To What Extent are Mind and Brain Identical?
I am sure that my question is not new, but a recurring philosophy question It seems that there is a large corresponding between the brain and mind and associated states of consciousnes. However, explaining this appears complex, especially in terms of how the physical gives rise to the mental states, or vice versa. Within the debate between materialism and idealism it could be asked which is primary?
However, as human beings, each of us has a brain and associated mental states and so much comes down to understanding of how our experience and thinking has come about. The brain as an aspect of the wiring of consciousness is so extremely important, but are brain and mind completely identical? What about states of bodily sensation and it could even be asked what are bodies? They incorporate so much of what it means to be alive, but it could be asked, to what extent is consciousness an aspect of bodily expression or of brain? What is the role of the brain in the experience of consciousness, including the whole realm of sensations and the nature of emotions ?. To what extent is consciousness based on the physical basis of human experiences?
I am sure that this is not in any way a new theme or question, but one which remains as a recurrent aspect of philosophy and the nature of human consciousness. We could also ask what is 'mind?
However, as human beings, each of us has a brain and associated mental states and so much comes down to understanding of how our experience and thinking has come about. The brain as an aspect of the wiring of consciousness is so extremely important, but are brain and mind completely identical? What about states of bodily sensation and it could even be asked what are bodies? They incorporate so much of what it means to be alive, but it could be asked, to what extent is consciousness an aspect of bodily expression or of brain? What is the role of the brain in the experience of consciousness, including the whole realm of sensations and the nature of emotions ?. To what extent is consciousness based on the physical basis of human experiences?
I am sure that this is not in any way a new theme or question, but one which remains as a recurrent aspect of philosophy and the nature of human consciousness. We could also ask what is 'mind?
Comments (156)
We could ask about the whole nature of correspondences and causation in general. The brain may be the apparatus of the mind, but the exact nature of causal reality may be more complex, especially as to how the material gives rise to specific states of mind in terms of human experiences.
@180 Proof, I'm only guessing, would've said, as walking is to legs so mind is to brain. Once we look at mind as a function, Putnam's notion of multiple realizability becomes powerful and minds can be transferred from one medium to another, like people moving homes. I guess the notion of a soul was millennia ahead of its time.
I would say the opposite, the brain gives rise to the mind. The material gives rise to the immaterial. As the wood gives rise to the fire.
If we stick to the fire analogy, there is slightly more to it than just fire from wood. You need oxygen to feed the fire, and a spark to start it. What is the “oxygen” and “spark” for a mind? If we figure out when the mind comes online, perhaps the “spark” is somewhere around that time…being born maybe?
The “oxygen” might be the brains interaction with everything not brain like sensory organs or environmental influences.
It is indeed a puzzle and I imagine that 180 Proof may have something to say if he is not sick and tired of this underlying question in philosophy. I wonder to what extent it can ever be explored sufficiently or whether many of us could spend our entire lives wondering about the nature of consciousness, especially how it is bound up with the nature of matter, as the underlying basis of it, as one of the central philosophy conundrums.
We could ask is the physical the starting point for mind? I am not saying that they are not, but I do wonder about this, especially in relation to philosophies of idealism, such as those of Berkeley. Are these outdated ideas? The exact same role of matter and mind, or which is primary seems to be essential within philosophy. Is it possible that it may go beyond an either/ or? What is mind and matter and how are the two differentiated in the first place? Is dualism is an issue here, although I am certainly not clear where mind and body end or merge, especially in the realms of emotions.
The short answer is that we don't know.
A longer answer is that the term "identical" isn't useful here, a brain is not like experience. We in fact can see this empirically, we see brains outside of heads, lacking experience. Or in the cases in which a person is conscious and a surgeon sees inside the brain, the surgeon sees the brain as it appears to his experience, and not experience itself.
All we can say, at this point, is that the brain is a necessary condition for experience. But the how this is possible question, might well be beyond our capacities to understand, which is very plausible.
Two points – (1) walking : legs :: mind-ing : brain (IME "mind" is an abbreviation for the verb minding) and (2) "soul" is a nonphysical entity separate from the brain, which assumes "substance dualism" (re: MBP which was dissolved about three and a half centuries ago by Spinoza via 'property dualism', etc) and so what's called "soul" is not analoguous or related to what cognitive neuroscientists (re: functionalists) call "mind" – minding – today. Also: multiple realizability says that the connectome ('pattern of functions' of which minding consists) is like digital files that can be transferred from a CD to a flash drive or a DVD, that is, encoded into a different substrates; your analogy of "people moving houses" doesn't work, Fool, because minding is a property and not a separate entity like people who exist without, or separate from, houses (which implies 'minding separate from a brain' or 'walking without legs' ... :roll:).
I would argue the concept mind is not equivalent to the brain but to the entire body. No other entity, least of all parts of that entity, engage in any act of minding. Besides, what is a brain absent the blood or oxygen or energy or support from the rest of the organism?
This is the mind/body problem, tweaked a little.
We have no idea what “material” or “physical” or “body” mean.
So there is no problem.
Quoting khaled
I used this last week. I like it so much, I'll use it again.
To the same extent that your TV set is identical to "Gilligan's Island."
:kiss:
We could ask what is physical and what is not. In some ways, this may appear as a stupid question, but, on an experiential level of existence in terms of living in a spectrum of living as embodied minds this may make sense. In other words, to what is do mind and matter come together in the realisation of embodied human experience?
But we know how a television and computer work.
Besides that, the brain is a concept. Concepts are an aspect of thinking. Thinking is something people do. So again it’s a problem of whether we believe in materialism or, perhaps better, the “physical” world. There isn’t a technical notion or theory in which “material” or “body” (which would include the brain) are defined— so there can’t be a mind-body problem.
:up:
An excellent question, yes.
Quoting Jack Cummins
You’re missing my point, though. To ask about mind and matter coming together begs the question. The question is: what is matter?
We can’t ask about whether something is or isn’t matter until we know what matter is. Or material, or body. There’s been no conception since the 17th century. So there’s really no problem, just speculation. We can define matter in many ways, just as we can define God in many ways. To me the questions about, for example, whether God is male or female, is as silly as asking about whether our being is physical or mental. May be fun to speculate about, but we’ll get precisely nowhere.
I have no doubt this will be discussed anyway, despite this obvious objection. But to me it’s a waste of time. I at least occasionally like to point it out when these threads are created.
And I repeat is again too. The brain is no medium through which information flows to show it to the ones watching. If you talk with your girlfriend there isn't some TV show that was once put on video that is passed to you. The TV is just part of the physical world neutrally passing images of that world from faraway times or faraway places. A computer does the same, basically.
