Thanks a million Wayfarer for starting what to me is a thread that provides a deep insight into what wisdom is. To put it simply, in line with the book titles that appear in the website you provided the link to, wisdom boils down to how to? guides. The underlying idea behind wisdom perceived in this manner is that of methodandtechnique. This conception of wisdom has an Eastern analog viz. The Tao (The Way) but that's another story.
Everyone knows what the 6W1H is. Allow me to explain why how? is the mother of all questions and by doing that justify why how? underpins the holy grail of philosophy aka wisdom.
1. What is an elephant?
We must know how to identify an elephant.
2. Why does God exist?
We must know how to prove/disprove God exists.
3. Who is Aristotle?
We must know how to identify Aristotle
4. When is the right time to plant corn?
We must know how to find out the right time to plant corn.
5. Which is better, sex or food?
We must know how to determine better.
6. Where is Paris?
We must know how to find the location of Paris.
7. How to think? A contender for the title of the most important question of all time.
HOW?
Amateur:
a) Method: Any answer to how? will do. A child's method of solving problems involves guessing ( :chin: hmmmm). An adult's method might take that to a new level as in systematic but still guessing.
Pro:
b) Technique: Not any answer to how? will be accepted. Aspects like efficiency (spatial/temporal/others) :cool: , aesthetics :heart: , to name a few will matter.
A sophist's notion of 'wisdom' – a syllabus of self-help nostroms. :yawn:
Point! However, you're a veteran philosopher and philosophizing is second nature to you, your middle name so to speak. For beginners, on the other hand, how to do philosophy? is a skill that has a steep learning curve, especially for those self-taught. Self-help books on philosophy are just what the doctor ordered!
To put it simply, in line with the book titles that appear in the website you provided the link to, wisdom boils down to how to? guides.
I think that's a very shallow reading. Many of those kinds of texts are far from self-help or how-to in any modern sense. I put that link up for reference, it's a good source for those materials.
Yeah, Seneca, Cicero, Aristotle - all hacks. I'm wondering why I bothered posting it.
Don't let Reply to 180 Proof contrarian posts deter you. He's probably been imbibing too much of his namesake beverage. Which makes everything seem pointless. :joke:
Alcohol proof is a measure of the content of ethanol in an alcoholic beverage. The term was originally used in England and was equal to about 1.821 times the percentage alcohol by volume.
180 proof = 100% pure brain cell poison??? :100:
In actual fact, I think his comment was directed at the post he replied to, which I realised after I made that snide remark, which is why I removed it. I know for a fact 180 holds those authors in high regard.
You will note that I amended my very snide post immediately after making it, I would be obliged if you removed the quotation of it. And please don't litter the thread with pointless youtube rubbish.
Done! Youtube videos are more expressive than I can ever hope to be. Hence, my fondness for videos from said website and others. Your post wasn't snide enough to require an edit/deletion. Nevertheless, different strokes for different folks. :up:
In actual fact, I think his comment was directed at the post he replied to, which I realised after I made that snide remark, which is why I removed it. I know for a fact 180 holds those authors in high regard.
Yeah. I know. I was just poking fun at his ancient philosophy of "how to drink like a Cynic". :cool:
Anyway - to try and get this back on track - I'm reading Pierre Hadot's well-known book, Philosophy as a Way of Life. I makes an excellent 'companion volume' to many of those weighty titles given in that original list.
In actual fact, I think his comment was directed at the post he replied to, which I realised after I made that snide remark, which is why I removed it.
I suppose, I can concede there is a sense in which these could be 'self-help' books, with the caveat that there is no 'quick and easy' method. Takes reading, concentration, and patience. Also interpretive skill - the ability to take into account the very different cultural background of ancient texts.
Well, I for one definitely think that ancient wisdom is better than no wisdom.
And it seems to me that wisdom is fast disappearing from both language and culture under the modernizing influence of "gangsta cultcha" and other progressive trends ....
I suppose, I can concede there is a sense in which these could be 'self-help' books, with the caveat that there is no 'quick and easy' method. Takes reading, concentration, and patience. Also interpretive skill - the ability to take into account the very different cultural background of ancient texts.
As I tried to convey in my first post, as one advances from beginner to expert in any discipline, including philosophy, one realizes there's a difference between method (any ol' way of doing something) and technique ("...quick & easy..." = efficient & beautiful way). Self-help books are about the latter - reading them will enhance the reader's experience in whatever subject the books are on.
I think that's a very shallow reading. Many of those kinds of texts are far from self-help or how-to in any modern sense. I put that link up for reference, it's a good source for those materials.
And it seems to me that wisdom is fast disappearing from both language and culture under the modernizing influence of "gangsta cultcha" and other progressive trends ....
:up: There's something about modernity that is inimical to the traditional idea of wisdom. I think it has to do with the fact that in liberal individualism, the ego is the sole arbiter of value. That said, I don't much care for corporatist or collectivist cultures either (which Chinese culture tends towards). I think the advantage of modern liberal culture is that it provides the complete freedom to pursue any path, which is definitely a freedom worth defending. But the standard modern outlook of consumerism, gratification, hedonism, materialism and instrumental utility, is worlds away from the traditional virtues, and so if you absorb those along with the freedom that secular culture provides, then they're inimical to the philosophical life.
One of the essays on my homepage discusses Jurgen Habermas' late-in-life re-evalution of religious metaphysics:
[quote=Does Reason Know what it is Missing?;https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/12/does-reason-know-what-it-is-missing/]What secular reason is missing is self-awareness. It is “unenlightened about itself” in the sense that it has within itself no mechanism for questioning the products and conclusions of its formal, procedural entailments and experiments. “Postmetaphysical thinking,” Habermas contends, “cannot cope on its own with the defeatism concerning reason which we encounter today both in the postmodern radicalization of the ‘dialectic of the Enlightenment’ and in the naturalism founded on a naïve faith in science.”
Postmodernism announces (loudly and often) that a supposedly neutral, objective rationality is always a construct informed by interests it neither acknowledges nor knows nor can know. Meanwhile science goes its merry way endlessly inventing and proliferating technological marvels without having the slightest idea of why. The “naive faith” Habermas criticizes is not a faith in what science can do — it can do anything — but a faith in science’s ability to provide reasons, aside from the reason of its own keeping on going, for doing it and for declining to do it in a particular direction because to do so would be wrong. [/quote]
What is implicit in most of the ancient philosophies is 'the idea of the Good', whether that be concieved in explicitly theistic terms or not (and in Greek philosophy, it often wasn't). But it was simply the assumed background of philosophy, meaning that 'the good' was something that could be discovered or realised. That is generally absent from modern philosophy, post-Neitszche.
I agree that consumerism, hedonism, etc. are contributing factors in the general decline of civilization and culture. However, I think there are reasons to believe that the main culprit is the movement to actively and systematically deconstruct traditional culture and society initiated in the late 1800's and early 1900's by Fabian Socialists and allied liberals, including the likes of G. B. Shaw who declared that good statesmanship was to blow to pieces every cathedral with dynamite, whilst he was praising Lenin and Stalin as great statesmen, Annie Besant, who believed that the Westminster Abbey should have its "barbaric psalms" replaced with Wagner, whilst she was busy promoting Freemasonry and Theosophy as a replacement for Christianity, and many others who simply hated Western civilization even as they were making the most of its achievements. But I think this is a topic for another thread, or forum.
Sri Aurobindo (born Aurobindo Ghose; 15 August 1872 – 5 December 1950) was an Indian philosopher, yogi, maharishi, poet, and Indian nationalist. He was also a journalist, editing newspapers like Bande Mataram. He joined the Indian movement for independence from British colonial rule, till 1910 was one of its influential leaders and then became a spiritual reformer, introducing his visions on human progress and spiritual evolution (Wikipedia).
[quote=Sri Aurobindo, 'Materialism' ; http://intyoga.online.fr/materia.htm] Admit - for it is true - that this age of which materialism was the portentous offspring and in which it had figured first as petulant rebel and aggressive thinker, then as a grave and strenuous preceptor of mankind, has been by no means a period of mere error, calamity and degeneration, but rather a most powerful creative epoch of humanity. Examine impartially its results. Not only has it immensely widened and filled in the knowledge of the race and accustomed it to a great patience of research, scrupulosity, accuracy - if it has done that only in one large sphere of enquiry, it has still prepared for the extension of the same curiosity, intellectual rectitude, power for knowledge, to other and higher fields - not only has it with an unexampled force and richness of invention brought and put into our hands, for much evil, but also for much good, discoveries, instruments, practical powers, conquests, conveniences which, however we may declare their insufficiency for our highest interests, yet few of us would care to relinquish, but it has also, paradoxical as that might at first seem, strengthened man's idealism. [/quote]
I quote this from time to time as a counter-factual to what I myself often say.
And it seems to me that wisdom is fast disappearing from both language and culture under the modernizing influence of "gangsta cultcha" and other progressive trends ....
I’ve been under the impression that gangsta cultcha was pop rather than progressive or regarded as dispensing wisdom, though in some part authentically counter-cultural and validly so.
I provided the link to the Princeton Press series for those interested. I am interested in authors such as Cicero, Plutarch and Seneca, never having studied such texts at school or University. It seems a gap in my education which modern editions like these might help to fill.
I provided the link to the Princeton Press series for those interested. I am interested in authors such as Cicero, Plutarch and Seneca, never having studied such texts at school or University. It seems a gap in my education which modern editions like these might help to fill.
We're in your debt! It's not easy to know what to look for but to know where to look, like you do, is taking the notion of search to a whole new level. Kudos, Wayfarer. I'll be keeping an eye out for your particularly informative posts. :up:
[quote=Wikipedia]The early suttas also almost always open by introducing the geographical location of the event they depict, including ancient place names, always preceded by the phrase "thus have I heard" (eva? me suta?).[/quote]
So, are we to infer that the Buddhism predates the written word and it was transmitted orally until India invented a script?
None of the following are intended to impart wisdom, but if one is in pursuit of wisdom these books will help with regard to thinking, seeing, evaluating, perspective, self-knowledge, attitude, altitude.
Plato: Republic
Aristotle: Ethics Ecclesiastes
Maimonides: Guide for the Perplexed Zhuangzi
So, are we to infer that the Buddhism predates the written word and it was transmitted orally until India invented a script?
It's not inference, it's a matter of fact. They were aural traditions for centuries, until being codified in various Indic scripts, of which one early extant version is Pali. (Please lay off the idiotic youtube artifacts, they sometimes have their use and I sometimes post them but in this context they might as well be grafitti.)
Please name your top five "ancient wisdom" reads for modern (beginner) philosophers.
That would depend on which aspect/s of "ancient wisdom" one is interested in.
But I think that the introductory booklets on Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, and The Buddha in the Very Short Introductions series by Oxford University Press would be a good start.
Edit. I would strongly advise against reading Maimonides. He probably had no access to Platonic texts and learned about Plato through Arabs like al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. He complained that there are so many parables in Plato's writing one can dispense with it and stick to Aristotle. The fact that he is held in high esteem by the likes of Leo Strauss speaks volumes.
I’ve been under the impression that gangsta cultcha was pop rather than progressive or regarded as dispensing wisdom, though in some part authentically counter-cultural and validly so.
Yes, counter-cultural or anti-cultural sounds about right. And anything that serves as a substitute for traditional culture qualifies as "progressive" in certain quarters where deconstruction and replacement count as progress.
Please lay off the idiotic youtube artifacts, they sometimes have their use and I sometimes post them but in your hands they might as well be grafitti.
:lol: Can you be like, "we'll just have to put up with TheMadFool's shitty videos!" Puhleeez!!
It's not inference, it's a matter of fact. They were aural traditions for centuries, until being codified in various Indic scripts, of which one early extant version is Pali
The Chinese Whisper Problem
The Buddha (bad pronounciation): [blah blah blah] This ire is the cause of suffering.
Eager Disciple (hearing impaired): Yes, yes, desire is the cause of suffering.
Yes, counter-cultural or anti-cultural sounds about right. And anything that serves as a substitute for traditional culture qualifies as "progressive" in certain quarters where deconstruction and replacement count as progress.
Postmodernism announces (loudly and often) that a supposedly neutral, objective rationality is always a construct informed by interests it neither acknowledges nor knows nor can know.
Objectivity may be "honored more in the breach than in the observance". A succinct statement of ancient philosophical wisdom is Socrates' epigram : "know thyself". Which requires enough self-directed insight to "see" your own personal biases and ignorances. Perhaps we could rephrase as : "the fear of self-deception is the beginning of wisdom". :smile:
Reply to Fooloso4
Seeing Ecclesiastes and Maimonides: Guide for the Perplexed together reminds me that Spinoza tried to be a bridge between the ancient and the modern. The perspective of change happening over generations is a difficult perspective. It has been tried before.
I would strongly advise against reading Maimonides. He probably had no access to Platonic texts and learned about Plato through Arabs like al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. He complained that there are so many parables in Plato's writing one can dispense with it and stick to Aristotle. The fact that he is held in high esteem by the likes of Leo Strauss speaks volumes.
I am open to arguments for or against this or that point of view. But to propose not reading an author is an odd proposition. How will we know how right you are if we don't try it out for ourselves?
I recall Russell saying in HWP that in Maimonides he found more perplexity than guidance. I think it's very specialised with all the nuances of language and interpretation - written in Arabic but using the Hebrew alphabet, then translated. And also a polemic seeking to reconcile arcane theological terms with recondite philosophical argument. I wouldn't include it among primary sources for material of that era (which was in any case medieval rather than ancient.) I think it's rather too specialised.
The authors I'm really trying to come to terms with are the major Platonist and Neo-platonists.
Proclus's system, like that of the other Neoplatonists, is a combination of Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic elements. In its broad outlines, Proclus's system agrees with that of Plotinus with a notable difference: unlike Plotinus, Proclus did not hold that matter was evil, an idea that caused contradictions in the system of Plotinus. However, following Iamblichus, Plutarch of Athens, and his master Syrianus, Proclus presents a much more elaborate universe than Plotinus, subdividing the elements of Plotinus's system into their logically distinct parts, and positing these parts as individual things. This multiplication of entities is balanced by the monism which is common to all Neoplatonists. What this means is that, on the one hand the universe is composed of hierarchically distinct things, but on the other all things are part of a single continuous emanation of power from the One. From this latter perspective, the many distinctions to be found in the universe are a result of the divided perspective of the human soul, which needs to make distinctions in its own thought in order to understand unified realities. The idealist tendency is taken further in John Scotus Eriugena.
And from there became one of the main sources of later German Idealism, according to Dermot Moran. I see that as being more in the mainstream of Western philosophy.
I am open to arguments for or against this or that point of view. But to propose not reading an author is an odd proposition. How will we know how right you are if we don't try it out for ourselves?
I can see your point. However, if some recommend that we read a certain author, others may equally recommend not to read another (or the same) author. This is what book reviews normally do.
Of course, I can't stop people from reading a book if that's what they want to do. In fact, in the case of Maimonides, I think he would probably make interesting reading if you are into medieval Jewish philosophy, for example.
But (unlike Aristotle) Plato's works were not widely available in Islamic Spain, and considering Maimonides' anti-Platonist bias it would be wrong to regard him as a reliable guide in interpreting Plato, as Leo Strauss seems to be doing. More generally, reading Plato through the eyes of medieval Jewish and Arab philosophers whilst dismissing other authors like Plotinus or Proclus - who had direct access to Plato's Greek texts - does not seem to be a particularly scholarly or impartial approach. But this is just my opinion.
Metaphysician UndercoverAugust 02, 2021 at 01:51#5743410 likes
Anyone mention Augustine of Hippo yet? He's probably one of the wisest human beings to have ever lived. Augustine's writings will never grow old, and like Plato's, they are very relevant today.
There's something about modernity that is inimical to the traditional idea of wisdom.
The modern attitude, generally, is that any old knowledge, especially if it has a theological base, has been thoroughly supplanted by modern scientific advancements. So anything old is seen as outdated and incorrect, having been replaced by the new knowledge.
However, wisdom is composed not only of knowledge, but also of experience. And experience is produced from the temporal extension of being. So a large part of wisdom is understanding the principles which have stood the test of time.
To my knowledge, Plato's works were available in Islamic Spain only as partial translations or commentaries in Arabic. So, they would hardly make a reliable source. In contrast, Plotinus, Proclus, and other Greek-speaking authors in the east who had direct access to Plato's original Greek works and had actually studied Greek philosophy under Greek teachers, were in a better position to read and interpret Plato than Maimonides was.
Yes, I did mention Augustine in my recommendations from Oxford University Press' series Very Short Introductions, above. And, of course, in the old days philosophy was a way of life and was about experience, not armchair philosophizing as it is seen today.
Daodejing, Laozi
• Ping fa, Sunzi
• De Rerum Natura, Lucretius^
• Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Sextus Empiricus
• Enchiridion of Epictetus, ed. Arrian
Can you please summarize all of these books in one or two sentences? E.g.
1. Daodejing: The way to live is to know how to die! :chin: This is just my own interpretation of Daoism. Yours will be different of course!
Pleaaaaasssseee! :smile:
Metaphysician UndercoverAugust 02, 2021 at 11:38#5744510 likes
Reply to 180 Proof
I'll take Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonism, but it's doubtful whether skepticism can be classed as a form of wisdom. Perhaps it is better classified as a way toward wisdom.
But this would cast a shadow of doubt on all the methods, techniques, or practises, as to whether they are actually wisdom, or ways toward wisdom. If wisdom is what is produced from the practice, therefore something other than the practise itself, it would be an end to which the practise is a means. Then we need to be able to judge the various practises themselves as to efficacy for obtaining that end. This requires that we have a determination as to what wisdom itself is, as something separate from the practise, which is observed to be the result of the practise. Otherwise we can list all sorts of practises with no criteria as to how they are related to "wisdom".
Otherwise we can list all sorts of practises with no criteria as to how they are related to "wisdom".
Totally agree. If lifelong perpetual doubting, questioning, and inquiring, followed by more doubting, questioning, and inquiring, followed by rejection of all conclusions, principles, and guidelines, and systematic dismissal of the possibility of ever actually knowing anything, constitutes "wisdom" then we might as well forget about it.
Moreover, if to the general self-imposed skepticism, nihilism, and sophistry we add Straussian esotericism, then we are on the sure road (or shortcut) to pseudo-philosophical acrobatics bordering on the delusional and the schizoaffective. Quite the opposite of what Socrates and Plato aimed to achieve IMHO ... :smile:
I agree and would add that it is not just a matter of time but of place. The problem is compounded by the fact that it is not only a question of how Maimonides or Spinoza read those who came before and what they said about them but of how we today read them.
The philosopher is not a scholar. His concern is not to explicate the work of his predecessors. He appropriates them and uses them in the service of his own teachings. The comparison between Maimonides and Spinoza is particularly instructive. Both had to navigate between conflicting worldviews.
I wouldn't include it among primary sources for material of that era (which was in any case medieval rather than ancient.)
The OP is framed in terms of ancient and modern. He was not a modern philosopher.
As to his importance:
Succeeding generations of philosophers wrote extensive commentaries on his works, which influenced thinkers as diverse as Aquinas, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Newton. (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/maimonides/)
Maimonides is a medieval Jewish philosopher with considerable influence on Jewish thought, and on philosophy in general. Maimonides also was an important codifier of Jewish law. His views and writings hold a prominent place in Jewish intellectual history.
His works swiftly caused considerable controversy, especially concerning the relations between reason and revelation. Indeed, scholarly debates continue on Maimonides’ commitments to philosophy and to Judaism as a revealed religion. However, there is no question that his philosophical works have had a profound impact extending beyond Jewish philosophy. For instance, Aquinas and Leibniz are among the non-Jewish philosophers influenced by Maimonides. (https://iep.utm.edu/maimonid/)
And also a polemic seeking to reconcile arcane theological terms with recondite philosophical argument.
Can you give specific examples? The Guide takes common terms such as the hand, the finger, and the face of God and argues that they should not be taken literally.
In addition to not having access to the Platonic corpus except in incomplete Arabic translations or commentaries, Maimonides had no interest in Plato. In fact, he simply used Greek philosophy – as seen through the eyes of al-Farabi and Ibn Sina - to construct his own philosophy.
And Maimonides has certainly been used by the likes of Leo Strauss as a vehicle for the fabrication and promulgation of some really strange ideas.
First of all, there are theorists (following in the tradition of Leo Strauss) who view Maimonides as committed to esoteric writing strategies rooted in socio-political considerations—essentially, on such a view, Maimonides will often be seen to have written the exact opposite of what he truly believed. For these theorists, the stated view of Maimonides will almost always be in extreme contrast to his true, unstated view [for a related discussion. Applying this theoretical starting point to the case at hand, the fact that Maimonides seems to embrace creation ex nihilo would suggest to some that he truly believed in Aristotelian eternity, the opposite view ….
Strauss happened to read al-Farabi and Maimonides who lived in Muslim-occupied Spain - when philosophers had to be very careful about what they said - and developed the theory that all ancient philosophers had “secret teachings”. As a political philosopher and atheist, he believes that Plato’s dialogues have a hidden political message and he makes no effort to see anything metaphysical in the dialogues. In fact, he positively resists the idea just as he ridicules Plato’s theory of Forms.
Why Plato thought of this apparently fantastic doctrine [of the Forms] is a very difficult question. ... According to an interpretation which I read in certain writers, Plato teaches that there is an idea of everything which is designated by a term which is not a proper name. There is no idea of Socrates. But whenever you find a noun or an adjective, there is surely an idea conforming to that. My favorite example is the third undersecretary of the Garment Workers Union. Even if there exists only one of those, there could exist an indefinite number, and therefore there is is an idea of it. Somehow this sounds like an absolutely absurd doctrine. What is the use of such a duplication?
- L Strauss, On Plato's Symposium, p. 199
I think that to dismiss an idea out of hand is a rather unscholarly and unphilosophical approach. When combined with Straussian esotericism, it makes a mockery of any author, ancient or modern.
Strauss has an idiosyncratic, not to say unique, reading of the ancients: he reads them as Machiavellians, or even Nietzscheans. Strauss is a Machiavellian of a peculiar sort, however. Strauss favors the ancients, who agree with Machiavelli in all respects but one: they are atheistic and amoral, like Machiavelli and Nietzsche, but are critical of the moderns for openly admitting these things. The truth, according to Strauss, is that there is no God, no divine or natural support for justice, no human good other than pleasure. Strauss, in a word, is a nihilist ...
- C Zuckert and M Zuckert, The Truth about Leo Strauss
Reply to Metaphysician Undercover Yes, each of my selections can be characterized better as "a way towards wisdom" (i.e. philosophy) than as "wisdom" itself (i.e. sophistry).
(1) Daodejing, Laozi
(2) Ping fa, Sunzi
(3) De Rerum Natura, Lucretius^
(4) Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Sextus Empiricus
(5) Enchiridion of Epictetus, ed. Arrian
— 180 Proof
Can you please summarize all of these books in one or two sentences?
It's probably unwise, Fool, to spoon-feed (i.e. "summarize") what you can easily find yourself by searching Google, SEP & wikipedia. That said, and given I'm not wise myself, I'll say only what each book has meant to me:
1. 'to flow with the complementarities of nature'
2. 'high stakes strategic thinking & preparation'
3. 'an immanent way of reducing misery'
4. 'the undecidability of philosophical (& religious) statements'
5. 'exercises in equanimity'
(1) Daodejing, Laozi
(2) Ping fa, Sunzi
(3) De Rerum Natura, Lucretius^
(4) Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Sextus Empiricus
(5) Enchiridion of Epictetus, ed. Arrian
— 180 Proof
Can you please summarize all of these books in one or two sentences?
— TheMadFool
It's probably unwise, Fool, to spoon-feed (i.e. "summarize") what you can easily find yourself by searching Google, SEP & wikipedia. That said, and given I'm not wise myself, I'll say only what each book has meant to me:
1. 'to flow with the complementarities of nature'
2. 'high stakes strategic thinking & preparation'
3. 'an immanent way of reducing misery'
4. 'the undecidability of philosophical (& religious) statements'
5. 'exercises in equanimity'
A gazillion thanks 180 Proof, a gazillion thanks! :up: :fire:
However, wisdom is composed not only of knowledge, but also of experience.
Actually, i think there's a key term missing in the Western philosophical lexicon, which is 'reaiisation' or 'awakening' in sense in which I think it is conveyed in Eastern philosophy. It's been subsumed under 'religious conversion' in Western culture, but I think it's something distinct from that, because religious conversions can occur which provide no real intellectual illumination in the sense intended by that term. The only source I'm aware of that discusses the distinction is Buddhist:
[quote=Traleg Kyabgon Rinpoche; https://tricycle.org/magazine/letting-go-spiritual-experience/ ]In Buddhism, we distinguish between spiritual experiences and spiritual realizations. Spiritual experiences are usually more vivid and intense than realizations because they are generally accompanied by physiological and psychological changes. Realizations, on the other hand, may be felt, but the experience is less pronounced. Realization is about acquiring insight. Therefore, while realizations arise out of our spiritual experiences, they are not identical to them. Spiritual realizations are considered vastly more important because they cannot fluctuate.[/quote]
Reply to baker Laozi & Lucretius, I imagine, would take me in their stride easy enough. Can't say that about the others though, or see why that matters one way or the other.
Laozi & Lucretius, I imagine, would take me in their stride easy enough. Can't say that about the others though, or see why that matters one way or the other.
It matters because by studying and appreciating those ancient authors, one is basically putting oneself in a fantasy social relationship that is only one-way, one-sided. It's a type of parasocial interaction. One is trying to be part of a community, even if just in an abstract sense, from which one has no feedback as to whether that community would accept one or not. One is living in the delusion that one has found a community of like-minded people, even if just through books, when in fact one is just as alone and isolated as before, except that one is spending real time and energy on people who don't reciprocate, thus missing real world opportunities for reciprocal interactions.
A series from Princeton Press. Details here https://press.princeton.edu/series/ancient-wisdom-for-modern-readers
I don't mean to be contrarian.
But what is the use of this ancient wisdom? How can it be used nowadays?
Unless one has already internalized the worldview that has produced that wisdom, that wisdom can, at most, serve as self-helpy "tips and tricks" that a person will possibly employ in ways not originally intended (because the person cannot understand that wisdom, due to not having internalized the worldview that produced it).
And even if one were to somehow internalize that ancient worldview, it would put one at a disadvantage in the modern world which doesn't function by that ancient worldview.
Yes, each of my selections can be characterized better as "a way towards wisdom" (i.e. philosophy) than as "wisdom" itself (i.e. sophistry).
Do you equate wisdom with sophistry? I would think that wisdom is more the opposite of sophistry, the capacity to detect, identify, and disprove sophistry.
Reply to Metaphysician Undercover Only sophists claim to be wise, or to possess "wisdom". Sophistry, as you know, comes from sophos meaning "wise man" (sophia "wise woman"). Socrates in Plato's dialogues unmasks those who claim "wisdom" as not being wise at all since they don't even understand that they are not wise. In the context of what I wrote, this is what I alluding to with Socratic irony.
Metaphysician UndercoverAugust 04, 2021 at 01:35#5751580 likes
Only sophists claim to be wise, or to possess "wisdom".
In modern usage we normally refer to others as being wise, like in this thread, Wayfarer refers to the wisdom of the ancient people. So in this context it's a judgement concerning others, not about oneself. And, as I mentioned in the other post, one might have the goal of being wise, and look for a method to provide this end, without ever thinking oneself to be wise.
Socrates in Plato's dialogues unmasks those who claim "wisdom" as not being wise at all
Well, he certainly argued that. He also argued that transcendant forms are the foundation of reality and that democracy is wrongheaded. He also was a rationalist, as opposed to an empiricist, which can be seen in his claim about wisdom. He was a dualist who believed in an immortal soul. Now some or perhaps none of these beliefs bother you be he seems to have considered his arguments effective on these, including his about wisdom (or was that one a claim). I am not sure he unmasked anyone claiming to have wisdom (a description of his positing which includes the assumption that his argument holds) as being a sophist in the pejorative sense. He certainly had that position. Whether his various arguments and claims hold water is another can of fish and perhaps a claim to his authority might no longer be so strong for many modern people basing their beliefs on science, for example.
It seems to me many people claiming to have wisdom are not that wise - just my opinion. On the other hand, at least they are openly claiming it, rather than implying it.
[quote=IEP Entry on Pierre Hadot; https://iep.utm.edu/hadot/#SH4d][A] too-often neglected feature of the ancient conception on philosophy as a way of life, Hadot argues, was a set of discourses aiming to describe the figure of the Sage. The Sage was the living embodiment of wisdom, “the highest activity human beings can engage in . . . which is linked intimately to the excellence and virtue of the soul” (WAP 220). Across the schools, Socrates himself was agreed to have been perhaps the only living exemplification of such a figure (his avowed agnoia notwithstanding). Pyrrho and Epicurus were also accorded this elevated status in their respective schools, just as Sextius and Cato were deemed sages by Seneca, and Plotinus by Porphyry.
Yet more important than documenting the lives of historical philosophers (although this was another ancient literary genre) was the idea of the Sage as “transcendent norm.” The aim, by picturing such figures, was to give “an idealized description of the specifics of the way of life” that was characteristic of the each of the different schools (WAP 224). The philosophical Sage, in all the ancient discourses, is characterized by a constant inner state of happiness or serenity. This has been achieved through minimizing his bodily and other needs, and thus attaining to the most complete independence (autarcheia) vis-à-vis external things. ...
Aristotle equates the contemplation of the wise man with the self-contemplation of the unmoved mover. Platonic philosophy sees ascent in wisdom as progressive assimilation to the divine (WAP 226-7). Hadot goes as far as to suggest that Plotinus and other ancient philosophers “project” the figure of the God, on the basis of their conception of the figure of the Sage, as a kind of model of human and intellectual perfection” (WAP 227-8). However, Hadot stresses that the divine freedom of the Sage from the concerns of ordinary human beings does not mean the Sage lacks all concern for the things that preoccupy other human beings. Indeed, in a series of remarkable analyses, Hadot argues that this indifference towards external goods (money, fame, property, office . . . ) opens the Sage to a different, elevated state of awareness in which he “never ceases to have the whole present in his mind, never forgets the world, thinks and acts in relation to the cosmos . . . ” [/quote].
[quote=Thomas Nagel, Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament]Plato was clearly concerned not only with the state of his soul, but also with his relation to the universe at the deepest level. Plato’s metaphysics was not intended to produce merely a detached understanding of reality. His motivation in philosophy was in part to achieve a kind of understanding that would connect him (and therefore every human being) to the whole of reality – intelligibly and if possible satisfyingly. ....
The Platonic sense of the world is that its intelligibility and the development of beings to whom it is intelligible are nonaccidental; so our awareness and its expansion as part of the history of life and of our species are part of the natural evolution of the cosmos. Without a religious interpretation, this view does not face the problem of evil, or the problem of whether the whole process is aiming at any result. But it does expand our sense of what a human life is. [/quote]
Reply to 180 Proof Well, we only know Socrates through Plato, including his 'unmasking' if he managed it. Are you really saying that Socrates was not a dualist, rationalist, advocate against democracy, etc.? And how do you know this? My point with bringing these things up is to say that his assertions include those, as far as we know, ideas that generally are not held today. Of course Socrates may not have had positions attributed by Plato, but then that would include the ones you seem to accept. And there his demonstration that those who claim to be wise are not was not based on empirical study and really comes down to opinion with some deduction thrown in. Someone who thinks they are wise and asserts it may very well have wisdom about a lot of things.
As I said before, I posted the link for those interested. There's no penalty for not being interested. I would add, though, that these works have the status of classics, because they've retained interest and validity from ancient times. It's impossible to know what of our current philosophical oeuvre wil be read and appreciated centuries from now, it's the kind of perspective that only the passage of a lot of time will provide.
No, I want to know what use is there in reading those old books. Don't just brush this off idly, it's not an idle question.
Is there anything more to it than nostalgia?
I don't want to put words into Wayfarer's mouth but isn't one of his opinions that the post enlightenment worldview, especially that of the current, post-Darwinian era holds a limited physicalist metaphysics and has rejected much wisdom that was ours for millennia? I imagine that these old books contain some of this repudiated knowledge and many other ideas besides worth cultivating.
I want to know what use is there in reading those old books. Don't just brush this off idly, it's not an idle question.
Of course! One of the things I've regretted in my adult life, is the paucity of my education in the classics of ancient literature and philosophy. I was always a poor student, for various reasons, but aside from that, hardly any of this material was on my curriculum. Later in life, I've come to realise just how profound the classical philosophical tradition is, even though my knowledge of it is fragmentary. In my view - which is shared with Pierre Hadot, who is a scholar of the history of philosophy - most of what passes for philosophy in today's world, has nothing to do with philosophy as understood in the classical tradition. Philosophy proper is a transformative understanding of the nature of life.
On the other hand, it's mistaken to idolise the ancients, (or anything for that matter), and ancient cultures had their own shortcomings and blind-spots, no doubt. But the 'sacred thread' that runs through Greek philosophy and the formation of Western culture is unique and important, and constantly under attack from degenerative forces, principally materialism in all its forms, which has hijacked the terminology of philosophy whilst rejecting its meaning.
... the paucity of my education in the classics of ancient literature and philosophy.
But the 'sacred thread' that runs through Greek philosophy and the formation of Western culture is unique and important, and constantly under attack from degenerative forces, principally materialism in all its forms, which has hijacked the terminology of philosophy whilst rejecting its meaning.
Thales, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Epicurus, Lucretius, and others were all materialists in some form.
That is an interesting way to frame the question, the pain of losing the past.
On a personal level, the past is what happened to me and what I can remember about the events. Short term memory becomes some other thing after a while. It is difficult to keep the past alive.
An interest in the "old books" can be based upon how they are the parents of the new ones. The new books try to mark out what is original against the background of what has already been said. The old books did the same. Is there an absolute now that allows us to escape that process?
... the 'sacred thread' that runs through Greek philosophy and the formation of Western culture is unique and important, and constantly under attack from degenerative forces, principally materialism in all its forms, which has hijacked the terminology of philosophy whilst rejecting its meaning.
How can that be when "materialism" was there, almost from the beginning as this "sacred thread" unspooled, from Thales to Leucippus & Democritus to the Epicureans featured exclusively in Book X of Diogenes Laërtius' masterwork and Lucretius ... which parallels (or was inspired by) the "materialisms" of the C?rv?ka in India and exemplified by the Chinese astronomer-philosopher Wang Chong during the Han Dynasty?
What are you talking about, Wayf? Naturalists and atomists (re: materialists) have always belonged to the counter, more radical, tradition within the idealist-dominant, cultural mainstream of Western philosophy.
And besides: in this world, what could be more "degenerative" than otherworldly – therefore nihilistic (Nietzsche) – idealism "in all of its forms" (e.g. platonic, cartesian, subjective, transcendental, absolute, linguistic)?
How can that be when "materialism" was there, almost from the beginning as they "sacred thread" unspooled, from Thales to Leucippus & Democritus to the Epicureans featured exclusively in Book X of Diogenes Laërtius' masterwork and Lucretius ... which parallels (or was inspired by) the "materialisms" of the C?rv?ka in India and exemplified by the Chinese astronomer-philosopher Wang Chong during the Han Dynasty?
Materialists represent one tendency or pole in the dialectic in those cultures. In the modern period, it took on a modern form. The French philosophers of the Enlightenment re-discovered Lucretius. Baron D'Holbach's 'all I see are bodies in motion' is directly from that source. But the fact that it's always existed doesn't validate it. It's a natural thing to believe, as we appear to be sorrounded by material objects, but that too doesn't validate it.
Beside physics itself has undermined materialism. Paul Davies and John Gribben's book The Matter Myth, published decades ago, it is about how 20th century physics completely torpedoed classical materialism, as Heisenberg said a few decades beforehand. There are thousands of books out there saying the same. Materialism, in the Democritean or Lucretian form, as in the ultimate existence of point-particles, is dead and buried.
During the nineteenth century, the development of chemistry and the theory of heat conformed very closely to the ideas first put forward by Leucippus and Democritus. A revival of the materialist philosophy in its modern form, that of dialectical materialism, was this a natural counterpart to the impressive advances made during this period in chemistry and physics. The concept of the atom had proved exceptionally fruitful in the explanation of chemical bonding and the physical behavior of gases. It was soon, however, that the particles called atoms by the chemist were composed of still smaller units. But these smaller units, the electrons, followed by the atomic nuclei and finally the elementary particles, protons and neutrons, also still seemed to be atoms from the standpoint of the materialist philosophy. The fact that, at least indirectly, one can actually see a single elementary particle—in a cloud chamber, say, or a bubble chamber—supports the view that the smallest units of matter are real physical objects, existing in the same sense that stones or flowers do.
But the inherent difficulties of the materialist theory of the atom, which had become apparent even in the ancient discussions about smallest particles, have also appeared very clearly in the development of physics during the present century.
This difficulty relates to the question whether the smallest units are ordinary physical objects, whether they exist in the same way as stones or flowers. Here, the development of quantum theory some forty years ago has created a complete change in the situation. The mathematically formulated laws of quantum theory show clearly that our ordinary intuitive concepts cannot be unambiguously applied to the smallest particles. All the words or concepts we use to describe ordinary physical objects, such as position, velocity, color, size, and so on, become indefinite and problematic if we try to use then of elementary particles. I cannot enter here into the details of this problem, which has been discussed so frequently in recent years. But it is important to realize that, while the behavior of the smallest particles cannot be unambiguously described in ordinary language, the language of mathematics is still adequate for a clear-cut account of what is going on.
During the coming years, the high-energy accelerators will bring to light many further interesting details about the behavior of elementary particles. But I am inclined to think that the answer just considered to the old philosophical problems will turn out to be final. If this is so, does this answer confirm the views of Democritus or Plato?
I think that on this point modern physics has definitely decided for Plato. For the smallest units of matter are, in fact, not physical objects in the ordinary sense of the word; they are forms, structures or—in Plato's sense—Ideas, which can be unambiguously spoken of only in the language of mathematics.
I think the form materialism takes in the modern age is simply the methods of scientists and engineers applied to the problems of philosophy. When those principles are applied to the problems that they're suitable for, such as technology and medicine, then the results are often spectacular and (hopefully) beneficial (although the same wizadry that produces brain-assisted prosthetics can also produce killer robots). It's when they're applied to the problems of philosophy that they're completly unsuitable, notwithstanding that this is not even understood by many of its proponents.
As for the C?rv?ka in India, they were very similar to today's variety. There's a charming character, representative of their school, in the early Buddhist texts called Prince Payasi, who ordered condemned prisoners to be sealed in clay pots to see if the soul could be observed escaping when it was unsealed. (It couldn't.) Materialist of that kind are classified as nihilists in Buddhist literature.
Reply to Wayfarer Heisenberg disingenously poses a contrast between a philosopher for whom almost all of his writings are lost and a later philosopher who left an encyclopedia of texts. C'mon. And as for Davies and Gribbin, they compare apples and oranges too in order to argue from the position that QM, etc "refutes" materialism, rather than to that position, given that the latter is a speculative, or philosophically interpretative, stance and the former a scientific theory.
Analogously, I think interpreting classical 'atoms' as quarks (or even quanta) and 'void' as QM field is valid as I've previously mentioned without rebuttal. Paraphrasing Churchill, 'materialism' (now sexed-up physicalism) is the most incoherent ontology or inconsistent methodology, no doubt, except for all the varieties of idealism proposed.
Paraphrasing Churchill, 'materialism' (now sexed-up physicalism) is the most incoherent ontology or inconsistent methodology, no doubt, except for all the varieties of idealism proposed.
I think interpreting classical 'atoms' as quarks (or even quanta) and 'void' as QM field is valid as I've previously mentioned without rebuttal.
I think the most pregnant phrase in Heisenberg's quote is that sub-atomic particles don't exist in the same way as flowers, stones, and so on. Implicitly, this re-introduces modal metaphysics, in that things can exist in different ways (see this article.)
Whereas in Democritean atomism, a thing either exists or doesn't exist - all that exists being atoms and the void. So the atom is completely existent, the void is completely non-existent. But that is precisely what is being called into question.
And consider this - we know about electric and atomic fields, because they show up in the kinds of experiments, and using the kinds of equipment, that are likely to detect those fields. And even so, nobody knows what 'fields' really are. But what if there are fields of completely different kinds, like biological fields, or mental fields? A science which methodically excludes consideration of anything of the kind is bound not to acknowledge them, but they might be equally fundamental to the constitution of living beings. And besides, it has to be acknowledged that there are enormous gaps in current physics, with 96% of the totality of the Universe existing in some form that science can't even fathom.
materialism' (now sexed-up physicalism) is the most incoherent ontology or inconsistent methodology, no doubt, except for all the varieties of idealism proposed.
You'd agree with this passage from Richard Lewontin's review of one of Carl Sagan's books, wouldn't you?
Our willingness to accept scientific claims that are against common sense is the key to an understanding of the real struggle between science and the supernatural. We take the side of science in spite of the patent absurdity of some of its constructs, in spite of its failure to fulfill many of its extravagant promises of health and life, in spite of the tolerance of the scientific community for unsubstantiated just-so stories, because we have a prior commitment, a commitment to materialism.
It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated.
Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door. The eminent Kant scholar Lewis Beck used to say that anyone who could believe in God could believe in anything. To appeal to an omnipotent deity is to allow that at any moment the regularities of nature may be ruptured, that miracles may happen.
My interpretation is that this attitude is actually the direct descendant of Western monotheism - but with 'the Cosmos' in the place of God - Carl Sagan himself said 'Cosmos is all there is" - and 'scientific laws' standing in for divine commandments (Whitehead says in Science and the Modern World that they our modern equivalent of 'the decrees of Fate'.) The jealous God dies hard!
Totally agree. If lifelong perpetual doubting, questioning, and inquiring, followed by more doubting, questioning, and inquiring, followed by rejection of all conclusions, principles, and guidelines, and systematic dismissal of the possibility of ever actually knowing anything, constitutes "wisdom" then we might as well forget about it.
What if wisdom consists in ataraxia, though? What if it consists in simply following your inclinations and conscience, of being yourself fearlessly, and being skeptical of external so-called authorities and traditional methods as paths to wisdom and of any claims that we need to rely on such things to gain wisdom?
