Ontology of a universe
I brought up the subject in another thread, but thought it was off-topic enough to require its own thread.
Ontological existence seems to be distinguished from nonexistence as being a member of some set. So my car exists if it is a member of things that are in this universe (wherever we decide to delimit that), or perhaps of things that are in the universe now. The latter is just a different set: Things that are actual in this universe at some definition of temporal state.
But my question is more about what distinguishes this universe from a nonexistent one. The definition (being a member of some set) seems to result in a category error when applied to the set itself.
"This universe exists if it is a member of the set of existing universes".
That sounds completely circular, and makes no sense.
Let me take an example from platonic existence: The number seven exists in the set of prime numbers, and eight does not exist in that set. Whether or not one ascribes platonic existence to the set of primes seems irrelevant to that fact. Seven is a prime regardless of the ontology of the set of primes. Similarly, it seems not to matter at all if our universe is a member of some set actual stuff that excludes other potential universes. My existence in this universe does not seem to depend on the ontology of the universe itself.
Disclaimer: I seem to be running on assumptions of natural realism, that time is a property of our universe, not something external to it, which would give the universe mere 'object' status as just another thing that was 'caused' (and thus distinguished from the potential things never actualized) by some deeper ontology that again has no ontology of its own.
Ontological existence seems to be distinguished from nonexistence as being a member of some set. So my car exists if it is a member of things that are in this universe (wherever we decide to delimit that), or perhaps of things that are in the universe now. The latter is just a different set: Things that are actual in this universe at some definition of temporal state.
But my question is more about what distinguishes this universe from a nonexistent one. The definition (being a member of some set) seems to result in a category error when applied to the set itself.
"This universe exists if it is a member of the set of existing universes".
That sounds completely circular, and makes no sense.
Let me take an example from platonic existence: The number seven exists in the set of prime numbers, and eight does not exist in that set. Whether or not one ascribes platonic existence to the set of primes seems irrelevant to that fact. Seven is a prime regardless of the ontology of the set of primes. Similarly, it seems not to matter at all if our universe is a member of some set actual stuff that excludes other potential universes. My existence in this universe does not seem to depend on the ontology of the universe itself.
Disclaimer: I seem to be running on assumptions of natural realism, that time is a property of our universe, not something external to it, which would give the universe mere 'object' status as just another thing that was 'caused' (and thus distinguished from the potential things never actualized) by some deeper ontology that again has no ontology of its own.
Comments (133)
Is this about existential quantification?
If so, then to exist is to be an element in the domain of discourse; roughly, to exist is to be spoken of.
Russell's paradoxes show the deficiencies of set theoretical interpretations of first order schemes.
I was thinking:
a) 7 is a number, same as 8. To say 7 is prime or 8 is even is to state some knowledge that describes properties of these numbers. As product of knowledge, what it is to be a prime number, has no effect on their assumed 'ontology'
b) The set of primes is separate from the rest of the sets of numbers, yet what it excludes both limits it and helps define the set.
c) To say the universe is this or that, is not viciously circular, since we have no independent viewpoint.
Sorry about that statement. I can barely parse it myself. Language fails me trying to express this issue.
I should give em a look.
Point taken. The structure of whole numbers would need to exist to give meaning to the primes and the numbers that are not. The primes exist as part of that set, and that set part of rational numbers and so forth in a sort of heirarchy of supersets. Is there a bottom to that? Is our universe just a member of (an actuality in) some larger structure of things (like inflation bubbles for instance)? My question still stands then about that superset, unless there is no bottom to the regression.
Hence my choice of a structure other than this universe we know. I am not a member of that structure (I am not a prime), so I have sort of an independent viewpoint of it. Similarly, inflation theory posits all these different universes with different tunings of the various cosmological constants, and in almost all of them, they have the wrong number of macro dimensions or wrong forces for anything coherent like matter to form. They cannot be observed, do not exist in any sense of the term 'now', yet it would seem to be a violation of consistency for them not to share our own ontological status.
Per realism, that we can observe or point to something is not what makes that thing exist (which is a separate question), but it is what allows us to claim that it exists. We aren't confused about the ontological difference between our universe and the Harry Potter universe because we can point to the books and the author from where those ideas derive and we understand their history. That gets more complicated with mathematical theories of our universe (or historical and religious accounts) largely due to the fact that some aspects are not readily observable.
So you want set and set membership to be the starting point, and to define existence in terms of those. Something exists if it is a member of some special set U.
How do we define U? Here's where you start to have trouble, because so far you've only defined U as "the set of all things that are members of U." That's not going to help much. Obviously, you can't define U as "the set of all things that exist," because then you do have circularity.
So what's the next move? How could you define U in a way that does some work?
What I am questioning in this thread is what distinguishes U itself from existing or not, especially absent a member-observer being aware of some portion of the contents of the U. Not asking why U exists and certainly not how it 'became to exist', but what it means at all. Is there an objective fact to the matter, despite the lack of anything that can actually know said objective fact?
I looked up all sorts of articles from the various philosophers, and they seem more concerned with what classes of things exist, and which are excluded. Does love exist? Depends who you ask. But nobody seems to address what it means to exist in the first place, at least not in a way that can be applied to our universe itself. So quantum MW interpretation says there is another universe with an earth where life never began. Assuming the MW interpretation is correct (is there an objective correct answer???), does such an alternative world exist? The only distinguishing difference would be the absence of observers on Earth, and it would seem to be idealism to suggest that what makes this world exist but not that one.
Hey look! You did it. You could define U as "all the stuff I see, and all the rest that is implied by it." Would love be a member of U? Would our universe? (Don't assume U="our universe.") Would stuff implied by the MW interpretation? Would the set U be a member of itself? (Sometimes that's okay.)
I know you want to skip ahead. Your real question is, "If existence means being part of our universe, what does it mean for our universe--or some other one--to exist?" Slow down. Look carefully at the words you're using, at how you're using them, and think through it.
This delineation, however, does a disservice to the form of realism that noAxioms wants to uphold: one that does away with all possible notions of idealism. Because this definition of U depends on awareness in order to hold, it opens doors to idealistic notions.
Since the concept of objectivity has been used, maybe the crux of the problem can be formulated in terms of defining (via awareness) what an awareness-devoid objectivity is—this in the abstract sense, and not in the concrete sense, such as in a physical world predating the existence of physical life. By extension, resolving this would then serve to resolve what an awareness-devoid (hence, objective, in this sense of the word) existence of U consists of. Otherwise, the concept of objectivity becomes entwined with notions of awareness such as those of impartiality; such as where the confirmation biases of aware beings become optimally minimal as regards that which is concluded. This philosophical impartiality applying both to what can be made directly available to awareness as well as to what is inferred from the data of our direct awareness—e.g., the inference that the far side of the moon exists. (Both means of interpreting objectivity can result in an objective physical reality that is regardless of what any awareness might want to make of it—but the latter approach becomes amenable to some forms of idealism, namely those that incorporate the notion of an objective (or, 100% impartial/selfless) reality.)
From the OP:
Quoting noAxioms
It could help out to better pinpoint what is intended by the term “existence”. For example, as mentioned in Wikipedia, existence can be classified into the “wide” and the “narrow” sense. In the wide sense of existence, anything that holds any type of being (or presence) can be stated to exist. Figments of the imagination, such as fictional characters, then exist in the wide sense. In the narrow sense, only that which pertains to objective reality (but see the aforementioned for different approaches to what this could imply) can be stated to exist. Harry Potter, then, does not exist in the narrow sense. Then questions can be posed such as the following: does QM MW exist in the narrow sense, or only in the wide sense?
As a related example, existence could either entail the set of “that which is distinguishable from some background” (this being in line with the literal translation of “standing out”) or the set of “that which holds any sort of presence” (e.g., hypothesizing the Buddhist notion of Nirvana, the state of Nirvana would only exist in the latter sense and not the former). The universe—here presuming it equivalent with everything that exists in the wide sense—can be argued to not exist in the first sense just mentioned: it has no background against which it can be distinguished. This conception of the universe, then, can be argued to exist only in the second sense just mentioned. To me this implies that U can exist only as a member of itself. The only way I can find to avoid this conclusion is to grant existence in the wide sense a background of nothingness (also in the wide sense)—but, then, it seems that this would endow nothingness in the wide sense with substantial presence: thereby making nothingness too an aspect of existence in the wide sense. Hence, again leading to the conclusion that set U can exist only as a member of itself.
Otherwise, it can be stated--as another example--that this universe exists in the narrow sense by standing apart from all other universes which exist a) only in the wide sense (but not the narrow) or b) in the narrow sense but in some way that is different from this universe. (I'm in favor of upholding there being only one universe, though.)
