"The Critique of Pure Reason" discussion and reading group
I am forking this off of my previous thread on Henry Allison's book.
My goal is to finish the Critique by the end of this year. I hope to closely read and understand every sentence of it. I plan on giving my own summary of each section as I progress through the text. Any questions I have will also be raised.
For reference, my copy of the Critique is the one translated by Meiklejohn.
My goal is to finish the Critique by the end of this year. I hope to closely read and understand every sentence of it. I plan on giving my own summary of each section as I progress through the text. Any questions I have will also be raised.
For reference, my copy of the Critique is the one translated by Meiklejohn.
Comments (52)
Introduction
Summary
I: On the difference between Pure and Empirical Knowledge
With respect to time, all knowledge begins with experience. However, this does not necessarily mean that all knowledge arises from experience. The question is, can there be knowledge independent of experience? Knowledge of this kind is called a priori, while that which is derived from experience is called a posteriori.
A priori knowledge is not simply that which may be known before some experience occurs; it is that which is absolutely independent of all experience whatsoever. Pure a priori knowledge has no empirical elements mixed up with it, whereas impure a priori knowledge has some relation to experience. Knowledge that is a posteriori - that is, empirical - is only possible through experience. For instance, “every change has a cause” is an impure a priori proposition, because the concept of change is derived only from experience.
II: The Human Intellect, even in an Unphilosophical State, is in Possession of Certain Cognitions “a priori”
How can we distinguish between a pure and an empirical cognition? The two tests for purity are that of necessity and universality. The empirical can never provide either, for experience cannot tell us that some phenomenon must be of some way, or that all phenomena are of some way. Empirical universality is an arbitrary extension of validity from most cases to all cases. In contradistinction, pure (a priori) cognition is characterized by its necessity and strict universality. Both need not be established for a cognition to be deemed pure; and it is enough to demonstrate only one, as neither one is a feature of the empirical.
That humans possess judgements that are necessary and strictly universal can be demonstrated by any mathematical proposition. But also, scientific propositions like “every change has a cause” (although being an impure a priori proposition) possesses both necessity and universality due to the conception of a cause necessarily and universally being connected to an effect, since a cause would not be a cause if it had no effect. Furthermore, empirical judgements could not acquire any degree of certainty if the principles they are based on are themselves also empirical. Finally, there are also concepts that remain after we have stripped away all that is empirical, such as the concepts of body and substance.
III: Philosophy stands in need of a Science which shall Determine the Possibility, Principles, and Extent of Human Knowledge “a priori”
Some human cognitions seem to extend the range of judgements beyond that of possible experience, by means of concepts with no corresponding object of experience. This transcendental, or supersensible, realm of thought holds problems of reason which are of great importance to humans and of which doubt or indifference does not restrain us from inquiring into. These include God, the freedom of the will, and immortality. The science which deals with these problems is called metaphysics. It has been dogmatic from the beginning because it has taken on this task without first investigating its capacity to do so.
Since it deals with questions outside the safe ground of experience, the foundations of metaphysics ought to be investigated before going any further. But humans have a natural desire to expand their knowledge on these important questions, and so go about doing so (and very quickly) without knowing whether this is possible. At any rate, mathematics has had such undeniable success as an a priori science, that metaphysics is taken to have the same fruitfulness. Just as a dove, flying through thin air, may believe it would fly even more effortlessly if it were to be in airless space, metaphysicians see in the independence from experience a freedom for limitless thought. Indeed, outside of experience, metaphysics encounters very little resistance to rapid and complex theorizing.
But regardless of all the effort and enthusiasm, there has been no real progress in metaphysics. Every new metaphysical theory is another attempt to blindly stumble around in the dark. Part of this has to do with the desire to finish the edifice of knowledge as quickly as possible, and only reflect upon the foundations when absolutely required to. But also, a great deal of the operations of reason consist in the analysis of concepts, which does not introduce any new matter or content (but merely clarifies that which was already contained in the concepts). However, reason unconsciously slips into a second mode of function, where it connects foreign concepts to each other, without knowing how these are connected. These two modes are explored in the next section.
IV: Of the Difference Between Analytical and Synthetical Judgements
In all judgements where the relation between the subject and the predicate is cogitated, this relation is possible in two ways: either the predicate belongs to the subject and is contained within the conception of the subject, or the predicate lies outside of the subject, though it stands in connection with it. The former judgement is termed analytical, the latter synthetical.
Analytical judgements are those in which the connection is cogitated through identity and can be called explicative; synthetical judgements are cogitated without identity and can be called augmentative. An example analytical judgement might be “all bodies are extended”, because extension is built into the concept of body. An example synthetical judgement might be “all bodies are heavy”, as the concept of weight is not contained in the concept of body, but nevertheless is related to it by means of experience.
In this way, all judgements of experience are synthetical, since analytic judgements have no recourse to go outside of the sphere of conceptions with the application of the principle of contradiction. The principle of contradiction is what establishes a priori knowledge as necessary and universal. Whereas synthetical judgements conjoin concepts contingently as part of a whole, which is called the synthesis of intuitions.
Analytical judgements are always a priori (pure), but synthetical judgements are not always a posteriori (empirical). A synthetic a priori judgement would occur without the aid of experience; indeed, it is the characteristic of an a priori judgement to be necessary and universal, which cannot be established through experience. All speculative knowledge, such as metaphysics, is synthetic a priori.
V: In all Theoretical Sciences of Reason, Synthetical Judgements “a priori” are contained as Principles
All mathematical judgements are a priori synthetical. Consider the proposition 7 + 5 = 12. This is not an analytic proposition, as the number 12 is not contained in the concept of the sum of 7 and 5, i.e. (7 + 5 = SUM) is not the same proposition as (7 + 5 = 12). In order to derive 12 from the sum of 7 and 5, we need to resort to an intuition corresponding to one of the concepts, such as the fingers on a hand. This becomes more clear when doing more complex mathematical operations. The same can be said of the proposition that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points. The concept of shortest is not contained in the concept of line, and so is a wholly new addition to the concept, the synthesis of which is achieved through an intuition.
Natural philosophy (physics) also contains synthetical a priori judgements as principles. For instance, the propositions that the quantity of matter in the universe remains constant, or that an action must equal a reaction in terms of motion, are both synthetic. The necessity and universality of these claims is clear, so they are indeed a priori. But they are also synthetical, as they involve concepts that do not share an identity, e.g. matter with permanency.
Metaphysics, too, must contain synthetic a priori judgements. It must not simply clarify the concepts we have of things, but actually extend the knowledge we have of them to regions beyond possible experience. A metaphysical proposition like “the world must have a beginning” involves necessity, so it is a priori. And the concepts of world and beginning are not contained within one another, so a judgement using them must be synthetic, which requires an intuition as its ground. But since the judgement is a priori, it cannot appeal to experience for this ground, so some other intuition must be used for the judgement to be valid.
VI: The Universal Problem of Pure Reason
It can be advantageous to put a number of different investigations under a single question; for the purposes of this essay, the question is this: how are synthetical a priori judgements possible? The entire existence or downfall of the science of metaphysics depends on the answer to this single question.
The reason metaphysics has vacillated for so long with no progress is because the distinction between analytical and synthetical judgements was never properly drawn. David Hume was the closest to suggesting it, but he failed to accept that certain propositions - like those containing the concept of causality - could be possible, because he thought they were simply confused notions borrowed from experience and habit. However, had he applied his skepticism universally, he would have had to reject all mathematics, which would have been absurd.
Because mathematics and natural philosophy have undeniably made progress in the extension of our knowledge, the aforementioned question can be asked for them as, “how are they possible?”, since it is already evident that they are. But with metaphysics, which has made such miserable progress, the question is rather, “is metaphysics possible?” Metaphysics as a natural and powerful human disposition is certainly possible, but the real question is whether metaphysics is possible as a science; that is, whether we can possess knowledge of the objects in which it treats.
The critique of (pure) reason is what can lead to the establishment of this science. It is not a large science, as its object of study is only Reason itself. Once Reason understands itself, it can determine the limits of its application, namely to that of objects outside of experience. This is a completely different procedure to any other done in the past; the focus is on determining how the concepts used in metaphysics come about a priori. Although metaphysics has consistently failed in the past, it is indispensable to human reason, so it is prudent to assess what the limits of reason are with respect to this science.
VII: Idea and Division of a Particular Science, under the Name of a Critique of Pure Reason
The science which deals with all that has been said is called the Critique of Pure Reason, since reason is the faculty which provides the principles of knowledge a priori. The Critique is a propaedutic to the complete system of pure reason, which would be called transcendental philosophy. The term transcendental here means all knowledge which is occupied not with objects, but with the mode in which we cognize these objects, as far as this mode is a priori. For the purposes of this essay, the focus will only be the principles of a priori synthesis, as a guide and preparation for a complete transcendental organon. The Critique of Pure Reason is the complete idea of a transcendental philosophy, but not the science itself. There must be nothing empirical involved in its concepts, for its subject is pure reason.
It is divided into two parts: a Doctrine of the Elements, and a Doctrine of the Method. The former is subdivided into two parts, which deal with the two sources of human knowledge, sense and understanding. Objects of sense are given, while objects of understanding are thought. The conditions under which objects are given must precede the conditions under which objects are thought, so the conditions of sensibility will be addressed first.