Metaphysician UndercoverAugust 05, 2021 at 01:05#5755390 likes
Aristotle equates the contemplation of the wise man with the self-contemplation of the unmoved mover. Platonic philosophy sees ascent in wisdom as progressive assimilation to the divine (WAP 226-7). Hadot goes as far as to suggest that Plotinus and other ancient philosophers “project” the figure of the God, on the basis of their conception of the figure of the Sage, as a kind of model of human and intellectual perfection” (WAP 227-8). However, Hadot stresses that the divine freedom of the Sage from the concerns of ordinary human beings does not mean the Sage lacks all concern for the things that preoccupy other human beings. Indeed, in a series of remarkable analyses, Hadot argues that this indifference towards external goods (money, fame, property, office . . . ) opens the Sage to a different, elevated state of awareness in which he “never ceases to have the whole present in his mind, never forgets the world, thinks and acts in relation to the cosmos . . . ”
In his Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle positioned contemplation as the most virtuous activity. The highest form of thinking is thinking about thinking. This is directly from Plato where the highest form of knowledge is knowledge of intelligible objects, i.e. knowledge of knowledge.
But in Aristotle's cosmology he posited eternal circular motions. as the orbits of the planets. Then to support the eternal circular motions he posit unmoved movers involved in the virtuous circular thinking of thinking on thinking. The idea of eternal circular orbits has been proven faulty, and circular thinking is now considered a vicious circle. So this aspect of his metaphysics seems to have failed
However, he left another door open in his Nichomachean Ethics. He divided knowledge into practical and theoretical, which was quite a bit different from Plato's division. Each section has different levels, but what happens is that "intuition" is designated as the highest form of knowledge, in both the theoretical and the practical divisions. It's difficult to grasp exactly what intuition is supposed to be, but it seems be something concerning the relating of theory to practise, and practise to theory.
[quote=Werner Heisenberg]I think that modern physics has definitely decided in favor of Plato. In fact the smallest units of matter are not physical objects in the ordinary sense; they are forms, ideas which can be expressed unambiguously only in mathematical language.[/quote]
[quote=Niels Bohr]Everything we call real is made of things that cannot be regarded as real.[/quote]
Both, it seems, were referring to the fact that quarks, the smallest units of matter, behave like mathematical points. I got that from Marcus du Sautoy's book What We Don't Know.
I'm not convinced there are any 'smallest units of matter', as such. The entities that exist on that scale are only 'particles' by way of analogy. Paul Davies, who I mentioned above, has been writing about this for decades - Matter Myth, God and the New Physics, Goldilocks Enigma, and other such titles. Not to forget Tao of Physics, which despite it's many critics, was still a ground-breaker.
in Aristotle's cosmology he posited eternal circular motions. as the orbits of the planets. Then to support the eternal circular motions he posit unmoved movers involved in the virtuous circular thinking of thinking on thinking. The idea of eternal circular orbits has been proven faulty, and circular thinking is now considered a vicious circle. So this aspect of his metaphysics seems to have failed
Of course that is true. Galileo rightly demolished Aristotelian physics but there's a deeper issue, which is along with it, banishing the idea of any purpose other than mechanical interaction. And besides in many other respects Aristotle's philosophy still has much to commend it. But you can't deny the aspects of it that were just plain mistaken, either.
I'm not convinced there are any 'smallest units of matter', as such. The entities that exist on that scale are only 'particles' by way of analogy. Paul Davies, who I mentioned above, has been writing about this for decades - Matter Myth, God and the New Physics, Goldilocks Enigma, and other such titles. Not to forget Tao of Physics, which despite it's many critics, was still a ground-breaker.
Oh! So we're on a similar if not the same "wavelength". Glad to know that. I feel I'm in good company. :up: Resonance! I hear ya!
Here's the deal!
If the very small are but ideas, doesn't that mean the very big (the universe comes to mind but maybe there are things bigger than it) could also be just an idea?
Reminds me of @Devans99's argument that infinity is a nonsensical idea in re points and lines. Faer argument proceeds like so: Mathematical points are dimensionless (size 0 like many of our anorexic, malnourished super models). How can then a line, a set of such points, exist. How can a series, any series of zeros (points) add up to a line, a nonzero object? How can quarks (point particles) yield matter? Is matter an illusion?
There have been some materialists in the ancient times, but they were just a few individuals scattered here and there, and in the pre socratic times. It is not that they were the materialists who denounced minds and souls, but when they were asking what the universe is made of, the materials were what they were seeing and touching. In that regard they were not the diehard materialists as such, but rather pseudo or scientific materialists.
The main domineering philosophical school was the idealism headed by Plato and his followers.
Metaphysician UndercoverAugust 05, 2021 at 11:05#5756520 likes
Of course that is true. Galileo rightly demolished Aristotelian physics but there's a deeper issue, which is along with it, banishing the idea of any purpose other than mechanical interaction. And besides in many other respects Aristotle's philosophy still has much to commend it. But you can't deny the aspects of it that were just plain mistaken, either.
The fundamental issue I see is the continuity of existence. This is the question of how do some things remain the same, as time passes, in a changing world. The idea of eternal circular motions supports what was observed in the world as a continuous sameness.
When the Aristotelian assumption was removed, there was no replacement provided. Instead, the continuity of existence was taken for granted, as expressed by Newton's first law of motion. Notice the difference between Aristotle and Newton. Aristotle has a reasoned eternal motion, a perfect circle has no beginning or end, so if something is moving in a perfect circle it could just keep going around forever, perpetual motion. Newton, on the other hand, assumed any, or every motion is eternal, unless it is caused, by a force, to change. I hope you can see the fundamental difference here. In Aristotle, there must be a reason for the temporal continuity of motion, and existence in general, but in Newton that continuity is taken for granted.
In modernity an important problem has evolved. Newton did not actually take the continuity of motion completely for granted, as stated in his first law, he presented this law as dependent on the Will of God. So it was granted by God, and dependent on His Will. Therefore we have implicit within that law, the requirement of the Will of God, in order for that law to be a reasonable law. This is part of the process of Neo-Platonist metaphysics becoming supreme over Aristotelian metaphysics in western society. Material existence for Aristotelian metaphysics is supported by the eternal circular motions, and the divine thinking which is thinking on thinking, whereas the Neo-Platonist perspective from Augustine supplanted the divine thinking with the Will of God.
Modern western society in its atheist tendency, has removed the Will of God, and left Newton's first law as unsupported and unreasonable. So we have in quantum mechanics for example, nothing to support a temporal continuity of fundamental particles. The wisdom of the ancient people tells us very explicitly that the temporal continuity of material existence, from one moment to the next, is not something which we can take for granted. It must be supported by reasoned principles. When the reasoned principles which have been handed down to us over time (the Will of God) appear to no longer be reasonable, we cannot just dump them and forget them as if they've provided no service to us, they need to be rethought, and restructured, or else we are left with a huge hole in our understanding of reality.
Ataraxia can get you anywhere. You need to take the beginning, the center, and the end, i.e., "s", "o", ph", "i", "a", and discard the "ch", "i", "z", "r", "e", "n" to get it right. :smile:
Otherwise put, you need some reference to external realities (and authorities) to make sure you don't go to places where you don't want to be.
to contemporary physics. The classical philosophical tradition is not what you imagine it to be. The philosophers did away with the gods of the poets and priests. They were guided by reason rather than mythology.
... banishing the idea of any purpose other than mechanical interaction
That the universe itself acts purposively is analogical. The fact that some living things act purposively does not mean that the universe does. Rather than rule it out it is a question of why it should be ruled in.
Ataraxia can get you anywhere. You need to take the beginning, the center, and the end, i.e., "s", "o", ph", "i", "a", and discard the "ch", "i", "z", "r", "e", "n" to get it right. :smile:
Otherwise put, you need some reference to external realities (and authorities) to make sure you don't go to places where you don't want to be.
I think on that point we will remain in disagreement. I see the arts and free-thinking philosophy as alternative "ways" to following any of the "external authorities". What you say may be true for some, but not all, in my opinion. I mean how could we possibly justify a belief that we can speak for all anyway?
I see the arts and free-thinking philosophy as alternative "ways" to following any of the "external authorities". What you say may be true for some, but not all, in my opinion. I mean how could we possibly justify a belief that we can speak for all anyway?
I never said to "follow external authorities" in the sense of entering into some form of master-disciple relationship, only to refer to them as a general standard. We do that anyway by learning from parents, teachers, experts, etc.
The artist or free-thinking philosopher does not invent his or her own reality, method or technique. They learn from others and remain in contact with others of their kind and with the general public.
In other words, yes, we are artists or free-thinkers, but we don't operate in isolation, we keep our feet on the ground and stay in touch with reality including with people that can give us advice on matters of importance.
Whether or not any of us feels the need to subordinate themselves to an external authority is of course a personal choice and in some cases may not even be necessary, as you say.
Reply to Apollodorus OK it seems I misinterpreted what we're saying. I agree we are not isolated individuals; we always live and think within a received cultural matrix.
There are many references to Greek philosophy in Heisenberg's later philosophical writings. The passage I quoted was from his lecture, The Debate between Plato and Democritus.
That the universe itself acts purposively is analogical. The fact that some living things act purposively does not mean that the universe does. Rather than rule it out it is a question of why it should be ruled in.
Because then you have the problem of how purpose arises out of purposelessness. By accident, is the presumed answer, if it is ruled out. I think that issue arises very early in Greek philosophy and finds final form in Aristotle's Aitia and scheme of fourfold causation.
I agree we are not isolated individuals; we always live and think within a received cultural matrix.
Not only that, but even in terms of finding our own way toward the attainment of wisdom, we cannot do it in complete isolation but need at least from time to time to turn to external points of reference in order to verify that what we have found or are in the process of finding is indeed wisdom and not something else.
Reply to Apollodorus Perhaps, but I'm an enthusiast for Aristotle's idea of phronesis—commonly translated as "practical wisdom". I think wisdom is, and can only be, tested by action. "By their fruits ye shall know them". I think this applies to oneself; by your fruits shall ye know yourself—"talk is cheap".
The problem I see with relying on external "points of reference" is that you would need to already know that those points of reference were manifestations of wisdom. How could you know that unless you could see the fruits of those external points of reference and have the practical wisdom to recognize them as fruits of wisdom?
I think we must make our assessments in acknowledgement of uncertainty and the possibility of doubt as Socrates seems to be advocating. But, you know, that's just me; that others may have different ideas they follow, I also acknowledge.
The possibility of doubt is always there until we have reached certainty.
And yes, phronesis is practical wisdom. And so is sophia. Ancient philosophy is, by definition, a practical endeavor. This tends to get overlooked in modern culture.
I'm an enthusiast for Aristotle's idea of phronesis—commonly translated as "practical wisdom". I think wisdom is, and can only be, tested by action. "By their fruits ye shall know them". I think this applies to oneself; by your fruits shall ye know yourself—"talk is cheap".
I am in agreement but what do you think the 'fruits' would actually look like? How do you demonstrate this?
Reply to Tom Storm If beliefs and actions appear to support thriving and happiness in oneself and others, then I would say they count as wise beliefs and actions. i don't claim this could ever be an exact science, but I think a sufficiently open-minded, observant and intelligent inquirer should be able to judge reasonably well as to what promotes peace and harmony and what promotes conflict and disharmony in both oneself and others.
Perhaps, but I'm an enthusiast for Aristotle's idea of phronesis—commonly translated as "practical wisdom". I think wisdom is, and can only be, tested by action. "By their fruits ye shall know them". I think this applies to oneself; by your fruits shall ye know yourself—"talk is cheap".
What do you think of the role of intuition in Aristotle's "practical wisdom". I have great difficulty understanding what is meant by "intuition" in Aristotle because he describes it as the highest form of knowledge, and in his logic he implies that it cannot be wrong.
I've seen "intuition" explained as the means by which we establish connections, relations between things. So for example, if a primitive person noticed that when the sun comes up in the morning there is warmth from the sun, and water on the ground, dew, dries up, by intuition, the person would establish a connection between these three things, sun, heat, and drying up, and one could create a couple of principles, the sun creates heat, and the sun dries things up. From other information, such as heat from a fire drying things up, one might deductively conclude that heat dries things.
So I think that intuition is necessary, as prior to any form of logic, inductive or deductive, as the part of the intellectual process which determines meaningful relations (causal perhaps). But I think Aristotle gets the whole hierarchy of certainty backward, when he says that these first principles can't be wrong. Clearly delusional thinking and mental illness demonstrate that such intuitions are often wrong. And this backwardness reflects on Aristotle's complete epistemological structure. He states that logic proceeds from the more certain, toward conclusions which are less certain. But if the first principles are provided by intuition, and intuition is not reliable, then how is it possible that we start from a higher level of certainty in our logical proceedings?
Because then you have the problem of how purpose arises out of purposelessness.
That there are living things that act purposively, that there are living things with desires, does not mean that the universe must act with purpose and have desires, any more than that there are living things that walk and talk and see means that the universe must walk and talk and see.
Regarding your example, wouldn't you say that the observed connection between sunlight (and other sources of heat). warmth and evaporation is as certain as anything can be? The usual counterexample to this kind of intuitive understanding is Aristotle's belief that heavier things fall faster. Even Aristotle could have tested this theory, though with a heavy sheet and a small stone lighter than the sheet, if he had thought to; the raw materials for the experiment would have been readily available to him.
That there are living things that act purposively, that there are living things with desires, does not mean that the universe must act with purpose and have desires, any more than that there are living things that walk and talk and see means that the universe must walk and talk and see.
Certainly, the universe considered as the object of science need not be regarded as purposeful or even as 'acting'. Putting aside these motivations is part of the basic methodology of science.
But the philosophical issues are deeper than that. Cast your mind back to the Phaedo, where Socrates says of Anaxagoras' naturalism:
[quote=IEP Plato, Phaedo; https://iep.utm.edu/phaedo/]One day after his initial setbacks Socrates happened to hear of Anaxagoras’ view that Mind directs and causes all things. He took this to mean that everything was arranged for the best. Therefore, if one wanted to know the explanation of something, one only had to know what was best for that thing. Suppose, for instance, that Socrates wanted to know why the heavenly bodies move the way they do. Anaxagoras would show him how this was the best possible way for each of them to be. And once he had taught Socrates what the best was for each thing individually, he then would explain the overall good that they all share in common. Yet upon studying Anaxagoras further, Socrates found these expectations disappointed. It turned out that Anaxagoras did not talk about Mind as cause at all, but rather about air and ether and other mechanistic explanations. For Socrates, however, this sort of explanation was simply unacceptable:
To call those things causes is too absurd. If someone said that without bones and sinews and all such things, I should not be able to do what I decided, he would be right, but surely to say that they are the cause of what I do, and not that I have chosen the best course, even though I act with my mind, is to speak very lazily and carelessly. Imagine not being able to distinguish the real cause from that without which the cause would not be able to act as a cause. (99a-b)[/quote]
Here, Socrates is criticizing that the mechanistic principles provided by Anaxagoras as being insufficient - mere 'bones and sinews', whereas the explanation that he wants has to account for 'Mind' (presumably 'nous') as the ultimate cause. So here, the principle of agency is introduced.
I think it anticipates later developments, particularly Aristotle's 'four causes', in which the cause of something is also part of the explanation as to why it exists, and also the various dialogues of Plato's which explicate his cosmology and the role of the Demiurge.
Because science is principally concerned with what Aristotelian philosophy would call material and efficient causes, it has lost the broader conception of reason that is suggested by that. It's all 'bones and sinews'! Post 'death of God' the Universe is believed to be devoid of reason, save that superimposed over it by the mind of h. sapiens. That's why there's a major thread in 20th Century philosophy and literature that life is a kind of cosmic accident, the 'million monkeys' theory (e.g Jacques Monod, Richard Dawkins, early Bertrand Russell. It's always struck me as somewhat absurd that 20th century science, which insists on finding causes, regards the absence of cause, in the case of the beginning of life, as being somehow an explanation.)
Now, I'm not appealing to ID arguments. But what I will say is that the consequence of this view is that the mind, as the result of the doings of the 'blind watchmaker', is presumed to be the product of this billion-year process which is essentially insentient and non-rational. And I think there's someting profoundly fallacious about that picture.
Putting it in as naturalistic terms as possible, what if the tendency towards the evolution of more intelligent species is a latent capacity within the Universe itself. Thomas Nagel wonders in Mind and Cosmos if 'each of our lives is a part of the lengthy process of the universe gradually waking up and becoming aware of itself’. Which doesn't deny, or even conflict with, the scientific analysis of the process, so much as extend it, to re-encompass the dimension of 'intentionality' which has somehow become lost.
Metaphysician UndercoverAugust 06, 2021 at 23:39#5763930 likes
Regarding your example, wouldn't you say that the observed connection between sunlight (and other sources of heat). warmth and evaporation is as certain as anything can be? The usual counterexample to this kind of intuitive understanding is Aristotle's belief that heavier things fall faster. Even Aristotle could have tested this theory, though with a heavy sheet and a small stone lighter than the sheet, if he had thought to; the raw materials for the experiment would have been readily available to him.
The example of the sun and evaporation is just one example. I'm sure there are many examples of deluded minds, and mentally ill people making connections which are not sound. Your example of falling objects is a good one. Heavier things in general do fall faster, but in this case the intuition was wrong. Further testing proved that intuition to be wrong. This is the point, science proceeds from first principles derived from intuition. and since we trust science we tend to believe that these principles provide us with certainty, even though they haven't been properly tested. Einstein's relativity is a good example of such a principle, derived from intuition, but not properly tested.
That's why there's a major thread in 20th Century philosophy and literature that life is a kind of cosmic accident, the 'million monkeys' theory.
This I believe, is the principle of plenitude. Given an infinite amount of time, every possibility will be actualized. But of course "infinite amount of time" is not a wise intuition.
That there are living things that act purposively, that there are living things with desires, does not mean that the universe must act with purpose and have desires, any more than that there are living things that walk and talk and see means that the universe must walk and talk and see.
Strange, isn't it, how some people never outgrow the early naive stage of psychological development in which they anthropomorphize every thing, "seeing" intentional agents and hidden purposes every where, like toddlers in a nursery? The world is not a cradle, Freud points out; rather the world is an indifferent wilderness by turns beautiful and terrible, and yet many demand it be more secure and comforting – consoling – than it is, and via hasty generalizations and compositional fallacies they posit some "religious or idealist metaphysics" (re: ego-flattering "Providence") which, of course, collapses under rational scrutiny like blowing on a house of cards.
Reply to 180 Proof Ah yes, I kept one of your immortal snippets from the old forum about just this question:
[quote=180 Proof] 'life' is a specific emergent level of molecular-structured thermodynamic complexity that "happened" insofar as -- "because" -- there weren't conditions which prevented it. Same reason snowflakes "happen". In other words, the universe consists in entropy-driven transformations wherein complex phenomena like (terrestrial) "life" arises & goes extinct along a segment of the slope down from minimal entropy (order) to maximal entropy (disorder); the universe is always-already "dead" but becomes a little less-so ever-so-momentarily at different stages of its (cosmic) decomposition. [/quote]
You want that, it's all yours. I'm not even going to complain.
Einstein's relativity is a good example of such a principle, derived from intuition, but not properly tested.
There is a difference between observational and theoretical claims in science. There are no simple observable confirmations that can be made with theoretical claims in the way there can be with claims about what is directly observed.
So, relativity has been tested insofar as its predictions concerning what we would expect to observe if it were correct have all panned out so far I believe.
Ah yes, I kept one of your immortal snippets from the old forum about just this question:
'life' is a specific emergent level of molecular-structured thermodynamic complexity that "happened" insofar as -- "because" -- there weren't conditions which prevented it. Same reason snowflakes "happen". In other words, the universe consists in entropy-driven transformations wherein complex phenomena like (terrestrial) "life" arises & goes extinct along a segment of the slope down from minimal entropy (order) to maximal entropy (disorder); the universe is always-already "dead" but becomes a little less-so ever-so-momentarily at different stages of its (cosmic) decomposition.
— 180 Proof
You want that, it's all yours. I'm not even going to complain
:fire: Well I'm flattered and much obliged, my friend! The ideas expressed in that quote reflect what is more true than not no matter what we "want" to believe which, I think, is the beauty and power of a naturalistic (realist) worldview. Sublime ephemerality (anicca, no?) A universe is a drop in the ocean of oblivion – we make of ourselves, and maybe of the universe itself, what we can with the time given us (says Camus or "Gandalf the Grey"?) :death: :flower:
Nope. (Explains the dire consequences of objectifying non-objectification.)
//the point being, Buddhism, and the Buddha, are not nihilistic. Nihilism is the view that at death, the body returns to the elements, there are no consequences of actions, to put it minimally. Of course that has been elaborated in mythology but the point remains. (The Buddha also rejected ‘eternallism’, which in my interpretation is the belief that one can be re-born in perpetuity through successive lives, and that there is a separate, self-caused essence. Nihilism and eternalism are the ‘two extreme views’ which the ‘middle way’ avoids.)
I wonder if you’ve ever read Tom Wolfe’s famous 1996 essay, Sorry but your Soul Just Died? It’s still online. I think it is relevant to this conversation.
There is a difference between observational and theoretical claims in science. There are no simple observable confirmations that can be made with theoretical claims in the way there can be with claims about what is directly observed.
We do not agree here. Every observation is theory laden, starting with the words we use to describe something. Call it "red", and there is theory behind the meaning of that word. There is no real separation between observational claims and theoretical claims in science today, because all claims have elements of both. This reality underscores the need to determine which of the principles within an observation, are based in intuition, therefore unproven theory.
If for example you are describing something you saw as having been "red", then unless there are strict criteria as to what constitutes red, this part of your description is based in intuition, unproven theory. That's why in a litmus test there is a colour chart for the purpose of comparison, it removes the unproven intuition of "red" with a definition, a chart, derived from proven theory. Either way, the intuitive judgement or the colour chart judgement, when you say "it's red" the judgement is based on theory, one is just better proven than the other..
We do not agree here. Every observation is theory laden, starting with the words we use to describe something. Call it "red", and there is theory behind the meaning of that word.
I don't agree. For me 'red' is just a word we use to refer to a certain colour or range of colours that are commonly observed. Indeed there may be and have been various theories associated with our use of that word or its cognates (not specifially our use of 'red', our use of colour words in general) but is there any essential theory underpinning its/ their use?
Metaphysician UndercoverAugust 07, 2021 at 02:20#5764380 likes
For me 'red' is just a word we use to refer to a certain colour or range of colours that are commonly observed.
The incompatibility between "a certain colour", and a "range of colours" is the important point to recognize here, which makes your observation, when you use the word "red", theory dependent.
I took that to be a reference to Buddhist philosophy - anicca being 'impermanence'. But I'm saying that it's not true to characterise Buddhism as naturalism (or nihilism) which is why I linked to that particular verse.
Reply to Metaphysician Undercover I don't think that's right. What I call 'red' at the two extremes of the range some may call 'orange' or 'mauve'. That would just be personal perception and choice; I can't see what it has to do with theory.
I don't want to put words into Wayfarer's mouth but isn't one of his opinions that the post enlightenment worldview, especially that of the current, post-Darwinian era holds a limited physicalist metaphysics and has rejected much wisdom that was ours for millennia? I imagine that these old books contain some of this repudiated knowledge and many other ideas besides worth cultivating.
Let's just keep in mind that for many of these ancient authors, a half of the human population was by default considered lesser beings. They thought women are defective, incomplete men.
What if wisdom consists in ataraxia, though? What if it consists in simply following your inclinations and conscience, of being yourself fearlessly, and being skeptical of external so-called authorities and traditional methods as paths to wisdom and of any claims that we need to rely on such things to gain wisdom?
That would require one to be an epistemic autonomist, and to in fact be epistemically autonomous. Epistemic autonomy is not possible. Because, as you later say:
I think wisdom is, and can only be, tested by action. "By their fruits ye shall know them". I think this applies to oneself; by your fruits shall ye know yourself—"talk is cheap".
No, that's not enough, because one still needs some standards by which to assess those fruits.
If beliefs and actions appear to support thriving and happiness in oneself and others, then I would say they count as wise beliefs and actions. i don't claim this could ever be an exact science, but I think a sufficiently open-minded, observant and intelligent inquirer should be able to judge reasonably well as to what promotes peace and harmony and what promotes conflict and disharmony in both oneself and others.
Except that humans have developed such vastly different ideas of what counts as "thriving", "happiness", "peace", "harmony" that the above criteria are too general. People can thrive, be happy, live in peace and harmony while living under tyranny. People can also thrive, be happy, live in peace and harmony if they are politically correct androids.
The problem I see with relying on external "points of reference" is that you would need to already know that those points of reference were manifestations of wisdom. How could you know that unless you could see the fruits of those external points of reference and have the practical wisdom to recognize them as fruits of wisdom?
And what is more, spiritually advanced people tend to resent to be put to the test and their actions judged.
I think we must make our assessments in acknowledgement of uncertainty and the possibility of doubt as Socrates seems to be advocating.
Of course. But as Reply to Apollodorus points out repeatedely, acknowledgement of doubt and uncertainty can lead to a schizoaffective disorder.
If the Sun & Moon should doubt they'd immediately go out .
Strange, isn't it, how some people never outgrow the early naive stage of psychological development in which they anthropomorphize every thing, "seeing" intentional agents and hidden purposes every where, like toddlers in a nursery? The world is not a cradle, Freud points out; rather the world is an indifferent wilderness by turns beautiful and terrible, and yet many demand it be more secure and comforting – consoling – than it is, and via hasty generalizations and compositional fallacies they posit some "religious or idealist metaphysics" (re: ego-flattering "Providence") which, of course, collapses under rational scrutiny like blowing on a house of cards.
And yet precsiely those same people who demand the Universe to be a welcoming place for them, who demand it to be secure and comforting for them get to thrive in it. Because such people, believing they are entitled to security and comfort in this world, tame rivers, kill the infidels, and pursue science, in order to make the world a safe place for themselves. And they get it done.
Because such people, believing they are entitled to security and comfort in this world, tame rivers, kill the infidels, and pursue science, in order to make the world a safe place for themselves. And they get it done.
:up: That is a great angle. Never had thought of that.
Not only that, but even in terms of finding our own way toward the attainment of wisdom, we cannot do it in complete isolation but need at least from time to time to turn to external points of reference in order to verify that what we have found or are in the process of finding is indeed wisdom and not something else.
The problem is that those external points of reference are often hostile to us, and we have to find a way to rely on and trust people who, at the very least, don't care if we live or die.
That would require one to be an epistemic autonomist, and to in fact be epistemically autonomous. Epistemic autonomy is not possible. Because, as you later say:
I don't see why you say that. As I see it all it requires is not being concerned about the opinions of others and making up your own mind.
Except that humans have developed such vastly different ideas of what counts as "thriving", "happiness", "peace", "harmony" that the above criteria are too general. People can thrive, be happy, live in peace and harmony while living under tyranny. People can also thrive, be happy, live in peace and harmony if they are politically correct androids.
I disagree. Sure people can make the best of bad situations, but I don't believe anyone with any self-respect would choose to live under any form of tyranny. As to being politically correct androids, I don't count failing to think for yourself as an example of fulfilling your potential and hence it also doesn't count as an example of thriving in my view.
Note, I haven't said you have to agree with my view; you should have your own view which you have worked out for yourself, if you have the capacity for that at least; otherwise you will fail to reach, or even approach, your potential in my view.
I don't see why you say that. As I see it all it requires is not being concerned about the opinions of others and making up your own mind.
If one is blissfully ignorant of how one's opinions came to be (and whom one got them from), then all is well in la-la land...
This is also a reason why "ancient wisdom" isn't so popular: to acknowledge ancient wisdom would be to acknowledge that one's ideas aren't one's own, but that one got them from others. Now, that's deflating.
I disagree. Sure people can make the best of bad situations, but I don't believe anyone with any self-respect would choose to live under any form of tyranny. As to being politically correct androids, I don't count failing to think for yourself as an example of fulfilling your potential and hence it also doesn't count as an example of thriving in my view.
Oh really, and how do you know that? What criteria do you personally employ to enable you to judge whether someone is fulfilling their potential?
Note, I haven't said you have to agree with my view; you should have your own view which you have worked out for yourself, if you have the capacity for that at least; otherwise you will fail to reach, or even approach, your potential in my view.
Oh, so you know what my potential is?
Come on.
And what is more, spiritually advanced people tend to resent to be put to the test and their actions judged.
— baker
Oh really, and how do you know that? What criteria do you personally employ to enable you to judge whether someone is spiritually advanced or not?
I'm being both cynical and not. I've noticed that people who tend to describe themselves as "spiritually advanced" or who imply as much tend to resent to be put to the test and their actions judged. (Or their fans do it on their behalf.)
Personally, I'm not sure what it means to be "spiritually advanced" (if I would know that, I wouldn't be here at this forum). But my overall impression is that being spiritually advanced might very well have nothing to do with the usual lovey-dovey notions that some people promote in the name of spirituality (kindness, compassion, empathy), but something much more Darwinian. I have this impression based on the things that the supposedly spiritually advanced people do that get described as "kind, compassionate, empathetic", and those acts include killing, raping, and pillaging.
Rubbish! Chronic and crippling doubt may lead to mental disorders, but mere acknowledgement of uncertainty is just being intellectually honest.
Your arguments are not convincing; surely you can do better?
You've been operating out of some unstated premises, it's those I want you to spell out.
Of course! One of the things I've regretted in my adult life, is the paucity of my education in the classics of ancient literature and philosophy. I was always a poor student, for various reasons, but aside from that, hardly any of this material was on my curriculum. Later in life, I've come to realise just how profound the classical philosophical tradition is, even though my knowledge of it is fragmentary. In my view - which is shared with Pierre Hadot, who is a scholar of the history of philosophy - most of what passes for philosophy in today's world, has nothing to do with philosophy as understood in the classical tradition. Philosophy proper is a transformative understanding of the nature of life.
Oh, how fresh you sound! How romantic!
The upshot of being born and raised in old-fashioned Europe is that one did get a classical education. But it's also an education that kills one's interest in the Classics. (There is a cynical saying -- "The Classics are those that everybody knows and nobody reads.")
The upshot of being born and raised in old-fashioned Europe is that one did get a classical education. But it's also an education that kills one's interest in the Classics. (There is a cynical saying -- "The Classics are those that everybody knows and nobody reads.")
What do you consider a classical education and at what age?
Metaphysician UndercoverAugust 07, 2021 at 11:33#5766400 likes
I don't think that's right. What I call 'red' at the two extremes of the range some may call 'orange' or 'mauve'. That would just be personal perception and choice; I can't see what it has to do with theory.
On what basis would you say "it's red", rather than "it's orange", unless you are applying some sort of theory which enables your judgement? But I really don't know how you are proposing to define "theory". Doesn't personal choice involve theory in your understanding?
In the case of the colour chart, the fact that there is theory involved in the judgement is more obvious, because it's recorded on paper. But if you do not refer to a colour chart aren't you still referring to some sort of theory in your mind, which supports your choice? I don't think you'd say that the choice of words is random.
And yet precsiely those same people who demand the Universe to be a welcoming place for them, who demand it to be secure and comforting for them get to thrive in it. Because such people, believing they are entitled to security and comfort in this world, tame rivers, kill the infidels, and pursue science, in order to make the world a safe place for themselves. And they get it done.
The materialist/determinist metaphysics is persistent in its denial of the obvious, that intention is a cause. Aristotle produced volumes of material which explains the reality of this obvious fact, as "final cause". So this materialist/determinist perspective ought not even be called "metaphysics", because it's simply a denial of the reality of that whole realm of activity which lies beyond the grasp of physics. It's more like anti-metaphysics.
Then they'll posit "a world" which is at the same time, both beautiful and terrifying, with complete disregard for the fact that such are simply the judgements of intentional beings. So they never get to the real metaphysical questions, such as how does this world support, or provide for real intentional judgements, because they employ contradictory statements like that, to make the reality of intention disappear behind a cloud of smoke and mirrors.
This is also a reason why "ancient wisdom" isn't so popular: to acknowledge ancient wisdom would be to acknowledge that one's ideas aren't one's own, but that one got them from others. Now, that's deflating.
Actually, far from deflating, this realization may be very motivating. When one's ideas are "out of sync" with the conventional knowledge of the day (materialist/determinist), that person may become quite isolated in one's own disillusion. To find consistency in "ancient wisdom" is satisfying and encouraging.
Socrates expected to find something else in Anaxagoras because Anaxagoras says that Mind directs and causes all things. He assumes that Mind is like his mind and its cause like his. What he expected was an explanation for why it is best that things are as they are. But not only did Anaxagoras fail to provide such an explanation, Socrates himself failed. He goes on to tell of his "second sailing", his investigation by means of accounts, logoi. He posits the Forms as hypotheticals with the Good as their cause. He orders the world according to his own mind not Mind.
But as ?Apollodorus points out repeatedely, acknowledgement of doubt and uncertainty can lead to a schizoaffective disorder.
Nope, Apollodorus does not say that "acknowledgement of doubt and uncertainty can lead to schizoaffective disorder". It is not the acknowledgment but giving in to doubt and uncertainty, especially when coupled with Straussian esotericism, that can open the trapdoor leading to schizoaffective or delusional disorder. Two totally different things IMO.
The problem is that those external points of reference are often hostile to us, and we have to find a way to rely on and trust people who, at the very least, don't care if we live or die.
Sure. This is what we have intelligence, wisdom, and discernment for.
But if the first principles are provided by intuition, and intuition is not reliable, then how is it possible that we start from a higher level of certainty in our logical proceedings?
I think the distinctions Aristotle makes between the sciences makes the question different depending upon what is being sought:
Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book Kappa, 1064a, 10, translated by Hippocrates G. Apostle:"Since there is a science about nature, clearly it must be distinct from both a practical and a productive science. For the principle of motion in a productive science is in that which produces and not in that which is produced, and this is either some art or some other power. Similarly, the principle of motion in a practical science is not in the thing done but rather in the doers. But the science of the physicist is concerned with things which in themselves have a principle of motion. It is clear from what has been said that physics must be neither a practical nor a productive science, but a theoretical one, for it must come under one of these genera of sciences."
Regarding the status of the color red, the old Philosopher seems to be favoring Janus during this discussion of Protagoras' view:
Ibid, 1063a:"Moreover, it is foolish to attend alike to the opinions and imaginations of disputing parties, for clearly those on one side must be mistaken.
This is evident from what happens with respect to sensations; for the same thing never appears sweet to some people and the contrary of this to others, unless in the one case the sense organ which jjudges the the said flavors is injured or defective. In such a case, we should believe those on one side to be the measure but not those on the other. My statement applies alike to the good and the bad, the beautiful and the ugly, and all other such. For the claim of our opponents does not differ from that of those who make each thing appear two by pressing below the eye with their finger, and say that there are two things, because two things appear, and again that there is one, for each thing appears as one to those who do not press a finger."
Reply to 180 Proof
The anthropomorphic element is an important criteria to employ when comparing models of the divine.
For instance, the creator in Timaeus seems to work in a similar fashion to how we make a plan and then build "copies" of it. While Aristotle uses a lot of the cosmogony found in that dialogue, he makes clear that nobody is going out for beers with the Unmoved Mover after work.
What do you think is the relationship between models of the divine and models of the origin of the universe?
I hope the questions don't get harder to answer after attempting to meet this one. They probably will, though.
The interest in understanding this place where we are born, taken by itself, argues against seeing them as separate sets of models. The possibility that our response to what has been given to us is a dynamic relationship with the original set up develops a separation that allows for a difference to be considered.
Amongst the arguments about whether this is the best of all possible worlds, the desire to change it is always well nigh behind.
If one is blissfully ignorant of how one's opinions came to be (and whom one got them from), then all is well in la-la land...
All ideas may be "the same old stew reheated"; but so what? You choose the idea and opinions out of the suite of those culturally available to you that seem to fit best with your lived experience. We don't have to be that rare person who comes up with a completely novel idea (if there be such at all) in order to think for ourselves.
On what basis would you say "it's red", rather than "it's orange", unless you are applying some sort of theory which enables your judgement?
It's not theoretical (for me at least). I would say it's red rather rather than orange if it seems to be red rather than orange. It's just a seeming or a feeling. as associated with my felt sense of my overall experience of colour, not theoretical at all.
The interest in understanding this place where we are born, taken by itself, argues against seeing them as separate sets of models.
Doesn't that depend on one's interests? Someone who takes no interest in talk about gods will see them as separate, with scientific models being appropriate for investigation and theological models as inappropriate.
Regarding the status of the color red, the old Philosopher seems to be favoring Janus during this discussion of Protagoras' view:
The point I was making is that I think it is impossible to make any sort of measurement at all, even the most basic sense judgement, what Aristotle refers to as a "measure", in your quoted passage, without applying theory. As he says in that passage, to judge a flavour is to "measure", and what I say is that to measure requires theory.
It's not theoretical (for me at least). I would say it's red rather rather than orange if it seems to be red rather than orange. It's just a seeming or a feeling. as associated with my felt sense of my overall experience of colour, not theoretical at all.
You "feel" the difference between the meaning of two words, rather than thinking it? That's a new one on me. You call it "orange" because when you see it you get the feeling of orange from it?
I can't say that I know what orange feels like, but I think I can judge whether or not something is orange. When I make this judgement I do not refer to my feelings, I refer to my memories, so clearly my judgement is not derived from my feelings, it's derived from my mind.
You "feel" the difference between the meaning of two words, rather than thinking it? That's a new one on me. You call it "orange" because when you see it you get the feeling of orange from it?
I can't say that I know what orange feels like, but I think I can judge whether or not something is orange. When I make this judgement I do not refer to my feelings, I refer to my memories, so clearly my judgement is not derived from my feelings, it's derived from my mind.
Orange is a sensation, a feeling, just as red is. When I look at something and it feels or seems or looks orange to me I say it is orange. There is no right or wrong in this as there is no definite boundary between orange and red. If I said it was green, yellow or blue that would be a different matter. I have no idea what you are looking for beyond that.
Reply to Metaphysician Undercover
I think I understand the basis of your skepticism. What is unclear to me is how it relates to Aristotle. The guy kept arguing for a shared body of experience. Maybe he was wrong. Is there another way to understand the texts?
Metaphysician UndercoverAugust 08, 2021 at 01:52#5771490 likes
When I look at something and it feels or seems or looks orange to me I say it is orange. There is no right or wrong in this as there is no definite boundary between orange and red.
The issue is not whether there is a right or wrong to this judgement, but whether there is theory employed in this judgement. When you say "it feels or seems or looks orange to me", how do you think you can make that judgement without applying theory? Obviously your eyes are not making the judgement that "orange" is the word to use, so it's not the sense organ which judges that the thing is orange. Do we agree that it is the mind which makes this judgement? If so, then how do you think that your mind can judge the colour as orange rather than red or some other name for a colour, or even some other random word, without the use of theory? What type of principles do you think your mind might rely on in making such a judgement if they aren't theoretical principles?
Reply to Valentinus
A "shared body of experience"? What do you mean by this?
When you say "it feels or seems or looks orange to me", how do you think you can make that judgement without applying theory?
I have no theory in mind, so I am not applying a theory. I'm not claiming that it is orange or red just that it looks or seems orange or red to me. As I said it's a matter of a lifetime of impressions and associations, not theories, that have formed my association of 'orange' or 'red' or any colour word with some impressions and not with others. If you think it is a theory then explain just what the theory is and what its predictions could be.
Metaphysician UndercoverAugust 08, 2021 at 11:12#5772970 likes
If you think it is a theory then explain just what the theory is and what its predictions could be.
How could I know that theory? It's your theory which is being applied, and you refuse to tell it to me. You even refuse to acknowledge its existence. Isn't "associations" of ideas exactly what theory is? How can you say you are making associations, but the associations are not theoretical?
This reminds me of Plato's portrayal of Socrates. Socrates would ask all sorts of people (artists and craftspeople) who obviously had some sort of practical knowledge because they knew how to do things, to explain the knowledge which enabled them to do what they did. And they couldn't, just like you can't explain the knowledge which enables you to judge something as orange. You seem to think that it's just something that your senses do, you "feel" the difference between orange and red.
Consider this imaginary scenario. A very young child is learning colours. The person sees that if there is a hint of yellow in the red, it ought to be judged as orange. So the person applies this theory (you agree that this is theory?) and states "orange" accordingly, and this is accepted by others. After some time, the person no longer needs to apply the theory, as the judgement is habitualized, it becomes 'automatic'. The person then completely forgets all about that learning process, and having to apply that theory to make the decision, because this process is no longer present to the person's conscious mind. What happens to this theory? Is it not still playing an important role in the person's judgement of colour?
Reply to Fooloso4
One way to express my uncertainty about interests can be observed at the beginning of the Timaeus.
The polity of the Republic, where storytelling is closely regulated, is inserted into a story about the distant past. That seems to complicate one's relationship to the cosmogony rather than provide orientation to our present endeavors.
Aristotle explicitly objects to the confusion in that text and generally seeks to clarify the contexts in which we talk about different things. Does that difference in approach mean Plato and Aristotle are using different models of the divine?
... where storytelling is closely regulated, is inserted into a story about the distant past. That seems to complicate one's relationship to the cosmogony rather than provide orientation to our present endeavors.
Do you mean that we must take into consideration of Glaucon and the others, or those at that time who read the dialogue, who were educated through the stories of Homer and Hesiod, and how our own education is quite different? If so, then I agree. It is not so straight forward for us to read an ancient author about things that were ancient to that author. We are in that respect twice removed.
Does that difference in approach mean Plato and Aristotle are using different models of the divine?
Different from each other or different from us? Since the problem of a purposive universe was raised and the claim by @Wayfarer that something along the way was lost, we need to consider whether in what way what was said to be lost was even present, but also whether our understanding of the universe should include models of the divine, what that means, and what they are.
Reply to Fooloso4
I was referring to when Critias related the story of what an Egyptian priest told Solon about ancient Athenians:
Plato, 26d, translated by Benjamin Jowett:"The city and citizens, which you yesterday described to us in fiction, we will now transfer to the world of reality. It shall be the ancient city of Athens, and we will suppose that the citizens whom you imagined were our veritable ancestors of whom the priest spoke; they will perfectly harmonize and there will be no inconsistency in saying that the citizens of your republic are these ancient Athenians"
What is one to make of the "fiction that becomes a fact" immediately before a creation story is told? This is especially peculiar when the "fiction" involved questions the value of fictions. Yes, we are twice removed from the conversation.