[Work has me fairly busy nowadays (not a bad thing), so I don’t know how I’ll do with follow up posts if replied to.]
To be an element of the domain of discourse and to be spoken of are not the same.
When we say that Harry Potter can point to stuff, we are making a different kind of claim to when we say that we can point to stuff. The latter is understood in a straightforward literal sense, the former assumes we are talking about a work of fiction. That is, our interpretation of those claims already depend on us making a distinction between what exists and what is mere representation. That distinction is enough to provide a usage for the word "exists".
You mention that you are not confused about the difference between the two. But whether Harry Potter is confused is only a question of whether the author represents him as confused or not.
We distinguish it, we find meaning in it, we live in it, we give nature a point of view that's "what it means at all". Science tells us that the universe existed for eons without us, but its existence was meaningless without us, we assert meaning into an indifferent universe. The only alternative to this is the belief in god whose viewpoint (immanent, transcendental or both at the same time) is indeterminable. The universe has a point of view, and as far as we know, we comprise it, even if it is imperfect, it's all its got :)
Similarly, perhaps our world is a fictional one depicted in stories in Harry's world. There can be no test of it, but I was wondering if it was meaningful to ask what it would mean, without asking to what it would be meaningful to.
The representation is only that, I admit.
In terms of antinatalism, it is interesting to know that you need existence to know that non-existence is preferable. However, non-existence does not seem like something that can exist in and of itself. So, how can anything be purely non-existence by itself without an existence to compare it to? Existence entails non-existence but non-existence itself does not seem to make sense. Perhaps non-existence is pure possibility without being actualized? Then again, what is pure possibility as that seems to be "something" and thus has an existence.
Something's not right here. Has LGU clockwork oranged Banno?
[/quote]However, non-existence does not seem like something that can exist in and of itself. So, how can anything be purely non-existence by itself without an existence to compare it to?[/quote]It would seem to be a property, no? There can be no pure-warm property without a thing to which the property can be applied (a lit candle say), and something other thing with which to contrast it (un-lit candle). I can do this with objects. A tulip exists in my yard, and the pink elephant does not. Hmm, my logic sort of fails, since the pink elephant seems to need to exist at least so far as to permit the application the property of nonexistence.
You're going down the same path I see. The pink elephant is for whatever reason possible, and hence can have the property of nonexistence. What doesn't get that far? Maybe what makes the pink elephant possible (but not actual) is what makes our universe distinct from one that is not possible.
I think, therefore I'm possible. Ewww, but maybe...
Science may not offer an opinion on whether or not what exists, exists independently of us, but philosophically & objectively we form opinions based on the data science presents to us about our empirical world. Science's rendition of the universe's ancestral history, has & needs no human manifestation, what existed in reality was prior to and independent of our existence. So yea, there is an objective "fact of the matter", it existed prior to us, and I don't see a reason to suppose this independence has changed because we appeared on the scene.
Can you explain this more?
That last bit was where I was headed. Would have been clearer if I had said "a special set, let's call it U." That's what @noAxioms seemed to want to do, and I was just helping him along, as it turns out, mistakenly.
Hey, no worries.
Been thinking about this some more: potential categories of existence and inexistence. You’re right, it’s a hefty topic … one I’m still muddling my way through. But I’ll wait for your replies to see where the discussion is going.
Though a bit off-topic, I wanted to comment:
I’m on board with the general perspective you’ve mentioned: namely, that what our collective, most impartial views and inferences inform us of is that live evolved from out of nonlife (though more complex, it’s akin to the inference that the moon has a far side). Nevertheless, if metaphysics is to be understood as a study of being at large as abstraction, this rather than the study of physical being as concrete particulars (such as the study of the nature of causation rather than arriving at concluding inferences of particulars drawn from uncontemplated notions of what causation is) … then there can be found reasons to uphold a metaphysical (though not necessarily physical) primacy of awareness. Will anyone honestly contend that the presence of awareness is not itself an objective fact of our existence? How does the strength of this experiential objective fact then compare with the strength of any inference concerning our physical objective reality—this when the two propositions are compared side by side and are to any extent contradictory? I’m here intentionally avoiding an argument for the metaphysical primacy of awareness on epistemological grounds, though I do intend to allude to at least some means in which this conclusion can be obtained (and, though you and me would be implicated in this metaphysical primary of awareness, the latter is not about you or me as individual beings [unless one desires to uphold the vacuous dogma of solipsism]).
As to the resulting apparent contradiction: what can I say? There currently appears to be a contradiction between a metaphysical primacy of awareness and life evolving from nonlife; but, as with many paradoxes, philosophically resolving this paradox in a manner harmonious to the truths of both sides could bring us closer to deeper truths about our universe and ourselves. My current ballpark guesstimation—to present a rough idea of what I’m entertaining—is that awareness can become more diffuse as it can also become more acute and of greater magnitude (e.g., the awareness of a bacterium is vastly more diffuse than the awareness of a human); in some ways parallel to pansemiosis, it could then be feasible that awareness at its most diffused extreme consists of nonlife.
But again, despite these apparent incongruities, there are indeed reasons to uphold the metaphysical primacy of awareness. When push comes to shove, these reasons take precedence, imo.
Why would we need give some other condition or criterion for what it is to exist? And for whatever condition or criterion we give, why wouldn't we have to then give another condition or criterion for that? Why would something be a satisfactory stopping place, but "exist(ing)" isn't?
Mathematical objects and sets only exist as ideas that individuals have.
Potentials, as well as possibles that aren't actualized, do not exist.
Metaphysics is about Being, First Principles, the concept of necessity, which is why Kant following Hume demolished Descartes's ontological proof of god. Thought cannot confer being, because being is not a predicate, a perfect being does not have to exist by virtue of its being perfect. I think absolutes/universals/transcendentals must exist epistemologically, in order for there to be knowledge, but I do not agree that the structure of the world is necessarily the same as the structure of thought.
If I understand what you are saying: 'mind' evolved by means of material evolution to the point of self-awareness, but it is only by virtue of this self awareness that we became aware of this material evolution. I don't think this is contradictory. I think thought as self-awareness, the unity of apperception is a mode that matter has the potential to assume given the correct composition, as it is in us ...a kind of panpsychism that asserts thought as possible mode of matter.
OK, per hypothesis, there would be a (Many-Worlds) quantum world where a real Harry Potter exists as well as the Harry Potter fictional stories in our quantum world. Similarly, there would be fictional stories in Harry's world that just so happens to describe our world.
In this case it would be true to say (justification aside) that Harry Potter existed somewhere in the universe, though not in our quantum world. We would just need to be careful to keep our claims about the real Harry Potter in the other world distinct from claims about the fictional Harry Potter in our world. Similarly for Harry's claims about us.
Quoting Cavacava
Interesting way of putting it. No, you’re right, this approach need not be contradictory. I get bogged down in the details, though. And, as I expressed previously, when push comes to shove I’ll uphold the metaphysical primacy of awareness (and will) over all other perspectives.
Yes, I’m not big on Descartes’ proof of God either, nor with much of his metaphysics, for that matter.
As to nature following the structure of though … my own tendency is to think that what we term laws of thought - such as that of noncontradiction (X cannot be not-X in both the same way and at the same time) - manifests within our thoughts as they manifest in nature at large, of which our minds are a product of. I strongly disagree with the nature vs. human intellect divide that many metaphysics uphold, Cartesianism very much included among these.
Oddly enough, though, I have a large intuitive bias against panpsychism. I can’t yet make sense of it. I can barely make sense of a plant’s awareness … even though I’m thoroughly confident that plants are endowed with it in some manner. When it gets to some form of very diffused awareness that rocks, molecules, atoms, quarks, etc. could be endowed with, I have no idea of what this could possibly mean. Its only when I start thinking of the universe (our uni-logos in the Stoic sense of Logos … so to speak; i.e., our common, singular, objective reality) as adhering to what we term laws of thought—such as that of noncontradiction—that I start feeling that there might be a logical bridge to some form of pan-something, this in relation to the awareness we sentient beings hold. Not anticipating that all this will be agreed with (assuming that it makes good enough sense as written), but wanted to share.
Anyway, thanks for the feedback.
It could help out to better pinpoint what is intended by the term “existence”. For example, as mentioned in Wikipedia, existence can be classified into the “wide” and the “narrow” sense. In the wide sense of existence, anything that holds any type of being (or presence) can be stated to exist. Figments of the imagination, such as fictional characters, then exist in the wide sense. In the narrow sense, only that which pertains to objective reality (but see the aforementioned for different approaches to what this could imply) can be stated to exist. Harry Potter, then, does not exist in the narrow sense.[/quote]All these are the the same class to me. They are objects, things, representations, relations, whatever, within their universes. None are the universe itself, something that is not a member of some more general structure. So some might classify a relation like velocity to be something that exists, and others else might not. I'm not too concerned with that. What does 'existence' mean to a universe whose full description defines defines that velocity?