Questions:
This is what I think. When an arithmetic calculation is performed, the answer is not in the adding or subtracting numbers, but it comes from the intuition of the mind . IOW intuition must work to come up with the answer for arithmetic calculations, therefore it is a synthetic judgment process. One does not notice it when it is a simple calculation such as 1+1=2. But when there are larger (complex) numbers such as 756 + 243 = 999, it is evident that, intuition is called for to come up with the answer.
Geometry is based on the contradiction principle. Contradiction principle says that, A cannot be "not A" .i.e. a circle cannot be "not circle", a triangle cannot be "not triangle", and geometrical items have their definitions already contained in the concepts. a triangle is a 3 sided polygon and the total of the 3x internally formed angle is 180 degrees. The definition covers all the triangles in the universe. There is no triangle in the universe, which does not fall in the definition. If it doesn't then it is not a triangle. Therefore geometric judgments are analytical.
Yet, the analytic is conditioned by the....
“....Analytical judgements are therefore those in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is cogitated through identity....
Hard to reconcile this apparent mischaracterization. But assuming Kan knew what he wanted to say, the reconciliation must be possible. If that weren’t tough enough.....
“....Mathematical judgements are always synthetical.....
Given that geometricians are mathematicians, and all mathematical propositions are synthetic judgements, the “preposited” principles by geometricians must not be mathematical propositions covered by synthetical judgements. That being the case is supported by....
“....and depend on the principle of contradiction. They serve, however, like identical propositions, as links in the chain of method, not as principles—for example, a = a, the whole is equal to itself, or (a+b) —> a.....
Why not change a little teeny-weeny thing, and call it identity propositions? So if the “preposited” principles of geometricians that depend on the principle of contradiction, are really just the first links in a chain of a method, and if that method Is just formal logic, not mathematics, then it follows that it is only logical that the geometrician work with one figure in order to gain something from it, and he would not work with any other kind of figure, for working with trapezoids would necessarily contradict what he wanted to discover about a triangle. Hence, the preposited principle of contradiction relates to what figure he works on, but the real mathematical propositions remain synthetical, which relates to how he works with the figure.
Formal logic consists in conceptions by their similar identities, Kantian analytics consists in conceptions by their similar relations, within a given proposition. If conceptions can be conceived as relating without any additional conceptions supplementing that which is given in the proposition, or, which is the same thing, no additional conceptions are necessary to derive a truth from that proposition, it is analytical. This is a two-aspect system, the conceptions avail themselves to mere analysis for their similarity.
If the conceptions in a proposition cannot be related to each other without the addition of another conception, it is synthetical, and is a three-aspect system. The conceptions in this system avail themselves, not to analysis, but to synthesis, by means of which the additional conceptions are derived.
“....merely the equivocal nature of the expression.”
.....the expression being any considered analytical judgement, and the equivocation residing in the dual nature of, on the one hand, identity, and on the other, contradiction. Therefore, even geometrician’s judgements with respect to their profession alone, is nonetheless synthetic. And “...mathematical judgements are always synthetical...”, survives unscathed.
Dunno if that helps or not......
Some simple ones are 100 or 99 per cent synthetic and the more complex they get the greater the analytical proportion of it. Any educational psychologist or person that is being helped with specific learning differences will tell you that much.
As for the a priori part that is on a sliding scale as well. Husserl who followed Kant quite a bit, found there are three sequences to perception alone (which apply whether priori / posteriori / synth. / analy.)
I like the thread, thanks for posting the notes.
Ok. Good to know.
Empirical intuition
"The effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far as we are affected by the said object, is sensation. That sort of intuition which relates to an object by means of sensation is called an empirical intuition.
The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called phenomenon."
Pure intuition
"I call all representations pure, in the transcendental meaning of the word, wherein nothing is met with that belongs to sensation. And accordingly we find existing in the mind a priori, the pure form of sensuous intuitions in general, in which all the manifold content of the phenomenal world is arranged and viewed under certain relations. This pure form of sensibility I shall call pure intuition."
Form
"That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation, I term its matter; but that which effects that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations, I call its form.
But that in which our sensations are merely arranged, and by which they are susceptible of assuming a certain form, cannot be itself sensation. It is, then, the matter of all phenomena that is given to us a posteriori; the form must lie ready a priori for them in the mind, and consequently can be regarded separately from all sensation."
"Thus, if I take away from our representation of a body all that the understanding thinks as belonging to it, as substance, force, divisibility, etc., and also whatever belongs to sensation, as impenetrability, hardness, colour, etc.; yet there is still something left us from this empirical intuition, namely, extension and shape. These belong to pure intuition, which exists a priori in the mind, as a mere form of sensibility, and without any real object of the senses or any sensation. The science of all the principles of sensibility a priori, I call transcendental aesthetic." - The CPR, Transcendental Aesthetic
My understanding and interpretation on the CPR texts I am reading, might be wrong, different from yours or the formal views in the commentary books. If you see or spot any points wrong, different, unclear, or simply points for discussions, please let me know. Thanks.
What supports Kant against his usual opponents? Max Black’s comments? Is it Black that says what you wrote...
Quoting Fine Doubter
If so, that opposes Kant rather than supports him, insofar as Kant makes no mention of the varying degrees of analytic/synthetic with respect to mathematical judgements. Maybe nowadays, folks have added their own interpretations to Kantian metaphysics, but that shouldn’t detract from what the man himself says.
And Kant was brief about the analytic/synthetic dichotomy, because all he was trying to prove was the possibility of synthetic a priori cognitions. In order to do that, he first had to distinguish the conditions synthetic cognitions must have, from the other kinds of cognitions there are, then determine whether such cognitions were indeed possible a priori.
It turns out he was so brief, because it was so simple and easy to prove. In fact, he chastised Hume....gently of course..... for not having thought of it already.
Anyway.....drop in when you feel like it, bearing in mind there are no proper Kantian scholars here. Or, if there are, they’re being awful damn quiet.
I don't think Black criticised Kant for his brevity on that. The spectrums / continuums is something I added because I found they are very successful for me in various circumstances in all fields of knowledge.
I got The nature of mathematics in a second hand shop ages ago, didn't understand it totally, but Black is basically juxtaposing several viewpoints or camps in maths. Godel's findings were new at that time but surely it was always obvious that maths is an ideal / a fiction / an approximation? Even at the everyday level we have the paradox of one, two or three oranges (integers) versus 1.35694027 (continuums). And right angled triangles are right enough. This all fascinated me since infant school, and indeed it doesn't get spelt out enough (imagination isn't appealed to enough). At the greengrocer he didn't slice an apple when we asked for a pound of apples: it was over or under.
I've now downloaded the same book as free PDF.
I think zero is an approximation, and infinite and infinitesimals are approximations to approximations.
I expect this is only a small part of Kant's story and I don't want to make the thread subject small or partial. A site based partly on Fries, and which appreciates Kant somewhat, that I stumbled upon is www.friesian.com
Yeah....a take-off on the old “is math invented or discovered” dichotomy. There are those that say math is ideal because there are no numbers in Nature, that math is a fiction because there are no mathematical laws in Nature, and that math is an approximation because the possibility exists that other rational agencies have different maths. Not to mention, any mathematical formulation predicated on pi must necessarily be an approximation.
What is sets of sets of sets?
There are numbers in Nature in the form of recursions, which a lot of prominent personalities make great show of "not" understanding. When they are calculated, they are calculated approximately.
Page 35 of a book I greatly like, 50 mathematical ideas you really need to know by Tony Crilley, describes imaginary numbers as grouping several pieces of maths together to be done at the same time. Reportedly quaternions are a very advanced form of this. Reputedly sets are a greatly more complicated development from that. And models are a greatly more complicated development from that. "Model theorists" claim not to be modelling anything > sigh < Once we can't see it at all, it stops being even 1 % synthetic or a priori and one no longer has assumptions one can consciously critique or adjust.
There never was anything wrong with approximations being approximations, or honesty about ideals being ideals.
Hmmm. How does infinite reflections in paired mirrors prove numbers are contained in Nature?
If counting is a recursive procedure, the procedure itself cannot show numbers are already contained in Nature, for numbers must be presupposed in order for the procedure to even occur.
But....maybe neither of those are what you meant by recursive. In which case, I don’t understand what you do mean.
I: Transcendental Doctrine of Elements [0]
Summary:
First Part. Transcendental Aesthetic
I: Introduction
Intuition is the only means in which our knowledge immediately [1] relates to objects [2]. An intuition can only happen [3] if an object is given [4] to us, which can only occur if the object can affect the mind. The receptivity of the mind for representations through various modes is called sensibility. Objects are thought by the understanding, from which arise conceptions; but all thought must relate in some way to intuitions, and therefore sensibility [5].
Sensation is the means in which an object affects the faculty of representation [6]. Intuitions which relate to objects by means of a sensation are called empirical intuitions. The undetermined object of an intuition is called a phenomenon [7]. Within the phenomenon are its matter and its form; the matter corresponds to the sensation, and the form corresponds to the rules for the way the matter is represented. The matter of a phenomenon is given a posteriori, while the form is given a priori, for the form cannot be a sensation itself.