I meant to ask if Plato and Aristotle are using the same model despite taking such different approaches. Aristotle takes the cosmogony and edits it so that it can become an argument. Plato works many different arguments that are not integrated into a system in that way. Plato often makes reference to the "fabulous" to draw out a quality he is in accord with or opposes. Since the two thinkers cannot be compared directly as competing models, what would using the same or different model of the divine look like in their case?
I figure I am asking Wayfarer's question from a different starting point. We have developed a language for what is "theological" or not. We have certainly changed our world view over the centuries. If we have lost something then it is going to be difficult to express. Otherwise, it is not lost at all.
I was referring to when Critias related the story of what an Egyptian priest told Solon about ancient Athenians
This is interesting in several respects that I won't go into. I will only mention the idea of the old and venerable. We tend to put more value in what is new as more advanced. Plato acknowledges the old but is himself an innovator. The story of the ancient Athenians stands in contrast to Socrates' city in speech. It is significant that in retelling the story of the Republic Socrates neglects to mention the philosopher-king, without whom the city would not harmonious with itself let alone in perfect harmony with the ancient city.
What is one to make of the "fiction that becomes a fact" immediately before a creation story is told?
It becomes fact only if we accept Critias' story to be true. It seems to be fiction in the guise of fact. To pose the question another way: what is the role of poetry in philosophy?
I meant to ask if Plato and Aristotle are using the same model despite taking such different approaches. Aristotle takes the cosmogony and edits it so that it can become an argument.
The Timaeus is strange for a Platonic dialogue. It is almost a monologue, and Socrates uncharacteristically says very little. He does, however, remind Timaeus to call upon the gods in accordance with custom. (27b) This raises the problem of theology, to what extent talk of gods is a matter of custom, of nomos rather than logos.
The person sees that if there is a hint of yellow in the red, it ought to be judged as orange. So the person applies this theory (you agree that this is theory?)
No I don't agree it is a theory; it is a name for a perceptible difference, a distinction.
Theories are imagined purportedly plausible explanations for observed phenomena. They come with predictions as to what would be observed if they were correct. If you think it is a theory then I think you have an eccentric notion of what the word means.
Metaphysician UndercoverAugust 10, 2021 at 01:41#5780810 likes
No I don't agree it is a theory; it is a name for a perceptible difference, a distinction.
There's no name for the perceptible difference. One thing is an orange colour, and another thing is a red colour. What would be the name of the difference between them? There is no name for the difference between them, only an explanation for the observed phenomena, one has yellow in it, the other does not. Seems to me like such differences, or distinctions, are not named, they are described by exactly what you say theories are, "plausible explanations for observed phenomena".
Since the problem of a purposive universe was raised and the claim by Wayfarer that something along the way was lost, we need to consider whether in what way what was said to be lost was even present, but also whether our understanding of the universe should include models of the divine, what that means, and what they are.
Consider the famous essay by Bertrand Russell at the dawn of the 20th Century:
[quote=Bertrand Russell, A Free Man's Worship]That man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labors of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of Man’s achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins–all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand. Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul’s habitation henceforth be safely built.[/quote]
This became the theme of an enormous range of literature, drama, art and philosophy in the 20th century. One book worth mentioning is Max Horkheimer's 'Eclipse of Reason', written immediately after WWII. The main theme of this book is that in classical philosophy and culture, reason is assumed to be objective, in the sense of underlying the cosmos. The role of philosophy (and science) was naturally assumed to be discerning this reason and acting in accordance with it. 'Since it is objective and not bound to a particular subject, the rationality of correct ends is the rationality of the whole world or universe, it’s proper ordering or harmony. Humanity’s understanding of it is not a technical accomplishment so much an achievement of revelation or wisdom achieved.' [sup]1[/sup]
However, he says, the ascendancy of instrumental reason, the reason of means and ends, and specifically its formalization and application to science and technology, have undermined the objectivity of reason by exposing its mythological origins. While we have countless traditions still based in old ideologies that give us shared values and norms simply out of habit, they have been exposed as superstition because of their connection with mythological creation narratives (as Neitszche diagnosed in Twilight of the Gods and other works). And so while the human ability to engineer outcomes has been vastly amplified, our ability to pursue goals with intellectual integrity has collapsed, due to the perceived meaninglessness of the Universe. This is a crisis - perhaps another facet of that described in Edward Husserl's 'Crisis of the European Sciences'.
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1. 'Plato was clearly concerned not only with the state of his soul, but also with his relation to the universe at the deepest level. Plato’s metaphysics was not intended to produce merely a detached understanding of reality. His motivation in philosophy was in part to achieve a kind of understanding that would connect him (and therefore every human being) to the whole of reality – intelligibly and if possible satisfyingly.' - Thomas Nagel, Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament.
There's no name for the perceptible difference. One thing is an orange colour, and another thing is a red colour.
There is no single word for the perceptual difference. But the term for the difference would be "the difference between red and orange". The fact that there are two colour names 'red' and 'orange' entails that there are two different colours, red and orange, If there are different colours then there is a difference between the colours. Of course red and orange are not each one determinate colour; there is a continuum shading between them; a range that goes from almost mauve or purple to almost yellow. There is nothing controversial or puzzling about any of this.
Reply to Wayfarer I recall what a shock it was back in the day when I was still an engineering undergrad to read Horkheimer (and Adorno ... re: The Frankfurt School) about 'instrumental reason', 'calculable rationality', 'the culture industry', etc. It wasn't until I'd studied Spinoza years later, however, that I understood that 'the myth of reason' Horkheimer & co were peddling was based on their misunderstanding of reason as ever having been 'autonomous', or unalloyed, without the admixture of "objective", "subjective" & "instrumental" tendencies or limitations (re: Spinoza's 'three kinds of knowledge'). A quasi-Marxist, Hegelian-psychoanalytic interpretation of culture and political economy itself still seems to me too futilistic because it concludes what it mistakenly assumes, namely that (western civ) has "fallen" losing something it once had (which, of course, it never had), and thereby can / has lead nowhere but into a cul de sac of "pure reason" nostalgia.
Russell's essay more or less says as much; the question for his time like ours is 'whether or not we can muster the collective courage to go on without lying to ourselves about ourselves with mythic / religious / idealistic-ideological denials' (E. Becker, R. Brassier). Horkheimer & co say no, we can't, it's too late for this mass consumerist civilization. Same as Heidegger. Same as other faux-Cassandras like Žižek. And woo-fundies of every apocalyptic persuasion and sect too. What could be more decadent, or futile, than ritually reenacting 'the fall from imaginary grace' (i.e. philosophical suicide) like a bunch of latter-day (cyber)Gnostics?
If there are different colours then there is a difference between the colours.
Right, but that's a logical inference, that there is a difference between them. It's not something sensed. If we simply sense that one colour is different from another colour, there is no necessity to proceed logically to the conclusion that there is a difference between them. But when we label them as "red" and "orange", there is a desire to use the words correctly and the need to determine the difference between them arises from this desire. It is from this desire, that the inference "there is a difference between them" is derived.
Notice that the logical conclusion requires the unstated premise, of a correspondence between what you sense, a difference of colour, and the reality that there actually is such a a difference. This constitutes the assumed truth of "there are different colours". The assumed truth of the proposition, "there are different colours", relies on an assumed correspondence between sense and reality, so the conclusion ":there is a difference between the colours", is dependent on that assumed correspondence. The skeptic doubts this correspondence, and is not lead to that conclusion. The determination, and designation of "different colours" might be completely arbitrary. Therefore a justifiable theory is required to account for "the difference between the colours", in order to prove the truth of "there are different colours".
Of course red and orange are not each one determinate colour; there is a continuum shading between them; a range that goes from almost mauve or purple to almost yellow. There is nothing controversial or puzzling about any of this.
This is just theory though, which you appear to be presenting to justify your claim "there are different colours". I will warn you that this principle, a "continuum" fails in any attempt at such a justification. It implies that there is an infinite number of differences between any two colours. To justify real "different colours" requires discrete differences without the necessity of assuming another colour which lies in between, as this results in infinite regress of different colours between any two colours. The infinite regress negates the original purpose and requirement of correspondence with reality. Aristotle demonstrated this problem in his bid to combat sophism.
Something genuinely was lost, and it’s very hard to discern what.
I think what was lost is the premodern worldview that emerged through millennia of human thought and experience, a worldview that was more in tune with both man and the cosmos, that enabled humans to create great art and architecture, and inspired them to great thoughts and actions. The spirit that gave birth to great civilizations and moved our ancestors to conceive of and aspire to higher realities and ideals. We have lost touch with the Form of greatness and for this reason we need the ancient authors to remind us of and guide us to the lost heritage that is waiting to be rediscovered and that, when found, will make us whole again, that is, both human and divine.
Notice that the logical conclusion requires the unstated premise, of a correspondence between what you sense, a difference of colour, and the reality that there actually is such a a difference.
This is just theory though, which you appear to be presenting to justify your claim "there are different colours". I will warn you that this principle, a "continuum" fails in any attempt at such a justification. It implies that there is an infinite number of differences between any two colours.
I used the word continuum to refer to the fact that there are many many gradations between red and orange, not a clear boundary, I haven't said the gradations are infinite.
That’s where we differ. Something genuinely was lost, and it’s very hard to discern what.
I don't think it's that hard to discern; I'd say it's a sense of profound mystery, awe and the reverence that goes with that is what has been lost. It lives on in (some) philosophy, arts, music and poetry and in (some) religious and spiritual practices. Some scientists also seem to be alive to that sense of mystery, awe and reverence.
You can have that sense without needing to draw any conclusions about the nature of reality. That's really the point; the sense of mystery and reverence do not warrant any such conclusions and become banal when they are applied.
I think the greatest need is to learn to live with uncertainty. But the modern sensibility characteristically feels entitled to answers, and to the assumption that it knows all the answers. That sense of entitlement and smug self-assurance is what has been gained to our detriment in my view.
Metaphysician UndercoverAugust 11, 2021 at 01:32#5784610 likes
I'm only talking about what we see not some purported reality beyond that.
But we don't see with our eyes, the difference between red and orange, that's the point. We see red things and we see orange things, and since we perceive them as not having the same colour, i.e. we see them as different, we infer that there is a difference between them. That you see them as different does not imply that you see the difference between them. Do you grasp the difference between these two, seeing two things as different, and apprehending the difference between them? The latter is a matter of understanding theory.
I used the word continuum to refer to the fact that there are many many gradations between red and orange, not a clear boundary, I haven't said the gradations are infinite.
That's just your theory, and as I explained, it's not a very plausible one. In the classic spectrum, orange is beside red. There are different shades of red, and different shades of orange, and people may disagree as to whether certain shades are properly called "orange", or "red", but there are no other colours between red and orange. If your theory explains the difference between two colours as a matter of there being a third colour between the two, you will have an infinite regress of colours, and the necessary conclusion of an infinity of colours between any two different colours. Between colour A and colour B is another colour, C. But between A and C there must be another colour D, Then between A and D there is another colour, ad infinitum. And the same between C and B, and all of the other colours required as the difference between two colours. It's a completely unrealistic theory as to what constitutes the difference between two colours.
If your theory explains the difference between two colours as a matter of there being a third colour between the two, you will have an infinite regress of colours, and the necessary conclusion of an infinity of colours between any two different colours.
The theory would be that humans cab see different colours on account of differing wavelengths of light (and also possess the requisite visual capabilities, obviously). But I don't need that theory in order to see different colours, obviously; I don't need any theory at all to do that. Animals can do it too, to varying degrees and in different ways.
Humans can differentiate millions of different colours. Computer monitors purportedly can generate over a billion. I haven't said anything about the difference between two colours being on account of a third colour between them. The difference between two colours is on account of the fact that we can distinguish between them. If there are more colours that may be generated by a computer than humans can differentiate, it follows that there are different colours that humans are unable to see any difference between.
Reply to Janus For sure, these last centuries our social practices are arranged around and directed by perceiving nature and thereby society (ourselves) far more algorithmically (re: causal relations) than heuristically (re: correlative relations), through (in)numeracy instead of (il)literacy, which is almost the mirror image (photo negative) of the centuries and millennia of parochial or folk 'worldviews' preceding the advent of mathematized natural science and mechanically precise time-keeping. Premodernity, if you will, was based on perceiving 'the world' far more heuristically via narrative (orature broadly, literature narrowly) than algorithmically and therefore with greater ambiguity-tolerances (i.e. allegories, metaphors, signs (omens/miracles)) for filling in – reducing anxiety of – the gaps in (parochial) understanding of their daily lives and 'world' within which they lived and died. With modernity, acceleration has supplanted (and increasingly risks obliterating) the agrarian, even seasonal, cycles which have constituted the human condition for at least a hundred millennia.
So is that a great, or profound, epochal "loss"? Is the infancy, or even childhood, of our species, especially traumatized to the extreme (re: sanguinary histories), "lost" by recently becoming a barely adult species (maturing, or wisening-up, much too slowly for our own good) which completely debilitates h. sapiens' further cultural and social development? Is it all downhill metaphysically (or spiritually) once we've entered puberty and our "eyes opened, and saw that we were naked"? And that striving to think for ourselves (i.e. learning to take smarter risks despite uncertainty aka "black swans") rather than submit to being told by invisible "mysteries" & "revelations" what to think and believe is a(nother) "fall from grace"?
Metaphysician UndercoverAugust 11, 2021 at 10:58#5785650 likes
If we see them as different then from the point of view of seeing there just is a difference, otherwise how could it be that we see them as different?
We can't take that for granted, that's the point of skepticism. Things are not necessarily as you perceive them. So the conclusion "they are different" is not validly derived from "I see them as different".
The theory would be that humans cab see different colours on account of differing wavelengths of light (and also possess the requisite visual capabilities, obviously). But I don't need that theory in order to see different colours, obviously; I don't need any theory at all to do that. Animals can do it too, to varying degrees and in different ways.
We were not talking about simply seeing them as different. We were talking about labeling them as "orange" and "red", and this is what I said requires theory.. You seem to be either attempting to deny that there is a difference between seeing things as different, and being able to identify the specifics of that difference, or else you are just not grasping that there is such a difference. So whenever I say something about the latter, identifying the specifics concerning the difference between what is called "orange" and what is called "red", you attempt to reduce this to a general capacity of seeing that there is a difference. But seeing that there is a difference could apply to any different colours, and what we are talking about is specifically the difference between orange and red, not the general capacity of seeing that two things have different colours.
The difference between two colours is on account of the fact that we can distinguish between them.
This is the faulty principle which falls to skepticism. You claimed, :I'm only talking about what we see not some purported reality beyond that", yet you claim that there is a real difference on account of the fact that you see a difference. Until we thoroughly understand the means by which colours are sensed, and discount as impossible that one could be deceived in sensation, this conclusion is not valid.
We can't take that for granted, that's the point of skepticism. Things are not necessarily as you perceive them. So the conclusion "they are different" is not validly derived from "I see them as different".
You're not paying attention. I already said I am not making any claim beyond what is the case in the context of seeing colours. IF we see different colours we see colours as different from one another, from which it logically follows that there are differences between colours, as seen.
So is that a great, or profound, epochal "loss"? Is the infancy, or even childhood, of our species, especially traumatized to the extreme (re: sanguinary histories), "lost" by recently becoming a barely adult species (maturing, or wisening-up, much too slowly for our own good) which completely debilitates h. sapiens' further cultural and social development? Is it all downhill metaphysically (or spiritually) once we've entered puberty and our "eyes opened, and saw that we were naked"? And that striving to think for ourselves (i.e. learning to take smarter risks despite uncertainty aka "black swans") rather than submit to being told by invisible "mysteries" & "revelations" what to think and believe is a(nother) "fall from grace"?
I don't know if it is a general loss. I don't know to what degree the average person in ancient and medieval times was suffused with feelings of the magic, the poetry and mystery of existence. I don't much favour analogies between the development of humanity as a whole and individuals: Babyhood, childhood, adolescence, adulthood as applied to general human development; I think they are somewhat facile.
As I said I don't think those experiences of magic, poetry and mystery are reliant on any particular worldviews, at least I don't believe they are for those whose thinking is sufficiently subtle. As for the so-called "common man", I really don't know if anything has been lost for them.
Metaphysician UndercoverAugust 12, 2021 at 00:09#5787840 likes
You're not paying attention. I already said I am not making any claim beyond what is the case in the context of seeing colours. IF we see different colours we see colours as different from one another, from which it logically follows that there are differences between colours, as seen.
Then you've changed the subject. We were discussing how one would distinguish red from orange, not simply how one would see that one thing's colour is different from another thing's colour. The former, distinguishing red from orange, is what I argued requires theory.
Then you've changed the subject. We were discussing how one would distinguish red from orange, not simply how one would see that one thing's colour is different from another thing's colour. The former, distinguishing red from orange, is what I argued requires theory.
We distinguish red from orange by seeing one thing as red and the other orange; which just means that we associate the term 'red' with one and 'orange' with the other. There is no theory involved; it is just seeing and acquired association; and the latter is just habit, if you like. I am at a loss to know what it is that is confusing you about this, so I am afraid I can't be of further help.
Metaphysician UndercoverAugust 12, 2021 at 01:02#5787970 likes
I am at a loss to know what it is that is confusing you about this, so I am afraid I can't be of further help.
It's not that I'm confused, not at all. I just find it a very poor explanation, and therefore unacceptable. If you said "that thing is red, and this thing is orange", and I asked you why you say so, and you said because I associate the term "red" with the colour of that thing, and the term "orange" with the colour of this thing, I'd say that's a very poor explanation. In fact, I'd reject it as most likely false. It's the answer of a lazy person who does not want to take the time and introspection required to determine the real reason why the one was designated as red and the other as orange.
The thing about habits is that they must get formed, created. They cannot be taken as granted. So when asked, why do you do things in that particular way instead of another way, the explanation is not "because it's my habit". The true explanation is the process which formed the habit. And, it is the person who is avoiding the question due to intellectual laziness, or some other infliction, who simply says "because it's my habit".
If you said "that thing is red, and this thing is orange", and I asked you why you say so, and you said because I associate the term "red" with the colour of that thing, and the term "orange" with the colour of this thing, I'd say that's a very poor explanation. In fact, I'd reject it as most likely false.
Do you deny that some animals see different colours? What explanation could there be for seeing different colours other than that there are different colours? I would see different colours regardless of what I called them; or are you denying that? So what does it matter if you call two colours red and I call one red and one orange?
What could explain that difference between us other than I associate a different name to one of the colours than you do or else you see one as being more red than I do due to your inferior capacity to distinguish differences among colours? I'm telling you the truth as I see it: reject it if you like. I don't care. This "conversation" has already been a complete waste of time.
Metaphysician UndercoverAugust 12, 2021 at 01:53#5788050 likes
Do you deny that some animals see different colours? What explanation could there be for seeing different colours other than that there are different colours? I would see different colours regardless of what I called them; or are you denying that? So what does it matter if you call two colours red and I call one red and one orange?
You seem to be missing the point altogether. A person might see two completely different shades of red, hence different colours, yet call them both "red". Likewise with orange. And, the same thing which I might say on one day is "red", I might say if instead I encountered it on another day, under different conditions, is "orange".
The issue is not a matter of seeing differences of colour, it's a matter of seeing instances of different colours, and calling the different colours by the same name, "red". In this case we are saying that two different colours, which we clearly perceive as different, are the same colour, red.
This is why I say there must be theory involved. It is not a matter of always seeing the very same colour, and calling it by the very same name, "red". It is a matter of seeing a very wide range of different colours, and calling them all the same, "red". The capacity to categorize a particular instance of colour, under the classification of "red", cannot be a matter of habit, because one can see a completely new shade of red, never before encountered by that person, and have no problem categorizing it as red. How could one be employing habit in the completely new activity consisting of categorizing a colour never before encountered?
Reply to Metaphysician Undercover So what if I might call some colour red one day orange on another? All that indicates is that on the borderline cases there is no clear boundary, or the lighting conditions might be different. I might even say that it's kind of reddish orange. naming in this case is by no means precise, but that imprecision does nothing to cast the habitual association of colour names into doubt.
I don't see anything of significance that you are trying to get at here.
Premodernity, if you will, was based on perceiving 'the world' far more heuristically via narrative (orature broadly, literature narrowly) than algorithmically and therefore with greater ambiguity-tolerances (i.e. allegories, metaphors, signs (omens/miracles)) for filling in – reducing anxiety of – the gaps in (parochial) understanding of their daily lives and 'world' within which they lived and died. With modernity, acceleration has supplanted (and increasingly risks obliterating) the agrarian, even seasonal, cycles which have constituted the human condition for at least a hundred millennia.
You've explained your belief that 'all religions are false', but I don't share it. Sure, religions are a mixture of history, myth, superstition and many other things, but there is a vast range of documentation, based on witness testimony, describing various super-normal and paranormal abilities and powers that yogis and ascetics obtain. And there are also many instances of individuals with gifts in such areas with no discernable training or other kinds of ability. Of course, most of these instances will never be subject to 'peer reviewed science' or reproduced to the satisfaction of so-called empirical science, and frankly, attempts to validate such claims through paranormal psychology and the like seem pretty gauche as far as I'm concerned.
But all cultures, all religions, in all periods of history, have various terms for 'higher knowledge'. Liberation, as articulated in the Indian traditions, is a reality, notwithstanding the fact that Western materialistic science has not the least conception of what it is.
Just want to amplify one more point about the above. It is in relation to concepts, and how concepts relate to religious or spiritual discernment or understanding.
In a broad sense, a concept is something that needs to be expressible in thought and language and that correlates with something observable or intelligible. In the Western tradition, as Russell points out in HWP, Pythagoras plays an important role, as (arguably) the first philosopher, but also a scientist and a religious seer. It was his recognition of the importance of number and ratio which gave Western philosophy its uniquely mathematical bent, and which differentiated it from the mysticism of the Orient (from the chapter on Pythagoras).
As the Greek tradition evolved, there was enormous emphasis on epistemology, the nature of reason, the role of geometry and mathematics, the ideas of form and substance - and so on. None of that is news. And I am not slighting it in the least, I'm of the view that this is why the 'scientific revolution' occured in Europe, and not in China, which, recall, at the time of the ancient Greek was arguably considerably more advanced in many of the arts and sciences than were the Western cultures of the day.
So where I'm going with this, is that the role of conceptual reasoning and mathematics is what gave rise to truly modern science, through the synthesis of Galileo, Newton, Descartes, Bacon and the other seminal thinkers of modernity. Again, a mighty and world-altering achievement, and not seeking to cast any aspersion on that.
But, when it comes to understanding what is called in comparative religion 'the sapiential tradition' - the traditions embodied in the metaphysical and spiritual lore of the various cultures - you're often NOT dealing with the kinds of insights that can be encoded on that conceptual-mathematical language (even though, again in the Western tradition, there is some resonance between them, as you see, for example, in Einstein's more mystical musings.) But the point I'm trying to make is that this is why, for example, you cannot properly speak of 'the concept of Nirv??a.' Because it is emphatically not a concept, and cannot be navigated, understood, comprehended, by conceptual means.
Of course, at this point the near-universal conclusion is, 'ah, then you're talking about faith, believing something with no evidence'. In my case, emphatically not. I recognise the role of faith (and not only in the religious context) but am also of the view that religious traditions encode forms of understanding that are not simply a matter of believing or doing as you're told, but are also not amenable to quantitative analysis. In other words, they are (or can be) a kind of knowing - something learned by doing, as part of a community of discourse, and as part of a narrative history. Karen Armstrong, who's a scholar of religion, not a religous apologist, said in respect of religious myth:
[quote=Karen Armstrong, Metaphysical Mistake; https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/jul/12/religion-christianity-belief-science]Stories of heroes descending to the underworld were not regarded as primarily factual but taught people how to negotiate the obscure regions of the psyche [sup]1[/sup]. In the same way, the purpose of a creation myth was therapeutic[sup]2[/sup]; before the modern period no sensible person ever thought it gave an accurate account of the origins of life. A cosmology was recited at times of crisis or sickness, when people needed a symbolic influx of the creative energy that had brought something out of nothing. Thus the Genesis myth, a gentle polemic against Babylonian religion, was balm to the bruised spirits of the Israelites who had been defeated and deported by the armies of Nebuchadnezzar during the sixth century BCE. Nobody was required to "believe" it; like most peoples, the Israelites had a number of other mutually-exclusive creation stories and as late as the 16th century, Jews thought nothing of making up a new creation myth that bore no relation to Genesis but spoke more directly to their tragic circumstances at that time.
Above all, myth was a programme of action. When a mythical narrative was symbolically re-enacted, it brought to light within the practitioner something "true" about human life and the way our humanity worked, even if its insights, like those of art, could not be proven rationally. If you did not act upon it, it would remain as incomprehensible and abstract – like the rules of a board game, which seem impossibly convoluted, dull and meaningless until you start to play.
Religious truth is, therefore, a species of practical knowledge. Like swimming, we cannot learn it in the abstract; we have to plunge into the pool and acquire the knack by dedicated practice. Religious doctrines are a product of ritual and ethical observance, and make no sense unless they are accompanied by such spiritual exercises as yoga, prayer, liturgy and a consistently compassionate lifestyle. Skilled practice in these disciplines can lead to intimations of the transcendence we call God, Nirv??a, Brahman or Dao. Without such dedicated practice, these concepts remain incoherent, incredible and even absurd.[/quote]
Of course in our techo-centric post-industrial culture, many of these ideas do indeed seem 'incoherent, incredible, and even absurd'. But the problem might be just as much with the reciever.
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1. Which would not be news to anyone familiar with Carl Jung
Reply to Wayfarer :chin: Thus, the ancient, as well as Indigeous peoples', prohibitions against making graven images: oral traditions, which had enacted ritual practices, when written down as "scriptures" became (conceptual, symbolic) idols ... dogmas ... absurdities (i.e. saying what can only be shown or practiced).
Reply to Wayfarer My point in the context of this discussion is that what we have "lost" is living human-scale lives (via correlation-based heuristics) of pre-modernity – and not merely "all religion is false"; on the other hand, modernity consists in living at more-than-human-scales (via causality-based algorithmics) which, for better or worse, is more deliberately risk-tolerant. I see pre-modernity having unevenly become modernity as a (Promethean) transformation-in-progress rather than as a (fatalistic) nostalgia-inducing "decline" (pace Spengler) or "Fall" (pace Augustine). I speculate further: perhaps something else 'other-than-humanity' is struggling chrysalis-like to be 'born' ...
Thus, the ancient, as well as Indigeous peoples', prohibitions against making graven images: oral traditions, which had enacted ritual practices, when written down as "scriptures" became (conceptual, symbolic) idols ... dogmas ... absurdities (i.e. saying what can only be shown or practiced).
:ok: There's a philosopher of religion, Mark Johnston, about whom see this review. He says most of what is taken as religion is idolatory. I do see his point, but I'm also mindful of the fact that religions have to appeal to the full spectrum of humanity. There's not enough awareness of the Buddhist principle of 'the raft' - something to be 'used for crossing the river' but 'not to be clung to'. That is one of the most odious absences from Western religions (which is not to say Buddhism doesn't have idolatory of its own.)
I speculate further: perhaps something else 'other-than-humanity' is struggling chrysalis-like to be 'born' ..
Well, here's where I think a philosophical framework is badly needed, and mostly absent. Again with reference to Eastern religions, I think they have a kind of naturalistic attitude, i.e. that liberation is in some sense the culmination of, or the transcendence of, the process of evolution, so in that sense has a cosmic significance. But unlike with the Christian dogma, this is not a linear and historical process, beginning at some fixed point and culminating in some fixed event at some particular point in history, but something that arises within the endless cycle of birth-and-death (bearing in mind that even so, its occurrence remains extremely rare.)
The problem is, Christianity nailed its colors to the mast with its linear and historical view. It's one of the reasons (in hindsight the main reason), I left it (although many would say it was because I was too indolent to follow its demands.)
So, with in respect of your point, and this is something I'm sure you would find in Spinoza also, the human is a way in which the Universe comes to realise its own nature. (Mindful of the fact that you won't want to acknowledge anything specifically pietistic about that.)
incidentally you might find this article of interest.
this is why, for example, you cannot properly speak of 'the concept of Nirv??a.' Because it is emphatically not a concept, and cannot be navigated, understood, comprehended, by conceptual means.
Correct. Even Plato’s descriptions of the “tripartite soul” or Forms are often hopelessly misinterpreted because some readers fail to understand that the descriptions in question refer to realities that are ultimately indescribable, and that language merely serves as a pointer in the direction the mind must take in order to arrive at the reality described.
As Socrates puts it in the Phaedrus:
Concerning the immortality of the soul this is enough; but about its form we must speak in the following manner. To tell what it really is would be a matter for utterly superhuman and long discourse, but it is within human power to describe it briefly in a figure (246a)
The problem tends to be compounded by some readers’ attempt to interpret Plato through Aristotle who erroneously interprets Plato’s Forms, for example, through his own categories. Thus “scholars” conclude that Plato’s statements are “ambiguous”, “unclear”, “contradictory” or “confused”.
As observed by Francisco Gonzales and others:
It is no surprise that Plato should prove “confused” when interpreted through Aristotle […] As something beyond either a universal property or a paradigm instance, though bearing characteristics of both, the form cannot be expressed in language, with the result that Plato must shift back and forth between treating it as a universal and treating it as an instance. Scholars who attempt to show that Plato is confused and mistaken, “do not understand,” in the words of the Seventh Letter, “that it is not the soul of the speaker or the writer that is being refuted, but the defective nature of each of the four [means of attaining knowledge]
- F. J. Gonzales, “Plato’s Dialectic of Forms”.
And then there are the committed anti-Platonists who deliberately use Aristotle to demonstrate the “inconsistency” and “incoherence” of a “Theory of Forms” that they choose to attribute to Plato but that simply does not exist in the dialogues in the form they claim it does ....
Reply to Apollodorus
I cannot tell who you are shadow boxing with.
Gonzales saying: "the form cannot be expressed in language" does not appear to support Socrates' effort to distinguish the dialectic from mere argument:
Plato, Republic 454a, translated by Joe Sachs:[454A] “Oh Glaucon,” I said, “what a noble power the debater’s art has.” “Why in particular?” “Because many people even seem to me to fall into it unwillingly,” I said, “and imagine they’re not being contentious but having a conversation, because they’re not able to examine something that’s being said by making distinctions according to forms, but pounce on the contradiction in what’s been said according to a mere word, subjecting one another to contention and not conversation.”
“That is exactly the experience of many people,” he said, “but that surely doesn’t apply to us in the present circumstance, does it?” [454B] “It does absolutely,” I said. “At any rate, we’re running the risk of engaging in debate unintentionally.”
Gonzales also appears to be no friend of Plotinus who links the generation of creatures to contemplation through forms:
Plotinus, Ennead III, viii, translated by Joseph Katz:
Generation is a contemplation. It results from the longing of pregnancy to produce a multiplicity of forms and objects of contemplation. Begetting means to produce some form; and this means to spread contemplation everywhere. All the faults met with in the begotten things or in actions are due to the fact that one did stray from the object of one's contemplation. The poor workman resembles the producer of bad forms. Also lovers must be counted as those who contemplate and pursue forms.
Gonzales saying: "the form cannot be expressed in language" does not appear to support Socrates' effort to distinguish the dialectic from mere argument
I think what Gonzales says with regard to Forms and Aristotle’s interpretation of them is quite clear. And if Socrates says that it would be a matter for utterly superhuman and long discourse to tell what the form of the soul is, and he describes it only by comparing it with a charioteer and winged horses then, presumably, the Forms are even more difficult to describe. Moreover, the point is that the Forms are to be “seen” or “grasped with the eye of the soul”. Language can at the most stimulate the soul’s recollection of the Forms.
I think that what you are getting at in the first part is two-fold. One, do not make the all to common mistake of thinking that argument and philosophy are the same. Second, and this becomes clear when considering the passage from the Phaedrus where Socrates admits he cannot give an account of what the soul really is. Socrates regarded the inability to give an account as an indication that one lacks knowledge, as can be seen for example when he interrogates the poets in the Apology. His main contention with the poets in several of the dialogues is their inability to distinguish a likeness from what it is a likeness of. Any yet here in the Phaedo, instead of saying what the soul is, he presents a likeness. How are we to know that it is a true likeness without knowledge of the thing itself? We are left with a dispute of words.
If what is being talked about is indescribable then the only sensible thing to do is to remain silent. Ironically, those who proclaim indescribable truths are those who have the most to say, although they do become silent when asked how they know about such things as the immortality of the soul and Forms, thinks that cannot be said but only seen. The contradict themselves by retreating and quoting things that are said.
Socrates himself prior to admitting that he cannot give an account of the soul presents an argument for the immortality of the soul:
First, then, we must learn the truth about the soul divine and human by observing how it acts and is acted upon. And the beginning of our proof is as follows: Every soul is immortal.(245c)
.
He cannot say what the soul is but argues that the truth is it is immortal. It is a physical argument based on motion. He goes on to say that a living being, compounded of soul and body is mortal. (246c) We are mortal beings. Some may believe stories about things we have no knowledge of, but they are for us images that we cannot measure against a purported reality. Where Plato points to the limits of our knowledge some mistakenly think he is pointing beyond them.
The problem tends to be compounded by some readers’ attempt to interpret Plato through Aristotle who erroneously interprets Plato’s Forms, for example, through his own categories. Thus “scholars” conclude that Plato’s statements are “ambiguous”, “unclear”, “contradictory” or “confused”.
And then there are the committed anti-Platonists who deliberately use Aristotle to demonstrate the “inconsistency” and “incoherence” of a “Theory of Forms” that they choose to attribute to Plato but that simply does not exist in the dialogues in the form they claim it does ....
I think what Gonzales says with regard to Forms and Aristotle’s interpretation of them is quite clear.
I am not having trouble understanding the statement. I don't know who he is boxing with either so I am not in a position to evaluate his argument in the context it was given. But the problem of describing the forms as they really are is one thing. Having that be the reason "that Plato must shift back and forth between treating Forms "as a universal and treating it as an instance" is another. I brought up examples that do not fit with the idea of keeping the two activities in separate places.
Perhaps you can present his argument with more definition.
You choose the idea and opinions out of the suite of those culturally available to you that seem to fit best with your lived experience.
What a strange idea of "thinking for yourself".
I think "thinking for yourself" is about epistemic autonomy, ie. being autonomous in how one knows/believes one knows things. Like I said already, it's epistemic autonomy that is questionable.
Relative novelty of one's ideas isn't the measure of "thinking for yourself" (although this is how it is often understood in popular discourse).
Nope, Apollodorus does not say that "acknowledgement of doubt and uncertainty can lead to schizoaffective disorder". It is not the acknowledgment but giving in to doubt and uncertainty, especially when coupled with Straussian esotericism, that can open the trapdoor leading to schizoaffective or delusional disorder. Two totally different things IMO.
Thank you for the correction.
The problem is that those external points of reference are often hostile to us, and we have to find a way to rely on and trust people who, at the very least, don't care if we live or die.
— baker
Sure. This is what we have intelligence, wisdom, and discernment for.
That's just it: In order to become religious/spiritual, one has to kick one's intelligence, wisdom, and discernment to the curb, on account that they are inferior, not suitable for religion/spirituality.
What do you consider a classical education and at what age?
A thorough awareness of European cultural history from primary education on and upwards.
Literature used to be taught in a temporal linear manner starting with the ancient Greeks. By college, one is supposed to understand various references to Homer, Ovidius, etc. Also, being at least fluent in Latin and some Greek.
This is made easier when one lives in a place where it takes a short drive and one arrives at an ancient archeological site. I myself live in a town where I have a 5' drive to the remains of an ancient Roman settlement. The locals perform dress-ups and do reenactments of ancient living. Granted, this now is more of a tourist attraction aimed at making money; still, it's built on a tradition of knowing things about the past that took place on this territory.
Perhaps you can present his argument with more definition.
My post was in response to @Wayfarer's comment regarding Nirvana not being "navigated, understood, comprehended, by conceptual means."
The same is true of metaphysical realities such as Plato's Forms referred to by Gonzales:
It is precisely because a form is neither a subject nor a predicate that we cannot speak of it as simply one or the other but must, if we are to speak at all, treat it as both. it is thus our very language that leads us to regard beauty both as a property and as something that has this property. Many scholars see Plato as not always, or even ever, clearly distinguishing between being a property and having a property
In other words, language has obvious limitations when it comes to metaphysical realities that are supposed to be experienced, not talked about. This is why Socrates emphasizes the fact that those higher realities are "like the soul" and can be experienced only when the soul dissociates itself from the physical body and perception-based thought and contemplates the realities "alone by itself." This is the point where the mind's contemplative faculty, the nous, takes over from language and discursive thought, and leads the philosopher to a direct experience of the realities in question.
I think that what you are getting at in the first part is two-fold. One, do not make the all to common mistake of thinking that argument and philosophy are the same.
People who know, do not need the Dialectic. Socrates' rebuke of Glaucon, observing that we can leave that process "unintentionally" and become mere debaters, recognizes a vigilance that each must maintain for themselves. The perception of the sincere desire to know in the interlocutor is impossible unless the quality is alive for oneself. But the ways to check oneself and others is not only a matter of goodwill. Each conversation has its own life. The need to work through issues as they are raised requires different distinctions at different times. We can move closer to the truth by proceeding this way even if we are still ignorant by the measure of what is sought.
Where Plato points to the limits of our knowledge some mistakenly think he is pointing beyond them.
I think of the different readings of Plato in a smaller circle of comparison. Either the various and quite different approaches seen in the Dialogues were necessary in view of what Plato was attempting or they were episodes of pretense. If he could have written it all down like a system in the fashion of Proclus, the whole process of the Dialogues is a sham.
Reply to Apollodorus
That view is echoed in Plotinus regarding the contemplation of the One.
He also used the same theory to explain the creation of the physical world in the fashion of the Timaeus.
I don't think he was offering the items à la carte.
Philosophy in antiquity was not learned from books, but from a living teacher. There were philosophy schools and groups formed around a teacher, that were accessible to anyone with an interest, especially in the Greek-speaking parts of Europe and the Mid East.
The way I see it, Plato's works provide a number of general guidelines, not a system of water-tight theories, for the simple reason that any unclear matters would have been clarified in conversation with the teacher of your particular school. It was a living tradition based on personal practice and experience, not an academic endeavor in the modern sense.
In any case, as pointed out by Gonzales and others, Plato must be read within his own framework. If we apply Aristotelian categories and ontology to Plato, then we are reading not Plato but Aristotle's interpretation of him. Even if do take some material from Aristotle, as later Platonists sometimes do, it has to be consistent with Plato's own framework.
It was a living tradition based on personal practice and experience, not an academic endeavor in the modern sense.
Socrates was killed for talking in public about his ideas.
Maybe there was a tradition of training involved that was kept secret. If so, the secret is still hidden from view.
Plato formed an academy, in the ancient sense, if you will.
I don't recognize any of my comments in your reply. Perhaps you are talking to someone else.
I think "thinking for yourself" is about epistemic autonomy, ie. being autonomous in how one knows/believes one knows things. Like I said already, it's epistemic autonomy that is questionable.
Relative novelty of one's ideas isn't the measure of "thinking for yourself" (although this is how it is often understood in popular discourse).
I'd say this is far stranger. Firstly what could being autonomous in how one knows/ believes one knows things even mean? Are you suggesting the enlightened sage is or could be epistemically autonomous? You seem to have been disagreeing with my arguments that the enlightened person cannot rationally know that she knows whatever she thinks she knows, no matter how convinced she may be that she does, and yet here you say that epistemic autonomy is questionable. So, I can only guess you must mean something else.
I haven't said that relative novelty of one's ideas is the measure of "thinking for yourself" although having novel ideas might be an example of thinking for oneself.
As I said before in my view thinking for yourself is just thinking what seems to be in best accordance with and evidenced by your own experience, understanding and rational assessment rather than thinking something because some authority told you it was so without providing any empirical evidence or rational argument to back up their assertion.
So, if the purportedly enlightened sage tells you that there is an afterlife, and you say how do you know that and they say 'I just know', or 'I remember my past lives', you would be warranted in being skeptical about such a claim. That would be thinking for yourself. If you accepted the claim, and henceforth believed it yourself because you believed the person was enlightened and must know the truth, that would not be thinking for yourself.
I'd say this is far stranger. Firstly what could being autonomous in how one knows/ believes one knows things even mean?
Believing one is epistemically independent of other people.
You seem to have been disagreeing with my arguments that the enlightened person cannot rationally know that she knows whatever she thinks she knows, no matter how convinced she may be that she does, and yet here you say that epistemic autonomy is questionable. So, I can only guess you must mean something else.
As I said before in my view thinking for yourself is just thinking what seems to be in best accordance with and evidenced by your own experience, understanding and rational assessment
Okay for now.
rather than thinking something because some authority told you it was so without providing any empirical evidence or rational argument to back up their assertion.
I seriously doubt anyone ever believes things the way you describe here. That's a caricature.
I think that when people believe experts and authorities, this has more to do with social dynamics and, to some extent, belief economy, rather than some "blind trust" or "not thinking for yourself".
So, if the purportedly enlightened sage tells you that there is an afterlife, and you say how do you know that and they say 'I just know', or 'I remember my past lives', you would be warranted in being skeptical about such a claim. That would be thinking for yourself. If you accepted the claim, and henceforth believed it yourself because you believed the person was enlightened and must know the truth, that would not be thinking for yourself.
Except that I would not ask the sage "How do you know?" anymore. There was a time in the past when I would, but not anymore. And no, this doesn't mean that I now accept their claims. It's that I contextualize the whole matter entirely differently. Namely, I don't see the declarations of a "sage" as being some kind of opening for a discussion and dialogue.
Some think that dialectic is a method that leads to knowledge of the Forms. But how can someone know this unless they have completed the journey? That it does is something we are told not something we have experienced. It is a matter of opinion. Dialectic leads to knowledge of our ignorance. It leads us to see that philosophical inquiry leads to aporia.
