What can I know with 100% certainty?
I am 100% certain that I am conscious but it is not possible for me to know with 100% certainty that my body, other humans, non-human organisms, the Earth and the rest of the Universe actually exist. I perceive my body, other humans, non-human organisms, the Earth and the rest of the Universe. It is possible that what I perceive is either a dream or a hallucination or an illusion or a simulation and not objectively real. It is also possible that my perceived reality is actually real, but I have no way of knowing this with 100% certainty. Given the fact that I cannot know with 100% certainty what is objectively real, how can I know what is morally correct with 100% certainty? Does quantum indeterminacy prevent macroscopic determinism? Quantum superposition does not create macroscopic superposition. When one tosses a coin, either the head or the tail ends up on the top but not both. How can we know if macroscopic determinism is true or false with 100% certainty?
Comments (1386)
Hey, how the hell did he think that was self-evident at all?
In philosophy it might well be worth exploring and Idealists, at least some of them might be saying that in some way. But it's not what Descartes was saying.
Which is the person's fault to try to interpret a view without having read at the very least the chapter in which the view is contained. Realistically, to really understand Cartesian epistemology you don't need much, perhaps the Discourse would be enough, but the metaphysics, which is relevant for the epistemology, can only be well understood after reading the Meditations, the Principles, and the Objections, at least.
Quoting Bylaw
Pages 20 to 30 of this very thread would blow your mind.
I avoided parts of this thread to prevent that.
I have a question: for Descartes, what do you think he thought 'existing' meant exactly?
For me, and people may disagree with this (if so, id be interested to know your views and why) I would say that Descartes wanted proof that the world, and he himself, were as he perceived them. (basically, the usual, everyday world we know and... love-- unless we are having a bad day)
As an aside here, I'd like to point out that I don't think it is such a wild thing to assume that most people, including myself, do actually believe that the world is as we perceive it.
Quoting flannel jesus
My point here is I think that this is no different to most, if not all, of us... excluding the 'strangest' of people who believe the world is being secretly run by aliens with glowing eyes and antennas on their heads! Most people do not need to be 100 percent sure because most of us are fairly certain things are as we know them to be. (I am not having a go at you here by the way, flannel jesus. From what I can tell--and it can sometimes be hard to tell when you only have messages on a forum to go by-- you seem like a fair and reasonable person. I try to be so too.)
However, the whole point, I believe, was that Descartes wanted absolute certainty that the world was not totally different than how he perceived it, such as, he wanted to be sure that he was not living an illusion and the world was not really like The Matrix, or something like that. (My imagination could make up hundreds of different weird and wonderful scenarios of what the world 'could' be like without us knowing it. I do not believe them, but still, it 'could' be like that.) But because I believe Descartes would not have been satisfied with discovering what the world/he 'may' be like--because he wanted to know FOR SURE--and the fact that he thought the cogito was enough to give him that certainty, because of this, I think that is why people are contesting it-- at least those who believe that there is no such thing as absolute certainty. However, the problem that seems to occur from his point of view is that, while a skeptic has at their disposal pretty much anything they can imagine to throw doubt on him, he has limited himself to absolute certainty because he wanted to find something to rely on absolutely that skepticism couldn't throw doubt on. (Okay, so I know some people believe the Cogito did this, and some do not, but anyway...)
Therefore, the 'I am' part of the cogito, in my view, relates to him existing, but specifically in the form that he perceives of himself (like a 'normal' every day person) I'm probably going to regret asking this but... does anyone else disagree with this? Oh and also, it would be good to hear from those who agree with it too.
This isn't an uncommon criticism, and I definitely have time for it.
If you allow the "I" to take a more amorphous form, "I think therefore I am" could be interpreted more like "there is thought, therefore there is something" - and the word "I" fits in there not as a clearly defined ego but just as the experiential reason for why the thinker knows "there is thought".
You, whatever "you" might refer to, knows there is thought because you're experiencing thoughts.
That is not what Descartes wanted. If you want to know "why" you have to read what he wrote.
I get what you're saying, but why do you think he did the meditations in the first place? What was he trying to achieve? What was he trying to find out? Do you think he was only trying to find proof that he was just a bunch of thoughts? Or some undefined form with a bunch of thoughts? Would have have minded what that 'form' was? Would have have not wanted to know? For example, if he was an evil demon with a bunch of thoughts, wouldn't he have wanted to know? Or would he have just been happy knowing that he existed in any form, evil demon or grotesque monster included, with a bunch of thoughts?
I feel like if someone wants to follow Descartes process, but maybe they want to reject the ego, the "I", part of it, they can rephrase it in a way that makes sense without the ego, which is what I was trying to do in my previous post.
Maybe he simply couldn't apply it as deeply as considering the possibility that he himself could be the evil demon (and who could blame him? Who wants to face the thought that they could be an evil demon?)
Also, I didn't mean to type the word silly above. Typo. I've changed it to "clearly".
Don't you think he would want to know if he was or wasn't?
No because that is not the point. Later in his metaphysics he refutes (or so he thinks) the existence of an evil demon.
I'm not sure how much demons have to do with his thought process for the cogito anyway. Seems unrelated to me.
It seems related because it is an example of how much i believe he would want to know. I think that when he says, 'I think therefore I am" he imagines himself to be as he perceives himself, and ordinary person. If someone said to him, "How do you know you are not an evil demon?" I think he would want to prove otherwise.
He never wrote anything about that, so I have no idea how he feels about that idea. I think the "I" in "I think therefore I am" is a lot more amorphous than that, it's not referencing any thing in particular. He's not confirming he's a human, or a mammal, or has a brain - he's only confirming 2 things, the existence of his thoughts, and his own existence. Maybe he's a mammal with a brain, maybe he's a demon - these things are debatable - but either way, he thinks and he is.
This is true. But I am pretty sure that he would want to know if he was a demon or not, for example. I think anyone would. (I know i would!)
And without knowing, wouldn't he be living in an illusion like the one he was trying to prove that he wasn't?
LOL I really hope I'm not!!!!
I did have a cream cake last night at 10.30pm. That does seem a bit devilish :grimace:
As for me, I don't mind. My favourite picnic food is deviled eggs.
Oh my gosh! I am not kidding, I have some angel cakes in my cupboard! How spooky! (I just spent ages trying to figure out how to post a picture ive just taken of them, but I couldn't figure it out, so I put it as my profile picture lol)
Watch out for those deviled eggs!
You keep doing this. I ask for a demonstration that "Whatever thinks, exists", and you reply with a demonstration that if "Whatever thinks, exists" then I exist:
Quoting Deleted user
I am after a proof of the first line. The syllogism is not a proof of the first line of the syllogism.
I seem to have to keep making this point, and I am not enjoying doing so.
This is more to the case. But there is a problem here, in the move from a variable to an individual...
to
For clarity, let's move to free logic, adopting the definition ?!a = ?(x)(x=a).
What Descartes wanted was
(edited) But again, this is invalid. It needs the additional deduction Pa ? ?!a, which requires ?!a.
That is, the argument does not lead to the conclusion that I think - that individual. All it concludes is that something thinks - whatever is the referent of the variable x.
This is I take it the point Russell makes, probably set out a bit more formally than he was able to do with the state of logic in his time.
Quoting Deleted user
There is a difference between concluding that a particular individual is pink - "Fred is pink" - and concluding that something is pink - "x is pink" .
That's why we differentiate Px and Pa in first order logic.
Quite right.
In so far as I have a purpose here, it is to show how silly it is to rely on "I think, therefore I am".
To that end, I have been at pains to show that a certain syllogism does not show that "I think, therefore I am" is true; and that "I think, therefore I am" is not the result of an inference but is rather closer to an intuition.
It would be extraordinary if mere logic were to conclude that this or that thing exists. That is not the sort of thing logic is capable of.
"I am" does not need "I think" as a preamble.
Quoting Banno
The Madfool was a now-banned individual.
It might be better to say that If Descartes' argument is valid, then it is circular.
A good rule of thumb might be that if your logic appears to demonstrate that some particular individual thing must exist, then there is an error in your logic.
I've got a book for you...
(Granted, it would make more sense if it was the Logic)
This is the first time you ask for a demonstration of that specific premise. The rest of the time you were asking for Descartes' argument as an inference. Even then, I preemptively addressed the first premise multiple times:
Quoting Deleted user
Quoting Deleted user
Quoting Deleted user
Is that enough for the first premise?
It also leads me to think about how I hesitated in answers in primary school, wishing to be 'certain' of answers before volunteering answers at school. It raises the whole issue of doubt and how the spectrum of doubt and certainty exist in life and so many questions of philosophy.
I also wonder about the extent to which doubt and certainty are desired. Would I like all the answers to personal life and the existential questions of life to appear in the clouds as absolutes, Or, would it shortcut the philosophy quest, and the whole phenomenon of knowing and unknowing? T
To what extent is 'unknowing' the important variable for all philosophical exploration and innovation?
Well, no, but I won't do chapter and verse. See, you took over an argument from someone else - where they were claiming that to be the whole of the Cogito. And so I at first presumed you were also claiming it to be the whole thing.
I hope we are now agreed that
is a furphy.
Let's look at "Whatever thinks, exists".
I'm making the point that it does not parse validly (is not a tautology) in first order logic anymore than in propositional logic.
Do you agree?
"Whatever thinks, exists" is not a tautology, yes.
Is that it is an intuition enough for it to be 100% certain? Folk are 100% certain about all sorts of things.
Is it enough for it to be known with 100% certainty? Well, what justification is there for this intuition?
Thanks for your patience.
If you mean it with "100% certain", Descartes' achievement is not immune to silly doubts like "Do I really know what 'is' means?". In any case, no one can convince oneself that one does not exist.
You may not remember, but some 15 pages ago, our roles were switched here, and I was defending skepticism.
Quoting Banno
Using Bayes theorem, everything that relies on something else is already not 100%.
Quoting Banno
To be clear, I agree that the intuition is not logically valid just like p?q is not valid. Not that it is furphy, whatever that means.
Here's a list of your replies to me.
SO, if we go back to the beginning, I gather you were being ironic.
Again, I find myself puzzling as to what we might be disagreeing about.
Agreed. :up:
Quoting Fire Ologist
You still need to give some merit to Cogito. It is undeniable that it is a historical byproduct of ideas, which made start for the new philosophical tradition based on the method of doubt.
Supporting Cogito blindly as if it is a logical statement like some twidledee twiddledum folks in this thread would make them sound asinine.
However totally ignoring and rejecting Cogito as useless, and claiming, therefore it is not even worthwhile to discuss about it would make the interlocutor appear to be obtuse.
Well, yes, in the first four I am defending skepticism.
Quoting Banno
No, I would still defend skepticism. The fact that I have to defend Descartes against improper criticism has nothing to do with that.
I think the "problem" with Descarte's thought experiment is the "I". There are likely a few reasons but I'll focus on one. The problem of Time.
You are correct about his conclusion fitting the present. But this "I" which "is," is not the same "I" as the "I" which was nanoseconds ago thinking. The "I" is successive. Just as there isnt really a linear narrative, there are only successive nows.
Descarte's discovery was really "thinking therefore is-ing,." It does not rest thus no "am"; it does not rest thus no "I".
Interesting point. I wouldn't describe Cogito as some insane moronic babble. But it is obvious that it has many rational incongruities to be classed as a logical statement. It is a subjective psychological expression at best, which reminds us to use method of doubt in all reasonings.
But you agree with the fundamental premise of it, which is that one must exist in order to think.
I totally agree. Or should say “agreeing is”.
Ha! :up:
:up:
Query: why not thinking is existing in the present; beyond that, "I" and "one" is constructed to suit logic/meaning?
I'm not disagreeing. I'm wondering.