A representation is pure when nothing in it belongs to sensation. The form of phenomena is a pure representation which arranges the manifold content [8]. This pure form of sensibility can be shortened to simply pure intuition. There is no real object of sensation corresponding to a pure intuition, as this is a requirement for its purity.
The science of the principles of sensibility a priori is called transcendental aesthetic (the term “aesthetic” is referencing the first half of the ancients’ division of objects of cognition into the sensible and the conceivable). This forms the first science of the transcendental doctrine of elements, the second being the transcendental logic, which is the science of the principles of pure thought. To get to the forms of pure sensibility, which is the focus of transcendental aesthetic, sensibility must first be isolated from the understanding by stripping away all concepts; the raw empirical intuitions must then be stripped of all sensation. There are two pure forms which remain after all this has been done: space and time. Space will be investigated first.
Section I. Of Space
2. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception [9]
A metaphysical exposition of a concept is a simple and clear representation of what belongs to the concept when it is given a priori. Space is the external sense of the mind, that being which permits the mind to represent to itself objects that are not itself. On the other hand, time is the internal sense of the mind, that being which permits the mind to contemplate itself and its states. Thus the focus here will be on determining what belongs to humans’ external sense - space - when this is given without any sensation.
1. Space is not given through outward experience, because the very notion of outward-ness (objects being separate from the mind and separate from each other) necessarily involves spatiality. Space must be prior to any outward experience for there to be any outward experience at all.
2. Thus space is a necessary condition, and not a determination, of all outward experience. To further illustrate the previous point: we cannot imagine objects that are not in space, but we can imagine space without any objects [10].
3. Space is not a discursive (or general) conception of the relations between things, but is rather a pure intuition, because there is only one all-encompassing space, which is prior to all of its parts [11].
4. Space can also be known to be an intuition, because it is given as an infinite quantity; while concepts can have infinite representations under it (it applies to an infinite number of representations), they cannot have an infinite number of representations within it (it must be defined by a finite number of representations), and the opposite is true for intuitions.
3. Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Space
A transcendental exposition of a concept is an explanation of how other synthetical a priori cognitions are made possible through the concept. In order to do so, it must be shown that these cognitions are actually conditioned by the given conception, and further that this is only possible if the given conception is of a certain way.
Geometry will be the other synthetical a priori cognition used here, since it is the science which determines the properties of space in this way. Because geometry involves synthetic propositions, its subject matter - space - cannot be a concept, since no concepts alone cannot yield synthetic knowledge; thus space is an intuition. And because geometry is apodictic, space cannot be empirical, as apodicticity entails necessity and universality, which cannot be found through experience; thus space is a pure intuition which precedes the perception of objects. A pure intuition of external objects that is anterior to the objects themselves can only come from the subject is just what is meant by a form of sensibility - in this case, the form of the external sense.
4. Conclusions from the foregoing Conceptions
a. Space is not a property of things as they exist apart from the mind; it is a condition for the experience of external objects, and not a determination of these objects, since a determination of an object cannot precede the existence of the object it is determined by.
b. Space is the form of the phenomena of external sense, and nothing more. It is what makes possible external intuition, and its given-ness precedes that of objects of external intuition. Outside of the subjective point of view of a human mind, space has no meaning, it is nothing. It is a predicate that is applicable only to objects of human sensibility, that is, phenomena. The form of the external sense of other beings cannot be known.
Joining the limitation of a judgement to the conception of a subject gives it universal validity. For instance, the proposition “all objects are beside each other in space” is applicable only when they are taken to be objects of intuition, whereas the proposition “all things, as external phenomena, are beside each other in space” does not suffer this deficiency. Thus the expositions before demonstrate the empirical reality (objective validity) of space with respect to objects of sensibility, but the transcendental ideality of space with respect to things-in-themselves [12].
Space is the only subjective representation that has objective validity with respect to sensible intuitions; there is no other representation from which we can derive synthetical a priori propositions, like we do in geometry. Sensations are subjective but not ideal [13], and give no cognition of objects as intuitions do. They are not properties of things, but changes in the subject, which may be different across people, and so cannot ground any objective validity.
Section II. Of Time
5. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception
1. Similar to that of space, the focus here will be on determining what belongs to humans’ internal sense - time - when this is given without any sensation or inner states.
2. Time is a priori, for neither coexistence nor succession would be perceptible to us if it was not in relation to time. Thus time is not empirical, as the notion of change requires there be time.
3. Time is a necessary representation, because we cannot think of phenomena apart from time, but we can think of time as apart from phenomena [14].
4. Since time is necessary, it is also possible to make apodictic judgments regarding it, such as “different times are not coexistent but successive” (just as different spaces are not successive but coexistent). Neither necessity nor universality can be derived from experience, so time is a priori.
5. Time is not a discursive conception, but a pure form of sensible intuition. Just like what was said for space, time is given as a single object that is prior to its parts, and only an intuition can relate to a single object. Also, the proposition that different times cannot be coexistent is synthetical, which prevents time from being a concept [15].
Each part of time is given as a limitation of the one unlimited time, just as space is. But conceptions can only furnish a partial representation [16], so time must be an intuition.
6. Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Time
The conception of change and the conception of motion (change of place) is possible only through the representation of time; if this were not an internal, a priori intuition, no conception could make the conjunction of contradictorily opposed determinations in the same object comprehensible. Time allows for this in terms of succession, by placing one determination after another.
7. Conclusions from the above Conceptions
a. Time is not a property of things as they exist apart from the mind. For if it were real in itself, it would not present to the mind any real object; and it belonged as a determination to objects, it could not be their condition, and we could not form synthetical a priori propositions about it.
b. Time is the form of the phenomena of internal sense, and nothing more. It does not concern objects of external sense (those in space), but rather with the relations of representations in our internal state. These representations have no spatiality, so we use analogies to help describe them (such as a linear line extending into infinite). All of its relations can be expressed in an external intuition, which is yet another reason why time is an intuition [18].
c. Time is the formal condition of all phenomena, both internal and external. All representations of objects, external or internal, are determinations of the mind. They belong to our internal state, which is subject to the formal condition of internal intuition. Thus all phenomena stand necessarily in relation to time; immediately if they are internal, and mediately if external.
And just as with space, time has objective validity and a priori universality only with respect to objects of sensibility, and not with things as they are in themselves. Since all intuition is sensuous, no object can ever be presented in experience that is not conditioned by time. It is empirically real, that is to say, it has objective validity with respect to all objects of sense; but it is transcendentally ideal, that is to say, it is nothing outside of this domain.
8. Elucidation
One common objection to the aforementioned argument for the empirical reality and transcendental ideality of time is this: change is real, and is only possible through time, so time must be real as well. It is true that time is real, but only as the subjective internal sense; that is to say, it is a mode of representation of the self as an object, and not an object itself. However, that which is represented to humans by time does not stand in a necessary relation to time; if we (or another being) could intuit ourselves without time, there would be no change. Thus change is only real if time is real, and that which is represented through change need not be represented as such if time is not the condition of inner sensibility.
The reason why this argument is brought up so often is because time is taken to be an easier target than space. Objects in space cannot be proven to be absolutely real, due to the possibility of skeptical idealism; but objects of the inner sense are taken to be undeniably real. However, this ignores the nature of both objects, which is that they are phenomena. Phenomena have two aspects: the object considered in-itself, and the form of our intuition of the object. The form of phenomena as intuitions applies only because the form is provided by the subject. Space and time are the only forms of sensuous intuition, and they allow us to make synthetic a priori judgements, such as what is done by mathematics with space. Most importantly, they are only applicable to objects considered as sensuous phenomena, and not with the thing-in-itself.
If space and time are absolutely real (subsistence), then they must be eternal and infinite and exist (without being any object themselves) in order for all other real entities to exist, which results in absurdities when the understanding attempts to go beyond them. And if space and time are relational (inherence), then they are an abstraction from experience; in which case, apodictic propositions, like those of mathematics or physics, would be invalid, for experience cannot ground the necessity or universality that is required for apodicticity. Neither flaws are present for the theory of the transcendental ideality of space and time.
The Transcendental Aesthetic has only two components, space and time. All other representations of sensibility require experience. Even motion, which unites both, presupposes that there be an object (in space and time) that can move. Space and time have no such requirements. They are pure forms of intuition, and therefore require no empirical sensation for their representation.
9. General Remarks on Transcendental Aesthetic
I. In order to avoid misunderstanding, all that has been said so far with respect to sensuous cognition will be summarized. Our intuitions are nothing but the representation of phenomena; the things and the relations that we intuit are not the same (in themselves) as our representation of them in intuition. These representations - and crucially including their spatial and temporal properties - are dependent upon the subject, and are nothing without it. The nature of the thing-in-itself that is represented to us through intuition is completely unknown and can never be known; nor can it be known how it is represented to other perceptive beings with different receptivities.
Space and time are the pure (a priori) forms of intuition, the matter of which being provided by sensation. They alone can be cognized independently of experience, and in fact are given antecedently to all actual perception [18]. Only the pure forms can provide apodictic knowledge by grounding necessity and universality; empirical (a posteriori) sensations are contingent and can only provide it relatively. And no accumulation of empirical knowledge will ever yield any knowledge of the thing-in-itself, but only knowledge of our own sensibility.