There seems to be two ways of approaching the issue:
i) Armchair philosophy: A priori way. Just sit there in your favorite chair and see if the mind matters make sense. I suppose this can't be done with some empirical input; nevertheless, the idea is to look for inconsistencies in the Sherlockian sense (eliminate the impossible and whatever remains, no matter how improbable, is the truth).
ii) Neuroscience: A posteriori way. Do physical experiments and see how it pans out.
I see no reason why we can't do both. Get the best of both worlds, you know.
Speaking for myself, there's a very thought-provoking paradox lying at the heart of the issue: My mind knows, for sure, that this cup on my table is physical but it seems to be hopelessly incapable of ascertaining its own nature (physical/nonphysical). Contrary to the Delphic Oracle's nugget of advice - temet nosce (know thyself) - our minds are more confident about the not-mind than itself (the mind).
In a sense, then, we're not as self-aware as we think we are for there's a lacuna in our knowledge of ourselves, to be precise our minds, its true/real nature is unknown.
All that aside, I have a simple argument to make:
1. A mind [math]\rightarrow[/math] A brain [Premise, verifiable. Have you ever encountered a mind without a body?]
2. A brain [math]\rightarrow[/math] A mind [Premise, verifiable. A healthy brain is always conscious]
Ergo,
3. A brain [math]\leftrightarrow[/math] A mind [from 1, 2]
In short, as far as we can tell, mind = brain.
I'm with you on the mind being just what the brain does (physicalism), but, this is where we diverge, I'm persuaded to believe that the mind can be transferred from the brain to another substrate, preferrably something more durable with replaceable parts. :grin:
Ya I think its outdated. We have a lot of data now about how our minds are directly correlated to various parts of the brain. Its possible brain is where mind comes from but until we get new data that suggests otherwise I don’t see a basis to say otherwise.
Well…both of those are better than mine. I guess Ill just go fuck myself :razz:
I share the view that its more accurate to say body rather than brain, since the brain is affected by the rest of your body. We know that the foods and other things your body processes effect your mind/thoughts. I read your stomach has almost as many neural connections as your brain does.
This is also the reason I don’t by the conventional philosophical free will arguments, like you dont have free will because the decisions are locked in before your aware of them. Sure, science shows us that but just because its happening outside your awareness or elsewhere in your body doesn't mean its not you doing it.
Agency isnt your conscious mind, its your whole body.
I think science is on the verge of addressing this with conclusiveness. It is essentially the binding problem of consciousness: how do trillions of distinct biochemical ingredients produce the integrated perceptual substrate of experience?
Like every occurrence, experience must be caused by substances, so what is the binding property of substance? A simple explanation which scientists have provided much preliminary proof for is that the electromagnetic field of the brain has emergent organization driven by local field potentials (LFPs), with intentional will being like the gulf stream among the much more finely grained EM fields of particular neural networks. The brain's EM radiation then quantum superpositions into biochemical pathways of neurons, a process analogous to the simpler additive properties of light itself. EM radiation in the brain quickly decreases in intensity as it radiates, but the spread is still enough for billions of radiative fields to each bind thousands upon thousands of molecules into individual units, and these are the basic percepts, essentially quantum resonances that generate images, sounds, smells, etc. Neuronal matter must be extremely absorptive of EM radiation to cause these effects, explaining why it looks dark greyish from the outside while being subjective color, feel, thought - additive quantum resonance - from the inside.
Essentially, superposition must nondimensionally "feel" or at least involve physical fragments of feeling that are conglomerated into complex sensations and emotions by the brain and body's emergent organization. Complex quantum mechanisms are located throughout the body which cause these percepts to seem located in structures external to the brain such as sense organs. Synchronization of these percepts is orchestrated by "supervenient" LFPs conjuncted to biochemistry.
The soul's physical basis is a more obscure scientific problem, but it probably arises from nonelectromagnetic fields our instruments have not yet been able to detect that are more nonlocal in their causation, synchronizing matter in a similar way. Perhaps these nonelectromagnetic, aetherlike fields can manipulate electromagnetic matter so that percepts and what they perceive are generated outside a carbon-based body by similar field/superposition mechanisms.
All of this still has to be proven by research, but the experimental results so far always support the model, so it seems promising. Consciousness must be a result of substances the mind is made of, and this is how the evidence suggests those substances work.
I do think that the question of what is matter is extremely important, especially in relation to the underlying one of mind and matter. It can be asked if matter is the foundation of mind, but how do the two aspects come together and where diid matter arise from in the first instance? To what extent are mind and matter similar as aspects of metaphysics, or ways of describing important aspects of human constructs about this?
This may be a large question which arises in the area between philosophy and quantum physics..I wonder to what extent the findings of the physicists will throw some clarity, or whether it will give rise to so much more uncertainty and the whole philosophical questions about the nature of consciousness and substances underlying the existence of 'mind'.
So the material description is missing an essential part. The part experienced from within. You can make a map from the materialistic description to the the experienced one. Of course. But it doesn't explain consciousness, however necessary for being able to exist in the world.
Yes, it seems that in the current world of physics, what we call reality is actually understood as quantum waves, with discreet blobs of energy bobbing about on them. Seems kind of hard to talk about mind and body if this is what physicalism amounts to.
Personally, I struggle to understand how a mind would not be what a brain does. I lack the ability to relate fully to the supposed hard problem and to the idea of qualia and the notion of 'what it is like to be something' which seems to be at the heart of this debate for some very clever thinkers. Subjective experience is the crux of the matter.
Is consciousness is an immaterial property, a 'magic thing' that sits in our bodies for a while and then with death, transmigrates, or moves to be with the gods? Or is consciousness the product of brain function? John Searle described consciousness as being to the brain what digestion is to the stomach.
What we do know is that there seems to be a lot at stake in this subject. The outcome of this question seems likely to support or demolish the idea of the soul.
My question is this. If it could be conclusively proven that what we call mind is just what brains do, would intelligent people still believe in higher consciousness?
It does seem that so much time and energy is spent in explaining and thinking about the nature of consciousness. Of course, I have read the thread about enlightenment and probably spend the majority of my time in unenlightened states of consciousness. It can lead beyond the question of who am I, to what on earth is going on?
I wonder to what extent 'inside' and 'outside' are real, or fabrications of the human understanding of the experience of consciousness.
Instead of complicating our image of reality, I think quantum neuroscience along with field theory in physics will harmonize the physical and metaphysical so we have less cognitive dissonance in our picture of the world. All the intuitions of metaphysics that have been developed over the milennia and all the theoretical insights of technical philosophy and science will be bound into a unified framework allowing every individual and subculture to have a solid, compatible understanding of what is real. I think my comprehension of human nature and myself is greatly enriched by existing neuroscience, and this will be much more once consciousness is effectively modeled.