I fully agree with you. At the risk of offending, I think the poetry metaphor applies to much metaphysics. Perhaps not in the conventional way we view poetry. But, at the end of the day, isn't metaphysics necessarily metaphorical? This does not mean it is not deeply enriching to our particular form of existence. On the contrary, like all art, it is very enriching.
For Descartes, ultimately, duration is an attribute of a substance, so it would remain through time; but for him, that is only possible because God allows it. It is a convoluted double cop-out, and the two parts don't seem like they fit here. Which is why I made this thread a while ago https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14823/reasons-for-believing-in-the-permanence-of-the-soul/p1
Quoting ENOAH
There are additional issues to that. When we conclude that that thought isn't ours and we only have a memory of it, we can no longer conclude that anything exists, as that memory is no proof of anything thinking; if anything, it is proof that I exist, because I am remembering it, and remembering is thinking. Furthermore, "someone thinks therefore something is" is a phrase, it is hard to articulate (and perhaps that is the issue) how that phrase translates to thoughts, ¿is it a single thought or 2+ thoughts one after the other? If the latter, perhaps the first "something" is not the same as the second "something".
If the former, when we say "I think" in "I think therefore I am", we can be talking about "I think therefore I am" itself, then it can be taken as self-fulfilling.
Sadly, this thread has reached 1.1 replies.
Very informative.
Also, dishearteningly, so.
Logic. Damn!
It seems there is no place for the thinker to rest their weary head.
Just adding to the "Same." chorus. :up:
...unless Descartes was stating the discovery from his meditations is that "he" is a thinking thing.
In which case he could just as easily conclude that he is a breathing thing; a heartbeats thing; and so on, shaved down to the is-ing thing.
But no. Not if it was he who simultaneously decided he was a dualist. Was it he? Or did we superimpose that upon him?
Is the poem sufficient to give you 100% certainty?
Then what?
I can be certain I'm thinking, and existing.
The poem doesn't grant certainty, the poem is just a poem. The poem is there to trigger you to think.
I don't follow that.
Quoting flannel jesus
So what grants certainty? Is "I must exist in order to think" an inference? Or an intuition?
You don't follow what? That this poem is stated as concisely at possible for aesthetic purposes, but implies a more complete argument within?
Quoting Banno
My thoughts. My thoughts grant certainty to me. Descartes thoughts grant certainty to him.
So it's a poem and an argument? In your own words, it's not Quoting flannel jesus
You were convinced by an incomplete thought?
Quoting flannel jesus
All of them, or just the incomplete ones?
Walk away, then.
The question is, what can I know with 100% certainty? You seem to be claiming the Cogito as the source of your certainty. I'm asking how that works. What you have said in the last few posts does not appear coherent.
I don't think it is I who is not being serious.
I told you what I am convinced by, and I didn't say it was an incomplete thought.
You said:
"the cogito as a poem, rather than a complete thought"
"It's not the poem that gives certainty"
"this poem... implies a more complete argument within"
"My thoughts grant certainty to me"
So, what is the compete argument that grants you certainty? Presumably: "I must exist in order to think". But that is not an argument, or at the least is not valid. Sure, something is doing the thinking. Why presume it is you?
Are you just stipulating that you are the thinking?
But then, why did you laugh at the suggestion from @Corvus that you cease to exist when not thinking?
Presumably for you all this holds together somehow. I'm not seeing it.
Then perhaps you might explain it to me?
Quoting ENOAH
Are you suggesting that the arguments in the Second Meditation are metaphors? Metaphors for what? They look very much like arguments to me.
Ooo I take that back. I hadn't logged in. And now the reply I write as an edit to this post has gone into the aether.
Roughly, I take Russell as making a point about the illegitimacy of the move from "Something is thinking" to "I exist". See https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-free/#inexp
Unless I know it is me, I can't say it is thinking, as I only have access to my own thoughts, not anyone else's.
Quoting Deleted user
Quoting Banno
Because things don't cease to exist when they don't think. And his suggestion was based on denying the antecedent, which is bunk.
Well, they do if they are by definition thinking things. That's rather the point. It seems that the defenders of the Cogito now want something like "I am by definition that which thinks", which is not "I think therefore I am", and which has it's own difficulties. In particular, the bit where you stop existing when you go to sleep.
Yes, you went into great lengths about the difference between extended substance and cognitive substance, but having to invoke dualism to solve this issue counts against the whole enterprise.
But it is denied...
Here's my position again. The enterprise of the Second Meditation relies on doubt, and doubt is a language game. Doubting some proposition implies a range of other propositions which are held to be true - if only those that set the doubt out. Hence doubt is only possible if some things are held to be indubitable.
The things which need to be taken as granted in order to accept the Cogito include far more than one'e existence. One has to be a member of a language community...
And all this is to show that the very idea of finding some foundation that is "100% certain" is somewhat fraught.
Yup. It’s hard to say anything without presupposing. Even hard for you to say “It is denied” without presupposing all of the logic and games surrounding the words involved.
So it is hard to say what Descartes was trying to say. Established that. Cogito isn’t perfect. But you haven’t denied the existence of saying (something, anything, any game), and the saying is all you need to see what is said about existence.
But if you are saying "I am" will do, without the "I think, therefore...", then we can agree.
..saying that.
I have been.
…saying that.
I say, therefore I am.
(Just ignore the “therefore” if the game of expressing “I say” or “I am” as a conclusion rather than a premise or just a present fact is no fun.)
You have this wrong. The logically entailed negation of 'I think, therefore I exist' is 'I don't exist, therefore I don't think' not 'I don't think therefore I don't exist'.
It's a rookie mistake you're making.
I tried reading Philosophy in Korean which is my native language, but it was actually more difficult to understand. I think problem is the translation.
Why he or she didn't mention this when it was pointed out how 'therefore' was being interpreted i this thread, I have no idea. I realize that the parallel error is happening in the symbolic logic, but perhaps it is inspired by not really getting 'therefore' (which can be used a few ways), as somewhat tricky word in a second language.
Could you forward your full explanation why it is?
Quoting Janus
You obviously don't seem know what had been tried there for the proof. Do you even understand what logical proofing means?
'If I am thinking I must exist'
It follows that
'If I don't exist I am not thinking'.
It doesn't follow that
'If I not thiing I don't exist'
Your hypothesis make no sense. Do you reject the standard meaning of "therefore" from the dictionaries? Symbolic logic works for all the languages in the world.
You seem to be just citing what is on the internet or textbook for symbolic logic truth table.
For proof process, you must apply your own reasoning to the statement you want to prove or disprove.
Anyhow it was the last attempt to make the dualist understand the core problems. As Banno put it correctly, Cogito is not logically provable. It is an intuition. It is a subjective psychological solipsistic statement.
Please note. In the Internet truth table, P and Q has the truth values, which were given as either T or F. Hence they can make axiomatic assumptions. It is still assumptions based on the truth values given to P and Q.
But here, we are not assuming any truth values at all to P and Q. Hence we can make most realistic assumptions and assertions against the original assumption based on the reasonable inference. I hope you see my point in the proof process.
You were citing something you saw on the internet truth table, and citing that as if all proof process must follow that, or it is wrong was your claim, which was really wrong and silly.
Quoting Banno
They do to me too. Convincing or not, they are edifying. And much more than I know has likely been built upon, or because of, them.
Quoting Banno
I recognize this may be excrutiating to some, maybe you. They can also be satisfying as poetry; read as metaphor. I believe you might have been rhetorical, so rather than offend you, I'll withhold any elaboration. But when you read the meditation, think of Descartes as an existing human being, grappling with a profound personal struggle. For my part, I defy you not to see the poetry.
Anyway, I respect where you're coming from and I won't trouble you with anything further on the topic.
Obviously, reading metaphysics strictly for its logic and reasoning is the orthodox approach.
IF I must exist in order to think (or do anything else for that matter) then it follows that there can be no thinking or anything else done by me if I don't exist.
It doesn't follow that if am not thinking or doing any other particular thing, that I don't exist.
Whether or not 'I think therefore I am' can be logically proven is irrelevant. It cannot be disproven by the spurious entailment you adduced.
Did you notice his bizarre understanding of the word "therefore" already as well? It's going to make it hard to reason with him, if he doesn't have a solid grasp of the basic English words we use to talk about reason and logic.
Causal Interpretation:
In English, “therefore” is a logical connective that indicates a conclusion drawn from preceding premises.
However, in Korean, the equivalent word “????” (geureom-eoro) can sometimes be interpreted more causally or chronologically.
Korean speakers might associate it with a cause-and-effect relationship, even though the intended meaning is more about logical inference.
Context Matters:
The context in which “therefore” appears plays a crucial role.
Philosophical discussions often involve nuanced reasoning, and the precise meaning depends on the overall context and philosophical background.
Alternative Translations:
To emphasize the logical aspect, one could use alternative translations like “?????” (gyeollonjeog-eulo), which directly means “conclusively.”
Using “???” (geulaeseo) is another option, which is less causal and more focused on the logical connection.
Or it could just be a coincidence that the native speakers here are pointing out thattherefore is being taken by Corvus as causal and chronological, when in fact this is not the case, AND this is real possibility for native speakers of Korean to take the word in those incorrect ways.
Editing post now I have time to take a look...
t=I think
e=I exist
Quoting Corvus
t?e
Quoting Corvus
¬t?¬e
And the syllogism is...
Quoting Corvus
(t?e)?(¬t?¬e)
Quoting Corvus
¬(¬t?¬e)
Quoting Corvus
?~(t?e)
Giving
(((t?e)?(¬t?¬e))?¬(¬t?¬e))?¬(t?e)
Which is valid.
Check my working.
Quoting Janus
t?e negated is ¬(t?e))
but
¬(t?e) ? (¬e?¬t) is invalid, and
¬(t?e) ? (¬t?¬e) is invalid.
¬(t?e) ? (¬e?t)?
(fixed link)
As I read it @Corvus purports to prove that 'I think therefore I am/ is false, but I think his purported proof is invalid. It doesn't seem appropriate to talk about 'I think therefore I exist' as being valid or invalid, because it is not really an argument, but a premise.
You could put it as
P 1: If I am thinking then I must exist
P2: I am thinking
C: Therefore I exist.
That seems valid but it may not be sound I suppose, although it is hard to see what is wrong with it. Perhaps Corvus misinterprets the argument as claiming that thinking is not only sufficient, but necessary for existence. I think that is a different argument. That would be 'If I am existing, then I must be thinking'.
He thinks it's ALWAYS true. He thinks for all statements t implies e, it's always true that not t implies not e.
He even called that idea "modus ponens", that's how I know he thinks you can always do that for all implication statements.
(t?e)?(¬t?¬e) CAN be a premise in a valid proof, and it's synonymous with (t <-> e). But it hasn't been used that way
He's talking about modus Tollens though.
One problem I note is that "I" is not well defined. Does "I" refer to some immaterial thing which interacts with the pineal gland?
Of course we all have some conception(s) associated with "I", but how accurate is that conception?
Quoting Janus
Ok, so
(t?e) ? (¬t?¬e) is invalid.
"I think therefore I am" is not equivalent to "I don't think therefore I am not".
And
(t?e)?(¬e?¬t)
"I think therefore I am is equivalent to "I'm not, therefore I don't think"
But this is not the argument @Corvus presented in the quote.
Quoting flannel jesus
Here's the argument quotes:
Quoting Corvus
(t?e)?(¬t?¬e) is a premise. it's P->Q.
It's not easy to see what you're saying here. It looks like you're saying
(t?e)?(¬t?¬e)
Is equivalent to saying
(t?e)
Or in other words, whenever you have
(t?e)
You must also have
(¬t?¬e)
Is that what you're saying?
Only if you misread what is writ.