[19]
The distinction between essential and accidental properties of phenomena is merely empirical, and does not represent any property of the thing-in-itself, as the transcendental object remains entirely unknown. When viewing a rainbow through a sunny shower, the empirical distinction might be to assign the rainbow as an accidental feature (dependent upon things like the geometric orientation of the person), while the raindrops are the essential feature (because they exist regardless of the rainbow existing). But the transcendental distinction would be to assign both the rainbow and the raindrops (including their spatial and temporal properties) to mere phenomena - that is, representations that are inseparable from sensibility - while the thing-in-itself remains unknown.
The theory of the Aesthetic must not just be plausible, but undeniably certain, if it is to serve as an organon for a greater Transcendental Philosophy. To do so, it will be helpful to assume an opposite view; that space and time are in-themselves objective and conditions for the possibility of objects as things-in-themselves. From where do we cognize the apodicticity of synthetic a priori propositions concerning these forms, as we do in geometry or physics? It can only be through intuition or conceptions given a priori or a posteriori. Empirical concepts founded on empirical intuitions cannot provide the necessity nor the universality required for apodicticity, so space and time must be a priori.
But conceptions by themselves cannot render synthetic propositions; the only possibility remaining is for space and time to be a priori intuitions - that is to say, intuitions are given to us by ourselves, and not through sensation. Yet if they are a priori intuitions, but did not belong to a faculty of intuition, then it would be impossible to formulate any synthetical propositions regarding external objects [21] whatsoever, because there would be no way to know if the necessity of your representation being the way it is, is also found with the object of the representation as it is in-itself. If space and time are forms of the external sense, however, then while the thing-in-itself is still unknowable, the objective validity of phenomena is retained.
II. In further demonstration of the ideality of space and time, it will be noted that all of our cognition belonging to intuition contains nothing more than mere relations (feelings of pain and pleasure, as well as the will, are exempted, since they are not cognitions [22]). The relations for space are: extension (of place), motion (change of place), and the forces of motion (the laws in which this change of place is determined). Time contains the relations of the successive, the coexistent, and the permanent (the successive and the coexistent). The things that are involved with these relations are not given through intuition. Relations themselves cannot give any knowledge of a thing-in-itself, so the forms of intuition only contain the relation between the object and the subject, and not the object in-itself.
A representation that precedes all thought of an object is an intuition, and when it contains nothing but relations, it is a form of intuition. The form presents us with no representation itself except when something else is placed in the mind [23]; in other words, the form can only be the way in which the mind presents itself with representations and is affected by itself. The subject is represented to itself as a phenomenon through the internal sense, time, and not as it is in-itself, were it to be intuited spontaneously (intellectually).
The question at hand is, how can the subject have an internal intuition of itself? It will be noted that apperception (the consciousness of the self) is the basic representation of the “ego”; and if by it every representation of the manifold in the subject were spontaneously given, then the internal sense would indeed be intellectual. But for a human, this consciousness requires an internal perception of the manifold representations which were previously given in the subject, the manner of which is called sensibility (which is the absence of spontaneity). Self-consciousness can only apprehend what is in the mind if it can affect the mind and produce an intuition of the self, which is only a phenomenon arranged by the internal sense, or time.
III. To say that intuition of objects through the forms of space and time represents objects as phenomena is not to say that they are mere illusions. A phenomena is that which is never found in the object itself, and only and always with the relation of the object with the subject and the representation of it by the subject. Phenomena truly are given, and are objective with respect to the conditions in which they are given. They are only illusory when these predicates are applied outside of this domain [24].
IV. The object of God (which can never be an object of intuition to us [25]) must have spontaneous intuitions as his only means of cognition, since thought always involves limitation [26]. This intuition must not involve the conditions of space and time [27]. But if space and time are forms of objects as things in themselves, they would also be the conditions of the existence of God, which would seem to contradict the idea of God being infinite. But if space and time are not objective forms of things, then they must be subjective and be the forms of our intuition, which is sensuous, by which we mean the subject is affected by an object that already exists.
Even if all beings have the same forms of sensibility, this universality would not change the fact that it is still sensuous, and not intellectual (it is deduced, not original [28]), which seems to only belong to God. But this is only an illustration of the Aesthetic, and not a proof of it.
10. Conclusion of the Transcendental Aesthetic
This concludes one part of the solution to original problem formulated in the Introduction, that being: “how are synthetical propositions a priori possible?” It has been demonstrated that we are in possession of pure intuitions (space and time), which allow us to pass beyond a given conception and connect it with a foreign representation during an a priori judgement, and thereby form a synthesis. These judgements, however, do not apply to anything but the objects of our senses, and are only objectively valid when considered in relation to possible experience.
0. In the Introduction, Kant says that the Critique is not a doctrine; yet here he calls part of it the Doctrine of Elements (and later the Doctrine of Method). Why?
1. What does "immediately" mean here? Independently of thought, as in, we don't have to reflect upon it?
2. What does "object" mean here?
3. How does an intuition happen, if not in time? Unless it is that the affection of an object upon the sensibility happens "in time" (with respect to our sensibility), but "happens" in-itself in a way that we cannot conceive?
4. What does "given" mean here?
5. Kant says "But all thought must directly, or indirectly, by means of certain signs, relate ultimately to intuitions". What does he mean by "signs"?
6. What does "representation" mean here? I have seen it used to describe both intuitions and conceptions. Is a representation just anything that we are aware of?
7. Does this mean the undetermined object of an intuition just is the intuition, or does the intuition contain an undetermined object? i.e. is intuition phenomena, or does intuition contain phenomena?
8. Why does Kant use this term, "manifold content", how is it different than just "matter", i.e. sensation?
9. Why does Kant call it a conception, when space is an intuition?
10. Can we imagine space without any objects? I can imagine a black, empty void, but the fact that it is black means that it is not simply extension.
11. I don't think Kant explains here why space being essentially one makes it an intuition, and not a conception. I know that he claims that that which relates to a single object is an intuition, but I guess I don't understand why concepts can't do that too.
12. To clarify, objective reality with respect to objects of sensibility basically means intersubjective agreement upon certain properties of these objects?
13. How is ideal different from subjective? Is it like essential vs accidental?
14. See 10. I don't know if we can imagine time without any phenomena.
15. Why is this proposition synthetic? I understand the difference between analytic and synthetic propositions, but sometimes I find it hard to tell if a proposition is analytic or synthetic.
16. What is a "partial representation", is it related to how concepts require an intuition for synthesis?
17. Redacted.
18. What exactly does it mean for something like time to be given "antecedently" to all actual perception. How do I conceive of this apart from some analogy to time?
19. I genuinely have no idea what this paragraph meant: "To say, then, that all our sensibility is nothing but the confused representation of things containing exclusively that [...] " Any help?
20. Redacted.
21. I'm not sure if I follow the last step of this argument. Why would it be impossible to formulate synthetic propositions regarding external objects if space and time are real, objective conditions of things-in-themselves?
22. Kant asserts this is the case, but does not argue for it. Why are they not cognitions?
23. If forms do not present us with representations except when matter is given, then why does Kant say that we can conceive of space and time as empty of objects?
24. I'm not sure if I wholly follow why Kant thinks transcendental realism leads to skeptical idealism.
25. Why can't God be an object of intuition? Because this would place him in space and time, which would mean he would be limited?
26. Why does thought always involve limitation?
27. Why not?
28. What does Kant mean by "deduced" and "original"?
I think transcendental has different meanings depending on the context. There seem to be at least two different meanings:
But in general, the term transcendental is connected to the conditions of human sensibility. The pure forms of human sensibility are transcendentally ideal, and the thing-in-itself is transcendentally real.
I don't know if I would describe transcendental as before or prior to experience. That would just be a priori, I think. The Transcendental Aesthetic is one part of the general question, "how are synthetic a priori judgements possible?", and it focuses on the conditions of sensibility, whereas the Transcendental Logic focuses on the conditions of thought.
Quoting darthbarracuda
Since I take this to be self-evident, I’ll comment: Thought devoid of aboutness, devoid of some given it is about, could be meaningfully classified as thought in which sense? Even in thinking about possible cases of such type of thought, I’m thinking about the addressed topic. This aboutness then will be literally limited, or bounded, to that which it is about. Here, then, one obtains the conclusion that all thought, in order for it to be meaningfully classified as such, will be limited and, hence, in some way finite.
The sole alternative to this conclusion is that there can occur thoughts that are literally unlimited, or unbounded, in all ways: an infinite thought. But such loses all semblance of what the term “thought” refers to, in part because it would be a thought devoid of aboutness which, again, is always in some way limited to that which is addressed, to that which the thought is about. Because a literally boundless, or limitless, aka infinite, thought is nonsensical, one again concludes that thought always involves limitation. Differently expressed, that it is always finite.