MW is a strange case, and it seems more a question of if that interpretation is in fact the correct one or not. If that interpretation is correct, then there are certainly other worlds and they are certainly observed, some of them at least. They're really all just other places, all part of one universe actually, and thus fail to be an example of the sort of existence I seek.
Some might say there is no fact of the matter (QM interpretation), but I don't think that fact is beyond investigation. They're attempting to build a quantum computer, which means money is being put behind one interpretation over the other, and that money would be wasted if there was no way to empirically falsify something like hidden-state interpretation.
Well, it's that background I'm seeking I think. I'm not so sure about a necessary lack of one.
But I didn't like the second-sense, finding it pretty much the same as the first sense. No, U would not be a member of itself, but it would be a member of something that includes other
This problem goes back to the first philosopher, Anaximander actually. He thought all was undefined or Boundless. Essentially, it was the idea that all was potential with no actuality to it (no form). Of course, how it goes from boundless to boundaries or undefined to defined from the very start, is anyone's guess. There's always Schopenhauer's idea that WIll is always there striving ever-forward. This at least brings a principle of momentum to the puzzle.
So when I assert that unicorns exist, now, on earth, I am speaking of the simple form of existence but extending my definition of 'earth' to include all the inaccessible quantum versions of earth. It seems improbable that such a creature did not evolve in some of those worlds.
Now about the sort of existence that I am talking about: Our spacetime seems possibly to be one of many bubbles of ordinary physics that condenses (?) out of inflation-stuff, all according to inflation theory. In that sense, our spacetime is just one of those bubbles, and thus is just an object of sorts in a strange collection of related but very different bubbles. The cosmologists are working on the nature of that inflation stuff. There seems to be time there, but not time that maps to ours. The bubbles all obey quantum physics and are effectively related even if they cannot interact. They are objects, not true universes. The inflation stuff seems to be the universe (unless there is even more regress), but if there is a bottom to the regression, what sort of ontological statement can be made about that fundamental universe?
Taking your definition of U, your statement above is just restating the problem in my OP. Our universe is presumed to 'exist', and not just by being a member of itself. I'm asking what that means. I'm questioning that it means anything at all.
Quoting Srap TasmanerYes, I can name any number of sets, but I don't think my naming a set is what makes the universe exist.
Yes, a special set. A distinguishing rule.
We don't have a grand-unified field theory, but I had heard that we expect it all to be fairly simple in the end and "fit on a T-shirt". A limited number of fundamental components and their relational rules. But without a cap on said rules, there seems to be no limit to what is possible. So: a universe just like this one, but with the addition that Latin invokes magic if you have the right DNA. Same T-shirt, but with a little extra stuff printed on the sleeves.
In the end, I don't think there is a set of existing things. I think 'existence' is misapplied. The cosmological argument questions the how of the existence of the universe, or more naively, how it was 'caused', but the universe seems not to be in need of either causation or existence. There is no set, and I exist in the universe despite the lack of meaning to the concept of the existence of the universe.
You are in a universe where contingent and determined forces play out perhaps from an original apeiron of boundless and indefinite possibilities which was broken in an original asymmetry which allowed for yet more asymmetries into the universe or multiverse we reside.
I'm not sure if you saw my previous post:
This problem goes back to the first philosopher, Anaximander actually. He thought all was undefined or Boundless. Essentially, it was the idea that all was potential with no actuality to it (no form). Of course, how it goes from boundless to boundaries or undefined to defined from the very start, is anyone's guess. There's always Schopenhauer's idea that WIll is always there striving ever-forward. This at least brings a principle of momentum to the puzzle.
1. I think, therefore I am.
Gx -> (some F)(Fx).
2. I am therefore It's possible that I am.
(some F)(Fx) -> possible((some F)(Fx)).
Therefore,
3. I think, therefore I'm possible.
Gx -> possible((some F)(Fx)).
This presumes that it does 'go from undefined to defined', which seems contradictory since it would imply states and time are defined before anything is defined. Isn't potential enough?
Yes, within this universe, contingent forces play out the possibilities into actualities. Hence a tulip is actual, but that is merely a property of this universe: of the temporal relations between states, and the interpretation of the differences in states between various points, as 'becoming' or actuality. A tulip is is interpreted as an object in a temporal container, and all such objects are rightly interpreted as being caused. The temptation is to generalize the universe itself as such an object that has temporal existence (or existence at all), or that it 'became' at all. I find that view quite naive since I have found no evidence to support it. Hence my labelling it a category error. Actuality is a property of a temporal tulip object. The universe cannot be actual in this way.
Quoting noAxioms
How would you address this reasoning?: The background to the sum of all existents either exists or does not. If it exists in some way, it is contained within the sum of all existents. If it doesn’t exist in some way, then there is no background to the sum of all existents. Both conclusions result in there not being a background to the sum of all existents, aka to existence.
Quoting noAxioms
I think the following supports this quoted conclusion:
Looking at things from a solely physical perspective, the Big Bang is inferred to have resulted from a volume-less gravitational singularity (both space and time began with the Big Bang, so, before the Big Bang there was no space: the gravitational singularity is then volume-less, or space-less [as well as timeless; a different issue though] … hence neither incredibly small nor incredibly big, for both these are contingent upon the existence of space). The more mainstream of modern physics—excluding suppositions such as those of QM MW and M-theory—infers the "Boundless" in the physical form (if it can be termed “form”) of a gravitational singularity. There’s lots of evidence for the Big Bang, and all this evidence points to a volume-less state of being that preceded it (in which all the energy of the universe was contained).
This volume-less gravitational singularity, then, does not exist in the manner that a tulip does. Yet, assuming it to be objectively real, it nevertheless is (or was), thereby physically existing in a manner other than the physical existence of a tulip.
I’m far less confident in upholding what I’ve heard from documentaries about the known universe of today (sorry, I don’t recall which documentaries): that the universe is inferred to have no center and no circumference. Nevertheless, were this to be objectively real, the same roundabout issue of existence would apply to the physical universe as it is today: there is distance from one tulip to another, or from one galaxy to another, but there is no distance regarding the whole. If so the universe (as everything that is) physically exists in a manner other than that in which any physical item exists as a part of the universe.
... It’s why I invoked the concept of existence as presence. Such would apply to the singularity, the universe, and the tulip. But only the tulip exists as something that is distinguishable from some background; the singularity and the universe do not exist in this latter sense ... I would still argue.
Restating your position was the whole point. It wasn't my definition, not even tentatively. I don't think you intended what you said as a definition of "existence," but I wanted to point out that you could use it that way. Or you could use something else. Whatever. Use it and see how well it works.
(Btw, what you said offhand is really not bad. It amounts, in an informal way, to "science": what I can directly sense plus what my model tells me must exist even though I can't directly sense it, so, you know, atoms and shit.)
Gracious. If you want to figure out what something means, take a stab at defining it and see how it goes. I'm just pointing out that you've kinda already been doing that, but you keep jumping around to other stuff.
I'm not saying this method is guaranteed to work. (Chisolming is a thing.) But you'll probably learn something.
Look, offhand, it looks a bit like a classic "category mistake." (Ryle's original example was the guy looking around at the buildings of Oxford and asking, "But where is the University?") But there's no reason for you to even entertain that conclusion yet. Do not look at solutions until you're clear what the problem is.
But can we apply this logic to a horse? Against what background does the actual horse stand apart if the background doesn't exist? I pick horse because it might stand out against the nonexistent (in this world) unicorn. Does the unicorn need to be actual enough for the horse to stand apart from it, in which case the contradiction is unavoidable.
We need to find logic that works for the horse (an example we believe to understand a bit more clearly) before attempting to apply it elsewhere.
I would say space and time are bounded by the big bang, avoiding the 'before the big bang' reference you use above, a conflicting implication of a time before time. Similarly space, which cannot be a prerequiste. Choose your model. Empty space existing until stuff bangs into it, or space and time being bounded. The two models don't mix kindly. The former requires creation: a cause of sorts. Inflation theory fits the bill at least for a cause, if not the preexisting space and time. The inflation concept of time does not map to the time measured by clocks here, and the theory does not posit space into which stuff exploded.
The singularity qualifies as an event, and events exist sort of in the way the tulip does (the tulip is multiple events, grouped together by language). The universe is not just that one event.