Of course uncertainties will still exist, but I think these are more endemic to the human condition as we have thus far experienced it than a consequence of any particular paradigm. Are skepticism, predestination, behaviorism, materialism, informationism, free will, individualism, chaos theory, deontology, utilitarianism etc. inhibiting or liberating to the human psyche? If we can consistently realize that all imaginable knowledge is to this point a temporary paradigm comprised fundamentally of concepts to be perpetually reconfigured as we innovate, not infallible truth, I think any furtherance of philosophy and science can only reinforce the insights associated with metaphysical perspectives and typically give purpose. But of course transition is always a gradual, multigenerational process requiring much diligence and reflection.
Prehistorically, a nonsustainable hunter-gatherer lifestyle of hominins decimated the world's species and introduced a strong strain of cruelty and violence into human nature and culture. With a scientific-theoretical component in our worldview we mitigated war, invented ecology, introduced recycling, protection of endangered species and nature preservation generally, etc. Technology causes many problems, but solves as many problems as it causes. If we transplanted antiquity's humans and values into our societies, the world would be so much worse than it is. The major problems modern civilizations face are a residue from the ancient past, not an outcome of the Information Age itself. Adapting to a lifestyle of high technology is still our huge challenge, but we have become better citizens in the process and can hopefully continue to do so. And should probably acknowledge we'll be screwed by a mass extinction event eventually without futuristic tech, so might as well try as much as we can to conscientiously advance and make it work.
It would likely be a positive development if neuroscientists are able to enable less cognitive dissonance. My only hope is that any such attempt, rather than putting limits on human potential, open it up to the most creative ones possible for the individual and humanity.
The interest in 'identity theory' (google it, I didn't know about it until it was pointed out to me) is that the duality that anchors our epistemology is not necessary any longer if states of the brain are whatever the 'real' as a one-to-one correspondence could possibly entail.
The element about the idea that most interests me is how the proposal could be tested. If what is said to be Two is actually One, won't I need a Third to arbitrate?
In fact that's the real problem.And the root question of mind-body problem also.
Objectivity is the platform for creative pursuits of even the most arcane kind to be possible, so fashioning a general framework and humanist value system for consciousness theory along with everything else is key for radical innovation to have more than an extremely improbable chance of actualization. Look at the pioneering quantum physicists or any intellectual progress, it always arises from the drive for some kind of social appeal, an optimal validation in some form.
Quoting Xtrix
"Physical" is an infinitely malleable category for every aspect of experience we can categorize as substance, usually by employing empirical methods.
"Material" in the context of neuroscience and consciousness theory has a similar meaning: physical "matter".
The "body" is carbon-based physiology, which consciousness transcends.
Seems simple enough to me.
It really can’t— and that’s the point. Not until we have an understanding of matter — which we don’t have. There was one, long ago, but that was abandoned.
So the question dissolves.
No, it isn’t. The question of whether the mind reduces to the activity of the brain is a variant, and it presumes we know what we’re talking about when we discuss the “physical.” But we don’t. Which is a reason these conversations continue endlessly.
Quoting Enrique
You, like many others before you, can define things any way you’d like. But what I’m talking about is a technical notion, not armchair meaning creation.
But beyond that, you’ve simply punted by employing “substance” and “empirical,” two more loaded terms. (Substance — especially — has a very long history.)
Then you go on to say that material is “physical”(substance-like) “matter” which — unless there’s matter out there that isn’t physical — is a redundancy.
This, so far we once again have armchair philosophy, consisting solely of moving words around. Material = matter = physical = substance. …And we’ve gotten precisely nowhere. What is substance?
But even if this were more coherent, it’d still miss the point entirely.
I’ll ignore the remark about consciousness “transcending” the body.
I guess piss on whatever you want and ignore the rest! This gets back to whether feelings = matter lol
I don't understand why that matters. I don't see any evidence that the brain is mysterious, just that we don't understand important things about how it works yet.
I didn't understand this argument before, and I don't understand it now.
I’d say not understanding how something works makes it pretty mysterious. If TV were to play movies without any understanding of how, I think that too would qualify as a mystery.
Regardless, the main point is that the entire idea of matter (which includes brains) is a mystery.
Every day, billions of people watch TV without any understanding of how it works. They don't think it's particularly mysterious.
Quoting Xtrix
I don't see matter as particularly mysterious either. "Not fully understood" is not the same as "mysterious." Also, matter also includes wood, computers, and TV sets.
If I watch TV, the TV merely functionss as an intermediary, a sophisticated medium, like air, by means of which information is sent to you. It's in principle the same like the air between you and me if we directly talk to each other. It can pass ?ive events of a plane hitting a twin tower or carry a picture and sound of you and me talking to each other from far away. It needs a camera though to serve as your faraway eye. And there lies your misunderstanding or inability to undestand. You think the TV gives an internal representation, an analogue of the stuff which is put inside it. This doesn't happen though, as it doesn't happen in air, the newspapers, a radio, or a computer.
Quoting T Clark
:100:
The thing is that mind is clearly something non physical. So either "physical" and "material"(brain) , as we define it according to the known existing nature elements, generates and interacts with something non material, something different. Either we still have a narrow perspective of what physical/material is. And what we consider as physical is much more complicated than what we already know and observe.
I think that your post is particularly interesting as the way in which the brain gives rise to mind is the part which is not known. The human mind is so complex, even if the mechanics are based on the brain.
Sure, but within that dualism the necessary brain/mind distinction is given, from which some relative primacy follows.......so why the question in the thread title?
Not true. The TV takes information from outside and then processes it to form the image and sound we see as the images. You would not be able to understand the electromagnetic signal put out by the transmitter. Let's give up on this discussion.
Quoting Cartuna
Another good reason to stop the conversation.
Exactly. A medium, like I wrote. You tele see. A far away image or one from the past. Of course that needs more than aether or air. The image is not formed inside the TV but merely transmitted by it.
It's my duty, as a scientist, being loyal to the imperative of the Sciences, to correct you. Others may take your false image of reality for granted...The Truth must be told...
Slight tangent, but supradimensional causation within spacetime transcending aether that matter, physiology, electricity, technology etc. are embedded in? What does physics have to say about it?
Of course they do. It’s a total mystery — to them. A black box. They’re aware that experts know how it works.
Quoting T Clark
I know. Which is why you, like many others on here, continue on with these conversations.
But there hasn’t been a technical notion of matter for centuries, despite your feelings.
Plenty of people argue the same thing about God, incidentally. God isn’t “fully understood,” but not mysterious. I don’t find that very convincing. I also said nothing about “fully understood.”
Quoting dimosthenis9
First we have to know what physical means. Which we don’t. So the statement is meaningless.
So, you do not consider the Standard Model a "technical notion?"
Quoting Xtrix
I believe that was me. Quoting Xtrix
That's a different discussion. If you don't understand that, then this one is pointless.