Quoting darthbarracuda
What I don't get is how one can envision a plurality of intuitions that are unlimited, or infinite. Quantity is always finite, limited. And plurality entails quantity - hence a multitude of finite intuitions, since they're quantifiable. So, by my appraisals, these spontaneous intuitions would themselves then not be infinite, instead being bounded one from the other. And they would themselves entail that God's cognition (assuming the hypothesis of such God) consists in some manner of limitations, rather than being infinite (in the sense of literally devoid of limits/boundaries). Thereby resulting in the conclusion that such God is in fact in some way limited, rather than infinite.
Excellent work on your posts, looks interesting and a lot to go over in them. :up:
Sure, I appreciate your points on "transcendental". Will read and reflect on them, and get back if there are further queries. cheers.
1. Immediate merely indicates systemic successions. Everything starts somewhere.
2. Because object herein relates to intuition, they are real, physical existences with the capacity to affect the senses. They are distinguished thereby, from objects of reason, objects of experience, ideas, notions, transcendental objects in general which do not affect the senses.
3. It is enough to say the time of the affect on the senses by objects, is sufficient for how intuitions happen. Intuitions do happen in time, but that doesn’t say how they happen. For that, we really don’t have an explanation, nor do we need one.
4. Intrinsic Kantian dualism. Given to us here means that which we do not give to ourselves. That which is a perception vs that which is merely thought.
5. Keep in mind the perspective. This has all to do with the empirical side of reason, thus objects here are the real physical things in the world. Signs are the matter of objects in accordance with the mode of their affect. One kind of sign of an object is its odor, another sign is its shape.....and so on. Like any sign, it is a preliminary indication of that which is to understood by means of it, but in this case, a preliminary indication of the phenomenon it should become. Thought must relate just says the conceptions synthesized to intuitions must be imagined as necessarily belonging together. In other words, it is inconsistent to synthesize a conception belonging to smell, to a sign given from the sense of sight.
6. Representations are not all present to awareness, but that which is present to awareness, is a representation. Intuition and conceptions are representations, as are ideas, sensations, even perceptions themselves. As unsatisfying as it may be, representations are the means by which reason explains itself.
7. In this system, an object of intuition just indicates any object of perception in general, that is as yet merely an appearance. An undetermined object of intuition, per se is that which follows from the operation of that faculty, which is therefore a phenomenon, a particular determinable representation. Intuition can be said, if anything, to contain the forms of objects, insofar as such forms reside a priori in this faculty. The CofJ gives a more inclusive exposition of this part of the system....changes in subjective conditions, and all that. Aesthetic vs empirical judgements. Productive vs reproduction imagination. Seriously complex methodology, needless to say.
8. It is safe to say manifold content is the matter of the object, because all sensation is with respect to it. Technically, that which in phenomena is arranged according to forms, is the manifold content of them, and they correspond to the sensation from which they are given. The inference being, if the matter of objects were that which is arranged, they would be determined by that arrangement. It follows that if object were to be determined merely from the arrangement of its matter, there would be no need of any synthesis with conceptions in order to experience an object as a certain thing, and the entire transcendental system immediately becomes untenable.
9. Space is an intuition....a pure intuition only....because it is considered to be the necessary condition for the experience of objects. Space is a conception insofar as it must first be thought as both justified for, and logically consistent with, the role it plays in a theoretical system. If space could not be thought, it could never be a conception. If never a conception, never a possibility. If never a possibility, never a necessity. If never a necessity, never a necessary condition. If never a necessary condition, never a logically justified domain in which objects are to be found, because we already know with absolute certainty where they are not. If no logically justified domain in which they are to be found, no logically justified possibility of being known. A contradiction.
10. That space is necessary for objects, and objects are necessary for color, it follows that empty space will be absent any color, which is merely our conception of black, which is contingent on objects in space, not the space they are in. Extension is shape, neither extension nor shape is a property of black. Space doesn’t have shape, insofar as all parts of space are each themselves just space, and the shape of objects is merely the limits of the space it is in. To imply space as black or that black is extended, are a transcendental illusions of mischaracterized reason.
Enough.
I recall a discussion of the infinite in Allison's book that made the point that the concept of infinite need not involve the actual presentation of an infinite number of representations, but instead just the presentation of "limitlessness", e.g. there is always more to be had, the supply of possible representations will never run out. This is how space and time are presented, as a single unified whole which can be broken down into infinitely smaller parts.
God is supposed to not be subject to any boundaries, for these impose limits, as well as to be divinely simple, i.e., not consisting of any parts; “infinite”, or "limitless", in this specific sense; rather than that of a qualified infinity (one which is restricted or limited) - for example, the infinite length of a geometric line that assumes endless constituent points bounded by their particular alignment.
But this is getting into deep waters (for me at least), I could be completely off the mark here.
I did some reading on the NKS commentary to the CPR for this points. NKS summaries 3 different definitions on transcendental of Kant in the CPR.
"1. Transcendental" is primarily employed by Kant as a name for a certain kind of knowledge. Transcendental is knowledge not of objects, but of the nature and condition of our a priori condition of them. In other words, a priori knowledge must not be asserted, simply because it is a priori, to be transcendental ; this title applies only to such knowledge as constitutes a theory or science of the a priori. Transcendental knowledge or transcendental philosophy must therefore be taken as coinciding ; and as thus coincident, they signify the science of possibility, nature and limits of a priori knowledge. The term similarly applies to the subdivisions of the Critique. The Aesthetic is transcendental in that it establishes the a priori character of the forms of sensibility ; the Analytic in that it determines the a priori principles of understanding, and the part which they play in the constitution of knowledge ....
But later in the critique Kant employs the term transcendental in the a second sense, namely, to denote a priori factors in knowledge. All representations which are a priori and yet are applicable to objects are transcendental. The term is then defined through its distinction from the empirical on the one hand, and from the transcendent on the other.
2. An intuition or conception is transcendental when it originates in pure reason, and yet at the same time goes to constitute an a priori knowledge of objects. The contrast between the transcendental and the transcendent, as similarly determined upon by Kant, is equally fundamental, but is quite of different character. That is transcendent which lies entirely beyond experience ; whereas the transcendental signifies those a priori elements which underlie experience as its necessary conditions. The transcendent is always unknowable. The transcendental is that which by conditioning experience renders all knowledge, whether a priori or empirical, possible. The direct opposite of the transcendent is the immanent, which as such includes both the transcendental and the empirical. ....
3. The third meaning of the term transcendental arises through its extension from the a priori intuitions and concepts to the processes and faculties to which they are supposed to be due. Thus Kant speaks of the transcendental syntheses of the apprehension, reproduction, and recognition, and of the transcendental faculties of imagination and undertaking. In this which render experience possible. And in as much as processes and faculties can hardly be entitled a priori, Kant has in this third application of the term departed still further from this first definition of it." - NKS Commentary to the CPR pp. 73-76 1922
I have based my interpretation of transcendental from the 2nd definition in NKS commentary to the CPR.
"The transcendental is that which by conditioning experience renders all knowledge, whether a priori or empirical, possible. The direct opposite of the transcendent is the immanent, which as such includes both the transcendental and the empirical."
That was a critical point, on which my understanding of transcendental in Transcendental Aesthetics was based.
The condition of experience must be prior / before to experience logically, otherwise it is not condition at all. If it is the same as experience then it would be experience itself, if after experience, then it would be the effect / result of experience.
Experience must always be the experience of something of someone. So it must have the subject of experience, and also the object of experience too. Experience in general before the real experience by the subject about something is a blank concept which has no meaning on its own, because there is no such an object which stands for experience in the real world. All experience is mental and has its subject and object to be meaningful.
Therefore the term a priori is also prior / before to experience to be meaningful, because on its own without matching real world experience of someone about something, it also is just a blank concept.
That was my understanding, but of course I imagine that it is subjective, and do expect possible criticisms.
1. any knowledge that is about the a priori conditions of experience and thought of objects (such that, the representation of space is not transcendental, but the knowledge that the representation of space is a priori and a condition for experience is),
2. a representation that is a priori and a condition for experience and thought of objects (such that, the representation of space is transcendental - though not transcendent, i.e. pertaining to the thing-in-itself),
3. not sure if I follow this last point.
Quoting Mww
I don't understand what you mean by systemic successions, could you clarify this?
Quoting Mww
"Give to ourselves" - I take this to not mean things like memory or imagination (which we present to ourselves without an external stimuli), but rather that which does not have its original origin in us?
Quoting Mww
Okay, so just to be sure I follow, the intuition of space is not identical to the conception of space. The conception of space is just the thought of the intuition of space.
Quoting Mww
I get that space is not colored, but I still don't see how Kant can say we can imagine space as empty without objects. How do I imagine space without something in it? How do I imagine a representation with no object? I understand space and the objects that are in it are distinct, but it is not clear to me that space can precede objects; i.e. space and objects seem to be given always together.
]That which is independent of the conditions of human sensibility.[/quote]
You mean an objective reality? God(s) is (are) transcendental in this sense. So is the dual stuff in the magic trinity theory of consciousness.
Quoting darthbarracuda
That's what HE thinks.
Second Part. Transcendental Logic
Introduction. Idea of a Transcendental Logic
Summary
I. Of Logic in general
Human knowledge has two sources: the capacity to receive impressions from objects through affection (sensibility), and the capacity to cognize [0] by means of these representations (understanding); objects are either given through our faculty of receptivity, or thought via the production of conceptions by the faculty of spontaneous [1] cognition.
