Objective Morality: Testing for the existence of objective morality.
I firmly believe things are right or wrong apart from who does them. But, I can't account for how this could be; because every case seems to be about an observer. An early apology for not making a firm case. I thought of some questions and wondered how they would be answered.
1. Is it Morally wrong to destroy a beautiful painting?
2. What if no one would have ever seen it?
3. What if you painted it?
An attempt at an exploration in search of objectivity, because relativism causes so much harm. Is there anything that can be said about the different answers to the same action?
In addendum 1. I don't know the effect on anything but the painting. I'm not assuming it leads to unspecified hardship. 1. Replace beauty with art of notable quality or art that one would assume could possess value. Maybe it captures the expression of a significant time in history like no other picture can; I don't know, it's not simply paint on a canvas. 2. No one other then the person acting on it.
1. Is it Morally wrong to destroy a beautiful painting?
2. What if no one would have ever seen it?
3. What if you painted it?
An attempt at an exploration in search of objectivity, because relativism causes so much harm. Is there anything that can be said about the different answers to the same action?
In addendum 1. I don't know the effect on anything but the painting. I'm not assuming it leads to unspecified hardship. 1. Replace beauty with art of notable quality or art that one would assume could possess value. Maybe it captures the expression of a significant time in history like no other picture can; I don't know, it's not simply paint on a canvas. 2. No one other then the person acting on it.
Comments (277)
Intrigued by this. How do you imagine it causes harm?
But how?
Do you really think people capable of genocide are worried about what's morally permissible?
Clumsy editing on my part.
Then why would it matter if morality was objective or not? Objectively wrong, or subjectively wrong, they don't care either way. Neither force people to do what's right.
Whether or not an action is objectively wrong is different from an action being right/wrong independent of the actor/situation. Moral absolutism says an action is intrinsically wrong regardless of the ends or actor, whereas an objective morality entails that ethical norms are not up to interpretation; they are laws like any other that one can simply point to.
Quoting Isaac
Yes, but allowing for moral relativism no doubt allows for beliefs that cause actions that then cause unnecessary suffering. While beliefs don't force evil people to do evil things, beliefs often times influence good people to do bad things - something that could be more easily avoided imo.
Quoting Cheshire
What you are searching for is an absolute morality, not objective morality.
Well, the long answer is the subject of entire research projects. The short answer - several different factors; empathy, disgust, in-group reinforcement, social narratives, social identity... are the main ones.
Quoting ToothyMaw
How? No one seems to be presenting a mechanism connecting objectivity of morals to people being somehow unable to act or form beliefs contrary to them
I'm saying accepting that morality is subjective gives cover for some pretty horrible beliefs - such as female genital mutilation being acceptable. I know that people could always just form beliefs counter to whatever is the - supposedly - absolute morality, but that doesn't mean we have to allow something like FGM.
Furthermore, even though FGM is absolutely horrible, the people who do it might just see it as justified - and I wouldn't even call them evil. If it could be argued coherently that they shouldn't do it because of some sort of absolute morality then maybe it could be stopped, however. All indicating that creating a justified absolute morality could potentially curb some suffering.
I acknowledge, however, that there is no direct mechanism that would connect the objectivity of morals to people not being able to develop beliefs counter to said morals. But really what we should be talking about is moral absolutism, not objectivity.
Not only are they worried about what’s morally permissible, their actions are bound by a strict moral justification. See Mein Kampf or the old and new testament But I get what you’re saying. In committing genocide they are rejecting one set of moral precepts
in favor of another.
Good point. But I think many evil people will create justifications for evil acts because of a deeper issue - a lack of empathy, fanaticism, tribalism, etc.
And it happens that humans are fallible enough to believe some of these justifications.
Quoting ToothyMaw
Not justifications.
The use of the word evil may be problematic as it suggests a convenient explanation for what we all may see as atrocity. Surely Hitler thought he was an agent of moral goodness and that his work was all about improving human life on earth with the same passion that, say a committed environmentalist might feel today.
I think it is situational. Many evil people try to justify their evil actions, whereas some believe they are, as you say, agents of good.
Appealing to some twisted morality might convince more people that your cause is righteous, but, ultimately, I think it makes little difference what evil people think they are doing - they are doing evil things and should be stopped. And I think we should not compare someone like Greta Thunberg to Hitler - there is good reason to believe that human contributions to climate change matter, whereas Hitler was obviously full of shit.
We are on the same side.
I'll start by saying that every case of an object is also 'about an observer'. This is a post what I wrote and you read. Or it is nothing at all.
But I'll ignore your questions in favour of a simple case. Communication is good, and to say that it is good is to pick out an asymmetry between truth and falsehood. If falsehood is seen to prevail, there is no communication, even of the falsehood. Thus to assert the moral equivalence of truth and falsehood is a self-undermining act and a performative contradiction. Therefore, we ought to be honest and tell the truth as far as we can, and in general.
This is the key. When we retrofit our own moral judgements and assume people are 'justifying' actions using rationalisations we are assuming that 'evil' is done by people who know they are evil and what they are doing is wrong. In many cases they are true believers in the perfectibility of the human race.
Quoting ToothyMaw
I hear you but the point is not that he was full of shit, the point is he thought he had a plan for improving the world and millions of people agreed with this plan.
I literally said that beliefs cause many good people to do bad things; I totally acknowledge this here:
Quoting ToothyMaw
I must correct myself, however: some evil people believe they are agents of good, but I still hold that evil people often times just want to do evil things.
Quoting Tom Storm
Not all justifications are post hoc rationalizations. They can just mean "the action of showing something to be right or reasonable", which is what I meant when I used the word originally. So it seems we are splitting hairs; I totally agree with you.
One might even venture a developmental model of a cultural history of morality. connecting empathy with a gradual evolution from one-dimensional foundationalism to increasingly multi-dimensional , differentiated social understanding. What we judge in hindsight as genocidal evil becomes a necessary phase in that development. (I’m trying not to sound too Hegelian, or modernist).
Yes, I get that, but on one side you have justified beliefs, and on the other totally unjustified. There is no symmetry except in terms of zeal perhaps. So I do not find it to be a useful comparison.
Not going to lie, dude - that was exceedingly abstruse. What does any of that even mean? That genocide was necessary as part of the evolution of a more pluralistic morality?
I'm not even sure what my question means.
I think that all religions are latently dangerous, but Islam is probably the worst. In general, however, no. I know what you are getting at - if I associate evil with a particular set of beliefs then I must think that evil is mostly perpetrated as a function of beliefs, and not just evil people doing evil things.
My position on normative ethics is (aretaic) negative utilitarianism, wherein 'harm suffering misery' of members of any sentient species (at minimum) are considered 'the moral fact' (which solicits help to reduce harm or prevent increasing harm). Given that, I answer:
1. Only insofar as it increases harm to someone.
2. ditto
3. ditto
The answers here are the same in large part because the criterion proposed in objectively grounded. Harm is the objective moral fact at issue: objective because it is specie member-invariant; moral because it entails a meliorative (helping) response; fact because it indicates a natural species defect that when stressed risks dysfunction or worse.
Quoting Isaac
Same with laws: why bother with legistlating or deterrent punishments since "neither force people to do what's right?"
I do, however, think beliefs are highly relevant when it comes to moral culpability, which I've written about elsewhere.
No, I was focusing on your claim that there are just evil
people doing evil things. That is a quintessentially theological notion. Even if you don’t think of yourself believing in God, you clearly believe in Good( which is what defines as evil as what it is) , and for many theologians and philosophers this amounts to the same thing as God.
Nice. Is this the 'path' you think humans are on?
Quoting Joshs
That's a pretty bold idea. I feel uneasy with the word 'necessary' but I see what you mean.
Quoting Joshs
Yes - that's my point too. Many a Western secularist still holds a Judeo-Christian view of morality, despite protestations.
Claims about reality involve observers every bit as much as claims about morality do: that's what empiricism is all about, there's nothing more to reality than the way it appears to people, and it can appear differently to different kinds of people in different contexts, and the true reality is whatever consistently ties all those different appearances together.
The lesson to take away is that subjective-as-in-phenomenal doesn't have to be subjective-as-in-relative, and conversely, something doesn't have to be objective-as-in-transcendent just to be objective-as-in-universal.
Suffering may be observable and obvious, but how does suffering constitute a moral fact? A moral fact is an invariable law, not a subjective experience like suffering, harm, misery, etc. - even though I concede that it is a fact that people suffer.
Quoting 180 Proof
It might be a fact that certain actions will increase or decrease suffering, but how are these moral facts? They do not provide an objective moral criterion, even if they tell us what to do given we accept that suffering is wrong.
Quoting 180 Proof
I'm not sure what you're saying here. If you mean harm/suffering is invariant between members of the same species that isn't true. One person's suffering often cannot be compared to another's.
Quoting 180 Proof
It seems to me none of this is objectively grounded.
The system works in the sense it can be applied. But, I can't suppose the outcome of your criteria. I don't want to assume to know and the matter be led off track. Feel free to supply any missing necessary details. My guess is all three answers won't be the same. To me destroying things that express beauty are at least an intrinsic harm to the possible increase in the quality of life they produce.
This is a bit too silly.
People didn't enslave others because they believed the rightness or wrongness of it was relative, that doesn't even make sense as an explanation (as Isaac has pointed out). They did it because they believed that their superiority over the races they enslaved and their God-given right to do with the natural world as they pleased were objectively true and irrefutable. Same goes for genocide. I'm not sure illegal downloading, the odd one out in the list, causes much suffering at all.
I'm glad the assumptions are being put to the test. I had largely taken it for granted that relativism is bad because, just cause..
I think that there might be some moral facts, and that maybe good can exist, but I have no faith in the matter. That would be the most important difference between my view and a theologian's.
I think we might disagree semantically, but the understanding of the implications seems to be the same. The opinion of the actor isn't a determining factor in the result; regarding the right or wrongness.
Yes, but it is more difficult to justify an objective morality than an absolute morality it seems to me. If you just want the act to be right regardless of opinion absolute morality satisfies that without you needing to prove that moral facts exist.
Perhaps it would help to examine your assumptions. Seems like you are missing the point. Hitler thought what he was doing was good - engaged in righteous foundational work for a new epoch of human greatness that would be celebrated for 1000 years. It's you that's determining what's justified and what is 'totally unjustified'. You don't find it a useful comparison because it looks like you can't see the perspectivism inherent in this matter.
What you just wrote is quite similar to the postmodern perspective of ‘religion after religion’ philosophers like John Caputo and Simon Critchley.
No, I see what you are saying, I just don't see why it matters. And it isn't a matter of perspective which beliefs are justified in this case - one belief is based in science whereas the other in something else entirely. Surely that makes a difference?
That was unintended.
You are raising a separate matter - the justification of beliefs - I have not touched upon that. Morality is not a science. Remember too that Hitler based his ideas on 'race science' and eugenics and was supported by many highly educated academics and scientists. The science card is by no means straight forward either.
Good point. I agree.
I was talking to Tom, I know you meant that.
Then you're not a negative utilitarian as I claim to be when I prefaced my answers.
Again. How?
We find a book clearly written by God called "All the Morals" and in it is a passage which say "FGM is immoral". People who want to do FGM say "Well we're Immoral then" and carry on.