I certainly did not write
(t?e)?(¬t?¬e) ? (t?e)
That's invalid.
Indeed, I am not saying anything of that sort, but pointing out that the argument Corvus uses appears valid.
Quoting Banno
He wasn't always formulating his argument like that, he did that mid conversation. That is of course a VALID argument, but the question is, where does that premise come from?
We know where Corvus gets it from - he gets it from a missapplication of modus ponens, where he denies the Antecedent.
Quoting Corvus
P= (t?e)
Q= (¬t?¬e)
The first assumption:
Quoting Corvus
(t?e)?(¬t?¬e)
I can't see how to make that any clearer.
I don't think it matters how we conceive "i". We could say "if something thinks it must exist", and as I already said, "if something does anything at all it must exist". The idea of existence seems to be implicit and ineliminable in thinking of any activity at all.
Quoting Banno
What do you think his argument is? Couched in plain English would be good.
Quoting flannel jesus
Okay, I hadn't thought of that.
The premise is invalid. But it is not a contradiction. That is, it seems possible. (But it has been a long few days and I may be wrong).
@Corvus' logic has been less than impeccable - we all make errors. But again, while he has not shown that the Cogito is invalid, no one else has managed to show that it is valid.
I'm not going over that again. Time to move on. Corvus is wrong, but perhaps not in the way folk have suggested; and that he is wrong does not imply that therefore the Cogito is valid.
Of course it's possible, it's equivalent to saying a <-> b, and there's many a and b for which that's true.
But the cogito doesn't say a <-> b, it just says a -> b.
So how is Corvus turning a -> b into (a -> b) -> (not a implies not b)? We already know, because he told us. He says any logic textbook will show, modus ponens means you can deny the Antecedent.
I don't think anybody has that train of thought
No, it isn't.
Quoting Corvus
or in my parsing
Quoting Banno
Show how that is equivalent to A?B.
I slightly misstated the argument. If (t?e)?(¬t?¬e) holds, as a general rule, then all (t?e) are actually (t?e).
any time you have (t?e) and (¬t?¬e), you have (t?e).
https://www.umsu.de/trees/#((t~5e)~1(~3t~5~3e))~5(t~4e)
Fine.
Quoting flannel jesus
But...
(t?e)?(¬t?¬e) isn't itself equivalent to (t?e), it's equivalent to saying "if you have an implicaation (t?e), it's safe to say (t?e)". He's turning ALL implications into bidirectional implications. Which has some absurd consequences.
https://www.umsu.de/trees/#(t~4e)~5(t~5e)
I'm not sure what you're getting at with that.
Quoting flannel jesus
Make up your mind! :wink:
I'm out, I think. Too tired to think.
(Which can be seen in what I just wrote...)
Why do you want to prove (t?e)?(¬t?¬e) is equivalent to A <-> B?
You too are missing the point here.
As you put, your conclusion Cogito is invalid is correct, but your logic seems to be missing the critical point in your reasoning.
You got explain in detail what you are exactly trying to do when you are asking (t?e)?(¬t?¬e) is equivalent to A <-> B, and I will tell you where you got it wrong.
He's asleep I believe, so he can answer you himself later
But do you not understand the fact P -> Q has not TF value at the stage? You shouldn't be brining in some internet truth table here. This is tragic that it has to be explained again and again because you seem to be talking with a thick blanket on your face.
Well you insisted, Banno's post was addressed to you, so I will wait until Banno gets up from his sleep, and comes back with his explanations. Then after that I will tell him where he got wrong.
If you can recall, it had been explained repeatedly over and over again.
Nope, never said anything like that in this thread. You must be dreaming, or believing that everything in the arguments and explanations were poems.
You seem to have read something about MP on the internet and been parroting about it
Can you get to the point without slinging shit?
You cannot logically go straight from p -> q to not p -> not q. If you're in a situation where p implies q, that does NOT mean you're necessarily in a situation where not p implies not q. That's why denying the Antecedent is a formal Fallacy
Your arguments so far amount to applying that Fallacy
Dude, just don't sling shit. Naughty words are fine. Unnecessary shit slinging is not. This isn't preschool, people can say naughty words.
You always find the goofiest ways to cop out of defending your arguments , never a real defense. The latest cop out: my mom told me not to talk to people who say the s word.
Opponent: “First of all there are the epistemological problems - how can you know any of this? And what is this “train” really or what “you” means?”
Descartes: “You need to get off the tracks! The train is coming therefore you will get hit or worse!”
Opponent: “Therefore? Really?? It’s not even a logical statement. I can show you how meaningless your babbling is with some analytics.”
Descartes: “Ok. Just sayin. You might want to be quick about it. Because I don’t think we are talking about the same thing, and I’d like to get back to my point.”
No, no urgency in the cogito or anti-cogito argument. Just trying to analogize looking at the logic of the words before addressing the meaning of the statement.
Quoting Corvus
I don't, since it isn't. And that was directed at Quoting flannel jesus
Whaat does that mean - that we need a predicate logic? I offered that already. Have you an analysis that shows the validity of "I think, therefore I am"?
Quoting flannel jesus
To be sure, that is not what I am saying; but that certainty of my existence is not dependent on the cogito. Further, I suspect your exist was undoubted long before encountering the Cogito.
Fair enough. I got email from the forum that you quoted me in your post, and I also read in your post you saying my logic is wrong in somewhere. So I was trying to clarify on that point.
There are so many ways to reason about the Cogito statement to prove. You apply several assertions and inferences to the statement to prove. Some will be valid and some invalid. But what we were trying to prove was not validity here. We were trying to prove the statement is true or false, sound or unsound.
Others here claim that it is true, and indubitable, but offer no support for that contention.
It would help your standing immensely if you were to explicitly reject the argument that
(t?e)?(¬t?¬e).
The “validity?” Of the cogito text? An “analysis”?
The point of the cogito, once you get the point, is that no analysis is needed; by analyzing anything further, you just make the point again.
And again.
If one is carefully considering whatever may exist, once one comes to be considering one’s own existence, one finds something existing that one can’t deny.
One can deny the statement, but then “I deny, therefore I am.”
And again..
(t?e)?(¬t?¬e)
(¬t?¬e) = F
hence (t?e) = F
Would you agree on that?
Ignore the MP nonsense. It is not relevant here.
Quoting Fire Ologist
Notice the "if...then" in that? If what you say were so, someone ought be able to set the argument out formally.
If (one is carefully considering whatever may exist) and (one comes to be considering one’s own existence) then (one finds something existing that one can’t deny)
One can find all sorts of other stuff that one cannot coherently deny - like that you are reading this post. So if that is our standard, the Cogito is hardly special.
But you see that even a simple logical formalisation and reasoning of Cogito, proves it is false.
I gather (¬t?¬e) = F is to be understood as "(¬t?¬e) implies the false"?
No, it doesn't. Countermodel: Rocks don't think, but exist.
Quoting Corvus
You have not shown this.
Logical validity is only relevant, if Cogito had been deduced from some premises. But it hadn't.
The only premise of Cogito was Descartes has doubted everything (presumably).
Therefore (¬t?¬e) = F ?
I don't know what you are asking. Shouldn't that be (¬t?¬e) ? F? Which is not valid, as shown by the countermodel.
https://www.umsu.de/trees/#(~3t~5~3e)~5(p~1~3p)
I can coherently deny any sense data, like reading “this post”.
But I can’t deny to myself that I am reading, or at least that I think I am reading. (Hence Descartes’ use of “I think”.)
But you just said “the Cogito is hardly special” based on it showing something one cannot coherently deny. BUT, you asserting that the Cogito isn’t special won’t work for you to argue that the Cofito is meaningless. You just asserted it has a non-special meaning.
If you don't think, you don't exist. Is this not False?
Even if you don' think, but you still do exist. No?
You replied to the post. Now you would deny that there was a post, and supose this to be somehow coherent?
I have not claimed that the cogito is meaningless.
I commend On Certainty to you.
There are things that... and here one needs a free logic... that don't exist and don't think.
But you have gone off on a tangent, I asked if you would explicitly deny that (t?e)?(¬t?¬e).
But here are we not talking about "I"? - "Cogito"? We are not talking about rocks and bricks here.
Quoting Banno
Of course I deny its Truth. It is FALSE. That is one of the proofs (t?e) is FALSE. But there are so many other reasonings that can be applied which makes t->e is false.
If we agree to infer that Descartes Cogito's premise was I doubt everything. Then,
I doubt everything. (P1)
But I don't doubt Thinking. (P2)
Therefore I think, therefore I am (C)
Then Cogito becomes invalid.
Doubt is also type of thinking, which makes P2 false.
The core problem here is that, mental event Think cannot leap into 100% certainty of verified Truth of one's existence. They are different class in existence. Think is a mental event. Existence is a physical object.
Then I don’t know what you are arguing with me about. I already said I’m not interested in the gaming of logical analysis of “I think; therefore, I am.” That whole conversation is an exercise in missing the point the feeble statement is trying to show, a point that any 10 year old thinks is so obvious it allows them to laugh at philosophers.
I know that I am while wondering what is, and I can’t unknow this.
It’s not about the “I”. It’s not about the “therefore”. It’s about the “am” present in “think”. “Am thinking” says enough.
It’s a premise more than a conclusion, so certainly no argument is needed.
If you disagree with me I can only assume you might not exist to check my math.
But if you cannot prove, or refuse to prove your claims of "Am thinking", it means nothing to anyone apart from to yourself. It would be like talking about your last night's dream.
It's not false - if by that you mean that it is a contradiction and false for every interpretation.
(t?e) tells us nothing about (¬t?¬e).
How is it tell you nothing? It is a result from the principle of contradiction in proof process.
If it rains, then the ground is wet.
It doesn't rain.
Hence the ground is not wet.
How is it tell you nothing? They are the reasoning from contradiction.
If I think, then I exist.
If I don't think, then I don't exist. ???? False.
Hence If I think then I exist. Is False.
In Corvus world, there's only one way for the ground to get wet. That's the absurdity of taking p->q to imply notp -> notq - everything can only happen in one way, every property can only exist in one thing.
If you're arnold schwartzanegger, then your muscles are big.
You're not arnold schwartzanegger.
Therefore your muscles aren't big.
It's a hilarious type of reasoning really.
So you are certain of the Cogito without any justification?
Because (t?e) can be true and yet (¬t?¬e) either true or false.
He thinks implication is equivalence, it seems.
I have to go water the garden. It's not going to rain today.
Yes, that's what I was getting it when I was comparing it to a <-> b.
If all instances of implication p->q also mean notp -> notq, then all p->q are really p <-> q.
Which is kinda broadly similar to equivalence, I suppose.
(¬t?¬e) is definitely False in the Cogito case, which makes (t?e) False too.
No one with right mind would agree that, when he stops thinking, he ceases to exist.
I recommend sitting back and observing whether or not Banno can get through to Corvus. Here, have some popcorn.
Quoting Corvus
No, it doesn't.
You have been battered about this for a few days now, and it is difficult to back down when you make a mistake, even in the most friendly circumstances.
But I really do have to go water the garden. You see,
If it rains, then the ground is wet.
It doesn't rain.
The ground is not wet.
and
If I don't hose, and it doesn't rain, the ground will not be wet
But
If I hose, the ground will be wet.
All I did was remove "Hence". That's were you went astray.
If that is how you see it, you are wrong. I am only interested in the philosophical discussions based on reasoning. Nothing else will interest me in this forum.
I don't care about some inauthentic time wasters throwing nonsensical abuse in the thread. I have decided to ignore them totally. I have not been battered by what appear to be nonsensical tantrums motivated by some of their psychological problems.
Quoting Banno
Of course everyone knows that.
We are talking about the a logical progression started off from a specific premise in the argument.