By physical we mean what science have identified and observed so far. We define physical and material according to what science taught us so far. If and when we discover more about it then we can re-define what physical and material is.
Or else playing that definition game won't allow us to talk about anything at all! At the end which exact statement is not meaningless and what exactly is it that we know for sure what exactly is?! Can we define exactly what a tree is? Or only what our senses perceive?We can play that definition game endlessly but if that was the case then philosophy couldn't deal or say anything at all. It doesn't work that way.
The standard model is a theory, not a technical notion. It does deal with particles and forces, but doesn’t give a technical notion of matter.
Quoting T Clark
Yes, one where the same logic your using us also applied. That should tell you something.
So “physical” means anything science has identified and observed. First we have to know what makes something science — but leaving that aside: we don’t observe photons — are they not physical? What about forces? They’re identified, certainly — but so is the mind, and love, and morality. All “identified” as such.
You’re not providing a technical notion. You’re providing yet another personal take on the matter.
Quoting dimosthenis9
We can talk about all kinds of things. We talk about “work” all the time, for example. We go to work every day or work from home. We all know what that means in everyday life. When pressed to define it, many people would give various answers. We talk about God and the meaning of life.
But in the context of an explanatory theory, in science, “work” is used in a very different way. It has a precise definition, given to it within a theory.
In the 17th century, the mechanical philosophy prevailed. Descartes, Galileo, etc. Bodies were given a technical notion, involving contact action. Newton destroyed that. There hasn’t been another since.
So we can talk in everyday terms, or we can talk in technical terms about things. The former gets us nowhere, in this case, and the latter doesn’t exist.
So there is no problem, and the question is meaningless.
What’s the difference between mind and xchssertmison? Are they the same? Are they different? What’s the problem with these questions, exactly? Should be obvious.
This is how I kind of see the mind/brain thing.
The interaction of the body with the environment changes the physicochemical composition of the body, including that of the brain. If we imagine there exists an organ able to integrate changes in the physicochemical composition of the brain, we could suppose that the mind is the net result of such integration. In this scenario, the mind is not identical to the brain (the whole brain is not the mind); however, the mind is a part of and dependent on the brain. Keep in mind that in this scenario, such integrating organ is not affected, at least directly, by the (external) environment but by the physicochemical composition of the brain. The mind is NOT the molecular mechanism responsible for integrating changes in the physicochemical state of the brain; instead, it is what happens when the integrating molecular mechanism is activated.
Edit: you are not seeing a computer screen, you are "seeing" molecular processes that occur as a result of your body interacting with the computer screen.
The idea of the 'mind' involving a whole interaction with the environment makes sense in many ways, especially with regard to the whole body. After all we are not just heads, with other parts dangling on as extra parts. The whole experience of the body includes the whole relationship between the physical aspects of the environment, such as factors like being hot or cold, what food and fluid has been taken in, and these also affect the brain and thought processes.
It would also follow that social aspects affect the mind too, and the whole emotional aspects of life, which are interconnected with the brain. Human beings are affected by the quality of the relationships they have with others. Self worth and self esteem, even the will to live and purpose are based on aspects of interpersonal interaction and how this contributes to a sense of the quality of a person's life and sense of wellbeing.
Photons are identified with technological scientific means and exist on their own in nature(even without human existence). So of course are physical. Love and morality are human aspects of human behavior.So of course non physical. I don't see any connection here. The difference is obvious.
Quoting Xtrix
So it is a meaningless question that disturbs philosophy and science all these centuries?And even nowadays.
Again with your way of thinking we can't talk about anything at all.Even if the definitions aren't crystal clear in some cases and we still discover things, that doesn't mean that we can't talk about them.This definition game that some members play here in TPF is outrageous.
Throughout history in some cases even analyzing everyday terms and finding new ideas about them is what leaded humanity to technical terms.
Physical world is whatever exists in universe and we have scientific observed and verified. Mind is something that we are sure that exists from our internal empirical observation of ourselves but still science hasn't observed its form. Its essence. So of course we can talk about that distinction.
Explain how a theory is not also a "technical notion". (What do you mean by "technical"?)
Matter denotes dissipative structure. Material objects (e.g. events, things) are dissipative structures and material processes (e.g. hurricanes, radioactivity) are dissipative systems. Unless, however, one discounts – denies – both thermal and cosmic entropy, then ... :roll:
Quoting dimosthenis9
Explain how we/you know this to be true.
My statement is based on the fact that science hasn't been able to find a physical form to describe the essence of thoughts, ideas etc. At least not yet.
Can we examine for example thoughts? Can we "see" them and consider them as something material? As other elements in universe that we can observe even with technological science tools?
For me it sounds extremely weird how someone can consider mind, thoughts etc as something material.
So either it's something non physical that as to exist presupposes brain (material) and interacts with it or what we consider as physical is something more than we already know but we haven't discovered it yet. At least that's how my mind tries to wrap about this issue.
Cause that's what humanity always did. Not my stuff. It's our a priori thirst for answers.
Philosophy was always trying to find possible explanations for things that couldn't yet be understood. And in many cases it was ideas of possible explanations that were put in scientific trial and then proved to be right.
As long as someone isn't dogmatic about it and claims to hold the absolute truth (which of course I don't) I see no problem in making suggestions. Otherwise you can name all philosophical theories throughout history which aren't(or at least weren't at their time) proven scientifically as shit. I don't though.
Appeal to popularity fallacy. C'mon ...
That's mere nosiness, or curiosity, not wonder (Plato et al). Philosophers strive to reflectively reason to better, more probative, questions. An answer, after all, is only a question's way of generating another question – wonder is not satisfied by "answers".
This is so ... confused. Philosophy, as I understand it, describes (or critiques), at most, concepts, interpretations and other discursive practices for clarity's sake. Science, on the other hand, concerns testable explanations of phenomena that's either observed or postulated. Philosophy, dimo, isn't theoretical and doesn't consist of propositions (truths) about the physical world or nature (like e.g. logic, mathematics, theology, etc).
I think it is necessary to recognize at the outset that identifying the mind and the brain is a uniquely western problem. Eastern cultures have a tradition of fundamental spiritualization (Weber, Jaspers, etc.) compared to Western that, to a certain extent, transcends the mind-brain problem.
No doubt the brain is capable of engendering behaviours in response to stimuli. But if you adopt the spiritual perspective, these behaviours themselves could be thought of as subject to direction. A theory of will could be constructed along these lines.
Philosophy isn't theoretical? I can't understand that. What else is? Practical?
So for example Kant who made suggestions and propositions about space and time was full of shit for you??
Obviously... But maybe I might learn something here – Cite a "philosophical theory", dimo, that has been tested by making unique predictions about the physical / natural world with repeatable experiments. I'll wait. :yawn:
Yeah I did .Both of them. And that's why I asked you. Have you? Kant makes possible explanations about space time and also explanations about human a priori abilities. Are these full of shit for you?I will wait.
