minimalist way (p if p). And having good reasons for claiming you are and being certain you are beyond any serious doubt.
Whereas justice starts as an experience. But is more of an ideal to strive for.
(Sidenote. May I ask. Are you a professional philosopher or student or professor or autodidact?)
You said knowledge is true information. I said it is not: unless and until it's been tested, reviewed, classified, stored and incorporated into a data base, information may be believed and understood, but not known.
I distinguished kinds of knowledge as 1. what I can know from direct experience and 2. what I can know from learning and remembering. The second kind is always incomplete provisional, because new information can always be added and old information may be re-evaluated in light of new.
The first kind may also be questioned for validity, but can't be altered. Whether I did something or just imagined that I was doing it, the experience remains the same.
Who says you can know a true belief just because it is deemed justified? But not know true information if one has good justifications for believing the true information is true?
Anyway. That rethorical question makes it clear that we are just arguing on how to use words. And what to paste to those words. Sure it's helpful to have some stability. And I am for practical reasons leaning back towards JTB. However one can't prove that the way you use the word is the only correct one.
If we point to a book with knowledge.
We won't find justified true beliefs. We will find justified beliefs assumed to be true
Nor would you find in the book of knowledge true information for which they had justifications.
But rather information assumed to be true for which it was assumed they had good justifications.
Anyway this won't be productive beyond this. I recognize the common usage.ninhave already shifted back the common one. However I recognize its constructed nature. And the non objective nature of the current description. Which this nuanced view I have all I need and more.
What?
I wasn't concerned with the difference between belief and true belief or justification and justification, or even truth; I was concerned with the distinction between belief and knowledge. I see no reason to belabour the issue any more than it already is.
Quoting Jack2848
Since words are our only means of communication, I consider their use significant.
Quoting Jack2848
We can't; there is no such book. You can point to a book full of information on some subject, if you like, or an encyclopedia that contains information on many subjects. I believe that the contributors to such a book had knowledge of their subjects. But they didn't pour the contents of their minds into the book; they wrote words that convey information.
Quoting Jack2848
That's what belief is, yes.
Quoting Jack2848
Right.
In order to answer the question what is knowledge. We could point to "books of knowledge" and check what most aligns with how the word knowledge was used. To get closer to a more essential definition.
You can go such a book. You claim the sentence "I, John, think therefore I, John experience thinking" if written down is no longer knowledge, it seems. (No longer JTB). But just becomes information. And so a book filled with such sentences you say isn't a book of knowledge to begin with.
If that was so then the information "I, John, think therefore, I, John experience thinking" wouldn't also be a justified true belief. And yet it is. Now such a book would also contain. Justified false beliefs and non justified true beliefs.
And yet if the beliefs would be assumed to be true. Then that is the kind of book we would have to look at in order to see what essentially knowledge is. But because "belief assumed to be true and assumed to be justified" would cause trouble as a definition. We choose JTB.
It's your knowledge, nobody else's. To a reader, it's words that may be true, but they can't test, so they either believe it or not; they don't know it.
Quoting Jack2848
Then they would be beliefs, whether objectively true or not; information not assumed to be true is not a belief.
Quoting Jack2848
A great many choose to believe the Book of Genesis. They know that God created the wold in 6 days, because it's in their big book of all necessary knowledge and doesn't need justification. I know that people do believe those words; I know what they mean, but I don't believe them.
I don't want to be rude or mean, but this was the final time I go around I go around this circle: there is no finish line.