You're not saying anything about why people would stop doing something on finding out (or being convinced) that it was objectively or absolutely immoral. What is it about a thing's status in this magic Book of Immoral Things, or whatever, that makes people not do the things that are in it?
Sometimes. I think there are also cases where the narrative these people use is "Morals don't apply to me" or "morality is nonsense" etc. There are all sorts of available narratives, but yes, some grander purpose narrative is often chosen which they would see as 'moral'. Hopefully the point still carries. There's simply no status an action could be labelled with that would prevent people from deriving an alternative narrative within which doing the thing anyway was justified.
Yes. You're not alone, clearly.
Well laws have both social and penal consequences for disobeying, yes? This is the point I'm trying to steer toward. If an objective morality had any power to persuade people to act in accordance with it, then that power would be, like laws, social peer pressure. But then objectivity is not required. Popularity is sufficient.
Laws themselves are not absolute. They change over the years and are different in different countries. Are we immoral in the UK for letting our young adults drink at 18 instead of 21?
It's the normative force that matters in getting people to behave, not the objectivity. Good social narratives, positive role-models, being valued by your community... all worth a hundred times more than an appeal to a supposedly objective fact about the world that people would happily disagree with no matter what the evidence.
I think the problem is, that moral issues are by nature beyond what is simply 'objective'. Objectivity is fine to determine what is the case with respect to some quantifiable or measurable state of affairs, or where there is a basis of inter-subjective judgement. Examples would include jurisprudence, history, and other such subjects, where judgement is required, but is able to be referenced to a body of external knowledge, such as torts, or historical records, or export testimony, or peer review, and so on. In those cases, objectivity is certainly an attainable and worthy criterion.
But the problem is, moral judgements seem to require some criteria beyond what can be established with respect to specific subjects or domains of analysis. I think this is because they are bound up with very basic judgements about the nature of existence and the meaning of human agency. Consequently, they're grounded in very broad and general principles.
Although I'm not a Wittgenstein scholar, I sometimes cite these passages from his Tractatus:
Of course, the famous conclusion of this passage, and indeed the whole work, is 'What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence'. Regardless, I think those passages are useful for asking why the question about the source of moral values is such a difficult one.
Exactly. Basically the point I've been making here. Whether morals actually are objective, absolute, subjective, or relative matters not one jot when it comes to people following them. They will do so on the basis of a little bit of biology and a huge slice of enculturation. No matter what philosophers think.
What would a charitable reading look like? And yes, I am looking for a discussion, I just think you made a poor case for objective morality, that's all - otherwise I actually think your views on ethics are pretty solid.
At the very least we could justify implementing laws that prevent things like FGM if there were an absolute morality.
Furthermore, there is obviously a connection to what the vast majority of people believe is permissible and their philosophical assumptions - even if those assumptions are naïve. Most people, even if they don't know what the term "free choice" means, for example, have a concept of what it is - or so I've noticed in some of my discussions with people who don't read philosophy - and it contributes to their conception of moral culpability.
The same goes for morality I believe: people often act on their beliefs, or believe them justified and thus try to codify them, based on the belief that their morality is absolute - an assumption many people share. If enough people believe themselves to know that their shared morality is justified they may push to outlaw abhorrent practices such as FGM.
I, once again, acknowledge that while there is nothing to guarantee that an absolute/objective morality would prevent people from acting counter to said morality, moral relativism gives cover for horrible stuff.
There may be some truth to this but ethicists/bio-ethicists contribute disproportionately to the policies of organizations/corporations/government, and it matters whether or not they believe in an absolute morality. So it can be fruitful to search for an absolute morality imo.
Potentially, but not necessarily. There could be the law: "Do not steal", which has no context, as opposed to the law: "Do not steal on the Sabbath". Both could be objective.
Quoting Cheshire
Good point; If you still want to take into account context you need either objective laws that take into account context or some sort of relativism.
Possibly many/most people have this belief.
This is where you differ from the people above. A consequent moral objectivist would either not ask about the origins of morality, or would be certain of a particular source of it. Either way, he would not struggle how to account for objective morality.
It appears that you're not a consequent moral objectivist.
Are you familiar with Kohlberg's theory of the stages of moral reasoning?
According to this theory, people at different stages of moral reasoning reason differently about issues of morality. On a metalevel, this explains the differences between people and how the same person can reason differently about the same moral issue, in different times of their life.
That is interesting stuff; I remember being taught about it in psychology in high school. Many students appeared to be stuck at stage four of conventional morality - follow laws to maintain order in society.
At the present I seem to be spending a lot of time fishing in a contradiction of sorts. Which makes my proto-position hard to articulate. The first observation is that unobserved actions are indifferent to morality. An action wasn't considered to have a moral aspect until people arrived. So, morality is something we impose on the world. But, it isn't an empty label either which implies that the morality imposed becomes something real. I believe it was Mill that noted an animal could be considered to have personhood so long as a person cared enough for it. Which seems absolutely true and indefensibility arbitrary. So, currently I'm trying to reconcile the matter. Do we create morality and then it takes on it's own existence? Or perhaps the whole of existence is aware and no event is truly unobserved.
I'm sounding like a stuck record, but... why? If a firm has gone to the trouble of consulting an ethicist what difference is it going to make to the outcome whether that ethicist believes in absolute morality?
They say "most people think x is immoral", or they say "x is really, truly immoral (but most people don't think it is)".
Which do you think is going to have the most normative force with the company?
If they believe in absolute morality then they won't simply posit that ethics is relative - which is often equivalent to permitting just about anything within the scope of different cultures having different ethical beliefs. It seems to me that unless the application of the absolute morality posited caused more net suffering - assuming a negative utilitarian stance - advising a company to do what is absolutely right would cause less suffering and therefore be sound. It is also salient to recognize that this advisement is distinct from merely saying "most people think x is immoral so therefore we ought not do it", which is relativistic.
Quoting Isaac
I'm not sure which of those ethical claims would hold more normative force with a company.
Really? It's not something I've ever encountered. I've sat on an ethics committee for a short while, permitting just about anything didn't come up, and absolute moral rightness wasn't even mentioned. The entire talk is about what people consider moral from different perspectives. What ethical committees are you thinking of where relativists say "anything goes!"?
Quoting ToothyMaw
Indeed, tautologically so. And assuming a divine command theory stance - advising a company to do what is absolutely right would result in a happier God... Assuming a virtue ethical stance - advising a company to do what is more virtuous would lead to a more virtuous acting company...
But also, advising a company to do what most people think is right would result in a company doing what most people think is right...
You've not given any reason why we'd prefer either of these outcomes.
My former post doesn't totally make sense. I should have said: if there is an absolute morality and what is absolute is absolute because it causes less suffering then it would be right to advise a company to follow the course of action dictated by the absolute morality as opposed to simply saying "most people think x is immoral so therefore we ought not do it".
Yeah, I corrected myself. Sorry.
Truly agree. Furthermore, the goal of utilitarian morality could be subjective, phenomenal, relative, objective, transcendent and universal; and so would morality by intent be.
The whole morality thing hinges on two things: Humans, mammals and birds are capable to feel moral; and it is helpful in the survival as a species; or the survival of the individual's derivative DNA. Everything else (aside from moral or ethics surely exists but is undefinable, and the nature of moral code) are variations on a theme.
I summarized it very nicely in two papers, both of which appear in the Ethics forum of the The Philosophy Forum. I do not describe a guidance of how to behave; I simply explain the formation and present mechanism of morality, and it allows nicely for the variations.
I strongly urge you (who ever YOU are) to read these papers. If you have a comment to make on the papers, please for god's own sake, leave the comment on those paper's forums, not here. This thread has enough exposure. My threads are ignored BIG time.
There are two versions of the same paper. One is longer, in narrative style; people complained here that it was too long and contained too much ballast, too much extraneous information. The second version is shorter and in a point form, to satisfy those who think the first version was too long.
The longer version:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/10744/ethics-explained-to-smooth-out-all-wrinkles-in-current-debates-neo-darwinist-approach
The sorter version:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/10903/shortened-version-of-theory-of-morality-some-objected-to-the-conversational-style-of-my-paper
Please read, enjoy, and if you feel like it, and only if you do, please leave remarks on those two threads I am pointing at in this post.
It is totally possible my perception is skewed - I mostly hear about people on ethics committees from people who have talked about ethics committees without being on them necessarily.
The one that causes less suffering seems best to me.
Plug your papers elsewhere please. And if no one wants to comment on your threads you should just write better OP's.
Read your essay. It would help to change the format and have an introductory paragraph. It is difficult to tell where it is going; it meanders.
Understood.
Quoting ToothyMaw
So how is following what 'seems best to me' not precisely relativism?
Oh yeah, I just assume that minimizing suffering is pretty much indisputably right, because that is how I and many people other feel. At its base I have no justification for this other than that one thought experiment by Sam Harris (I don't like the guy that much, but his thought experiment about the worst possible world makes a lot of sense to me).
"worst possible misery for everyone" he calls it.
So what gives in the cade of inconsistency here, the premise or the conclusion? One of the two has to be wrong, but it's not given which. Either the moral theory is wrong because it produces a judgement that's inconsistent with some intuitive moral theory, or the intuitive moral theory is shown to be wrong because it's inconsistent with the rationally worked out answer. Doesn't seem like we've got any closer to knowing what's right. If some moral theory proved that killing some small child was the 'right' thing to do would you do it, or would you question the theory?
That is similar to the two horned Euthyphro Dilemma. Either what god commands is arbitrary, or moral facts exist independently of god. Most theists won't just bite the bullet and say it is arbitrary - in fact the few theists I've proposed it to just claimed the dilemma was "ridiculous" and rejected it.
True, yes, but also products of it, no? It's not clear what role you think philosophers et al might have here. I can only think of two, each with their problems.
1. Sorting and clarifying. What is the underlying essence of what's moral, what are we talking about, the common thread? Problem being, if some moral approach 'in the wild' doesn't fit, is it the descriptive clarification that's wrong, or the aberrant moral approach that's wrong?
2. Determining what 'should' be moral. Morality, being about what we 'ought' do would seem to need to be already determined before anyone could commence working out what anything 'ought' to be.
Do you have some other role in mind?
Yep. That's moral relativism.
Quoting ToothyMaw
Indeed. Discussions about morality often end that way too.
Nice topic!
Quoting Cheshire
I assume that by "apart from" you mean "independently of" and that "about an observer" you mean "depends on the observer". Right?
I would also have to assume the term "morality" with the general meaning "The extent to which an action is right or wrong". Because it can be used with other meanings too (e.g. rules/principles of right or wrong behavior, etc.)
Finally, I consider as moral action as one that makes more good than harm. For whom? Well, for the greatest number. Humans are social beings. This means that if my action can affect others, I have to consider if it will make more good or harm to them. And if I have already done it, I have to ask myself if it made more good or harm to them.
Now, let's see your questions:
Quoting Cheshire
We can apply the definition-criterion I mentioned above (I don't want to call it "rule" or "principle") to every one of them:
1. How destroying the painting (that you value as "beautiful") could affect others?
2. I'm not sure what do you mean by "no one would have ever seen it". How can this happen? For one thing, you must be one who has seen it! :))
3. It is you who painted it, you have basically the right to do whatever you want with it. However, on a higher moral plane, if you think that it would be good --for one or the other reason-- to show it and even give it as a present to other people, e.g. family, friends, etc. wouldn't it be wrong to destroy it?