What exactly are you talking about? You misrepresent my views and you ask me to answer to your fictional questions also? Where exactly i stated that philosophy is science? I just mention that philosophy provides science with ideas and attempts to form suggestions for possible explanations. That's all and that is extremely helpful.
Who told you that I think my opinion that thoughts are non physical as true for sure? It's just my view. Explain how thoughts are physical then. Can you?
Please you better stop it. You embarrass yourself.
Quoting DingoJones
Quoting TheMadFool
None of this helps at all. My mind is not made up of jittering neurons and electric currents. My mind is made up of colors, shapes, sounds, smells, tastes and feelings. Walking legs, burning wood, and functioning computers are all composed of these components of mind. Brains are no different. Why can't you see a mind when you look at a brain, like you can see walking when looking at legs?
Everything is process. Minds, as a process, objectify other processes thereby creating objects from processes. When you observe an object engaged in a process, like legs walking, you are actually observing a relationship between processes. Walking is a relationship between legs and the ground, both of which are processes themselves. Processes all the way down.
Brains are the way minds model the process of other minds. Brains are objectified minds.
The question of how the Western world does think about the mind and brain is interesting, although as far as I am aware there is underlying debate about idealism and materialism even amongst Buddhists. I am not sure how the brain and mind issue fits in relation to the perennial philosophy of Aldous Huxley.I know that you read this book, so do you have any idea about how it links in any way.
You can, just not with your naked eye. Brain scans etc with instruments of science.
I'm not sure what to say to such a statement. Maybe someone else, e.g. @180 Proof, @Banno, or @tim wood, will be able to help.
Quoting Xtrix
Again, you've lost me.
If I was "transferred" to your body, I assure you I would act more like you than you like me. Why would you act more like me when I am experiencing your body?
As for the OP, Brains and minds are no more identical than stomachs and digestion.
I think that if you wanted to transfer someone's consciousness into another body, you would either have to replace the whole central nervous system of the host (or maybe only a part of it) with that of the person whose consciousness you want to transfer, or rearrange the host's central nervous system (or maybe only a part of it), at some level of organization (probably at the molecular level), so that it resembles the current organization of the central nervous system of the person whose consciousness you want to transfer. In either case, the transferred CNS would become under the influence of the host's body - I think its organization would end up resembling the organization of the host's CNS. So, if you are transferring something from one body to another, it would be the (current) physicochemical state of the CNS of the person whose consciousness you want to transfer; as you might see, in the rearrangement scenario we would be rearranging your molecules into the arrangement of mine, which might be a problem if either of us has something the other one doesn't.
I don't think anyone disagreed with that.
Quoting Harry Hindu
For the same reason you can't see a program when looking at a computer.
Quoting Harry Hindu
I doubt you see all legs walking. If they belong to a sleeping person for example, it is very likely you can't see walking in those legs.
Quoting Harry Hindu
I think I'll stick to what I have.
That's debatable, in fact.
"Technological scientific means" is a meaningless statement. Quoting dimosthenis9
The difference is obvious to you, and that's the point. When you think of it a little longer, using your criteria both are "physical." Why should aspects of human behavior be "non-physical"? That's hardly an obvious point, and in fact is what's being discussed here.
Adding "of course" proves nothing, except perhaps that you haven't examined your own assumptions. I hear "of course God exists" a lot too.
Quoting dimosthenis9
Yes.
Quoting dimosthenis9
So "empirical observation of ourselves" isn't science? Then what is science?
What people think distinguishes science from non-science is actually very complicated. So here again we have another idea you simply take for granted, assuming by simply declaring something "scientific" we will all nod our heads in agreement, and that will settle the question of what's physical.
I've told you before, and you can look it up if you'd like: there was once a definition of physical and "body," based on contact action, in the 17th century. That was abandoned.
Quoting 180 Proof
By "technical" I mean a term defined specifically within a theory. I used "work" as an example, but there are many others. A theory can be defined in various ways, but here I'm referring to an explanation -- hence why I used "explanatory."
So the theory of evolution seeks to explain the development of life on earth. Within this theory there are many technical notions. Natural selection is a technical notion.
Quoting 180 Proof
That's one definition. I suppose the one used in the context of relativity theory.
What is unclear about this? It doesn't give a technical notion of matter.
I'll quote CERN:
What's called matter is here assumed as "fundamental particles." Is that the technical notion you were referring to?
Theories are theories. Technical terms are not the same as theories.
DingoJones just did.
Quoting khaled
How do programmers write programs that they can't see? I think you're thinking about the output of the program, like the webpage you see on your screen right now. But there is code that creates this webpage and that is written by programmers and you can see if you have the right software. You can't do this with your mind. Your mind is of a different category - of which you only know of brains and bodies and their behaviors via your mind composed of colors, shapes, smells, sounds, and feelings.
So if anyone wants to assert that the mind, or qualia, is an illusion then they pull the rug of reality out from under themselves as they have just declared that their only way of knowing the world is an illusion, yet they want to cling to the idea of the existence of brains in bodies with accompanying behaviors even though they are only aware of those things by the very thing they assert is an illusion.
Quoting khaled
This doesn't make a difference, if you want to talk about sleeping legs then I could just point to looking at your sleeping brain and seeing a sleeping brain rather than your dream you are experiencing.
Quoting DingoJones
When I look at your brain I see a grey, squishy mass. Is your mind a grey, squishy mass? Are you saying the entirety of your experience of the world is just various quiverings of a grey squishy mass?
"Technological scientific means-tools" is a statement? And meaningless too?
Quoting Xtrix
Aspects of human behavior like morality are physical? Do they have" matter"? Sorry I really can't follow you. For me the difference is obvious.
Quoting Xtrix
When I observe that I have mind or two legs or two arms am I doing science?? That makes me a scientist?
Quoting Xtrix
From all that you write here also the general point is that as I told you before with your way of thinking we can't talk about anything. You question every single word and we don't have even a base to start discussing. Now you put into question the definition of "science" So it's really pointless.
There are common definitions of what some things mean(like science, physical etc), even if some of them aren't perfect and of course some might change at the future(as the 17th century example you gave) still they are more than enough as people to understand each other and discuss about it.
With your way you make philosophy forbidden. I really see no use in playing such definition game.Even if the definitions aren't crystal clear the general concepts of some words are more than enough as people to discuss about them.
Sure. Anytime you attempt to integrate your observations into an consistent explanation of reality, you're doing science.
But I don't put any effort at all for that. It's what I can do a priori. I can observe myself. I was born with that ability. I can walk also. When I walk I perform science also? Sorry but I can't consider that science.