There is a tension in Plato where he both points beyond us and points in the opposite direction to us, to self-knowledge as fundamental. The risk of the former is the neglect of the latter. The former is an activity of the imagination, the latter of truth about oneself. The flights of the former do not encounter resistance, the work of the latter must overcome self-resistance.
I think of the different readings of Plato in a smaller circle of comparison. Either the various and quite different approaches seen in the Dialogues were necessary in view of what Plato was attempting or they were episodes of pretense. If he could have written it all down like a system in the fashion of Proclus, the whole process of the Dialogues is a sham.
This raises several issues. If the whole is singular it seems reasonable to think there should be a single logos. But we do find these different approaches in the dialogues that address different aspects of the whole. Each, by bringing something to light occludes issues that come to light in another. None, however, either separately or all together, are comprehensive. Any speech of the whole must include us, the speaker. Our inability, the inability of the part, to give a comprehensive account of the whole says something not only about us but about the whole of which we are a part.
Some think that dialectic is a method that leads to knowledge of the Forms. But how can someone know this unless they have completed the journey? That it does is something we are told not something we have experienced. It is a matter of opinion.
The problem of learning what you do not know is discussed in the Meno. I remember a class from long ago when the dialectic was argued by some to be a method of knowledge of the Forms themselves. The wily old professor said: "Well, Parmenides went to great lengths to question the existence of the Forms but, after all that, decided that we have to use them, despite those problems, in order to distinguish this from this and that from that." It doesn't sound like we will be getting tans outside the cave any time soon.
Dialectic leads to knowledge of our ignorance. It leads us to see that philosophical inquiry leads to aporia.
The inquiry does lead to aporia. That doesn't mean we must start from zero every time. Debates are like wrestling matches. Whatever worked as a technique in one match is not a starting place for another. The desire for victory is stronger than the love of knowledge. Returning to a conversation that has undergone the rigors of the dialectic in order to form better opinions can be a starting place for a new conversation.
This raises several issues. If the whole is singular it seems reasonable to think there should be a single logos. But we do find these different approaches in the dialogues that address different aspects of the whole. Each, by bringing something to light occludes issues that come to light in another. None, however, either separately or all together, are comprehensive. Any speech of the whole must include us, the speaker. Our inability, the inability of the part, to give a comprehensive account of the whole says something not only about us but about the whole of which we are a part.
I agree with that approach wholeheartedly.
So much so that I am uncertain about what counts as divine or not within it. Thus my previous concerns about comparing different models.
Returning to a conversation that has undergone the rigors of the dialectic in order to form better opinions can be a starting place for a new conversation.
Good point. Dialectic is mutually beneficial. Sooner or later, however, we have to address the claim that we can use hypothesis to free ourselves from hypothesis.
So much so that I am uncertain about what counts as divine or not within it. Thus my previous concerns about comparing different models.
In the Phaedo Socrates calls Homer divine. In the Iliad Homer call salt divine (9.214)
In addition to the question of what counts as divine with it there is the question of whether there is anything divine outside of the whole. Or if the whole is itself divine.
I think that when people believe experts and authorities, this has more to do with social dynamics and, to some extent, belief economy, rather than some "blind trust" or "not thinking for yourself".
When people believe experts and authorities in various fields it is because they trust that those expert's expertise has been rigorously tested and demonstrated, and could be retested and redemonstrated if needs be. The same does not apply with sages and gurus. There is no way to rigorously and without bias test their purported expertise, even in principle, let alone practice.
Except that I would not ask the sage "How do you know?" anymore. There was a time in the past when I would, but not anymore. And no, this doesn't mean that I now accept their claims. It's that I contextualize the whole matter entirely differently. Namely, I don't see the declarations of a "sage" as being some kind of opening for a discussion and dialogue.
I actually agree with this. The declarations of a self-styled sage are meant to be followed devotedly by aspirants without question.There is no room for discussion and dialogue in such institutions. I know this because I have participated in several in the past.In one way there's a good reason for this; you are not there to have a philosophical discussion; you are there to learn how to change your consciousness, and I have no argument with that aim at all as such.
But I know what kinds of cultures of gullible mythologizing actually arise around cult leaders and gurus of all kinds; the same kinds of lamentable human dynamics play out everywhere. People happily relinquishing their capacities to think for themselves; listening to the oracular voice of the "master" and believing every word; it's just sad in my view.
the human is a way in which the Universe comes to realise its own nature.
:up: Resonates with me at a deep level although I don't fancy myself as capable of contributing to the effort. I hope someone in my lifetime, what's left of it, has that Eureka moment ASAP and then...
When people believe experts and authorities in various fields it is because they trust that those expert's expertise has been rigorously tested and demonstrated, and could be retested and redemonstrated if needs be.
It's not clear this is the case. Ideally, it should be the case, but I don't think it is, or only rarely. It seems that most people who believe experts and authorities in various fields don't even have a concept of "rigorously testing and demonstrating". Instead, their believing the experts and authorities is, essentially, a fallacious argumentum ab auctoritate.
The same does not apply with sages and gurus. There is no way to rigorously and without bias test their purported expertise, even in principle, let alone practice.
You cannot "rigorously and without bias test the purported expertise" of scientists either. You don't have the resources, you don't have the data, you don't have the access, and they sure as hell aren't going to do it for you.
But I know what kinds of cultures of gullible mythologizing actually arise around cult leaders and gurus of all kinds; the same kinds of lamentable human dynamics play out everywhere. People happily relinquishing their capacities to think for themselves; listening to the oracular voice of the "master" and believing every word; it's just sad in my view.
There's no guarantee that "thinking for yourself" will make you happy and successful either.
Resonates with me at a deep level although I don't fancy myself as capable of contributing to the effort. I hope someone in my lifetime, what's left of it, has that Eureka moment ASAP and then...
We're contributing to the average. Wisdom is simply an awareness of ones own ignorance. Chances are fairly good plenty of eureka moments have come and gone with no one noticing. I just hope to recognize a good idea when I hear one.
It's not clear this is the case. Ideally, it should be the case, but I don't think it is, or only rarely. It seems that most people who believe experts and authorities in various fields don't even have a concept of "rigorously testing and demonstrating". Instead, their believing the experts and authorities is, essentially, a fallacious argumentum ab auctoritate.
Sure many people simply believe what they read. The point was that people who think for themselves, and are honest enough to realize their own inadequate expertise to make experientially and intellectually informed judgements in specialized fields realize that the best place to put trust is on those whose expertise is demonstrable due to having been rigorously testing during their education and ongoing work in the field. Doesn't mean they are infallible, but expert consensus is the best we have.
You cannot "rigorously and without bias test the purported expertise" of scientists either. You don't have the resources, you don't have the data, you don't have the access, and they sure as hell aren't going to do it for you.
I can't personally do it, obviously. But that is what the peer review system is for. The science community as a whole can be trusted on judgements that they have arrived at a broad consensus on. We can trust them, because within the community of expertise errors should be exposed, at least over time. We should trust the experts, simply because we have nothing else to go on when it comes to making judgements in fields where we have little or no expertise.
There's no guarantee that "thinking for yourself" will make you happy and successful either.
Did I ever say it was? Did I say that we all ought to think for ourselves because that will make us happy and successful? All along I've acknowledged that some people don't have the capacity or the desire to think for themselves. They are probably happier and less troubled if they don't.
Such people should keep away from philosophy, because studying that would only lead them to question everything, that is would only lead them to think for themselves; which would make them unhappy if they don't want to do that. On the other hand if someone wants to question everything and think for themselves, they will be obviously happier if they do that, no?
Such people should keep away from philosophy, because studying that would only lead them to question everything, that is would only lead them to think for themselves
There is a split that goes back at least as far as Plato. On the one hand, Socrates' human wisdom is his knowledge of his ignorance, and, on the other, the philosopher-king who possesses divine wisdom.
Those who read philosophy typically stand on one or the other side of this divine - those for whom philosophy is a matter of inquiry and those for whom philosophy provides answers; those who think for themselves and those who are told what to think and believe.
In a world ruled by opinion, the task of the philosopher is twofold. On the one hand to provide necessary, useful, and salutary opinions, and, on the other, to lead those who are not satisfied with opinion to think for themselves. The road to the latter, however, is by way of the former. All along the way one must ask if this or that is something one knows and how it is that they know it.
I think there must have been some form of training as this was the whole purpose of a school.
The purpose of Plato's academy certainly was about training thinkers. It was a specifically discursive endeavor with the express goal of improving discourse. Perhaps it included an esoteric element of instruction as you described here::
This is the point where the mind's contemplative faculty, the nous, takes over from language and discursive thought, and leads the philosopher to a direct experience of the realities in question.
But it is difficult to perceive the school that stands at the center of the City as serving an entirely personal experience. The rigor of rational thought practiced in such schools is at odds with your description given here:
The way I see it, Plato's works provide a number of general guidelines, not a system of water-tight theories, for the simple reason that any unclear matters would have been clarified in conversation with the teacher of your particular school. It was a living tradition based on personal practice and experience, not an academic endeavor in the modern sense.
One thing that puzzles me about this last statement is that it doesn't square with your efforts in other places to see Plato presenting a unified theory of the soul.
One thing that puzzles me about this last statement is that it doesn't square with your efforts in other places to see Plato presenting a unified theory of the soul.
It also does not square with the dialogues. The dialogues do not clarify themselves in conversation.
The leap from language and discursive thought to direct experience is the very thing that is ignored. Although such an experience can be imagined, we should not make the mistake of imagining that it is our own experience.
One thing that puzzles me about this last statement is that it doesn't square with your efforts in other places to see Plato presenting a unified theory of the soul.
Well, maybe some people are in a perpetual state of puzzlement, which is why they seem so attached to the word "aporia". :smile:
Personally, I prefer to read Plato's dialogues at face value first and then see if anything else may be inferred from them that does not appear to be there on first sight.
For example:
But if we are guided by me we shall believe that the soul is immortal and capable of enduring all extremes of good and evil, and so we shall hold ever to the upward way and pursue righteousness with wisdom always and ever, that we may be dear to ourselves and to the gods both during our sojourn here and when we receive our reward, as the victors in the games go about to gather in theirs. And thus both here and in that journey of a thousand years, whereof I have told you, we shall fare well (Rep. 621c-d).
To me, this suggests belief in the soul of the kind that would have been quite widespread in 4th-century BC Greek society. And I see no indication whatsoever that Plato intends the reader to disbelieve that statement.
As regards "theories", we call them that because it has become customary practice, not because Plato himself employed that term.
And because Platonism is a practical system, things like "soul" and "Forms" are to be known or experienced personally, through reason and contemplation. The accounts or arguments relating to them serve as pointers or reminders, which is logical if we consider that the soul is real and that it is supposed to have previous knowledge of the Forms.
In contrast, the assumption that Plato spent all his life writing books, and even founded a school, for no other purpose than to preach ignorance and "aporia", seems rather unfounded and far-fetched to me.
In contrast, the assumption that Plato spent all his life writing books, and even founded a school, for no other purpose than to preach ignorance and "aporia", seems rather unfounded and far-fetched to me.
I don't get any images in my mind when I say "preach ignorance and aporia" out loud. It sounds like a kind of surrender; a reason to stop trying to do something. Socrates did not exemplify a retreat from what is difficult to understand. Did Plato set up a school to learn what wasn't known or tell everybody about what he had found out?
It seems like you want to cast the limits of our understanding, that Plato brings to our attention, to be actually some sort of catechism to something else. That is unfounded and far-fetched.
The leap from language and discursive thought to direct experience is the very thing that is ignored. Although such an experience can be imagined, we should not make the mistake of imagining that it is our own experience.
Who do you have in mind when you say 'our own experience'? Why is it not possible for 'us' to have such experiences? What prevents it?
There's a author and teacher in the US, Pierre Grimes, who used to offer a class he called 'philosophical midwifery', which was a form of therapy based on Plato's Theaetetus. I think he's probably very old now if indeed he hasn't died, from what I can discern, I don't know if he was ever very well known. There's a brief biographical entry of him here. Anyone here have any knowledge of him?
It seems like you want to cast the limits of our understanding, that Plato brings to our attention, to be actually some sort of catechism to something else.
Not at all. On the contrary, it seems like some people choose to deny Plato's statements and replace everything with spurious claims of "ignorance" and "aporia".
What exactly is the purpose of writing a book - actually, lots of books - that teaches that there are some things that we don't know. Don't we know that already???
Besides, my views are supported by the text of the dialogues and by a very long Platonist tradition and to my knowledge they are mainstream. And I haven't seen any evidence here that Plato teaches atheism, skepticism, and nihilism.
If the text says "the soul is immortal" or "the Sun is one of the Gods", on what rational basis can we deny that it says that?
If philosophical inquiry "leads to aporia," then what is the point in philosophical inquiry?
And you are not answering my question. If the text says "the soul turns out to be immortal" or "the Sun is one of the Gods", on what rational basis can we deny that it says this?
Time to mention the 'forgotten wisdom' thesis again. See Huston Smith's 1976 book, Forgotten Truth. He proposes that there is an hierarchy of being, the higher being the origin and ultimate destiny of all beings, the lower being the material and sensory domain. This is depicted in countless forms in traditional literature, art and religion, principally as the 'great chain of being'.
Some vestiges of this understanding are visible in 17th century philosophy - 'most 17th century philosophers held that reality comes in degrees—that some things that exist are more or less real than other things that exist. At least part of what dictates a being’s reality, according to these philosophers, is the extent to which its existence is dependent on other things: the less dependent a thing is on other things for its existence, the more real it is.'
There are also vestiges of it in German idealism, which inherited the outlines of these conceptions from medieval theology (per Dermot Moran's writings on Eriugena.) But generally speaking, since the rejection of idealism at the beginning of the 20th century, there is nothing remaining of it in analytical and anglo-american philosophy.
Smith says (and I concur) that scientific materialism - not science itself but the belief-system purportedly based on it - is a degradation of the mainstream philosophical tradition.
But at the same time, whatever philosophy we have, has to be able to accomodate the genuinely novel discoveries of science since the 17th century. So we have to thread the needle between the two extremes of dogmatic belief systems on the one hand, and scientific materialism on the other.
But you can't do that hence you profess "aporia" and insist that this is all that Plato has to say
Saying that an inquiry leads to aporia is not equivalent to stating that the purpose of it has been cancelled. So when you say that I am claiming that "I insist that this is all that Plato has to say", that is a limit you have applied to yourself, not an accurate description of my view. The words you put in my mouth are not very interesting.
Saying that an inquiry leads to aporia is not equivalent to stating that the purpose of it has been cancelled.
Saying that an inquiry leads to aporia does not constitute proof that Plato's statements are not in the dialogue or that he preaches atheism, skepticism, and nihilism, does it?
In contrast, the assumption that Plato spent all his life writing books, and even founded a school, for no other purpose than to preach ignorance and "aporia", seems rather unfounded and far-fetched to me.
It is quite revealing that you think what Plato is doing is preaching anything at all.
It is not a matter of something preventing it, it is simply that you and I and others here have not had an experience of being dead.
'Dead' is also a metaphorical expression. From an essay on the Catholic philosopher, Josef Pieper:
Our minds do not—contrary to many views currently popular—create truth. Rather, they must be conformed to the truth of things given in creation. And such conformity is possible only as the moral virtues become deeply embedded in our character, a slow and halting process. We have, he writes on one occasion, “lost the awareness of the close bond that links the knowing of truth to the condition of purity.” That is, in order to know the truth we must become persons of a certain sort. The full transformation of character that we need will, in fact, finally require the virtues of faith, hope, and love. And this transformation will not necessarily—perhaps not often—be experienced by us as easy or painless. Hence the transformation of self that we must—by God’s grace—undergo “perhaps resembles passing through something akin to dying.”
It is quite revealing that you think what Plato is doing is preaching anything at all.
Don't you think it's also revealing that you wish to dissociate Plato from anything religious whatever?
Max Weber wrote of the disenchantment of the world, the cultural rationalization and devaluation of religion apparent in modern society. Your posts reflect that. In saying any of this, I'm not seeking to convert, but I am seeking to draw out some of the cultural dynamics beneath the surface.
But at the same time, whatever philosophy we have, has to be able to accomodate the genuinely novel discoveries of science since the 17th century. So we have to thread the needle between the two extremes of dogmatic belief systems on the one hand, and scientific materialism on the other.
As a general principle, yes. However, when the materialists insist on denying that Plato makes antimaterialist statements in his dialogues, then it is unclear how their claims can be accommodated.
Reply to Apollodorus The issue is, a thorough-going secular philosophy has no imaginative domain which corresponds with 'the mystical'. In a secular system, 'the mystical' is synonymous with nothing, nonsense, non-being, it's a placeholder or a frightening vacuum which the gullible seek to fill with religious beliefs.
a thorough-going secular philosophy has no imaginative domain which corresponds with 'the mystical'.
As I see it, the problem is when what is imagined is taken for what is. Plato distinguishes between truth and imagination, dreams and reality. What do you know of an imaginative domain other than what you imagine it might be?
The issue is, a thorough-going secular philosophy has no imaginative domain which corresponds with 'the mystical'. In a secular system, 'the mystical' is synonymous with nothing, nonsense, non-being, it's a placeholder or a frightening vacuum which the gullible seek to fill with religious beliefs.
I think the issue may be described as psychological deficiency if not pathology.
I can understand if some people have an aversion toward religion or spirituality and in particular toward Plato, and I have no problem with that. But when doubt and denial become compulsive then we are dealing with a pathological condition IMHO.
In any event, "aporia" can become a debilitating fixation, it seems, that is as toxic as religious fanaticism - if not worse. :smile:
Saying that an inquiry leads to aporia does not constitute proof that Plato's statements are not in the dialogue or that he preaches atheism, skepticism, and nihilism, does it?
The double negative combined with the rhetorical question is confusing. Are you saying that saying an inquiry that leads to aporia amounts to atheism, skepticism, and nihilism?
If so, I repeat my previous statement that such a view is at odds with Socrates' willingness to pursue ideas despite such difficulties.
I recommend reading more authors who use the quality of "aporia" as an element of discourse. From Aristotle to Proclus, the term refers to how far one can advance in making distinctions. It is not a cry of meaningless despair at the sight of the abyss.
Don't you think it's also revealing that you wish to dissociate Plato from anything religious whatever?
Correct. This appears to go so far as to deny that in the Republic, for example, Socrates says that the Sun is one of the Gods (something that most Greeks would have agreed with), in spite of the fact that even notorious anti-Platonists like Strauss admit that the Sun is a God and that Plato has a theology involving cosmic Gods like the Sun:
Let us not forget that the sun is a cosmic god ... In the tenth book of the Laws Plato presents what one might call his theology and also his political doctrine regarding gods. It consists in a substitution of the gods of the cosmos [e.g. the Sun] for the gods of the city
I am speaking specifically about such things as the experience of being dead and the transcendent experience of seeing the unchanging Forms.
As I think has been discussed throughout these threads, in dealing with such matters, there's a mixture of myth, conjecture, suggestion and argument. It's true there's no certainty on the level of discursive reasoning. But what is hinted at, alluded to, is part of the meaning of these texts, also.
I think, possibly, the Platonic forms or ideas are not so remote or mysterious as many are making them out to be. One clue for me is platonism in mathematics. I know that mathematical platonism is not 'the philosophy of Plato', but it provides a way for imagining real abstracts, because in that view, numbers are real, but in a different way to corporeal objects. Naturalism will want to say that these are therefore mental artifacts or constructions. But the counter to that is that they are the same for all who think - they're independent of any particular mind, but can only be seen by the rational faculty. That is nearer to the traditional meaning of 'intelligible'. And I think those ideas have been preserved to some degree in Aristotelian philosophy, which is present in the scholastic tradition.
That's why I'm intrigued by the medieval terminology of 'the rational soul'. I'm intending to do some more reading in that area.
What do you know of an imaginative domain other than what you imagine it might be?
I recall one the the authors I read in Buddhist Studies speaking of the 'Pali imaginaire'. This was the imaginative world of the ancient Pali texts of Buddhism. It contained various domains of existence, gods, demons, hells, heavens, and Nirv??a, in addition to the world of ordinary experience. But the use of that term 'imaginaire' does not mean that all of these domains are taken to be 'merely' imaginary. Rather they provide the extended conceptual framework within which the Buddha's discourses take place. The Buddha denies being a god, demon, or even a human - his self-description just is 'Buddha' - awakened one. But that imaginative depiction of the totality of the cosmos was the setting for those discourses.
But in addition to that imaginative realm there is also in Buddhism a precise definition of degrees and kinds of knowledge - jñ?na being one of the terms. That is translated as 'wisdom', although the 'jn-' particle is an etymological cognate with the 'gn-' of gnosticism. In Buddhism, it is understood as a real, practical insight into the principle of dependent origination. It is associated with the jhanas, states of meditative absorption which enables the practitioner to enter higher levels of understanding, to reach states known as 'lokuttara' (transmundane). That is not held to be imaginary in the least, although also not amenable to discursive understanding. The distinction between those kinds of understanding i.e. insight into ??nyat? and discursive understanding, is highly formalised in later Chinese and Japanese forms of Buddhism.
Obviously a very roundabout way of answering your question, but I'm wanting to show that there's a sense in which imagination is more than simply fanciful thought or fictionalism. Imagination opens into other domains of being, not simply conjectural or fanciful. (Interestingly I was just now watching a documentary on Philip K Dick in which he says exactly that.)
If so, I repeat my previous statement that such a view is at odds with Socrates' willingness to pursue ideas despite such difficulties.
But what is the point in "pursuing ideas" if that pursuit leads to "aporia"?
And, having read one dialogue that allegedly leaves the reader in a state of "aporia", why read another dialogue that leaves the reader in the same "aporetic" condition?
What I fail to see is how additional aporia can resolve the initial aporia. Or is the intention to maximize the aporetic state until all reasoning ability has been suspended?
Besides, you are not answering my question. If the text says "the soul turns out to be immortal" or "the Sun is one of the Gods", on what rational basis can we deny that it says this?
I can understand if some people have an aversion toward religion or spirituality and in particular toward Plato, and I have no problem with that. But when doubt and denial become compulsive then we are dealing with a pathological condition IMHO.
In any event, "aporia" can become a debilitating fixation, it seems, that is as toxic as religious fanaticism - if not worse
As I understand it, such unanswerable questions or conundrums are intrinsic to the Platonic dialogues. Often they are regarded as 'purgative' (i.e. in the Meno) by dismantling a view falsely held.
I think I mentioned before, that I see some similarity between those, and the 'way of unknowing' that is found in later Christian mysticism.
But I'm also aware of the danger of simply asserting as a matter of fact ideas which are in reality conjectural. It's easy to fall into dogmatism that way, which will often amount to claiming to know something that really is only believed. My position is, as I'm not wedded to physicalism, then I'm open to the possibility of higher states of being or higher knowledge, but I can't claim to know them as a matter of fact.
My position is, as I'm not wedded to physicalism, then I'm open to the possibility of higher states of being or higher knowledge, but I can't claim to know them as a matter of fact.
I totally agree with that. Nobody should claim that they have knowledge that they either don't have or is mere belief.
But nor should they claim that other people's personal experience is just imagination.
And they certainly should not deny statements clearly made in the dialogues. For example, if the Republic says "the Sun is one of the Gods in heaven", then it is irrational to insist that it does not say so.
The issue is not whether one believes that the Sun is or is not a God. The issue is whether Socrates in the dialogue makes this statement. If he unquestionably does so, then it is unacceptable to deny it, all the more so when no rational reason or evidence for the denial is provided.
It's true there's no certainty on the level of discursive reasoning.
And that is exactly what is required to distinguish knowledge from fanciful speculation. But, as was seen in the Phaedo, argument ends in aporia. So without the experience of being dead we have no knowledge of such things.
But the counter to that is that they are the same for all who think - they're independent of any particular mind, but can only be seen by the rational faculty.
We learn about triangles through images. We learn about number by counting.
Let us not forget that the sun is a cosmic god ... In the tenth book of the Laws Plato presents what one might call his theology and also his political doctrine regarding gods. It consists in a substitution of the gods of the cosmos [e.g. the Sun] for the gods of the city
- L Strauss, On Plato's Symposium, pp. 38, 277
In the first part he is not talking about Plato, he is discussing Cicero's Republic and Laws, as can be seen by looking a few lines before what you quote.
As to the second part, having never read Strauss you are bound to misunderstand what he is saying when you take things out of context. It is only when you read the tenth book of the Laws and follow the argument that you may begin to get a better idea of what his theology and political doctrine regarding the gods might be. Hint: it is a political doctrine regarding the gods being discussed in the context of establishing the laws of the city. In other words a theology (speech about the gods) suited to the city.
Socrates seeks the sun in summer, when it is hardest to bear; he seeks the light of the sun at its strongest. In accordance with that he prays to the sun at the end. Let us not forget that the sun is a cosmic god
Obviously, "cosmic God" for Socrates (and Plato).
Strauss is discussing Plato's Symposium (that's what the book is about!) where the information regarding Socrates' praying to the Sun is provided by Alcibiades:
Immersed in some problem at dawn, he stood in the same spot considering it; and when he found it a tough one, he would not give it up but stood there trying. The time drew on to midday, and the men began to notice him, and said to one another in wonder: ‘Socrates has been standing there in a study ever since dawn!’ The end of it was that in the evening some of the Ionians after they had supped—
this time it was summer—brought out their mattresses and rugs and took their sleep in the cool; thus they waited to see if he would go on standing all night too. He stood till dawn came and the sun rose; then walked away, after offering a prayer to the Sun (Symp. 220c-d)
And Plato's "theology that consists in a substitution of the gods of the cosmos for the gods of the city" is a theology that substitutes the cosmic Gods, like the Sun, for the Gods of the city. Period.
There is nothing unclear about that at all. Not to normal people, in any case. :smile:
That is translated as 'wisdom', although the 'jn-' particle is an etymological cognate with the 'gn-' of gnosticism. In Buddhism, it is understood as a real, practical insight into the principle of dependent origination.
That was exactly what I was thinking myself. "Jn-/gn-" is also cognate with the "kn-" of English "know" which comes from Proto-Indo-European via Germanic and Anglo-Saxon.
The Buddhist concept of dependent origination is related to the Hindu concept of consciousness generating cognition by producing name (nama) and form (rupa) which in turn give rise to sense-perception and the sensible world. And the two concepts come very close to Platonic Forms.
Ancient Greek makes no distinction between "word" and "name". For Plato, a word acquires its meaning by there being an object of which the word is the name. And if there is a word or name for something, there is a corresponding "Form". Hence, "Name" and "Form", exactly as in the Indian concept of nama and rupa.
I think, possibly, the Platonic forms or ideas are not so remote or mysterious as many are making them out to be. One clue for me is platonism in mathematics.
Those with a "mathematical mind" may indeed find it easier to grasp the idea of Forms. Plato's Forms aim, in the first place, to explain the phenomenon of identity in difference, and this requires a certain kind of abstract imagery where mathematics may be helpful.
But the metaphysical aim of the Forms is to lead the mind to their ultimate source which is the Good or the One, the cause of all things that are good. And this can only be consciousness itself. Thus, by inquiring into the Forms, the mind eventually arrives at the point where determinate cognition arises from indeterminate consciousness, and the inquiring mind merges with consciousness in the process of creating cognition and, ultimately, with transcendent consciousness itself.
This is logically the final stage of self-knowledge which coincides with knowledge of ultimate reality where all is One.
1. Strauss' book is entitled "On Plato's Symposium".
2. The incident of Socrates praying to the Sun is discussed in Chapter 12, "Alcibiades", that discusses Alcibiades' speech about Socrates in the Symposium.
3. Strauss quotes Alcibiades' speech about Socrates:
He conceived a thought there and stood from dawn considering it, and when he couldn't make any progress, he refused to let up but kept on standing considering. It was now already noon, and the soldiers became aware of it, and in amazement one said to another, 'Socrates has been standing there since dawn reflecting.' Finally, some of the Ionians, when it was evening, once they had dined, - it was then summer - brought out their bedding and slept in the cold while keeping watch on him, to see whether he would stand also through the night. He stood till dawn and the sun came up; and then he went away after he had prayed to the sun (220c3-d5)
- L Strauss, On Plato's Symposium, p. 276
4. Strauss only mentions Cicero's Republic and Laws to say that the former is a dialogue in winter when people seek the sun, and the latter in summer when they seek the shade, in order to contrast this with Socrates who seeks the sun in summer "when its light is the strongest and in accordance with that he prays to the sun at the end" and "let us not forget that the sun is a cosmic god" to explain why Socrates prayed to the Sun (p. 277), after which he continues discussing the next Symposium passage (220d5-e7).
5. Nothing to do with Cicero whatsoever except to emphasize Socrates' seeking the Sun in the summer, when the Sun is at its brightest, as opposed to what people normally do. Period.
Why would he mention Cicero if only to say what everyone knows and does in summer and winter?
He says:
That theme [contemplation in summer as distinguished from winter] is known to those who read Cicero's Republic and Laws.
Have you read them? Do you know the meaning of that theme is in them?
Strauss is pointing to Alcibiades' disregard for Socrates' justice and in its place his admiration of his endurance. (274)
He says:
In accordance with that [seeking the sun in summer] he prays to the sun at the end.
Do you know what this means? How is seeking the sun in summer in accordance with his prayer to the sun? Do you understand the connection between custom/law (nomos) and prayer? What do you know about the topic of prayer in the dialogues.
There is a great deal more going on in Strauss's lectures on the Symposium then one can know from taking a couple of statements out of context.
Edit: With regard to the cosmic gods versus the gods of the city look at the charges brought against Socrates.
Strauss discusses Alcibiades' speech about Socrates.
This is why he quotes the Symposium:
He conceived a thought there and stood from dawn considering it, and when he couldn't make any progress, he refused to let up but kept on standing considering. It was now already noon, and the soldiers became aware of it, and in amazement one said to another, 'Socrates has been standing there since dawn reflecting.' Finally, some of the Ionians, when it was evening, once they had dined, - it was then summer - brought out their bedding and slept in the cold while keeping watch on him, to see whether he would stand also through the night. He stood till dawn and the sun came up; and then he went away after he had prayed to the sun (220c3-d5)
The scene with Socrates praying to the Sun is in Plato's Symposium, not in Cicero's Laws.
Strauss' book is about the Symposium. This is why he also mentions the Forms but only to say that Plato's theory of Ideas "sounds like an absolutely absurd doctrine" without even discussing it.
Which, incidentally, demonstrates that he is as unimaginative and clueless, i.e. psychologically and spiritually deficient, as his followers ....
I'll take this as an admittance that you cannot answer the questions raised and don't understand what Strauss is saying, which is not surprising since you have not actually read him.
You do not understand him and yet you think he demonstrates that he is as unimaginative and clueless. This is an example of why knowledge of your ignorance is so important. Shifting blame from where it belongs to someone else.
Cicero does not discuss Socrates’ praying to the Sun.
Strauss does not discuss Cicero.
In the whole 294-page book, Strauss mentions Cicero only once, when he addresses Socrates' endurance to the heat of summer.
Strauss says:
Cicero's Republic is a dialogue in winter, where they seek the sun, and the Laws is a dialogue in summer, where they seek the shade. Socrates seeks the sun in summer, when it is hardest to bear; he seeks the light of the sun at its strongest. In accordance with that he prays to the sun at the end. Let us not forget that the sun is a cosmic god (p. 277)
Strauss discusses Socrates’ praying to the Sun as related by Alcibiades in Plato’s Symposium.
He DOES NOT discuss Cicero at all.
Strauss also says that "Plato substitutes a natural theology for a civil theology".
In the tenth book of the Laws Plato presents what one might call his theology and also his political doctrine regarding gods. It consists in a substitution of the gods of the cosmos for the gods of the city. The impiety which is to be condemned is the impiety against the gods of the cosmos, but not the impiety against the gods of the city. We can say Plato substitutes a natural theology for a civil theology
Ergo, Strauss says that "the Sun is a cosmic God" and that "Plato has a theology consisting in a substitution of the cosmic Gods for the Gods of the city".
Of course I have read Strauss since I am quoting from his book On Plato's Symposium. He is right on certain issues but on others he displays symptoms of psychological deficiency and unscholarly methodology.
Cicero does not discuss Socrates’ praying to the Sun.
And you avoid discussing what Cicero does discuss and how it relates to Strauss' discussion. But of course you cannot discuss it because you know nothing about it.
Strauss also says that "Plato substitutes a natural theology for a civil theology".
Right, but you fail to understand the significance of this. You do not know what he means when he says that:
In the tenth book of the Laws Plato presents what one might call his theology and also his political doctrine regarding gods. It consists in a substitution of the gods of the cosmos.
He is not saying that Plato believed the sun is a god. The theology of the Laws is not separate his political doctrine in the Laws. Theology was not a matter of personal belief. For the Greeks, and for Strauss as well, the problem of the gods and the problem of the city were part of the same. But the sun is not a god of the city.
In the Apology when Meletus accuses him of declaring the sun a stone (26d) Socrates does not deny it. He points out that Anaxagoras said that, but does not say whether he agreed with him or not. Nowhere does he criticize this. In fact, his criticism of Anaxagoras was not that he did not elevate natural things like the sun to divine status but that natural things cannot be the kind of cause that Socrates sought.
... symptoms of psychological deficiency and unscholarly methodology.
You are projecting again. Your inability to directly respond to questions I raised shows you have not understood him. The only deficiencies here are your own. Your ignorance of your ignorance is a serious stumbling block.
I think you have some serious psychological issues, not just mere deficiencies.
Cicero does not discuss Socrates' praying to the Sun.
Strauss does not discuss Cicero.
Strauss discusses Socrates' praying to the Sun as related by Alcibiades in Plato's Symposium. His whole book is about the Symposium and is called "On Plato's Symposium".
If you believe that Strauss discusses Cicero, then feel free to quote where he does so. But of course you cannot do that because you are making it up.
I have Strauss' book right in front of me. Name any page and I can quote from it any time.
What Strauss does say is this:
Cicero's Republic is a dialogue in winter, where they seek the sun, and the Laws is a dialogue in summer, where they seek the shade. Socrates seeks the sun in summer, when it is hardest to bear; he seeks the light of the sun at its strongest. In accordance with that he prays to the sun at the end. Let us not forget that the sun is a cosmic god (p. 277)
Prove that he doesn't say that if you can .... :grin:
That theme is known to those of you who have read Cicero's Republic and Laws. Cicero's Republic is a dialogue in winter where they seek the sun, and the Laws a dialogue in summer where they seek the shade.
Strangely, you go on to quote this but still this he is not discussing Cicero.
If his point was simply that people normally seek the shade is summer he would not have brought up Cicero.
He brings him up in response to his question:
What could that [contemplation is summer as distinguished from winter] possibly mean?
Can you answer that question?
Strauss' lecture were very popular. They were attended by professors and grad students from various departments including classics, and including those who had read Cicero's Republic and Laws. He is saying something to them that others might not understand. Do not fault him for your lack of understanding.
I have Strauss' book right in front of me. Name any page and I can quote from it any time.
Good to hear that you have finally gotten around to at least obtaining one of his books, but perhaps you can get your money back. Since you do not understand him, it is of no value to you.
Strauss admit that the Sun is a God and that Plato has a theology involving cosmic Gods like the Sun:
I assume you mean that Strauss admits that the sun is a god and not that Strauss admits that the sun is a god. In either case you have misunderstood him.
He says:
Plato substitutes a natural theology for a civil theology (38)
Compare this to the charges brought against Socrates regarding the gods of the city.
If the sun is a god then it is a god without intellect.
Taking things out of content and not thinking things through leads to serious misunderstanding.
Bullshit! You searched for statements by and about Strauss so that you could argue against them, found excerpts online, and quote them out of context.
If you believe that Strauss discusses Cicero, then feel free to quote where he does so. But of course you cannot do that because you are making it up.
Strauss does not discuss Cicero, period. He discusses Socrates' praying to the Sun as related by Alcibiades in Plato's Symposium.
And anyway, Socrates could not have acted according to what Cicero says as he lived centuries before Cicero, another fact that seems to have escaped you! :rofl:
Is English your first language? Not believing you does not make me a liar.
From Dictionary.com:
Discuss:
to consider or examine by argument, comment, etc.
Strauss comments in order that those who know Cicero's dialogues will consider what the story Alcibiades means. He does not spell it out, but he says enough that those who know will make the connection.
Socrates could not have acted according to what Cicero says
First, what is at issue here is not a matter of how Cicero said Socrates acted. Second, it is not Alcibiades who says who how Socrates acted. Strauss points out that what is told is not even by someone who was there to hear what Alcibiades said. The dialogue is a work of fiction. But neither works of history or of fiction are bound by an author being alive at the time he writes about. Third, Cicero often discusses Socrates, referring to the works of Plato and Xenophon. The fact that he was not alive is no more relevant than the fact that we were not alive to discuss Socrates.
There are now several issues that you have ignored in your attempt to discredit me and Strauss. If you would address them you might begin to see that there is so much more here than you are aware of, beginning with what theology is for Plato and how it cannot be understood apart from political considerations.
The issue is not your belief which is totally irrelevant. The issue is your statement to the effect that I “search for statements by and about Strauss so that I can argue against them.”
It was not a “belief” but an emphatic assertion, emphasized by invectives and exclamation mark. And since it turned out to be a blatant lie as I actually have Strauss’ book in front of me, that makes you a liar, does it not?
Even if it was a “belief”, it was a false belief, which illustrates how your Straussian mind operates.
You are also a liar because of the following facts:
First you claimed that Strauss is talking about Socrates as depicted by Cicero.
Then you cited some mysterious “great deal more in Strauss’ lectures on the Symposium”.
Then you cited a mysterious “connection he is making between Alcibiades’ story and Cicero”.
Then you claimed that “Strauss’ lectures were very popular”.
Then you mentioned a mysterious “theme of contemplation in summer”.
And finally, you came up with a novel definition of “discuss” that amounts to an admission that Strauss does not discuss Cicero, which of course he doesn’t. And Cicero does not discuss Socrates’ preference for praying to the Sun in summer.
So, basically, the BS is entirely yours and you are full of it, no offence intended. :smile:
If anyone is reading this and is interested, I will tie some things together in order to make sense of all this.
Strauss introduces Cicero in order to make sense of the the theme of the difference between contemplation in the summer and winter. It is a theme in Cicero's own works entitled after Plato's own, Republic and Laws as well as those of Plato.
In his lectures on Cicero Strauss quotes him:
“Socrates was the first who called philosophy down from heaven, and placed it in cities, and even introduced it into the houses, and compelled it to investigate, regarding life, manners and good and bad things. Socrates’ manifold way of disputing, and the variety of subject matters, and the magnitude of mind consecrated this way of disputing to writings and thus produced a variety of dissenting philosophical schools. Out of those schools (the relevant philosophical schools), we, Cicero, have followed that school particularly, or that manner particularly, which we believe Socrates had used (namely, the dialogical) in order to conceal our opinion, in order to liberate others from error, and in order to seek in every disputation what is most similar to the truth (alt, translation: what is most probable).” Tuscan Disputations V. 6.10-11
Socrates concern was not with heavenly things, not the sun or gods or whether the sun is a god, but with the human things, both public and private, which includes what is said about the gods.
"To conceal our opinion" is what is at issue here. Socrates opinion about the gods is concealed because of his concern for the city and philosophy. This is the theme Strauss is pointing to regarding summer and winter. As with Socrates' contemplation during a military campaign, Cicero relates a story of a military campaign in the winter where a few soldiers gather in a meadow for a discussion:
A sunny place, surely. In summer they would seek the shade. Now this is the symbolism which Plato has used in the Laws. In the Laws the discussion is taking place on the hottest day of the year, the longest day of the year, a very hot day, and they seek the shade. Here they seek the sun. Now what is the meaning of that symbolism, the seeking of the shade and the seeking of the sun? It is not difficult to guess—because Cicero’s Laws, which we shall read afterwards, are a summer discussion. This is a winter discussion.
... We seek light, we seek knowledge; shade, we seek obscurity.
In Cicero's Laws:
Atticus suggests that they go to an island in the river there, and they sit down there. It is a hot day, the longest day in the year; they seek the shade and they find that shade on an island. And you understood this [is an] island of contemplation.
Plato's Laws too takes place on an island.
There is a connection made in both Plato's and Cicero's Laws between law (nomos, authoritative custom) and obscurity. As Strauss points out, the first word of Plato's Laws is "God". The laws that found a city must deal with the gods, but the gods of the city are not the cosmic gods. What Socrates says about the gods, that is, his theology, is determined by what he thinks is best for the city. But the participants in Plato's Laws are from different cities, and so, the problem of which gods is of central importance. A cosmic god who is impartial is the answer.
A few other points:
The theme of the active versus the contemplative life. In both Alcibiades story and Cicero's there is a contemplative pause within a setting of military action. Socrates prayer to the sun is not theological , not a matter of what is said, but of something done with the Ionians but not the Athenians watching.
Strauss points out that the Symposium is the only Platonic dialogue explicitly devoted to a god. It is, he adds, "of course", a Socratic dialogue. Eros was generally regarded as a god, but Socrates denies that Eros is a god. The reason has to do with eros' connection to the human.
What is going on here is not evidence that Socrates or Plato believed in a cosmic god. What is at issue is, as Cicero correctly points out, philosophy brought down from the heavens to the city, a concern with human rather than heavenly things, or, rather, a concern for heavenly things in so far as they were related to human things, for example, justice rather than piety.
Some think that dialectic is a method that leads to knowledge of the Forms. But how can someone know this unless they have completed the journey? That it does is something we are told not something we have experienced. It is a matter of opinion. Dialectic leads to knowledge of our ignorance. It leads us to see that philosophical inquiry leads to aporia.
Not under the Socratic method.
Inherent in the Socratic method is the inequality of the teacher and the student, and the student's submission to the teacher.
And, having read one dialogue that allegedly leaves the reader in a state of "aporia", why read another dialogue that leaves the reader in the same "aporetic" condition?
What I fail to see is how additional aporia can resolve the initial aporia.
Or is the intention to maximize the aporetic state until all reasoning ability has been suspended?
Perhaps not deliberately. This is also how the practice of koans works. Namely, contemplating a koan is supposed to bring one's mind to a halt, from whence on one can "see things as they really are".