Once we are talking about art, maybe you know about the Tibetan mosaics that are created with colored sand ... Very beautiful, very detailed and big. They take quite long to finish. Yet, when the group is satisfied with the result, they just destroy them with a few sweeping movements! This has of course an explanation, but the fact is that they all agree that destroying these creations is a good and meaningful act.
Conclusion: There are universal and thus objective criteria upon which a person can act or judge his actions. It does not matter how he (for brevity) evaluates good or harm, this is always subjective. But from the moment that he believes that something is right or wrong, and acts according to those criteria, his actions are moral. "Be true to yourself", they say. Moral integrity is one of the most important things in human behavior and consciousness. The only thing one can do wrong is breaking that integrity!
I know. But I think moral absolutism might be possible, along with objectivity. I suppose I could arbitrarily specify that suffering is inherently bad, and then adopt a negative utilitarian position. That would lead to an absolute morality I think, even if not objective. I suppose that is more my position - but how I feel enters into me specifying that suffering is bad; I have suffered and don't like it a whole lot - like most people. Thus I think it is wrong.
Then reply to my criticisms, please. Saying I was uncharitable doesn't negate them.
Anyway, your input likewise is appreciated as well.
Pedagogue or ideologue are not "roles" for philosophers (sophists, clergy) to play? Your examples mostly belong to pedagogy.
Again, just saying so is not a "criticism" warranting, or even inviting, more of a reply than I've given.
Can you foresee any circumstance where the negative utilitarian position on an issue might, nonetheless feel wrong? If no, then no need for any moral thought at all, you already know what's right in any situation just by gut instinct. If yes, then what do you do? You only came up with negative utilitarianism because it's how you feel, so when it advises some course of action which clashes with how you feel in some other way, it has no greater claim to rightness.
Quoting 180 Proof
Then I'm afraid I've completely missed the point of your...
Quoting 180 Proof
...any chance of an elucidation for the slow ones at the back?
It does if I can actually make a case for suffering being inherently wrong. Which I really can't except for the idea of expanding my own experience to those of others - I have a preference to not suffer, and so does everyone else, so it should be avoided whenever possible, regardless of whether or not other people suffer in unique ways.
I can't think of any circumstances under which I would permit suffering if it could be avoided (or a greater amount of suffering incurred in exchange for a smaller amount).
Do you have no other preferences? What gives your preference to not suffer it's superlative status?
Quoting ToothyMaw
What constitutes it not being avoidable? If you had to give up all your money to prevent someone stubbing their toe would you do so? The trouble with balancing something as nebulous as 'suffering' is that virtually everything can be framed in those terms. Do I 'suffer' when I have to give a pound to the homeless? Of course. Does god 'suffer' when we don't do as he asks? Maybe. Do people 'suffer' when we don't act virtuously. Arguably, yes. So deciding to measure 'suffering' doesn't answer any questions because the questions aren't about the measurement unit, they're about the relative quantity of it.
Anyway, I don't think I can make my meaning any plainer or clearer than what you've quoted (particularly in the contexts of my prior posts). We agree on the significance of 'enculturation' for moral conformity but, apparently, differ on the efficacy of the role philosophy plays – has played, can still play – in cultivating values, norms, etc.
No, because living in poverty would lead to more suffering than someone stubbing their toe. Obviously.
Quoting Isaac
I disagree; just because suffering is subjective doesn't mean we can't observe people's suffering; they can often times explain, quite explicitly, how they are suffering and how intensely; it really isn't nearly that nebulous.
Quoting Isaac
But suffering can, in some ways, be quantified, because we all (usually) do not suffer in ways entirely unique; we can get a general idea of what it is like to lose a loved one even if we haven't. Like I said - people can report on what causes them suffering, and how intensely they are suffering, even if there are no strict units.
Quoting Isaac
Yes, I do have other preferences, such as a will to live. But at a certain point I suppose the will to live could lead to more suffering than would be incurred if one died, an unfortunate fact. So I suppose that is one circumstance where my intuitions lead me away from the negative utilitarian position; if you can take the pain then keep going, no matter how much it sucks.
No, I criticized you before I said more succinctly that I didn't think you made a good argument for moral objectivity. Go back and read what I wrote if you want to have a discussion.
The closest candidate for moral objectivism/absolutism being the solipsist.
That was funny.
(not because it's wrong)
I did and so again ...
Quoting 180 Proof
It's not relativism if the person is a narcissist, or, specifically, an epistemic narcissist or egotist. Such a person is firmly convinced that "the way things really are" is precisely as they view them. Such a person has no sense of their perspective, instead, they believe they can directly perceive the truth. Such a person is, for all practical intents and purposes, a solipsist.
I think that for one's moral stance to be strong, one has to believe that it's not merely one's own, subjective, partial, biased view, but that it intimately has something to do with "how things really are", ie. that it is objective, beyond mere subjectivity.
But, once again, you are just claiming I was being uncharitable without engaging with me - an indication that you have no responses to my criticisms. It's fine; we all make bad arguments sometimes.
Quoting baker
Quoting baker
I know quite a few of those: the universe was created just so that I can have a relationship with some supreme celestial creator/father figure, and all of his edicts in my special book are truth.
The thing is that in the mind of such a person, there is objective morality. I mean this in the metaethical sense. Such a person has an unfailing conviction that they know objective morality.
Perhaps this is the most objective that morality can get.
But whether or not morality is objective is still independent of anyone's feelings by definition. Just because I don't believe in god doesn't mean he doesn't exist and that the bible isn't made up of (contradictory) moral facts. The converse applies too.
But I get what you are saying.
It harms a painting. I won't assume it harms a person, so it's not wrong(if I apply your criteria for you). Yet, it seems wrong to destroy a painting that commands some degree of intrinsic value. Is this inconsistency immaterial to your positions considerations?
I think this is the most comprehensive and clearly described point of view the thread has inspired.
Can "a painting" suffer harm? (Category mistake.)
How does it make sense to say that something which cannot value itself has "intrinsic value"?
To answer anyway: No, but "intrinsic value" is not determinative, or the decisive factor in moral judging. As I said "in relation to rather than the essence of" – sentients over above non-sentients (things) because the latter cannot suffer – is the ethical criterion I find more reasonable and pragmatic.
Interesting, I'm not trying to be difficult. But, you seem to include criteria that isn't necessary for making a judgement - in this particular case - and exclude criteria I would think is most informative. Specifically, you noted a preference for "sentients"; No sentients were harmed in the filming of the OP. Next, you discard "intrinsic value" from the decision. Seemingly in direct opposition to the meaning of value.
Is it still not wrong to destroy a thing or is it wrong to destroy a thing without having to favor a sentient in the process.
Not saying it's incorrect; but it is curious.
If it were a true conflation, I was aware you meant harm to people. I know you don't consider these uses of harm to be equal.Quoting 180 Proof
I took for granted that art of a certain quality has intrinsic value.
The test of a theory against intuitive morality is done with the expectation the intuitive morality is in fact shared. So, the beast seems to coil around itself.
1. I present a moral theory.
2. You demonstrate that it can produce a permittable immoral act.
3. We agree the theory is flawed; but based on a shared theory that is unstated but seemingly understood.
No one has ever been cheated and then wondered if the dishonest party knew what they were doing was wrong. Maybe, morality is too broad or nuanced to be decided by axioms; we might be making a type of grammar by pretending patterns are rules.
People like their own ideas, so starting with a concluded matter that isn't pre-distributed is asking a lot. The most success I've had is when I truly don't have an answer, but rather a few premises. I hope that helps with the future attempts. In regards, to evolutionary pressures for morality; I think it is one of the most overlooked. It's been regulated to feminism by mistake or to some disservice. The idea that the preservation of relationships describes the basis for what is moral or immoral seems compelling to me. I'll take a read this evening. Cheers.
If a destructive act harms a sentient, it's usually morally wrong; otherwise, it could be wrong on non-moral (e.g. instrumental or aesthetic) grounds.
Quoting Cheshire
And I called into question taking for granted that "art ... has intrinsic value" in ethical terms.
Why does my lone perception carry less moral validity than some one's imagined consensus with the universe? I expect the opposite to be true. If I had to convince some one what they were doing was wrong then my system is probably in error. In terms of not feeling emotionally insecure in applying moral judgements a belief in a objective source is helpful. I suppose I have resistance to the subtext and mixed thoughts on the surface. The king and I think what your doing is wrong. It does feel better.
Are you saying the OP fails to describe a moral decision?
I selected the case because I know how many systems rely on human suffering in order to make a determination. I thought eliminating this element would highlight something different or even new regarding morality. You have successfully confounded my attempt by insisting to judge it as if it were regarding human suffering. I don't have any traps set; people are more important than things; but damaging at least some things must carry a moral element. Consider things are destroyed for their lack of moral value; so the opposite should be true.
I didn't say you couln't measure it, I said it was nebulous and everything can be framed in those terms. Take any existing moral dilemma, then say 'we should look at this in terms of how much each option would cause suffering'. What is achieved by framing it that way. All the factors being considered (tradition, God's will, personal preferences, in-group bias...) can be framed as types of 'suffering', so no factors are being filtered or highlighted for consideration. The dilemma is exactly as it was.
Quoting ToothyMaw
As is often the case with arguments about moral calculus, you select a clear case with which no one would disagree and imply that the same calculus could be used to work out real dilemmas. Consider it like simple maths. I say to you "take a handful of ball bearings and then six handfuls of marbles and add them to a bucket" without accuracy, we can say a lot about the bucket, it's not going to contain a million items (that'd be obviously too many), it's going to contain more marbles than ball bearing (six is way more than one even though ball bearings are smaller). But this success doesn't mean we can apply the technique universally. Comparing two buckets filled this way we wouldn't have a clue which one might have more marbles in it, make it 27 and 32 handfuls respectively and we're lost as to whether there'd be more marbles or ball bearings.
The reason why most real moral dilemmas remain dilemmas is because they are of the latter sort. The values on each side are close, difficult to put a number to. That's why I say couching it in terms of 'suffering' doesn't help, because the problem is the closeness of the estimated values on either side of the balance, not the units in which those values are measured.
Quoting baker
No, but it's not morality either, which involves how we ought to act toward each other. If there's no other (either in one's reality, or in one's calculus) then there's no moral question to answer.
Quoting Cheshire
This would be treating ethics as if it were trying to describe what we consider moral rather than trying to determine it, which would make it a science, not a philosophical practice. I think that's a valid aspect , but it sidesteps the question of what I 'ought' to do.
Quoting Cheshire
Yes, that's my view. Morality is a complex and dynamic collection of decision-making tools and no one rule-set captures it.
Thank you for giving me the time. My idea I like, tremendously, as you said. Opposed to many or all dilettantes (which I am one of) I don't prescribe a moral code or ethic; I simply state "this is how it is, why it is so, and how it developed." Nothing more.
Incidentally, none of your sentences make sense to me, other than the last two. Don't take me wrong; I am not belittling you. It may be due to the fact that you're much more intelligent and deeper than I. I dunno. It could be mockery on your part, too, for all I know.
It's not publishing success I am after, but getting the idea I developed and described popularized. I don't write to publish; I wish to publish what I wrote. Totally the wrong concept, I know, but I like what I write. I think my pieces are cuddly, they're likeable, they're cute.
If you have any comment to make, please make them on that thread. Thanks.