Funny, since I cannot conceive of one with a location in space that is the center. Such a picture would mean there's an edge to it with the fastest moving stuff, and if you were there, you'd see stars only on one side, making it pretty easy to point to said center. If spacetime is modeled in 4D, the center is in that 4th direction, which is arbitrary, but they all point to the same place. I guess we just view the geometry differently.
Didn't quite understand this part. If you're saying that our universe doesn't have a location in relation to other universes, they I'd agree. For the record, I don't use the word 'universe' as 'all there is'. It is quite context dependent, and, and for the purpose of this discussion, it means all there is in this grand ball of quantum-mechanical structure, bounded by a bang on one end. Otherwise the question of the existence of other-universes is meaningless, being a question of if there is another all-there-is. A more confined definition of universe would be 'all that matters', which is a more idealistic notion since it implies all that matters to us. This perhaps excludes the past which cannot be affected, the future which cannot be sensed, things that are currently not-here, which is inaccessible in both ways, and places simply beyond our reach even over time, for whatever reason.
And thanks for the feedback javra. I may not agree with everything, but I've already identified some bad ideas I had in need of reconsideration. I need these critiques.
It doesn't much give me the answers I seek, but the word seems to better express the question a bit at least.
If the world started from boundless possibility, as you were implying earlier, we cannot escape it. Possibility exists and therefore actuality can exist. Thus, perhaps the antinatalist can never say "non-being is preferable" as that makes no sense in the universe we know. Rather, non-actualized potentiality is better than actialuzed potentiality is as close as we can get.
Does it cover the costs?
Quoting OwenWell, I am not willing to accept this, so hardly tautological. Even Descartes went only so far as something like "thinking, therefore existence" without immediately being so bold as to fit an "I" into that picture. But I'm questioning what it means to exist, so such axioms cannot be held if they rely on what I'm trying to define.
Quoting schopenhauer1Maybe they're the same thing.
Despite my discarding objective existence based on possibility (due to inability to think of anything objectively impossible), I wondered if there is a distinction between 'possible' and 'real'. There is an epistemological difference, but seemingly not an ontological one.
For example, take again my context of the prime numbers. Eleven is a real prime, and twelve is not. The number of grains of sand on Earth is a potential prime with some significantly low probability. It is impossible to count them, but assuming we had a hard definition of what it means to be counted or not (we most certainly don't), the resulting number would in fact be a prime or not, with no probability about it.
Hence my questioning possible things. If something is possible in some context, it exists. If it doesn't exist in that context, it isn't possible. Can I defend that? I couldn't think of a counter-example. It doesn't work without 'context'. Objective existence is without context, and without context, existence is undefined, and possibility has no impossibility with which to distinguish itself.
Where does that leave me? Thinking, therefore existing in the context of this universe, but no requirement that the universe be real in a context that excludes impossible ones. There does seem to be a deeper context, but it seems that such regression is finite. No turtles all the way down. There is a context that is the entire structure, and it seems not to be a meaningful thing to apply the label 'exists' to that context.
x exists =def (some F)(Fx).
Descartes exists <-> (some F)(F(Descartes)).
If Descartes has a particular predicate such as 'thinks' (Descartes thinks) then
there is some predicate of Descartes that is true.
(Descartes thinks) implies (some F)(F(Descartes)).
This is an instance of the theorem: Ga -> (some F)(Fa), for any G.
Also..
If 'Descartes thinks' then the predicate 'thinks' exists.
1. Descartes thinks therefore Descartes exists.
2. Descartes exists therefore Possible(Descartes exists)
therefore,
3. Descartes thinks therefore Possible(Descartes exists).
By, ((p -> q) & (q -> r)) -> (p -> r).
F is a variable predicate of individuals x
(some F)(Fx) means there is at least one instance of F such that Fx is true.
ie. Ax v Bx v Cx ...
Fx is true for a value of F.
If x has a predicate B, eg. (Bx),
and B is a value of F then (some F)(Fx).
Bx -> (Ax v Bx v Cx ...).
One truth about x proves x exists.
So if your system needs a formula such as [math]\exists x Fx[/math] then your ontology is committed, as he puts it, to the existence of whatever goes in the [math]x[/math] place.
Construed substitutionally, [math]\exists xFx[/math] says "'[math]x[/math] is [math]F[/math]' is sometimes true, depending on what you substitute for [math]x[/math]" and [math]\forall xFx[/math] says "'[math]x[/math] is [math]F[/math]' is always true, no matter what you substitute for [math]x[/math]." Quantifiers, on this view, range over expressions, not objects. (Again, no expert.)
I actually am not far from that logic, but I wanted to make sure you're saying that. It also seems to leave open the obvious paradox of one truth about a nonexistent thing is that it is nonexistent, thus proving its existence.
Somehow I missed that you're doing this the other way round. You have the quantifiers ranging over the predicates. Is this deliberately second-order logic or are you just doing it backwards? (Quantifiers can't range over predicates in FOL.)
Where you getting the individuals in this scheme? If you can predicate anything of Descartes, you've already assumed Descartes exists.
If you can prove unicorns exist by saying they have four legs, you know you've done something wrong.
Remember, I'm not trying to prove anything exists. I am trying to nail down what we're claiming if we claim something exists or not. My shabby attempt of that is "is present in a context", and no, counting legs does not prove presence in whatever context in which we might claim unicorns exist.
I think you followed him okay, but it's not yet clear what he's up to.
Quoting noAxioms
Yeah, that's a distinct possibility.
I guess we can agree that every thing that exists must satisfy the criterion of logical consistency: it must be what it is and not be what it is not. In other words, it must be identical to itself and different from what it is not.
I think that in the most fundamental sense, existence is just that. Logical consistency. Then we can talk about various kinds of existence, like spatio-temporal, abstract, mental etc., but these are secondary distinctions.
If it is true that unicorns have four legs then unicorns exist.
Truth is that which can be shown to be the case.
To show that 'Unicorns have four legs' is true, we need to verify it.
Verification requires the existence of unicorns and unicorn legs.
One truth about x proves x exists. ..where x is the subject of the truth.
Gx -> ?F(Fx), is tautologous.
|-. Gx -> x exists.
I'm still not sure what you're up to here. It's starting to look like you're deriving existential generalization in a roundabout way. You don't need to.
[math] Fa\to\exists xFx[/math]
is already a rule of FOL.
For some x, Fx is true. Not sure what the a is.
It being a rule of first order logic doesn't tell me what it means that something (my context universe in particular) exists.
About identical, the word is ambiguous. Twins share identical (indistinguishable) DNA but are not the same person. A lit candle seems to share numeric identity with the burnt out stub an hour later. It is the same candle (identical), but the two states are hardly indistinguishable.
I was just pestering @Owen for no particular reason.
So, you've been at this for over week, how's it going?
There are some things you could try if you get stuck:
Sometimes it will turn out you can answer some question from this list, and you'll learn something important--maybe a new approach, maybe that your original problem cannot possibly be answered, etc.
Linguistic ascent is the worst. Not looking for how existence is used in our language. Almost all the confusion in philosophy, especially in forum discussions, seems partially rooted in language use, which takes far too much for granted.
Transcendental: I'm not asking if anything is the case. Everybody thinks I'm looking for proof or evidence of something.
The theory crafting is perhaps a way of wording part of what I am doing.
As for going over this over a week, sure. Years actually, but it only recently got stuck on this point. I have a pretty good story that is self-consistent as any I've seen, and solves almost all the hard questions, at least to my satisfaction. Fermi paradox is one of the things that is yielded a coherent answer. But part of my supposedly consistent story is flippant use of the word 'exists', so I'm trying to pin that down.
I perhaps claim to have an answer, which I rate still very low on a probability of being THE answer. Everybody has a different opinion, and the odds of mine being the closest guess to the fact of the matter is still very low odds.
So in pondering the question "why is there something instead of nothing", I instead ask how the experience would be different if there were not anything, and found it to be the same. Instantiation is not required. But that answer leans heavily on what it means for something to just be.
Sorry for the delay in replying. Getting back to where we left off:
Quoting javra
Quoting noAxioms
You’ll have to explain this better. The main crux that I don’t yet understand: how is a horse—which is one particular existent—in any way compare with the sum of all existent things? The argument I provided was for the latter; and I can’t yet make sense of how it could be meaningfully applied to the former (or to any particular existent for that matter).
Less pivotally, you’ve lost me with how a horse can be distinguished as such without it holding a background of not-horse; I’m thinking background in terms of shrubs, the sky, a tree or two, etc. But even an imagined or dreamed horse will have some background that is itself distinguishable as such … no? Then again, say you try your hardest to visually imagine a horse with no background; let me know if you can visually imagine this such that there is no color or shade of grey, white, or black to this not-horse realm. I know I can’t. Which isn’t to say that I can’t focus my attention on the imagined horse such that the non-horse background is not payed attention to; but this non-horse area will still be relatively dark, or light, or something. This not-horse realm is then a background to the visually imagined horse.