But nor should they claim that other people's personal experience is just imagination.
But there is still an issue of power. Defining what is real for another person is an act of power.
It's not possible to do away with issues of power in interpersonal interactions of any kind, not even in philosophy.
We should trust the experts, simply because we have nothing else to go on when it comes to making judgements in fields where we have little or no expertise.
What's the alternative? Trust no one?
No. But desist from making many judgments to begin with.
Obviously, this wil make one unpopular in certain circles where having a lot of definitive opinions is required. But realistically, there are rather few things that one actually needs to have a definitive opinion about.
On the other hand if someone wants to question everything and think for themselves, they will be obviously happier if they do that, no?
Because philosophers are known for being such a happy bunch!
Inherent in the Socratic method is the inequality of the teacher and the student, and the student's submission to the teacher.
Although dialectic is depicted in the Republic as a way out of hypothesis of the Forms to knowledge of the Forms, Socrates famously says that he knows that he does not know. He did not gain knowledge of the Forms through dialectic.
Cicero’s Laws that Strauss refers to as being “in summer where they seek the shade,” mentions Socrates exactly three times:
And therefore did Socrates deservedly execrate the man who first drew a distinction between the law of nature and the law of morals, for he justly conceived that this error is the source of most human vices (1.33).
—I think we should seek the boundaries which Socrates has laid down in relation to this question, and abide by them (1.56).
For I have never found water much colder than this, although I have seen a great number of rivers;—and I can hardly bear my foot in it when I wish to do what Socrates did in Plato’s Phædrus (2.6)
The Republic, which Strauss refers to as being “a dialogue in winter, where they seek the sun,” mentions Socrates six times, at 1.15, 1.16, 2.3, 2.22, 2.51, 3.5.
There is no connection whatsoever between the above instances and Alcibiades’ account of Socrates praying to the Sun in summer as discussed by Strauss in his Symposium lectures.
The island scene in Laws 2.1-2, is in summer, where they seek the shade, as stated by Strauss, which is why he contrasts this with Socrates’ seeking the Sun in summer. For Socrates, the light of the Sun (who is a God) symbolizes the light of knowledge and truth as he states in Plato’s Republic:
“Which one can you name of the divinities in heaven as the author and cause of this, whose light makes our vision see best and visible things to be seen?” “Why, the one that you too and other people mean for your question evidently refers to the Sun.” “Is not this, then, the relation of vision to that divinity?” (Rep 508a).
“This [the Sun], then, you must understand that I meant by the offspring of the Good which the Good begot to stand in a proportion with itself: as the Good is in the intelligible region to reason and the objects of reason, so is this [the Sun] in the visible world to vision and the objects of vision.” (Rep 508b - c ).
Therefore the Sun in Plato is a deity as stated by Strauss, and so is the Good. The Sun is the supreme God in the realm of sensibles and its creator, the Good or the One, is the supreme deity in the intelligible world. This is the core of Plato's theology.
As Strauss himself admits in Introductory Remarks:
We find something which is almost explicitly called the theology in the second book of the Republic
To recap. First, Socrates cannot have any connection with Cicero, for the simple reason that he lived centuries before Cicero.
Second, Strauss does not connect Socrates’ praying to the Sun in Plato’s Symposium with Atticus and Marcus’ contemplating in summer in Cicero’s Laws. He contrasts the former with the latter as Socrates contemplates in the sun whereas Atticus and Marcus contemplate in the shade:
Contemplation in summer distinguished from winter. What could that possibly mean? That theme is known to those of you who have read Cicero’s Republic and Laws. Cicero’s Republic is a dialogue in winter, where they seek the sun, and the Laws is a dialogue in summer, where they seek the shade. Socrates seeks the sun in summer, when it is hardest to bear; he seeks the light of the sun at its strongest. In accordance with that he prays to the sun at the end. Let us not forget that the sun is a cosmic god (p. 277)
Third, even if Strauss did make some connection between Alcibiades’ account of Socrates praying to the Sun to some other scene in Plato, he torpedoes his own connection by claiming (without adducing any evidence) that Alcibiades’ story is fiction.
If you claim that (1) A is connected to B and (2) A never took place (i.e., A doesn’t exist), then you have nothing to connect to B, and therefore no connection!
But I admit that Strauss does appear to have the occasional schizoaffective or delusional episode induced, no doubt, by his compulsive Maimonidean esotericism (as do some of his disciples) ….. :grin:
Reply to baker Yes, I was given some of Alain Du Bouton's books as gifts. I like him, he's a original thinker and very good writer. Jules Evans is another contemporary philosopher. Anyone who can break through and become recognised as a philosopher in popular culture, as distinct from the ivory tower, deserves respect in my mind, provided they're not spouting something morally objectionable.
Your petty small mindedness is something that neither Plato or anyone else can fix for you, so live in the bliss of your ignorance of your ignorance. Perhaps one day you will come to know yourself well enough to recognize how impoverished both your understanding and attitude are. If it is ever to happen the former will follow from the latter.
No. But desist from making many judgments to begin with.
Obviously, this wil make one unpopular in certain circles where having a lot of definitive opinions is required. But realistically, there are rather few things that one actually needs to have a definitive opinion about.
I don't disagree: I try to avoid making judgements, and having opinions, about as many things as possible. Most of the time when I have an opinion it is the opinion that we are not warranted in having an opinion. But when it comes to a potentially life or death decision such as whether to be vaccinated or not in a pandemic, I think a judgement to form the basis for action is called for. And in such a situation one really has nothing better to go by than the current medical advice.
Because philosophers are known for being such a happy bunch!
Are you claiming that they are known to be an unhappy bunch? Can you cite a list of examples that will make up the majority of philosophers? Or is that just a caricature based on a few notable malcontents?
But there is still an issue of power. Defining what is real for another person is an act of power.
It's not possible to do away with issues of power in interpersonal interactions of any kind, not even in philosophy.
Power is a problem only when it is misused. This is why it is important for all philosophers, beginners and experienced, to place themselves in the proper power context vis-a-vis one another.
This is why, traditionally, the cultivation of virtues is a preparatory stage to philosophy proper.
Socrates opinion about the gods is concealed because of his concern for the city and philosophy.
I would amend this statement by striking from it the consecutive words, “the city and”. Socrates considered philosophy the highest way of life, and natural; he did not, however, consider the city natural, nor did he believe there was any natural consonance between the philosopher and the city. Indeed the city and the philosopher are natural enemies; the latter founded on convention, the former born to dissolve that convention in order to get at the truth.
The reason Socrates conceals his true beliefs about the gods is because he wishes to avoid persecution by the city. This is the source of his irony. He wants that his hearers believe he believes as they do, while subtly expressing doubt through his questioning, to elicit those of his audience who might rise above the conventional opinion of the citizenry.
... while subtly expressing doubt through his questioning, to elicit those of his audience who might rise above the conventional opinion of the citizenry.
This is the other side of it. When one follows the arguments, his theology, what he said about gods, leads to questioning the gods. He does this, in part, by seeming to defend the gods. If the gods are good then they cannot do what the poets say they do. Talk of the gods is displaced by talk of the just, noble, and good.
Socrates' examination of the just, noble, and good exposes a tension between convention and philosophy. The assumption of the city is that the conventional is the good. The city is hostile to philosophy because it regards it as a threat to its conventions.
In the Republic and elsewhere Socrates argues that philosophy is not a threat but the greatest good for the city. On the one hand, with justice understood as minding your own business, the just city protects the self-interests of the philosopher. On the other, although the city may be hostile to philosophy, the philosopher is not hostile to the city. She recognizes the need to protect philosophy from the city, but also recognizes an obligation to it.
The reason Socrates conceals his true beliefs about the gods is because he wishes to avoid persecution by the city. This is the source of his irony. He wants that his hearers believe he believes as they do, while subtly expressing doubt through his questioning, to elicit those of his audience who might rise above the conventional opinion of the citizenry.
I do think Socrates works laterally in many exchanges to question a convention rather than declare something wrong outright. I am not sure of how cleanly the boundary between the realm of the city from the pursuit of philosophy is drawn. I don't think Socrates is hiding anything or avoiding persecution when he explains why he won't go into exile:
Plato, Crito, 51a, translated by Harold North Fowler:Or is your wisdom such that you do not see that your country is more precious and more to be revered and is holier and in higher esteem [51b] among the gods and among men of understanding than your mother and your father and all your ancestors, and that you ought to show to her more reverence and obedience and humility when she is angry than to your father, and ought either to convince her by persuasion or to do whatever she commands, and to suffer, if she commands you to suffer, in silence, and if she orders you to be scourged or imprisoned or if she leads you to war to be wounded or slain, her will is to be done, and this is right, and you must not give way or draw back or leave your post, but in war and in court and everywhere, [51c] you must do whatever the state, your country, commands, or must show her by persuasion what is really right, but that it is impious to use violence against either your father or your mother, and much more impious to use it against your country?” What shall we reply to this, Crito, that the laws speak the truth, or not?
The view of the city during attempts to persuade her of "what is really right" is different from attempts to see the city as itself. The staging of the Republic as taking place outside of Athens seems to point toward a tension between the two places but not that one cancels the other.
I don't think Socrates is hiding anything or avoiding persecution when he explains why he won't go into exile:
He is certainly not avoiding persecution by not going into exile, which would have been a way of avoiding it. But can we say Socrates is not hiding something? Consider to whom he speaks here, Crito, the sort of man devoted to his country and its laws, certainly not a philosopher:
Plato, Crito, 51a, translated by Harold North Fowler:What shall we reply to this, Crito, that the laws speak the truth, or not?
To such a one he cannot say, “Look, I love to question young men about their notions of justice and courage and moderation and the like—I’ve been doing it all my life, and it has been all I lived to do. But I’ve lived here in Athens all my life, and I’m an old man now, on the threshold of Hades: what great addition of my peculiar pleasure to a long life lived so pleasurably could I expect to get in exile?
“On the other hand, by displaying devotion to my country and its laws, I might gain favor in the eyes of posterity, and my life might be immortalized in the writings of one of my disciples, as Achilles’ was in Homer’s, thereby bestowing on me the only true immortality a man can have: the sort he can’t enjoy—and perhaps even helping philosophy survive by making it more palatable to aristocratic youth, the sort most likely to influence the regime’s opinions.”
Socrates knows full well that the laws don’t speak the truth!—but this appeal will work with a man like Crito.
The view of the city during attempts to persuade her of "what is really right" is different from attempts to see the city as itself.
But it was Socrates’ direct experience of Athens being wrong that undoubtedly taught him first-hand about the irrationality of the polis. I refer to the putting to death of the generals after the naval battle at Arginusae. Socrates’ vote was the only one in the council acquitting the generals. He alone, free of the theocratic terror that gripped the other councilmen, realized that more lives would have been lost by attempting to recover the bodies, that it is sometimes impractical to assuage the gods...
...more importantly he learned that, according to the polis, you must always assuage the gods.
He is certainly not avoiding persecution by not going into exile, which would have been a way of avoiding it. But can we say Socrates is not hiding something?
That's the big question. If he is hiding something, what exactly is it that he is hiding?
And, if he is not afraid of prosecution, why hide anything?
On the one hand, with justice understood as minding your own business, the just city protects the self-interests of the philosopher.
The city doesn’t protect the interests of the philosopher, whether it be just or unjust. Leaving aside the latter, even in Plato’s Republic, the ideal and just city, the philosophers are not allowed freedom as private men, “minding their own business” to pursue “the things under the earth and in the heavens”, but must be dragged back into the darkness of the cave to rule a merely temporal entity. Does that sound to you like a true philosopher’s business?
On the other, although the city may be hostile to philosophy, the philosopher is not hostile to the city.
The city is hostile to the philosopher precisely because the philosopher is hostile to the city—not in the way of ordinary lawbreakers, but implicitly, by calling the city’s dearest beliefs into question.
It is characteristic of modern thought that there must be a solution to every problem. Socrates and Plato knew much better: there are inherent problems we can ameliorate—but never eradicate...and some of these are imbedded in the nature of mankind. One of these is the tension b/w the philosopher and civil society: you can accommodate, but never entirely reconcile the two.
The response to this tension is what characterizes and explains the history of Western philosophy. The difference b/w ancient and modern philosophy is the difference b/w persuading aristocrats to accept philosophy, and forcing rulers to so do, and what made this difference was the advent of what we now call technology: modern philosophy, armed with the new practical science that not only explains all natural phenomena, but, more importantly, uses that knowledge to benefit mankind at large, could appeal to the hoi polloi above the heads of the nobles and tyrants and force the latter to leave science alone to pursue its objects in peace—
—except now an entirely different relationship b/w philosopher and civil society had come into being: the philosopher was a benefactor of mankind—just as he is in Plato’s Republic: as ruler! In The Republic he is forced to rule; in the modern dispensation, he chooses to. Swift’s Flying Island is conceived of, and nuclear weapons fall into the hands of both Roosevelt and Khrushchev...
...there was a time when an Archimedes, out of disdain for their practicality, destroyed the manuscripts of his that described the engines of war he fashioned in Syracuse to repel the invading Roman army. This was proof of his disinterested philosophical nature. Now, as I suppose, a scientist’s papers would receive short shrift unless they benefitted man through potential application of technology. This fact, I say, compromises the purity of the philosopher’s natural quest, what he was born to do: is he a benefactor of mankind, or a seeker of the truth? Are these two separate goals reconcilable?
He is certainly not avoiding persecution by not going into exile, which would have been a way of avoiding it. But can we say Socrates is not hiding something?
— Leghorn
That's the big question. If he is hiding something, what exactly is it that he is hiding?
And, if he is not afraid of prosecution, why hide anything?
Viewing him as a martyr makes sense of his trial and death sentence.
Viewing him as a martyr makes sense of his trial and death sentence.
Sure. The question remains, though, what exactly is he hiding? And if he is hiding things, how can we rely on what he is saying?
There are numerous instances in the dialogues where he appears to be praying, or is supposed to attend the worship of some deity or other. Is he pretending or being ironic in all cases?
I went down yesterday to the Peiraeus with Glaucon, the son of Ariston, to pay my devotions to the Goddess, and also because I wished to see how they would conduct the festival since this was its inauguration (Rep. 327a)
Reply to Apollodorus The problem appears to be the same as with some other religious martyrs.
If someone is so sure that things are exactly as they should be and that nothing happens without God's will -- then what exactly is going on??
The problem appears to be the same as with some other religious martyrs.
If someone is so sure that things are exactly as they should be and that nothing happens without God's will -- then what exactly is going on??
Good point. However, some seem to believe that he was an anti-religious martyr, something like a "militant atheist" under a theocratic system.
Personally, I do not think this is supported by the careful examination of the evidence. The charge against Socrates was (1) politically motivated and (2) it was not that he was an atheist but that he disrespected the Athenian Gods and introduced "new deities".
This is consistent with the mainstream scholarly view that Plato introduces a new theology based on cosmic Gods such as the Sun as a substitute for the traditional Olympic Gods (Zeus, Hera, et al.), as admitted even by anti-Platonists like Strauss.
Socrates knows full well that the laws don’t speak the truth!
As I noted earlier, both Plato's Laws and Cicero's Laws, as opposed to their Republic which takes place in the light of the sun, take place in the shade. As Strauss says succinctly:
... We seek light, we seek knowledge; shade, we seek obscurity.
Why is obscurity necessary for the Laws and not for the Republic? The answer has something to do with the fact that the Republic is a city in speech, it is theoretical, but the Laws has to do with the founding of an actual city. This is related to the theologico-political problem. On the one hand, political action requires concealment. On the other, what might be called "legal theology" or theology enacted in the laws requires that it be shaded from the light of truth. Men are lawmakers but they make it appear as though the authority for what they do lies with the gods. Nomos in the sense of custom must be honored, but as law it attempts to stand above what is customary.
Euthyphro is a distorted image of the lawmaker. Piety is for him the measure of the law. Socrates, in praying to the gods, does what is customary. But Socrates' actions are guided by his views of the just, noble, and good not by piety.
The city is hostile to the philosopher precisely because the philosopher is hostile to the city—not in the way of ordinary lawbreakers, but implicitly, by calling the city’s dearest beliefs into question.
If the philosopher does this for the benefit of the city is this still a hostile act or a benevolent one? But here Plato puts his thumb on the scale. In the Republic the philosopher is not one who inquires but one who knows what is best for the city. The philosopher in the Republic has knowledge of the good. But, of course, this is not a true image of the philosopher. Plato makes the philosopher appear to be more beneficial to the city than he might be. Were Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle hostile to the city? Did their activities cause more harm than good? Those who wished to conserve the old ways might think they did, but if the old is not the good then it is not so clear that what they did was not for the good of the city.
He is certainly not avoiding persecution by not going into exile, which would have been a way of avoiding it. But can we say Socrates is not hiding something?
I agree that Socrates is hiding many things, that was what I was referring to when saying the place where he tries to persuade is different from where he looks at that activity from the outside, as it were.
What I read to be sincere in the passage was how his devotion to the city gave him the right to criticize and attempt to change it. He suffers the cruelty and ignorance of the city and his acceptance gives him the right to confront its decisions and standards. In that sense, the city belongs to him to whatever extent the city claims he belongs to it.
This obligation to what brought him into the world sees filial duty and that of the citizen together in the Crito dialogue. In the Republic, the relationship between those elements is brought into question. Can it be said that the obligation itself has been surpassed?
Power is a problem only when it is misused. This is why it is important for all philosophers, beginners and experienced, to place themselves in the proper power context vis-a-vis one another.
This is why, traditionally, the cultivation of virtues is a preparatory stage to philosophy proper.
I do think Socrates works laterally in many exchanges to question a convention rather than declare something wrong outright.
Although the images are vertical - ascent, higher, the importance of lateral exchange should not be ignored. It is often a matter of a shift in focus or attention.
I am not sure of how cleanly the boundary between the realm of the city from the pursuit of philosophy is drawn.
This raises all sorts of questions. A distinction must be made between the philosopher in the Republic and actual philosophers. But this raises the question of who the philosopher is in distinction from those who call themselves or are called by others philosophers. Both actual philosophers and actual cities exist in the realm of opinion. The city regards itself as wise, but does not make the distinction between knowledge and opinion. The philosopher's knowledge of ignorance is not simply a matter of knowing he is ignorant but knowledge of what it means to think, choose, and acting in the face of his ignorance.
If the city is the cave and responsible for our opinions, is the city responsible for the philosopher? Or is philosophy something that arises contrary to the city? Is the education of the philosopher dependent on or independent of the city?
When reading Plato the problem of concealment stands together with the problem of interpretation. Someone lacking the ability to interpret is not even aware that there is anything concealed. They are content with what the see and may even vehemently deny that there is another other than plainly stated claims that they accept as true.
The problem is not that anyone can read what is written, but the author is not there to respond to misunderstandings and misrepresentations. In the Seventh Letter Plato says:
Therefore every man of worth, when dealing with matters of worth, will be far from exposing them to ill feeling and misunderstanding among men by committing them to writing.
It is not that there is some secret teaching hidden in the dialogues meant only for initiates into the mysteries. It is, rather, that there are matters that those too attached to their beliefs would be hostile to, things that are not understand by men who are not of worth and cannot deal with matters of worth.
But Plato did write, and it would be wrong to assume he did not say anything of worth in his writings. He devised ways of keeping things from readers who are not suited to read them while making them available to those capable of interpretation and following the arguments wherever they lead. So we find statements and claims that give the impression that he or Socrates thinks or believes one thing or another only to find that he says something else elsewhere in the same or another dialogue. Even the impression that is Plato or Socrates and the problem of whether it is one or the other or both is the result of an act of concealment.
The charge against Socrates was (1) politically motivated and (2) it was not that he was an atheist but that he disrespected the Athenian Gods and introduced "new deities".
I reread the Apology not long ago, and if I remember correctly, during his trial, Socrates WAS charged with atheism...some of you who can retrieve the passage more quickly than I can at this late hour might help me out here.
As far as “politically motivated” goes, are you referring to “corrupting the youth”, the formal charge, or to something different? As far as I know, corrupting the youth in this context is really the same thing as teaching gods different from those of the city.
I reread the Apology not long ago, and if I remember correctly, during his trial, Socrates WAS charged with atheism...some of you who can retrieve the passage more quickly than I can at this late hour might help me out here.
Regarding the motivation of his accusers, Socrates says:
From among them Meletus attacked me, and Anytus and Lycon, Meletus angered on account of the poets, and Anytus on account of the artisans and the public men (23e)
So, it appears that Anytus, Meletus and others had some grudge against him.
Regarding the charges against Socrates, "corrupting the youth" was one of them and "introducing new Gods" would amount to "corrupting the youth".
However, my comment referred to Socrates being taken to court for "making new Gods" and "not believing in the old ones" which seems different from "atheism" in the sense of "believing that there is no God"
In the Euthyphro Socrates says:
For he says I am a maker of gods; and because I make new gods and do not believe in the old ones, he indicted me for the sake of these old ones, as he says (3b)
And in the Apology:
Let us take up in turn their sworn statement. It is about as follows: it states that Socrates is a wrongdoer because he corrupts the youth and does not believe in the gods the state believes in, but in other new spiritual beings (24b-c)
The issue is how do we reconcile Socrates' "making new Gods", "believing in new spiritual beings", and the various instances in the dialogues where he appears to be praying and/or worshiping some deity, with the view that he was an "atheist"?
However, my comment referred to Socrates being taken to court for "making new Gods" and "not believing in the old ones" which seems different from "atheism" in the sense of "believing that there is no God"
Those were the two formal charges. But Meletus goes further: at 26c-d (Thomas G. West’s translation), Socrates asks him:
“...Or do you assert that I myself do not believe in gods at all and that I teach this to others?”
[MELETUS] This is what I say, that you do not believe in gods at all.
[SOCRATES] Wondrous Meletus, why do you say this? Do I not even believe, then, that sun and moon are gods, as other human beings do?
[MELETUS] No, by Zeus, judges, since he declares that the sun is stone and the moon is earth.
Socrates then goes on to make fun of Meletus, “as if he were to say, ‘Socrates does injustice by not believing in gods, but believing in gods’”, for Meletus’ formal indictment was (24b), “Socrates does injustice by corrupting the young, and by not believing in the gods in whom the city believes, but in other daimonia that are novel.”
The issue is how do we reconcile Socrates' "making new Gods", "believing in new spiritual beings", and the various instances in the dialogues where he appears to be praying and/or worshiping some deity, with the view that he was an "atheist"?
It is a difficult question, requiring intimate familiarity—which I do not possess—with not only Plato’s works, not only Xenophon’s in addition, but also the greatest interpretations of Socrates down through the tradition. It would also require the ability to interpret Socrates’ life through those works:
When reading Plato the problem of concealment stands together with the problem of interpretation. Someone lacking the ability to interpret is not even aware that there is anything concealed. They are content with what they see and may even vehemently deny that there is another [way of seeing these things] other than the plainly stated claims that they accept as true.
It would be easy for a modern educated liberal student of him to be unable to believe that Socrates actually believed in gods— and it would be difficult for a theist not to be heartened by Socrates’ prayers and worship. To the former I would point out all these signs of Socrates’ piety; to the latter, I would point out that we cannot know what is really going on in the mind of a man who prays silently.
It would be easy for a modern educated liberal student of him to be unable to believe that Socrates actually believed in gods— and it would be difficult for a theist not to be heartened by Socrates’ prayers and worship. To the former I would point out all these signs of Socrates’ piety; to the latter, I would point out that we cannot know what is really going on in the mind of a man who prays silently.
Well said.
That observation returns us to the beginning of the OP and the proposal of a continuity of meaning from Plato down through the last of the Neoplatonists. However one stands upon the issue, the latter are unmistakably theist in their language and read Plato as a unified cosmogony. Augustine took hold of the package and remodeled it for the purpose of explicating Christian doctrine.
In the context of those conditions, being able to read Plato without assuming it was a theological text is a relatively recent development.
But we have no signs of Socrates' piety. We have the stories of Plato and Xenophon who wrote in light of the trial and prosecution of Socrates. There was good reason to portray Socrates as pious in both the conventional and an unconventional way.
It is not without significance that Plato brings Anaxagoras into the trial. It is not just Socrates but philosophy that is on trial. It should be noted that Socrates neither affirms nor denies that the sun is a rock and not a god.
All too often it is unreflectively assumed that talk of god or gods is about the same thing. Although Plato wrote a dialogue that asked what piety is, there is no dialogue that asks what a god or a deity or a divinity or daimonion or the divine is.
When the question of whether or not Socrates was an atheist is raised we need to ask just what specifically it is that one thinks is being denied or affirmed. Did he believe in the gods of the city? Did he believe in one or more of the gods recognized as gods today?
What is the relationship between gods and Forms? What is the relationship between theology and religion? Between gods and religion?
The problem was raised regarding how Socrates is seen in light of current views. We must also consider how he was and is seen under the influence of Platonism and Christian Platonism where it is unquestionably assumed that he did believe in gods as they did. But we must also look back prior to Platonism. The pre-Socratic philosophers, sophists, and those educated by them were not bound by such assumptions. In other words, appeal to the views of modern, educated liberal students on the one hand, and Platonists on the other solves nothing. They are not the only options.
What both might overlook but we should not is that questions about gods could not be raised without regard for politics and public opinion without great risk.
But we have no signs of Socrates' piety. We have the stories of Plato and Xenophon who wrote in light of the trial and prosecution of Socrates..
What signs of Socrates’ piety would you accept as proof then of his belief or disbelief in god? confession from his own lips? But those lips have been silenced for millennia...well, only literally: we have the “stories” of Plato and Xenophon about him—which may be better than having him in praesentia before us, as I’ve been told—for I doubt that either Socrates confessed his atheism to Plato or Xenophon, his most prized pupils, or that they asked him whether he believed in god or not.
There was good reason to portray Socrates as pious in both the conventional and an unconventional way.
The only way I’m familiar with from the dialogues of Plato is the latter...unless you mean the descriptions of him praying to the goddess, etc. I wonder: did he ever exclaim, as did his many interlocutors, in any of the dialogues, “by Zeus!”, or, “by Hera!”, or any of the other stock exclamatory theistic formulae? That would be an interesting topic of research.
It is not without significance that Plato brings Anaxagoras into the trial. It is not just Socrates but philosophy that is on trial.
But, if I recall correctly, Socrates in that passage attempts to distance himself from that natural philosopher, saying that Anaxagoras’ works can be so cheaply bought that the young can purchase them and learn these ideas without having to bother Socrates to learn them, “especially since they are so strange” that he would never espouse them.
But this passage is fraught with irony. Firstly, Socrates never charged anyone a fee for his audience (though a “tip” might have been accepted) and therefore, to learn these ideas might have been even cheaper through him. Secondly, the charge Socrates brings of “strangeness” to Anaxagoras’ ideas is ironic, since so many of his own ideas are strange.
What signs of Socrates’ piety would you accept as proof then of his belief or disbelief in god?
Both Plato and Xenophon defend Socrates in a way that he does not defend himself in their accounts of the trial. What we read of his piety should be seen in light of their rhetoric. In the Euthyphro Socrates places the just above piety to the gods. In Plato's Apology he demonstrates his obedience to the god by doubting what the oracle said and trying to show it was wrong. His daimonion is problematic because it is a personal deity, which is quite different from the gods of the city as well as gods of the cosmos.
if I recall correctly, Socrates in that passage attempts to distance himself from that natural philosopher, saying that Anaxagoras’ works can be so cheaply bought that the young can purchase them and learn these ideas without having to bother Socrates to learn them, “especially since they are so strange” that he would never espouse them.
Correct. In fact, in the Phaedo (98b) Socrates relates how he started his true philosophical career by renouncing Anaxagoras' materialism.
Had he been an atheist all those years, he would have been taken to court much sooner. But he was taken to court very late in life and only after falling out with Anytus and others (Meno 95a).
I think on the whole the arguments for Socrates being an atheist are very weak and unconvincing.
More generally, what we must not overlook is that religious beliefs were quite common among ancient philosophers, and it seems unwarranted to assume that they all were secret atheists.
I think he found Anaxagoras unsatisfactory and disappointing.
In any case, I don't see Socrates taking a huge interest in Anaxagorean materialism, and unlike Anaxagoras, he did not deny the divinity of Sun and Moon.
Reply to Apollodorus
Whoa there, fellow reader of the Dialogues.
I did not mean to argue whether Socrates was an atheist or not.
You referred to a bit of text as amounting to something. I took issue with the reading.
If the difference is not a difference in your mind, just ignore it.
Socrates in that passage [Apology, 26d-e] attempts to distance himself from that natural philosopher
— Leghorn
He correctly points to Anaxagoras as the source of that claim, but he does not distance himself from it. He neither confirms nor denies.
O Morosophos, do you assert that distancing yourself from something is the same thing as denying it? Does not Socrates in that passage ridicule Anaxagoras’ notions as so strange that no reasonable person would assign them to him? Is this not distancing himself from Anaxagoras and his ideas?
Nevertheless I agree with you that he doesn’t come out and boldly proclaim that the sun is not a rock, and the moon not earth, and I believe this fact indicates he may have believed something similar to what Anaxagoras taught.
In any case, I don't see Socrates taking a huge interest in Anaxagorean materialism, and unlike Anaxagoras, he did not deny the divinity of Sun and Moon.
So I learn from @Fooloso4 that Socrates neither confirms nor denies the divinity of the sun and moon, and I learn from @Apollodorus that he does not deny that same divinity—seems like you guys have at least half of something in common—unless you, O Morosophos, further agree that Socrates never denied the divinity of Sun and Moon. In which case, y’all would be in total agreement!...
...but I suspect that even if y’all agreed that Socrates neither denied nor confirmed those celestial beings to be gods, you would disagree as to how this fact is to be INTERPRETED...and that is the crux of the problem. I suspect Socrates and Plato wanted it to be that way: ambiguous and open to interpretation.
I suspect Socrates and Plato wanted it to be that way: ambiguous and open to interpretation.
Your suspicion possibly points in the right direction.
However, my own suspicion would be that Socrates does not only not deny the divinity of Sun and Moon, but positively acknowledges them as “Gods in heaven” as in the Republic (Rep. 508a) and in the Timaeus where the heavenly bodies are said to be divine, in fact, the whole Cosmos is an ensouled, living being:
We must declare that this Cosmos has verily come into existence as a Living Creature endowed with soul and reason owing to the providence of God (Tim. 30b)
Could it be that Plato became so popular precisely because he was not an atheist and that his views resonated with those of the majority of philosophy students?
I wonder: did he ever exclaim, as did his many interlocutors, in any of the dialogues, “by Zeus!”, or, “by Hera!”, or any of the other stock exclamatory theistic formulae? That would be an interesting topic of research.
As it happens, Socrates does use theistic expressions like "by Zeus" (Cratylus 423c; Rep. 345b) and "if God wills" (Phaedo 69d) quite frequently.
They are not always translated literally, but if you look at the Greek text, you will often find "nai/ma Dia", "yes/no by Zeus/God", etc.
do you assert that distancing yourself from something is the same thing as denying it?
As to whether the sun was a rock, he neither affirms nor denies it. As to whether Anaxagoras' Mind is a cause, he found it problematic. Anaxagoras' explanation did not show how Mind order each thing in a way that is best. (Phaedo 97b-d)
I believe this fact indicates he may have believed something similar to what Anaxagoras taught.
The passage from the Phaedo is a prelude to Socrates "second sailing", which he calls his safe answer, the hypothesis of Forms. He shifts from Mind to his own mind.(99d-100a) He arranges things according to kind. That it is best that they be this way, either as a way of understanding things or as things are, is something he does not show. As to the relationship between a Form and a thing of that Form he says he cannot insist on the nature of that relationship. (100e). Later he recognizes the need to reintroduce physical causes. He calls the safe answer, his hypothesis of the Forms ignorant. (105b-c)
This statement leaves me very perplexed, since we only know Socrates’ defense of himself from Plato’s and Xenophon’s accounts of it.
Right. That is why I said, in their accounts of the trial. We do not know what he actually said, but we do know that both Plato and Xenophon defended him in their works after their Apologies.
I suspect Socrates and Plato wanted it to be that way: ambiguous and open to interpretation.
I think both would agree that whatever Socrates might have believed about the gods is secondary to the truth about the gods. To even raise the question is an impiety. To who or what do we turn to learn the truth about the gods? Do we believe the poets and their stories of the gods acting unjustly? Do we turn to reasoned argument? In that case the authority of reason stands above the gods, for it is reason that determines their truth.
We must declare that this Cosmos has verily come into existence as a Living Creature endowed with soul and reason owing to the providence of God (Tim. 30b)
Could it be that Plato became so popular precisely because he was not an atheist and that his views resonated with those of the majority of philosophy students?
I suspect the reason is more likely this: “But why, then, do some enjoy spending so much time with me? You have heard, men of Athens; I told you the whole truth. It is because they enjoy hearing men examined who suppose they are wise, but are not. For it is not unpleasant.”—Apology 33b-c, West translation.
This statement leaves me very perplexed, since we only know Socrates’ defense of himself from Plato’s and Xenophon’s accounts of it.
— Leghorn
Right. That is why I said, in their accounts of the trial. We do not know what he actually said, but we do know that both Plato and Xenophon defended him in their works after their Apologies.
But your statement is unsubstantiated: since we do not know what Socrates actually said, how can you say that Plato and Xenophon didn’t faithfully portray his defense? Does Plato’s portrayal contradict Xenophon’s?
It is the Platonic perspective with which Socrates' statements are in agreement. Why would he spend hours in the Phaedo trying to convince people of the immortality of the soul and divine judgement in the after life, if he is an atheist?
Similarly, in Gorgias he says that he is convinced of divine judgement after death and urges all men to join him in this belief in order to save themselves in the other world (Gorgias 526e). He repeats this in the Republic (621c), etc.
But your statement is unsubstantiated: since we do not know what Socrates actually said, how can you say that Plato and Xenophon didn’t faithfully portray his defense?
I am referring to their Socratic apologies compared to their Socratic dialogues, Socrates in a public, legal forum versus Socrates in private conversation.
Why would he [Socrates] spend hours in the Phaedo trying to convince people of the immortality of the soul and divine judgement in the after life, if he is an atheist?
Why would he suggest it is possible that death is like a dreamless sleep in the Apology? I quote from West’s translation at 40c. Socrates speaks:
“Let us also think in the following way how great a hope there is that it [death] is good. Now being dead is either of two things. For either it is like being nothing and the dead man has no perception of anything, or else, in accordance with the things said, it happens to be a sort of change and migration of the soul from the place here to another place.”
There are a couple things that stick out to me in this statement. The first is that Socrates confines the possibilities of what death is to just two things, which correspond to the atheistic and theistic versions: there are no third nor fourth, etc, options available. Why does belief in god(s) require the immortality of soul? Because we wouldn’t believe in them unless we were granted the same immortality they enjoy?
The second thing that impresses my mind is the insertion of the phrase, “...in accordance with the things said...,” for it is just this, the things that are said, that Socrates has been contradicting all his life. At 40d-e he continues...
“And if in fact there is no perception [after death], but it is like a sleep in which the sleeper has no dream at all, death would be a wondrous gain. For I suppose that if someone had to select that night in which he slept so soundly that he did not even dream and had to compare the other nights and days of his own life with that night, and then had to say on consideration how many days and nights in his own life he has lived better and more pleasantly than that night, then I suppose that even the Great King [of Persia] himself, not to mention some private man, would discover that they are easy to count in comparison with the other days and nights. So if death is something like this, I at least say it is a gain. For all time appears in this way indeed to be nothing more than one night.”
What strikes me in this passage is that Socrates favorably compares the one eternal night of perceptionless sleep to—not just the many nights full of dream, and thus perception, we experience while alive, but also to the DAYS, in which we are awake. Even the King of Persia, the popularly considered happiest man, would prefer it! Life is but a nightmare in which you row, row, row your boat—not gently down the stream, but strenuously up against a contrary one. You suffer unhappiness during your waking hours, then have bad dreams while asleep, waking only to repeat the process—who wouldn’t prefer an eternal night of dreamlessness to this?
But Socrates appears to us to have lived a happy life—however much he was harassed by Xanthippe, or prosecuted for impiety, or criticized by Cleitophon, etc. So the above argument, though his own, doesn’t seem to apply to himself. For he is not speaking to himself, but rather to those who voted for his acquittal. He himself, we presume, would want to go on living the blessed life we suppose he lived—yet he chose death. He continues (40e-41c):
“On the other hand, if death is like a journey from here to another place, and if the things that are said are true...,”—cf “in accordance with the things said,” above: he continues to stress that the second alternative, that death is a journey to another place, is something merely spoken of—“that in fact all the dead are there, then what greater good could there be than this, judges? For if one who arrives in Hades, released from those here who claim to be judges, will find those who are judges in truth—the very ones who are said to give judgement there...,”—here again he points out that these things are only reported, not necessarily factual—“Minos and Rhadamanthys, and Aeacus, and Triptolemus, and those of the other demigods who turned out to be just in their own lives—would this journey be a paltry one?”
Suffice it to say that Socrates continues on to list other renowned men he would be more than glad to converse with in Hades. But this one statement, at 41b, sticks out: “And certainly the greatest thing is that I would pass my time examining and searching out among those there—just as I do those here—who among them is wise, and who supposes he is, but is not.” (!) Didn’t he just say he looked forward to finding the true judges there? Now he is saying he will examine them too, just as he did the mortal judges on earth, to see if they are wise, not assuming, as the many do, that they are actually wise!
What daring! What hubris!—to examine the greatest of all time in the afterlife—That is our humble Socrates.
I see what you mean and I certainly don’t disagree. :smile:
However, expressions like "in accordance with the things said" may well be just a manner of speech.
Also, there may be a difference between the way Socrates presents his case to the court and the things he says privately to people who are close to him.
I think his statements in the Phaedo shouldn't be ignored. Would he spend the last hours of his life convincing others of things he himself doesn’t believe in?
I do agree that the impression one gets of Plato is that sometimes he simply wants to get people to think and other times he has some message to convey. But if he does have a message, it does not seem to be atheism. Questioning and examining beliefs, yes, because that is his (or Socrates') particular way. But this does not amount to outright rejection or denial.
At any rate, I know of no serious scholars who are taking the stance that Plato is an atheist. Nor is there any independent credible tradition that claims this to be the case. I could be wrong though.
The first is that Socrates confines the possibilities of what death is to just two things, which correspond to the atheistic and theistic versions: there are no third nor fourth, etc, options available. Why does belief in god(s) require the immortality of soul? Because we wouldn’t believe in them unless we were granted the same immortality they enjoy?
That is an interesting question. It reflects how our use of the division "atheist versus theist" is a species of the "modern educated liberal student " you referred to before. In the Laws, starting from 885b, Plato argues that the legislation of piety requires declaring that the soul was created prior to all other things as the explanation for natural causes. This entangles the distinction between what is natural from what is artificial in terms quite different foreign from our modern discourse. We take the recourse to adequate means to seek natural causes for granted. Plato did not have recourse to such a nifty tool.
The way we treat theism/atheism as an inseparable pair may frame our desire for immortality as the reason we talk of the gods.
It does not help address these questions from Fooloso4:
When the question of whether or not Socrates was an atheist is raised we need to ask just what specifically it is that one thinks is being denied or affirmed. Did he believe in the gods of the city? Did he believe in one or more of the gods recognized as gods today?
For if one who arrives in Hades, released from those here who claim to be judges, will find those who are judges in truth ...
In other words, only the dead can judge the truth of death, but they are dead and, if death is like a dreamless sleep, then they cannot judge either. So how are we to judge whether the truth is in accordance with things said? Once again, Socrates points to our ignorance. The things said, are just that, things said. We cannot advance from the things said to the truth of what is said. Once again, we are led to aporia.
In the Laws, starting from 885b, Plato argues that the legislation of piety requires declaring that the soul was created prior to all other things as the explanation for natural causes.
A few points should be noted. First, they are making laws. The law itself is not natural. The city itself is not natural. Second, in the Timaeus neither the world soul nor the human soul was created first. As things made they are not eternal. Timaeus' speech was to be made for the purpose of seeing the Republic at war, that is, in action. A task that is left incomplete.
The craftsman, "the poet and father" (28e) is himself the work of Timaeus' poetry. The craftsman says he is "craftsman and father" of the gods who make gods. (41a) The craftsman of the craftsman, Timaeus, is the craftsman of the gods. But Timaeus himself is the work Plato and his poetry.
Reply to Fooloso4
The law is arbitrary and and does not fit with the Timaeus or the limits of understanding the natural world as expressed by Socrates in a number of dialogues.
The use of the statement as a justification for outlawing impiety is interesting because it defends the existence of gods by demanding a certain view of the natural world rather than citing how angry gods will get if not worshiped properly.
Point! However, you're a veteran philosopher and philosophizing is second nature to you, your middle name so to speak. For beginners, on the other hand, how to do philosophy? is a skill that has a steep learning curve, especially for those self-taught. Self-help books on philosophy are just what the doctor ordered!
So a (small) contribution provoking more clarity of purposes, no?
Also this: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/574601
... it defends the existence of gods by demanding a certain view of the natural world ...
I take it you mean this:
For the result of the arguments of such people is this,—that when you and I try to prove the existence of the gods by pointing to these very objects—sun, moon, stars, and earth—as instances of deity and divinity, people who have been converted by these scientists will assert that these things are simply earth and stone, incapable of paying any heed to human affairs, and that these beliefs of ours are speciously tricked out with arguments to make them plausible. (886d-e)
The concern here seems to be twofold, first, the implications of the scientific view rather than the truth of it. This is the problem Socrates points to with Anaxagoras. Second, a proper account of the gods, theology, must take into account the human good. This is what Leo Strauss refers to as the theologico-political problem.
Reply to Fooloso4
Yes, that passage is the start of the argument against the "scientists." But before the explanation of what should be accepted as "natural" is given, the matter is connected to the role of convention:
[890a] is at that time authoritative, though it owes its existence to art and the laws, and not in any way to nature. All these, my friends, are views which young people imbibe from men of science, both prose-writers and poets, who maintain that the height of justice is to succeed by force; whence it comes that the young people are afflicted with a plague of impiety, as though the gods were not such as the law commands us to conceive them; and, because of this, factions also arise, when these teachers attract them towards the life that is right “according to nature,” which consists in being master over the rest in reality, instead of being a slave to others according to legal convention.
