An Objection to Divine Command Theory
The Divine Command Theory (DCT) is a theory of ethics commonly held by Christians and other religious folks. It states that actions are either right or wrong because they are either in line with God's will or against it. Being kind is good because God wills it so, and murder is wrong for the same reason. Below I have formulated an argument for DCT that comes from Martin Luther's The Bondage of the Will.
1. If there were a rule or standard for God's will, then it would be above God's will.
2. Nothing is above God's will.
3. So, there is no rule or standard for God's will.
4. If there is no rule or standard for God's will, then God's will determines what is right or wrong.
5. So, God's will determines what is right or wrong.
Initially, this argument may seem attractive, but I think something fishy is going on with the use of the word "above" in premise 1. I'm not entirely sure what Luther meant by a standard being "above" God's will, since above is a spatial term and God's will does not exist in space. But my best guess is that he meant that nothing supersedes or takes priority over God's will. I propose that this argument fails because the conclusion is an absurd result.
It seems like his mode of reasoning could land us in a vicious circle. Allow me to explain. A common way to think about God, both in philosophy and religion, is as the greatest possible being. A being which we can not even imagine anything to be better than. Such a being possesses the maximum share of all good characteristics. These surely include benevolence, power, knowledge, justice, and the like. But why are these the characteristics that the greatest being has? Why does this being not possess maximum weakness, ignorance, injustice, and so on? The obvious answer is because those are bad properties. But the Divine Command Theorist cannot answer this intelligibly. They must say that those properties are only good because God possesses them. So, we can only define God as having a maximum share of the properties that God has. Suddenly, we are caught in a circle in which we have no evidence for our definition of God. Specifically, we cannot claim that God's properties are good, because our only evidence of their goodness is that God has them. All the while defining God as the being with the maximum share of good qualities. Therefore, I conclude that Divine Command Theory must be mistaken.
1. If there were a rule or standard for God's will, then it would be above God's will.
2. Nothing is above God's will.
3. So, there is no rule or standard for God's will.
4. If there is no rule or standard for God's will, then God's will determines what is right or wrong.
5. So, God's will determines what is right or wrong.
Initially, this argument may seem attractive, but I think something fishy is going on with the use of the word "above" in premise 1. I'm not entirely sure what Luther meant by a standard being "above" God's will, since above is a spatial term and God's will does not exist in space. But my best guess is that he meant that nothing supersedes or takes priority over God's will. I propose that this argument fails because the conclusion is an absurd result.
It seems like his mode of reasoning could land us in a vicious circle. Allow me to explain. A common way to think about God, both in philosophy and religion, is as the greatest possible being. A being which we can not even imagine anything to be better than. Such a being possesses the maximum share of all good characteristics. These surely include benevolence, power, knowledge, justice, and the like. But why are these the characteristics that the greatest being has? Why does this being not possess maximum weakness, ignorance, injustice, and so on? The obvious answer is because those are bad properties. But the Divine Command Theorist cannot answer this intelligibly. They must say that those properties are only good because God possesses them. So, we can only define God as having a maximum share of the properties that God has. Suddenly, we are caught in a circle in which we have no evidence for our definition of God. Specifically, we cannot claim that God's properties are good, because our only evidence of their goodness is that God has them. All the while defining God as the being with the maximum share of good qualities. Therefore, I conclude that Divine Command Theory must be mistaken.
Comments (140)
1. Moral imperatives are imperatives of reason
2. Imperatives of reason have a single source: Reason
3. Only a mind issues imperatives
4. Therefore, moral imperatives are the imperatives of a single mind
5. The single mind whose imperatives are the imperatives of reason will be omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent (God).
What mistake have I made?
I think you would have to say that moral imperatives are imperatives of perfect reason in order to get to steps 4 and 5.
I do not see at least at first sight the valid logical jump from 1, 2 and 3 to 4 and 5. Because in 1, 2 and 3 also a mundane reason and a mundane mind could be meant. In 4 and 5, however, suddenly there is talk about a divine reason and a divine mind.
Moreover, an invalid leap could have been made from many human minds to a single divine one.
Francisco Suárez (1548—1617) would argue "that for a law to be genuine law and not just law in name it must be grounded in the legislative act of a superior[.]"
Thus, without Divine Command, there might be no true moral imperatives.
Suárez takes a middle path: "The extreme voluntarist thinks that God is free to command as he wishes, unconstrained by the natures of things. Suárez, on the other hand, thinks that God’s commands and prohibitions are constrained by natural goodness and badness. As befits a perfect being, God prohibits some actions precisely because they are evil. Suárez thinks it absurd to suggest that there are no actions such that they are too evil for God to command or even just to permit." https://iep.utm.edu/suarez/#SH3i
Every chicken comes from a single egg. Only an egg can produce a chicken. But there is no single egg from which every chicken comes.
And if only a mind can issue an imperative, then that single source is a mind.
So far so logical. To block that conclusion you must deny a premise.
Then I assert that the mind would have the three divine attributes. I can show that to be the case, but first let's agree that Reason is a mind. Then I can show why that mind will, by virtue of being the source of all reasons, be all powerful, all knowing, and all good.
Okay, now I understand your reasoning.
Quoting Bartricks
I would deny that. There is a multitude and plurality of sources. These are namely the many individual rational faculties of humans.
Quoting Bartricks
Please state your full definition of reason and mind.
So, if I instruct myself to be cruel, then there is an imperative of reason enjoining me to be cruel? I have reason to be cruel and no reason not to be? And so Hitler had moral reason to do what he did as he was in favour of himself - and others - doing so? Indeed, your view is that immorality is just a form of self conflict, nothing more. Yes?
That view is extremely silly and is rejected by all moral philosophers.
As for my definition of Reason - Reason is the source of all reasons to do and believe things.
And a mind is a thinking thing.
Please, goodness, not him again.
I think @spirit-salamander 's idea is that there are lots of minds, some of which (at least) are capable of using the faculty of reason. So reason's being a single source of some thing does not entail that a single mind is the source of that thing.
Lots of minds. One faculty of reason. Each mind uses the faculty of reason when and only when it is being reasonable.
Nothing that @spirit-salamander wrote entails that every mind uses reason all the time. Some minds are crazy some or all the time.
You definitely have a faculty of reason, even if sometimes, for example in sleep, you do not use it so that it lies dormant in potentiality, so to speak.
Quoting Bartricks
I would not draw this conclusion and it does not necessarily follow from what I said before.
An imperative of reason must imply a pressure to act, it must be normative. How do you derive normativity? Does reason always imply morality in your theory?
Now, your view entails that Hitler did nothing wrong. Which is stupid. Hitler was a jerk. Your view is false and now you are going to change the topic from imperatives of reason to faculties of reason.
How so? You seem to be hypersensitive when asked specific questions to understand your moral philosophy. So far, I have not made my moral philosophy explicit in the least. Therefore, you cannot draw any conclusions about what I must think about Hitler's actions. You are twisting the discussion here.
Reason is, after all, a faculty.
This is a philosophy forum. Learn to argue. Learn to focus on premises. No premise of mine mentions our faculties of reason. And again, your view that we are the source of moral commands means Hitler did nothing wrong. Which is stupid, yes? That's your view. Your view is stupid. Demonstrably stupid.
And now you think your faculty of reason 'is' reason. So Hitler's was Hitler's, yes? So he did nothing wrong. That's your view. It's stupid.
Shall I help you?
If you deny that moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason, then you show only that you are conceptually confused.
If you insist that we are Reason, then Hitler did nothing wrong, which is dumb.
If you insist that something that is not a mind can issue an imperative, then you are bonkers.
Thus, there is no non-dumb sane way to avoid my conclusion. Which is why it is a proof. A proof, that is, that Reason is a person.
Quoting Bartricks
I dispute this premise because it seems to me to be ontologically ambiguous.