As regards the remainder of the exchange, I’ll try to better express my own outlook:
There’s being in and of itself and then there’s things that sand out in one way or another—or, to be more up to date with the thread, things that have a context. Both givens with being and things that have a context are existents, but while being encapsulates all things with a context—such that all things with a context are—not all forms of being are things with a context.
To hopefully better phrase a previously given example: A gravitational singularity from which the Big Bang resulted (this as is modeled by todays mainstream physics) is one such instance of a given with being that is not a thing with context. One way of putting it: if the Big Bang resulted from absolute nonbeing, then it was an ex nihilo effect. Allowing for such can result in metaphysical mayhem if one is to be consistent about what one upholds—which is one strong justification for the very old philosophical proposition that “nothing can come from nothing” (maybe a different issue though, this were there to be disagreements with this outlook on ex nihilo effects). On the other hand, as our models of spacetime break down the further we conceptually move back through the Big Bang, we are left with the alternative that there initially existed a state of being devoid of both space and time. This state of being is conventionally conceived to be a gravitational singularity … which, by its very nature, can only be devoid of context, though nevertheless holding being.
But, getting back to the reasoning first offered for the sum of all existents, let “the sum of all that exists” be here termed the cosmos. If one wants to uphold multiple universes, then the cosmos would encapsulate all these multiple universes. Thus defined, I still find it justifiable to uphold that the cosmos can only exists in terms of being per se but does not exist in terms of a thing with context. The existence of things with context is a product of pertaining to the cosmos as one of its many parts, imo.
In retrospect, though, I’m arguing from a point of view not very sympathetic to there actually being multiple physical universes. If you’re leading enquiry is into how our universe’s existence compares to those of other universes, this is something that I’m not qualified to comment on.
You cannot come up with an example of a consistent thing that is known not to exist? There is no such example. If existence is logical consistency then every logically consistent thing exists.
Quoting noAxioms
When I say that a thing is identical to itself I mean that it is identical in every way. The DNA strands of twins are not identical in every way - to say the least, they have different positions in spacetime, which makes them different things.
If you take a more general definition of "context" you will find that the singularity of the Big Bang does have a context from which it is different. The context can be anything that is not the singularity of the Big Bang, for example my cat (which exists at a different point in spacetime) or number 7 (which transcends every spacetime).
Quoting javra
A collection of things (such as a cosmos) is also different from its parts, so the parts provide a context for the collection/whole.
1. Ga -> ?x(Gx), is valid.
2. Ga -> ?F(Fa), is valid.
3. Ga -> ?x?F(Fx) is valid.
1 is 1st order and 2 and 3 are 2nd order theorems.
1a. Ga -> G exists.
2a. Ga -> a exists.
3a. Ga -> ((G exists) & (a exists)).
These are adequate contexts in reference to our concept of a gravitational singularity, which stands out as one concept among many others. Were the gravitational singularity addressed to be ontically real, however, it of itself would have no context - no not-singularity to which it could be contrasted. Neither entities, such as cats, nor quantities, such as the number seven, would hold presence. Else, we are addressing two different things.
Quoting litewave
The “cosmos” was for the purposes of the argument specifically defined as the “sum of all existents” - and not as merely a collection of things among many others. Then, to state that the context of the sum of all existents is the particular existents themselves is to equivocate both the meaning of “context” and the reasoning first quoted in my previous post. The context of a cat, for example, is not one of its ears.
OK, how about the candle? Are the two states not the same candle because of the differences in lit and burnt-out, or are they one thing, identical to itself, just extended in spacetime? Even the latter has a hard time with identity if you consider MW cloning. The statement "candle is lit at time T" has no truth value if all those states are part of one identity, and only some of those states are 'lit'.
Not sure why we're nailing down the usage of identical in this topic.
"to exist is to be spoken of."
Yes. As Lao Tzu may have written - "The unnamable is the eternally real. Naming is the origin of all particular things."
Naming is what brings things into existence.
Vulcan does not exist.
Pegasus does not exist.
Santa does not exist.
etc.
Sometimes naming does not bring things into existence.
Given a model of language where words are akin to culturally preformed boxed within which we can place concepts and then pass them along to others—this being only a very rough analogy—then naming a new concept can at times bring awareness of the concept into existence within the minds of others … as well as better anchor the concept within our own minds via a means by which it can be succinctly addressed.
But if I name a “five-legged, telepathic, ghost unicorn that’s been teleported to Earth by AI UFOs which have traveled back in time from a future multiverse in which planets are all shaped as four-sided triangles” as “dfjsl-ajf’l” my ontological suppositions are that this entity does not then suddenly pop into existence (in the narrow sense of existence, i.e. into the realms of objective reality). [Not to put words into other’s mouths but I presume that Banno would agree.] Yea, I try for humor but seldom succeed (seriously, good natured humor was intended in the given example). Still, the outlandish nature of “dfjsl-ajf’l”—thus defined—is all the same a good example precisely due to its outlandishness, imo.
p.s. just noticed Owen already replied to the same issue. I'll post my comments all the same.
Of course Vulcan, Pegasus, and Santa exist. Or are you saying that only things that have a physical representation exist? By that standard, mathematics, hunger, vision, and love don't.
And my response to you is the same as mine for Owen.
The whole spacetime is present, with the Big Bang singularity presumably at the beginning of the time dimension. And abstract entities like numbers are present even without a spacetime.
Quoting javra
If by the "sum" you don't mean "collection" or "whole" but all existent things, then the "sum" is not a single thing but many things. And each of those things exists in the context of all the other things.
And if by the "sum" you mean the collection or whole of all existent things then this "sum" is different from each of its parts - because it is not identical to any of its parts, and so the sum is a thing that exists in relation to (or in the "context" of) its parts, which are other things. Anyway, there is no such greatest collection, just as there is no greatest number.
Quoting T Clark
Ah, but these stated givens don’t exist because they were named. They were named, and conceptualized, because they exist. And no, one does not need to be a physicalist to uphold this. Note the following for instance:
Quoting T Clark
That which is eternally real is itself existent despite it being unnamable.
Besides, you have yet to address whether or not dfjsl-ajf'ls are existent or not - and if existent, if they exist in the same way you do.
"Ah, but these stated givens don’t exist because they were named. They were named, and conceptualized, because they exist."
And I say it is useful to say that they exist because they are named. It's not the only way to think about it, but it is one valid way. Hey, this is metaphysics. It's not true or false. It's enlightening or misleading. It's useful or not.
"[...] "The unnamable is the eternally real. [...]
— T Clark (Lao Tzu actually)
That which is eternally real is itself existent despite it being unnamable."
There's a formulation of that line from the Tao te Ching I like better - "The Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao." That's Lao Tzu's joke. He's was a funny guy. He was aware of the irony and expects his readers to be also.
Then did you mean the DNA as an abstract thing? In that case, it is a single abstract thing, identical (in every way) to itself. And this abstract thing is instantiated in concrete things - in the concrete DNA strands of the twins. And each of those concrete DNA strands is identical to itself and different from the other, at least with respect to its position in spacetime. Also, each of those concrete DNA strands is different from the abstract DNA.
Quoting noAxioms
In the usual usage the candle is meant as a thing extended in spacetime (enduring in time). Then the statement "candle is lit at time T" means that the candle is in the lit state at time T.
Anyway, every thing is identical to itself in the sense it is defined. So "candle" as a thing extended in spacetime is identical to itself as a thing extended in spacetime. If by "candle" you mean something else, then this something else must be identical to itself too, in the sense in which it is defined. Otherwise it doesn't exist in that sense - there is no thing in that sense.
Quoting noAxioms
Existence in the most general sense means being identical to oneself and different from others.
Not according the to model of spacetime which breaks down and thereby leads to the inference of a gravitational singularity.
Quoting litewave
I agree that the whole stands in relation to its parts. But I'm addressing context in the what I take to be the typically utilized way: such as that within which a given resides.
Quoting litewave
Are you saying there is no universe?
Tell you what, I'll reply to your posts after you reply to mine. As a reminder:
Quoting javra
If the model is inconsistent then it is not an accurate representation of reality, because reality cannot be inconsistent. I am talking about reality, not a model. Apparently there is spacetime in reality and there is a Big Bang at the beginning of our universe.
Quoting javra
If by universe you mean the collection of all existing things then there is no universe in this sense. Why? Suppose there is a collection of all existing things. Then this collection is a thing too, and another collection can be defined in which this thing is included as a part, so what you supposed to be a collection of all existing things is in fact not a collection of all existing things.