1. You present a theory on something that we don't know what it is. It's like stating a theory on god: everyone has a concept of god, or of morality, but we can't put our fingers on it just precisely what it is.
2. To decide something is immoral we only rely on our inner gut feelings. It can't be proven that it's immoral, while the emotional judgment is so strong that we are unilateral in the opinion -- without having a basic definition of it. For instance, we agree that biting kitten's heads off is immoral, or raping babies... but why? We have no concept of morality other than emotional judgment.
3. No, it's not flawed; and we are not basing our moral compass on theory, but on feelings. It's not flawed, because moral theories try to emulate the truth behind morals, which actually follow the explicable but unreasoned rules to help society's propagation and the propagation of the individual's DNA.
This can also be inferred from my paper.
Quoting Cheshire
Thank you, @Cheshire. I am very glad that you consider my contribution valuable! :)
No, it wasn't mockery I should have broken the post into two sections. The first was an attempt at some casual advice on herding cats to a thread via a style of OP. I appreciate the generous supposition, but I'm just smart enough to appreciate the things brilliant people do.
I'm not sure I understand. Unless I'm mistaken you are saying that suffering is caused by every action, so we cannot weigh one course of action against another. Well, sometimes there is a measurable tradeoff - one course of action might cause suffering, but less suffering than if it weren't taken. That is how many moral dilemmas could be solved: choose the option that causes less suffering, which, as you admit, can be measured. This seems exceedingly simple to me: trade more suffering for less whenever possible.
Or are you saying there is no discernible criterion for "suffering" since everything could be interpreted as suffering, so there is absolutely no way of navigating moral dilemmas? That seems incorrect to me too because we definitely can can develop a criterion - suffering is an inherently undesirable state of mind we all feel. Thus extraneous factors like God's will can be disregarded. But then again I don't really understand how God's will could actually be a form of suffering anyways.
If we could choose the option which causes less suffering it wouldn't be an extant moral dilemma, it would already be solved (like no-one is wondering whether we should torture children for fun). Moral dilemmas are dilemmas because it is undecidable which course of action causes the least (or most) of whatever metric you're using to determine 'right'. Since every metric can be 'converted' to suffering, changing the metric doesn't resolve the fact that the measurement of it is unresolvable.
Try it, by all means. Take a moral dilemma where people disagree with you about the 'right' course of action. Tell them how much 'suffering' you think the 'wrong' option causes and see if they disagree. If they do, where do you go next? To what higher authority do you appeal to judge the correct amount of 'suffering' in cases of disagreement?
Okay, yes, I see what you are saying - if the dilemma is merely that which course of action causes less suffering then it isn't really a moral dilemma; it is a disagreement about facts about which course of action will cause less suffering.
Quoting Isaac
Do you mean they disagree about the amount of suffering caused or whether or not minimizing suffering is a good objective?
Well, in this context of "testing a moral theory" we would be both comparing the "gut feeling" and the logical implications of the theory in question. In example, there are some that would suppose negative utilitarianism implies the removing of suffering people; by means other than reducing there suffering. I don't agree, but it is a vivid example of testing a moral theory.
Quoting god must be atheist The desire to make a morally correct decision isn't flawed, but the basis for it may be. If the emotional feeling is in fact reliable, we should be able to put into words why one decision is in fact better than another.
Quoting god must be atheist
The style of making sweeping declarative statements that must feel self-evident does mirror some elements I found in the paper. I agree you aren't imagining the points you are making; but you may be missing some of the issues that come along with them. Thanks for the response.
If you define suffering as exclusively being an undesirable state of mind then it seems to me that not every metric can be converted to suffering, although almost anything could be seen to cause suffering.
Of course. It is always possible to attempt to approach such a thing, I think. However, how would we know for certain whether or not even small deviations from the answer won't result in catastrophic implications that can completely change the end-result? I'm not trying to shut your argument down, but I'm wondering if this is the case.
If the liking system were still in effect I would like that comment. :up:
Unless I'm mistaken that is a big thing that happens when running certain simulations.
Right, but Chaos Theory is almost entirely mathematical. I think linguistics is probably more important in this context than math because we would describe a moral fact, or the approximation of one, in terms of language, not, say, in terms of the curvature of the path of a body in the presence of other bodies. So I don't know if Chaos Theory could say a whole lot about approximating moral facts and the outcomes of doing so.
But it is interesting nonetheless, and the concept might be useful.
That's just it: feelings are not universal over some particular action or event.
For example: One nation's celebration of victory over the overlords is a sad day in the life of the overlord. The victory is moral on one side of the fence, immoral on the other side.
Or take the crucifixion of Jesus. Christians decry and hate the decision by the Jewish leadership to crucify him; yet without the act, people of Jesus' followers would never be saved. So should Christians thank the Jews for killing their god, or hate them for it? Christians by-and-large chose the hate part.
If my soccer team wins by one goal where the referee did not punish my team for being off side, then it's not a moral sin for the followers of my team, but it is for the opposing team.
How does that relate to what you quoted? I think Cheshire was more talking about how we have to give a justification for why one act is better than another - and explain it in words; we have to be able to give
- at minimum - a rationalization about why we are right, if not a fully logical explanation.
I see now what you were getting at, but I think Cheshire meant something else entirely.
that's precisely what the subjectivism is about (voluntary) morality; the precise thing that eradicates any trace of objectivism. You said it yourself, and ever so rightly: we rationalize our actions into moral superiority, without any substantive support for it. I have seen it in communist Hungary, I have seen it in capitalist USA, I have seen it in fascist anti-Semitic literature.
Karl Marx (one of quite a few of his observations that I find true that are not related to communism) discovered this in political movements: "Humans of a common movement create an ideology to help them succeed in their efforts." In other words, humans must lie to themselves to explain the evil acts (not in a religious sense evil, but in a moral sense) they are about to commit. The WARS to satisfy the greed for Indian spices was explained as crusades. The killing of the Jews was explained as an economic and moral good deed by Hitler. The enslavement of Blacks was explained by saying they are sub-humans. The American Civil War was explained as a humanitarian act.
I also personally thought that linguistics had more to do with the expression of ideas rather than the idea itself. Of course, certain ways of expressing ideas could yield promising results that can help us get better at approximating the actual answer. I was wondering what your thoughts on using linguistics for this subject were.
Yeah, I definitely agree with all of that. :up:
But it seems to me many of these rationalizations are the result of or an interaction with deeper tendencies like tribalism, fanaticism, greed, hegemony, etc. - things that are both explicitly and latently dangerous.
For example, none of the neocons in the US can even give a fucking half-decent rationalization for their forever-wars, so the tendency towards hegemony with regards to the US is quite explicit.
Maybe analyzing applied approximate moral facts in terms of the semantics of their constituent parts and comparing the combinations of constituent parts to the outcomes arrived at by their application could yield a basis for combining said constituent parts into a more accurate approximation through trial and error?
Basically you would insert different combinations of chunks of meaning into an ever-closer approximation based upon how you know they interact from trial and error, and then check the consistency/closeness of the approximation.
Yes, thats right, and if the dilemma were previously framed as which course of action caused most happiness, changing it to which causes least suffering won't change the disagreement because lack of happiness can be framed as a type of suffering.
Quoting ToothyMaw
The former. They may talk as if they disagreed about the latter, but my argument is that such disagreements are superficial whether it's least suffering, or most happiness, or most virtuous, or most culturally acceptable, or most pleasing to God... The main thrust of the disagreement in moral dilemmas is not the objective, it's the means of getting there.
Quoting ToothyMaw
Seems contradictory. If anything can be framed by how much suffering it causes, then it seems to follow that every metric can be converted. All that's required is to measure the suffering caused by it's valence.
Fair enough.
Quoting Isaac
Once again, fair enough.
Quoting Isaac
That was a bit of a mindfuck. I suppose that that is true too.
So where does that even leave us?
Suffering e.g. starvation is much more than "inner gut feelings". If reducing suffering is the goal, then 'causing / not reducing starvation' fails to pursue, or undermines, the goal. But is this goal moral? may be asked.
Negative utilitarianism, as I understand it, is the position which assumes, on a naturalistic basis, that the defects of our species (and most other mammalian species), when stressed cause dysfunction or worse, are objective facts and that these stressors are homeostatic / hedonic signals for help to reduce them; it is this inherent solicitude – appeal, or demand, for help – to others (with defects and vulnerability to the same stressor-hazards) which is moral – which makes the goal of reducing suffering (e.g. starvation), in this framework, moral.
This is how you know, more than with "inner gut feelings", that being starved is to suffer the same for others as it is for yourself, and failing to reduce such an abject condition for another is, by this standard, "immoral" (I prefer morally wrong) insofar as you, like the other, expect – appeal/demand for – help to reduce your starvation. And so caveat: taking any decisionist scenario out of the context of any ethical framework, gmba, renders it arbitrary (e.g. "we rely only on our inner gut feelings") and so even easier to conclude what you've assumed: thus, moral nihilism or emotivism, moral relativism or egoism – intractably confused whateverthefuckism – fatuously and decadently proliferate.
That is true. What many don't realize is that the USA would be in the middle of a long-long elongated depression, created by an overproduction crisis. This is counter-effected by the powers that be by draining the economy; they do it by building up a military. The military brings nothing to the table of the economy; but because it only takes away, it makes sure that whatever is on the table will get bought up. If things remain on the table, they have a poisonous effect on the economy. A bit like a real, food table: if you don't wash it and empty it of food every day, it will develop greasy dirt that attracts microbes, rodents and disease.
I never would have thought such a thing. But wouldn't production naturally slow down if people weren't buying things and there was no tremendous military industrial complex draining the economy? I'm no economist (or really anything for that matter), so that question might be a bit naïve. But I understand what you are describing.
Quoting god must be atheist I think it's irrational to hold people accountable for being related to other people by 2000yrs just in any context; it's a very misguided concept. In this one; I would remind the interested party he was crucified by Romans and at least some of the account of it was probably written or added in transcription in Rome. Or if your religion makes you hate anyone, then get a new religion.
Quoting god must be atheist
Well, this is actually more significant. It sounds like happenstance of human error in regulating a game. I guess you could ask if it is immoral to enjoy a victory not fully earned?
So, there are ways of taking things out of the subjective; but if your purpose is the opposite, then maybe I'm missing something.
I'm going to flag your comment for triggering me. Triggered.
Nice pun!
There are many ways to skin a cat, but the cat has nine lives, and the cat-o-tail has nine whips.
That's just it. You could ask a number of things, and they could answer a number of things. "The victory was fully earned because the game goes to the team with the higher score." or "The refereeing is a human act, it is prone to error, and it could have happened the other way around. The rules say the referee's judgment is the ultimate judgment in the game, so who are we to argue with the referee? It may even earn us a yellow card (personal punishment) if we pressed an argument." "No, it was not offside. The referee saw it correctly." ETC.
Right you are. But you are swaying from the decision made on a moral basis. If logic is at the top of the list, and morality is at the bottom, then the reasons put forward would be the real ones. instead of saying that we are waging a war for the glory of god or for the embetterment of mankind, we would say we are waging a war to satisfy the greed of our leaders at the cost of many of our compatriot's death, suffering, maiming, mutilating and damaging psychologiclally. I guess that would not go down so well would it.
So logic is the trigger for wars, and ideology is the lie that covers the real reason to make sure the war will happen.