Here, the mundane reason of everyone can be meant (every human being is endowed with the faculty to reason) or already the divine reason (there is in principle only one reason, which does not belong to any human being). The former you consider absurd, because otherwise Hitler would have done nothing wrong. If the latter, you already presuppose what you want to prove.
But the former does not imply that Hitler did nothing wrong. It does not follow from it. Indeed, he acted against his moral reason, the principle of which is: to treat every human being at least also as an end in itself.
One can distinguish between purposive calculative reason and moral reason. Hitler only acted right with regard to his (immoral) purpose.
A moral imperative of reason must imply a pressure to act, it must be normative. How do you derive normativity?
Quoting Bartricks
You still don't know my whole view. So you can't call it stupid. You still have a lot to learn about how to discuss philosophically in a dialogue.
Why did you put the word 'ontologically' in there?
Quoting spirit-salamander
Er, what are you on about? The premise is talking about the 'imperatives' of reason. You have just ignored that and decided to start talking about faculties of reason! Stop doing that. Focus on what the premises actually say.
Faculties of reason are not imperatives of Reason! Faculties of reason are faculties of awareness. Big difference.
Quoting spirit-salamander
Er, that's not what Hitler thought. And you think that Hitler himself determines what it is morally right or wrong for Hitler to do. Or do you not understand your own view?
If moral standards are external to Hitler - and they are - then they are not 'his'. He is not their source. Hitler is not the source of the moral imperatives that apply to Hitler and that he flouted. It's wrong to be a racist holocauster, is it not? And it is wrong even if Hitler approves of being one and commands himself to be one, right? And so......your view is wrong. Morality doesn't come from Hitler! Jesus.
Don't tell me you think what Hitler did is wrong and then at the same time express a view about the nature of morality that entails he did nothing wrong.
Moral imperatives apply to us, but do not come from us. And the same goes for all of the imperatives of Reason.
And we call them 'imperatives of Reason' because they come from.....you guessed it, Reason!
And we are 'aware' of these imperatives via our faculties of reason. Which are 'faculties' not commands.
Now, if you think Hitler did something wrong, then you do not think that Hitler was the source of the morality of his actions, yes? Because - breaking news - Hitler approved of what he did.
Quoting spirit-salamander
I know enough to know that your view is stupid. It entails that Hitler did nothing wrong. That's very silly.
Why not? Individual and collectivist subjectivists about morality think Hitler did nothing wrong (if they have any coherent thoughts at all). That's outrageous. They should be outed for the idiots they are.
Quoting Cuthbert
He's confused. He didn't read the argument carefully and consequently he has started to blather on about faculties of reason, even though the argument was about imperatives of Reason. Faculties of reason are not imperatives, but faculties - means of awareness.
There are sights and then there is sight. Sights are what you see with sight. Sight is the faculty and sights are what you see with it. Reasons - including imperatives of Reason - are what faculties of reason give us some awareness of. Imperatives of reason, then, are among the rational sights that our reason - our rational sight - gives us some awareness of.
But the likes of Salamander and, I'd wager, 99.9% of everyone else on this site, cannot keep hold of the difference and conflate the means of awareness with the object of awareness. And then they all conclude that morality is something we ourselves make and then have to say that Hitler did nothing wrong.
They reason like this (if they reason at all): "I am aware of moral imperatives by means of my mind, therefore morality is in my mind! I am the source of morality" Or they reason "I have been caused to have my moral beliefs by my mind.....therefore, morality is in my mind!"
It's very silly. But once someone commits these fallacies - and they're known as the subjectivist fallacies - and arrive at their outrageously stupid view that morality is in our gift and is a creation of our own minds, you can't get them out of it. For most people cannot accept that they can be that stupid. It's why they should teach metaethics in schools and not stupid things like French or algebra.
Discussions like ours have been going on forever. I have tried to argue from a naturalistic approach:
The following quotes on the late medieval and early modern Jesuit theologian and philosopher Francisco Suárez (1548—1617) are instructive:
"One position is extreme naturalism or intellectualism, which Suárez attributes to Gregory of Rimini and several others (DL 2.6.3). On this view, no legislative act on God’s part is needed. Rather, natural law simply indicates what should be done or not done on the basis of what is intrinsically good or bad. Loss of life, for example, is bad: murdering King Duncan deprives him of life, and so Macbeth ought not to stab Duncan. On the extreme naturalism espoused by Gregory, Macbeth’s duty not to murder Duncan would obtain even if God had not given the Ten Commandments and even if God had not existed at all.
On the other side is an extreme voluntarism that says that natural law consists entirely in a command or prohibition coming from God’s will, a view that Suárez attributes to William of Ockham (DL 2.6.4). On this view, what one ought or ought not to do is wholly determined by God’s legislative acts and, furthermore, God’s legislative acts are unconstrained. That is, there is no act that is intrinsically bad such that God is compelled to prohibit it or even prevented from commanding it and no act that is intrinsically good such that God is compelled to command it. Had God commanded us to murder and steal, then doing so would have been obligatory and good.
Characteristically, Suárez charts a middle course. He first agrees with the extreme voluntarists that natural law is genuinely preceptive law, and argues that for a law to be genuine law and not just law in name it must be grounded in the legislative act of a superior (DL 2.6.5-10). The obligatory force of natural law comes from God’s will. Contra Gregory of Rimini, that obligation would not be present had God not legislated or not existed at all.
But then comes the crucial qualification that ends Suárez’s agreement with extreme voluntarism: “Second, I say that this will of God—that is, this prohibition or precept—is not the whole reason for the goodness and badness that is found in observing or transgressing the natural law, but that the natural law presupposes in the acts themselves a certain necessary fineness or wickedness and adjoins to these a special obligation of divine law” (DL 2.6.11). The extreme voluntarist thinks that God is free to command as he wishes, unconstrained by the natures of things. Suárez, on the other hand, thinks that God’s commands and prohibitions are constrained by natural goodness and badness. As befits a perfect being, God prohibits some actions precisely because they are evil. Suárez thinks it absurd to suggest that there are no actions such that they are too evil for God to command or even just to permit. To this extent, then, Suárez agrees with the naturalist; the obligations of natural law are rooted in natural goodness and badness." https://iep.utm.edu/suarez/#SH3i
I have outlined my actual view here:
The derivation of a morally binding ought?
Quoting Bartricks
As that argument is deductively valid it will, if sound, refute all other views about the matter.
You have not refuted it. You have confused imperatives of Reason with our faculties of reason and then proceeded to insist that we ourselves are the sources of moral imperatives, a view that entails Hitler did nothing wrong and is thus absurd in the extreme.
My view is, clearly, a form of divine command theory and, where moral imperatives are concerned, it is equivalent to William of Ockham's. But you cannot refute a view by categorizing it or identifying it with one Ockham defended.
The view that moral imperatives are our imperatives entails Hitler did nothing wrong. It is thus absurd and can be rejected (and there are plenty more reasons to reject it, but that will do).
The view that moral imperatives are somehow being emitted by the mindless natural world (metaethical objectivist naturalism) is downright potty.
The view that moral imperatives are somehow being emitted by Platonic Forms is equally potty.
So, again, to refute my argument you must either deny that moral imperatives are imperatives - which is conceptually confused - or deny that moral imperatives have their source in Reason - which is also conceptually confused - or deny that imperatives need a mind to issue them - which is insane. There's no way out. My argument goes through and establishes both that morality is God's commands and that Reason is God and that God exists.
You've started three discussions but have only made one comment. You've never commented on the discussions you started other than the opening post.
If you're not going to participate fairly, especially in the threads you start yourself, get lost.
It's the most stupid claim I've read so far in this thread to consider this argument (as it is) deductively valid.
Neat.
Seriously?! Pls, formalise your argument as it is so we can laugh harder at your stupid claim.
Your counterargument looks more as a strawman wrt the DCT argument you have proposed:
Indeed I have literally no clue what "deductively valid" means to you. But in logic, "deductively valid" has a very specific meaning, not whatever stupid claim comes to your mind. So pls, formalise your argument and show to the world the deductive validity of your argument according to your stupid claim.