It is about whether the conclusion is derived from the premises.
If you deny that and bring out some irrelevant argument, then there is nothing in the world which can be proven on the empirical issues.
If you hose your ground, so the ground will be wet.
But that is false, if the water gets dried out in few hours under the scorching sun.
I was under impression you would be good at logic and proofing, but taken back at your inability to understand even what simple logical proof process means. Bringing out some irrelevant premises into the argument to the conclusion drawn from the set premises and denying the validity of the proof is a sign of misunderstanding of the very basic foundational principle of the subject.
It seems not, but
I am. :nerd: Banno claims that he ceases to exist when he doesn't think. :rofl:
Hoping to be edified.
And from "If it rains, the ground will be wet" it does not follow that "If it does not rain, the ground will not be wet". I can hose the ground, and rocks exist without thinking.
Why - because that would be entertaining?
It is not about follow. It is about introducing assertion and inference.
Are you still claiming that when you stop thinking, you cease to exist is true? I am saying that is False.
Rocks existing without thinking is totally irrelevant. It doesn't rain, then the ground is not wet was given as an example to let you see, that Not t - > Not e is telling something, not nothing.
However, we are talking about Cogito (I think) here.
No, because if you are able to get through to Corvus, observing how you did so might provide me with insight that I don't have at present.
Yes, Follow. Quoting Corvus
No, Corvus. That is your confusion. I have never claimed that when you stop thinking, you cease to exist. What I have said, quite explicitly, is that if Descartes' argument is that if you are thinking, you exist, then that this does not, as you have claimed, imply that if you stop thinking you cease to exist.
I have also attempted to show you that your argument would hold if Descartes' argument is that by definition "I" am the thing that is doing the doubting. This is your out; but it seems you have difficulty seeing it.
You bite the hand...
Are we now playing "posts last wins"?
Previous experience has shown that Corvus will not correct his errors nor accept any interpretation not at one with his own, apparently now to the point of extremis.
On the other hand, he has quite successfully made this thread about himself. A tragedy in which we are all implicated.
We were moving on a bit, until became involved, leading us back into the mire.
No, that is not my game. You mistook me for some other folks in the thread.
I am just trying to understand your logic here. There are parts in your claims which is not crystal clear.
I will think over, and will return with my thoughts on your point. Enjoy your gardening. Cheers mate.
It's not just my logic.
As I said quite a ways back in the thread...
Quoting wonderer1
Still, I was hoping you could falsify my working hypothesis.
For better or worse, life has trained me to have strong pattern recognition of narcissism. (Both grandiose and vulnerable type.) I would have preferred being shown to be wrong.
Certainty is, on some accounts, indubitable belief.
Now there are all sorts of things that go undoubted. Are we certain of them all?
Or do we need reason, justification, warrant, to doubt?
Who else is saying what you have been saying? Although, it doesn't matter how many folks are saying the same thing. Ultimately what matters is the truth. Later~
That's kinda why I have been backing up and checking what I have writ with the tree generator.
(Edited - I assumed the wrong author)
If P doesn’t think. It may or may not exist. For instance P may be dead, or may be in a meditative state or in a coma…. Or it may be a fly on the wall incapable of what we
So then we have:
~p -> (q v ~q)
Now to go the other way
If q exists, then it may or may not think. It may be a bug. Forget the fact that bugs “might” think. Say amoeba instead of bug.
q -> (p v~p)
But if q doesn’t exist then it doesnt think. A logocal impossibility.
~q -> ~p
That I think is as far as it can be taken in a limited scope. And I see no refutation of cogito ergo sum.
Or another simple way: existence doesn’t necessitate thinking, but it doesn’t preclude it either.
2 variables, so we have 4 entries in the truth table. No need for any more. Of course if I err please chime in!
But what you have not shown is that if P thinks then it exists.
Have you a proof of that?
Here we go again.
Unfortunately I haven't read On Certainty. Off the top of my head I'd say it's a big subject and I'm apt to start talking about our neurology and how it can result in doubt arising subconsciously in a way such that reason, justification, and warrant aren't the most applicable terms to be using.
On the other hand, I consciously consider doubt in the reliability of the cognitive faculties of myself and others to be a matter of good epistemic hygiene.
In any case, I'm not good at knowing how to respond to such an open ended question. So I'll leave it for you to clarify if you want to discuss things with a more specific focus.
Quoting Banno
No. P may or may not be capable of thought. A coma vegetable for instance. Or P may be an amoeba. Or a philosophy professor.
But that fact does not invalidate the cogito.
This covers it: q -> (p v~p)
No; nor does it validate it.
Why should we agree with the cogito?
Quoting Metaphyzik
But, ¬q ? (p ? ¬p) is equally valid. Note the negation.
Give me a real world example of
P-> ~q
I believe this is just sophistry.
An example of something that thinks but doesn’t exist.
Quoting Banno
So not existing, implies that it thinks or doesn’t think? That is invalid. It obviously doesn’t think.
Real world example? Or are we playing games with letters ;). Haha
I don’t know what you are asking me.
If you are asking am I certain that I exist while I am in the act of thinking “I exist”, than yes - I am certain of this. Something is up, and I am certain of it at that moment. And that is something I can know, while in the acting of knowing I am existing there still…. It’s a phrase like “knowing now” that describes this moment, this place. Immediate certainty of my own becoming that is seeming to forever keep coming once I am being aware of it……aware of being “I am”, calling my own name because “am calling told me I could.
Certainty of all that which is really nothing but “I am”.
If you are asking me whether the statement or syllogism “I think therefore I am” is valid, or sound, or both, or neither, or equivalent to “if P then Q”, than I am only mildly interested in that discussion because I think those things have little to do with what Descartes observed.
Here is the thing, I can’t tell if you think the above two questions I posed are different questions, so that’s why I started this post with “I don’t know what you are asking me.”
You asked me a question and I answered you the best I could, posing two interpretations and answering them both.
Now let me ask you an honest question. Can you say what Descartes meant (or gets credit for for some reason even though any idiot knows “I am” for certain)? What did Descartes mean?
Without letting some syllogism, or logical, third-party verification, constrain you or set you free or justify your words - just what do YOU think Descartes meant. I am not asking you whether you are certain of it, or whether you are certain of it with or without any justification. My question is simpler. You have to see what I think Descartes meant. What do you think Descartes meant?
It is not ~p -> ~q
I think that is your logical error
Quoting Banno
Well, I'm not at all sure - that's somewhat the point.
Some folk think he was making an inference - you seem to think otherwise, and no one has set the inference out for us in a valid way.
Some folk think he was setting out an intuition. But if that is what he was doing, then can we coherently say the intuition is justified, as is needed if it is to answer the question in the OP - that we know we exist.
Some folk think it a definition of "I" - that his argument is that I am what thinks. That has various novel problems, pretty much not considered so far.
Now I've said quite a few times in this thread that I do not think we need be "100% certain" in order to get on with things. I think the phrase sets up a bad framework for dealing with doubt and certainty. I am being a pain in the arse in order to show that there are issues with the very notion of insisting on being "100% certain".
Actually, it's ~(p? q).
What I was pointing to is the triviality of your Quoting Metaphyzik
Both ¬q ? (p ? ¬p) and q ? (p ? ¬p) are valid.
Well the operators in logic have to relate to something.
And they are contextually relevant as that defines their set. Their axiomatic assumptions
So… give me an real world example of your logic and then I’ll consider what your atoms are made of ;)
You said “justification”. I thought of a third way to address your question.
You distinguished “certainty of the Cogito” from “without justification”. In order to justify certainty, or justify anything, I need some framework, to judge the certainty as justified. I have to clarify one thing “certainty of Cogito” and clarify some means and framework of justification, and then marry the two I suppose.
In order for me to justify the certainty of “I think therefore I am” I would have to be justifying, be in the act of justifying, to myself, to you, to whomever, about whatever. At the Cogito, the details are all drained and the only thing left is being, or becoming at best, like justifying or doing anything’s else.
The clearest meaning of the Cogito starts looking at the act of justifying, or now the act of “looking” at the act of justifying. It’s always an act that is the subject. An act of being, stated simply. It may as well be “I am justifying, therefore I am.” All I see is that I am, as I am justifying or I am anything (and even the “I” no longer matters in this seeing or this being).
I am is self-awareness.
It is mental reflection.
Thinking that I am does seem to be knowing that I am, and knowing that I am, while I am in the act of thinking seems to be knowing something that justifies itself in the act of “thinking justifying thoughts.”
So maybe I would say that, the “I am” reflection is self-justifying.
If by justification you mean words like “I am” that reflect or refer to an existing object, a referent, there being in the world in this case there being specifically here, being the “thinking justifications”. But I know that’s an outlandish statement here.
BUT, like a tautology, (which is what I think of the language of the stupid Cogito; “I am thinking = I am” is just as good of syllogism for my purposes as “I think, therefore I am.”), like a tautology it kind of makes sense that the “I am” reflection would be self-justifying. It literally fabricates a self.
An “I” just to be expressed.
You just helped me clarify what I mean by the Cogito. I see it as: the “I am” reflection.
That’s it. No “therefore”. I also recognize we could deconstruct “reflection” and there are always identity problems, but then I would be deconstructing, or identifying, and would come right back to the “I am” reflection.
I did, you missed it, it's not going to help.
Quoting Banno
So I asked you what does Descartes mean. And you said.
Quoting Banno
If he was making an inference, then he was making or inferring. If he was setting out an intuition or intuiting, he was just the same.
Then you go right after the “I” further distancing from what I think Descartes meant, which is the “am”.
But I wish you would have answered my question.
We don’t have to know whether it’s an inference, or an intuition, or logical, or whether we can know, or whether I have a split personality such that the “I” in “I am” starts us off on a bad foot. When you attempt to empty the “I am” reflection you have already moved past what the reflection means, moved on to where you “are emptying”, and you find again “I am”.
Enoah above said the am “is-ing”. That’s meaningful here. The inference or reference, is an act. The intuition is of intuiting. The content doesn’t matter anymore. Inference and intuition distract as much as the I who might infer or intuit.
Thinking “I am” already happened when it is happening.
So sophistry is the logic?
That is a game and you know it haha. If you really believe in green cows (or think that is a justification for your arguments) you have a few screws loose.
Anyways when you feel like being honest let me know. You can’t provide a real world example because your argument has no epistemological foundation… else you would provide it.
Just an aside, I don’t mind your intransigent. It’s refreshing. So I know you can accept a rebuttal. As can I.
And those are logically identical, in this case, correct??? Haha
p -> -q. Is identical to ~(p-> q)
:wink:
I actually think it's a great opportunity. What we have here is someone who is *perfectly* wrong - I dare say there's very few things that are more provable on this forum, very few debates that are more explicitly settlable, then "Does P implies Q mean notP implies notQ?" Corvus APPARENTLY believes in logic, he's not in here saying "logic isn't useful / logic doesn't make sense / logic is a government trick", he believes in logic, he's just completely wrong about it.
Which makes it a fantastic little experiment, I think. Can you use logic to prove to someone that they've lost their grasp on logic? I think that's a wonderful question. No better opportunity to test it than here.
If you analyse the truth table of ~(p implies q) , it's only true when p is true and q is false.
Which is the same truth table, not as (p implies not q), BUT (p implies not q) and (p). So I think you're half right, but you need that "and p" to complete it.
https://www.umsu.de/trees/#(~3(p~5q))~5((p~5~3q)~1p)
Of course the frustrating part is, in natural language when someone says "it's not true that p implies q", they're not actually saying "p and not q", they're usually saying "p and q don't have that relationship, maybe no relationship at all".