It's empirical observation, according to you. So what's the difference?
Quoting dimosthenis9
No, I'm questioning the word "matter."
I also made quite clear that technical notions (nomenclature) are not the same as everyday talk. If we want to speculate about ectoplasm or "work," etc., we can. But the technical notion of "matter" or "body" had a technical notion within the mechanical philosophy. It was abandoned long ago. There hasn't been one since.
Quoting dimosthenis9
Indeed, since you invoked "science" to define what's physical. Yet you don't seem to have much appreciation for the long history of the philosophy of science.
Quoting dimosthenis9
True, which is partly why a discussion about mind and body can continue. I'm indeed questioning that. I'm challenging the assumptions we're making about "body," specifically -- and hence matter, material, physical. If the "physical" is "what science observes and identifies," then I ask: "What is science?" This shouldn't be surprising. What it is is uncomfortable -- at least for you.
Quoting dimosthenis9
It's not a game, it's asking questions. If that's a game, then Socrates was playing games as well.
Because you've apparently defined science as "what scientists do," and a scientist is someone in a lab coat doing experiments, some specialized, professional labor.
That's fine for everyday discussion. Not when we're questioning philosophically.
How is observing yourself any different than observing nature? Are you not part of nature? Any explanations you come up with about what you are and your relationship with everything else is a product of your scientific thought processes that allow you to make predictions which is basically the only reason we produce explanations in the first place.
Science, among others, is what provide us proofs as to categorize what we observe to "matter".
Such proofs haven't been provided in the case of "mind". Instead of the protons example you presented before,that have been provided.
Now I guess your next question will be "what is proof?". And so on.
Quoting Xtrix
Well you seem not to have much appreciation in philosophy in general. Considering such a great question like mind/body, that philosophers dealt for centuries useless just cause we don't hold the absolute truth of definitions. Anyway I see no point continuing that.
Yes, with your naked eye.
I didn’t say you can’t see code. I said you can’t see code by simply looking at a computer. You can bust open the motherboard and look at it all you want (like looking at a brain) and you won’t see what’s happening in there.
Quoting Harry Hindu
False. With the right software I can see what you’re feeling generally well. Whether it’s fear, anger, etc. Brain scans exist. They don’t show everything, but they are showing more and more.
What are you referring to here? What “proofs”?
Frankly, you’re talking in circles.
We can define matter in several ways. We can say it’s anything made up of particles, energy fluctuations, substance. Then nature consists of matter and forces. This is the common view.
As we know at least since Kant, what is “true” is not simply a correspondence between the object and the subject — rather, there’s a contribution of the human mind.
Best to at least review these ideas before continuing. Otherwise you’re simply talking nonsense.
So exactly which of these common view criteria mind meets as to consider it as "matter"?? Is there any substance of mind that has been observed? Or you consider the brain energy as mind?
Quoting Xtrix
Yeah whatever. Anyway told you it's pointless. We have no base at all to start talking. The game you play it is silly. And trust me non Socratic at all. I will just leave you on your own here.
Many say the mind is simply the brain.
Notice I’m not saying either, because the question itself is meaningless.
Quoting dimosthenis9
No, not “whatever.” If you want to be taken seriously on here, then doing a minimal amount of reading is essential. Otherwise you sound ignorant — which you do.
What reading has to do with the silly definition game you play here?What exactly I stated here that was ignorant?
You regard a philosophical problem mind/brain as useless cause we don't hold the absolute truth of definitions. And that's ridiculous.
If people could talk only about what we know for sure (which arent much) then philosophy would be condemned. Unless if you consider philosophy same as science. But I forgot, according to you, we can't define science either. So wtf.
Well no thanks I don't want to be taken seriously from people who I don't take seriously. So cool.You can think whatever you want for me. No harm feelings.And yes, that was my last response.
No.
Quoting dimosthenis9
That’s not what I said.
You don’t have a clue about what you’re talking about.
Quoting Xtrix
Quoting Xtrix
Quoting Xtrix
Sorry I couldn't resist.You are weird. Bye.
Couldn't resist continuing to make yourself look foolish?
I'll help you:
Quoting dimosthenis9
That's exactly correct.
The question is meaningless. That has nothing to do with "absolute truth of definitions," which was your claim, and a complete misinterpretation.
Quoting dimosthenis9
Again, exactly correct. But because you're having trouble, I'll again help:
Questioning the definition of science does not mean we "can't define science." If we can't define it, I wouldn't be asking for a definition. You simply failed to give one, because you really don't know what you're talking about.
But please continue...
Sorry, I couldn't resist. Apparently your word is as reliable as your reading.
What is it that you're looking for that you say you can't see? You'll need to define "computer program" because now it seems that you're just moving goalposts. Also, explain what a "computer program" is independent of someone observing it and then what it looks like when someone looks at it and how they would know that is what they are looking at.
Quoting khaled
That's the point I'm trying to make - what is a "feeling" when looking at it through software or a brain scan as opposed to experiencing it? Why is there a difference at all? Why is there an experience of a feeling in the first-person and also a coinciding experience of neural activity in the third-person? Which perspective is of the feeling as it actually is? In other words, which perspective has more direct access, or knowledge, to the "feeling" and why?
Quoting Harry Hindu
Quoting Harry Hindu
Quoting Harry Hindu
A set of instructions to do something. Answer to all of the above.
Quoting Harry Hindu
By knowing the language the instructions are written in.
Quoting Harry Hindu
There is a difference between seeing something and being something. I can see someone who's sad. That's not the same experience as being sad. I don't get what you mean by the quesiton "Why". You're asking why is feeling X (seeing something, in this case a brain scan) different from feeling Y (in this case being sad). That makes as much sense to me as "Why is this car different from this plane?"
Wouldn't you see a set of particular switching operations? That's what code ultimately is.
Try it. Open up the motherboard and tell me what the first 10 switching operations for the Windows Kernel is.
Of course, there are devices that can detect binary code. You can't do so with your eyes however. Similar to how you can't see feelings when looking at a brain without the use of special tools.
But it is possible to see the switching operations. For example, the first computers were the size of rooms and made of vacuum tubes. Could you "reverse engineer" the code from the switching operations, if you had the right tools?
But the reverse isn't true. You couldn't reverse engineer a mental state by observing brain states. Even if you were looking at the brain states of someone you were convinced is seeing red, the inverted spectrum problem would pop up. Is the person with brain states "seeing red" really seeing red, or does red to them look blue to everyone else?
Yes you could.
Quoting RogueAI
Why would it look different? If I clone you do you think there is a chance that “red” to the clone will look different from “red” to you?
If not, then there must be some physical difference that inverts the spectrum for you, or do you disagree with that? If there is such a thing, then we can scan for it and find out exactly whether or not someone is seeing an inverted spectrum or not.