But if you want to know why the person of Reason would have the three omni properties, it's because she will be the source of all the laws of logic, and the source of all justifications, and the source of all moral value. As the source of the laws of logic she will be the arbiter of what is and isn't possible and thus will be capable of doing anything. As the arbiter of justifications she will be all knowing for her will constitutively determines whether a proposition is justified; and as the source of moral value she will be morally perfect as she will value herself.
can you formalise your argument or not, logic pimp?
Do you agree that this is deductively valid:
1. If p, then q
2. p
3. Therefore q
Yep, what's next?
You accept, then, that this is valid:
1. If moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason, then they all have a single source: Reason
2. Moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason
3. Therefore moral imperatives have a single source: Reason
And you accept as well that this is valid:
1. If something is issuing imperatives, then it is a mind
2. Reason issues imperatives
3. Therefore Reason is a mind
And you accept as well that this is valid:
1. If Reason is a mind, then Reason is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent (God)
2. Reason is a mind
3. Therefore, Reason is God.
And you accept that this is valid:
1. If moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason, then they are imperatives of God
2. Moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason
3. Therefore moral imperatives are imperatives of God
Or you don't as you don't know what you are talking about. Slink off, that's my advice.
It may shock you to hear this, but I'm a bit cranky sometimes. On the other hand, three discussions with only a single post beyond the OPs is a bit much.
Sure ma’am.
First let me stress my initial claim:
Quoting neomac
What you have just now provided is a list of 4 deductions that do not correspond at all to the formalisation of the argument you provided (as it is) which consisted in 5 propositions (where the 4th one seemed a conclusion from the first 3 premises):
This argument, as it is, is deductively invalid. And it’s stupid to claim otherwise. You needed a sequence of 4 deductions to make it look acceptable. So now the audience has 8 possible premises to question (instead of 3 or 4) when assessing the soundness of your DCT argument. Which also means that it would have been intellectually more honest to provide this argument from the start.
BTW the first 2 premises of your Bartrickstein argument seemed to distinguish between “reason” and “Reason”:
[i]1. Moral imperatives are imperatives of reason
2. Imperatives of reason have a single source: Reason[/i]
So you should still adjust your first deduction accordingly.
Now, each argument was deductively valid, yes?
And they are also sound. Deal.
"But you made a typo in your first premise, so I win and your argument is stupid and dumb and just so stupid. So there."
Indeed there is lots I could learn from your intellectual dishonesty. But no, sorry, not interested.
Quoting Bartricks
Let me stress it once more (from the abyss of my public humiliation you are so sadly fantasizing about): as it is, your first argument is obviously deductively invalid and it's utterly stupid to claim otherwise. You wouldn't need a sequence of 4 deductions, if it was valid as it was.
Here are the 8 premises that one can question:
1. If moral imperatives are imperatives of [s]Reason[/s] reason, then they all have a single source: Reason
2. Moral imperatives are imperatives of [s]Reason[/s] reason
1. If something is issuing imperatives, then it is a mind
2. Reason issues imperatives
1. If Reason is a mind, then Reason is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent (God)
2. Reason is a mind
1. If moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason, then they are imperatives of God
2. Moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason
Quoting Bartricks
Yep
Quoting Bartricks
Nope.
Quoting Bartricks
Don't worry, your stupid claim still remains the one I pointed out for the reasons I explained. Typos can be excused, of course, I'm not intellectually dishonest as you are proving to be the more you talk, but it was still worth mentioning it for clarity.
I see he's hooked poor @neomac.
1. Arguable. Emotions and irrationality may also play a role.
2. The word "source" seems ambiguous here. Mostly seems okay.
3. Seems okay.
4. "Single mind" is a non-sequitur and suggests an agenda.
5. Non-sequitur.
You seem to be just using me as a passive-aggressive way to attack Bartricks. Knock yourself out.
Quoting Bartricks
PhD in philosophy are you? From where? what was your dissertation on?
1.??? (outlandish)
2. Obviously false. Reason is a faculty. Reason isn't a mind.
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
That doesn't make sense as a response to "Moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason". Do you mean that moral imperatives are imperatives of emotion? What does that mean? How does an emotion - a feeling - issue an imperative?
It is uncontroversial that moral norms are norms of Reason. Moral reasons are called moral reasons precisely because they are just among the different sorts of reason that Reason issues. Aesthetic reasons, instrumental reasons, epistemic reasons and moral reasons.
So 1 is uncontroversial and you've said nothing to challenge it - indeed, nothing that even manages coherently to address it.
Now, when we talk about imperatives of Reason, the 'of' bit refers to the source of the imperatives - to Reason in the 'e' sense of the term. It does not refer to the faculty of reason. The faculty of reason is the means by which we are aware of the imperatives and other issuances of Reason. That's why it is called a 'faculty' of reason and not a 'source' of reasons. Note, if there's a faculty - and you admit that there is a faculty of reason - then there's that of which the faculty gives us some awareness or impression. Those impressions or awarenesses are 'of' the imperatives of Reason. And among them are the imperatives of morality. That's why we use our reason to gain insight into what's right and wrong. And those imperatives are imperatives of Reason. They're not imperatives the faculty is issuing. That's bonkers. Faculties do not issue imperatives. Plus that would mean that whatever your faculty told you you had reason to do, you'd have reason to do - it'd be impossible for the faculty to give you a false impression. Yet it does so all the time. Yours, for instance, is telling you I am not very good at arguing, yes? That's a false impression.
Skeptical are we? How would my telling you those things do anything to reduce your skepticism? Anyone could just make up such answers.
Here's a more reliable test: try and refute my argument.
If you like. It's just that you seem to be annoyed at a newbie for not responding, when their thread has been hijacked - you are upset a the wrong thing.
The variation on the Euthyphro dilemma in the actual OP might have had some merit as a topic. @SwampMan's argument is one of those that sets limits on the way god can be understood. Perhaps everything that happens has to be for the greater good in order to keep the notion of god consistent. That might be an interesting line to pursue. - at what point would the state of the world be so poor as to demand one drop faith in god?
But instead we have Bart's theatrics.
Quoting Bartricks
There seems to be some controversy.
Ironically this is precisely why most philosophers reject divine command theory - they reject it because it makes moral imperatives imperatives of God, rather than imperatives of Reason. Needless to say, they do not realize that Reason is God.
Is this also non-controversial?
Bart's an obvious troll. Why are you responding?
Hey, @SwampMan, Banno is full of crap. If you are going to start posts, and you've started three, you should be participating.
Banno likes to stick his nose in cause he thinks he's all wise and stuff, but you'll notice he rarely has anything substantive to say. This exchange is a case in point.
Indeed!
Quoting Bartricks
My question was rhetorical. It is evident that you do not have a PhD in philosophy.
Quoting Bartricks
They could. Is that what you would do rather than tell the truth?
Quoting Bartricks
The problem is, more than once you have demonstrated that you are incapable of seeing that you have been refuted.
I will go back to ignoring you, just as most other members do who are familiar with your "arguments.
False. It's precisely controversial:
Moral emotions are a variety of social emotion that are involved in forming and communicating moral judgments and decisions, and in motivating behavioral responses to one's own and others' moral behavior.
However, in the last 30–40 years,[when?] there has been a rise in a new front of research: moral emotions as the basis for moral behavior. This development began with a focus on empathy and guilt, but has since moved on to encompass new emotional scholarship on emotions such as anger, shame, disgust, awe, and elevation. With the new research, theorists have begun to question whether moral emotions might hold a larger role in determining morality, one that might even surpass that of moral reasoning.
Wiki on Moral Emotions
It's amusing. :halo:
It is uncontroversial that the argument I made is deductively valid, as anyone who understands arguments would know.