If by universe you mean all existing things then there is universe in this sense but it is not a single thing.
Suppose I claim there is a smallest positive real number, call it k.
It's easily proven that k < 1, right?
Does that prove that there is a smallest positive real number?
[quote="Owen]Sometimes naming does not bring things into existence.[/quote]This seems only a different context, and a different designation of which contexts are included in objective existence, a term with which I have yet to find any meaning. So naming a thing (doesn't need a name, but even any concept of it) does bring the thing into existence in the context of ideas. I see nobody being right or wrong here, but working from different contexts without stating them.
Quoting javraOutlandish though it be, your description did seem to make it pop into existence in my thoughts, and you seem to realize that, prompting your parenthesized disclaimer that you're not including imagined ideas as existing things.
My only disagreement with your comment the is the " i.e. into the realms of objective reality". I am very much questioning that the reality you reference there is objectively real. Reality seems to be things that are present in our universe (our context). That being the definition of objective reality is to deny that there are other contexts (not just deeper but related contexts, such as a creating deity which would not be a real thing in the universe), but completely unrelated contexts.
You have a lot in your posts, but I'm just now getting to it all and trying to weigh in on some of the discussions.
"naming a new concept can at times bring awareness of the concept into existence within the minds of others …"
Let's see. Maybe I'm saying "awareness of the concept" is existence. Yes, I think I am. Something like that.
"But if I name a “five-legged, telepathic, ghost unicorn that’s been teleported to Earth by AI UFOs which have traveled back in time from a future multiverse in which planets are all shaped as four-sided triangles” as “dfjsl-ajf’l”
I'm a little confused by your formulation, but let's try this - Yes, this dfjsl-ajfl exists as much as Santa, love, math, or the moon.
"...in the narrow sense of existence, i.e. into the realms of objective reality..."
I think the idea of objective reality is hard to support in this context. I think its existence is worthy of examination. That is not a new idea. You have assumed the existence of the physical reality of objective reality independent of human conceptualization. I think you have begged the question.
As for your humor - I think it was more than just that. You were coming up with what you thought was an absurd example to test my idea. That is a reasonable rhetorical method.
"...objective existence, a term with which I have yet to find any meaning."
We sort of agree, but I think the terms "objective existence" and "objective reality" have plenty of meaning. I only object to their unexamined application in this context. I think depending on the physical existence of objective reality in this context is misleading.
"So naming a thing (doesn't need a name, but even any concept of it) does bring the thing into existence in the context of ideas. I see nobody being right or wrong here, but working from different contexts without stating them."
First of all, you're not paying attention. I specifically wrote that there is no right or wrong in this discussion. It's metaphysics. I think I have been very clear in stating the context of what I am writing.
Second - no. It doesn't bring something into existence "in the context of ideas." It brings it into existence in the only way things are brought into existence.
"I am very much questioning that the reality you reference there is objectively real. Reality seems to be things that are present in our universe (our context). That being the definition of objective reality is to deny that there are other contexts (not just deeper but related contexts, such as a creating deity which would not be a real thing in the universe), but completely unrelated contexts."
I think you've gone a bit off the tracks there. If you bring a "creating deity" into the discussion you miss the point. God is brought into existence in the same way lamb chops are. In one of my favorite verses from the Tao te Ching, Lao Tzu says "[The Tao] is hidden but always present. I don't know who gave birth to it. It is older than God."
Srap Tasmaner...
Suppose I claim there is a smallest positive real number, call it k.
It's easily proven that k < 1, right?
Does that prove that there is a smallest positive real number?
No.
The name k is a non-referring description, like the present King of France.
There are no provable qualities of k.
If k exists then 1/k (the largest real number) must also exist, which is false.
There are no positive qualities of k that are true!
Naming or describing do not require reference.
In the usual usage the candle is meant as a thing extended in spacetime (enduring in time). Then the statement "candle is lit at time T" means that the candle is in the lit state at time T.[/quote]This also makes sense. Interestingly, the naming of it creates it. To physics, it is all just particles and events and relations, but the grouping of them, extended in spacetime, is encapsulated by the name 'candle', which has meaning to the user of the language.
This is worth a reply on its own. Thank you for this different definition, which admittedly seems not to reference a context, but is one implied? More later.
Quoting Owen
And yet mathematicians talk about and use the concept of infinity in productive ways all the time.
You're missing the point.
You have claimed that "one truth about x proves x exists," and given a reconstruction of the cogito along these lines.
Presumably if you are trying to prove x exists, you don't know yet. In particular, you don't know yet whether the expression "x" refers. Your method was supposed to show that "x" refers. (Because it is true that Descartes is thinking, Descartes exists.)
If you must already know that the expression "x" has a reference (the object x) in order to know that "Fx" is true for some F or other, then you are not proving x exists, you are presupposing it.
Of course you can infer from the truth of "Ga" that G is a real predicate and a is an existing individual. But that's not proving anything. You already knew all of that.
It's as if you derived Fx and derived Gx, then used &-introduction to get (Fx & Gx), and then told us that you could prove Fx from (Fx & Gx). You can infer Fx from (Fx & Gx), sure. That's just &-elimination. But you could only truly assert (Fx & Gx) in the first place because you could already truly assert Fx and you could already truly assert Gx. Do you see the difference?
This was commented on by others. The singularity is but one event in a much larger collection of events in the context. It is a special boundary event to be sure, and none of the other ones qualify as the edge of it, but it still seems to be but one event in that context. The entire context is what perhaps lack a context of its own. I see this as the same wording you are reaching for here, but I don't envision the singularity as a context free existent of its own.
Why effect? The word implies a cause, contradicting ex nihilo. 'Resulted' is a verb tense implying time is not part of the collection, but something (time, perhaps space as well, but not ex nihilo) into which the Big Bang happened, again a contradiction. All these references seem to imply a deeper context, and the metaphysical mayhem resulting in the conflict between that context and the ex hihilo.
If spacetime (not just the singularity, but the whole QM collection) exists sans context, then it just is. It is not an effect, and is not something that 'resulted'. If so, what does it mean when I say it 'just is'? That's the conflict I run into: lack of meaning to that wording.
Existed? That wording contradicts there not being time. How can time not yet exist? Maybe it will exist in an hour. Sorry, my eternalist leanings are really showing through here. If the universe defines time, then it doesn't have the property of an object within that temporal context, of needing to come into existence from nonexistence. Being one of those things myself, such thinking is hard to set aside. The intuitions are what make us fit.
Agree with this. The way you define cosmos is an objective description, not confined to things existing in
One of the simplest ones is that of places beyond the Hubble sphere. Physics says the universe is infinite. There's not a place you can be at the edge where you see stars only on one side. Given that, are there stars 50 billion light years distant? If so, that star defines another universe, completely beyond empirical reach from here. Light from anywhere in that universe will never reach us. If it doesn't exist, then there must be a furthest existing star, from which no other stars in that direction are visible.
Strange answer is that both might be true, depending on your coordinate system of choice. The question plays on several unstated assumption, one of which equates existence to 'existence now'. In that latter form, the big bang doesn't exist because it is in the past. But a reference to time doesn't work for anything outside the context of that time. I can't ask if pi exists now, but I can ask if the concept of pi exists now, but not before somebody thought of it.
Just for my $0.02: I think love is a physical thing in the same category as the moon. Not an object, but a complex physical relation of matter, not just an an abstraction like Santa and Math. I can give coordinates to an instantiation of love. A simpler relation is velocity, not a property of any physical thing, but a relation that a physical thing can have with some reference. Of course I can give coordinates to Santa as much as I can to my invisible friend at my side, both being references to mentally constructed objects.
Yes, that's what started this topic. I felt myself to be begging when I pushed this problem.
Quoting litewaveMore on this. Wouldn't something nonexistent be identical to itself? Take the smallest postive real number, or javra's dfjsl-ajf'l, something not logically possible (mostly due to that four-sided triangle bit). How about the 'like' button on this forum. It seems not to exist, but it is logically consistent, and identical to itself. Perhaps it exists, but is not present in the context of the features of this forum. Were it not to exist at all, I could not complain of the nonexistence of it in this context.
Quoting T ClarkOnly way? There is nothing possible yet unnamed, totally not known by any entity capable of knowing about things? Is that what you're saying?
"Existence in the most general sense means being identical to oneself and different from others."
I agree that: x exists <-> x=x
x exists <-> Ey(x=y)
Names and descriptions refer or not.
1. (x=x, for all x) is an axiom in FOPL=.
Leibnitz/Russell: x=y =def AF(Fx <-> Fy).