Like if someone says "You're a virgo, that means you have a small brain", and you say "that doesn't imply that", you're not saying it means you're a virgo and you DON'T have a small brain, you're saying there's just no relationship between those two variables. Classic logic doesn't capture that well, it seems to me.
This is one of those instances where it's clear that natural language reasoning can diverge from symbolic logic.
Logic books? That's a poor logic of you again. If someone with poor logic or weird mind wrote some logic books and published (anyone can publish books by themselves via amazon these days), and if you happened to pick one up and read it, then you would believe in whatever is in the book.
You got to use your own loaf. Of course you read the books, but you must be able to apply the logic into the real life examples not parroting away what you read or seen.
I have thought this again, but it is clear what I say is correct. It is simple, but you don't see it for some reason.
(t -> e) -> (Not t -> Not e) This is via the contradiction reasoning.
This can be replaced with
T -> E
E = False
Therefore T = False
This is nothing to do with (t -> e) -> (Not t -> Not e) doesn't follow of your logic.
When you are applying the contradiction principle, it gets applied to both T and E.
Not just E or just T.
I am going out now, and will be back later. Would be interested in what you got to say about it.
The tree generator you keep brining in doesn't deal with applying the contradiction reasoning. It just generates trees and checks for validity. It cannot tell you a formula is true or false mate.
Yes thanks for the correction. It’s been a long time since I was doing logical proofs. Most of the time now I’m just coding in c / c++ / c#….
Right. Needed to add the boolean p truth phrase as well.
I believe my old friend Russel and Whitehead would balk at the soundness requirement for a true premise when confronted with gobbleydey-gook. Ergo my request for a real world example: In the mapping of reality to symbolic logic it seems like a very salient point to make. Should we not use the same soundness and completeness requirements for our mapping as we do within the closed logic system we are mapping to? Else those variables in use could in fact represent invalid states that would not be useful for inclusion in any computation.
In other words: you have to validate your inputs… usually a purify method is prudent when taking in data from the wild before you include it in your precious logic / code ;). After all you can’t let the wolves in - it’s bad enough they must already know where you live.
Yes no problem. I think your intuition was leading you in the right direction anyway, which is a good sign. Good logical intuition is valuable, because if you don't have it, your intuition leads you to thinking absurdities like "if it rained, the ground is wet; it didn't rain, therefore the ground isn't wet".
That is if a->b, then ~a->~b. Which is only true if you have a very limited and closed system or set to consider. Aka if there is no other way the ground could get wet, except for rain.
Aka the utility of formal logic depends on the validity / context of the parameters being used - their scope. So scope has to be verified and agreed on before logic can aptly be applied to anything really… else the outcomes will not be accepted anyways.
Typically these can be represented with other axiomatic inclusions… but when considering a mapping to reality it is easy to see how that fails at some point…. Just too many variables to take into account. Completeness is the eternal problem.
But the simple cogito? With 2 things that could be easily represented as Booleans? Formal logic does just fine without contradicting itself. I don’t think therefore I don’t exist is not in the truth table as the negation would also have to include the truth of thinking for inclusion - as you so rightly have pointed out
If there were no other way to exist other than to think, Banno would be correct in considering such a closed system. But I dont believe anyone would allow that axiom into the equation.
Descartes' arguments are a meditation. The meditation is expressed with words on a piece of paper. But it is not the words on a piece of paper — a poem —, put together validly with logical connectives in the form of English conjuctions, that prove my existence. It is when I exercise the meditation myself that I realise that I exist.
Quoting Fire Ologist
Indeed, Fire, he says in the beginning of the Second Meditation:
And this article reaffirms it:
Quoting Descartes, Russell, Hintikka and the Self
In a letter to Bourdin, Descartes instead puts it as "ego cogitans existo". It is not so much that we take "I think" and then conclude "I exist", but every thought gives the certainty of existence. Which is why Descartes says, as quoted by Banno, that it is almost as if he would stop existing if he stopped thinking.
Quoting Banno
There are not many strong points in this thread.
Quoting Banno
Which I acquisced and clarified before, you say so:
Quoting Banno
I would hardly say that was a great length, but the proof of one's own existence does not depend on dualism. The mind-body dualism simply clarifies under what conditions something would cease to exist when it is not thinking. If something inherently thinks, it would not be anymore if it stops thinking. If X is inherently red, X would cease to exist were it to stop being red, aka it would stop being.
Quoting Banno
If we define dreaming as thinking too — which is an assumption that "stop existing when you stop thinking" relies on —, we don't stop existing when we go to sleep. Even if it were, there is a difference between ontology and epistemology. Descartes is trying to show how we can come to know that we exist, which is a different matter of under what conditions we exist. That I know that «I am» is different from «what it is that I am». He explores this also in the beginning of the Second Meditation:
Quoting Corvus
Guilty as charged ¯\_(?)_/¯
That is not the premise, that is where he starts his investigation.
Quoting Corvus
The two premises are contradictory. Not that it matters, because Descartes never said anything like this. I can only recommend reading Descartes.
That is one of the many mistakes he has made. I fully address it here:
Quoting Deleted user
Which he replied:
Quoting Corvus
Then:
Quoting Deleted user
To which there was no reply.
https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/therefore#:~:text=(used%20to%20introduce%20a%20logical,reason%20or%20as%20a%20result
The guy has a narrow understanding of a word in a language that isn't his first language, which is understandable and I don't fault him for that - the part that isn't understandable, that I do fault him for, is that he has absolutely 0 humility about it. He refuses to hear, from native English speakers, that "therefore" has different uses than what he insists it must mean.
The whole ordeal is a never ending illustration of the Dunning Kruger Effect
If it is I that thinks and given that there is thinking, then isn’t it necessary for “I” to be? Under these conditions, there is no way for “I” to be other than to think. Descartes used the term “exist” here and there, for which he should be forgiven, considerIng the general mandate of his thesis.
“…. This is the best way to discover what sort of thing the mind is, and how it differs from the body. How does it do that? I am supposing that everything other than myself is unreal, while wondering what sort of thing I am. I can see clearly that I don’t have any of the properties that bodies have—I don’t have a spatial size or shape, and I don’t move—because those properties all fall on the supposed-to-be-unreal side of the line, whereas we’ve just seen that I can’t suppose that I am unreal. So I find that the only property I can ascribe to myself is thought. So my knowledge of my thought is more basic and more certain than my knowledge of any corporeal thing.
….I take the word ‘thought’ to cover everything that we are aware of as happening within us, and it counts as ‘thought’ because we are aware of it. (…)
….I’m not going to explain many of the other terms (in addition to ‘thought’) that I have already used or will use later on, because they strike me as being sufficiently self-explanatory. I have often noticed that philosophers make the mistake of trying to explain things that were already very simple and self-evident, by producing logical definitions that make things worse! When I said that the proposition I am thinking, therefore I exist is ‘the first and most certain thing to occur to anyone who philosophizes in an orderly way’, I wasn’t meaning to deny that one must first know what thought, existence and certainty are, and know that it’s impossible for something to think while it doesn’t exist, and the like. But these are utterly simple notions, which don’t on their own give us knowledge of anything that exists; so I didn’t think they needed to be listed…”
(Principia Philosophiae, 1, 8-10, 1644, in Bennet, 2017)
I just found this so galling...
I mean, this is precisely an error a native speaker of Korean can make. It's easily forgivable that he makes that mistake. It's easy to find out this is a problem coming from Korean, and that there are two words used to translate 'therefore' one much closer to this use in the English cogito (and also donc in the French version). Several different native speakers are telling him he is misunderstanding the word. And when it's pointed out he tells me I am not using the standard definition. Well, there are a few ways to use 'therefore' in English.
Just for thoroughnessI'll like to what you're responding to of mine: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/892205 and which you linked to.
Earlier he told Flannel Jesus that he could look in any logic textbook and find that his denying the antecendent was correct. Yet recently he chided Banno for citing logic books. And he never got around to showing us how his logic book said he was correct. But when a logic work (supposedly) supported his position, it was fine to point this out. (though never to get around showing us that it did). I don't understand the language. Banno doesn't understand the difference between truth and validity. Flannel Jesus doesn't understand....and on and on.
I do often wonder how conscious people are of what they seem to be avoiding admitting (to themselves? to us?) that maybe, just maybe other people might have a point. Conscious or not I think there are dozens of examples of disingenousness in this thread.
True!
Was thinking of a simpler model I guess:
If x thinks, then x exists.
And I guess if x is in a coma and is not thinking - or is successfully meditating then x would not be currently thinking (but capable of thought)
True.
Quoting Banno
:roll:
I wonder why you chose Korean specifically. But take a look at this https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/857740
first part of sentence comes earlier in time ontologically than what is mentioned in the second part.
Any chronological is about one being able, when one notes the first, to conclude that the second was also present at the time of the thinking.
It's a basic misinterpretation of therefore in this context. Discussions by philosophers of the cogito will show that they all get this and interpret therefore and donc in a way different from Corvus. Corvus is a non-native speaker. In his language it is easy to mistranslate therefore to a words that has the meaning he projects on to the English word (and the French word also). There is another way to translate it into Korean that is better, and so on.
Instead of for one second considering he might be misinterpreting the term and exploring that for a bit, he accuses me of leading everything into nonsense.
in a post in response to you in fact...
Anthropomorphic tautologies with respect to x aside….on the off-chance you weren’t actually going there….the coma thing won’t work, if we’re keeping with the original cogito simpliciter you started with, in that Descartes counts thinking as such “because we are aware of it”.
From this same article https://www.jstor.org/stable/40694016 . The second half with Gassendi is much more interesting than the first about Russell.
It is notable how much scrutinity Descartes' philosophy has received.
Ok ;)
My point was really more about the context
Far more wild premises are made up and forwarded as some reasons why the contradiction reasoning is not the case by the other folks. Those are not said or written by Descartes, but they are reasonable and interesting inferences for the premises of cogito.
In logical arguments, premises are made up with reasonable inferences and assertions. Nothing like talking about hosing a garden, when the argument was about the rain and wet ground.
If Descartes had said or written about the basis for cogito, then no premises would be necessary. Because the only basis for cogito was his doubt on everything he perceived, the premises from the reasonable inferences were asserted in the post.
I wonder if you read any Descartes at all yourself.
But he says in the Second Replies:
About that:
His wild imagination has no ground. Just someone said his native language is Korean doesn't prove that he is a Korean. His repeated meaningless citing on the point is very strange and irrelevant for the discussion. If you listen to him, and thinks it makes sense, it proves that you have no ability to reason.
OK. Thanks.
If red light, then drive away. R -> D
If not red light, then don't drive away. Not R -> Not D is False
Therefore If red light, then drive away. R -> D is False
They are not, which is why no scholar says Descartes' argument is contradictory.
Quoting Corvus
On what basis do you have this wonder, since you have basically admitted that you didn't read him at all?
Quoting Corvus
That is an order, it has nothing to do with logic. It is not how A?B is used.
If it's red, then the order is to drive away.
If it's not red, then the order is to not drive away, apparently
i don't know if he's saying that's a second, separate order or if he's saying that follows from the first order. Obviously to most people here (all except one), it doesn't follow from the first. You can order them to drive away if it's red and not order anything at all if it's not red, there's nothing wrong with that.
He's still just searching for new ways to deny the Antecedent. No idea why, he knows he didn't find it in his textbook.
The only basis for your claim, they are not, is because no scholar says D's argument is contradictory?
Quoting Deleted user
Your claims on D seem to be based on some type of religious beliefs rather than academic theories.
Quoting Deleted user
Any event which can be described in human language can be translated into the formal logic. It is called propositional logic.
If he could find that denying the Antecedent is valid in his textbook, then it's true that it's valid.
He couldn't find it in his textbook.
Therefore
it's not true that it's valid.