And each premise, taken individually, is uncontroversial.
It is uncontroversial that moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason.
It is uncontroversial that all imperatives of Reason have a unified source: Reason (that's why we call them imperatives of Reason, as opposed to just 'imperatives').
It is uncontroversial minds and only minds can issue imperatives.
So, put together, we get the conclusion that Reason is a mind. That's controversial. But it uncontroversially follows from uncontroversial premises. That's called a discovery.
Yeah, it's the Wild West.
Wouldn't the mods boot Bart if someone reported him?
How so?
Do you have anything philosophical to contribute or are you too just interested in Bartricks baiting?
Happy to be a second. He constantly ruthlessly insults (almost?) everyone he talks to.
I am not interested in making this thread anymore about you than it has already become.
> No, it is valid.
Of course it's invalid, no matter how many times you keep boring us with your stupid claim. You should formalise your first argument as it is to prove that it is formally correct. But you can’t. Why? Because you need 4 deductions to make your first argument look formally acceptable, that’s why. And to claim that these 4 deductions back up your claim that your first argument is deductively valid, would be just the second most stupid claim in here. So you contributed with the two most stupid claims one can find in this thread. Kudos.
> And note, bolding false assertions does not an argument make.
Right, but if you can claim that your first argument is a valid deduction without proving it (and you didn’t prove it yet), I do not feel compelled to provide an argument to affirm that your claim is stupid.
> I and 2 of the first argument are open to question, as are the first premises of the next two.
One can philosophically question all 8 premises of your 4 deductions. Your premises are theoretically loaded so much that one could question any of them.
> Now, you've got nothing philosophical to contribute, have you?
BTW is your intellectual dishonesty a moral imperative from Reason?
> Thus far you have made none at all, just Barticks baited - which didn't go so well, did it?
Bait all you want, little ant. I’ve got enough thick skin for you.
I can handle trolls. And also trolls might have interesting things to say.
Plato shows us that the personal is an important part of philosophy. Not knowing that you do not know but insisting that you do know is a serious problem. Fix that and the ability to have a reasoned discussion might follow.
Whatever else you might think about B's musings, I don't believe he's a troll (I'm guessing he identifies as male). I just checked - he has nearly 4500 posts in the 2 years he's been out here, and AFAICT his positions seem consistent. My take is that he genuinely believes what he's saying
His constant puerile insults mark him as a troll regardless of his positional consistency.
The only reason I became involved here is because of the oddity of 's reply to @SwampMan. The real OP has a genuine philosophical point, written by a relative newbie, well grounded in an historical and logical context, that has now been submerged in nonsense.
I think that merits Mod intervention.
I don't know. None of Bart's posts seems to deserve moderation on its own, so if he/she is as disruptive as you say, the best thing would be for everyone to ignore him/her.
Quoting T Clark
Apparently you're the only person who's allowed to do that. What were you saying in the shoutbox about kettles and pots?
Right now I'm not going to take any mod action, but to @Banno and @T Clark I say: probably best to avoid this thread unless you're going to address the OP.
And not only new research:
[quote=Hume, T 3.2.5.4, SBN 517]All morality depends upon our sentiments; and when any action, or quality of the mind, pleases us after a certain manner, we say it is virtuous; and when the neglect, or non-performance of it, displeases us after a like manner, we say that we lie under an obligation to perform it. A change of the obligation supposes a change of the sentiment; and a creation of a new obligation supposes some new sentiment to arise.[/quote]
I don't wholly agree with that quote but sentiment (emotion) certainly has some part to play. It's not all about commands. And the part that is about commands is problematic as per the OP, also the idea that you can ask about any command "Why is it right - or is it right at all - to do what I've just been told?", meaning (if it is right) then it would be so regardless of being commanded or not.
[quote=G E Moore, Chapter IV: Metaphysical Ethics.§ 76].
And Kant also commits the fallacy of supposing that This ought to be means This is commanded. He conceives the Moral Law to be an Imperative. And this is a very common mistake. This ought to be, it is assumed, must mean This is commanded; nothing, therefore, would be good unless it were commanded; and since commands in this world are liable to be erroneous, what ought to be in its ultimate sense means what is commanded by some real supersensible authority. With regard to this authority it is, then, no longer possible to ask Is it righteous? Its commands cannot fail to be right, because to be right means to be what it commands. Here, therefore, law, in the moral sense, is supposed to be analogous to law, in the legal sense, rather than, as in the last instance, to law in the natural sense. It is supposed that moral obligation is analogous to legal obligation, with this difference only that whereas the source of legal obligation is earthly, that of moral obligation is heavenly. Yet it is obvious that if by a source of obligation is meant only a power which binds you or compels you to do a thing, it is not because it does do this that you ought to obey it. It is only if it be itself so good, that it commands and enforces only what is good, that it can be a source of moral obligation. And in that case what it commands and enforces would be good, whether commanded and enforced or not. Just that which makes an obligation legal, namely the fact that it is commanded by a certain kind of authority, is entirely irrelevant to moral obligation. However an authority be defined, its commands will be morally binding only if they are—morally binding; only if they tell us what ought to be or what is a means to that which ought to be. [/quote]
I don't care if he is a troll. He's got the intellectual creepiness of a troll, though.
Quoting EricH
I don't know what you are referring to when talking about the consistency of his position. All I can say is that I learned about his positions on this and another previous thread. The first time his line of reasoning looked catastrophic to me from the start to the end, while now it just started very badly, but later it improved. However his attitude was less hysterical the first time than this time.
This time his line of reasoning started very badly b/c he made the stupid claim that the following argument is deductively valid, which is obviously not.
Quoting Bartricks
Indeed the logical form of this argument (as it is) is something like:
And only nutcases and Bartricks would dare to call this line of reasoning deductively valid. BTW since he is using quantifiers (e.g."single source", "single mind"), his argument may look even messier if you put it into a predicative logic form, instead of a propositional logic form. So the claim that his first argument, as it is, is logically valid is the most stupid claim one can find on this thread up to now.
Later he presented 4 deductions to counter my accusation against his deductively invalid argument, to support the idea that his deductively invalid argument was indeed valid. But this is just the second most stupid claim one can find in this thread b/c the 4 deductions provided by him do not present the propositional logical structure of the first argument, as I asked.
Conclusion: I can grant you that his 4 deductions express a line of reasoning worth examining, (at least wrt the first argument), even if they do not argue in favor of the DCT argument of the main post of this thread, still they were preceded and then accompanied by the 2 most stupid claims one can find in the current thread. He could have simply said something like: "All right, the first argument is not deductively valid but what I meant is that I can provide a better version of it, which is deductively valid, here it is...". Instead he preferred to put up a hysterical straw man show, only proving his intellectual dishonesty on top of his two stupid claims (indeed the two most stupid claims one can find in this thread).
I have been left alone. So far. I am reminded of a wrestler belittling his opponents and announcing victory before, during and after the fight, regardless of what happens in the ring. I'm only sticking around to show that I'm not scared and add some Hume and Moore to the mix. Although, truth to say, I am a bit scared.
In this respect, he @Bartricks sees his philosophy in agreement with that of Ockham:
Quoting Bartricks
This is what Ockham's moral theory says:
Quoting spirit-salamander
The last sentence is crucial:
"Had God commanded us to murder and steal, then doing so would have been obligatory and good."
So this is what B subscribes to.
On the other hand, he says:
Quoting Bartricks
Quoting Bartricks
Quoting Bartricks
Surely there is a great deal of tension here. God could command Hitler's behavior from us. He could do that, and it would be all right if he did. But then why is Hitler wrong in commanding his own behavior?
According to Bartricks, there is nothing in God or outside of Him (no reason, no principle whatsoever) that would prohibit murder per se except His total arbitrariness, which, however, from our point of view, is total randomness. I don't see why God should be in any respect better than Hitler.
That's why I showed him Suarez's view as a middle ground:
Quoting spirit-salamander
Yes I agree, these quantifiers make the premises conceptually unclear.