In which case x=x <-> AF(Fx <-> Fx),
ie. x=x is tautologous for any x.
AF(F(Vulcan) <-> F(Vulcan)) is tautologous.
Therefore, Vulcan exists ???
Note that: AF(F(The present King of France) = F(The present King of France)), is also tautologous.
Therefore (The present King of France exists) ???
A better definition of Identity...
x=y =def (EF(Fx) & EF(Fy) & AF(Fx <-> Fy)).
x=x <-> (EF(Fx) & EF(Fx) & AF(Fx <-> Fx)).
x=x <-> EF(Fx).
x=x <-> x exists.
If x or y do not exist then x=y is false.
I wouldn't say that naming something creates it. The candle is objectively there, as a collection of atoms. Just because we find this collection interesting enough to give it a name doesn't mean we created this collection by naming it.
Quoting noAxioms
Every thing must be differentiated from other things, so those other things provide a context. But I mean the word "context" in the sense of "all other things". Those other things need not be just outside a whole but also inside the whole - the parts of the whole. Because the whole is also different from its parts.
A nonexistent has no identity, so I don't think it makes sense to regard it as identical to itself. The definition of a four-sided triangle, for example, denies that the triangle is a triangle; it denies its identity. It refers to nothing. All contradictory definitions refer to nothing.
Quoting noAxioms
Maybe the existence of the 'like' button on this forum is logically consistent, but obviously its nonexistence is logically consistent too. If both scenarios are consistent then they both exist - but in different worlds (contexts), because it would be contradictory if the button existed and simultaneously didn't exist in the same world. We happen to live in a world where the button doesn't exist, but perhaps our copies in a different world (which is a copy of our world) can enjoy the button.
It depends on whether Vulcan is consistently defined. Does it have a consistent identity? If not, then it has no identity and it makes no sense to say that it is identical to itself. So we have to examine what properties the presumed Vulcan has, what parts, if any, it has, and whether these properties and parts do not contradict each other or whether they do not contradict the environment in which they presumably exist.
But a candle is a fairly simple example of an object as member of a known context. There is perhaps an apple that isn't next to it with which I can perform an empirical test. I can't do that with the universe since there's no objective stance from which a distinction can be made. The candle seems to be an example of what a naming does to it. I wanted to explore the idea of that.
Quoting litewaveI have a hard time with this one. Perhaps I don't exist because I am a contradiction in some way not identified. The lowest positive real number seems to have the identity named, and has obvious properties like being the inverse of the largest number. A sufficiently complex nonexisting thing might have the property of self awareness, and yet is not identical to itself due to some contradiction deep in some unexplored corner.
I kind of like the identity <-> existent thing, but my nature is to see if it stands up to a little exploratory cross examination. If I (or my universe context) was self-contradictory, what test for that might there be?
Quoting litewaveWe don't think entirely differently, do we? If no world has it, then it is logically impossible. If this is a uni-world sort of physics (non-MW interpretation), then hard-determinism is what makes the alternative with the button an impossible thing.
I think it would be absurd if there existed something that is not identical to itself, or something that is not different from other things. So your existence is a guarantee that you are consistent with all reality, even though it is in practice impossible for you to check the consistency of your relations to all your parts, properties, and everything else.
Quoting noAxioms
Yes. Although it doesn't seem to be inconsistent for there to be parallel worlds.
Your statement above presumes the existence of the inconsistent thing. If a inconsistent thing can still think, then cogito ergo sum doesn't work. That's actually what I always suspected, so I'm not taking this as any sort of denial of your definition of existence. Just noticing the implications.
I'll also try to look at your paper you just put out.
No, I have always favored the interpretation since the other ones require the ability to alter the past. Not impossible, but a harder pill to swallow I think. The view really messes with one's intuitive sense of self identity, and for that reason, probably meets more resistance than it deserves.
I don't want to go down this path now, it's off post, but I'll say this - Love is no more the pattern of neurons blinking in my brain than the basketball game I'm (rhetorically) watching on TV is the same as the pattern of electrons moving through it's circuits.
Nitpicking. They compare sets with uncountably large numbers of members.
Quoting noAxioms
It exists to the extent I understand that the universe, which does exist, may include things which are "possible yet unnamed, totally not known by any entity capable of knowing about things." Other than that, how do they exist any more than a unicorn does?
I assert at the beginning that existing things must be consistent because it seems absurd to me that an inconsistent thing (such as a four-sided triangle) could exist. So to suppose that I am self-contradictory means to suppose that I don't exist, which is absurd.
Quoting noAxioms
On the contrary, I presume that inconsistent things don't exist.
An inconsistent thing doesn't exist, but it still seems to have properties, so having properties is not proof of existence.
I never really asked myself the question if I exist - I take my existence for granted. The reason I take it for granted is that I am conscious (consciousness) and consciousness is something rather than nothing, so it exists. Regarding the existence of my body, I am not 100% sure because it might be an illusion in my consciousness and I am not totally certain that the body is necessary for my consciousness. But there seems to be a lot of sensory as well as rational converging evidence that my body exists too, and in that case the body must be logically consistent too.
Quoting noAxioms
How can something that doesn't exist have properties? There is nothing that would instantiate those properties.
I must admit, I've gotten lost in this back and forth between noAxioms and litewave, so I've been reading, but not participating. I do have a problem with this whole "four-sided triangle" thing. Here's the game we are playing. Let's call it the geometry game. Here are the arbitrary rules we come up with:
A couple of weeks later you ask me "can a four-sided triangle exist?" I don't say "No, a four-sided triangle can't exist." I don't say "That's inconsistent." I say "You've broken the arbitrary rules of the geometry game."
I've spent quite some time trying to identify all the things I take for granted. There are plenty I'm sure I've not yet identified. Some of them hold water when put to the test, but I like to put all of them to the test.
If existence is consistency, then the consciousness is not evidence unless it can be shown to be consistent. The fact that they've named 'the hard problem of consciousness' implies that the self-consistency of it is in question.
Quoting litewaveA far better question. I notice the word instatiation there, perhaps implying a thing possible but not instantiated. Let's presume a person is a physical thing, with a body and consciousness that is part of physical processes of that body. This person is one thing extended in time and space, from conception to death, head to toe. Now picture two of those persons, identical, except one instantiated, and the other not. What would be the difference between the thought processes (consciousness) of the instantiated one vs. the uninstantiated one?
That's sort of my method of working my way through these sort of questions. Doing it in 3rd person really helps. The problem above can be simplified to 2+2=4. Is 2+2 objectively equal to 4, or does the arithmetic require instantiation for the sum to be true/performed?
Sorry, I didn't completely answer your question about properties of an inconsistent thing, but I named some of the lowest positive real number. Those properties still seem valie, even if they lead eventually to inconsistencies. If the inconsistencies are subtle enough, the nonexistence of the thing might not be so clear.
Quoting T ClarkWhat rule was broken? Sure, the name arbitrarily assigned to the three sided thing, but what is fundamentally impossible is equating three to four. Is the abstract rule that makes that impossible some arbitrarily assigned rule, or is three really not equal to four, even in the absence of people doing geometry?
Whatever rules you make, if they refer to reality they cannot say that something has and in the same sense doesn't have three sides.
That would be an interesting question for another thread.
That which is logically consistent has an identity and so is something. That which is logically inconsistent does not have an identity and so is nothing. We may speak of an inconsistent thing as of "something", but due to the absence of identity it is not really something or a thing.
Quoting noAxioms
Consciousness is difficult to explain but that doesn't have to mean it is inconsistent. I think qualia of consciousness could be intrinsic identities of things, as opposed to structural/relational identities of things, and that's why they are indescribable and yet related to other things (correlates of consciousness). I elaborate it in my paper An outline of reality.
Quoting noAxioms
If it is consistent for a property to be instantiated in a thing then it is instantiated in that thing (because consistency = existence). If a property is not instantiated in a thing then it is inconsistent for that property to be instantiated in that thing.
Quoting noAxioms
I think a property (abstract entity) would not be a property if it was not a property of something. In other words, uninstantiated properties are a contradiction, and so they don't exist.
Quoting noAxioms
Yes, but whether the inconsistencies are clear to someone is ontologically irrelevant.
It seems to me that you eliminate the existence of nothing without explicit statement of contradiction. So four-leaf clovers with three leaves don't exist, but barring that sort of contradiction, everything else does. It seems to leave completely empty the question of if something exists. I can think of no thing that is not completely abstract that is logically inconsistent. I own a four wheeled car with five wheels. Does my car not exist?
I don't usually find myself on this side of the argument. Consistency, while perhaps necessary, doesn't seem sufficient. I've argued for the existence of unicorns, not just imaginary ones, which, as I stated in your thread, are imagined experience of unicorns, not unicorns themselves. Not even an idealist can create a physical object. He only creates the experience of that object since his entire universe is experience.