Why would red to you look different than red to me? Maybe small changes in neural structure and brain chemistry. Who knows? My point is simply that looking at brain scans cannot tell you that red to me looks the same as red to you.
The clone would occupy a different point in space, would physically diverge from me right after the cloning process. These are very small changes, but who's to say whether they result in different mental states. Since the contents of my mind are a black box to you and vice-versa, you can't get around this problem. You will never know if red to me is the same as red to you. It's an insolvable problem.
I would call "all in" for the opposite. And it's totally the opposite indeed.
Quoting Goldyluck
Exactly cause all that "load" you mention is different makes your perception of "red" unique. And different from any other's.
The way that each of us experiences all the "data" that our senses give us is a total personal case.
All that sensational data we get, are "filtered" by these and many others factors and give us our own unique personal perception of "red". And it is an unsolvable problem indeed so far.
Right. There is some physical difference that’s the cause. That’s all that’s needed to allow us to know what others are seeing.
Quoting RogueAI
It’s very simple to confirm that neither of those have an effect. If being in different points of space changes perception of color, your perception of color should change as you move. That doesn’t happen. If minor physical divergences of the kind you’re describing change perception of color, then your perception of color would be changing all the time. That doesn’t happen.
And similarly we can continue eliminating variables. If we hypothesize that changes in neural structure and chemistry change our perception of color, it is theoretically possible to try changing those and checking what changes the subjects report if any.
With enough testing (let’s not consider practicality of ethics right now) we will be able to map out all the relevant variables and their effects.
Quoting RogueAI
False, they aren’t. As stated above, if you concede that differences in perception are due to physical differences, then theoretically, it is possible to discover each relevant physical difference and it’s corresponding effect.
If, say, we find that toe size affects perception of color by increasing the red value proportionally to toe size, and that’s the only physical difference between me and you, then I can easily see exactly the contents of your mind. All I need is a color spectrum and I transform it accordingly, and the result will be what you see.
We just need to repeat this for every relevant physical difference and each of us can figure out exactly what’s in the other’s mind.
Quoting Agent Smith
I want to retract my statement above.
Think about it.
Functionalism (as I understand the word)
1. Brain is to thinking as legs is to walking
However, there's something fishy going on:
2. I can't walk about walking BUT I can think about thinking.
Also,
3. I can't breathe about breathing BUT I can talk about talking.
And so on...
Breath (etymology of psyche; soul?), talk/language (self-reference paradoxes), think/mind (self-awareness).
This distinction relies on the assumption that thinking is an exclusively subjective activity that can point at objects or point at its own subjectivity. Walking , by contrast, is assumed as an objective activity, and so doesn’t ‘point’ at anything to begin with. But we only know we’re walking becuase we are conscious of it. We can shift our awareness from what we are walking on ( the sidewalk) or where we are walking to( the store) to the act of walking itself, for instance, when we are afraid we might stumble , or we are recovering from a stroke. Being self-consciously aware of any physical activity is a meta-aboutness.
:up:
The whole underlying impulse of 'mind=brain' is because it gives science hopefuls something to work with. Mind is, you know, squishy, vague, indeterminate, it's almost impossible to nail it down. But neuroscience - leading edge! Lots of fantastic equipment and an endlessly enormous field of research! However.....
That's good - is it yours? If not, what's the source?
Searle makes the comparison that mind is to brain as digestion is to stomach. This does not fall to the recursion you point out, since the stomach might digest the products of the digestion process, and hence recursion might happen.
We might digest what we have already digested. It's just that the results will be of increasingly low quality.
That might also be analogous to thinking.
Quoting Joshs
:up:
Interesting! Thinking, then, is either not reducible to a function or, if philosophers insist it is one, it's in a category if its own, it stands out from the rest. That should mean something!
What links, if such exist, language [self-reference (paradoxes)] to meta-aboutness [self-awareness (anatta)]?
Are you referring to peptic ulcers? False analogy: I can't digest about digesting!
Quoting Banno
It's certainly analogous to a lot of your thinking but I fail to see any connection between that and philosophy proper.
Eat shit and die. So to speak.
:chin:
Can you digest about digesting? I can't!
I can, that's the whole point! Can't you?
Your notion of 'philosophy proper' is a nonsense. Cheers.
:up: I'll check it out when I have the time to do so.
But in both cases it's probably not something to do in polite company.
As per you,
Digestion = Cogitation
Products of digestion (nutrients) = Products of cogitation (thoughts)
My thoughts can be about thoughts. Check.
Can my nutrients be about nutrients? I don't think so.
You can think about thinking. You can't digest digestion. Anyone competent in English knows this.
Apparently you aren't.
Good advice but then philosophers can't afford to be finicky, right?
Though many of the phenomenological methods involve various reductions, phenomenology is, in essence, anti-reductionistic; the reductions are mere tools to better understand and describe the workings of consciousness, not to reduce any phenomenon to these descriptions. In other words, when a reference is made to a thing's essence or idea, or when the constitution of an identical coherent thing is specified by describing what one "really" sees as being only these sides and aspects, these surfaces, it does not mean that the thing is only and exclusively what is described here: the ultimate goal of these reductions is to understand how these different aspects are constituted into the actual thing as experienced by the person experiencing it. Phenomenology is a direct reaction to the psychologism and physicalism of Husserl's time.[/quote]
'Psychologism' and 'physicalism' are the attempts to account for the mind in terms of psychological attributes or in terms of neuro-science. Physicalism is the default in mainstream Western culture.
I think it's become a habit, a not so helpful one.
Quoting Wayfarer
How very unfortunate. Reminds me of the drunkard's search and Maslow's hammer. The good news, it isn't a lost cause.
Quoting Banno
Believe me, I tried to see the funny side to your comments. Tell you what, I actually don't have a problem with the gut being capable of aboutness - it (the digestive system) has its very own complex neural network. Gut feelings! Ring any bells? :grin:
I would've liked it to have been the other way round! Die and eat shit! :rofl:
A missing comma?
[quote=Wikipedia]Phenomenologists reject the concept of objective research.[/quote]
Like I shared with you once before, to be conscious, broadly speaking, is to have a unique (subjective) point of view. This is either an essence or a significant aspect of having a mind. I don't see how any approach that's predicated on objectivity can make any headway into understanding the mind for that reason. What's the sense in being objective about something (the mind) that has subjectivity written all over it? De gustibus non est disputandum!
One of the key factors of the 'scientific revolution' that occured in the early modern period was the conjunction of Galileo, Kepler, and Newton's discoveries with Descartes' discovery of algebraic geometry. From this emerged the outlines of the modern scientific worldview. Aristotle's physics and medieval cosmology were swept away and replaced with this mathematized structure ruled by the seemingly universal Laws of Motion. Of course this has unfolded over centuries, and a lot of ink has been spilled in describing it, but here we have to keep it in highly compressed form.