OK, but doesn't that run up against Moore's objection? If God prohibits actions because they are evil then we can work out we ought not to do those things regardless of any supposed divine prohibition. We can only presume an action is a prohibited by God by referring to its being evil. If we can make that reference successfully, then God (or any other supposed issuer of commands) drops out of the equation of moral reasoning.
I did not mean to object to Moore. Bartricks was meant. But you're right, even Suarez would eventually be subject to Moore's criticism that God might be superfluous. Suárez would, however, argue "that for a law to be genuine law and not just law in name it must be grounded in the legislative act of a superior[.]"
Moore would then reply:
In any case, the subject of the discussion is complicated and definitely not clear-cut as Bartricks believes it to be.
Personally, I find Gerold Prauss' theory the most convincing.
Pavlos Kontos sums it up in a review (Kant-Studien 2009). I hope the passages are somewhat understandable:
"The very case of an action that handles another person ‘only as an end in himself’ is [...] meant to exclusively define what morality is about; by contrast, the order of right emerges once we encounter other persons at the same time as means and as ends in themselves. These two real practical alternatives describe the difference between moral good and right (morally and rightly good), whence the negative alternative of handling someone ‘only as a means’ mirrors what is morally and rightly evil.
Prauss proceeds by dealing with the exclusively moral alternative, that is, with an action that handles other persons only as ends in themselves. It proves to be the case that this action, and hence the order of morality in general, is conditioned by a very peculiar situation: a claim to morality is grounded only “when the person handled is precisely not in a position to help himself and as long as he remains in this position” (711). “This self-help represents then the decisive criterion” in order for the realms of right and morality to be distinguished from one another and, consequently, this very distinction depends upon the emergence of such a particular case (711f., note). The rationale of the argument suggests that whoever cannot assure his own life cannot therefore represent a means for our subjective purposes (1117f.).
[...]
1. Morality emerges as a relation between an actor (able to help himself and others) and a
person in need or, according to the Samaritan example, a “verwundetes [wounded, injured] Subjekt” (1111f.).
Thus, Prauss is obliged to subscribe to two further claims: in addition to the claim that there is no morality possible between persons who are not in need, there is no morality possible between persons in need, since they have nothing to offer or, in the terms that the author will later introduce, they can give no life (not even to themselves). Hence, morality is conditioned by situations that are exclusively restricted to interpersonal relations between non-injured and injured persons.
[...]
[…] Prauss reconstructs the notion of ends in a long argument that we might reformulate as follows: Human will is not auto-referential but by essence directed to the success (and not to the failure) of the actions in which it is implicated. Due to this intentionality, good and evil are attributes we ascribe to actions, insofar as they respect the normativity (whatever its kind might be) that the agent has adopted and thereby freely ‘incorporated’ as his actual incentive (759). Every kind of normativity presupposes a claim raised by the Behandelte [patient, being treated, being acted upon] (that is, stemming from the objective side of action) and a kind of Befolgung [observance] (that is, the readiness of the agent to act according to the principles he has subscribed to).
[...]
Freedom bears practical relevance only insofar as it represents the object of conscience: normativity presupposes the knowledge of freedom, not just freedom itself (799). However, this factual knowledge is not sufficient to explain why human beings are regarded as ends in themselves. Thus, a second level of self-recognition is required, namely a level grounded upon a further fact: upon the fact that human beings, bestowed as they are with Vernunft [reason] and not simply with Verstand [understanding], achieve a thematization of their conscience of freedom (840). Hence, Vernunft makes possible a self-knowledge, i.e. a self-recognition, of human beings as free creators of ends, namely, as self-creators (817). It follows that the first kind of causality recognized by a human being bestowed with Vernunft is free causality as the vehicle of his selfrealization. It is only afterwards that a human being recognizes that other beings might also operate as causes, either as natural causes or even as free animals and human subjects. Prauss’ conclusion thus leaves no mystery: “free causality constitutes from the outset the necessary precondition of natural causality” (865). The synthesis of freedom (self-realizing will) and necessity (the claims raised by others), conditioned as it is by this mutual dependence of the two aforementioned facts upon one another, admits of three modalities: ‘to be only as a means’, ‘to be not only as a means but also as an end in itself’, and ‘to be not only also as an end, but only as an end in itself’. If one replaces being with will-to-live, he easily concludes that this synthesis allows for three modalities of action: “only life-to-take”, “not only life-to-take but also life-to-give”, and “only life-to-give” (1099).
[...]
Morality and right [...] represent a game that we are factually obliged to play, given the facts of self-knowledge and interpersonality; good and evil are attributes assigned to actions that directly or indirectly concern other human beings and are evaluated in light of their impact upon the lifetime of these human beings and, hence, morality and right do not dwell within our internal maxims or intentions."
"[W]hen we do not help someone in need, we do not solely prove to be non-meritorious but we commit an evil, whatever our maxims might be. From this point of view, Prauss’ proposal should be welcomed by those who acknowledge (without, however, supplying us with a convincing reformulation) that the duties of virtue should not be regarded as a kind of moral luxury we are allowed to neglect."
That is, in a nutshell, rational agents (can) issue imperatives all the time. But only in certain interpersonal contexts do these imperatives give rise to objectively binding moral obligations.
Agreed.
As an idealist who believes that there is only one cosmic mind (and we are dissociated aspects of it- separateness is an illusion), I would argue there are no moral imperatives, there is only a single cosmic mind dreaming and experiencing. Some of the dreams are horrific, but are bad dreams immoral? Is there a moral imperative for God to dream nothing but good dreams?
Yet of course, you have good evidence that you are not God, for you do not appear to be omnipotent, omniscient or omnibenevolent. Moral norms, and the norms of Reason more generally, do not seem to be emanating from you. So the additional premise seems unjustified.
The solipsist version of idealism you refer to is not characteristic of idealism per se. Idealism doesn't imply solipsism.
This 'criticism' is one that can be made of any analysis of morality. For instance, let's say that you believe (insanely) that moral norms emanate from Platonic forms - a view that is quite popular at the moment and goes by the names 'non-naturalism' or 'intuitionism' or 'non-reductionism'. Well, on that view if the Form of the Good commanded us to kill and steal, then doing so would be obligatory and good.
So it is a rubbish criticism, popular though it is. Plus my view can deal with it in a way that no other view can.
But before I do that, note the difference between the conditional 'if p, then Hitler's acts would have been right' and 'Hitler's acts were right'. The first is, as it stands, utterly innocuous, for it all depends on what 'p' stands for. The second is plainly false and stupid. If you think - as you do - that morality is made of our own commands, then it is the second, not the first, claim that you must affirm. If you do not affirm it, that is only because you don't understand your own view.
Quoting Bartricks
Then you say this:
Quoting neomac
Now, what you want everyone to know is that you've done an undergrad course in logic. But what it is plain to see is that, despite this, you can't actually follow an argument.
Do you actually have a criticism? I mean, do you think morality is not made of directives and values? Let's start there.
But that premise solves the question of where moral imperatives come from: there are no moral imperatives. If all that exists is one cosmic mind, how is there any morality? Does the one mind have moral imperatives as to how it treats itself?
Right.
It is very counter-intuitive. However, it doesn't seem impossible that a god could choose to experience things in a very limited way. If the goal is to experience as much as possible, then retaining the attributes of godhood would limit the experiences a god could have. I mean, a god can't very well experience things as a lowly human like me unless it becomes a lowly human like me (and bacteria, and virus, and aphid, and all the other limited things that are capable of having experiences).
Right.
There's no problem there - they come from a mind.
And they do exist - the reason (the faculty of resaon) of virtually everyone tells them that there are ways we ought to behave and ways we ought not to behave. Disagreement exists over exactly what we ought to do and ought not to do, but 'that' we ought to be doing some things and not others is beyond reasonable doubt.