A consistent something, whether it is abstract or concrete, exists. An inconsistent "something", whether it is defined as concrete or abstract, doesn't exist (is nothing).
Quoting noAxioms
Of course it doesn't. You just defined a concrete inconsistent "thing".
Quoting litewaveThis is a cheap shot on my part. My car is four wheeled, but it has a fifth as a spare. The statement is true, but the language ambiguity doesn't count as logical inconsistency.
Similarly, I can create a square circle. Grab chalk and draw a square in a parking lot (four equal sides and angles). If you draw it large enough (somewhat larger than 6000 miles on a side), it becomes a circle. Non-euclidean geometry to the rescue!
But it illustrates a point: Objectively, there seem to be no hard rules to be violated. I have a hard time justifying a four-sided triangle, but it presumes that three is not identical to four. Pretty obvious, but is that true given no rules at all?
This didn't really answer my question, but is simply a reiteration of your stance. I actually thought of a valid challenge to it, and it is an empirical one:
MW interpretation says there is no wavefunction collapse and all possible outcomes exist. Problem is that some outcomes are more probable than others. Some particle has a half-life of say a millisecond, but it is possible that the thing lasts a minute or more. So if all these outcomes exist, why do empirical measurements find more occurrences of the probable ones than the improbable ones? Wave functions would not be known at all if all outcomes exist equally.
One solution is that any event (the decay of said particle) has some finite number of discreet possible delay times to decay. This implies an upper limit to the length of time of decay (violating definition of half-life), and it means all the times between those discreet values are somehow impossible. I don't think any physicist would accept such a solution to the problem, but I suppose it cannot be disproved either unless it can be measured better than the resolution of the discreed possibilities.
The other solution is that some realities are more probable than others, and in the case of your proposed view, it means some things are more logically consistent than other things. This world exists more than the possible but more improbable ones.
If you deny the problem, how so? If you agree with the problem, what might resolve this seeming conflict?
"contradictory statements cannot both be true in the same sense at the same time"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_noncontradiction
So if in one sense you mean wheels only as those on which the car currently travels and in another sense also as a spare wheel, your statement about the wheels is consistent. A contradiction arises only when something is asserted and denied in the same sense.
In arithmetic, four is not identical to three. It is the successor of three. So to claim that four is identical to three in the arithmetical sense is a contradiction.
Quoting noAxioms
The only reason I can think of is that the more probable outcomes occur in more worlds than the less probable outcomes. But I heard that this is still an unsolved problem in MWI because it is not clear how to calculate frequentist probabilities when there are infinitely many worlds. Maybe the number of worlds that split at a measurement cannot be infinite. Maybe a unified theory of QM and gravity will give the answer? (just my lay speculation)
Quoting noAxioms
I don't know what it would mean that some things are more logically consistent than others.
So the more worrisome case is the discreet ones like the measurement of spin along some axis. For a typical particle, that is a 50/50 shot, but for two particles, you get four outcome permutations. If the two particles are entangled, you can select the probability of correlation by the similarity of the axes between the two measurements. Nearly parallel axes means pretty much full correlation. So four worlds result from the two measurements, and they have probability of say 40, 40, 10, 10 percent. That is just four worlds, two of which are four times as probable as the other two. They all are logically consistent, so they all exist, but two of them seem to be more consistent. What does that mean??? It can't mean that there are 4 of one world and 1 of the other, since four of them would be identical, and thus violate the law of identity.
Yes, the physicists are trying to work that one out, and I suspect their answer is going to shed some empirical light on the whole ontology matter. The ontology of worlds within the one context of QM rules/logic is still a different from context-free ontology where there seem to be almost no rules, making me question even stupid things like why 3 is not 4. I think some axiom (something unproven) is needed to demonstrate the inconsistency of that.
You can have copies of a world that are the same as that world. Their only difference would be their different position (place) in reality.
You're assigning nonexistent differences to the same thing and contradicting your own definitions now.
A space can consist of identical points, that is, points that are the same except for their position in the space they make up. Now imagine that the points are worlds - again, identical except for their position in the space they make up.
If the worlds are supposed to exist in the same reality, and they are numerically distinct (despite having the same qualitative properties) from one another then I cannot see how that makes sense without saying that they occupy different regions of some kind. How they are distributed may be a problem to explain in detail, but it seems to necessarily be one that it has to deal with.
Anyway, the issue once again can be broken down into simple abstract cases. Consider that a square seems to be distinct from a square in a coordinate system. A square is just a square, and as such all four sides and vertices are identical to each other. Sure, relative to one, there is a far one and two (again identical) other ones to either side. The far one is unique. But that is true of any of them, so they are all identical without the coordinate system. But if they're identical, the square has only one side and thus seems not to meet the requirement of being a square. So I am not going to push the issue. Four identical things are still in relation to each other and despite lack of coordinates, seem to be still four distinct things. A circle is worse, with an infinite number of identical points. Is there one point then without the coordinates? Well, there are relations, so no, they're not the same point.
So maybe our answer lies in here somewhere. The sides of the square are identical, and thus are one side, but it exists four times as much as center point of the thing.
Coordinates complicate matters, but simplify it in other ways. It gives the vertices of the square identities and makes them non-identical, but the assignment of the coordinates requires definition of A) an origin, B) the orientation of the X axis, and C) the sign of the orthogonal Y axis. In our universe, it seems that five things need definition. We need an origin point in spacetime, an arbitrary orientation of any three of the four axes, and the sign of the last one. Yes, the temporal axis can be arbitrarily assigned. If its orientation could be locally discovered by some empirical method, relativity would be disproved.
Quoting Mr BeeOf some kind, yes. But the spatial relation that exists between the Earth and the Moon is not it, nor is it the temporal relation between an ice cube and that cube melted an hour later. Both those relations can be measured in linear terms and thus can be assigned meaningful coordinates. The relation between Earth and the Earth with the unicorns is not expressible in linear terms. It is a different kind of separation, not one that can be ordered or have distances like spatial and temporal relations.
I think 'Hilbert space' names the mathematics that describes this sort of relation, but it is not yet another linear dimension.
Is it? We are talking about something related to physics which means we are dealing with something physical here. So it seems closer to say that these worlds, if they should exist, exist within a physical space rather than say the space of abstract ideas (not a Platonist myself or anything but I'm just saying). These parallel worlds could be said to exist in another dimension of space for instance, and not necessarily the dimensions that we are normally accustomed to either.
Or we can say that one abstract line is instantiated in four particular lines. The abstract line and the four particular lines are five different things.
They have made such boxes in the lab, but they don't look like boxes, and they can be used to do strange things like alter the past.
The coordinates of a world (of an event actually, worlds don't have identities, but their events do) can be specified by listing the outcome of every quantum decoherence event in the past light cone of that event. If multiple-worlds are how the probability problem is solved, identical ones all have the same coordinates, and thus be truly the same world. I can arbitrarily assign different coordinates to the corners of the square, but there is no way to do that (even abstractly) with identical worlds.
I would say that any things that are differentiated from each other make up a "space" of some kind, in which they are differentiated from each other. So you could have a one-dimensional space of natural numbers, or a two-dimensional space of complex numbers, or a space where on one axis is the price of a product and on another axis is the demanded quantity of the product (the demand curve can be said to exist in such a space). Or if you don't want to use the word "space" in such a general sense, just use the word "collection", "set" or a "multiset". Multisets are sets that treat identical copies of their members as different objects.
This is better. No addition or subtraction is meaningful between two members. I didn't say space, but I said 'spatial'. The latter is a linear thing. Hilbert space is not linear, so 'space' is a more general term like this multiset, a term I had not heard before.
So our physical universe can be modeled by the set of all possible chess states where each state includes its history. The set is finite (there is entropy and thus a longest possible chess game), but beyond that the analogy is pretty good. There are two spatial dimensions, and it is meaningful to state the distance between two pieces (which make up the elementary particles). Time is measured in moves, and this forms a tree of legal states. Each move is like a quantum decoherence event and it creates a set of worlds. Once move X has been made, the world where Y was made becomes inaccessible. The coordinates of any particular state is simply the history of moves leading up to it, corresponding to the history of quantum events that led to event X (say me posting this comment). This space is not linear. It is not meaningful to reference the distance between a first chess position and a second one that is possible but not possible from the first position.
The chess analogy poorly illustrates weighted existence. All the legal states exist, and the introduction of favoritism of win/lose/draw states is required to model differing weight, and that model would not correspond to how QM works (I think), so it seems pretty pointless to explore that.