How do you distinguish between an emotional reaction and moral calculation? If I am angry, does that mean some one did something wrong?
Yes, production would slow down, workers would lose their jobs, and would buy even less. Less bought, production would plummet deeper down. Bunch of workers fired again. ETC. This is the prescription for the overproduction crisis, and this was the reason behind the Great Depression.
That's just it; my examples showed that there is no neutral side in some moral questions. By the multitude of answers to the multitude of questions I aimed to demonstrate that any rationalization can be fabricated to support one's position.
So then it would be bad to reign in the military-industrial complex?
What if we just organized a vigorous infrastructure revitalization plan? Maybe that would drain enough to avoid the overproduction crisis?
All moral calculations contain some emotional reaction, but not all emotional reactions are part of moral calculations.
You are implying they are all equally valid?
You are absolutely right! In fact, in minor depressions this is the described practice by economists. The great highways, the damns, the huge infrastructure works are done in times when production is low. These activities suck up the work force, so employment levels go higher, and the economy recovers.
I don't like that question, because it shows to me you haven't been getting my point.
They are equally valid in two groups: valid for one group with one set of answers, and valid for the other group with a different set of answers. The validity is decided on whom the answer vindicates morally. To one group those questions will be valid that morally vindicate them; to the other group, conversely so.
There is no objective morality in the world of voluntary morals. This is the point of my paper as well. You actually took exception to my mentioning that in only one sentence in the paper. You wanted to see more of that, but to me it has always been clear. I did not want to clutter the paper with proving already accepted truths.
To you and to some others in this thread it may be not self-evident, that morals are never absolute and objective. Just think of cannibalism and burning witches at the stakes. Some cultures foster it, some cultures are abhorred by it. Voluntary (acquired) morals are not pervasive over all cultures. That's very much one of the points in my paper.
I am talking voluntary moral calculations.
- peer induced moral values
- whether the actor accepts them or not
- if the actor does not accept and internalilze them, then there is no moral calculation
- if the actor accepts them then most acts are straightforward
- acts become not straightforward when an accepted and internalized voluntary moral contradicts other internalized morals -- this is the only time of conflict, when the person will act to the outside world unpredictably, and according to the actor, as he sees how he or she makes the decision, weighing the pros and cons between two choices.
Wouldn't this dissolve the meaning of the word "bias". We recognize the degree to which a person's interest can mistakenly be injected into their perception. It's the reason some decisions are made best by a neutral party. A bias decision shouldn't be as equally valid as an unbiased decision.
Quoting god must be atheist I was simply verifying your point. Proclaiming all positions equal simply because they are positions is rather bold. You did verify it in a qualified sense, so I wasn't too far off the trail. Is it an immoral question, because of how you feel? Why not?
I think those who're concerned about moral systems are really concerned about influence, not rightness, They already seem to have a pretty robust (if net even a little dogmatic) opinion about what's right, what they're looking for is a stick with which to beat their opponents. The hope is that absolute morality will be such a stick. If saying "you shouldn't walk past the homeless" isn't working, maybe "you absolutely shouldn't walk past the homeless, I proved it" will. At the end of the day, they just don't want people walking past the homeless.
The trouble is that people don't make their decisions on the basis of what some philosopher says (even 'philosopher' with a small 'p', and even when that philosopher is themselves). Most rationalisations are post hoc, the decision's already been made and the rational argument is engaged to try and support it. Moral decisions are at the most extreme end. The gut feelings which viscerally repulse us from harming the innocent child aren't going to be overridden any time soon by the results of a parlour game like philosophy.
It's easy enough to get people to behave more morally - make sure they feel welcomed and valued in some social group and then set the membership criteria of that group as consistent moral behaviour (whatever your chosen brand of 'moral' is). It doesn't matter that you can't work out exactly what is right in certain edge cases because their being edge cases precisely means that there's no clear right or wrong. The problem is not the unresolved dilemmas, it's the inability to live with them.
I don't see how. Smashing the painting would be morally wrong. It would be wrong because doing so would make you the kind of person who could destroy beautiful things without revulsion and removing that revulsion which prevents you from doing so could lead to suffering in future as you're no longer held back when feeling the urge to destroy something. Many beautiful things give value to society and cause suffering when they're lost. It's the same argument against things like torturing androids, or showing violent films to children. No one is harmed, at the time but the consequences of removing the barriers to such behaviour present a risk of harm in the future.
I'm not saying this is necessarily an absolute truth, with regards to the painting. I'm just showing how your instincts about moral actions can be framed in terms of suffering even when there's no subject to suffer at the time. Many moral duties are about cultivating good moral sense to protect people from harm later on, they're not necessarily about harm at the time.
I think this is a valid response. I could argue we have to reach a little to get to suffering, but it's well within reason. Thanks for the direct analysis.
The question I did not like because it showed you did not get my point. I never said because it was immoral. I never said because how it made me feel. I did not like it because -- you know. Because it revealed that you did not get my point.
I said so, and then you had to go and invent a number of OTHER reasons -- none of which were indicated or hinted at -- why I may not have liked that question.
If any of those invented concerns were the real reason why I did not like your question, I either would have said so, or admitted to them. But I don't admit to them, because... because the reason I did not like your question was that it revealed you did not get my point.
So you wouldn't consider, for example, masturbation a moral issue?
As I said...
Quoting Isaac
... I don't doubt that if someone wanted to make a moral case against (or for) masturbation, they would have no trouble framing it in terms of future harms.
Hitchen's Razor applies here.
It seems to me you didn't like the question, because it implied I questioned the conclusion. Your point was to demonstrate that different people may assert different positions concerning the same 'moral' event. You proceed to show how each person's position is valid to them; and suppose they are justified in this validity. Simply, because it follows from their particular bias's surrounding the event.
Which produces a bit of a hole in the system. We intuitively know a bias opinion is more likely to be in error. But, the idea you are putting forward suggests otherwise. Specifically, the notion that one's emotional reaction to a decision validates one's position. Which is absurd and demonstrated by the questions I asked. But, you couldn't point this out because it follows from the idea you are putting forward.
You've said "did not get my point" a suspicious number of times. I asked if you meant they were all equally valid, which you confirmed. Which is not what, not getting a point means. It's like pontificating from a position that has no authority. I suppose that makes the activity less offensive .
2. In this case, you are only harming yourself. If you hate the painting, destroy it.
3. Here only the first harm of 1. applies, not necessarily the second.
Morality can be objective as you like, presuming you accept axoims: i.e. harming others is bad. In this way it is as objective as math.
Thanks for addressing the OP. It's strange to me; if I was watching this event I wouldn't be thinking about the people that would never see it or the painter. I believe I would consider the act immoral based on the direct injury to the object. I think a momentary faux personhood by virtue of it's ability to possess and deliver meaning would be the subject of harm. In your answer to number 2, you dropped the painter. I was wondering why. Number 3 seems consistent.
We know people can see other paintings and gleam comparable joy. If I can show that an immoral act can be against an object; then I've demonstrated an objective morality is more likely to exist?
Fake acct., I was trying to post an extra story in the story contest, haha.
Quoting Cheshire
Same.
I think the axiom I proposed is too narrow. Harming reservoirs of value is bad. Not just humans are reservoirs of values. Animals are, and the environment, and paintings.
Quoting Cheshire
I guess I felt it is effectively destroyed for him, since he will never see it.
Quoting Cheshire
Sounds like a different meaning of "objective".
:up: I very much appreciate this formulation. It crystallizes beautifully what I tried to express here. Thanks.
It hints at being too literal. I meant the ability to establish morality without the perception of any person being injured. The painting is indifferent. Often, morality relies on the golden rules, suffering, means to ends, human relationships, etc. Here we've taken away the ability to measure a human reaction and still made a determination. So, it implies a person can act on the world in an immoral way. Ergo, morality exists beyond the human perception of it. It isn't something we made up in the sense that it isn't arbitrary; like the validity given to a preference.
If the answers to the questions proved to be contradictory, then it would make a case to the contrary. At least, that was the assumption in trying to produce a test. I did have to insert myself hypothetically in order to make the determination, so there's plenty of counter argument to be made.
The counterargument here is that values ultimately rest on the human, and (probably) animal. They do not have independent existence.
Could an object be beautiful if no one considered it so? Clearly not. So with value.
If you're asking if there is something objective about an immoral act, I would say there is, viz., the harm done. So, for example, if I cut someone's arm off for no good reason, then I've committed an immoral act by definition. One can objectively see the harm done, viz., the arm severed from the body, the blood, the screams of pain, the pain of onlookers, etc., these objective components can be seen by any rational onlooker. The objective harm done in this example is clearly definable, and in most immoral acts the objective harm done is clearly observable. There are cases where the harm done is not so clear, and in those cases it may take more study to understand if harm has really be done, but it's clear to me that harm is a property of all immoral acts. This is not to say that whenever a harm is done that it's necessarily immoral, but only to say that all immoral acts have this property.
This only answers part of your question, but it's an important part.
If I had said there IS an objective morality then that would apply.
And i don't give a shaved rats ass about anybody's razor or any philosophical fallacies or phrases by other people that I'm not talkin to so because I'm alive and actually here to talk to how about you say something other than quoting somebody else that's not in the conversation because I don't subscribe to the groupie phrases
Yes, I'm hoping for a binary result to be the product of my "test". Morality does often present as being subject to an individuals perception. If I was using a looks like a duck, quacks like a duck protocol; then rejecting objectivity outright would be a likely outcome. I think we do want it to be objective to validate how much emotional investment the subject entails. Wanting a particular answer too much can be a trap.
:up:
Quoting Isaac
Quoting Cheshire
How are any of these the fault of relativism? These acts were often argued to be morally acceptable and objectively moral. It's the actual argument that these acts are objectively moral that provides the reasoning for others to participate in them.
Moral relativism doesn't make the case that these acts are what everyone should be doing. In fact, it makes the opposite case. So, because someone is engaged in illegal downloading doesn't make it ok for you to do it. That's you're own personal choice. And if you are making your moral decisions on what others are doing, that isn't moral relativism, but more of moral objectivism. So, moral relativism isn't thinking that what is good for others is good for you. It is in the understanding that you are a social animal capable of complex reasoning and that using reason to navigate the social environment is in your best interests as a social animal.
I don't know that you can actually blame a moral theory on an outcome(which is what I did to be fair). But, moral relativism would hold that there was a time or place these acts were permissible. Moral objectivism would argue they were never permissible. Intuitively they seem wrong regardless of when they occurred, so adhering to a system that permits acts(in hindsight) that are always wrong; implies a faulty system of ethics is available.
Really? What if you're committing genocide/slavery against another group that is committing genocide/slavery against your own group? Many in today's political environment argue that killing or imprisoning your political opponents is a good thing.
Yep.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Two groups are committing immoral acts.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Almost curious what you have to twist in order to support this assertion. No one is generally arguing it in the way you have presented it.
Then defending yourself with equal force is immoral?
You derived self defense from the refutation of the following statement about genocide/slavery.
Quoting Harry Hindu
I thought you were going to twist the political killing statement, but you pivoted. What's the tactic here anyway? Make a wide indefensible statement and hope the counter-argument over reaches at an easy target? I bet it works, but it's pretty annoying.
Genocide and slavery are not legitimate forms of self defense. So, there is no "defending yourself" that can be implied rationally. Rhetorically, you can ignore that if you like though; doesn't make for much of a philosophical position.