The basis for my claim is that I have read Descartes and that is not his argument. If that were his argument, some scholar would have picked up that his argument is contradictory, but that never happened, because that is not his argument.
Quoting Corvus
That sucks. But I have read him, the scholarship around him, the objections to him. I recommend you at least watch a series of lectures on him, there are plenty of uni channels on Youtube, so at least you stop embarassing yourself.
Quoting Corvus
Interesting, please translate the following into propositional logic:
"If you had been there, you would have seen that the fireworks went off at the same as the bell rang."
Sentence is the basic constituent of Logic. What do you think Logic is?
I'm just giving you a way to interpret it that leaves it as a logical implication still. It's of course a poor example anyway. Just giving him the benefit of the doubt
I am not sure what you mean here. You obviously are avoiding to answer for the question whether you agree or disagree with the example propositional logic shown calling it order, not logic.
Yes you do. You said every sentence can be translated to logic. Translate my sentence to logic.
Quoting Corvus
Your example has nothing to do with propositional logic, having the word "then" in it does not make it so.
One reaches a point where the only thing to do is laugh and walk away.
Thanks for attempting to explain this to @Metaphyzik.
The other missing bits for them are that p and q in p?q need neither be related nor true, and p?q might itself be false. Unlike p?p , which is always true, and p?~p, which is always false.
, you asked for an example of p?q. "That there are green crows implies there are no new ideas" is just that: with "There are green crows" for p and "There are no new ideas" for q. It is intended to show how hollow "p?q" is. Have a think on it.
By the way, when it comes to Descartes' argument as an inference, the Aristotelian concept of enthytema is interesting. But ultimately, it is a medidation, not an argument autistically put into a first-order logic, those that don't want to understand will not understand.
What's the point of that? What would anyone gain translating what you are saying into logic?
Quoting Deleted user
You say it is order, not logic. That is nonsense. Orders are expressed in sentences. The sentences must have truth values to be effective as law or order.
Quoting Corvus
Proving your absurd claim.
Quoting https://www.queensu.ca/alumnireview/articles/2016-05-03/ego-sum-ego-existo-descartes-divisive-legacy
That doesn't prove anything at all. If you exist, you can think, or you don't have to think. It just means, in order for you think, prior to that, you must exist.
Sure. Certainty is often restricted to tautologies. And new ideas are extremely rare. Expression and learning and finding your way to navigate the channel are not.
However, as the pace of technology continues to increase, it seems inevitable that we are going to be getting actual new ideas at least at a glaciers pace
I am just telling you what is correct from the muddles that you folks have been spewing out. I am not trying to get out from anything like some of the senseless folks here try to make out.
No, you said any sentence can be put into logic. Put my sentence into logic.
I'm sure you do the same thing. Talking to multiple folk requires talking at different levels, or at least placing differing emphasis.
You are at pains to defend Descartes against my probing, but there is no need. I respect his system, and have enough of a grasp of it to see it's consistency. But there are problems with it, as I am sure you would acknowledge.
I seem to be the only one referring back to the topic. My position, again, speaking broadly, is that anything can be brought into doubt; and hence the notion of being "100% certain" is fraught. But also, not everything can be brought into doubt. And hence there are things of which we are certain. We are certain of those things for the purposes of the task at hand.
To that end I attempted to sow some doubt as to "I think therefore I am", by pointing out that it is difficult to give an account of it as an inference. To some extent that has been a success.
I'm not at present aware of a part of this discussion where you and I are at great odds.
You must be joking telling anyone putting your sentence into logic. Are you Descartes?
You never posted those pages from your textbook, so...
Here's another p?q: "If the milk is sour, then your bank account is empty".
Or "The first letter of the alphabet is 7, so Fred is a zebra".
So, from the Principles and the Replies to the Objections, to put in this exact terms, if I understand what is meant by them, the fact through which we realise we exist is an impression¹. When we express the impression, it is an inference – an enthytema often—, this reference of course relies on intuitions².
1:
2:
Do you agree the orders must be expressed in sentences, and the sentences must have truth values to be effective as the orders?
I don't care about your gibbersh. You said:
Quoting Corvus
If that is true, translate "If you had been there, you would have seen that the fireworks went off at the same as the bell rang" to formal logic.
I have asked you first, but you never answered my question. Is this the way you evade the question which will collapse all your points?
Do you agree the orders and rules must be expressed in sentences, and the sentences must have truth values to be effective as the orders and rules?
Quoting Corvus
Wow, so on top of not having ever read Descartes and feeling the gaul to comment on it, on top of not knowing how to use logic, you also don't know how time works? If you scroll up, you will see I requested that you translate my phrase before you deflected with that "question" of yours.
It would be wonderful to listen to Descartes and Wittgenstein discussing certainty.
Well, you keep running away from the question with smoky gibberish. How time works? Why do you suddenly want to know how time works? Please elaborate further.
For some reason, unclear to us, @Corvus is "unavailable for learning".
It is a pattern that can be seen in other threads in which he is involved. He puts up a pretence of paying attention and of understanding the discussion, then after a few days throws up a wall of nonsense. For some reason unknown to us, he is not able to take on new information.
For a teacher the only workable remedy is to address the circumstances. To give the student breakfast, treat their condition or approach the parents. We can't do that for Corvus.
Further conversation becomes like a child hitting the dog's cage with a stick. It will bark and growl back at you; fun, but progress will not be made.
Seriously this is your problem Banno. You think you are a teacher, and the rest of the members are the students. But you have no knowledge of the field that you claim to be knowledgeable at. Your claims are full of misunderstandings. When it is pointed out, you get upset, and then you put out unfair and untrue ad hominem.
I tried to treat you with my best fairness and friendliness this time. But it is over the limit. Your insincerity, dishonest and pretensions are too obvious in your post. It is a regrettable affair to be honest.
The lowest common denominator. What we always get in the end.
Welcome to the machine
Calm down Banno. This is The Philosophy Forum. :nerd:
Banno, we all know that you keep scanning other folks messages for sussing out the irrelevant grounds for your attacks. If you are honest, you will see and admit that I have never spoken to anyone with out of context vulgarities under any circumstances. I always kept my control in respecting others in the discussions.
There are a few of your cliques who have been throwing irrelevant out of context insults with the vulgar languages umpteen times. It just shows that they don't have basic respect for others, and disregard the manner of the discussions. But you never point out the problems of these folks because they are in your cliques.
With just this one evidence, your bizarre post is an unfair and untrue criticism of yours based on your psychological bias. I hope that you could realise the reality and be able to see the true situation.
You see, the number in the bottom left corner shows whether a message came up after or before.
Quoting Corvus
I did not run away all the times you posted nonsense, in fact I refuted you several times. And I refuted you again, your rendition of Descartes is wrong. Make some effort to actually read what he wrote.
or giving attention, even to excess, to the students who are on task, making their day pleasant despite the recalcitrant.
I have been away all day, and just returned to see your message to me. I have no clue what you were talking about on how time works. But I will catch them up when I have some spare time.
You see I don't read any other posts apart from which are directed to me.
Quoting Deleted user
When I asked you about the If Red Light then Drive logic for your agree or disagreement on it, you said it was order, not Logic. It is a logic. It gave the impression that you were trying to avoid the answer.
That logic is a critical one. We will examine that tomorrow. I will try to read what you sent me in full in due course.
The positivists were right. Philosophy is nonsense. We should all learn coding instead.
Quoting Corvus
Yes, "drive away if there is a red light" is an order (drive away) with a conditional (if there is), it has nothing to do with statements of the type p?q. It is a bad example. Choose another one.
:wink: The understanding of logic of some here who do coding leaves me doubting this. I taught coding for years, in the hope that it would improve my student's comprehension of and intuition for logic. It may have been to no avail.
It seems that folk are able to follow the sequent in a deduction, but are unclear as to what the elements represent. Hence not recognising examples of p?q, or thinking commands are statements.
We have a winner on aisle 4
You have changed my original example back to front to make it sound like order. Please read my original example given to you again, and confirm.
The example sentence in the logical form is not order at all. It can be expressed different way for the same meaning, if you have linguistic problem understanding the sentence. For example,
If it is red light, then it is safe to drive.
If it is red light, then it is legal to drive.
If it is red light, then it is ok to drive. ... etc.
The argument is made up into the formal sentence form in the argument.
It is only an order, if some one tells you to your face, "When it is is red light, drive", or as you have changed it "Drive away, if there is a red light."
Even if a sentence is order form, it can be formalised and executed in the logic.
If you read anything about mathematical logic, then you would have known that many of the computer programming languages operate on the instructions executed under the Boolean logic in the order form.
For example, if total order >= 10$, then offer FREE shipping.
Therefore, your claim that sentences in order form are not Logic is not correct.
If red light, then drive away. R -> D
If not red light, then don't drive away. Not R -> Not D is False
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/892642
You can interpret this as "the law says"
The law says if the light is red, you must drive away.
It's false that the law says, if the light is not red, you must not drive away.
If we are making a circuit that takes an input and translates to an output, and I am really forcing it here, where there is a photoreceptor and if it gets a 1 value, it makes the miniature car move (1). I can't know what Corvus means by "False" because he doesn't mean [sic] at all. I am assuming it means 0.
In this case, being that R?D is the same as (¬R?D), and that ¬R?¬D is the same as (R?¬D), red light then drive away is the case (1,1), which makes ¬R?D (1), not red don't drive away is (0,0), so R?¬D is also 1, aka not 0, aka not false as Corvus claims.
This made-up scenario he came up with is not even equivalent to his original nonsense. His original nonsense is an argument where the two premises are contradictory. His new nonsense is an "argument" where the conclusion denies the first premise because the conclusion does not follow from the premises at all. It is a fantasy he made up.
Again, he has no clue what he is talking about, ever. It is nonsense upon nonsense on an unwillingness to learn basic propositional logic. He is LARPing that he has read books on logic. Someone who cannot even understand that he can't deny the antecedent does not have the skill to even read a high school book on set theory — not an easy task by itself.
By the way, your bio does not mean what you think it means.
What do you mean? Could you please explain on that point?
It means Google translate does not work properly.
Yeah I agree with that, but if you want to show him that you probably have to agree on an example to talk about first. You don't like the one he gave, which I understand, it's genuinely a very strange example.
He previously said "if I'm swimming, then I'm wet". I think that's a fantastic example of implication to look at.
Why suddenly talk about the bio written in Latin? What do you think it means?
Ok, just for funsies, I found an Introduction to Logic textbook online.
https://www.fecundity.com/codex/forallx.pdf
End of page 24:
Suppose, for instance, that the antecedent A happened to be
false. ‘If A then B’ would then not tell us anything about the actual truth value of the consequent B.
Denying the antecedent of a statement of implication tells you nothing about the truth value of the consequent.
I don't think it means anything. I know what it means. And it is not what you were thinking.
Quoting flannel jesus
I have tried that a thousand times already with "If it rains, the floor is wet". Banno also. It is pointless.
https://reader-service.z-library.se/reader-pdf/387cccf294949913ee2e9a2ef4687ceafd21b6effc11b65a211c579cd2817362?download_location=https%3A%2F%2Fz-library.se%2Fdl%2F2327764%2F8360ad&page=139
Page 130
But why do you talk about the Bio, in the middle of talking about order and logic? It would help in understanding, if you let us know what you think it means.
Quoting Deleted user
Mentioning about Banno or the other folks in the discussion won't help for clarification on the point.
What did you say about "If it rains, the floor is wet."? What is your point? This is the first time I am reading you talking about it.
Because your bio says something other than what you meant. If anything, it means something funny.
Quoting Corvus
Another case of selective amensia in this thread.
I still cannot see any relevance of my Bio to this thread and what we have been discussing. Something other than what I meant? How do you know what I meant? :)
Quoting Deleted user
I did discuss the argument case with Banno, but never with yourself.