Furthermore, we are talking about imperatives of Reason here (of which moral imperatives are simply a subset). You can't reasonably doubt that there are imperatives of Reason for a 'reasonable' doubt would itself appeal to some.
So, moral imperatives - which are imperatives of Reason - come from a mind. And as they exist, so too does the mind.
Quoting RogueAI
It's 'God' rather than 'a god', but yes, they could. That's why I did not say that it is impossible that you could be God. It is metaphysically possible. But you have no evidence that it is the case and, it would seem, plenty that you are not. For you do not appear to be omnipotent. When you try and levitate, for example, or try to will the world into a different form, these attempts fail. Now, perhaps they didn't fail and you simply duped yourself into thinking you tried to do them and failed, rather than actually did them and failed. I do not deny this possibility. But possibilities are not good evidence. Appearances, by contrast, are. And as you do not appear to be all powerful, all knowing and all good, you would be unreasonable if you believed yourself to be God nevertheless. Plus God wouldn't believe he's God, so there's that too.
If we stick to respecting appearances, then there appear to be norms of Reason - indeed, nothing could really 'appear' to be the case unless there were norms of Reason, for an appearance incorporates a representation of Reason - and these norms appear to have a unified source, Reason. And that source does not appear to be me or you, for we are 'subject' to these norms and do not seem to be their author. And it also appears to be the case that minds and minds alone can issue imperatives. And thus, when we apply our reason to the appearances we are told that Reason is a mind and that we ourselves are not that mind.
Quoting neomac
If your original argument is "patently obviously valid," you should be able to formalize it, like neomac formalized it above. (Formalize means something like to put into symbolic form. It's useful for looking at the form of an argument without the distractions of content.)
Neomac asked you to formalize but you seemed to think he meant formulate. He mean formalize.
Here's an introduction to formalization in propositional logic. Enjoy.
https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Introduction_to_formalisation_in_propositional_logic
My opinion:
1. You don't know how to formalize your argument - that's why you think it's deductively valid when it "patently, obviously" isn't.
2. Once you take the time to learn how to formalize your argument, you will see it's "patently, obviously" invalid.
Show me how this syllogism is unsound:
1. A person who doesn't know how to formalize his argument can't possibly have a PhD in philosophy.
2. Bartricks doesn't know how to formalize his argument.
3. Bartricks can't possibly have a PhD in philosophy.
1 is false.
You're mistaking being able to formalize an argument with being good at arguing. That's like mistaking being unable to speak Italian with being unable to argue well. If I have a PhD without ever having learnt the squiggle squoggle language, does that imply I am good at arguing or bad at it? What do you think?
Presumably you think Irving Berlin, Jimi Hendrix, the Beatles, Prince, Eric Clapton, and so on, were all shit at music because they couldn't read music? Yes? Someone should have told them and then we could have been spared all that noise they called tunes.
But anyway, this:
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
is not the argument made in the OP.
I argued if moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason, and if Reason is unitary, and if imperatives have to have a mind to issue them, then Reason is a single mind.
Formally, that's this: :<- [//****]. = <$@#***** ===$$//>
See?
Oh, sorry, made a slight error above - there should, of course, be 950 $ signs after the equals sign. Silly me.
Quoting Bartricks
Anyone can assert validity and that's all you're doing here: asserting validity. Validity is easy to assert. But you need to demonstrate validity. Otherwise, consider your argument dismissed.
Formalization is the best way to demonstrate validity.
I think neomac formalized your argument correctly and proved its invalidity. Show us where neomac's formalization is in error or be dismissed.
Every PhD in music can read music.
Dismissed.
To get a PhD in philosophy from a top university you need to be really good at arguing. And in case you haven't noticed, that's what I is. I can tell a good argument from a bad one without having to squiggle squoggle them first.
Oh, and Paul McCartney does have a PhD in music. You lose.
You're actually horrible at arguing. You're deluded. Your ego has blinded you. Take care.
Confidence: the water of the wise man, the liquor of the fool.
To get into an undergrad program in music you have to know how to read music so your assertion is total nonsense.
You lose.
Good night.
(McCartney is also a knight: another honorary title.)
No, I'm really good at it. I do it for a living.
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
No, I think I am good at something I have documentary evidence I am good at.
Anyway, all you have to do to demonstrate to me that I am bad at arguing is show me that my argument is a bad one.
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
Paul McCartney has a PhD, but can't read music. Thus, not all PhDs in music can read music. It's an honorary PhD, but you didn't qualify your premise.
Get neomac to formalize that for you. No doubt it'd be this: if p then r, if i then t, therefore S. That's the above argument formalized neomac-style.
Anyway, take me to school daddio and show me my mistakes (in English please papa).
You're all ego and delusion and I hope you find a way through the fog. I won't be talking to you again. Take care.
No, those are faults you have, not me. I've earned the right to consider myself good at arguing. You haven't and you've just decided - and this expresses the size of your ego - that because what I am saying doesn't make sense to you, it must be stupid. Yet you can say nothing specific in criticism of my case. So your objection is not rational and expresses a misguided confidence in your own superior ability, yes?
Do you think moral imperatives are not imperatives, for instance? Or not imperatives of Reason?
Or do you think that something other than a mind can issue an imperative?
Appeal to authority is a fallacy if, for instance, said authority is defective in some way. God's perfect, He doesn't make mistakes and if, perchance, one has any misgivings regarding a divine command, it can only imply our inability to comprehend true/real goodness. Sounds to me like the emperor has no clothes tale: The emperor is naked I tell you! No, imbecile, your stupidity and lowly rank prevents you from seeing the emperor's splendid attire! :grin:
Conspiracy theory, oui?
It's a theory about what's needed for morality to exist. It is no different in this respect from a theory about what's needed for a mushroom soup to exist.
And morality demonstrably requires God. For moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason. And the imperatives of Reason have a single source: Reason (that's why we call them imperatives of Reason). And only a mind can issue an imperative. Thus Reason is a mind. And that mind would, by virtue of being the mind of Reason, be omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. That is, the mind would be the mind of God.
So far no one has located an error in my reasoning. Note: I hold this view as a result of reasoning about the nature of morality. If an error is located, I will abandon it.
God, as having created our universe, seems to have fashioned it in a way that evil is permissible. What does that tell you about divine command theory?
What's up, Smith. :smile:
Bartrick's statement here is demonstrably false. Many forum members have found many, many errors in Bartrick's reasoning. Read the thread and you will see. Have fun! :smile:
Nothing. It tells us something about us and our situation. But it does not challenge the idea that moral imperatives are imperatives, or that they are imperatives of Reason, or that Reason has a sole source, or that imperatives are only issued by minds.
Here:
1. If God exists, God would not suffer innocent people to live in ignorance in a dangerous world
2. God exists (for imperatives of Reason exist and they wouldn't unless God did).
3. Therefore, God does not suffer innocent people to live in ignorance in a dangerous world
4. We are living in ignorance in a dangerous world
5. Therefore, we are not innocent.
And if you're wondering why God created evil folk like us:
1. If God exists, he would not create ignorant evil folk
2. God exists
3. Therefore, God did not create ignorant evil folk
4. We are ignorant evil folk
5. Therefore we are not creations of God.
Quoting Bartricks
Deduction at its best.
Just wondering though, wouldn't it be easier (on our egos among other things) to simply give up the idea of God, come to terms with the Sky Father being merely a figment of our imagination, a sign of our desperation?
Quoting ZzzoneiroCosm
I hope I still remember how. The last time I had fun was when I was 12. :sad:
> But you need it spelt out as it is not immediately apparent to you. Like I say, a bad sign!
Ma’am can you intellect that is not a moral imperative of Reason to prove you anything in this forum nor to do the job of clarifying your views for you?