There's also attempted Armacide. It's immoral from the intention to harm, but lacks the objective existence of it. Would this still qualify as a property and maintain an objective sense?
I'm not sure whether you're actually asking this, or whether it is just part of your discussion.
Note that here with your notion of moral objectivism, you're already taking for granted that certain acts are moral, while others are immoral.
What you have is double moral objectivism:
1. by taking for granted that certain acts are moral, while others are immoral,
2. by taking for granted that the above distinction applies at all times.
But on the grounds of what did you establish that a certain act is moral to begin with? Your gut feeling?
I'm taking for granted that I seem to believe it without any trouble. The OP was basically this assertion followed by But, I can't account for how this could be; because every case seems to be about an observer.
Quoting baker The ground that my perception of what is moral is accurate. But, I don't know why. It isn't compelling, but near universally understood. So much so we test our moral theories against an understood intuitive moral standard. Or unuttered theory. Then, expect the same from others without explanation. The thread was meant to test for the experience being real or an illusion of sorts. So far it's moderately inconclusive.
I am now confused. I can't identify what you mean by "they". But it's not your fault... my mind is going, I can't mentally encompass a great number of data items that require short-term memory recall. Sorry, again, it is clearly my fault and my problem.
Your demonstration of multi-sided ethics via a soccer gain result.
Referenced Here: Quoting god must be atheist
Originating Here:
Quoting god must be atheist
Cheshire, you're a gem. Thanks.
I just really can't fathom the jist of your criticism. You tie things in the model of your critical analysis to things where I don't even suspect a connection, let alone see a relationship that you see. You are talking in largely conceptual terms, and I don't know, don't understand, how your analysis relates to my theory in any way.
Am I to take away from this that you are seeing related logic in the theory as self-contradictory, and your vision is superior to mine? Or am I to take away from this that you (haha) don't get my point? Or am I to take away from this that you simply try to confuse me, for lack of better things to do, or because it's fun. Honestly, and in complete frankness, I could not tell the difference between the three. If my three-year-old great-grand-son asked me to explain what you mean, I would be lost not only for words, but also for even a modicum of understanding (cognitive understanding, not empathic) w
hat you are trying to say, and how what you say relates to my theory.
Generally everything stated here; some might call it the justification you provided. Is in error. I put the most absurd part in bold. You are using validity in a nonsensical way. I've pointed out the same issue 4 times to evasion and confusion. I believe that demonstrated a respectful level of patience. I can't fathom explaining it again, so let me know how it works out for you. At a much later time and date; lifetime would be fine. Good day.
Quoting god must be atheist
What you described is a simple case to explain, and you were so hung up for so long on it.
This is what it is:
- humans rationalize to the max. They will bend logic to the max. Look at Christianity and its tenets, and the vehemence the believers believe in them and defend them for their truths, whereas they can't be held logically true for one second. Same mechanism of sentiments work for judging for moral issues. Anyone will rationalize any moral issue to give him or her the right to be morally superior. They would immediately switch to the other opinion -- the one that stands against their own -- should the situation change so that it is required.
Why you don't see this as a true and accurate description of reality, baffles me. Insight levels are different in people, I guess, and they don't necessarily correspond to intelligence levels.
The more I think about it, the more I am convinced that you are stuck at the same hurdle as Kant, when it comes to lying (Kant said you can't and must not) and lying for the effect of effecting a moral good. You and Kant can't come to terms with the flip-flop nature of moral conviction, and its effect on people.
Morals would not exist without social dynamics. Social dynamics, as they developed, parallel with morals, had an effect on the voluntary moral system of humans, and the effect is that the same deed can be seen as moral by one group, and immoral in another group, PRECISELY because it is a SOCIAL aid for survival. When two groups have the SAME moral, and they clash over some resource problem, then they MAY invoke the same moral to applied against the other group. I have seen it in the cold war, in its golden age, and I see it now in the new strife for world domination. Precisely the same fabrications are applied to the would-be enemies by both parties, pre-war, to prepare the masses to feel righteous enough to go and kill members of the other group if needed.
Indoctrination for preparing to war. Same moral teachings are applied in both camps against the other camp.
So no, your criticism of my establishing a seemingly self-contradictory picture of what can happen is not valid. Morals are subject to explanation before the interpretation of a situation becomes internalized. If enough indoctrination happens then enough people will be influenced.
THIS IS ONE OF THE REASONS the members of the intelligentsia are the first ones to be lined up against the wall and shot. They see the dichotomy of any tyrannical indoctrination, and they will be prone to disseminate criticism of it, making it hard for the authorities to effect their input on shaping public morals. Therefore they are put out of action by way of execution.
There's always going to be instances where it's difficult to see the harm. That said, we know the effects of certain actions, because we have seen the effects before. So, the intent to do harm, as in the example given, maintains it's objective component because we know what the outcome would be, viz., the blood, the screams, etc.
It's more difficult to see the harm of certain thoughts, especially if they're not connected with actions. It may take someone with an understanding of psychology, for example, to point out the objective harm of certain thoughts (thoughts that aren't connected to a particular overt act) because we lack the knowledge. Note that even here the psychologist may be familiar with the effects of these thoughts by observation. So, even in a case like this, there's going to be an objective component.
Well......if no one has ever seen it, there is no beauty. We observers are not passive receivers of some beauty that is "out there". What, did you actually think this to be the case? Not only does beauty vanish in an unobserved world (an impossible thing to even imagine, really), but reason and meaning vanishes as well.
I think I'm in agreement. I suppose harm implies there is an understood value in the subject of harm. Others being high value and self-portraits held for disposal would be low value. The more I look at it we're just discussing criminal law without specific precedent.
The idea was to establish objective morality. If the answers are different, then morality is not from the act but rather a subjective notion of the observer. The same willful act of destruction of the same object should in theory produce the same moral judgement. Or not. An attempt at an inquiry.
First, I maintain that was a misinterpretation of Kant's work that was referenced in it's refutation. The original work is discussing lying in Kant's legal sense as whether or not it is a liability to tell the truth.
The fact people can rationalize an immoral act has zero bearing on whether it is an immoral act. Because the act takes place outside the mind of the agent. How do you reconcile this matter?
Since we are making personal assessments. I think you're having a bit of fun with me. Except you already had that document ready; which makes me wonder if you are typing in a white room.
Like other big-name philosophers, the ones
who enjoy household name status, Kant has several, more than two, camps of followers, who have widely differing interpretations of his works. It's a little bit like the Evangelist movement in this sense, that they categorically deny the truth in other interpretations in favour of their own. I now learned to reject those arguments that start with "those interpretations are wrong." To me (and only to me, as far as my claim goes) the claims of those philosophers are supported by their own interpretation, and that is a rather very subjective support of an argument; in other words, if an argument depends on rejecting alternative interpretations, then the argument is subjective, and lacks objectivity.
Quoting Cheshire
This is another contentious issue, which my paper covers and solves. Nothing has a bearing on an act whether it's moral or immoral, other than people's views. If the view is shaped by rationalization, then the verdict is the opinion still. You can't get an outside, objective judgment on morality; it is a people-generated and consensus-driven quality. I like to bring up the practice of cannibalism and the practice of backstabbing. In some cultures cannibalism is opined to be acceptable and is encouraged, in most cultures it is rejected and deemed immoral. In most cultures turning on your friends to gain advantages is horribly immoral; in the entertainment and movie industry it's the norm of accepted and actually expected behaviour.
Quoting Cheshire This is, I suppose, a symbolic culture-driven reference which I don't get. A white paper in a white room by a white philosopher who is a white folk? I don't know what you could possibly mean.
Can you read it without my making you to do so? And if not, then why not? this terseness is categorical surrender, because 1. You would have to read to know you don't want to read it 2. therefore you read it, and you don't want to deal with it 3. and that can only be so (from the tone that's given in "you can't make me read that") because it upsets you, or irritates you.
Being upset or irritable is not pleasant, and this site is basically purposed for entertainment, or for enjoyment for the users/ members. If you don't want to do something you don't enjoy, fine, but that in this instance you can only do that by aborting the dialogue. I will abide by your wishes.
We have your claim and supporting evidence presented above? It would be a shame to lose it the moment things seem untenable. My irritability is with being told how "right I am" repeatedly. If you've closed the matter then fine move on. If you are indeed correct some one will let a distance relative who doesn't understand it know. In the next 160 years. Till then, it's understood to be an open question.
Big door, tiny window.
That's another symbolic that is lost on me.
Or the literal description of institutionally themed interior space.
I miss understood what you meant the first time. I agree that a lot of our conviction concerning moral judgement is based on the perception of them being a matter of reality. But, so does our value of fiat currency.
I wonder if some of the immorality we perceive is subjective impressions while other matters are actually immoral. We do know people can disagree. At one time drinking and dancing on Sunday was considered immoral.
No, this "same moral judgment" is not requited at all, and indeed, such an agreement between is never a real agreement (this is a Quine/Derrida position). All that needs to be demonstrated is that there is a noncontingent part of the essential ethical affair. Just this. You're not going to get people to agree on the radically diverging and different entanglements ! These are impossible to pin down and are, in themselves, ethically arbitrary "facts" of a particular case. Such facts are massively entangled in unique particularities of each person, each case, each culture or community. This lack of agreement is inevitable and it is foolish to think otherwise. However, what is agreed upon is the phenomenological analysis: put aside all factual entanglements and the residual value is not disputed, is cognitively coercive.
It is not about judgments' differences at all. it is rather that disagreements arise out of ethically arbitrary conditions, like the fact that I borrowed the ax, I feel the obligation to return it and this conflicts with my suspicion that were I to do so it could lead to a terrible crime. One can ask further into such an affair, get more facts, find where justification for belief is grounded or not, examine the many, many possible relevant facts, psychological or otherwise, and it is HERE where disagreement emerges: in the indistinctness of the way the case is to interpreted. But logically beneath this, there is the assumption that the crime itself would be BAD, and it would be bad because there is some value at risk, in play, to be won or lost, and it is this value that is beyond inquiry.
I think this was the most notable point set down by the responses. The observation that harm came to a store of value. It does seem to suggest that we can act on the world in a way that carries some objective element apart from the variance that arises. And that an act can be judged apart from the measure of suffering entailed. The paintings did not suffer. Which isolates a major common thread in known moral theories. The scientific approach asks if there is a better test or way to realize more informative results. You say it's "coercive", but I'm not sure in which direction you mean.
Quoting Constance It also puts you at a personal liability of having possessed a murder weapon. Your fingerprints and DNA could be caught up in the handle. The matter is best resolved by covering the replacement cost of the axe and be done with it. When axe murder is in play the risk of withholding property wrongly is out weighed by a perceived non-trivial involvement in serious injury. How your complaints of entanglements exist above and are reconciled here is difficult to articulate. But, I understand the scenario introduces the seemingly conflicted nature of perception into a question of objectivity. But, having a known immoral act as the subject of perception in a way fabricates some of the matter or not. Criticism is difficult to establish; like so many things the differing suppositions of the context conflict with the desire for a clear analysis. Interesting points though; it does have informative value.
But then we're still left with the problem of distinguishing which is which.
Which means we've identified a problem. I'd call the thread a success based on that much clarity alone.