Are you not mistaking me for someone else?
Please tell us what you said about it in summaries and points.
Because it is obvious.
Quoting Corvus
No. Go post that picture of a logic book you were talking about. And also translate my phrase to propositional logic.
It is the most mysterious answer I have heard in the forum, I am afraid. :D
Quoting Deleted user
No Lion. Posting picture of a logic book is not a philosophical process. It is unnecessary. Our linguistic discussions and reasonings should be able to lead us to some sort of conclusion. I was going to explain everything again in detail, if you only let us know what you meant by you said thousands of times, but you were again telling untruths there.
You keep demanding to translate your phrase to PL. It is also unnecessary bizarre act in philosophical discussions. I have never heard such a ludicrous demand. If you read the good logic books, they would tell you with the reasonable inference and introducing assertions for the premises, one can build a logical argument on every event in the world. Obviously you aren't aware of that.
OK, I can only conclude that your motive was not philosophical in this discussion. So, I will leave you to it. I have learnt my lesson that I cannot make the folks to see the light, who are determined not to see it. So I will not keep trying wasting my time. All the best.
I would love to know who he can make see the light. One person who thinks (a -> b) leads to (~a -> ~b) as a general rule. I'd love to have a conversation with that person.
Sure, if you keep your control and just concentrate on the topics under the discussion, we can give another try. It is not because I am against using bad languages and swearing. I do swear in real life as much as anyone. Perhaps even much worse than you do. But in the forum, we must keep in control and respect the other party we are talking to. You cannot discuss anything rationally with someone who is not in control of their emotions.
You are judged by only on what you write here. So, check out if you are writing the facts, not the distortions or untruths and dishonest claims before posting. If you are ok with that, then I can give another try for clarifying (a -> b) leads to (~a -> ~b).
By the way, it is not a general rule. (~a -> ~b) is an assertion or inference against (a -> b).
You are trying prove (a -> b) is true or false.
One of the ways it can be done is applying the contradictions to (a -> b), and check if it is true or false with the reality.
So here already, it is clear that you have mistaken the very start of the point (a -> b) leads to (~a -> ~b) as a general rule. It is not a general rule at all. It is a reasoning by introducing contradiction case.
Oh, fascinating. That's not what it sounded like when you called it Modus Ponens, because Modus Ponens is indeed a general rule.
So you don't think it's a general rule, meaning you think there are scenarios where you can have an implication, a implies b, and yet not have the implication of (not a implies not b), is that right?
You can have (a implies b) without (not a implies not b), correct? In general, not specifically about the cogito.
There are many different ways proofs can be done. MP is one way to do it, but it was not good for proving cogito, so I tried different arguments to suit it. Is it such a shock? :rofl:
I am quite surprised to hear you all the way thought it was MP. MP is the most basic form, and was implemented by the Stoics. If it doesn't suit for the statement you are trying to prove, then you must move on to another type of reasoning.
It is a reasoning by contradiction in proof. It is so obvious just by looking at it, both premises and conclusions are contradicted and checked out.
(a -> b) -> (~a -> ~b) is not modus ponens, we can both agree on that now. Fantastic progress.
OK fine. That's rather quick and easy solution to us all. We have agreement. Thanks.
(a -> b) -> (~a -> ~b)
You said this isn't a general rule, which means there can be situations where (a -> b) is true, but (~a -> ~b) is not true, correct? Again, not to be interperted in the context of Cogito explicitly at this point, just in general. In general, there can be situations like that.
It is not, these two are not mutually contradictory. One translates to (a?¬b) and the other to (¬a?b). Both are true if a and b are true.
Quoting Corvus
The contradiction to a?b is ¬(a?b), it is not ¬a?¬b.
Quoting Corvus
The contradiction to "I think therefore I am" is not "I don't think therefore I am not".
More BS
And yet he still has you giving him attention.
Quoting Banno
You must reason the contradiction, and check it over with the real events or existence for the truth or falsehood. You don't keep on going on with the set truth table on this cogito case.
What is the contradiction of it? Tell us exactly what is the contraction of "I think therefore I am" in plain English.
A?B ? ¬A?B
¬A?B ? B?¬A
B?¬A ? ¬B?¬A = ¬A -> ¬B ?
I await to hear your contradiction of "I think therefore I am" in plain English, and will take it from there.
Quoting Banno
Quoting Corvus
No.
This seems to be your problem. ¬(a?b) is negation, not contradiction.
You don't know the difference between negation and contradiction.
https://www.csus.edu/indiv/m/mayesgr/phl4/handouts/phl4contradiction.htm
https://www.math.toronto.edu/preparing-for-calculus/3_logic/we_3_negation.html
I'm a little confused by this proof. You told me a few posts ago that it's not a general rule, but if this proof were valid, it would be a general rule.
If this proof were valid, A?B would always imply ¬A ? ¬B - that's what I call a "general rule".
Would you mind clarifying that? Is this always applicable to all statements in the form of A?B, or is it not?
It is not. You are wrong again.
¬(a?b) = It is not the case (a?b) = negation. It is not contradiction.
You never admit the truth as truth. That is part of your problem.
Yes, that was the general rule. It was to show the logical inference processes in detail from the rule to Lion because he seems having difficulties understanding it.
Quoting Corvus
So that leaves me a little bit confused. Are you sure you want to say it's a general rule? Were you incorrect before when you said that it's not a general rule at all, and that that was a mistake from me to interpret it that way?
It has to be one or the other. Either (a -> b) leads to (~a -> ~b) as a general rule, or it's not a general rule. I would like clarity on this.
Thats an inference.
Quoting Corvus
This is inference from the rule.
That's what the "general rule" question means, every time I've asked it. Can you always do it, or not always?
The classic syllogism cannot handle more complicated cases well, and it would be better to use Modal, Epistemic or Descriptive Logics. But if you convert the complex sentences into more atomic ones, and formalise them, then it works ok too. I am not a Logic expert, and I will be rereading my old logic books to brush up my knowledge on it.
I am now really bowing out from this thread. I have spoken enough, and learnt a lot myself. Thank you for your engagement with me. Although there were some rough times between us, I respect your strong interest in the subject. I hope to meet you in the other threads for the other discussions later hopefully. All the best.
1. The cogito is not a logical preposition
2. It can be - like anything else - be translated into a logical preposition.
3. Then that logical proposition can be proofed.
4. Then any of those proofs can be translated back into an adjusted cogito statement.
5. The adjusted statement doesn’t always make any sense. What was - it green cows?
The problem isn’t the simple logic. Nor is it the cogito (although it has flaws but they haven’t been the focus here). It is of course the translations. Devil in the details.
A goal of philosophers a hundred years ago was to be able to provide a symbolic logic tied to natural language. So just by logic we could determine the truth and falsehoods of statements. That was a failure. Besides the obvious reasons of translation issues, the failure was due to paradoxes in logic (famously Russell’s set of sets, among others…).
And traditionally what we have garnished from the paradoxical failures of logic is that it is a useful tool in a context. With parameters. And a set of assumptions. Because if it’s opened up to any input whatsoever it can never be proven to be logically complete. It is insular in nature.
This grey area of translation makes great fun…. But the mind grows weary of emotional sophistry no?
These are worthwhile considerations. I talked about it broadly on this post:
Quoting Deleted user
It is usual for one to be able to state the missing premise. If not, the enthytema is presumably invalid.
Labouring the point, we have (I think, ? I am); and the missing premise is "If I think, then I am". Which is, it seems, what was to be proved...
And as discussed, one might get around this by treating it as a definition, " I am that which is doubting".
But if we do this, then "I" ceases to be when not doubting.
And to get around that, as you explained, one needs to move to "I am at least that which is doubting". Hence the doubting self is at least part of, but not the whole of, what exists.
Is that roughly what you would argue?
And is dualism always the consequence here?
It is a flaw of the cogito that it contains “I”. Because yes the inclusion of “I” does lead inevitably to dualism (as Banno has pointed out).
In any case the question is ill fitted to a logical proof, no?
If I answer your question "what can I know for 100% certainty" with the answer: "nothing".
Does that mean you know nothing with 100% certainty. Or you certainly know nothing.
Does accepting a lack of knowledge impart some form of knowledge?
I’ll try…. But probably won’t succeed in answering your question.
The ultimate question (no not the one with the answer 42), is how can we know that we know anything. And the answer is we cannot. The best we can do is to convince ourselves of a solipsistic existence (think, therefore exist)…. But no proof can be found - or even what the proof may look like - to prove the world.
So we can know that we know nothing at all. Which is, yes a piece of knowledge. The only knowledge perhaps, but it is a lot stickier than that….
However that is really a tautological problem, as it doesn’t do anything for anyone. We accept the world regardless of mind games, so then the next question is: what can we be certain of, assuming we accept the world? Again if you don’t accept the world then there isn’t much point conversing with you ;). Haha
However given a set of things we do accept about the world - are we certain or more certain of them? Yes we are. That will depend on what context you accept, and if you indeed follow any logical reasoning (I would estimate that 2/3 of people have no logical reasoning capabilities whatsoever beyond habit), which doesn’t really count). These people think with emotions, basically what they want to believe because it makes them feel particular ways. Etc etc. well… probably a lot higher than 2/3. A lot. And of course everyone is logical sometimes and culpable sometimes, so let’s talk percentages of thoughts - I still think it is a lot higher than 2/3.
The point is, we can be certain of some things within a context / framework. But it is only as certain as the framework within which it resides is valid. Take scientific knowledge for example, what we “knew” 200 years ago is out of date in parts because the framework and context had been improved. Ad infinitum.
So certainty is relative.
I am not in line with everything in the post but the last line, yes, I am at least that which doubts.
Quoting Banno
Yes, but we can't do much against that. The hard problem of consciousness is perhaps incontrovertible.
Many physicalist philosophers say:
Image from Dr. Bogardus
Quoting Metaphyzik
An immediate awareness, an experience. This is the experience that the philosophers above are talking about. That thinking presupposes existence is an intuition, a belief that does not come from inference or from experience but that we can't conceive otherwise.
We need to be very careful here.
Is your claim that there are two substances, or that Descartes said there were two substances? If the latter, I will agree. If the former, then I will disagree.
Also, given the topic, is you claim that you are 100% certain there are two substances?
If not, then I suggest that this is too far from the OP.
Never heard of.
Quoting Banno
I am not defending dualism, but only that it appears that physicalism will always be incomplete.
Quoting Banno
Latter. Even for Descartes I don't thik he would say prima facie it is sure that there are two substances. The existence of bodies, aka res extensa, is far from certain. If he did, and he likely would, he would do so by invoking God.
But a statement like “certainty is relative” is not relative.
I agree that we are only certain of things within a context, but when we say “certainty is relative”, we are making everything the context (with no room left for the context to change) and speaking of all certainties ( namely they are all relative).
So maybe it is not that certainty is relative, but that certainty is rare and reserved for things in the context of everything and all time.
In a sense it does. We still know something (maybe generally) before we might adduce we know nothing in particular.
I seem to recall Bertrand Russell making the same argument. In proclaiming, "I think, therefore I am," Descartes has snuck "I" in the back door. All he has done with 100% certainty is to demonstrate "thinking" exists -- not "I."
Yes of course. The posit of the statement “certainty is relative” is an absolute statement. Absolute relativity is an oxymoron.
The thought pattern leads to it though. So it is a standard self-referential paradox. Set of all sets kind of stuff. There are lots out logic traps out there. Sometimes we can get out of them by couching our terms and avoiding the validity of self-referential statements… but in the end those never seem to be that convincing. They seem like special case exceptions for no real reason.
The takeaway is that it isn’t a certain statement.