In any case, and by common assent, one of characteristics of this new philosophy was the division between the primary and secondary qualities of objects. The primary qualities were held to be those attributes which were describable in mathematical terms and within the framework provided by this new science which was felt to be, at least potentially, universal in scope. At the same time, the so-called 'secondary attributes' were those of colour, taste, and so on, which were held to be essentially in the mind of the observer. This lined up with Descartes' philosophy of the separation of mind and matter giving rise to the basic framework of the modern worldview. Thomas Nagel, an American philosopher and cultural critic, describes it thus:
[quote=Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, Pp35-36]The modern mind-body problem arose out of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, as a direct result of the concept of objective physical reality that drove that revolution. Galileo and Descartes made the crucial conceptual division by proposing that physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them. Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop.[/quote]
There's another one of Nagel's books about the same general topic, called 'The View from Nowhere' - about how science proceeds by eliminating or bracketing out the subjective dimension, to arrive at a precise mathematical description of the phenomena under analys.
It is within this presumed framework of the purely quantitative that a lot of this debate is nowadays conducted. ('Show me the data!') It's very much an intellectual and cultural construction, a model. But it's so deeply embedded in our culture that you tend to look at everything through it - and then, of course, you won't see it, because you're looking through it, and not at it. And that's what that essay I linked, The Blind Spot of Science, is about.
Where phenomenology comes in, is that it attempts to step outside that whole construction by the discipline awareness of the nature and quality of experience - it's a 'philosophy of experience'. It's generally more influential in European philosophy than in British-American, for various reasons. But the times they are a'changin. I think, and a lot of people think, that that characteristically modern materialist mindset is on the way out.
The mindset you refer to, I think has never been more than half the total picture that is philosophy. The other half is the phenomenological tradition, a position which formerly was occupied by the classical metaphysical tradition until Kant put paid to it. (Metaphysics has re-surged but is now a part of the analytic, externally focused schools of philosophy). the two approaches have things to offer each other and they touch at various points.
So, I think both sides have value, but, unfortunately, there are many partisans on both sides who can't go beyond their polemical thinking and constantly indulge and express their wish to eliminate the other side. The self-righteous puritan spirit is alive and well on both sides and walking among us, to our detriment.
To think about something is plain thinking. The "about" comes from your consciousness which is ultimately plain thinking. With respect to the walking analogy, thinking about something would be equivalent to walking in a different way (backwards, sidewards, moonwalk, etc); the end result of any type of walk is (a change in) displacement, just like the end result of thinking about anything is a change in thoughts.
Anyway, which specific gait, would you say, corresponds to thinking about thinking?
I dont really know how to answer your question. How I see it, legs (or extremities, in general) allow you navigate the environment (they help you move from one place to another and overcome obstacles in the process). Walking cannot be about anything, of course; but just because walking does not have the capacity to be about something, it doesnt mean it is not a complex function; for example, walking in snow is different to walking in sand, and legs are fine tuned to respond to changes in topography, terrain, viscosity, etc; they have the capacity to move really slowly or as fast as their physiology allows; they can jump, stand in different positions, and some can use them as their hands when they have lost them; they help you swim, play sports, etc. Thinking about is an ability of minds, just like moving around is an ability of legs. So, thinking about thinking I would say does not correspond to a given kind of gait but instead would be somehow similar to legs moving in a given walking pattern; legs do not only have the ability to move in a walking pattern (they can jump, swim, crouch, etc) in the same way the brain does not only have the ability to contain/produce a mind (it is in charge of controlling motor activities, autonomous functions, hormonal cycles, etc).
Your problem is that your ontology lacks any kind of conceptual space for the distinction that needs to be made here.
Still, legs have no mind. They are coupled to it, but don't experience mind related stuff. Well, they can hurt or feel a massage, or feel the ground they walk on. Hot soil feels different from cold steel. They need the mind to perform their complex motions. But they are different from it. You can map there motions to brain processes as they need structured processes to perform their motions. Legs can't make their complex motions without a brain attached. And while legs can perform a huge variety of motions, there is no such motion visible in brains. While the legs are performing a wìde variety of motions, the brain stays stationary while on that stationary structure a huge variety of patterned electric pulses can run. The running of these patterns on the static structure can indeed be compared with legs moving in a statìc physical space on which other processes take place with which the legs, or the whole body, can interact. Confining your attention to legs is like confining the brain to motor function of the legs only.
The brain is a secondary organ in service to the body, the body produced the brain, the brain did not produce the body. That said, the physical environment produced the organism/life, and life interprets the physical world through its effects upon the body. We can only know the world through the body. It is the nature of the organism's body that determines its apparent reality, If one is to be at one with one's the context/physical world, one needs to be sensitive to it in ways that sures continued existence/survival.
Consciousness is knowing the world relative to the state of the body. Where there is a somewhat different biological body, there is a different apparent reality, a different consciousness. I personally do not believe that consciousness belongs to the brain/mind as a duality. I believe it is a mistake to think of the organism as anything but a functional organ of the physical world. Consciousness is reaction, cognitive processing is reaction, the understanding is the sum of reactions that form a meaningful concept for the bodily response, where reaction is response to the physical world, part to part, part to the whole and the whole to each of it's parts. In this sense the physical world for the organism is cause and reaction is effect, is consciousness.
Emotions are more primordial than thought but their essence is reaction to the effect of the physical world upon the nature of the body, again producing a response reaction to the bodies changed state. I think it might be helpful to think in terms of compound reaction as consciousness, always with the physical world as cause.
It does seem that emotions are a main aspect in between the brain and sentient experience. If too much emphasis in understanding the nature of consciousness is based on the brain it could leave out the whole role of bodily experience in viewing the mind. There is the whole realm of emotional intelligence rather than just approaching life from the 'head'. The emphasis on mindfulness within psychology is important in this respect, in making the focus not simply about cognitive processes.
Hi Jack,
Emotions I think determine the direction and color of any thought of an experience had. Only an exceptional mind can redirect thought away from the impulse of emotionally governed thought, and pehaps not only question one's thought, but the emotion governing it. As E.A Poe once said, the passions are the elements of life. Basic sounds once expressed the emotions felt about the experiences of the body. With the introduction of language I suspect not only did it mean refinement of both thought and emotion, but it acted as a cattalist for growth of the frontal lobes, until there was a give and take of thought influencing the emotions and the orginanal emotion generating thought. This is where the confusion and/or question comes about, are the mind and the brain identical. The brain I would guess is the hardware along with the rest which is the body, with mind being a bodily function. As it was the environment that produced the organism, its body, the body producing the brain, and thus the brain producing mind/thought and just as it is not possiable to separate subject and object, one cannot separate mind and body.