An act can be judged apart from the measure of suffering involved, but I certainly don't think this is an ethical judgment. A pragmatic judgment works like this, the kind that ignores suffering for some higher end, that is, utility. But even here in this contingent world of utility, attention must come to rest on actual value as the point of it all, whatever one has in mind.
I think it is absurd to think about things having value at all apart from what is attributed to them in a conscious act.
As to the scientist, well, all science begins with what is there, at hand. A geologist first has the object to be analyzed, then there is the classificatory work, techniques for measurement are called in, more classificatory work, etc., but it all begins with observation. So: observe an ethical case and give it its classificatory due: judgment is there, contradiction in principles, the rational end of assessing matters; then there is the actuality: the phenomenon of some pain or pleasure, some experience that feels good or bad in a palpable way, not discursively arrived at, but considered as an intuitive apprehension of the world.
the former rational end is itself ethically arbitrary. As Hume put it, reason would just as soon eradicate humankind altogether, for it is just an empty vessel. The ethical nature of ethics comes from the world. Forget about inner and outer conditions, for here we are looking exclusively at the phenomenon of suffering and joy and it doesn't matter if it is a brain "doing" this. It is there, period, like a typhoon is there, or a stone or this cup on the table. It's "thereness" is not at issue and it is not a thoughtful construct or an interpretatively fluid event. Its is absolute, its presence. AND, it carries by virtue of its own nature the the entire weight of the ethical import of the matter at hand. It doesn't matter if it is a trivial matter or one deeply important, the decisive presence of palpable value make ethics what it is foundationally.
Coercive because one is forced to acknowledge pain and pleasure for what they are. Of course, again, once this distributed in the world of entanglements, that are ethically arbitrary, then judgment gets confused, but our understanding of how value is coercive comes through in cases where entanglements do not obscure occlude: radical affairs, like having someone put a lighted match to your finger. The good sceintist asks, what IS this? as a phenomenon, as a phenomenologically reduced event (see Hsserl's epoche). It classification is not IN the interpretative constructs we could bring to bear. It is outside these. this is why Wittgenstein refused to talk about value, for as concepts, ethical ideas are nonsense as they do not tell what things ARE.
The idea that value and that suffering is a type of assault on value is becoming significant to my current working model. If this isn't the case then I'll have to rethink quite a bit to account for the error.Quoting Constance Imprecise or subjectively driven perhaps, but there is no reduction to absurdity in the practice. We bury treasure, rent storage spaces, and purchase insurance with the understanding objects can be a store of value,
Quoting Constance
Witty got this bit wrong. Popper has excellent refutation of it in Chapter 1 Conjectures and Refutations. Available on audio for free on youtube.
Quoting Constance
I'm going to have to reread this section several times to understand exactly what information you intend for me to possess. I haven't spent enough time reading Wittgenstein, so his communication style which is often adopted is very difficult for me. I do intend on rereading and editing this bit, but any clarifications or simplifications that could be made even tentatively would aid in my understanding of your position on the matter. I believe you are saying that ethical matters are often matters of reality even though they are subject to entanglement with less well grounded notions.
Not that suffering is an assault on value. Rather, suffering a simply a general notion that refers to kinds of value: I value not having double pneumonia. Why? Because it is a painful affair. Whatever model you have in mind regarding moral objectivity, this idea of objectivity is meaningful weighed against whatever subjectivity is, and so you have to look to both. Subjectivity in ethical theory attempts show that there is nothing in ethical prepositions that is like unproblematic cases of objectivity, like the density of iron being greater than that of mica, or the moon being closer to Earth than the sun. What makes these objective statements? Their truth is verifiable consistently by competent observers in a system of thought and experience. The scientific method, where verification or falsification rest with assumptions about the world and its facts or states of affairs. Note that science does not care for philosophical questions regarding the validity of these assumptions. Ask Neil Degrasse Tyson where the object called the sun gets its verification as an object at all, and he will simple dismiss such a thing. But it is here that ethics has its most salient presence, that is, at the level of inquiry beneath where science has its interests, and here is where phenomenology asserts itself: the level of presence as such, and all "naturalistic" knowledge is suspended and attention is put firmly upon the "given" only. Value as the palpable encounter with pain or pleasure "observed" as phenomena and not as interpretatively processed meaning reveals something Cartesian, that is, undoubtable, absolute.
Once here, the matter turns toward the nature of presence, rather than constructed propositions. This is where things get very interesting.
you may want to read his short Lecture on Ethics, which is I think available online. Then the Tractatus. He typically would refuse to talk about ethical foundations because he was convinced it was nonsense to do so, and this was because language and logic are simply not able to speak about it, for value is there, like qualia, like a pure phenomenon, a presence, and there is nothing one can say, because, reading the Tractatus, there is nothing observable about the "Good". The ethical Good is likely the weirdest thing that can be understood: Just ask yourself as you apply the lighted match to your finger, What IS it that makes this pain Bad?? It is not like a fact of the world, though there are many factuall things to say about it. After all facts have been exhaustively accounted for (see the Lecture on ethics' Big Book of omniscience) there is something unaccounted, which is the badness of the pain. We don't really observe the pain's badness, yet it is by parsecs that most salient feature of the event.
This Good Wittgenstein called divinity. Unspeakable, though; and the implications of the Good issuing from the "fabric of the world" are staggering. The world IS ethical, more so than any fact.
How does he account for these statements if he can't say anything? I suppose that comes up at some point. Observing a deficit is something if I can speak about it. I used to have the same intuitive opinion concerning ethics, but I've been talking about it for a week, so something is clearly there; strange we would hold something in such high regard and not manage to attach words to it. I might wait and see if the world produces a genius that writes more readable books. Thank you for the recommendations.
These moral rules is to prevent chaos, distress or presenting a threat to a community. Both physically and emotionally.
People tend to forget that the origin of morality comes from evolution and it serves an almost technical purpose also. Is not just all religious or political and such.
Morality was meant to be a set of rules to help the group corporate together to fend off threats and predators. Maximizing the greatest chance for survival.
But as we evolved as a civilization it became more complex. That emotional transgression coming from our peers became the predator.
Morality became almost like a filter to weed the undesirables out.
Morality is not just about character. Is a biological evolutionary mechanism to help humanity survive challenges we may face.
Right at the outset, he makes that cryptic statement about passing over in silence that which cannot be spoken. There is a lot written about your objection, and I mean a lot! Recently, I have been reaading Michel Henry and Jean luc Marion, and Jean luc Nanci and the theological turn of phenomenology, putting a great deal of emphasis on Husserl. Husserl's phenomenological reduction suspends judgment to allow the world to become phenomenologically clear. Was Wittgenstein a phenomenologist? Maybe.
Perhaps all this is true. But why should one do what is part of an evolutionary mechanism? Preservation of the species? Is this what you tell someone regarding the meaning of their suffering? As the plague blackens the finger tips and boils cover the body, we say, well, alas, this suffering is conducive to survival and reproduction! There, you have it?
You see the absurdity of explanations like this? The real questions in ethics go to more fundamental level, as with Why are we born to suffer and die at all? why does existence throw us into suffering at all as a condition for survival at all?
I'm impressed 180 Proof. Do you ever waste time? Rhetorical question!
Anyway, I'm particularly interested in negative utilitarianism because of one simple reason - reducing suffering seems more feasible than maximizing happiness. For instance, here I am in my room, typing away on a keyboard, expressing my thoughts, directed at you and I feel no pain, no suffering, I'm absolutely content with it all. I know, I know, my world, the world I described to you, is smaller than small; nevertheless, the point is I'm not suffering. I wouldn't say I'm happy though but the fact of the matter is I'm not suffering. Proof, wouldn't you say?, that negative utilitarianism has an attainable goal.
Maximizing happiness seems problematic though because I see no upper limit, no final endpoint to happiness. We're happy let's say but then happier we want to be. Lather, rinse, repeat (shampoo algorithm). It's only the finite nature of the means to happiness that people stop asking for more (happiness). I'm still a bit unsure about this so feel free to correct me.
I believe there's an ancient Greek counterpart to negative utilitarianism which you told me about in re the so-called tetrapharmakos you said I should adopt as a philosophy. I can't for the life of me recall that concept, it was in Greek. Mind sharing it with me once again for my benefit. Thanks!
Suffering is the challenge we as a species need to go through to weed out the weak and make sure only the strongest survive. The purpose evolution.
So we don’t have to do the dirty task ourselves nature does it herself and goes through the process of elimination. This is not by societies choice but by design by evolution and nature to give the human race the greatest chance of survival.
Is the ego of humans to believe we don’t abide by the same rules that of the other creatures of this Earth.
Yes it hurts, and yes it sucks but it been working for millions of years so who are we to question it.
Yes people will suffer others will experience the heartache of witnessing such things but by each passing event that happen the next Generation becomes better, stronger and wiser.
Is the individual that disapproves this cause they desire a easier alternative.
No, rather emphatically. Evolution is not a purposive theory, and there is no guiding hand in nature pushing for the survival of the fittest. Random mutation of genes has no purpose.Quoting SteveMinjares
Nature has no such design. You should stop thinking like this. It is an anthropomorphizing of nature.
Quoting SteveMinjares
This is all too familiar and beneath the level of inquiry presented here.
I wonder if the level of group reliance and the strictness of moral enforcement are correlated. Like, the difference in enforcing a tribal law versus the permissibility of social deviance in modern societies. In a study of behavior there are surely elements of evolution. The anxiety of losing social connections or dysregulation of sleep cycles from isolation points to a biological need for us to attain social involvement.
However, anytime we invoke evolution to explain everything there's the danger of reciting an anthropic principle. Yes, evolution must have functioned in such and such a way to produce this outcome or otherwise it wouldn't be here. The complication arises when trying to say what type of environment resulted in what type of evolution. Did the moral animals survive extreme circumstances better from strict group allegiance or was it a greater aid to proliferation when things weren't as stressful. So, simply stating it aids survival because it survives requires further investigation. But, inarguably is going to be the context of a scientific understanding; if one is ever fully formed.
Thanks! It's always nice to find I'm at least wandering down a path others see as well. I do intend on at least reading over the lecture on the ethics. What little I've gleamed is he seems like a secular phenomenologist. I read a stack of paper produced by Hegel and could only tell you he wants to see what God sees in order to make sense of things to humans. I think Einstein's approach of accounting for what things look like from the subjective and then explaining it from the objective was the reconciliation phenomenology required. Thanks again for the references; I'll look forward to seeing what the developed form of my objection entails.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/573153 (from p. 5 of this thread)
Other formulations:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/554048 (re: suffering is objective)
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/540198 (re: moral facts: suffering sapients)
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/572299 (re: consequences for future suffering)
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/548752 (re: tetrapharmakos^, or an ancient example of 'how to unlearn misery') link in post^
My intention wasn’t to make evolution to explain everything but it does play a role in moral conduct.
Hopefully I don’t sound like I am going off topic but take the example of mob psychology and how a large group of people can encourage bad behavior in individual or encourage to behave differently.
Mob psychology can be one piece of the puzzle showing how morality is define by culture and society and not by individual thinking.
How peer influences can change how we think.
It's technically raising the matter of relative morality, but ascribing it to an imagined subset. So, on topic but with a white nationalist sorta subtext vibe. If you are looking for honest impressions of the text presented.