The matter of nature versus convention is being directly connected to a discussion of who is above the law. That certainly did not come up when I studied the behavior of fruit flies. It involves other issues than a person believing or not believing in a divine agent. The next statement from the Athenian brings in a tiny bit of Socratic persuasion while considering proper punishment for the crime:
Ibid:What, then, do you think the lawgiver ought to do, seeing that these people have been armed in this way for a long time past? Should he merely stand up in the city and threaten all the people that unless they affirm that the gods exist and conceive them in their minds to be such as the law maintains2 and so likewise with regard to the beautiful and the just and all the greatest things, [890c] as many as relate to virtue and vice, that they must regard and perform these in the way prescribed by the lawgiver in his writings; and that whosoever fails to show himself obedient to the laws must either be put to death or else be punished, in one case by stripes and imprisonment, in another by degradation, in others by poverty and exile? But as to persuasion, should the lawgiver, while enacting the people's laws, refuse to blend any persuasion with his statements, and thus tame them so far as possible? [890d]
The Dialogues challenge us to ask how much to accept or question convention while seeking the actual Good rather than poor copies of it. The distance between that openness to discover what is not known and this argument for the gods upon the basis of service is large.
I spoke too broadly when saying the account of soul in the Laws did not fit the story of the Timaeus. It is an edited version of some details to serve a rhetorical purpose. Regarding how to view "materialism" versus "form" there is this observation:
Ibid:Athenian: The sun's body is seen by everyone, its soul by no one. And the same is true of the soul of any other body, whether alive or dead, of living beings. There is, however, a strong suspicion that this class of object, which is wholly imperceptible to sense, [898e] has grown round all the senses of the body,2 and is an object of reason alone. Therefore by reason and rational thought let us grasp this fact about it,—
Clinias: What fact?
Athenian: If soul drives round the sun, we shall be tolerably sure to be right in saying that it does one of three things.
Clinias: What things?
Athenian: That either it exists everywhere inside of this apparent globular body and directs it, such as it is, just as the soul in us moves us about in all ways; or, having procured itself a body of fire or air (as some argue), it in the form of body pushes forcibly on the body from outside; [899a] or, thirdly, being itself void of body, but endowed with other surpassingly marvellous potencies, it conducts the body.
It sounds like what we have sorted out as materialist or not in our modern lexicon is not a deal breaker to accepting the divine for Plato.
As related in the Timaeus, in the beginning God created the Cosmos as a living being endowed with a soul and reason. He next created the Cosmic Gods, i.e., the Earth, Sun, Moon, Stars and other heavenly bodies as living creatures, from whom were born Cronos and Rhea, Zeus and Hera, and the other Gods:
Wherefore, as a consequence of this reasoning and design on the part of God, with a view to the generation of Time, the Sun and Moon and five other stars, which bear the appellation of “planets,” came into existence for the determining and preserving of the numbers of Time. And when God had made the bodies of each of them He placed them in the orbits along which the revolution of the Other was moving, seven orbits for the seven bodies. The Moon He placed in the first circle around the Earth, the Sun in the second above the Earth; and the Morning Star and the Star called Sacred to Hermes He placed in those circles which move in an orbit equal to the Sun in velocity, but endowed with a power contrary thereto; whence it is that the Sun and the Star of Hermes and the Morning Star regularly overtake and are overtaken by one another. As to the rest of the stars, were one to describe in detail the positions in which He set them, and all the reasons therefore, the description, though but subsidiary, would prove a heavier task than the main argument which it subserves. Later on, perhaps, at our leisure these points may receive the attention they merit. So when each of the bodies whose co-operation was required for the making of Time had arrived in its proper orbit; and when they had been generated as living creatures, having their bodies bound with living bonds, and had learnt their appointed duties … Thus He spake, and once more into the former bowl, wherein He had blended and mixed the Soul of the Universe, He poured the residue of the previous material, mixing it in somewhat the same manner, yet no longer with a uniform and invariable purity, but second and third in degree of purity. And when He had compounded the whole He divided it into souls equal in number to the stars....(38c-41d)
It sounds like what we have sorted out as materialist or not in our modern lexicon is not a deal breaker to accepting the divine for Plato.
By the divine do you mean the intelligible soul?
The Athenian says:
If soul does drive the sun around ...
Whether or not it does is an open question. In Anaxagoras' account Nous orders all things but he holds that the sun and moon are rocks. Why does the Athenian propose that the sun is driven by its own soul? Is there some concern with autonomy? Some problem with a separate Mind that imposes order? Is this related to the political order and the imposition of laws?
Reply to Athena (1) Did you ask @TheMadFool if he had perceived my reply to him as "disrespectful" and that he told you so? His reply to my reply, which I have quoted above (with a follow-up link to another reply no less), certainly suggests he didn't think I'd given offense. And nothing "negative" has followed between us from that exchange either. In any case, I'll gladly apologize to TheMadFool if he now says my reply to him (quoted above) was "disrespectful" to him. (2) So tell me, "Miss Manners", on what basis do youaccuse me of this "disrespectfulness"? (3) And lastly, since mine are evident on the first several pages of this thread, where are yourpositive contributions to this topic? (Answering these three questions might count as you contributing something.)
I was referring to the way the "scientists" are viewed as being against the existence of the gods because of the power that arrogates to themselves at the expense of duty to the city.The observation was directed toward how we are using the terms of "atheist versus theist" in my reply to Leghorn saying:
There are a couple things that stick out to me in this statement. The first is that Socrates confines the possibilities of what death is to just two things, which correspond to the atheistic and theistic versions: there are no third nor fourth, etc, options available. Why does belief in god(s) require the immortality of soul? Because we wouldn’t believe in them unless we were granted the same immortality they enjoy?
The way we use the terms to affirm or deny what is believed by an individual to be true is going to have trouble in a land where the line between Olympian Gods and a rational Creator has not been clearly drawn. This goes back to me agreeing with you that Plato is not a unitary model but adding the caveat that what counts as a model of the divine will become more difficult to identify.
The Athenian says:
If soul does drive the sun around ...
Whether or not it does is an open question. In Anaxagoras' account Nous orders all things but he holds that the sun and moon are rocks. Why does the Athenian propose that the sun is driven by its own soul? Is there some concern with autonomy? Some problem with a separate Mind that imposes order? Is this related to the political order and the imposition of laws?
As regards to there being a problem with a separate mind imposing order, the Athenian's argument does resemble Aristotle's' approach of reasoning backwards to the Prime Mover. We don't get to look over his shoulder while he is making stuff the way we can in Timaeus' Craftsman's shop. On the other hand, Aristotle cannot have been a supporter of legislating upon the pursuit of natural causes seeing as how he did exactly that for a long time.
Pardon me if I don't respond to any responses for a while. I am giving my laptop to somebody else for a few weeks. I need to explore other regions of the soul.
"Scientists" is an infelicitous translation, Pangle has "men considered wise by young people". (890) This explains why the poets are included. Things are complicated by this:
What pertains to the ancients should be left alone and bid good-bye ... but what pertains to our new and wise men must be accused in so far as it responsible for bad things. (886d)
Surely the ancients include the poets Hesiod and Homer. Should they be included in those:
who maintain that the height of justice is to succeed by force
or excluded because they are among the ancients? To put it differently, does the fault lie with atheists? They after all were the primary source of stories about the gods.
The observation was directed toward how we are using the terms of "atheist versus theist" in my reply to Leghorn ...
If I understand you correctly, I agree. In the Apology Socrates points to different ways in which the term atheist is used as an accusation. In addition, I don't think belief in gods requires the immortality of the soul. In fact, a common distinction was made between mortal men and immortal gods.
The way we use the terms to affirm or deny what is believed by an individual to be true is going to have trouble in a land where the line between Olympian Gods and a rational Creator has not been clearly drawn.
This is part of what Socrates was ensnared in. A rational Creator is not the gods of the city. It is an innovation. The accusation of atheism would in one sense of the term be accurate.
...the caveat that what counts as a model of the divine will become more difficult to identify.
Two comments: First, it is generally the Biblical God who is identified with will, with the Greeks emphasizing intellect. Second, there are some theologians, both ancient and modern, who either eschew any such description (negative or apophatic theology) or reject and kind of personification or anthropomorphism (Tillich, the ground of being).
Pardon me if I don't respond to any responses for a while. I am giving my laptop to somebody else for a few weeks. I need to explore other regions of the soul.
However, expressions like "in accordance with the things said" may well be just a manner of speech.
By “a manner of speech” are you referring to a formulaic expression, like, “Let me be (very, perfectly) clear,” or “At the end of the day,” or “It was (good, useful, helpful, etc.) until it wasn’t,” or “These are not partisan issues,” or any of the other stock phrases that are so popular now? These sorts of phrases have little variability and wide application. Let’s compare Socrates’ phrases in the Apology from 40c through 41c, to see if they resemble these sorts of “manners of speech”, for I have found as many as four of them there that stress the fact that the popular accounts of the afterlife are merely “things said”. I quote them in the order in which they occur:
1) “in accordance with the things said”, (kata ta legomena); 2) “and if the things that are said are true”, (kai [ei] alethe esti ta legomena); 3) “the very ones who are said to give judgement there”, (oiper kai legontai ekei dikazein); 4) “at least if the things that are said are in fact true”, (eiper ge ta legomena alethe estin).
Of these four phrases, three have one word in common, ta legomena (“the things said”), and two of those share the additional words, alethe esti (“are true”). The third numbered phrase, however, is radically different, having in common with ta legomena only the same verb in a different form, legontai (“are said”).
I think this linguistic analysis is sufficient to prove that these phrases of Socrates’ in this passage are not identical mere “manners of speech” or variations of stock formulae. The only thing they have in common is the passive verb legesthai, “to be said”, and even it is in different forms. Add to this the fact that in this relatively short passage, a description of the afterlife, Socrates as many as four times reminds us that these are things only said, implying that they are not necessarily so.
Consider in contrast the passage where he describes the alternative: where there is no afterlife, only a dreamless sleep (40d-e). In that passage he never says anything like, “if these things that are said are indeed true”, as he does repeatedly in his account of the afterlife. Why not? Obviously because no such things are ever said—though they be certainly considered in the secret soul of every private human being.
The most obvious thing to the soul of man is that death marks the end of his life and consciousness. He sees not only all the animals die and rot, but even his own kind. This idea, that he will one day cease to be, is not tolerable for a human being. One of my fellow churchgoers once told me, “Everyone wants to go to heaven, but nobody wants to die to get there”.
But everyone must agree that there was an infinity of time before he was born in which he didn’t exist! Shouldn’t there then be, in correspondence with the afterlife, a “before-life”, in which the eternal soul lived before it was born into its earthly consciousness? Yet we have no memory of this before-life. If something is eternal, doesn’t it exist for ALL time? Does it make sense that there are things that come into being, but don’t pass away? Isn’t it in the nature of things that come into being that they must also pass away? On the other hand, doesn’t it make sense that the things that don’t pass away were always in existence?
I think that, for most of us, our mortal lives are tolerable only to the extent we can have hope in the promise of immortality offered by our gods and our religious beliefs in an afterlife. For a few, however, the only hope in happiness down here on this earth (for we can’t bring ourselves to believe that things that come into being can last forever), is to strive to grasp the things that are truly immortal, that is, the things that are eternal, that neither come into being (are born), nor perish (pass away), while we are still alive.
“But I think the vulgar notion of the immortality of soul leads us to consideration of a truer representative of human immortality.”
“What would that representative be, Leghorn?”
“Why, the men who have done great deeds or written great books. Aren’t Shakespeare’s or Plato’s or Milton’s, or many other men and their works said to be immortal?”
“Yes, that’s true.”
“Well, are they considered immortal for any reason other than that they influenced men’s souls long after their own death?”
“Yes, exactly for that reason.”
“And do you think they could have exerted this influence had they not tapped into the truly eternal things, the things whose consideration both make a man happy in his mortal life, and ensure that he will be remembered long after his death?”
(1) Did you ask TheMadFool if he had perceived my reply to him as "disrespectful" and that he told you so? His reply to my reply, which I have quoted above (with a follow-up link to another reply no less), certainly suggests he didn't think I'd given offense. And nothing "negative" has followed between us from that exchange either. In any case, I'll gladly apologize to TheMadFool if he now says my reply to him (quoted above) was "disrespectful" to him. (2) So tell me, "Miss Manners", on what basis do you accuse me of this "disrespectfulness"? (3) And lastly, since mine are evident on the first several pages of this thread, where are your positive contributions to this topic? (Answering these three questions might count as you contributing something.)
180 Proof & Athena. I'm alright. Thank you for your concern. Good day.
Socrates as many as four times reminds us that these are things only said, implying that they are not necessarily so.
Not necessarily. He is discussing things that are being said. He (almost) always starts with the current popular view of a particular topic. How else could he refer to things said than by using the verb legomai?
But he does not say "death", "dissolution", or "disappearance". If there is dreamless sleep, there must still be someone who sleeps. And someone who sleeps can wake up as explained in the Phaedo. One state gives rise to its opposite: being awake gives rise to being asleep and being asleep gives rise to being awake, etc. (71c ff.).
However, absence of memory is not evidence of non-existence.
When we say "I do not remember living before", we are merely referring to "I" as this particular person as we know it in this life which naturally did not exist prior to being born. It does not mean that the pure, disembodied "I", the nous, did not exist.
On the contrary, whenever we say "I do not remember", the existence of the "I" is always presupposed. For, without it, we would be unable to say anything. But, since we are saying something, it must be admitted that there is a subject who says it.
It is that conscious subject who does not remember existing as this current person. And by the very fact that it is in a position to remember not existing in the current form, it demonstrates its previous existence.
Socrates as many as four times reminds us that these are things only said, implying that they are not necessarily so.
Whether or not they are so is not addressed. This stands in stark contrast to Socrates standard practice of questioning what is said. It is left as one of two possibilities. The other is that :
The possibility that it is like being nothing is raised prior to what accords with things said. In the Phaedo, where Socrates attempts to charm away their childish fears of death (77e) this possibility is not raised at all. All the arguments are designed to demonstrate the immortality of the soul, but, of course, they fail.
As long as one assumes that Socrates' efforts are simply to discover the truth of things, the truth of his efforts will not be discovered.
Let us also think in the following way how great a hope there is that it [death] is good.
His efforts are, in part, to persuade, to give his listeners hope that death is good, but if it turns out that the things said are true, then it is good only for the souls of those who are good. And yet, what might be good for their soul is not necessarily what is good for them. Socrates the man is not a disembodied soul.
How else could he refer to things said than by using the verb legomai?
That’s exactly my point! Any resemblance to a common “manner of speech” all of those four phrases have would have to be based on the fact they share the verb legesthai, which, as you say, is a necessary ingredient in a phrase asserting that something “is said”. Therefore, these phrases were not mere manners of speech, as you suggested.
He (almost) always starts with the current popular view of a particular topic.
...and he (almost) always goes beyond it, often contradicting it. How does the fact that he is relating the vulgar view of the Greek afterlife explain why he so frequently reminds his listeners that the things he says are only things said? Do you suppose his audience, the Greek citizens who voted for his acquittal, need such constant reminding? Most likely they didn’t. They made up the more liberal element of the citizenry, the men more likely themselves to question the theological traditions of the regime, to see them as mere myths and to be more tolerant of a questioning Socrates.
But he does not say "death", "dissolution", or "disappearance". If there is dreamless sleep, there must still be someone who sleeps. And someone who sleeps can wake up as explained in the Phaedo.
But he does say this, as the ultimate sentence in his description of death as “the dreamless sleep” (40e): “For all time appears in this way indeed to be nothing more than one night.” (kai gar oudev pleiwv o pas chronos phainetai outw de einai e mia vuks). In other words, this dreamless night lasts for all time. There is no waking from it. It seems to be but one night precisely because it lasts forever.
And by the very fact that it is in a position to remember not existing in the current form, it demonstrates its previous existence.
It is not that it remembers not existing, but rather that it doesn’t remember existing. There is a difference. If I remember not eating, I believe I didn’t eat, because I have a memory of not having eaten. If, however, I don’t remember eating, I am in a state of uncertainty: maybe I ate, maybe I didn’t. I need more evidence than my poor memory.
But that extra evidence is easily supplied by reason: everyone knows he was born on a certain day and in a certain year back to which his memory does not even stretch, and he knows that before he was born, he was a sperm and egg on the verge of uniting. How did an immutable nous find its brief temporal home in the chance coincidence of two merely earthly bodies?
ApollodorusSeptember 01, 2021 at 12:17#5879620 likes
That’s exactly my point! Any resemblance to a common “manner of speech” all of those four phrases have would have to be based on the fact they share the verb legesthai, which, as you say, is a necessary ingredient in a phrase asserting that something “is said”. Therefore, these phrases were not mere manners of speech, as you suggested.
However, it isn't my point. I simply gave “manner of speech” as an example. The central issue is that he uses the verb legomai, “to be said”, to refer to things said. Hence my question (which you did not answer), “How else can he refer to things said without saying ‘it is said’ or something to that effect?”
How does the fact that he is relating the vulgar view of the Greek afterlife explain why he so frequently reminds his listeners that the things he says are only things said?
I don’t think he does though. “It is said” or “according to things said”, etc., is simply a statement of fact. He does not say “Please remember these are just things said”.
But he does say this, as the ultimate sentence in his description of death as “the dreamless sleep” (40e): “For all time appears in this way indeed to be nothing more than one night.” (kai gar oudev pleiwv o pas chronos phainetai outw de einai e mia vuks). In other words, this dreamless night lasts for all time. There is no waking from it. It seems to be but one night precisely because it lasts forever.
1. He says “appears,” phainetai.
2. Where there is sleep there is a sleeper.
3. He gives “dreamless sleep” as just one possibility, the other possibility being “a change and migration of the soul from this to another place” (Apol. 40c).
4. Elsewhere he urges all men to accept his account of divine judgement after death:
And I invite all other men likewise, to the best of my power, and you particularly I invite in return, to this life and this contest, which I say is worth all other contests on this earth; and I make it a reproach to you, that you will not be able to deliver yourself when your trial comes and the judgement of which I told you just now (Gorg. 526e).
5. Similarly, he now ends his speech to members of the jury by reminding them of the “truth” that God does not neglect a good man either in life or after death:
But you also, judges, must regard death hopefully and must bear in mind this one truth, that no evil can come to a good man either in life or after death, and God does not neglect him (Apol. 41c-d).
It is not that it remembers not existing, but rather that it doesn’t remember existing.
If the soul is immortal and existed before, of course it cannot remember being the current person who did not exist prior to being born. But it may well have prenatal memory of itself as pure nous. It may also have latent memory of Forms, etc. This is what Socrates' Theory of Recollection is about which he expounds after the trial in the Phaedo!
My apologies. I thought you were saying that Socrates’ repetition of phrases meaning that these were “things said” only indicated a certain idiom of speech that could normally be expected in any sort of discourse in the dialogues about a matter that was merely spoken of...but let me ask you, O Apollodorus: as an example of what, exactly, did you give “manner of speech”? That has me confused.
It is said” or “according to things said”, etc., is simply a statement of fact. He does not say “Please remember these are just things said”.
He essentially says “Please remember that these are just things said,” by repeating so often the different phrases that remind us of it. He is not speaking thusly to everyone who voted for his acquittal; only to those few who notice that, by repetition, he is reminding them of the spuriousness of the traditional tales of the afterlife.
If the soul is immortal and existed before, of course it cannot remember being the current person who did not exist prior to being born. But it may well have prenatal memory of itself as pure nous. It may also have latent memory of Forms, etc.
Do you have prenatal memory of yourself existing as pure vous? I don’t either, and I’ve never met anyone who did. My earliest memory is of pissing in the kitchen trash can thinking I was in the bathroom.
As for memory of forms (eidwn) before birth, those too must certainly be hidden (latent) from me, for I have none of them. I learned about them, like everyone else I suppose, by growing up trying to understand the world before my eyes, in the first place, and by reading books that I thought might teach me about them, in the second.
ApollodorusSeptember 03, 2021 at 13:03#5886990 likes
He is not speaking thusly to everyone who voted for his acquittal; only to those few who notice that, by repetition, he is reminding them of the spuriousness of the traditional tales of the afterlife.
But you are not answering my question (which I have asked about three or four times): How does one speak of things said without using phrases like “as they say”, “according to things said”, etc.
Do you have prenatal memory of yourself existing as pure vous? I don’t either, and I’ve never met anyone who did.
If, as Socrates says, the soul pre-exists the current life, prenatal memories may be stimulated through philosophical inquiry and contemplation. Any one recollection can lead to general recall of knowledge we once actively had. Incidentally, there is a similar teaching in Buddhism and Hinduism. In any case, we are talking about Socrates’ Theory of Recollection as given in the Meno and repeated in the Phaedo (after the trial and his speech to the jury), not about you and me.
He is not speaking thusly to everyone who voted for his acquittal; only to those few who notice that, by repetition, he is reminding them of the spuriousness of the traditional tales of the afterlife.
I think he is addressing both those who recognize or will come to understand that these are things said rather than things known, and those who will believe they are things known because they are things said.
The latter is a salutary teaching. Believing it is true promotes justice in the soul and the city. Those who are philosophical by nature, however, desire the truth. But, as Socrates points out in the Republic:
the best natures become exceptionally bad when they get bad instruction (491e).
That these are things said and not the truth is a truth suitable only to those who are of the best natures and have been properly educated through an education that includes such salutary tales.
The possibility that "death is like being nothing" presents both an ethical and existential problem. Plato deals with the first in the Republic where Socrates argues that justice is a matter of the health of the soul rather than a calculus of rewards and punishments. He deals with the second in the Phaedo, where Socrates attempts to charm away childish fears of death. (77e) In doing this he appeals to "things said" as well as his own myths. But none of these myths say what will happen to Socrates or you or me. They take the part as the whole.
but let me ask you, O Apollodorus: as an example of what, exactly, did you give “manner of speech”? That has me confused.
— Leghorn
Example of things other than "reminders".
Do you mean that Socrates’ frequent—I almost said “reminders”—repetitions of different phrases meaning that what was being said was only spoken of might be characterized by other phrases or words? Instead of “reminders”, might we call them “admonitions”? how about, “accidents”, or “glosses”, or “incidental comments”, or “insignificant utterances”, etc. You can call them a host of things, but if you agree they are there in the text in the frequency in which they are extant, you can’t merely dismiss them without cause.
But you are not answering my question (which I have asked about three or four times): How does one speak of things said without using phrases like “as they say”, “according to things said”, etc.
Well, you could say something like, “In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. And the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters,” etc. I suppose you would have to read a long time thence before ever encountering a phrase like, “as they say”, though all these sayings be characterized by that phrase.
we are talking about Socrates’ Theory of Recollection as given in the Meno and repeated in the Phaedo (after the trial and his speech to the jury), not about you and me.
Well, Mr. Apollodorus, I am certainly interested in what Socrates has to say about all this, but if what he says doesn’t jibe with my experience, I don’t have him around to ask about it. So if you say he tells me that I have a prenatal memory, the only one I have to question is you.
ApollodorusSeptember 05, 2021 at 02:05#5894010 likes
Do you mean that Socrates’ frequent—I almost said “reminders”—repetitions of different phrases meaning that what was being said was only spoken of might be characterized by other phrases or words? Instead of “reminders”, might we call them “admonitions”? how about, “accidents”, or “glosses”, or “incidental comments”, or “insignificant utterances”, etc. You can call them a host of things, but if you agree they are there in the text in the frequency in which they are extant, you can’t merely dismiss them without cause.
Well, if you ask me, when I relate what is being said, I normally use phrases like "They say that ..." etc. and I know of no other way of putting it in everyday language. "They say that", "as they say", etc. simply indicates that something is being affirmed. It by no means signifies that what is being said is a mere "story".
Hence my question to you (which I have asked multiple times):
Well, if you ask me, when I relate what is being said, I normally use phrases like "They say that ..." etc. and I know of no other way of putting it in everyday language. "They say that", "as they say", etc. simply indicates that something is being affirmed. It by no means signifies that what is being said is a mere "story".
Hence my question to you (which I have asked multiple times):
How does one speak of things said without using phrases like “as they say”, “according to things said”, etc.
— Apollodorus
Well, I DID attempt to answer this question in my previous post, but you obviously either didn’t notice I was answering, or just ignored it. So, I will attempt again, and I think I can respond to both these, your objection and question, in a single demonstration.
Let’s consider again the places in that passage (Apology, 40e-41c) where Socrates reminds us that the things he is relating are “spoken of”. The first is at 40e: “On the other hand, if death is like a journey from here to another place, and if the things that are said are true, that in fact all the dead are there,...” etc. Now, let’s consider if this phrase of Socrates’, “and if the things that are said are true,” is either necessary or expected in the context of this sentence. For I would assume—and correct me if I’m wrong—that if it is neither necessary nor expected, that it must be either extraordinary, or superfluous, or otherwise demanding of our attention.
How are we to answer this question? Well, one way might be to remove the phrase and see if it affects the sentence in any significant way: “On the other hand, if death is like a journey from here to another place,...[and] in fact all the dead are there,...” etc. Here, in order to make the elided sentence work, we have to drop “that” and add “and”—a mere procedural formality, I assume you would agree. Considering this new abbreviated sentence, what can we say about it? Is it now insufficient to convey the original meaning? I have my own opinion; I leave it to you to formulate your own.
Having treated the question of necessity, we still have that of expectedness to deal with: is “and if the things that are said are true” expected in this context? How are we to answer that? The only way to answer this question is to compare the passage at hand to similar passages elsewhere that deal with similar things in the same way—and we have such a passage close at hand, to be precise, at 28c-d, where Socrates speaks of “the demigods who met their end at Troy”. Let me reproduce that passage for our benefit out of West’s translation— a trusty one indeed, for it is an avowedly literal one. Socrates again speaks:
“For according to your speech, those of the demigods who met their end at Troy would be paltry, especially the son of Thetis [Achilles]. Rather than endure anything shameful, he despised danger so much that when his mother (a goddess) spoke to him as he was eager to kill Hector—something like this, as I suppose: ‘Son, if you avenge the murder of your comrade Patroclus and kill Hector, you yourself will die; for straightaway,’ she says, ‘after Hector, your fate is ready at hand.’—he, upon hearing this, belittled death and danger, fearing much more to live as a bad man and not to avenge his friends. ‘Straightaway,’ he says, ‘may I die, after I inflict a penalty on the doer of injustice, so that I do not stay here ridiculous beside the curved ships, a burden on the land.’”
I say this passage is similar to the first in that it deals with similar things in the same way as the first passage. The similar things are exactly the ones we’ve been talking about, “the things said,” the popular Athenian accounts of the gods, demigods or afterlife. The similarity in the way they are spoken of is that they are all spoken to either real or hypothetical men of Athens, and for purposes of admonition or instruction.
As to the difference between these two passages then, there is something that strikes me as particularly germane to our debate. Shall I say it? No. I would rather you tell me—if you are able and, especially, if you are willing.
To encourage you, if you answer my implicit question, you will have found my answer to your explicit one, the one you have so often asked of me. In addition, you will have discovered my response to your objection that there is nothing significant about Socrates having stated that such-and-such things are ones said.
ApollodorusSeptember 06, 2021 at 12:31#5898370 likes
Well, I DID attempt to answer this question in my previous post, but you obviously either didn’t notice I was answering, or just ignored it.
Well, I WAS going to say that your “answer” looks like Straussian hermeneutics to me but I resisted the temptation .... :smile:
But let’s try to simplify this. If I lived in 4th century BC Athens, where belief in afterlife was the prevalent position, and wanted to discuss the postmortem possibilities of (1) dreamless sleep (or “nothingness”) and (2) migration of the soul to another place, I would phrase it exactly as Socrates does. Wouldn’t you?
And, as already stated, we cannot ignore Socrates’ concluding remarks to the effect that God does not neglect a good man:
But you also, judges, must regard death hopefully and must bear in mind this one truth, that no evil can come to a good man either in life or after death, and God does not neglect him (41c-d).
IMO, this encapsulates Socrates’ belief in divine justice as expressed in Gorgias (526e), Republic (621c), Phaedo, etc.
Well, I WAS going to say that your “answer” looks like Straussian hermeneutics to me but I resisted the temptation .... :smile:
I wouldn’t boast about resisting a temptation which I did not resist. I am scarcely at all familiar with “Straussian hermeneutics,” for I have barely read the man. The interpretation I have presented you with is my own, and I am disappointed that you not only didn’t respond to its particular points, but denigrated it as coming from a source you apparently despise, which isn’t even its source.
I think I have implicitly answered your most pressing question, as to how else one can relate things that are said without using phrases like, “it is said,” or “as they say,” etc. Sometimes things are so obvious that it is otiose to try to explain them. It’s like having to explain a joke.
But let’s try to simplify this. If I lived in 4th century BC Athens, where belief in afterlife was the prevalent position,...
We don’t have to go back in time at all, O Apollodorus, to find a place like this. We are living in it now. You will not find one media spokesperson, on tv or radio, not one interviewer or interviewee, who doesn’t either agree with or fail to contradict statements like, “I know he is looking down on us now and smiling,” or, “now she is at last happy, reunited with her late husband whom she loved so much,” or, “he is in a better place,” etc.
A well-meaning acquaintance of hers recently told my sister—a staunch liberal and atheist—after the death of her husband, who died after a long debilitating illness, whose loss she yet grieves, that he was in a better place. My sister replied, “Well why don’t you kill yourself and go there and see how good it is!”—needless to say, my sister is in no position where she fears losing either status or a job.
...and wanted to discuss the postmortem possibilities of (1) dreamless sleep (or “nothingness”) and (2) migration of the soul to another place, I would phrase it exactly as Socrates does. Wouldn’t you?
I only wish I could phrase things exactly as Socrates does, and I suppose many of the greatest philosophers who came after him wished the same thing. I suppose, after I had been convicted of impiety and sentenced to death, I would have crapped my pants and peeed all over myself. I suppose I would have wailed and sniveled and carried on much like an animal.
But if I had composed myself enough to speak to those who voted for my acquittal, I suppose I would have cried out something like this: “Why weren’t there more of you? more of the lenient sort who are not so stricken with fear of transgressing the divine laws? You all know that my only transgression has been asking innocent questions to fellow citizens in public places. I never meant to overturn the laws of the state. I just wanted to find out the truth about things for myself!” In other words, I would have ended up instead complaining to to those who voted for my conviction.
I would not have been the Socrates that Crito found, soundly sleeping on the eve of his execution.
There are many accounts of Socrates, O Apollodorus. I have not even read all of them, much less studied them all. But I have read and somewhat studied some of his interpreters, and that knowledge—or opinion—added to my own, is what I have to work with.
This I am sure of: that Socrates is to philosophy what Jesus is to theology. These are the two chief figures in the tradition of our understanding of things. To these two must we ultimately refer when answering questions about the nature of things. We must compare and contrast, I say, the differences and similarities between their thoughts and lives in order to understand the difference between a life based on reason as opposed to one based on revelation. There are both similarities and differences...
...and one of the differences is the way they endured death: Jesus prayed to God to relieve him of the necessity of having to undergo his sacrifice: “Take this cup from me,” he said, “if it be according to your will.” Socrates, on the other hand, though begrudgingly, accepted his fate without appeal to a god for salvation.
Socrates, on the other hand, though begrudgingly, accepted his fate without appeal to a god for salvation.
I don't think this is entirely accurate.
Socrates does actually pray to the Gods before drinking the hemlock:
But I may and must pray to the Gods that my departure hence be a fortunate one; so I offer this prayer, and may it be granted (Phaedo 117c)
I just don't think your interpretation sounds very convincing. Obviously, it isn’t your fault, it’s just that the evidence seems insufficient to establish that Socrates is an atheist.
Given what Socrates says about the body in the Phaedo and his seeming indifferent to how he is to be buried (115c), what are we to make of his bathing before he dies? (116a) Is the care for the body more important than he lets on? Is his care for the body part of rather than separate from his care for himself? His concern is with "my departure from here to There". But "in accordance with things said", it would not be Socrates' departure, but "a sort of change and migration of the soul from the place here to another place.” A soul that would no longer be Socrates'.
It should not go without notice that the man who administers the poison is recognized by Socrates as:
one who has knowledge of these things. (117a)
The only one recognized as having any knowledge of death is someone who knows about putting him to death.
I just don't think your interpretation sounds very convincing.
Don’t I deserve then to learn from you where exactly it fails to convince? And I am not speaking of the large question, whether Socrates was an atheist, but the small one, whether he would ordinarily be expected to employ all those phrases reminding us that the popular Greek account of the afterlife consists of “things said”. I have been arguing that he would not be so expected. You appear to have given up attempting to refute my evidence. Does that mean we have come to a tacit agreement on that small point?
But "in accordance with things said", it would not be Socrates' departure, but "a sort of change and migration of the soul from the place here to another place.” A soul that would no longer be Socrates'.
I don’t see, O Morosophos, how it follows that his soul would no longer be Socrates’ after this “change and migration” of it. Do you take that phrase (Apology, 40c) to mean that the soul changes its form or essence after death?
I don’t see, O Morosophos, how it follows that his soul would no longer be Socrates’ after this “change and migration” of it.
In the Phaedo he says that the soul of a man might be that of an ass in the next life, or an ant, or other animal. (82a-b) This of course raises problems for the myth of recollection. I've been reminded that I'm an ass, but do not recollect being that kind of animal in a previous life. It would be remarkable if an ass had knowledge of the Forms!
In the Phaedo he says that the soul of a man might be that of an ass in the next life, or an ant, or other animal.
Again, reincarnation was an ubiquitious belief of the ancient Indo-European cultures. Pythagoreans certainly accepted it, and it was arguably accepted by Plato, hence the myths concerning recollections from previous lives. For various reasons, this mythology was suppressed in the early Christian era, around 400 AD by one of the Church councils. Thereafter it only survived in underground circles such as Catharism (and is generally the object of intense hostility whenever mentioned on this forum.)
Of course in the East it developed along entirely different lines, in the Buddhist world it is widely accepted that beings are reborn in one of the 'six realms' according to their karma (although the intricacies of Buddhist soteriology are rather difficult to understand, as there is no 'being who transmigrates', only a series of causal factors that give rise in repeated rebirths, the 'citta-santana' or mind-stream.)
ApollodorusSeptember 09, 2021 at 12:44#5911730 likes
You quoted my words, and they are before your eyes, and yet you seem not to be able to make out the last two: “for salvation”.
Socrates does pray to the Gods, does he not? And he believes in “salvation” (soteria) or “release” (lysis) of the soul by God or through righteous conduct (Rep. 621c; Phaedo 67a).
Don’t I deserve then to learn from you where exactly it fails to convince? And I am not speaking of the large question, whether Socrates was an atheist, but the small one, whether he would ordinarily be expected to employ all those phrases reminding us that the popular Greek account of the afterlife consists of “things said”. I have been arguing that he would not be so expected. You appear to have given up attempting to refute my evidence. Does that mean we have come to a tacit agreement on that small point?
I’m afraid there is little chance of any such agreement. His statements containing phrases like “as they say” do not in the least sound like “reminders” to me. They are simply statements of fact and do not constitute evidence of secret messages to atheist supporters in the jury (or among readers of Plato’s dialogues).
And anyway (just out of curiosity), if you are not arguing that Socrates is an atheist, what is it that you hope to achieve?
ApollodorusSeptember 09, 2021 at 12:52#5911760 likes
Again, reincarnation was an ubiquitious belief of the ancient Indo-European cultures. Pythagoreans certainly accepted it, and it was arguably accepted by Plato, hence the myths concerning recollections from previous lives.
Correct. Myths are often interpreted as the basis of beliefs, but the reality is that more often than not it is the other way round: myths serve the purpose of illustrating existing beliefs.
IMO this certainly seems to be the case in Socrates and Plato.
Yes, it can and has been argued. The fact that it was a ubiquitous belief might be a good reason for why it appears in some of the dialogues, but it is a bad reason for assuming he therefore accepted it. It is "in accordance with things said". Things said are the basis for Socratic inquiry. Of course, such inquiry must fail to arrive at a definitive answer. Death may be nothing. That it is something must be without sufficient evidence. None of us recollect being dead.
ApollodorusSeptember 09, 2021 at 16:15#5912500 likes
Do you take that phrase (Apology, 40c) to mean that the soul changes its form or essence after death?
I think the idea that Socrates would no longer be Socrates has little basis.
It is true that according to Socrates some souls are “likely to pass into the bodies of asses and other beasts of that sort” but this refers to “those who have indulged in gluttony and violence and drunkenness, and have taken no pains to avoid them” (Phaedo 81e).
Clearly, it would not apply to Socrates who, by his own standards, has led an exemplary life.
On the contrary, those who (like Socrates) love learning and have pursued philosophy and have departed in a perfectly pure condition, join the race of the Gods (82b-c).
Socrates does pray to the Gods, does he not? And he believes in “salvation” (soteria) or “release” (lysis) of the soul by God or through righteous conduct (Rep. 621c; Phaedo 67a).
So since Socrates 1) prays to the gods, and 2) believes in salvation, it follows that he prayed to a god for salvation after his conviction? Is that what you are saying? For what I said, in contrasting him and Jesus, was that the latter did, according to the Gospels, explicitly ask God for deliverance from his fate, while the former never did such a thing in regard to his own.
And anyway (just out of curiosity), if you are not arguing that Socrates is an atheist, what is it that you hope to achieve?
It is a good thing you are a curious creature, O Apollodorus, for without the faculty of curiosity, how will we ever have a hope of learning anything? I hope you do agree at least with that. You might say, “just out of curiosity”, in order to denigrate that passion, but, as I said, if we are not curious to know anything, how will we ever learn?
As for myself, while reading that passage from the Apology, at 40e-41c, I happened to notice that Socrates kept reminding me that the things he was relating were ambiguously true. Of course this was, however, in the context of a contrast of these things with one other alternative: that death is like an eternal dreamless sleep. Socrates was telling me, it seemed to me, that death is either like this, or like that, giving me no other alternative than these two.
But it must be acknowledged that Socrates was not necessarily speaking to me—some unknown reader in the future—but rather to those who voted for his acquittal. So I must, then, place myself in their place if I am to understand his rhetoric.
Certainly they are disappointed in the verdict, and sympathetic with the condemned man. Maybe some are even outraged. What do such men want to hear from him? Outrages against the verdict? quarrels and carryings-on? Some, perhaps, would have delighted in those things, deeply sympathizing with him.
What they got instead was a reasoned explication of what befalls a man after death, and a proof that no ill can come to him in the life after, whichever way it be. But one possibility is more favorable to Socrates than the other, and gets longer shrift in the dialogue. I mean the possibility that life after death is spent among the dead in Hades. For, if the things that are said are true, when Socrates dies he will be able to conduct an afterlife that is, in his stated opinion, superior to the one he led while alive, while, if the things that are not said are true instead, that death is like an eternal dreamless sleep, then he will only be relieved of evils.
And on what, exactly, is his preference for the former alternative based? His argument seems to be based on the fact that, if he go to Hades and find all of the dead there, their collectivity will be superior to the narrowness of what he experienced as a temporal being on earth. For in the blip of time we are alive on this earth, how many superior contemporaneous beings do you think you might chance upon; whereas, if you are given free rein of heaven itself, where everyone who has ever lived dwells, I suppose you would even meet with about the best souls that could ever be?
But what is more, he will retain there, in the afterlife in Hades, the same eternal power of dialectic he possessed on this corruptible earth, and be able to question the true judges there, the ones so reputed to have been, about justice. I don’t suppose he would say to Palamedes or Aiax anything like, “Hey, the same thing happened to me! Let me tell you about it..,” but would rather question these two, whether their penalties were justified or not.
More than that, he would be able to question personally—in what we call “real time”— the ppl considered the greatest judges of all time, about justice, and decide for himself whether they spoke the truth or a lie. Remember, if you will: Socrates’ concern with justice was not how it personally effected anyone, as a temporal being, with corrupting passions and the sort—but what it was as an idea or form.
ApollodorusSeptember 10, 2021 at 16:33#5919010 likes
So since Socrates 1) prays to the gods, and 2) believes in salvation, it follows that he prayed to a god for salvation after his conviction? Is that what you are saying? For what I said, in contrasting him and Jesus, was that the latter did, according to the Gospels, explicitly ask God for deliverance from his fate, while the former never did such a thing in regard to his own.
Well, it was you who brought Jesus into it. Personally, I prefer to read Socrates (or Plato) on his own terms. Salvation may mean different things to different readers. For Socrates salvation or liberation (soteria, lysis) means a release (1) from a life of ignorance, (2) from the prospect of being found wanting by the divine tribunal in the afterlife, and (3) from the cycle of death and rebirth.
If this is his conception of salvation, then it seems reasonable to assume that this is at the back of his mind when he prays to the Gods that his transition from this to the other world may be attended by good fortune.
In fact, he himself says: “But I see clearly that to die and be released was better for me” (Apol. 41d). Clearly, he sees his death as a release (apallage). And he is confirmed in this by his daimonion, the inner divine voice that is his lifelong guide.
But one possibility is more favorable to Socrates than the other, and gets longer shrift in the dialogue. I mean the possibility that life after death is spent among the dead in Hades.
The possibility of life after death seems to be more consistent with Socrates’ views given in the dialogues. This is precisely why he gives the other option first, because he intends to focus on the second possibility, the possibility of life after death, which is in line with his beliefs and teachings.
In fact, my personal impression is that Socrates’ views of afterlife are very close to those of the Orphic tradition as may be seen from the myth of Er in the Republic, the account of afterlife in the Phaedo, etc. The true purpose of his elenctic procedure is to get his interlocutors to hold those beliefs only that (according to Socrates) have been shown through rational argument to be the most reasonable or plausible.
ValentinusSeptember 10, 2021 at 23:42#5921340 likes
Reply to Leghorn
Your reminder that Socrates is not asking for a different life after death than the one he is having while alive does suggest he does not expect to be wandering around outside the cave of the Republic after his death.
The point of view reminds me of Unomuno in The Tragic Sense of Life in Men and Nations where the desire for immortality is continuing to do the groovy things one was doing rather than turn the experience into anything else.