With respect to sensation, both intuitions and conceptions can be either pure or empirical. Sensation is the matter of sensuous cognition. When an intuition is independent of all matter (sensation), it is a pure intuition, containing only the form of an intuition; and when a conception is independent of all matter (sensation), it is a pure conception, containing only the form of the thought of an object. Thus only pure intuitions and conceptions are possible a priori; the empirical only a posteriori.
Our nature is such that intuitions are never not sensuous; they must always appertain to the way in which objects affect us [3]. Through the understanding, the objects of these intuitions are thought. Only through the unification of intuition and conceptions can a cognition happen; thoughts without content are void, and intuitions without concepts are blind. The mind must make conceptions sensuous by joining them with the objects of intuitions, and it must also make its intuitions intelligible by bringing them under these concepts.
The science of the laws of sensibility is called aesthetic, and the science of the laws of understanding is called logic. Logic may be classified as either general or particular. General (or elemental) logic contains the absolutely necessary principles (forms) of thought, without which the understanding is useless. Particular logic concerns the laws of correct thought with respect to some specific class of objects; it is an organon for a science and arrives late in the maturity of the science on account of its requirement for an extensive knowledge of its objects.
General logic itself may be classified as either pure or applied. Pure general logic is that which abstracts from all empirical causes from which cognitions arise; things like sensations, imagination, memory, habit, inclinations, etc. Pure general logic contains only a priori principles which can be applied to either empirical or transcendental content [4]. Applied general logic is that which concerns the use of the understanding under subjective empirical conditions; in other words, it is a broad and general psychology of logic, a representation of the understanding within the context of empirical conditions, which concerns things like attention, doubt, conviction, etc. Only the pure logic of general logic is a proper science [6], concerning nothing but the forms of thought, without reference to its content (empirical or transcendental), or psychological factors. The relationship of pure and applied general logic is analogous to the relationship of pure and practical ethics.
II. Of Transcendental Logic
General logic is concerned with the form of the understanding, without distinction of the origin of its representations; it does not merely abstract from all sensation (as was done for the transcendental aesthetic), but all content, pure and empirical. Not all a priori cognitions are transcendental; only those that are directed at the a priori possibility and use of cognition are transcendental. Thus the representation of space is a priori but not transcendental, while the knowledge that the representation of space is a priori, is transcendental. The distinction between the transcendental and the empirical is applicable only to the critique of cognitions, and not to the relation of these with their objects.
The science of transcendental logic is concerned with the principles of pure understanding, by which we cogitate objects entirely a priori. It is a subset of general pure logic, applying only to the a priori relations in thought of objects.
III. Of the Division of General Logic into Analytic and Dialectic
If truth is the accordance of a thought with its object, then the object of a (valid) thought must be able to be distinguished from other objects. As such, to ask for a universal criteria for truth is self-contradictory, because it is to ask for a criteria that is valid for all objects, without distinction of content, the relation to which is precisely what truth amounts to. So in terms of the matter (content) of a cognition, no universal test of truth can be given. However, with respect to the pure form of a cognition, logic presents us with universal and necessary laws of understanding which can be used for such a necessary, though not sufficient criteria of truth - for a self-consistent thought may nevertheless disagree with its object.
The study of the principles involved in this negative test of truth can be called analytic pure general logic. Thought must be at least self-consistent if it is to be true; only after this is established can the content be scrutinized. Analytic logic has applicability only to the form of thought, and not to its matter. It cannot be used to determine if the content of a cognition is true, although it is tempting to do so. When this is done - that is to say, when general pure logic is used to try to extend our knowledge of objects - it is called dialectic. Dialectic, or general logic as an organon of thought, is the art of producing ignorance!, for it improper to be applied in this way and yields absolutely no knowledge when it is
IV. Of the Division of Transcendental Logic into Transcendental Analytic and Dialectic
Just like what was done in the Transcendental Aesthetic with sensibility, the Transcendental Logic must isolate the understanding and focus only on that which originates from it. The Transcendental Analytic is the critique of the principles of pure understanding, without which no object can be thought of, and thus is also a logic of truth. But this pure cognition requires that objects be given to it, to serve as the matter of application. When we apply these cognitions by themselves and to regions beyond experience, we make judgements of objects with no material distinction to provide the objective validity required for truth. The Transcendental Dialectic is the critique of this mistaken use of understanding and reason.
Questions:
0. Cognize, this term is used a lot, but without any definition. For a lot of these terms, I think I have a fuzzy grasp of what they mean, though a precise definition would be better.
1. Spontaneous, what does this mean?
2. Redacted.
3. How can Kant claim to know this, except by experience, e.g. it has been the case that all of my intuitions that I can remember have been sensuous up until the present.
4. By transcendental content, I take Kant to mean space and time?
5. Redacted.
6. What makes pure logic a proper science and applied logic not?
The room is still an object, with walls that have color.
Quoting darthbarracuda
It had a few spelling errors in that paragraph. When I used the spell checking software, it even replaced the words into some other words from its whim. Sorry. Now I have checked them, corrected the badly spelled words, and also added a little more sentences from the NKS commentary into 3.
I think what it says is that Kant's 3rd definition of transcendental is much different from the 1st, in that thranscendental preconditions the mental activities and concepts arising from a priori intuitions such as apprehension, reproduction, and recognition and even imagination and understanding, which render experience possible. But these faculties of mind cannot be themselves equated / called (titled) as a priori, which make the 3rd definition much more distant from the 1st.
According Kant space and time are ‘Intuitions’. Think of them as the canvas upon which cognition emerges. His view here is that mentally we ‘know’ (I prefer ‘ken’) only by way of space and time. We cannot imagine without placing something in a spaciotemporal frame.
The use of ‘transcendental’ will become more clear in later sections. He basically argues for and against different elements throughout the book so don’t take any of it as a ‘conclusion’ (so to speak).
0. "Lehre" vs. "Doktrine" (Transzendentale Elementar l e h r e in German). Both are translated as doctrine. "Lehre" can also mean something like "teaching", "(basic) lesson" or "basic knowledge" (I'm not a native speaker of German).
The following excerpt is from the "Jäsche Logic", Kant's lectures on Logic which were published in 1800 (Kant was still alive then). It can help to clarify the basic terms and distinctions:
"Of concepts
§1
The concept in general and its distinction from intuition
All cognitions, that is, all representations related with consciousness to an object, are either intuitions or concepts. An intuition is a singular(1) representation (repraesentatio singularis), a concept a universal (repraesentatio per notas communes) or reflected(2) representation (repraesentatio discursiva).
Cognition through concepts is called thought (cognitio discursiva).
Note 1. A concept is opposed to intuition, for it is a universal representation, or a
representation of what is common to several objects, hence a representation insofar as it can be contained in various ones.
2. It is a mere tautology to speak of universal or common concepts - a mistake that is grounded in an incorrect division of concepts into universal, particular, and singular. Concepts themselves cannot be so divided, but only their use."
https://cdchester.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Lectures-on-Logic-The-Cambridge-Edition-of-the-Works-of-Immanuel-Kant-in-Translation-Immanuel-Kant.pdf p.589
0. In the Introduction, Kant says that the Critique is not a doctrine; yet here he calls part of it the Doctrine of Elements (and later the Doctrine of Method). Why?
I think this is the common complaint of the commentators of the CPR such as NKS, Paton and D. P. Dryer. They all seem to agree that Kant was not consistent in the CPR in some of the definitions of the concepts and also the points. NKS even says the CPR is a patch work of shifting contents from Kant's previous publications. Still the significance and importance of the CPR cannot be denied in the history of philosophy. There are far more interesting and significant philosophies in the CPR than the minor inconsistencies that one should worry about.
But for me, when Kant says Doctrine, that means they are the points he accepts as principles, and follows. For critique, I would understand as something still to be investigated, analysed and come to a conclusion.
1. What does "immediately" mean here? Independently of thought, as in, we don't have to reflect upon it?
I would have thought, because independently of thought, it must be sensory perception or the content of the sensory perception. Sense perception of objects would not need intuitions for perception, because it doesn't need a thinking process. It would be direct perception such as bodily sensations?
2. What does "object" mean here? (An intuition can only happen [3] if an object is given [4] to us, which can only occur if the object can affect the mind.)
Some objects are general concepts, which have no particular reference to them. In that case, even if they are given to us, we have no concrete idea what they are. These objects don't relate or activate intuitions. For objects to affect our mind and relate to intuition, they must be particular objects such as the real objects that we see, hear and can touch etc. Or the objects from the past memory that we have directly experienced and acquainted with, then they do relate to the intuitions, which enable our mind think, reflect and imagine etc.
These are just notes from my thoughts on the points. Could be totally different from others' points of course, which I would be interested to hear and reflect again.
I am not disagreeing with Kant's claim that space is an a priori intuition, or that we can't imagine objects not in space. All I am saying is that I don't find this particular argument (that we can imagine space without objects) compelling because it's not clear to me that this is actually the case. I don't seem to be able to conceive of "extension" apart from having there be an object that is extended; while extension and the properties of the object are distinct, and may have different origins, they nevertheless appear to be inseparably conjoined when it comes to actually presenting themselves to the mind.