> All logic does is formalize what we can see by reason;
So what? Formalisation would still be useful, among others, b/c “others need to be taught how to look properly”. We are here to engage in philosophical debates in a public forum as anonymous users and no background knowledge about formal logic and related notions is required to participate to this forum. So it’s matter of intellectual honesty to be clear whenever possible, especially if this doesn’t require much effort, and we are uncertain about what relevant assumptions we actually share on a given subject.
> Anyway, you have said precisely nothing to address the argument.
Ma’am can you intellect that is not a moral imperative of Reason to entertain you in this forum?
> So all I was doing was showing you how the original was valid, for it seemed you could not see it by direct rational intuition (which is a really bad sign)
OK since by textual formalisation you are still not seeing that your original argument is not logically valid, despite you persistently claiming otherwise, do you see at least my middle finger to you with your rational intuition? Coz if you don’t, you better take your rational intuition to an optician.
In other words, since “you need it spelt out as it is not immediately apparent to you”, you made just the two most stupid claims in this thread. So suck it up and move on. You are fooling nobody, Bartrickster.
> Do you actually have a criticism?
Not yet, since your 4 deductions are so theoretically loaded that it’s even hard to understand how to unpack them. Additionally, no offense, but I don’t particularly enjoy exploring the extent of your intellectual dishonesty.
However, since you keep claiming that only 4 out your 8 premises are open to question and unless this claim of yours simply means that Bartricks is open to address doubts only against 4 out of 8 premises (which I don’t care, of course), then I will counter that indeed all 8 premises can be questioned (which is why it's important and more honest to spell them out from the start). And by that, I mean there are pertinent reasons to doubt the meaning or the truth of the given premises, either because they are not so strongly supported by our more general background knowledge or because they are not analytically evident (especially if no analysis of the relevant notions has been provided yet). If these reasons are compelling or not it’s entirely another matter and can be settled only by adequate arguments.
So here we go with your 8 premises and how one could question them (maybe there are other ways to question them, but my goal is exclusively to show that they can be pertinently questioned):
> 1. If moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason, then they all have a single source: Reason
> 2. Moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason
What are the reasons to support the first claim? We have societies with different law systems, so with different sources for legal behavior, why can’t it be the same for moral imperatives? Why should there be only one source for moral imperatives?
What are the reasons to support the second claim? Why can’t we talk of imperatives of emotions (as Hume could suggest) or will (as in the DCT argument proposed in the main post)?
> 1. If something is issuing imperatives, then it is a mind
> 2. Reason issues imperatives
What are the reasons to support the first claim? If the notion of “mind” is contrasted to the notion of “matter”, does that mean that a materialist view is incompatible with issuing imperatives? How so?
What are the reasons to support the second claim? What is “issuing imperatives” by Reason supposed to mean? Why can’t Reason just produce or consist in possible state of affairs which are morally good (where morally good is an intrinsic property different from aesthetically good and instrumentally good) that then human reason can identify and take as a source for issuing moral imperatives b/c, say, humans are attracted to moral goods as much as to aesthetic goods?
> 1. If Reason is a mind, then Reason is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent (God)
> 2. Reason is a mind
What are the reasons to support the first claim? Why are omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent attributed to Reason as a consequence of Reason being a mind? Also humans have minds but they do not seem omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. Besides Reason can be understood also in kantian terms, and not as a sort of divine entity.
What are the reasons to support the second claim? Why Reason is mind, and not mind and matter or just matter?
> 1. If moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason, then they are imperatives of God
> 2. Moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason
What are the reasons to support the first claim? Why are moral imperatives imperatives of God and not Gods? Why can’t Reason be shared between a plurality of divine entities as much as the divine nature is shared by 3 persons of the Holy Trinity?
What are the reasons to support the second claim? The preposition “of” in “imperatives of Reason” is ambiguous b/c it can express both a subjective and objective genitive (i.e. “Reason issues moral imperatives”, “moral imperatives are about Reason”), but depending on how we understand “moral imperatives” (see also the other previous questions) this notion can be compatible maybe with only one of the 2 senses and not the other. Besides should we take this claim as an identity or as an inclusion? Can't there be immoral imperatives of Reason (think of the case of Abraham & Isaac)?
There might be logic links between the 8 premises and the way we question them, but this depends on how these 8 premises are properly spelt out and how they are questioned. So nothing we can really decide a priori just from your 4 deductions.
Conclusion: unless the claim that only 4 out of 8 premises are open to question simply means that Bartricks is open to address doubts against only 4 out of 8 premises (which I don’t care, of course), then all 8 premises (not 4, not 5, not 6, not 7, but 8, exactly all 8 premises out of 8 premises!) can be pertinently questioned. Q.E.D.
How can you be so sure? And if it were so, one would have to question every prescriptive moral theory. One must then not be afraid of doing so.
Quoting Bartricks
I have also presented a theory here that may be able to deal with it:
an original transcendental (meta-Kantian) moral theory
Quoting Bartricks
Then give an explanation of the following problem:
Quoting spirit-salamander
Don't you think it
Quoting spirit-salamander
Paul has received honorary degrees from several universities, but he never attended college. But maybe I'm wrong - please provide some documentation for this claim.
Try harder.
Quoting neomac
Why are you crossing out 'Reason' and replacing it with 'reason'? It's 'Reason' not 'reason'. The source of normative reasons is traditionally called 'Reason' with a capital 'R' (because 'reason' is ambiguous).
Quoting neomac
Do you mean what reason do we have to think it is true? Why do you think we call them imperatives of Reason? My imperatives are called imperatives of Bartricks. Yours are called the imperatives of a hand-dryer. The mark of a rational imperative - an imperative of Reason - is that it comes from Reason. Now, there are lots more arguments for the unity of Reason - and relatedly, for the unity of morality - but that will do and is sufficient to place the burden of proof on you (and note, you don't discharge a burden of proof by pointing to brute possibilities - so stop asking questions and make an actual argument in support of your arbitrary belief that imperatives of Reason do not have a singular source in Reason - good luck with that).
Quoting neomac
Like I say, you clearly don't really understand how arguments work. They are imperatives of Reason, and Reason is a mind, and the mind in question would have the properties of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence.
Why can't they be imperatives of multiple minds? Because a group of minds is not itself a mind and it is only minds that can issue imperatives. If there were multiple minds, then in virtue of what would their imperatives be the imperatives of Reason? Furthermore, it is a principle of Reason that one should not posit more entities than is needed to get the job done: one mind is sufficient. So, positing several would be a) incoherent and b) ontologically extravagant (there's a big word for you - you can blow that at people in the future). Note as well, that even if one can coherently posit several minds (and one can't) - and it is not ontologically extravagant to do so (and it is) - you would not have refuted divine command theory, for all you will have done is multiply the number of gods!
Quoting neomac
Kant is never clear about what Reason is. He talks about imperatives of Reason and faculties of reason, but seems confused about what or who Reason itself is. So you'll get no help from Kant on that front.
If Reason is a mind then that mind would be omnipotent because she'd get to determine what is and isn't possible. And she'd be omniscient because she'd get to determine what is and isn't known. And she'd be omnibenevolent because she'd fully approve of how she is. That's why.
Quoting neomac
If I said "let's go to the bank and withdraw some money" would you respond "the word 'bank' is ambiguous as it all depends on whether it has subjective or objective preposterous genitals - do you mean a financial institution, or the side of a valley, or 'turn'?" Yes you would, wouldn't you. You're clearly one of those Dyson hand-dryers that insist you put your hands in a narrow slot and then blow them to the side so that they flap into the dried piss of the previous user's hands - very tedious and annoying.
Imperatives of Reason are imperatives that are emanating from Reason. As is obvious from the argument.
Quoting neomac
What? Gibberish. Only 4 premises can be questioned for all of the others follow logically from them. But you can't see that, can you? Here: $$$<<< =X///$$$$$$$$$$$ There, see now? Or should I put a few boxes and rhomboids in there?
Quoting neomac
Not 'Q.E.D. but 'W.T.F'. I have literally no idea what you are on about at this point.