The paradox runs like this:
* everything is relative
* if true then that is an absolute statement
* if it is an absolute statement then everything cannot be relative
“Certainty” doesn’t quite fit in place of “everything”. But close enough.
* certainty is relative
* if true then it’s an absolute statement. If we are to be certain of it then how would we even be certain in a relative way about something so straight forward / simple? It seems impossible to even know what relative certainty is in this case.
* if so, then certainty cannot be relative.
Now interestingly enough, that argument doesn’t make the statement false. It shows that it is not logically complete. Meaning you can’t say that it is always valid. In context… And around the circle we go again.
Does this mean that context with regards to certainty is an invalid parameter?
Does this mean that believing in relativity with regard to certainty is not a logically sound argument (after all the premise cannot be certain)
Or does it simply mean it is a meaningless statement to call anything relative?
And therein lies the "resolution" to your unresolvable paradox, right?
You are judging how it stands up to logic.
If nothing is absolute, neither is logic.
Hence the illusion of a problem that does not arise in a/the Reality where everything isn't relative.
It ends up being a critique of how we think. Aka how we logically thinks
It is a resolution in that it posits that logic is in itself invalid except where we can consider it to be complete. The conclusion would be that logic is only absolutely correct when it is relative.
And a self referential statement like that - logically derived - implies that it is absolute, if that statement is to be believed absolutely. Therefore relativity has nothing to do with it, even though that was the purpose of the statement. Negate it and follow through the loop to the same point, ad infinitum.
It is not a solvable problem.
Now that is theoria. In praxis, we aren’t too much concerned over this. And the avoidance of self referentially applying propositions like that is all part of accepting the world - else we would be all solipsists, or one step above that (meaning we accept logic as valid as part of the world… so avoiding that would mean we accept the world in absolute anarchy, which I think some do…)
But this distinction is interesting when we consider what we can be certain about. It seems that we are certain about what at base level we accept of the world. Substitute that for “I think”, which would really be “I accept” therefore I am, because there really isn’t much of a choice. So we are left to logically backfill the acceptance with an incomplete structural set of thinking patterns. Which are great when applied to a set, but fail when thinking about it belonging to its own set of sets that don’t belong to itself etc etc. logic is a tool designed for certain uses.
That is why (one reason anyways) the philosopher doesn’t really think he/she knows anything. We are certain to the extent that we can be convinced.
And the epistemological underpinning of acceptance is experiential, or a-priori if you will, etc etc. lots of room for plausible explanations (and room for some that don’t make sense). Given a very basic acceptance level - what else actually makes sense? I would think that the further up the acceptance chain you go the more specific beliefs and sets of knowledge are in play, and if you actually try to understand them instead of believing you already know what you are supposedly investigating, then the amount of certainty in the world (measured by people purporting certainty about things) to be fairly large, and the amount of falseness that we would recognize to also be less large. Ugh. Never mind.
No, that was informative. Thank you. And I get your frustration. Feels impossible sometimes to address such multilayered complexities in a narrow time and space.
You did a nice job, at the very least, illustrating how it is much more multilayered and com0lex than my prompt implied.
Thanks. I do tend to ramble on a bit though haha. Just my take on it though, although I am always ready to be convinced otherwise. Looking for the most plausible explanation really aren’t we?
Thanks I’ll take a read
This seems to justify: "I am" as opposed to merely: "thinking is," because there is both thinking and the recursive awareness of this thinking as thought. What is the "I" but this very sort of self-awareness in thought? But if there is self-awareness, some self exists, since it would seem that a "self" or "I" is definitionally just this very sort of awareness.
Whereas, it seems possible that a goldfish or fetus might experience some level of first person subjective experience, but not any sort of recursive self-knowledge.
Descartes' doesn't bring this out fully, but I do think he implicitly answers the big criticism against his famous line. For it is not simply that there "is thinking," but also that there is recursive self-awareness of thinking. This is what motivates the statement in the first place.
In other words, the "I" is what experiences thoughts — definitionally as you said.
But about recursiveness, Cardano's criticism:
Quoting Discource on the Method, Ian Maclean translation, explanatory note 28
But then Descartes states not "I think therefore I am" but "'I am, I exist,’ is necessarily true whenever… it is conceived in my mind.". It is not that the memory of something allows us to know that we exist, but that everytime we think we are sure of our own existence.
I'm not sure if this is much of a criticism. Thought is essentially processual. The very effort to understand a claim like "I think, therefore I am," relies on "prior cognition," as Aristotle says. "This is also true of both deductive and inductive arguments, since they both succeed in teaching because they rely on previous cognition: deductive arguments begin with premisses we are assumed to understand, and inductive arguments prove the universal by relying on the fact that the particular is already clear." (Posterior Analytics)
But simply because thought "is" in the context of becoming doesn't mean "it is not," anymore than an eclipse can be shown "not to be," simply because it occurs over an interval.
Notably, I think the common complaints here are dealt with quite well by Augustine, who has his own formulation of Descartes' famous proposition. There, the theory of mind binds together being, knowing, and willing, such that the three are intrinsically related in forming the "I"
It is. Cardano's point is that the earlier part of the process might belong to a subject other than the one that says "I am".
It just doesn't seem very convincing. The experience of being aware of an experience is phenomenologicaly concurrent with it. Certainly, it's true that we don't have an experience "in no time at all," but it seems like a mistake here to take experience as being decomposable into smaller and smaller intervals, with certain parts having to follow others in serial order. Understanding seems to occur as a sort of parallel, composite process (which makes sense given our cognitive architecture).
I think the issue might be conflating the process of developing a thought into a propositional form, and the experience of self-awareness itself. For example, in the passage from Augustine above he spends a paragraph unpacking inferences made from an experience of knowing and willing that occurs in an instant. These two are divided in propositional thought, yet if a line drive is hit to us while playing baseball, our experience doesn't seem to involve first knowing that the ball has been hit, then willing our body to move to catch it. We do all of these together, seamlessly knowing, willing, and acting. Likewise, in introspection we experience and experience our own experiencing together.
Beyond the possibility of a mistake, the task of decomposing thoughts on the axis of time is very troublesome, and I would be interested to know if there was ever a philosopher to undertake this task. For example, when we think "red car", does that take less time than if we were to think "the happy swimmer dove into the shallow lake"? Surely one has many more concepts than the other, but ultimately — at least for me —, both give one single mental image that can be realised at a given instant of time. So is it a single thought when we say "X therefore Y" because we are uniting these concepts or is it the thought of X followed in time by the thought of Y? I expressed this worry before in the thread:
Quoting Deleted user
In any case, though Cardano's criticism is very much welcome and healthy, I pointed:
Quoting Deleted user
Descartes' idea starts with an immediate intuition. And it may not even be that we need to know thinking implies existence to have this immediate intuition (the inference we were talking about). Everytime we think we are making sure that we exist, every thought comes with the experience of being there, of existing — a "da-sein" if you will.
Professor Hintikka in a letter put it as "ego cogitans existo" instead (I, who thinks, exists).
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Surely it is a process, but going too far with this idea would have implications on our view of personal identity, which might not be something that I want to commit myself to. Specifically, if our understandings cannot be at any point analysed from one other, we are committing ourselves to a psychological continuity. I think that it is desirable to be able to separate the thoughts from Tuesday from the thoughts of Sunday, even though they are ultimately linked — the first and last link of a chain are distinct even if ultimately connected.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Yes, I think this is an important distinction. Even if an experience, physically, neurologically takes place in time, it is still a experience; putting it in words is a translation of the experience, aiming for communication with people whose minds we assume are like ours; but yet language does not exhaust thought. If I had to make a wild guess, I would say this conflation is more common in people who think in words rather than images.
But as before, I still think the experiences/thoughts of Tuesday and the experiences/thoughts of Sunday can and ought to be separated.
“…. The schema of substance is the permanence of the real in time…..
……The schema of possibility is the determination of the representation of a thing at any time….
……The schema of reality is existence in a determined time….
……The schema of necessity is the existence of an object in all time….
……It is clear, from all this, that the schema of the category of quantity contains and represents the generation (synthesis) of time itself, in the successive apprehension of an object….
……the schema of quality the synthesis of sensation with the representation of time, or the filling up of time….
……the schema of relation the relation of perceptions to each other in all time (that is, according to a rule of the determination of time)….
……and finally, the schema of modality and its categories, time itself, as the correlative of the determination of an object—whether it does belong to time, and how.
The schemata, therefore, are nothing but à priori determinations of time according to rules, and these, in regard to all possible objects, following the arrangement of the categories, relate to the series in time, the content in time, the order in time, and finally, to the complex or totality in time.…”
(CPR A143-145/B182-185)
Maybe not exactly what you asked for, but does show there was/is a philosopher tasking himself with decomposing that which is thought about, to its necessary relation to time.
I have been kicking around ideas on this for a while. In Eddington's "The Rigor of Angles: Kant, Borges, Heisenberg, and the Ultimate Nature of Reality," he discusses a philosophical treaties by Heisenberg that tries to apply his famous uncertainty principle to language. His basic thesis is that words (and so propositional, syntactical thought) can have more or less dynamic or static meanings. In science, we try to speak very precisely and rigorously, using many words to be clear. This ultimately makes our language less dynamic, causing it to cover less cognitive ground. The more we try to focus them on to just one thing and fix that thing, the more the words lose their purchase on what we are describing.
I think we can tie this back to limits on the "cognitive bandwidth," conciousness has. R. Scott Bakker has written some good stuff reviewing studies on the quite limited bandwidth/bit rate of human propositional/linguistic thought (inner monologue being a prime example). Long descriptions essentially get too long and the flood of precise detail makes us lose the thing being described. For us to understand complex propositions about complex topics, e.g., some proposition about "Hegelian dialectical," we cannot stop to unpack our propositional knowledge of all the terms. We must have studied the terms and internalized them so that we have a "grasp" of their intelligibility such that they can be "present" to us simply, without unpacking.
We might liken this simple grasp to Aristotle's second sort of knowing, adiaireta. It's more a noetic awareness of the thing. It might be cultivated and informed by propositional knowledge, but it's opposite is ignorance or lack of awareness of a term, not falsehood as in propositional thought.
So for instance, we might paint a word portrait of the Mona Lisa quite well in a paragraph. If we try to be super detailed and start listing precise dimensions, hex codes for the colors used, etc., we can have a description with way more precision that we nonetheless read and have no idea what it is describing. By contrast, Keats' "Ode to a Grecian Urn," captures the substance of an art work in a dynamic way that a very static description cannot.
This is also why I think we can get endless milage out of some of the more poetic, vague philosophers. They don't fix their subject to the same degree, and this allows their words to cover a more dynamic range.
I think there is a good convergence here with some more phenomenolgical works on knowledge (e.g. Robert Sokolowski) and also St. Aquinas' understanding of the "God's eye view," where intelligibilities are present "all at once." The "view from nowhere," or "view from anywhere," errs by failing to account for how knowing occurs over time and how more and more abstract and rigorous formulations lose their grip on intelligibilities. The "view from nowhere/anywhere," really wants to be the God's eye view, where intelligibility is simply present, but the desire to excise God from an explanation led to excising mind as well, leading to incoherence where "objectivity approaches truth at the limit," and so the true view of things is "how they are conceived of with no mind."
The goal of understanding then is a sort of contemplative grasp that can then be used in the dividing and combining of discursive thought (e.g. Aquinas' description in his commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate).
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Interesting. This seems to be where the knowledge of my own existence falls into.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I wouldn't say being vague is ever a good thing in philosophy, I would say it is terrible indeed. Though the other side, limiting philosophy to language and philosophising by analysing propositions and syllogisms is also far from ideal, even if useful sometimes.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Instigating. There seems to be a useful anatomy of intellect entrenched in this idea.