Yes, there is empty space between the walls, but take away those walls, what is there? A black void, which nevertheless is still something on account of it possessing color. Again I am not saying that space possesses color, just that I can't conceive of space without applying color. Obviously this will be different for someone who is blind, I just happen to depend heavily on visual sensation when thinking about objects. Point being, some kind of sensation seems to be required for space to have any presentation, probably because it is just a form, and how do you conceive of a form (relations) without anything that takes part in the relation?
Cool, thanks that makes a lot more sense.
Yeah, I'm realizing that we can really get side-tracked by hairsplitting comparatively minor issues. Probably I need to ease off the perfectionism a bit and settle more on understanding the whole rather than each individual itty bitty detail. Those can come later with time.
Quoting Corvus
I figured something along the same lines, immediate meaning there being no other further representation that relates to the object. The object is given by sensations, sensation is the the initial way in which objects come into awareness. After which, forms and concepts are applied to sensation, thus indirectly (not immediately) to the object.
This is important for this book. VERY important. Like I said, you’ll find yourself jumping back and forward through the text countless times.
I think both ways are all valuable exercises. I am reading with a few different commentaries on the CPR (NKS, H.J. Paton, D.P. Dryer, S. Gardner, W. Sellars, H.W. Cassirer, Allison, P.F. Strawson, Walker, Bennett, Ewing) and it makes the reading painfully slow. But will try to catch up. I am not sure if it would be better for me just concentrating on the Kant's CPR first without the commentaries. But then, I would have less or more vague understanding of the text.
Allison's book is very good, and I am also using it. I was looking for the best commentaries, and keep getting one after another, and ended up with 7- 8 different copies. But on the hind sight, maybe should have stick to 1 - 2. I find D.P. Dryer's book also very good.
Systemic successions is just me, keeping the theoretically mandated order of the particular influences of the particular elements involved, between the perception of an object and the experience of it.
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Quoting darthbarracuda
Backwards. Given to us means has its origin external to us; given to ourselves means has its origin internally within us. Thus, “give to ourselves” does mean things like memory, imagination. Technically, every facet of the representational cognitive system we give to ourselves. The world only gives to us the things on which the system is used.
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Quoting darthbarracuda
Space is not an intuition, because all intuitions have sensuous origins, and we never sense space. Space for us is never a phenomenon. Space is called a pure intuition just to provide a condition under which objects of perception can be said to be located relative to us or to each other. As a conception, it allows the concept of motion to have meaning. Just as time as a concept allows change to have meaning.
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Quoting darthbarracuda
By imagining where some object would have to be, if there was one. Don’t forget, in Kantian-ese, you’re imagining a transcendental ideal, not a thing. Just hold out your hand, palm up, and imagine a Mars bar sitting there. Now think away the Mars bar, and imagine the space it was in, which you should be able to do. Now....just for fun....try thinking away the space the bar was in. You can’t, because there wasn’t, and never could be, anything relative to that empty space. There no such thing as an empty thought, you cannot think of that which may take the place of the space you thought away, therefore it is impossible to think it away in the first place. That’s why, along with time, Kant calls them ideals, because they are not themselves conditioned by anything. Instead, they are the conditions. Speculative epistemological metaphysics.
Besides, I don’t see a problem with imagining the empty space between two objects a foot apart. Elementary particle physics aside, of course, which we don’t care about anyway, but people like to try proving Kant wrong by bringing up such nonsense.
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The book is a critique of reason. Reason is what the show is all about. Transcendental is a perspective, one of four, that reason takes with respect to what it is doing at any given time, the others being empirical, rational and judicial, or, moral. Reason examines....we can examine using reason in these various perspectives....everything from one or more of those perspectives, and some require all of them, re: freedom of the will. The most noteworthy being, of course, the so-called Copernican Revolution....something Kant never said by the way....in which reason is said to look at things from a different point of view. The ultimate transcendental perspective.
:100: :up:
1. Spontaneity. Which makes more sense....that there exists in some faculty of the human mind a repository of all possible conceptions, even for that of which there is as yet no thought, or, a certain faculty of human reason brings up new conceptions pursuant to a circumstance in which no extant conception is sufficient? If the former, there would be no need to conceive anything at all, for the conception of it, no matter what it is, is already present in the mind. But then we would need a mechanism by which the mind, which is itself not part of the cognitive system, picks and chooses the proper conception out of every possible standing iteration resident in the repository, and then gives the conception to understanding, which most certainly is part of the cognitive system. Now, such could be the case, but parsimony suggests the simplicity of just letting understanding be that faculty by which conceptions arise, and that only and always in conjunction with something else already given by the system, re: phenomenon, because in that way, the system remains a unified procedure, operating by and within itself, without the influence of that which is not contained in it.
Again....transcendental philosophy. We aren’t talking about what we know. We talking about how it is possible to know, which presupposes not knowing. It follows that T.P. concerns itself with that instance between the absence of and the acquisition of, knowledge. In other words, the first ever instance of it. People are fond of missing the implication, instead complicating it by insinuating the effect of extant knowledge, when the cognitive system is most effective in, and absolutely necessary for, the absence of it. From the conception of “wheel” to the conceptions of “quark”, it’s all done the same way, the only difference being the time of it.
3. “Our nature is such that intuitions are never not sensuous; they must always appertain to the way in which objects affect us”
Quoting darthbarracuda
He doesn’t claim to know it; he claims that according to transcendental philosophy, such is a necessary hypothesis such that the philosophy is internally consistent and logically coherent. There is never an empirical proof for speculative metaphysics. What may be said that he does know, is that if intuitions are in some case not of sensuous origin, the entire treatise is worthless.
4. “Pure general logic contains only a priori principles which can be applied to either empirical or transcendental content.”
Quoting darthbarracuda
No. Logic has to do with understanding, as phenomena has to do with sensibility. Kantian dualism. The transcendental content of the logic of understanding, are the categories, which provide “.....unity to the different representation in a judgement...”. Space and time, as pure intuitions, are that which makes representations of objects possible, but has nothing to do with either the empirical content of phenomena, nor with judgements respecting the unity of those representations. Space and time, on the other hand, as conceptions, are deduced transcendentally, which merely indicates their objective reality and logical validity are thought absent any empirical influence in the formulation of their respective representations, and, their employment is completely a priori. This does not, however, make them transcendental conceptions, but only indicates the manner of their production.
An a priori principle takes the form of conceptions such as “cause”. While we have no logical need of cognizing a cause for the possibility of objects of sense, we certainly must append the conception of space to them necessarily, as a pure a priori intuition, as a means to justify the invocation of the system in the first place. “....for mere intuition does not in any respect stand in need of the functions of thought...” (A91/B123)
6. The answer to that is in the notes.
Not sure if I agree with this exactly, since Kant says in many places that space and time are intuitions, albeit pure; they provide the form, sensation provides the matter. They aren't concepts, and because of the dichotomy between concepts and intuitions, they must be intuitions. I agree they aren't phenomena, since they aren't appearances given to us by sensation. Space is given by us in order for phenomena to be given to us.
How I am understanding things as of now is that representations can be either concepts or intuitions, and can be either pure or empirical; but a representation cannot be both a concept and an intuition for they have a different nature.
Quoting Mww
I only find myself able to do so if I continue to image my hand (in space), and perhaps some sense of a geometric outline of where the Mars bar used to be. If I imagine extension in its most simplest form, I think of a grid or sorts. Hasn't Kant by this point already said that geometry requires the use of intuition (lines, graphs, etc) even though it studies the pure form?
I agree that I cannot imagine objects without space, and I think that this by itself can be turned into an argument for its a priority and therefore ideality, due to its universality.
Quoting Mww
Yes I have heard much about non-Euclidean geometry and particle physics as arguments against the Kantian view. Got any reading suggestions on this topic?
Quoting Mww
Very interesting, I'm not familiar with this distinction of four perspectives. Is it raised later in the CPR?
Quoting Mww
So, spontaneity refers to the capacity for the understanding to produce new and original conceptions that were never previously thought, when given the material to work with by phenomena.
Thanks again for all the detailed responses, I am grateful.
(Sigh) Ya know, I often frown upon subjectively, and sometimes chastise objectively, those who take some passage and reinvent it. So...here I am, unceremoniously busted for doing exactly that. From this little bit in the B introduction at xxviii.....
“.....For pure speculative reason has this peculiarity about it, that it can and should measure its own capacity according to the different ways for choosing the objects of its thinking, and also completely enumerate the manifold ways of putting problems before itself, so as to catalog the entire preliminary sketch of a whole system of metaphysics; because, regarding the first point, in a priori cognition nothing can be ascribed to the objectsd except what the thinking subject takes out of itself, and regarding the second, pure speculative reason is, in respect of principlese of cognition, a unity entirely separate and subsisting for itself, in which, as in an organized body, every part exists for the sake of all the others as all the others exist for its sake, and no principle can be taken with certainty in one relation unless it has at the same time been investigated in its thoroughgoing relation to the entire use of pure reason....”