Now, do you have an actual argument to make that calls into question the truth of any of the four premises of my argument?
I am trying to figure out what's true, not what it is easiest to believe. God exists, as my argument demonstrates. And the 'problem' of evil is no problem at all, just evidence that we are not God's creations and that we are in a penal colony as just punishment for previous immoral behaviour.
Well, I showed you how it would apply to non-naturalism. Nothing stops 'the Form of the Good' from issuing a prescription to kill others for fun, does it? So, it applies to non-naturalism.
What about naturalism? Well, if natural features can issue prescriptions - and obviously they cannot, but the naturalist thinks otherwise (or else isn't talking about morality at all) - then what stops the natural world or some relevant part of it (the trees, perhaps) from issuing a prescription to kill others for fun? Nothing. Yet were it to do so, then killing others for fun would be right. So it applies to naturalism.
I take it that you now reject those two kinds of view?
Right, moving on....well, it clearly applies to individual and collectivist subjectivist views, for nothing stops me from issuing a command to others to kill others for fun, and nothing stops a collective from doing the same (apart from the incoherence of thinking that collectives are themselves minds capable of issuing imperatives, of course).
So, I take it that you now reject individual subjectivist views - such as your own - and collectivist subjectivist views?
What about nihilism? Well, most nihilists think that morality is at least capable of existing, they just think it does not. So they think that there is a 'possible world' in which some acts are right and some wrong. But if they admit that there is a possible world in which some acts are right and some wrong, then they should accept that there are other possible worlds in which very different acts are right and wrong, such as killing others for fun. For in these possible worlds one of the above theories about morality will be true, and we've just seen that they can't rule out such possibilities.
So, I take it that you now reject this kind of nihilism as well.
The only view to which the criticism could not be made, would be the view that morality is incoherent and thus is incapable of existing. However, a proponent of that view thinks Hitler actually did nothing wrong. And if one is fine with that view, then it would be somewhat ridiculous to reject views that allow that it is metaphysically possible for Hitler's acts not to be wrong, but that they were in fact very wrong indeed, wouldn't it?!? So I take it that you reject that view too.
So, the criticism can be made of all alternatives worth considering. And it is my view and mine alone that can deal with it.
Note, you are now in the incoherent position of having rejected all possible views about the nature of morality. So, if you are logical, you will now realize that something must be wrong with the criticism, for they can't all be false.
Do your own research grandpa. Paul McCartney has a PhD in music. It's an honorary PhD. Go look at the argument I was addressing and see if the premises were qualified so as to rule out honorary PhDs.
And then try and engage with something relevant to the OP. You people - total lack of focus. I hope none of you are air traffic controllers.
No, God is a person.
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> try harder
What for?
> Why are you crossing out 'Reason' and replacing it with 'reason'? It's 'Reason' not 'reason'. The source of normative reasons is traditionally called 'Reason' with a capital 'R' (because 'reason' is ambiguous).
Your typo, remember? Anyway, I fixed it.
> is sufficient to place the burden of proof on you
I already proved my point. Suck it up and move on.
> Why can't they be imperatives of multiple minds? Because a group of minds is not itself a mind and it is only minds that can issue imperatives. If there were multiple minds, then in virtue of what would their imperatives be the imperatives of Reason? Furthermore, it is a principle of Reason that one should not posit more entities than is needed to get the job done: one mind is sufficient. So, positing several would be a) incoherent and b) ontologically extravagant (there's a big word for you - you can blow that at people in the future). Note as well, that even if one can coherently posit several minds (and one can't) - and it is not ontologically extravagant to do so (and it is) - you would not have refuted divine command theory, for all you will have done is multiply the number of gods!
Well at least nobody can say you don’t know how to glorify your intellectual failures.
Here some charitable thoughts for you:
> Only 4 premises can be questioned for all of the others follow logically from them. But you can't see that, can you? Here: $<<<=X///
Indeed, by randomly typing on a keyboard, you immediately look much smarter! So keep practicing!
> If Reason is a mind then that mind would be omnipotent because she'd get to determine what is and isn't possible. And she'd be omniscient because she'd get to determine what is and isn't known. And she'd be omnibenevolent because she'd fully approve of how she is. That's why.
Such unsolicited apodictic claims show how much you are into these old smelly scholastic farts. And that’s a second good reason why it’s pointless to argue with you about your DTC theory (especially if your preposterous terminology has not been adequately clarified). Scholastic junkies are just "ontologically extravagant entities" ;) which a principle of Reason requires me to simply get rid of (or laugh at, if in the right mood).
> Now, do you have an actual argument to make that calls into question the truth of any of the four premises of my argument?
No Fartrrricks. With you it’s not matter of truth. It’s just matter of very poor philosophical taste and lots of intellectual dishonesty. It would be stupid not to see it.
Quoting EricH
Quoting Bartricks
When someone says they have a certain degree in some subject, the default assumption is that they actually attended school and earned the degree. By leaving out "PhD" in your original comment you committed a lie of omission.
But if we are including honorary, then the correct statement should have been that Paul has multiple PhDs in music. And I know that you want to be accurate (as we all do).
I'm not so sure about that. Just because you ought to do something does not mean there's a moral obligation. For example, if I want to be a champion chess player, then I ought to practice chess, but I'm under no moral obligation to practice chess.
It seems obvious that we ought not torture children for the fun of it, but even there, I can remove the moral component if I stipulate that there are no children- there's only the one mind and what different aspects of it are doing to itself in its dreams. But still, I would agree that even in a dream, children should not be tortured, but not for moral reasons, but because doing things like torturing children and in general behaving like an egotistically ass in this dream we're all having will not help one reach one's goal: to wake up.
Presumably because also the floors are worth watching.
https://www.google.com/search?q=sistine+chapel+floor&tbm=isch&ved=2ahUKEwjKyamp8ZP2AhUEkFwKHcmZC64Q2-cCegQIABAA&oq=sistine+chapel+floor&gs_lcp=CgNpbWcQAzIFCAAQgAQyBQgAEIAEMgYIABAFEB4yBAgAEBgyBAgAEBg6BAgAEEM6BggAEAoQGDoGCAAQCBAeUIYKWPQ0YI09aAVwAHgAgAE-iAG7CpIBAjI3mAEAoAEBqgELZ3dzLXdpei1pbWewAQDAAQE&sclient=img&ei=CiQVYsqcA4Sg8gLJs67wCg&client=firefox-b-d
Yes, normative oughts can be generated by any kind of normative reason, not just moral ones. In the chess case the 'ought' is the ought of instrumental rationality, not morality. That is, you have instrumental reason - rather than moral reason - to practice chess.
We can distinguish, then, between instrumental imperatives of Reason and moral imperatives of Reason. But my argument applies to them both. Moral imperatives and instrumental imperatives are imperatives of Reason. They have a different character in that instrumental imperatives tell you what to do to further your own ends, whereas moral imperatives tell you to regulate that instrumental project in ways that respect others (and typically if you do not abide by a moral imperative you deserve to come to harm, whereas if you do not abide by an instrumental imperative you do not deserve to come to harm). But they're all imperatives and they have the same source: Reason. And as they're imperatives they need an imperator. And as only a mind can be an imperator, Reason - the source of all the imperatives of Reason, is a mind.
In other words, it is normativity that is doing the work of getting me to my conclusion. Morality is just a very clear case of something that is essentially normative.
That's why the argument constitutes a proof of God. For though it is possible, coherently, to deny the reality of moral imperatives, it does not seem coherently possible to deny the reality of all imperatives of Reason, for one's basis for doing so would, of necessity, be non-rational and thus count for nothing, or else would confirm what one was seeking to deny.
:100:
Chapel was pretty cool but my favorite was the Gallery of Maps
Not to mention that there is lots to learn from the history of Mona Lisa frames too:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mona_Lisa#Frame
https://artjourneyparis.com/blog/mona-lisa-story-behind-fame.html