Personally, I prefer to read Socrates (or Plato) on his own terms
How, dear fellow, can you read Plato, a most subtile and opaque writer, on his own terms, when you cannot even read me, a most crass and transparent one, on mine? Let me remind you, once again, what I said:
...and one of the differences is the way they endured death: Jesus prayed to God to relieve him of the necessity of having to undergo his sacrifice: “Take this cup from me,” he said, “if it be according to your will.” Socrates, on the other hand, though begrudgingly, accepted his fate without appeal to a god for salvation.
Your consideration in reading the above should not be what Socrates’ or Plato’s idea of salvation or swteria or lysis is, but what Leghorn’s is; for it is Leghorn, not Plato, neither Socrates, who said that.
Perhaps adding to your confusion is an ignorance of the story about Jesus, how he prayed in the Garden of Gethsemane on the eve of his crucifixion—I don’t know, of course, I’m just speculating. But if this is so, you can find the story in the three synoptic Gospels, Mark 14:26,32-42, Matt. 26:30,36-46, and Luke “22:39-46. To sum up the part that pertains to my statement, Jesus goes apart from his disciples and prays in private to God, asking Him to “take this cup from me” (I paraphrase: each of the three accounts says the same thing in a slightly different way).
Now I suppose that different readers have disagreed as to the meaning of Jesus’ words in these parallel passages, but it is clear to me from the context that he was asking God to deliver him from the necessity of being sentenced to death and having to pay the penalty, of being crucified.
Now, having educated yourself, if indeed you were ignorant about Jesus’ appeal “to God to relieve him of the necessity of having to undergo his sacrifice,” do you still believe that in the rest of my statement, what has to do with Socrates’ attitude toward his own indictment, when I said “salvation” I meant Plato’s notions of salvation or swteria or lysis? From the context of my entire statement, what do you think I meant by
Your reminder that Socrates is not asking for a different life after death than the one he is having while alive does suggest he does not expect to be wandering around outside the cave of the Republic after his death.
Have some scholars interpreted the metaphor of being led out of the darkness and opinion of the cave into the light of the natural sun as a migration after death into heaven or Hades? I am not familiar with that.
The point of view reminds me of Unomuno in The Tragic Sense of Life where the desire for immortality is continuing to do the groovy things one was doing rather than turn the experience into anything else.
I am not familiar with that work or author, Mr. Valentinus. Is he someone worth reading?
ValentinusSeptember 11, 2021 at 01:30#5921920 likes
Have some scholars interpreted the metaphor of being led out of the darkness and opinion of the cave into the light of the natural sun as a migration after death into heaven or Hades? I am not familiar with that.
I am not aware of any account that puts the matter in that way. Some Neoplatonists say Plato is teaching a personal transformation while one is alive. How well you prepare the soul will relate to its future possibilities. If you get out of the cave while alive, you have options others do not. Proclus has his version of this idea. "Platonism", in that vernacular, is a theology. One better get ready for the next stage.
Your observation about how Socrates wants to live after death does not fit with such an explanation: not because it disproves it but because it is without reference to it.
Unomuno makes a similar observation regarding the Catholic version of immortality. He gets the idea being proposed. He doesn't care if he cannot continue being who he is exactly as he is as a result.
ApollodorusSeptember 11, 2021 at 12:21#5923890 likes
Your consideration in reading the above should not be what Socrates’ or Plato’s idea of salvation or swteria or lysis is, but what Leghorn’s is; for it is Leghorn, not Plato, neither Socrates, who said that.
Well, I disagree. Personally, I don't care about Jesus when I read Plato.
The discussion was about Socrates, not Jesus. If you want to talk about salvation in the context of Socrates then we are going to discuss it as seen by Socrates, not Jesus.
On the other hand, if it is Jesus you wish to discuss, then I think this would be best done separately.
If not, you always have @Valentinus and Foolo (or "Morosophos" as I think you prefer to call him) to discuss things with :smile:
ApollodorusSeptember 11, 2021 at 12:37#5923920 likes
Socrates' myths, some of which are "in accordance with things said" and some of which he makes up and some of which he makes up and claims to be in accordance with things said, always point back to to life. He tells these tales not to inform his listeners of a life beyond life, a life not he nor them nor us knows anything about, but rather as part of living the examined life.
Socrates condemns:
the biggest lies about the biggest things (Republic 377e)
He is referring to Hesiod's myth about Cronus and Uranus. He continues:
Even if they were true ... the best way would be to bury them in silence, and if there were some necessity for relating them, that only a very small audience should be admitted under pledge of secrecy ... to the end that as few as possible should have heard these tales.
The problem is, how do we know if they are true? The muses tell Hesiod that they speak lies like the truth. (Theogony 27) Socrates says:
When anyone images badly in his speech the true nature of gods and heroes, like a painter whose portraits bear no resemblance to his models. (377e)
What do they know of the true nature of gods? Where are the models to be found? The muses? The poets? Or are they to make them themselves?
But the truth is not Socrates' foremost concern. If the story of Cronus is true, it is something that only a few should known. The truth should be hidden and in place of the "biggest lies", they should be told noble lies.
Socrates states what is at issue:
Shall we, then, thus lightly suffer our children to listen to any chance stories fashioned by any chance teachers and so to take into their minds opinions for the most part contrary to those that we shall think it desirable for them to hold when they are grown up? (377b)
"Chance stories by chance teachers", in other words, "according to things said".
And the stories on the accepted list we will induce nurses and mothers to tell to the children and so shape their souls by these stories ... (377c)
Myths shape the soul. The obverse of Socrates' avoidance of the politics of the city is his active engagement with the politics of the soul. It is not just those who are chronologically children who benefit from the myths.The souls of children of all ages might still be shaped by stories of the gods and rewards and punishment.
ValentinusSeptember 11, 2021 at 15:45#5924580 likes
I am not familiar with that work or author, Mr. Valentinus. Is he someone worth reading?
He is very much worth reading if you are interested in how the conditions of modern man relate to a desire for life as expressed through religious experience. The range of his scholarship is breathtaking and is an education even when one does not agree with him.
In chapter 10, Unamuno says:
Unamuno, translated by Anthony Kerrigan:And this relation with God, this more or less close union with Him, we call religion.
Yet what is religion? How does it differ from the religious sense and how are the two related? Every man's definition of religion is based upon his own inner experience of it rather upon his observation of it in others and it is impossible to define it without in one way or another experiencing it.
In the matter of longing for immortality, Unamuno does not like options he has been given. His work is an argument against the God he wishes to draw closer to. He refuses to go gently into the night.
In that respect, Unamuno's complaint differs greatly from Socrates' desire to keep living the same way as he had been doing. Socrates calmly swaggers toward the turnstiles, tipping his waiter on the way out.
Or, what might be the same thing, one hard-working Athenian saluting the virtue of another.
You lost me here.
ValentinusSeptember 11, 2021 at 21:13#5926520 likes
Reply to Fooloso4
Socrates defended himself as a citizen of Athens, striving to do the best he could for its sake. In the Republic, the City is only possible because of different citizens doing and making what others cannot. Respect for that inter-dependency is respect for the people actually doing it; including, in this case, the one assigned to kill him.
I see. The one who administers the poison is just in so far as he is doing his job. On the model of the Republic, one man one job. Minding his own business.
Comments (388)
Everyone knows what the 6W1H is. Allow me to explain why how? is the mother of all questions and by doing that justify why how? underpins the holy grail of philosophy aka wisdom.
1. What is an elephant?
We must know how to identify an elephant.
2. Why does God exist?
We must know how to prove/disprove God exists.
3. Who is Aristotle?
We must know how to identify Aristotle
4. When is the right time to plant corn?
We must know how to find out the right time to plant corn.
5. Which is better, sex or food?
We must know how to determine better.
6. Where is Paris?
We must know how to find the location of Paris.
7. How to think? A contender for the title of the most important question of all time.
HOW?
Amateur:
a) Method: Any answer to how? will do. A child's method of solving problems involves guessing ( :chin: hmmmm). An adult's method might take that to a new level as in systematic but still guessing.
Pro:
b) Technique: Not any answer to how? will be accepted. Aspects like efficiency (spatial/temporal/others) :cool: , aesthetics :heart: , to name a few will matter.
I may have missed a spot here and there!
Not a bad explanation. And interesting OP, too.
But do we do that before or after we learn how to drink, how to be a farmer, and how to be a bad emperor?
And what about why?
A novice's best shot! If it makes sense at some level then I chalk it up to beginner's luck! The OP? Thank :point: @Wayfarer
Quoting Apollodorus
Great question! As I said,
Quoting TheMadFool
For better or worse, I'm not omniscient!
Quoting Apollodorus
Quoting TheMadFool
Quoting 180 Proof
Point! However, you're a veteran philosopher and philosophizing is second nature to you, your middle name so to speak. For beginners, on the other hand, how to do philosophy? is a skill that has a steep learning curve, especially for those self-taught. Self-help books on philosophy are just what the doctor ordered!
I think that's a very shallow reading. Many of those kinds of texts are far from self-help or how-to in any modern sense. I put that link up for reference, it's a good source for those materials.
Don't let contrarian posts deter you. He's probably been imbibing too much of his namesake beverage. Which makes everything seem pointless. :joke:
Alcohol proof is a measure of the content of ethanol in an alcoholic beverage. The term was originally used in England and was equal to about 1.821 times the percentage alcohol by volume.
180 proof = 100% pure brain cell poison??? :100:
In actual fact, I think his comment was directed at the post he replied to, which I realised after I made that snide remark, which is why I removed it. I know for a fact 180 holds those authors in high regard.
Done! Youtube videos are more expressive than I can ever hope to be. Hence, my fondness for videos from said website and others. Your post wasn't snide enough to require an edit/deletion. Nevertheless, different strokes for different folks. :up:
Yeah. I know. I was just poking fun at his ancient philosophy of "how to drink like a Cynic". :cool:
So, I can restore my post then!
I suppose, I can concede there is a sense in which these could be 'self-help' books, with the caveat that there is no 'quick and easy' method. Takes reading, concentration, and patience. Also interpretive skill - the ability to take into account the very different cultural background of ancient texts.
Copy!
Well, I for one definitely think that ancient wisdom is better than no wisdom.
And it seems to me that wisdom is fast disappearing from both language and culture under the modernizing influence of "gangsta cultcha" and other progressive trends ....
As I tried to convey in my first post, as one advances from beginner to expert in any discipline, including philosophy, one realizes there's a difference between method (any ol' way of doing something) and technique ("...quick & easy..." = efficient & beautiful way). Self-help books are about the latter - reading them will enhance the reader's experience in whatever subject the books are on.
My two cents!
Noted for future reference! :up: :ok:
Quoting Wayfarer
Now I know how fragile even the most robust of threads are. Derailment is just one shallow-minded poster away. Apologies.
:up: There's something about modernity that is inimical to the traditional idea of wisdom. I think it has to do with the fact that in liberal individualism, the ego is the sole arbiter of value. That said, I don't much care for corporatist or collectivist cultures either (which Chinese culture tends towards). I think the advantage of modern liberal culture is that it provides the complete freedom to pursue any path, which is definitely a freedom worth defending. But the standard modern outlook of consumerism, gratification, hedonism, materialism and instrumental utility, is worlds away from the traditional virtues, and so if you absorb those along with the freedom that secular culture provides, then they're inimical to the philosophical life.
One of the essays on my homepage discusses Jurgen Habermas' late-in-life re-evalution of religious metaphysics:
[quote=Does Reason Know what it is Missing?;https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/12/does-reason-know-what-it-is-missing/]What secular reason is missing is self-awareness. It is “unenlightened about itself” in the sense that it has within itself no mechanism for questioning the products and conclusions of its formal, procedural entailments and experiments. “Postmetaphysical thinking,” Habermas contends, “cannot cope on its own with the defeatism concerning reason which we encounter today both in the postmodern radicalization of the ‘dialectic of the Enlightenment’ and in the naturalism founded on a naïve faith in science.”
Postmodernism announces (loudly and often) that a supposedly neutral, objective rationality is always a construct informed by interests it neither acknowledges nor knows nor can know. Meanwhile science goes its merry way endlessly inventing and proliferating technological marvels without having the slightest idea of why. The “naive faith” Habermas criticizes is not a faith in what science can do — it can do anything — but a faith in science’s ability to provide reasons, aside from the reason of its own keeping on going, for doing it and for declining to do it in a particular direction because to do so would be wrong. [/quote]
What is implicit in most of the ancient philosophies is 'the idea of the Good', whether that be concieved in explicitly theistic terms or not (and in Greek philosophy, it often wasn't). But it was simply the assumed background of philosophy, meaning that 'the good' was something that could be discovered or realised. That is generally absent from modern philosophy, post-Neitszche.
Sold separately.
Quoting Apollodorus
:up:
I agree that consumerism, hedonism, etc. are contributing factors in the general decline of civilization and culture. However, I think there are reasons to believe that the main culprit is the movement to actively and systematically deconstruct traditional culture and society initiated in the late 1800's and early 1900's by Fabian Socialists and allied liberals, including the likes of G. B. Shaw who declared that good statesmanship was to blow to pieces every cathedral with dynamite, whilst he was praising Lenin and Stalin as great statesmen, Annie Besant, who believed that the Westminster Abbey should have its "barbaric psalms" replaced with Wagner, whilst she was busy promoting Freemasonry and Theosophy as a replacement for Christianity, and many others who simply hated Western civilization even as they were making the most of its achievements. But I think this is a topic for another thread, or forum.
As I said, I think it’s easy to be corrupted my modernity, but it’s definitely not all bad.
I’ve got a very interesting post by Aurobindo which I’ll find later.
[quote=Sri Aurobindo, 'Materialism' ; http://intyoga.online.fr/materia.htm] Admit - for it is true - that this age of which materialism was the portentous offspring and in which it had figured first as petulant rebel and aggressive thinker, then as a grave and strenuous preceptor of mankind, has been by no means a period of mere error, calamity and degeneration, but rather a most powerful creative epoch of humanity. Examine impartially its results. Not only has it immensely widened and filled in the knowledge of the race and accustomed it to a great patience of research, scrupulosity, accuracy - if it has done that only in one large sphere of enquiry, it has still prepared for the extension of the same curiosity, intellectual rectitude, power for knowledge, to other and higher fields - not only has it with an unexampled force and richness of invention brought and put into our hands, for much evil, but also for much good, discoveries, instruments, practical powers, conquests, conveniences which, however we may declare their insufficiency for our highest interests, yet few of us would care to relinquish, but it has also, paradoxical as that might at first seem, strengthened man's idealism. [/quote]
I quote this from time to time as a counter-factual to what I myself often say.
@Apollodorus
@Gnomon
@anyone else ...
Please name your top five "ancient wisdom" reads for modern (beginner) philosophers. @The Mad Fool and I both could probably use the encouragement.
I’ve been under the impression that gangsta cultcha was pop rather than progressive or regarded as dispensing wisdom, though in some part authentically counter-cultural and validly so.
I second that motion!
1. Slavery
2. Sexism
3. Tyranny
4. Child/Human sacrifice
5. Torture
6. Woo-woo
7. Genocide
etc.
Wut wut? :chin:
Shit! :rofl:
We're in your debt! It's not easy to know what to look for but to know where to look, like you do, is taking the notion of search to a whole new level. Kudos, Wayfarer. I'll be keeping an eye out for your particularly informative posts. :up:
The Nag Hammadi Library.
Early Buddhist Texts (Wikipedia)
[quote=Wikipedia]The early suttas also almost always open by introducing the geographical location of the event they depict, including ancient place names, always preceded by the phrase "thus have I heard" (eva? me suta?).[/quote]
So, are we to infer that the Buddhism predates the written word and it was transmitted orally until India invented a script?
Telephone (game) :point:
None of the following are intended to impart wisdom, but if one is in pursuit of wisdom these books will help with regard to thinking, seeing, evaluating, perspective, self-knowledge, attitude, altitude.
Plato: Republic
Aristotle: Ethics
Ecclesiastes
Maimonides: Guide for the Perplexed
Zhuangzi
It's not inference, it's a matter of fact. They were aural traditions for centuries, until being codified in various Indic scripts, of which one early extant version is Pali. (Please lay off the idiotic youtube artifacts, they sometimes have their use and I sometimes post them but in this context they might as well be grafitti.)
That would depend on which aspect/s of "ancient wisdom" one is interested in.
But I think that the introductory booklets on Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, and The Buddha in the Very Short Introductions series by Oxford University Press would be a good start.
Very Short Introductions - Oxford University Press
Edit. I would strongly advise against reading Maimonides. He probably had no access to Platonic texts and learned about Plato through Arabs like al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. He complained that there are so many parables in Plato's writing one can dispense with it and stick to Aristotle. The fact that he is held in high esteem by the likes of Leo Strauss speaks volumes.
Yes, counter-cultural or anti-cultural sounds about right. And anything that serves as a substitute for traditional culture qualifies as "progressive" in certain quarters where deconstruction and replacement count as progress.
:lol: Can you be like, "we'll just have to put up with TheMadFool's shitty videos!" Puhleeez!!
Quoting Wayfarer
The Chinese Whisper Problem
The Buddha (bad pronounciation): [blah blah blah] This ire is the cause of suffering.
Eager Disciple (hearing impaired): Yes, yes, desire is the cause of suffering.
:lol:
You should move to a better quarter.
You mean better than counter-cultural or better than anti-cultural?
Objectivity may be "honored more in the breach than in the observance". A succinct statement of ancient philosophical wisdom is Socrates' epigram : "know thyself". Which requires enough self-directed insight to "see" your own personal biases and ignorances. Perhaps we could rephrase as : "the fear of self-deception is the beginning of wisdom". :smile:
Encouragement for what? "Loving life"? Work?
Yes. They are literally messages in a bottle. Usually, what gets erased stays that way.
Yes, a good resource. That is where I quote text from.
Seeing Ecclesiastes and Maimonides: Guide for the Perplexed together reminds me that Spinoza tried to be a bridge between the ancient and the modern. The perspective of change happening over generations is a difficult perspective. It has been tried before.
:roll:
I recommend any place that at least knows the meaning of progress, and perhaps on the coast with a temperate climate.
I am open to arguments for or against this or that point of view. But to propose not reading an author is an odd proposition. How will we know how right you are if we don't try it out for ourselves?
The authors I'm really trying to come to terms with are the major Platonist and Neo-platonists.
And from there became one of the main sources of later German Idealism, according to Dermot Moran. I see that as being more in the mainstream of Western philosophy.
I can see your point. However, if some recommend that we read a certain author, others may equally recommend not to read another (or the same) author. This is what book reviews normally do.
Of course, I can't stop people from reading a book if that's what they want to do. In fact, in the case of Maimonides, I think he would probably make interesting reading if you are into medieval Jewish philosophy, for example.
But (unlike Aristotle) Plato's works were not widely available in Islamic Spain, and considering Maimonides' anti-Platonist bias it would be wrong to regard him as a reliable guide in interpreting Plato, as Leo Strauss seems to be doing. More generally, reading Plato through the eyes of medieval Jewish and Arab philosophers whilst dismissing other authors like Plotinus or Proclus - who had direct access to Plato's Greek texts - does not seem to be a particularly scholarly or impartial approach. But this is just my opinion.
Quoting Wayfarer
The modern attitude, generally, is that any old knowledge, especially if it has a theological base, has been thoroughly supplanted by modern scientific advancements. So anything old is seen as outdated and incorrect, having been replaced by the new knowledge.
However, wisdom is composed not only of knowledge, but also of experience. And experience is produced from the temporal extension of being. So a large part of wisdom is understanding the principles which have stood the test of time.
To my knowledge, Plato's works were available in Islamic Spain only as partial translations or commentaries in Arabic. So, they would hardly make a reliable source. In contrast, Plotinus, Proclus, and other Greek-speaking authors in the east who had direct access to Plato's original Greek works and had actually studied Greek philosophy under Greek teachers, were in a better position to read and interpret Plato than Maimonides was.
Yes, I did mention Augustine in my recommendations from Oxford University Press' series Very Short Introductions, above. And, of course, in the old days philosophy was a way of life and was about experience, not armchair philosophizing as it is seen today.
• Daodejing, Laozi
• Ping fa, Sunzi
• De Rerum Natura, Lucretius^
• Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Sextus Empiricus
• Enchiridion of Epictetus, ed. Arrian
honorable mention:
• Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers (Book X), Diogenes Laërtius^
Can you please summarize all of these books in one or two sentences? E.g.
1. Daodejing: The way to live is to know how to die! :chin: This is just my own interpretation of Daoism. Yours will be different of course!
Pleaaaaasssseee! :smile:
I'll take Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonism, but it's doubtful whether skepticism can be classed as a form of wisdom. Perhaps it is better classified as a way toward wisdom.
But this would cast a shadow of doubt on all the methods, techniques, or practises, as to whether they are actually wisdom, or ways toward wisdom. If wisdom is what is produced from the practice, therefore something other than the practise itself, it would be an end to which the practise is a means. Then we need to be able to judge the various practises themselves as to efficacy for obtaining that end. This requires that we have a determination as to what wisdom itself is, as something separate from the practise, which is observed to be the result of the practise. Otherwise we can list all sorts of practises with no criteria as to how they are related to "wisdom".
Totally agree. If lifelong perpetual doubting, questioning, and inquiring, followed by more doubting, questioning, and inquiring, followed by rejection of all conclusions, principles, and guidelines, and systematic dismissal of the possibility of ever actually knowing anything, constitutes "wisdom" then we might as well forget about it.
Moreover, if to the general self-imposed skepticism, nihilism, and sophistry we add Straussian esotericism, then we are on the sure road (or shortcut) to pseudo-philosophical acrobatics bordering on the delusional and the schizoaffective. Quite the opposite of what Socrates and Plato aimed to achieve IMHO ... :smile:
I agree and would add that it is not just a matter of time but of place. The problem is compounded by the fact that it is not only a question of how Maimonides or Spinoza read those who came before and what they said about them but of how we today read them.
The philosopher is not a scholar. His concern is not to explicate the work of his predecessors. He appropriates them and uses them in the service of his own teachings. The comparison between Maimonides and Spinoza is particularly instructive. Both had to navigate between conflicting worldviews.
The OP is framed in terms of ancient and modern. He was not a modern philosopher.
As to his importance:
Quoting Wayfarer
Can you give specific examples? The Guide takes common terms such as the hand, the finger, and the face of God and argues that they should not be taken literally.
And Maimonides has certainly been used by the likes of Leo Strauss as a vehicle for the fabrication and promulgation of some really strange ideas.
The Influence of Islamic Thought on Maimonides - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Strauss happened to read al-Farabi and Maimonides who lived in Muslim-occupied Spain - when philosophers had to be very careful about what they said - and developed the theory that all ancient philosophers had “secret teachings”. As a political philosopher and atheist, he believes that Plato’s dialogues have a hidden political message and he makes no effort to see anything metaphysical in the dialogues. In fact, he positively resists the idea just as he ridicules Plato’s theory of Forms.
- L Strauss, On Plato's Symposium, p. 199
I think that to dismiss an idea out of hand is a rather unscholarly and unphilosophical approach. When combined with Straussian esotericism, it makes a mockery of any author, ancient or modern.
- C Zuckert and M Zuckert, The Truth about Leo Strauss
Quoting TheMadFool
It's probably unwise, Fool, to spoon-feed (i.e. "summarize") what you can easily find yourself by searching Google, SEP & wikipedia. That said, and given I'm not wise myself, I'll say only what each book has meant to me:
1. 'to flow with the complementarities of nature'
2. 'high stakes strategic thinking & preparation'
3. 'an immanent way of reducing misery'
4. 'the undecidability of philosophical (& religious) statements'
5. 'exercises in equanimity'
A gazillion thanks 180 Proof, a gazillion thanks! :up: :fire:
No. If I'm mistaken in that regard, I stand corrected.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Actually, i think there's a key term missing in the Western philosophical lexicon, which is 'reaiisation' or 'awakening' in sense in which I think it is conveyed in Eastern philosophy. It's been subsumed under 'religious conversion' in Western culture, but I think it's something distinct from that, because religious conversions can occur which provide no real intellectual illumination in the sense intended by that term. The only source I'm aware of that discusses the distinction is Buddhist:
[quote=Traleg Kyabgon Rinpoche; https://tricycle.org/magazine/letting-go-spiritual-experience/ ]In Buddhism, we distinguish between spiritual experiences and spiritual realizations. Spiritual experiences are usually more vivid and intense than realizations because they are generally accompanied by physiological and psychological changes. Realizations, on the other hand, may be felt, but the experience is less pronounced. Realization is about acquiring insight. Therefore, while realizations arise out of our spiritual experiences, they are not identical to them. Spiritual realizations are considered vastly more important because they cannot fluctuate.[/quote]
Maybe a topic for another thread, though.
If you were to meet those ancient authors, philosophers, wise men, what would they think of you?
Are you sure they wouldn't scorn you, reject you as a worthless man? Would they consider you a potential friend?
It matters because by studying and appreciating those ancient authors, one is basically putting oneself in a fantasy social relationship that is only one-way, one-sided. It's a type of parasocial interaction. One is trying to be part of a community, even if just in an abstract sense, from which one has no feedback as to whether that community would accept one or not. One is living in the delusion that one has found a community of like-minded people, even if just through books, when in fact one is just as alone and isolated as before, except that one is spending real time and energy on people who don't reciprocate, thus missing real world opportunities for reciprocal interactions.
I don't mean to be contrarian.
But what is the use of this ancient wisdom? How can it be used nowadays?
Unless one has already internalized the worldview that has produced that wisdom, that wisdom can, at most, serve as self-helpy "tips and tricks" that a person will possibly employ in ways not originally intended (because the person cannot understand that wisdom, due to not having internalized the worldview that produced it).
And even if one were to somehow internalize that ancient worldview, it would put one at a disadvantage in the modern world which doesn't function by that ancient worldview.
So why read those old books?
Unlike some here who would do most of the talking.
Do you equate wisdom with sophistry? I would think that wisdom is more the opposite of sophistry, the capacity to detect, identify, and disprove sophistry.
In modern usage we normally refer to others as being wise, like in this thread, Wayfarer refers to the wisdom of the ancient people. So in this context it's a judgement concerning others, not about oneself. And, as I mentioned in the other post, one might have the goal of being wise, and look for a method to provide this end, without ever thinking oneself to be wise.
It seems to me many people claiming to have wisdom are not that wise - just my opinion. On the other hand, at least they are openly claiming it, rather than implying it.
Yet more important than documenting the lives of historical philosophers (although this was another ancient literary genre) was the idea of the Sage as “transcendent norm.” The aim, by picturing such figures, was to give “an idealized description of the specifics of the way of life” that was characteristic of the each of the different schools (WAP 224). The philosophical Sage, in all the ancient discourses, is characterized by a constant inner state of happiness or serenity. This has been achieved through minimizing his bodily and other needs, and thus attaining to the most complete independence (autarcheia) vis-à-vis external things. ...
Aristotle equates the contemplation of the wise man with the self-contemplation of the unmoved mover. Platonic philosophy sees ascent in wisdom as progressive assimilation to the divine (WAP 226-7). Hadot goes as far as to suggest that Plotinus and other ancient philosophers “project” the figure of the God, on the basis of their conception of the figure of the Sage, as a kind of model of human and intellectual perfection” (WAP 227-8). However, Hadot stresses that the divine freedom of the Sage from the concerns of ordinary human beings does not mean the Sage lacks all concern for the things that preoccupy other human beings. Indeed, in a series of remarkable analyses, Hadot argues that this indifference towards external goods (money, fame, property, office . . . ) opens the Sage to a different, elevated state of awareness in which he “never ceases to have the whole present in his mind, never forgets the world, thinks and acts in relation to the cosmos . . . ” [/quote].
[quote=Thomas Nagel, Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament]Plato was clearly concerned not only with the state of his soul, but also with his relation to the universe at the deepest level. Plato’s metaphysics was not intended to produce merely a detached understanding of reality. His motivation in philosophy was in part to achieve a kind of understanding that would connect him (and therefore every human being) to the whole of reality – intelligibly and if possible satisfyingly. ....
The Platonic sense of the world is that its intelligibility and the development of beings to whom it is intelligible are nonaccidental; so our awareness and its expansion as part of the history of life and of our species are part of the natural evolution of the cosmos. Without a religious interpretation, this view does not face the problem of evil, or the problem of whether the whole process is aiming at any result. But it does expand our sense of what a human life is. [/quote]
As I said before, I posted the link for those interested. There's no penalty for not being interested. I would add, though, that these works have the status of classics, because they've retained interest and validity from ancient times. It's impossible to know what of our current philosophical oeuvre wil be read and appreciated centuries from now, it's the kind of perspective that only the passage of a lot of time will provide.
I agree. I've put Cicero's How to Win an Argument on my reading list and there are a few others that sound worthwhile reading.
Thank heavens that false humility makes for false pride!
IOW, a hierarchical one-way relationship in which you are the underdog.
IRL, you'd get tired of such an arrangement quickly.
No, I want to know what use is there in reading those old books. Don't just brush this off idly, it's not an idle question.
Is there anything more to it than nostalgia?
That is a good question. The answer in large part depends on how one reads these books and what is expected of them.
I don't want to put words into Wayfarer's mouth but isn't one of his opinions that the post enlightenment worldview, especially that of the current, post-Darwinian era holds a limited physicalist metaphysics and has rejected much wisdom that was ours for millennia? I imagine that these old books contain some of this repudiated knowledge and many other ideas besides worth cultivating.
Whatever uses we can make of their lessons.
Of course! One of the things I've regretted in my adult life, is the paucity of my education in the classics of ancient literature and philosophy. I was always a poor student, for various reasons, but aside from that, hardly any of this material was on my curriculum. Later in life, I've come to realise just how profound the classical philosophical tradition is, even though my knowledge of it is fragmentary. In my view - which is shared with Pierre Hadot, who is a scholar of the history of philosophy - most of what passes for philosophy in today's world, has nothing to do with philosophy as understood in the classical tradition. Philosophy proper is a transformative understanding of the nature of life.
On the other hand, it's mistaken to idolise the ancients, (or anything for that matter), and ancient cultures had their own shortcomings and blind-spots, no doubt. But the 'sacred thread' that runs through Greek philosophy and the formation of Western culture is unique and important, and constantly under attack from degenerative forces, principally materialism in all its forms, which has hijacked the terminology of philosophy whilst rejecting its meaning.
:ok:
Thales, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Epicurus, Lucretius, and others were all materialists in some form.
That is an interesting way to frame the question, the pain of losing the past.
On a personal level, the past is what happened to me and what I can remember about the events. Short term memory becomes some other thing after a while. It is difficult to keep the past alive.
An interest in the "old books" can be based upon how they are the parents of the new ones. The new books try to mark out what is original against the background of what has already been said. The old books did the same. Is there an absolute now that allows us to escape that process?
How can that be when "materialism" was there, almost from the beginning as this "sacred thread" unspooled, from Thales to Leucippus & Democritus to the Epicureans featured exclusively in Book X of Diogenes Laërtius' masterwork and Lucretius ... which parallels (or was inspired by) the "materialisms" of the C?rv?ka in India and exemplified by the Chinese astronomer-philosopher Wang Chong during the Han Dynasty?
What are you talking about, Wayf? Naturalists and atomists (re: materialists) have always belonged to the counter, more radical, tradition within the idealist-dominant, cultural mainstream of Western philosophy.
And besides: in this world, what could be more "degenerative" than otherworldly – therefore nihilistic (Nietzsche) – idealism "in all of its forms" (e.g. platonic, cartesian, subjective, transcendental, absolute, linguistic)?
Quoting 180 Proof
Materialists represent one tendency or pole in the dialectic in those cultures. In the modern period, it took on a modern form. The French philosophers of the Enlightenment re-discovered Lucretius. Baron D'Holbach's 'all I see are bodies in motion' is directly from that source. But the fact that it's always existed doesn't validate it. It's a natural thing to believe, as we appear to be sorrounded by material objects, but that too doesn't validate it.
Beside physics itself has undermined materialism. Paul Davies and John Gribben's book The Matter Myth, published decades ago, it is about how 20th century physics completely torpedoed classical materialism, as Heisenberg said a few decades beforehand. There are thousands of books out there saying the same. Materialism, in the Democritean or Lucretian form, as in the ultimate existence of point-particles, is dead and buried.
Quoting Werner Heisenberg The Debate between Plato and Democritus
I think the form materialism takes in the modern age is simply the methods of scientists and engineers applied to the problems of philosophy. When those principles are applied to the problems that they're suitable for, such as technology and medicine, then the results are often spectacular and (hopefully) beneficial (although the same wizadry that produces brain-assisted prosthetics can also produce killer robots). It's when they're applied to the problems of philosophy that they're completly unsuitable, notwithstanding that this is not even understood by many of its proponents.
As for the C?rv?ka in India, they were very similar to today's variety. There's a charming character, representative of their school, in the early Buddhist texts called Prince Payasi, who ordered condemned prisoners to be sealed in clay pots to see if the soul could be observed escaping when it was unsealed. (It couldn't.) Materialist of that kind are classified as nihilists in Buddhist literature.
Analogously, I think interpreting classical 'atoms' as quarks (or even quanta) and 'void' as QM field is valid as I've previously mentioned without rebuttal. Paraphrasing Churchill, 'materialism' (now sexed-up physicalism) is the most incoherent ontology or inconsistent methodology, no doubt, except for all the varieties of idealism proposed.
That's pretty funny. :clap:
I think the most pregnant phrase in Heisenberg's quote is that sub-atomic particles don't exist in the same way as flowers, stones, and so on. Implicitly, this re-introduces modal metaphysics, in that things can exist in different ways (see this article.)
Whereas in Democritean atomism, a thing either exists or doesn't exist - all that exists being atoms and the void. So the atom is completely existent, the void is completely non-existent. But that is precisely what is being called into question.
And consider this - we know about electric and atomic fields, because they show up in the kinds of experiments, and using the kinds of equipment, that are likely to detect those fields. And even so, nobody knows what 'fields' really are. But what if there are fields of completely different kinds, like biological fields, or mental fields? A science which methodically excludes consideration of anything of the kind is bound not to acknowledge them, but they might be equally fundamental to the constitution of living beings. And besides, it has to be acknowledged that there are enormous gaps in current physics, with 96% of the totality of the Universe existing in some form that science can't even fathom.
Quoting 180 Proof
You'd agree with this passage from Richard Lewontin's review of one of Carl Sagan's books, wouldn't you?
My interpretation is that this attitude is actually the direct descendant of Western monotheism - but with 'the Cosmos' in the place of God - Carl Sagan himself said 'Cosmos is all there is" - and 'scientific laws' standing in for divine commandments (Whitehead says in Science and the Modern World that they our modern equivalent of 'the decrees of Fate'.) The jealous God dies hard!
What if wisdom consists in ataraxia, though? What if it consists in simply following your inclinations and conscience, of being yourself fearlessly, and being skeptical of external so-called authorities and traditional methods as paths to wisdom and of any claims that we need to rely on such things to gain wisdom?
In his Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle positioned contemplation as the most virtuous activity. The highest form of thinking is thinking about thinking. This is directly from Plato where the highest form of knowledge is knowledge of intelligible objects, i.e. knowledge of knowledge.
But in Aristotle's cosmology he posited eternal circular motions. as the orbits of the planets. Then to support the eternal circular motions he posit unmoved movers involved in the virtuous circular thinking of thinking on thinking. The idea of eternal circular orbits has been proven faulty, and circular thinking is now considered a vicious circle. So this aspect of his metaphysics seems to have failed
However, he left another door open in his Nichomachean Ethics. He divided knowledge into practical and theoretical, which was quite a bit different from Plato's division. Each section has different levels, but what happens is that "intuition" is designated as the highest form of knowledge, in both the theoretical and the practical divisions. It's difficult to grasp exactly what intuition is supposed to be, but it seems be something concerning the relating of theory to practise, and practise to theory.
You might be interested in the following quotes:
[quote=Werner Heisenberg]I think that modern physics has definitely decided in favor of Plato. In fact the smallest units of matter are not physical objects in the ordinary sense; they are forms, ideas which can be expressed unambiguously only in mathematical language.[/quote]
[quote=Niels Bohr]Everything we call real is made of things that cannot be regarded as real.[/quote]
Both, it seems, were referring to the fact that quarks, the smallest units of matter, behave like mathematical points. I got that from Marcus du Sautoy's book What We Don't Know.
I'm not convinced there are any 'smallest units of matter', as such. The entities that exist on that scale are only 'particles' by way of analogy. Paul Davies, who I mentioned above, has been writing about this for decades - Matter Myth, God and the New Physics, Goldilocks Enigma, and other such titles. Not to forget Tao of Physics, which despite it's many critics, was still a ground-breaker.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Of course that is true. Galileo rightly demolished Aristotelian physics but there's a deeper issue, which is along with it, banishing the idea of any purpose other than mechanical interaction. And besides in many other respects Aristotle's philosophy still has much to commend it. But you can't deny the aspects of it that were just plain mistaken, either.
Oh! So we're on a similar if not the same "wavelength". Glad to know that. I feel I'm in good company. :up: Resonance! I hear ya!
Here's the deal!
If the very small are but ideas, doesn't that mean the very big (the universe comes to mind but maybe there are things bigger than it) could also be just an idea?
Reminds me of @Devans99's argument that infinity is a nonsensical idea in re points and lines. Faer argument proceeds like so: Mathematical points are dimensionless (size 0 like many of our anorexic, malnourished super models). How can then a line, a set of such points, exist. How can a series, any series of zeros (points) add up to a line, a nonzero object? How can quarks (point particles) yield matter? Is matter an illusion?
The main domineering philosophical school was the idealism headed by Plato and his followers.
The fundamental issue I see is the continuity of existence. This is the question of how do some things remain the same, as time passes, in a changing world. The idea of eternal circular motions supports what was observed in the world as a continuous sameness.
When the Aristotelian assumption was removed, there was no replacement provided. Instead, the continuity of existence was taken for granted, as expressed by Newton's first law of motion. Notice the difference between Aristotle and Newton. Aristotle has a reasoned eternal motion, a perfect circle has no beginning or end, so if something is moving in a perfect circle it could just keep going around forever, perpetual motion. Newton, on the other hand, assumed any, or every motion is eternal, unless it is caused, by a force, to change. I hope you can see the fundamental difference here. In Aristotle, there must be a reason for the temporal continuity of motion, and existence in general, but in Newton that continuity is taken for granted.
In modernity an important problem has evolved. Newton did not actually take the continuity of motion completely for granted, as stated in his first law, he presented this law as dependent on the Will of God. So it was granted by God, and dependent on His Will. Therefore we have implicit within that law, the requirement of the Will of God, in order for that law to be a reasonable law. This is part of the process of Neo-Platonist metaphysics becoming supreme over Aristotelian metaphysics in western society. Material existence for Aristotelian metaphysics is supported by the eternal circular motions, and the divine thinking which is thinking on thinking, whereas the Neo-Platonist perspective from Augustine supplanted the divine thinking with the Will of God.
Modern western society in its atheist tendency, has removed the Will of God, and left Newton's first law as unsupported and unreasonable. So we have in quantum mechanics for example, nothing to support a temporal continuity of fundamental particles. The wisdom of the ancient people tells us very explicitly that the temporal continuity of material existence, from one moment to the next, is not something which we can take for granted. It must be supported by reasoned principles. When the reasoned principles which have been handed down to us over time (the Will of God) appear to no longer be reasonable, we cannot just dump them and forget them as if they've provided no service to us, they need to be rethought, and restructured, or else we are left with a huge hole in our understanding of reality.
Ataraxia can get you anywhere. You need to take the beginning, the center, and the end, i.e., "s", "o", ph", "i", "a", and discard the "ch", "i", "z", "r", "e", "n" to get it right. :smile:
Otherwise put, you need some reference to external realities (and authorities) to make sure you don't go to places where you don't want to be.
Quoting Wayfarer
to contemporary physics. The classical philosophical tradition is not what you imagine it to be. The philosophers did away with the gods of the poets and priests. They were guided by reason rather than mythology.
Quoting Wayfarer
What is validated is that is played a significant part in the tradition.
Quoting Wayfarer
That the universe itself acts purposively is analogical. The fact that some living things act purposively does not mean that the universe does. Rather than rule it out it is a question of why it should be ruled in.
I think on that point we will remain in disagreement. I see the arts and free-thinking philosophy as alternative "ways" to following any of the "external authorities". What you say may be true for some, but not all, in my opinion. I mean how could we possibly justify a belief that we can speak for all anyway?
I never said to "follow external authorities" in the sense of entering into some form of master-disciple relationship, only to refer to them as a general standard. We do that anyway by learning from parents, teachers, experts, etc.
The artist or free-thinking philosopher does not invent his or her own reality, method or technique. They learn from others and remain in contact with others of their kind and with the general public.
In other words, yes, we are artists or free-thinkers, but we don't operate in isolation, we keep our feet on the ground and stay in touch with reality including with people that can give us advice on matters of importance.
Whether or not any of us feels the need to subordinate themselves to an external authority is of course a personal choice and in some cases may not even be necessary, as you say.
There are many references to Greek philosophy in Heisenberg's later philosophical writings. The passage I quoted was from his lecture, The Debate between Plato and Democritus.
Quoting Fooloso4
Because then you have the problem of how purpose arises out of purposelessness. By accident, is the presumed answer, if it is ruled out. I think that issue arises very early in Greek philosophy and finds final form in Aristotle's Aitia and scheme of fourfold causation.
Not only that, but even in terms of finding our own way toward the attainment of wisdom, we cannot do it in complete isolation but need at least from time to time to turn to external points of reference in order to verify that what we have found or are in the process of finding is indeed wisdom and not something else.
The problem I see with relying on external "points of reference" is that you would need to already know that those points of reference were manifestations of wisdom. How could you know that unless you could see the fruits of those external points of reference and have the practical wisdom to recognize them as fruits of wisdom?
I think we must make our assessments in acknowledgement of uncertainty and the possibility of doubt as Socrates seems to be advocating. But, you know, that's just me; that others may have different ideas they follow, I also acknowledge.
The possibility of doubt is always there until we have reached certainty.