1. It is immoral and without further qualification it is impermissible.
2. It is immoral and without further qualification it is impermissible.
3. It is immoral and permissible.
These were so interesting to read. It comes to my mind two different points of view: Søne Kierkegaard (the concept of anxiety) and Schopenhauer (his concept of “weeping” as one of the purest emotions in human behavior)
Good question. To be honest, I would not pay anything to “not suffer” because probably this emotion is one of which makes us so original (Kierkegaard).
I can’t estimate in money how much I should suffer along my life. But a considerable load to keep me up in my progress as an individual.
The people are full of weaknesses.
:up: :100:
Quoting 180 Proof
They impacted me exactly in this way. I guess this happened because I read some of Kierkegaard when I was having a difficult period of time so their theories helped me out as a “life jacket” because I remember seeing everybody so happy except me.
Then, I discovered this authors saying quotes like and completely changing the view of my life or at least understanding that is completely reasonable suffer or the act of suffering.
Food is so necessary to our lives that we have to pay some money to get the average calories per day and then have the body ready.
But, there are some aspects which makes us being totally humans: uncertainty, sadness, pain, weeping, etc...
I would never pay for quitting those emotions. The opposite is becoming a robot or just a program. I understand it is quite miserable when we are living an experience like these emotions are meant to but thanks to this, philosophy and other knowledge development is when start to flourish
From dukkha, arises a wish for how things can be; the so-called oughts. On that score, opinions are divided. Some believe we ought not outlaw homosexuality, others believe we should; some are of the view that eating pork is permissible, others eschew pork. There are many mutually contradictory moral injunctions to keep ethical philosophers busy for a centuries I suppose, trying to bring them all under one coherent system/theory.
Now, it's tempting to say that this proves morality is subjective - one possible explanation for differences of such kind. However, if you ask people following different moral systems - theistic, utilitarian, deontological, virtue ethics, etc. - you'll find that all of them are convinced and insist that their own systems are objective. In other words, though their are multiple systems on what is right and wrong, giving us the impression that morality is subjective, the fact that all such systems asssert that they're objective indicates a desire for if not that there is objective morality. It's just like debates/discussions on forums. Everyone wants to be right (objective) despite the fact that all are in disagreement (subjective).
In conclusion, how the world is is the objective side to morality and we desire to be as objective as possible with regard to how the world ought to be.
Reading over W's lecture addresses a point that it is part of our innate framework. In a legal sense morality can be seen as a measure for sanity. Here W is correct if he is implying we might be limited if the question is how do you describe sanity to some one. But, I think I've narrowed it down to a matter of value and permissibility.(with a lot of help from anyone willing to take credit)
I think every immoral act includes a reduction in value. The value of even the human condition in it's present state in the same sense a vandal devalues a car with a key. It is the only answer I've found for the OP that seems to fit without a struggle. It also accounts for the difference in perception of morality. We value things differently so once outside the measurement of human suffering the question of projecting beliefs about values onto the world creates room for a subjective type of morality.
In support of this I'd point to the way prisoners guide their institutional society. The primary rule among criminals is the maintaining of a level of respect and enforcing it; demanding it. To me this says that preventing others who are believed to be immoral actors from devaluing you is the primary way to guard against immoral acts. It is a proactive defense based on innate understanding.
Secondary to value is the observation that some things are immoral and we are allowed to do them anyway. Here I think a lot of confusion could be resolved. It explains how people come to do things that seemed reasonable at the moment, but that they later regret. It suggests an explanation exist for rationalized immorality and other fluid elements. But, this is mostly just me riffing on some ideas. Objective morality exists if value exists and we act as if it does; even suffering correlates to value otherwise extortion wouldn't work.
You would ignore that consuming food is a response to hunger in order to maintain some position held dear.
Quoting javi2541997
How much not to hit you with a hammer? I'd clear my checking if the fellow looked angry enough. Eliminating the ability to suffer is a different, but perhaps confusable matter.
Quoting javi2541997
I think we are discussing similar words in different contexts.
If I don’t do so I die of starvation... see how weak we are.
Quoting Cheshire
True. It is not necessary being so pessimistic because it can be unhealthy. I think inside anyone’s realism can be some pessimism to handle to. But everything in a responsible measure to not end up harming ourselves or even worse, suicidal thoughts.
I think one of the objectives of Kierkegaard was to show the people that living with suffering was accurate and we do not have to avoid it until is so miserable leading with it.
Quoting Cheshire
I feel the same :up:
I am reading Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit fully for the first time now. Always put this off because he requires work and time. The reason why he is important to me is because I want to understand Derrida, and this brings phenomenology into play, for one has to altogether stop thinking as an empirical scientist, and regard the thing before you as an "eidetic construct". Intuitively, one has to turn affairs around completely, and there is little desire to do this when analytic philosophers are so dominant and adamant in their rejection of existential thinking.
The extraordinary result of getting immersed in all this is one can read with understanding interpretations of the world that have foundational insights.
Einstein read Kant when he was 13, so he was no niave realist. But phenomenology has only one conclusion, and that is deconstruction. Soo interesting, Derrida is.
that Lecture on Ethics needs the Tractatus to see where gets his insistence on the division between sense and nonsense.
1. Depends on the audience. If they care or not
2. Then there is no empathy for the painting and it becomes irrelevant. No attachment no reason to be moral.
3. That answers the second question. There needs to be an audience for morality to matter. Have someone to be accountable.
I understand. This is what I wished to convey. There are two parts to this issue:
1. Sometimes there's agreement on the oughts e.g. theistic morality, utilitarianism, and deontology agree that murder/lying is wrong but, here's where it gets interesting, for entirely different reasons. It's like doing science - we have hard data (people don't want to murder/lie) but there are competing hypotheses (Bentham's, Jesus', Kant's, etc.) as to why that's the case. It's not a perfect match of course but there's a resemblance between moral theorizing and scientific hypothesizing that jumps out at you.
I don't know how far this is an accurate description of this state of affairs but it's as if we know what we should do but we don't know why? This makes for an intriguing possibility - morality is more of an intuition than a well-considered stance towards our fellow humans, animals, and life as a whole.
When I say intuition I don't mean to imply that morality has no rational foundation though. Intuitions are flashes of insight - they're, to me, necessarily giant leaps forward in thought and if one can jump like Hulk of Marvel comics fame can, all that the rational mind can see is where the Hulk (morality) leapt from (what is) and where the Hulk landed (ought). The intermediate steps are shrouded in mystery and our task is to find out what they are.
This squares with my own thoughts on morality being too far ahead of its time - take a look at our bodies and do a survey psychology and we discover that both our bodies and minds are ill-equipped/poorly-designed for morality to say nothing of the fact that the universe is utterly indifferent to our moral concerns.
It bears mentioning that morality is a product of the mind, that part of the mind that's capable of intuition & reason, the other parts being simply (the more animal-like parts) obstacles I mentioned above.
2. Other times we disagree on the oughts. This needs no explanation; after all, it's the biggest issue in morality. Why do we have different opinions on what is good and acceptable and what is bad and unacceptable. This is the Gordian knot and how do we solve it? If that's impossible how do we make sense of it.
I'll answer the second question because it's easier and helps us find closure. Every moral theory (theistic, utilitarianism, etc.) concur on some oughts (see 1 above) but there's a lot of dissonance on other oughts. In my humble opinion, the congruence in re oughts is due to what's common to these various theories and what's incongruent with respect to oughts is best attributes to the uniqueness (what's not common) of each.
As I said morality is likely an intuition and we haven't yet figured out their rational basis, the reasons for why we should be good.
An intriguing possibility that we might need to consider is these seemingly "different" moral theories could be different aspects of one single moral theory. You know, like how people, before Newton, thought that different forces were at play for an apple falling from a tree and for the heavenly motion of the planets. As it turned out, both were one and the same force - gravity. That many moral oughts are common to these apparently distinct moral theories suggests this might be the case.
Wittgenstein, it seems, was misled by superficial differences in morality - he failed to consider that there might be an underlying principle that connects an apple's fall and the revolution of the planets.
Wittgenstein's failing, if you ask me, was that, and this refers to the Tractatus, in ethics and aesthetics, he considered language to be suitable for designating empirical matters, but thought metaethical, metaaesthetic Good and Bad to be nonsense. So, you put the Good in view, music or falling in love, and then note its parts, features, the "states of affairs" then, he says, there is this residual that cannot be spoken: the Good of it. Weird, I grant you, this Good, but: it is no less sewn into the fabric of existence than empirical facts. It CAN be spoken, but speech (logic) is with all things qualitatively different from the actualities of the world (he gets this from Kierkegaard, whom he adored).
Why not talk about the Good and the Bad of ethics? Sure, no one can "see" these, but their presence is undeniable. (What does one actually "see" anyway? We speak here of sensory intuition. But doesn't one intuit the bad of pain with not equal, but more lively sense of it??
W is a bit maddening, for his line drawn between what is and is not nonsense set the stage for analytic philosophy's positivistic outlook. And has become just boring and irrelevant.
Indeed, anything meta necessarily involves essence. Thus, I believe, Wittgenstein's unwillingness to discuss such matters.
Pando (Tree)
We have to dig deeper to find the essence which Wittgenstein believes (mistakenly?) doesn't exist.
He looks exclusively to logic and the necessary conditions it imposes on knowledge. This will not allow the world to "speak" and mostly, he is right about this. Do you know the color yellow? If you do, then you can say so, like knowing what a bank teller is. But no saying so, no knowing. Wittgenstein and Derrida are close here, in the way logic and language have no application in basic questions about actuality. But in the end, and Wittgenstien knew this well, it is Hamlet who wins the day, for "There are more things in heaven and Earth, Horatio, / Than are dreamt of in your philosophy."
if youre alone on an island there is no morality
its nothing but fairness between people
everything is subjective relative and objective simultaneously
Thoughtfully disagree, you can still harm anything you value, it's just permissible to harm your own things.
Quoting hope
Yes, this is the innate understanding of morality and ethics. It's how the court knows you are sane.
Quoting hope
Yep. As far as I can tell participatory realism is the way to go.
then its not immoral
if your alone on an island everything is a-moral
because there is no morality outside of the human minds interpretation of human behavior
reality is meaningless
The subjective experience is of "not immoral".
Quoting hope
The Quoting hope is immoral but permissible. We are allowed to do some immoral things; which is how people screw up in the moment.
Everything the mind can think about is relative to point of view.
The mind is bound by point of view and will never escape it.
It's and omnipresent and eternal limitation.
Consciousness is intrinsically self reflective. The mind uses consciousness like a mirror to see itself. Which then allows it to alter itself. Otherwise we would all be eternally insane.
The mind is limited by point of view and it's constantly changing.
"A man can never step in the same river twice for he's not the same man and and it's not the same water."
Your real power is in your ability to adapt to the change.
Reality is eternally changing and if you were not also you would be soon dead.
Leaves room to correct some mistakes. I can't imagine what it would be like if my first impression governed every experience completely.
Quoting hope Technically correct, but skating on out of scope. If you ceased to travel with the planet through space it would probably crush you. Speculating to be fair.
Humans are nothing but a complex pattern and complexity is very fragile. So we better be very malleable if we're going to continue to exist. Glass shatters easily.
No saying, no knowing! Yes, precisely what I believe is Wittgenstein's position vis-à-vis epistemology (knowledge) which he equates with a person's world. Someone's world consists of the things this someone can express in words. Very socratic.
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Hamlet 1, Wittgenstein 0.