.....I unceremoniously took it upon myself to substitute perspective for relation. But there’s enough support for the substitution, elsewhere and throughout the text, I think, to make it at least not inconsistent. Kant is notorious for saying stuff like, understanding views all its conceptions....., or, imagination reaches for its synthesis....., which just makes it seem like these faculties have a sort of capacity to reflect or look at their objects, which is, for all intents and purposes, a perspective these faculties possess, relative to the mode by which objects are presented to them.
So rather than a reification of abstract ideas on my part, which is usually considered an argumentative fallacy, I think the use of perspective as more along the lines of a rhetorical device, which is sort of allowed. Still, CPR can be successfully studied without the notion of perspectives. Whatever suits the student, right?
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Quoting darthbarracuda
Point to you. I should have said, “space is not an empirical intuition”, insofar as all intuitions are of appearances and space does not appear in sensations. It is easy to see that space is necessary for the determinations of sensible objects, insofar as objects must be in space in order to be a perception for us. This from the metaphysical exposition of the conception of space. As such, we represent to ourselves a condition which pertains to all objects, as opposed to intuitions respecting the dissimilar matter of them. I suppose Kant means to say that whenever something is represented about an object, the representation of its space must have already been given, from which is deduced that space is then the form of sensibility, or, “....that which effects that the content of phenomena can be arranged under certain relations...”. All this means is, we cognize one end of this undetermined object as “tail” and the other end as “head”, with absolute certainty, because one is intuited as being in a different spatial relation from the other, and all that such that the conception of “dog” doesn't contradict itself. And while this seems like an awful lot of trouble to go through every time, the methodology of the system as a whole, just wouldn’t work without doing exactly that.
On the other hand, from the transcendental exposition of the same conception...Kantian dualism once more....in the case of synthetic a priori cognitions in which there are determinations on objects that are not of sensibility, re: geometric figures, which give to us a representation of the determinable space these figures enclose, it is found that this space is necessarily intuited as well, but not under empirical conditions. Kant says of this, “....What, then, must be our representation of space, in order that such a cognition of it may be possible? It must be originally intuition...” (added in B41, omitted in A).
Apparently, a representation can be both an intuition and a conception, albeit from different perspectives. Space is represented here as an intuition, there as a conception, but always a priori.
There’s a very good examination of the background history of Kantian critical philosophy in the introduction by Guyer/Wood, found here: http://strangebeautiful.com/other-texts/kant-first-critique-cambridge.pdf. Damn thing is 80 pages long, just as a measly intro, but there’s a lot of interesting commentary in it. You might find it useful.
Transcendental Logic. First Division
Transcendental Analytic
1.
The goal of the Analytic is to study the principles underpinning pure understanding; to accomplish this, the concepts contained in the Analytic must be pure (and not empirical), belong to thought (and not sensibility), elementary (and not deduced), and belong to a complete table of pure concepts. This completeness can only come from an idea of the understanding as a self-sufficient united system, whose parts cannot be added or removed.
The Analytic is divided into two books: the first covers the concepts of pure understanding, while the second covers the principles of pure understanding.
Book I
2. Analytic of Conceptions
This will not be focused on the analysis of some class of concepts, but on the faculty of understanding itself, which alone gives the possibility of a priori conceptions.
Chapter I. Of the Transcendental Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Conceptions of the Understanding
3. Introductory
When we think about the faculty of cognition, we usually do so in a haphazard and unsystematic way; doing so cannot lead to any certainty of judgement thereof, because it does not give any sense of unity or necessity to the conceptions thought, and is dependent on chance. Transcendental philosophy has the advantage that its concepts are pure and unified, and therefore connected by a single idea, which gives us a rule to follow during our investigations.
Section I.
4. Of the Logical Use of the Understanding in general
The understanding is non-sensuous (independent of sensation), and because of this it must not contain any intuitions, since it is in our nature for intuitions to be sensuous. And because there are only two modes of cognition (intuitions and conceptions), the understanding must cogitate through conceptions, that is to say, it is discursive [0], and not intuitive.
Since intuitions are sensuous, they require affection by an object, and so also on the receptivity of the sensibility to impressions. Conceptions, on the other hand, require that different representations be arranged under one common representation (the act of which is called a function), and so also on the spontaneity of thought.
The understanding uses concepts only in order to judge [1] by means of them. Since only intuitions relate immediately to an object, conceptions relate to them mediately (indirectly) as representations of a representation of an object. Judgements are therefore functions of unity, in that many possible representations are joined under one. As the faculty of judgement, the understanding is a faculty of thought (since thought is the cognition by conceptions), and conceptions are predicates of possible judgements. As such, all of the functions of the understanding can be found through the functions of thought, since the understanding just is the faculty of judgement, this being the faculty of thought.
Section II.
5. Of the Logical Function of the Understanding in Judgements
The function of thought in every judgement, when abstracted from all content, has four heads, each of which can be of three moments:
The following observations will be made to avoid any unnecessary confusion [2]:
1. Singular judgements are not the same as general judgements, so they can be considered to be entirely different from universal judgements.
2. In transcendental logic, infinite judgements are not the same as affirmative judgements, though this is the case in general logic.
3. All judgements are either categorical, hypothetical or disjunctive.
4. The modality of a judgement is peculiar in that it provides no additional content (since this is exhausted by quantity, quality and relation), but is only concerned with the copula (“is”). Problematical judgements may be false, yet still facilitate our cogitation of truth. Problematical judgements concern possibility (objective validity), assertorical judgements concern actuality (objective reality), and apodeictical judgements concern necessity. The mind judges things in this order.
Section III.
6. Of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding, or Categories.
While general logic abstracts from all content (and expects it to be provided elsewhere in order for it to transform it into conceptions), transcendental logic contains the a priori manifold of intuition, which is used as the matter for pure concepts. Since space and time are the condition of sensibility, they affect how objects are conceived in thought, since these concepts are void without any sensible content, and no concept pertaining to its content can arise before the content is given.
Once this sensibility is delivered to the mind, however, the process called synthesis occurs, in which different representations are examined and joined together into a single cognition. Synthesis in general is merely the operation of the imagination, which is indispensable as a function of thought, yet nevertheless usually not well-understood. The understanding reduces the product of the synthesis to conceptions, from which we attain a proper cognition.
The duty of transcendental logic is to reduce to conceptions, not representations, but the pure synthesis of representations. The diversity of the manifold of pure intuition is first given, then the imagination synthesizes it, before pure conceptions are applied by the understanding to give this synthesis unity, and therefore transform it into a cognition [3].
The pure conceptions of the understanding are the functions which gives unity to both the representations in a judgement, and the synthesis of representations in an intuition. These conceptions, through analytic unity, give rise to the logical forms of judgement, but they also introduce transcendental content through the application of the synthetic unity of the intuitive manifold [8]. Thus there are exactly the same number of pure concepts as there are logical forms, to which they correspond, and are given the name categories. They are:
It is through these, and only these, pure conceptions that the manifold of intuition is made conceivable - that is to say, thought as an object of intuition. While Aristotle tried to make a catalogue of his own, he went about it unsystematically, and the result was not only uncertain to be correct, but actually indeed contained elements that should not have been included. In comparison, this catalogue has been arrived at by abiding by a rule [4], and so the result is guaranteed to be correct and complete. These pure conceptions themselves have deduced conceptions (called predicables), however these are not included in the present work, as it would distract from its overall purpose, however they would belong in a complete transcendental philosophy.
7.
Here are some observations related to the pure conceptions:
I. The table of categories can be divided into two classes: the first of which relates to objects of intuition (deemed mathematical), the second to the existence of these objects in relation to each other and/or to the understanding (deemed dynamical). Only the latter has correlates [5].
II. There are always three members of each of the four classes. The third is always a product of the combination of the second and first members; but this third member is not a deduced category because of this, since a particular function is required for the first and second members to produce the third.
III. [6]
8.
Ancient transcendental philosophy contained a fifth categorical division, the members of which were the one, the true, and the good (unity, truth, perfection). This would augment the number of categories, which cannot be, because there is a one-to-one relation between a category and a logical function of thought. These supposed-categories are really just surreptitious names for the categories of quantity (unity, plurality and totality) when viewed as general laws of consistency of cognition. In every cognition of an object there is a unity of the manifold (qualitative unity); the truth (objective reality) of a cognition can be indicated by the number of true deductions that are sourced from it (qualitative plurality); and finally when this plurality is fully in accordance with the conceptual unity, it is perfect (qualitative completeness) [7].
Questions/Thoughts
0. By "discursive", I take Kant to mean the process in which the understanding organizes objects by concepts according to their marks.
1. By "judgement", I take Kant to mean basically the mental process of deciding if something is the case.
2. This part was fairly dense to get through, and I felt it was not as important to focus on, so I brushed over some of the parts I found confusing.
3. I don't really understand what the difference is between the synthesis of the imagination (conjoining intuitions) and the operation of the understanding (putting this synthesis under a concept to give it unity). This part was a bit dense for me.
4. It is unclear to me what this rule exactly is.
5. What does Kant mean by "correlate"?
6. Kant's discussion about community and disjunctive judgements is dense, but I recall in Allison's book a good deconstruction of the argument, so I will defer the summary of it to there.
7. I found this section to be incredible dense in areas, though I think I grasp the general idea.