And yes, phronesis is practical wisdom. And so is sophia. Ancient philosophy is, by definition, a practical endeavor. This tends to get overlooked in modern culture.
I am in agreement but what do you think the 'fruits' would actually look like? How do you demonstrate this?
What do you think of the role of intuition in Aristotle's "practical wisdom". I have great difficulty understanding what is meant by "intuition" in Aristotle because he describes it as the highest form of knowledge, and in his logic he implies that it cannot be wrong.
I've seen "intuition" explained as the means by which we establish connections, relations between things. So for example, if a primitive person noticed that when the sun comes up in the morning there is warmth from the sun, and water on the ground, dew, dries up, by intuition, the person would establish a connection between these three things, sun, heat, and drying up, and one could create a couple of principles, the sun creates heat, and the sun dries things up. From other information, such as heat from a fire drying things up, one might deductively conclude that heat dries things.
So I think that intuition is necessary, as prior to any form of logic, inductive or deductive, as the part of the intellectual process which determines meaningful relations (causal perhaps). But I think Aristotle gets the whole hierarchy of certainty backward, when he says that these first principles can't be wrong. Clearly delusional thinking and mental illness demonstrate that such intuitions are often wrong. And this backwardness reflects on Aristotle's complete epistemological structure. He states that logic proceeds from the more certain, toward conclusions which are less certain. But if the first principles are provided by intuition, and intuition is not reliable, then how is it possible that we start from a higher level of certainty in our logical proceedings?
That there are living things that act purposively, that there are living things with desires, does not mean that the universe must act with purpose and have desires, any more than that there are living things that walk and talk and see means that the universe must walk and talk and see.
Regarding your example, wouldn't you say that the observed connection between sunlight (and other sources of heat). warmth and evaporation is as certain as anything can be? The usual counterexample to this kind of intuitive understanding is Aristotle's belief that heavier things fall faster. Even Aristotle could have tested this theory, though with a heavy sheet and a small stone lighter than the sheet, if he had thought to; the raw materials for the experiment would have been readily available to him.
Certainly, the universe considered as the object of science need not be regarded as purposeful or even as 'acting'. Putting aside these motivations is part of the basic methodology of science.
But the philosophical issues are deeper than that. Cast your mind back to the Phaedo, where Socrates says of Anaxagoras' naturalism:
[quote=IEP Plato, Phaedo; https://iep.utm.edu/phaedo/]One day after his initial setbacks Socrates happened to hear of Anaxagoras’ view that Mind directs and causes all things. He took this to mean that everything was arranged for the best. Therefore, if one wanted to know the explanation of something, one only had to know what was best for that thing. Suppose, for instance, that Socrates wanted to know why the heavenly bodies move the way they do. Anaxagoras would show him how this was the best possible way for each of them to be. And once he had taught Socrates what the best was for each thing individually, he then would explain the overall good that they all share in common. Yet upon studying Anaxagoras further, Socrates found these expectations disappointed. It turned out that Anaxagoras did not talk about Mind as cause at all, but rather about air and ether and other mechanistic explanations. For Socrates, however, this sort of explanation was simply unacceptable:
To call those things causes is too absurd. If someone said that without bones and sinews and all such things, I should not be able to do what I decided, he would be right, but surely to say that they are the cause of what I do, and not that I have chosen the best course, even though I act with my mind, is to speak very lazily and carelessly. Imagine not being able to distinguish the real cause from that without which the cause would not be able to act as a cause. (99a-b)[/quote]
Here, Socrates is criticizing that the mechanistic principles provided by Anaxagoras as being insufficient - mere 'bones and sinews', whereas the explanation that he wants has to account for 'Mind' (presumably 'nous') as the ultimate cause. So here, the principle of agency is introduced.
I think it anticipates later developments, particularly Aristotle's 'four causes', in which the cause of something is also part of the explanation as to why it exists, and also the various dialogues of Plato's which explicate his cosmology and the role of the Demiurge.
Because science is principally concerned with what Aristotelian philosophy would call material and efficient causes, it has lost the broader conception of reason that is suggested by that. It's all 'bones and sinews'! Post 'death of God' the Universe is believed to be devoid of reason, save that superimposed over it by the mind of h. sapiens. That's why there's a major thread in 20th Century philosophy and literature that life is a kind of cosmic accident, the 'million monkeys' theory (e.g Jacques Monod, Richard Dawkins, early Bertrand Russell. It's always struck me as somewhat absurd that 20th century science, which insists on finding causes, regards the absence of cause, in the case of the beginning of life, as being somehow an explanation.)
Now, I'm not appealing to ID arguments. But what I will say is that the consequence of this view is that the mind, as the result of the doings of the 'blind watchmaker', is presumed to be the product of this billion-year process which is essentially insentient and non-rational. And I think there's someting profoundly fallacious about that picture.
Putting it in as naturalistic terms as possible, what if the tendency towards the evolution of more intelligent species is a latent capacity within the Universe itself. Thomas Nagel wonders in Mind and Cosmos if 'each of our lives is a part of the lengthy process of the universe gradually waking up and becoming aware of itself’. Which doesn't deny, or even conflict with, the scientific analysis of the process, so much as extend it, to re-encompass the dimension of 'intentionality' which has somehow become lost.
The example of the sun and evaporation is just one example. I'm sure there are many examples of deluded minds, and mentally ill people making connections which are not sound. Your example of falling objects is a good one. Heavier things in general do fall faster, but in this case the intuition was wrong. Further testing proved that intuition to be wrong. This is the point, science proceeds from first principles derived from intuition. and since we trust science we tend to believe that these principles provide us with certainty, even though they haven't been properly tested. Einstein's relativity is a good example of such a principle, derived from intuition, but not properly tested.
Quoting Wayfarer
This I believe, is the principle of plenitude. Given an infinite amount of time, every possibility will be actualized. But of course "infinite amount of time" is not a wise intuition.
Strange, isn't it, how some people never outgrow the early naive stage of psychological development in which they anthropomorphize every thing, "seeing" intentional agents and hidden purposes every where, like toddlers in a nursery? The world is not a cradle, Freud points out; rather the world is an indifferent wilderness by turns beautiful and terrible, and yet many demand it be more secure and comforting – consoling – than it is, and via hasty generalizations and compositional fallacies they posit some "religious or idealist metaphysics" (re: ego-flattering "Providence") which, of course, collapses under rational scrutiny like blowing on a house of cards.
[quote=180 Proof] 'life' is a specific emergent level of molecular-structured thermodynamic complexity that "happened" insofar as -- "because" -- there weren't conditions which prevented it. Same reason snowflakes "happen". In other words, the universe consists in entropy-driven transformations wherein complex phenomena like (terrestrial) "life" arises & goes extinct along a segment of the slope down from minimal entropy (order) to maximal entropy (disorder); the universe is always-already "dead" but becomes a little less-so ever-so-momentarily at different stages of its (cosmic) decomposition. [/quote]
You want that, it's all yours. I'm not even going to complain.
There is a difference between observational and theoretical claims in science. There are no simple observable confirmations that can be made with theoretical claims in the way there can be with claims about what is directly observed.
So, relativity has been tested insofar as its predictions concerning what we would expect to observe if it were correct have all panned out so far I believe.
:fire: Well I'm flattered and much obliged, my friend! The ideas expressed in that quote reflect what is more true than not no matter what we "want" to believe which, I think, is the beauty and power of a naturalistic (realist) worldview. Sublime ephemerality (anicca, no?) A universe is a drop in the ocean of oblivion – we make of ourselves, and maybe of the universe itself, what we can with the time given us (says Camus or "Gandalf the Grey"?) :death: :flower:
Nope. (Explains the dire consequences of objectifying non-objectification.)
//the point being, Buddhism, and the Buddha, are not nihilistic. Nihilism is the view that at death, the body returns to the elements, there are no consequences of actions, to put it minimally. Of course that has been elaborated in mythology but the point remains. (The Buddha also rejected ‘eternallism’, which in my interpretation is the belief that one can be re-born in perpetuity through successive lives, and that there is a separate, self-caused essence. Nihilism and eternalism are the ‘two extreme views’ which the ‘middle way’ avoids.)
I wonder if you’ve ever read Tom Wolfe’s famous 1996 essay, Sorry but your Soul Just Died? It’s still online. I think it is relevant to this conversation.
We do not agree here. Every observation is theory laden, starting with the words we use to describe something. Call it "red", and there is theory behind the meaning of that word. There is no real separation between observational claims and theoretical claims in science today, because all claims have elements of both. This reality underscores the need to determine which of the principles within an observation, are based in intuition, therefore unproven theory.
If for example you are describing something you saw as having been "red", then unless there are strict criteria as to what constitutes red, this part of your description is based in intuition, unproven theory. That's why in a litmus test there is a colour chart for the purpose of comparison, it removes the unproven intuition of "red" with a definition, a chart, derived from proven theory. Either way, the intuitive judgement or the colour chart judgement, when you say "it's red" the judgement is based on theory, one is just better proven than the other..
I don't agree. For me 'red' is just a word we use to refer to a certain colour or range of colours that are commonly observed. Indeed there may be and have been various theories associated with our use of that word or its cognates (not specifially our use of 'red', our use of colour words in general) but is there any essential theory underpinning its/ their use?
The incompatibility between "a certain colour", and a "range of colours" is the important point to recognize here, which makes your observation, when you use the word "red", theory dependent.
Quoting 180 Proof
I took that to be a reference to Buddhist philosophy - anicca being 'impermanence'. But I'm saying that it's not true to characterise Buddhism as naturalism (or nihilism) which is why I linked to that particular verse.
Let's just keep in mind that for many of these ancient authors, a half of the human population was by default considered lesser beings. They thought women are defective, incomplete men.
Better = That which gives more pleasure overall, taking into account space and time.
No. I'm just a sociopath. So i appear robotic.
See, now you wish I was a bot.
That would require one to be an epistemic autonomist, and to in fact be epistemically autonomous. Epistemic autonomy is not possible. Because, as you later say:
Quoting Janus
However, the garden variety of what you describe in the first quote above is epistemic narcissim, which is fairly common.
Quoting Janus
No, that's not enough, because one still needs some standards by which to assess those fruits.
Quoting Janus
Except that humans have developed such vastly different ideas of what counts as "thriving", "happiness", "peace", "harmony" that the above criteria are too general. People can thrive, be happy, live in peace and harmony while living under tyranny. People can also thrive, be happy, live in peace and harmony if they are politically correct androids.
And what is more, spiritually advanced people tend to resent to be put to the test and their actions judged.
Of course. But as points out repeatedely, acknowledgement of doubt and uncertainty can lead to a schizoaffective disorder.
If the Sun & Moon should doubt they'd immediately go out .
And yet precsiely those same people who demand the Universe to be a welcoming place for them, who demand it to be secure and comforting for them get to thrive in it. Because such people, believing they are entitled to security and comfort in this world, tame rivers, kill the infidels, and pursue science, in order to make the world a safe place for themselves. And they get it done.
:up: That is a great angle. Never had thought of that.
Quoting hope
:yikes:
The problem is that those external points of reference are often hostile to us, and we have to find a way to rely on and trust people who, at the very least, don't care if we live or die.
I don't see why you say that. As I see it all it requires is not being concerned about the opinions of others and making up your own mind.
Quoting baker
I disagree. Sure people can make the best of bad situations, but I don't believe anyone with any self-respect would choose to live under any form of tyranny. As to being politically correct androids, I don't count failing to think for yourself as an example of fulfilling your potential and hence it also doesn't count as an example of thriving in my view.
Note, I haven't said you have to agree with my view; you should have your own view which you have worked out for yourself, if you have the capacity for that at least; otherwise you will fail to reach, or even approach, your potential in my view.
Quoting baker
Oh really, and how do you know that? What criteria do you personally employ to enable you to judge whether someone is spiritually advanced or not?
Quoting baker
Rubbish! Chronic and crippling doubt may lead to mental disorders, but mere acknowledgement of uncertainty is just being intellectually honest.
Your arguments are not convincing; surely you can do better?
Reduces suffering is more to my taste.
If one is blissfully ignorant of how one's opinions came to be (and whom one got them from), then all is well in la-la land...
This is also a reason why "ancient wisdom" isn't so popular: to acknowledge ancient wisdom would be to acknowledge that one's ideas aren't one's own, but that one got them from others. Now, that's deflating.
Oh really, and how do you know that? What criteria do you personally employ to enable you to judge whether someone is fulfilling their potential?
Oh, so you know what my potential is?
Come on.
I'm being both cynical and not. I've noticed that people who tend to describe themselves as "spiritually advanced" or who imply as much tend to resent to be put to the test and their actions judged. (Or their fans do it on their behalf.)
Personally, I'm not sure what it means to be "spiritually advanced" (if I would know that, I wouldn't be here at this forum). But my overall impression is that being spiritually advanced might very well have nothing to do with the usual lovey-dovey notions that some people promote in the name of spirituality (kindness, compassion, empathy), but something much more Darwinian. I have this impression based on the things that the supposedly spiritually advanced people do that get described as "kind, compassionate, empathetic", and those acts include killing, raping, and pillaging.
You've been operating out of some unstated premises, it's those I want you to spell out.
Oh, how fresh you sound! How romantic!
The upshot of being born and raised in old-fashioned Europe is that one did get a classical education. But it's also an education that kills one's interest in the Classics. (There is a cynical saying -- "The Classics are those that everybody knows and nobody reads.")
What do you consider a classical education and at what age?
On what basis would you say "it's red", rather than "it's orange", unless you are applying some sort of theory which enables your judgement? But I really don't know how you are proposing to define "theory". Doesn't personal choice involve theory in your understanding?
In the case of the colour chart, the fact that there is theory involved in the judgement is more obvious, because it's recorded on paper. But if you do not refer to a colour chart aren't you still referring to some sort of theory in your mind, which supports your choice? I don't think you'd say that the choice of words is random.
Quoting baker
The materialist/determinist metaphysics is persistent in its denial of the obvious, that intention is a cause. Aristotle produced volumes of material which explains the reality of this obvious fact, as "final cause". So this materialist/determinist perspective ought not even be called "metaphysics", because it's simply a denial of the reality of that whole realm of activity which lies beyond the grasp of physics. It's more like anti-metaphysics.
Then they'll posit "a world" which is at the same time, both beautiful and terrifying, with complete disregard for the fact that such are simply the judgements of intentional beings. So they never get to the real metaphysical questions, such as how does this world support, or provide for real intentional judgements, because they employ contradictory statements like that, to make the reality of intention disappear behind a cloud of smoke and mirrors.
Quoting baker
Actually, far from deflating, this realization may be very motivating. When one's ideas are "out of sync" with the conventional knowledge of the day (materialist/determinist), that person may become quite isolated in one's own disillusion. To find consistency in "ancient wisdom" is satisfying and encouraging.
Socrates expected to find something else in Anaxagoras because Anaxagoras says that Mind directs and causes all things. He assumes that Mind is like his mind and its cause like his. What he expected was an explanation for why it is best that things are as they are. But not only did Anaxagoras fail to provide such an explanation, Socrates himself failed. He goes on to tell of his "second sailing", his investigation by means of accounts, logoi. He posits the Forms as hypotheticals with the Good as their cause. He orders the world according to his own mind not Mind.
Nope, Apollodorus does not say that "acknowledgement of doubt and uncertainty can lead to schizoaffective disorder". It is not the acknowledgment but giving in to doubt and uncertainty, especially when coupled with Straussian esotericism, that can open the trapdoor leading to schizoaffective or delusional disorder. Two totally different things IMO.
Quoting baker
Sure. This is what we have intelligence, wisdom, and discernment for.
I think the distinctions Aristotle makes between the sciences makes the question different depending upon what is being sought:
Regarding the status of the color red, the old Philosopher seems to be favoring Janus during this discussion of Protagoras' view:
The anthropomorphic element is an important criteria to employ when comparing models of the divine.
For instance, the creator in Timaeus seems to work in a similar fashion to how we make a plan and then build "copies" of it. While Aristotle uses a lot of the cosmogony found in that dialogue, he makes clear that nobody is going out for beers with the Unmoved Mover after work.
What do you think is the relationship between models of the divine and models of the origin of the universe?
Quoting Fooloso4
I hope the questions don't get harder to answer after attempting to meet this one. They probably will, though.
The interest in understanding this place where we are born, taken by itself, argues against seeing them as separate sets of models. The possibility that our response to what has been given to us is a dynamic relationship with the original set up develops a separation that allows for a difference to be considered.
Amongst the arguments about whether this is the best of all possible worlds, the desire to change it is always well nigh behind.
All ideas may be "the same old stew reheated"; but so what? You choose the idea and opinions out of the suite of those culturally available to you that seem to fit best with your lived experience. We don't have to be that rare person who comes up with a completely novel idea (if there be such at all) in order to think for ourselves.
It's not theoretical (for me at least). I would say it's red rather rather than orange if it seems to be red rather than orange. It's just a seeming or a feeling. as associated with my felt sense of my overall experience of colour, not theoretical at all.
Doesn't that depend on one's interests? Someone who takes no interest in talk about gods will see them as separate, with scientific models being appropriate for investigation and theological models as inappropriate.
I am not sure if the matter is resolved through identifying different interests.
Your question about the models should stand out there for a while. A large rock in the river.
The point I was making is that I think it is impossible to make any sort of measurement at all, even the most basic sense judgement, what Aristotle refers to as a "measure", in your quoted passage, without applying theory. As he says in that passage, to judge a flavour is to "measure", and what I say is that to measure requires theory.
Quoting Janus
You "feel" the difference between the meaning of two words, rather than thinking it? That's a new one on me. You call it "orange" because when you see it you get the feeling of orange from it?
I can't say that I know what orange feels like, but I think I can judge whether or not something is orange. When I make this judgement I do not refer to my feelings, I refer to my memories, so clearly my judgement is not derived from my feelings, it's derived from my mind.
Orange is a sensation, a feeling, just as red is. When I look at something and it feels or seems or looks orange to me I say it is orange. There is no right or wrong in this as there is no definite boundary between orange and red. If I said it was green, yellow or blue that would be a different matter. I have no idea what you are looking for beyond that.
I think I understand the basis of your skepticism. What is unclear to me is how it relates to Aristotle. The guy kept arguing for a shared body of experience. Maybe he was wrong. Is there another way to understand the texts?
The issue is not whether there is a right or wrong to this judgement, but whether there is theory employed in this judgement. When you say "it feels or seems or looks orange to me", how do you think you can make that judgement without applying theory? Obviously your eyes are not making the judgement that "orange" is the word to use, so it's not the sense organ which judges that the thing is orange. Do we agree that it is the mind which makes this judgement? If so, then how do you think that your mind can judge the colour as orange rather than red or some other name for a colour, or even some other random word, without the use of theory? What type of principles do you think your mind might rely on in making such a judgement if they aren't theoretical principles?
A "shared body of experience"? What do you mean by this?
Aristotle often refers to what "what most of us encounter" versus the exceptions. If you need citations, I will provide tomorrow.
I will sleep now.
I have no theory in mind, so I am not applying a theory. I'm not claiming that it is orange or red just that it looks or seems orange or red to me. As I said it's a matter of a lifetime of impressions and associations, not theories, that have formed my association of 'orange' or 'red' or any colour word with some impressions and not with others. If you think it is a theory then explain just what the theory is and what its predictions could be.
How could I know that theory? It's your theory which is being applied, and you refuse to tell it to me. You even refuse to acknowledge its existence. Isn't "associations" of ideas exactly what theory is? How can you say you are making associations, but the associations are not theoretical?
This reminds me of Plato's portrayal of Socrates. Socrates would ask all sorts of people (artists and craftspeople) who obviously had some sort of practical knowledge because they knew how to do things, to explain the knowledge which enabled them to do what they did. And they couldn't, just like you can't explain the knowledge which enables you to judge something as orange. You seem to think that it's just something that your senses do, you "feel" the difference between orange and red.
Consider this imaginary scenario. A very young child is learning colours. The person sees that if there is a hint of yellow in the red, it ought to be judged as orange. So the person applies this theory (you agree that this is theory?) and states "orange" accordingly, and this is accepted by others. After some time, the person no longer needs to apply the theory, as the judgement is habitualized, it becomes 'automatic'. The person then completely forgets all about that learning process, and having to apply that theory to make the decision, because this process is no longer present to the person's conscious mind. What happens to this theory? Is it not still playing an important role in the person's judgement of colour?
One way to express my uncertainty about interests can be observed at the beginning of the Timaeus.
The polity of the Republic, where storytelling is closely regulated, is inserted into a story about the distant past. That seems to complicate one's relationship to the cosmogony rather than provide orientation to our present endeavors.
Aristotle explicitly objects to the confusion in that text and generally seeks to clarify the contexts in which we talk about different things. Does that difference in approach mean Plato and Aristotle are using different models of the divine?
Do you mean his or Plato's interest in telling this unlikely "likely tale"? Or the city at war? Or the cause of the cosmos or in action?
Quoting Valentinus
Do you mean that we must take into consideration of Glaucon and the others, or those at that time who read the dialogue, who were educated through the stories of Homer and Hesiod, and how our own education is quite different? If so, then I agree. It is not so straight forward for us to read an ancient author about things that were ancient to that author. We are in that respect twice removed.
Quoting Valentinus
Different from each other or different from us? Since the problem of a purposive universe was raised and the claim by @Wayfarer that something along the way was lost, we need to consider whether in what way what was said to be lost was even present, but also whether our understanding of the universe should include models of the divine, what that means, and what they are.
I was referring to when Critias related the story of what an Egyptian priest told Solon about ancient Athenians:
What is one to make of the "fiction that becomes a fact" immediately before a creation story is told? This is especially peculiar when the "fiction" involved questions the value of fictions. Yes, we are twice removed from the conversation.
I meant to ask if Plato and Aristotle are using the same model despite taking such different approaches. Aristotle takes the cosmogony and edits it so that it can become an argument. Plato works many different arguments that are not integrated into a system in that way. Plato often makes reference to the "fabulous" to draw out a quality he is in accord with or opposes. Since the two thinkers cannot be compared directly as competing models, what would using the same or different model of the divine look like in their case?
I figure I am asking Wayfarer's question from a different starting point. We have developed a language for what is "theological" or not. We have certainly changed our world view over the centuries. If we have lost something then it is going to be difficult to express. Otherwise, it is not lost at all.
We still make cosmogonies.
This is interesting in several respects that I won't go into. I will only mention the idea of the old and venerable. We tend to put more value in what is new as more advanced. Plato acknowledges the old but is himself an innovator. The story of the ancient Athenians stands in contrast to Socrates' city in speech. It is significant that in retelling the story of the Republic Socrates neglects to mention the philosopher-king, without whom the city would not harmonious with itself let alone in perfect harmony with the ancient city.
It becomes fact only if we accept Critias' story to be true. It seems to be fiction in the guise of fact. To pose the question another way: what is the role of poetry in philosophy?
Quoting Valentinus
The Timaeus is strange for a Platonic dialogue. It is almost a monologue, and Socrates uncharacteristically says very little. He does, however, remind Timaeus to call upon the gods in accordance with custom. (27b) This raises the problem of theology, to what extent talk of gods is a matter of custom, of nomos rather than logos.
Quoting Valentinus
One problem the Timaeus raises is what serves as the model. In this case, what is the model of the gods, what is it they are made to look like.
All this calculation of a god who always is concerning the god who was one day to be (34a-b)
The god that came to be is the cosmos. All that comes to be passes away. Not all gods are eternal, unchanging gods. What does it mean to be divine?
No I don't agree it is a theory; it is a name for a perceptible difference, a distinction.
Theories are imagined purportedly plausible explanations for observed phenomena. They come with predictions as to what would be observed if they were correct. If you think it is a theory then I think you have an eccentric notion of what the word means.
There's no name for the perceptible difference. One thing is an orange colour, and another thing is a red colour. What would be the name of the difference between them? There is no name for the difference between them, only an explanation for the observed phenomena, one has yellow in it, the other does not. Seems to me like such differences, or distinctions, are not named, they are described by exactly what you say theories are, "plausible explanations for observed phenomena".
Consider the famous essay by Bertrand Russell at the dawn of the 20th Century:
[quote=Bertrand Russell, A Free Man's Worship]That man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labors of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of Man’s achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins–all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand. Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul’s habitation henceforth be safely built.[/quote]
This became the theme of an enormous range of literature, drama, art and philosophy in the 20th century. One book worth mentioning is Max Horkheimer's 'Eclipse of Reason', written immediately after WWII. The main theme of this book is that in classical philosophy and culture, reason is assumed to be objective, in the sense of underlying the cosmos. The role of philosophy (and science) was naturally assumed to be discerning this reason and acting in accordance with it. 'Since it is objective and not bound to a particular subject, the rationality of correct ends is the rationality of the whole world or universe, it’s proper ordering or harmony. Humanity’s understanding of it is not a technical accomplishment so much an achievement of revelation or wisdom achieved.' [sup]1[/sup]
However, he says, the ascendancy of instrumental reason, the reason of means and ends, and specifically its formalization and application to science and technology, have undermined the objectivity of reason by exposing its mythological origins. While we have countless traditions still based in old ideologies that give us shared values and norms simply out of habit, they have been exposed as superstition because of their connection with mythological creation narratives (as Neitszche diagnosed in Twilight of the Gods and other works). And so while the human ability to engineer outcomes has been vastly amplified, our ability to pursue goals with intellectual integrity has collapsed, due to the perceived meaninglessness of the Universe. This is a crisis - perhaps another facet of that described in Edward Husserl's 'Crisis of the European Sciences'.
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1. 'Plato was clearly concerned not only with the state of his soul, but also with his relation to the universe at the deepest level. Plato’s metaphysics was not intended to produce merely a detached understanding of reality. His motivation in philosophy was in part to achieve a kind of understanding that would connect him (and therefore every human being) to the whole of reality – intelligibly and if possible satisfyingly.' - Thomas Nagel, Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament.
There is no single word for the perceptual difference. But the term for the difference would be "the difference between red and orange". The fact that there are two colour names 'red' and 'orange' entails that there are two different colours, red and orange, If there are different colours then there is a difference between the colours. Of course red and orange are not each one determinate colour; there is a continuum shading between them; a range that goes from almost mauve or purple to almost yellow. There is nothing controversial or puzzling about any of this.
Distinctions are not explanations.
Russell's essay more or less says as much; the question for his time like ours is 'whether or not we can muster the collective courage to go on without lying to ourselves about ourselves with mythic / religious / idealistic-ideological denials' (E. Becker, R. Brassier). Horkheimer & co say no, we can't, it's too late for this mass consumerist civilization. Same as Heidegger. Same as other faux-Cassandras like Žižek. And woo-fundies of every apocalyptic persuasion and sect too. What could be more decadent, or futile, than ritually reenacting 'the fall from imaginary grace' (i.e. philosophical suicide) like a bunch of latter-day (cyber)Gnostics?
That’s where we differ. Something genuinely was lost, and it’s very hard to discern what.
How do you know something was lost if you don't even know exactly what that something was?
Right, but that's a logical inference, that there is a difference between them. It's not something sensed. If we simply sense that one colour is different from another colour, there is no necessity to proceed logically to the conclusion that there is a difference between them. But when we label them as "red" and "orange", there is a desire to use the words correctly and the need to determine the difference between them arises from this desire. It is from this desire, that the inference "there is a difference between them" is derived.
Notice that the logical conclusion requires the unstated premise, of a correspondence between what you sense, a difference of colour, and the reality that there actually is such a a difference. This constitutes the assumed truth of "there are different colours". The assumed truth of the proposition, "there are different colours", relies on an assumed correspondence between sense and reality, so the conclusion ":there is a difference between the colours", is dependent on that assumed correspondence. The skeptic doubts this correspondence, and is not lead to that conclusion. The determination, and designation of "different colours" might be completely arbitrary. Therefore a justifiable theory is required to account for "the difference between the colours", in order to prove the truth of "there are different colours".
Quoting Janus
This is just theory though, which you appear to be presenting to justify your claim "there are different colours". I will warn you that this principle, a "continuum" fails in any attempt at such a justification. It implies that there is an infinite number of differences between any two colours. To justify real "different colours" requires discrete differences without the necessity of assuming another colour which lies in between, as this results in infinite regress of different colours between any two colours. The infinite regress negates the original purpose and requirement of correspondence with reality. Aristotle demonstrated this problem in his bid to combat sophism.
I think what was lost is the premodern worldview that emerged through millennia of human thought and experience, a worldview that was more in tune with both man and the cosmos, that enabled humans to create great art and architecture, and inspired them to great thoughts and actions. The spirit that gave birth to great civilizations and moved our ancestors to conceive of and aspire to higher realities and ideals. We have lost touch with the Form of greatness and for this reason we need the ancient authors to remind us of and guide us to the lost heritage that is waiting to be rediscovered and that, when found, will make us whole again, that is, both human and divine.
This is, in my opinion, a romanticized image of ancient philosophy.
I'm only talking about what we see not some purported reality beyond that.Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I used the word continuum to refer to the fact that there are many many gradations between red and orange, not a clear boundary, I haven't said the gradations are infinite.
I don't think it's that hard to discern; I'd say it's a sense of profound mystery, awe and the reverence that goes with that is what has been lost. It lives on in (some) philosophy, arts, music and poetry and in (some) religious and spiritual practices. Some scientists also seem to be alive to that sense of mystery, awe and reverence.
You can have that sense without needing to draw any conclusions about the nature of reality. That's really the point; the sense of mystery and reverence do not warrant any such conclusions and become banal when they are applied.
I think the greatest need is to learn to live with uncertainty. But the modern sensibility characteristically feels entitled to answers, and to the assumption that it knows all the answers. That sense of entitlement and smug self-assurance is what has been gained to our detriment in my view.
But we don't see with our eyes, the difference between red and orange, that's the point. We see red things and we see orange things, and since we perceive them as not having the same colour, i.e. we see them as different, we infer that there is a difference between them. That you see them as different does not imply that you see the difference between them. Do you grasp the difference between these two, seeing two things as different, and apprehending the difference between them? The latter is a matter of understanding theory.
Quoting Janus
That's just your theory, and as I explained, it's not a very plausible one. In the classic spectrum, orange is beside red. There are different shades of red, and different shades of orange, and people may disagree as to whether certain shades are properly called "orange", or "red", but there are no other colours between red and orange. If your theory explains the difference between two colours as a matter of there being a third colour between the two, you will have an infinite regress of colours, and the necessary conclusion of an infinity of colours between any two different colours. Between colour A and colour B is another colour, C. But between A and C there must be another colour D, Then between A and D there is another colour, ad infinitum. And the same between C and B, and all of the other colours required as the difference between two colours. It's a completely unrealistic theory as to what constitutes the difference between two colours.
If we see them as different then from the point of view of seeing there just is a difference, otherwise how could it be that we see them as different?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The theory would be that humans cab see different colours on account of differing wavelengths of light (and also possess the requisite visual capabilities, obviously). But I don't need that theory in order to see different colours, obviously; I don't need any theory at all to do that. Animals can do it too, to varying degrees and in different ways.
Humans can differentiate millions of different colours. Computer monitors purportedly can generate over a billion. I haven't said anything about the difference between two colours being on account of a third colour between them. The difference between two colours is on account of the fact that we can distinguish between them. If there are more colours that may be generated by a computer than humans can differentiate, it follows that there are different colours that humans are unable to see any difference between.
So is that a great, or profound, epochal "loss"? Is the infancy, or even childhood, of our species, especially traumatized to the extreme (re: sanguinary histories), "lost" by recently becoming a barely adult species (maturing, or wisening-up, much too slowly for our own good) which completely debilitates h. sapiens' further cultural and social development? Is it all downhill metaphysically (or spiritually) once we've entered puberty and our "eyes opened, and saw that we were naked"? And that striving to think for ourselves (i.e. learning to take smarter risks despite uncertainty aka "black swans") rather than submit to being told by invisible "mysteries" & "revelations" what to think and believe is a(nother) "fall from grace"?
We can't take that for granted, that's the point of skepticism. Things are not necessarily as you perceive them. So the conclusion "they are different" is not validly derived from "I see them as different".
Quoting Janus
We were not talking about simply seeing them as different. We were talking about labeling them as "orange" and "red", and this is what I said requires theory.. You seem to be either attempting to deny that there is a difference between seeing things as different, and being able to identify the specifics of that difference, or else you are just not grasping that there is such a difference. So whenever I say something about the latter, identifying the specifics concerning the difference between what is called "orange" and what is called "red", you attempt to reduce this to a general capacity of seeing that there is a difference. But seeing that there is a difference could apply to any different colours, and what we are talking about is specifically the difference between orange and red, not the general capacity of seeing that two things have different colours.
Quoting Janus
This is the faulty principle which falls to skepticism. You claimed, :I'm only talking about what we see not some purported reality beyond that", yet you claim that there is a real difference on account of the fact that you see a difference. Until we thoroughly understand the means by which colours are sensed, and discount as impossible that one could be deceived in sensation, this conclusion is not valid.
You're not paying attention. I already said I am not making any claim beyond what is the case in the context of seeing colours. IF we see different colours we see colours as different from one another, from which it logically follows that there are differences between colours, as seen.
I don't know if it is a general loss. I don't know to what degree the average person in ancient and medieval times was suffused with feelings of the magic, the poetry and mystery of existence. I don't much favour analogies between the development of humanity as a whole and individuals: Babyhood, childhood, adolescence, adulthood as applied to general human development; I think they are somewhat facile.
As I said I don't think those experiences of magic, poetry and mystery are reliant on any particular worldviews, at least I don't believe they are for those whose thinking is sufficiently subtle. As for the so-called "common man", I really don't know if anything has been lost for them.
Then you've changed the subject. We were discussing how one would distinguish red from orange, not simply how one would see that one thing's colour is different from another thing's colour. The former, distinguishing red from orange, is what I argued requires theory.
We distinguish red from orange by seeing one thing as red and the other orange; which just means that we associate the term 'red' with one and 'orange' with the other. There is no theory involved; it is just seeing and acquired association; and the latter is just habit, if you like. I am at a loss to know what it is that is confusing you about this, so I am afraid I can't be of further help.
It's not that I'm confused, not at all. I just find it a very poor explanation, and therefore unacceptable. If you said "that thing is red, and this thing is orange", and I asked you why you say so, and you said because I associate the term "red" with the colour of that thing, and the term "orange" with the colour of this thing, I'd say that's a very poor explanation. In fact, I'd reject it as most likely false. It's the answer of a lazy person who does not want to take the time and introspection required to determine the real reason why the one was designated as red and the other as orange.
The thing about habits is that they must get formed, created. They cannot be taken as granted. So when asked, why do you do things in that particular way instead of another way, the explanation is not "because it's my habit". The true explanation is the process which formed the habit. And, it is the person who is avoiding the question due to intellectual laziness, or some other infliction, who simply says "because it's my habit".
Do you deny that some animals see different colours? What explanation could there be for seeing different colours other than that there are different colours? I would see different colours regardless of what I called them; or are you denying that? So what does it matter if you call two colours red and I call one red and one orange?
What could explain that difference between us other than I associate a different name to one of the colours than you do or else you see one as being more red than I do due to your inferior capacity to distinguish differences among colours? I'm telling you the truth as I see it: reject it if you like. I don't care. This "conversation" has already been a complete waste of time.
You seem to be missing the point altogether. A person might see two completely different shades of red, hence different colours, yet call them both "red". Likewise with orange. And, the same thing which I might say on one day is "red", I might say if instead I encountered it on another day, under different conditions, is "orange".
The issue is not a matter of seeing differences of colour, it's a matter of seeing instances of different colours, and calling the different colours by the same name, "red". In this case we are saying that two different colours, which we clearly perceive as different, are the same colour, red.
This is why I say there must be theory involved. It is not a matter of always seeing the very same colour, and calling it by the very same name, "red". It is a matter of seeing a very wide range of different colours, and calling them all the same, "red". The capacity to categorize a particular instance of colour, under the classification of "red", cannot be a matter of habit, because one can see a completely new shade of red, never before encountered by that person, and have no problem categorizing it as red. How could one be employing habit in the completely new activity consisting of categorizing a colour never before encountered?
I don't see anything of significance that you are trying to get at here.
You've explained your belief that 'all religions are false', but I don't share it. Sure, religions are a mixture of history, myth, superstition and many other things, but there is a vast range of documentation, based on witness testimony, describing various super-normal and paranormal abilities and powers that yogis and ascetics obtain. And there are also many instances of individuals with gifts in such areas with no discernable training or other kinds of ability. Of course, most of these instances will never be subject to 'peer reviewed science' or reproduced to the satisfaction of so-called empirical science, and frankly, attempts to validate such claims through paranormal psychology and the like seem pretty gauche as far as I'm concerned.
But all cultures, all religions, in all periods of history, have various terms for 'higher knowledge'. Liberation, as articulated in the Indian traditions, is a reality, notwithstanding the fact that Western materialistic science has not the least conception of what it is.
In a broad sense, a concept is something that needs to be expressible in thought and language and that correlates with something observable or intelligible. In the Western tradition, as Russell points out in HWP, Pythagoras plays an important role, as (arguably) the first philosopher, but also a scientist and a religious seer. It was his recognition of the importance of number and ratio which gave Western philosophy its uniquely mathematical bent, and which differentiated it from the mysticism of the Orient (from the chapter on Pythagoras).
As the Greek tradition evolved, there was enormous emphasis on epistemology, the nature of reason, the role of geometry and mathematics, the ideas of form and substance - and so on. None of that is news. And I am not slighting it in the least, I'm of the view that this is why the 'scientific revolution' occured in Europe, and not in China, which, recall, at the time of the ancient Greek was arguably considerably more advanced in many of the arts and sciences than were the Western cultures of the day.
So where I'm going with this, is that the role of conceptual reasoning and mathematics is what gave rise to truly modern science, through the synthesis of Galileo, Newton, Descartes, Bacon and the other seminal thinkers of modernity. Again, a mighty and world-altering achievement, and not seeking to cast any aspersion on that.
But, when it comes to understanding what is called in comparative religion 'the sapiential tradition' - the traditions embodied in the metaphysical and spiritual lore of the various cultures - you're often NOT dealing with the kinds of insights that can be encoded on that conceptual-mathematical language (even though, again in the Western tradition, there is some resonance between them, as you see, for example, in Einstein's more mystical musings.) But the point I'm trying to make is that this is why, for example, you cannot properly speak of 'the concept of Nirv??a.' Because it is emphatically not a concept, and cannot be navigated, understood, comprehended, by conceptual means.
Of course, at this point the near-universal conclusion is, 'ah, then you're talking about faith, believing something with no evidence'. In my case, emphatically not. I recognise the role of faith (and not only in the religious context) but am also of the view that religious traditions encode forms of understanding that are not simply a matter of believing or doing as you're told, but are also not amenable to quantitative analysis. In other words, they are (or can be) a kind of knowing - something learned by doing, as part of a community of discourse, and as part of a narrative history. Karen Armstrong, who's a scholar of religion, not a religous apologist, said in respect of religious myth:
[quote=Karen Armstrong, Metaphysical Mistake; https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/jul/12/religion-christianity-belief-science]Stories of heroes descending to the underworld were not regarded as primarily factual but taught people how to negotiate the obscure regions of the psyche [sup]1[/sup]. In the same way, the purpose of a creation myth was therapeutic[sup]2[/sup]; before the modern period no sensible person ever thought it gave an accurate account of the origins of life. A cosmology was recited at times of crisis or sickness, when people needed a symbolic influx of the creative energy that had brought something out of nothing. Thus the Genesis myth, a gentle polemic against Babylonian religion, was balm to the bruised spirits of the Israelites who had been defeated and deported by the armies of Nebuchadnezzar during the sixth century BCE. Nobody was required to "believe" it; like most peoples, the Israelites had a number of other mutually-exclusive creation stories and as late as the 16th century, Jews thought nothing of making up a new creation myth that bore no relation to Genesis but spoke more directly to their tragic circumstances at that time.
Above all, myth was a programme of action. When a mythical narrative was symbolically re-enacted, it brought to light within the practitioner something "true" about human life and the way our humanity worked, even if its insights, like those of art, could not be proven rationally. If you did not act upon it, it would remain as incomprehensible and abstract – like the rules of a board game, which seem impossibly convoluted, dull and meaningless until you start to play.
Religious truth is, therefore, a species of practical knowledge. Like swimming, we cannot learn it in the abstract; we have to plunge into the pool and acquire the knack by dedicated practice. Religious doctrines are a product of ritual and ethical observance, and make no sense unless they are accompanied by such spiritual exercises as yoga, prayer, liturgy and a consistently compassionate lifestyle. Skilled practice in these disciplines can lead to intimations of the transcendence we call God, Nirv??a, Brahman or Dao. Without such dedicated practice, these concepts remain incoherent, incredible and even absurd.[/quote]
Of course in our techo-centric post-industrial culture, many of these ideas do indeed seem 'incoherent, incredible, and even absurd'. But the problem might be just as much with the reciever.
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1. Which would not be news to anyone familiar with Carl Jung
2. Wiki entry on the origin of 'therapy'.
My point in the context of this discussion is that what we have "lost" is living human-scale lives (via correlation-based heuristics) of pre-modernity – and not merely "all religion is false"; on the other hand, modernity consists in living at more-than-human-scales (via causality-based algorithmics) which, for better or worse, is more deliberately risk-tolerant. I see pre-modernity having unevenly become modernity as a (Promethean) transformation-in-progress rather than as a (fatalistic) nostalgia-inducing "decline" (pace Spengler) or "Fall" (pace Augustine). I speculate further: perhaps something else 'other-than-humanity' is struggling chrysalis-like to be 'born' ...
...Alfred North Whitehead, in particular. Possibly his most famous saying.
Quoting 180 Proof
:ok: There's a philosopher of religion, Mark Johnston, about whom see this review. He says most of what is taken as religion is idolatory. I do see his point, but I'm also mindful of the fact that religions have to appeal to the full spectrum of humanity. There's not enough awareness of the Buddhist principle of 'the raft' - something to be 'used for crossing the river' but 'not to be clung to'. That is one of the most odious absences from Western religions (which is not to say Buddhism doesn't have idolatory of its own.)
Quoting 180 Proof
Well, here's where I think a philosophical framework is badly needed, and mostly absent. Again with reference to Eastern religions, I think they have a kind of naturalistic attitude, i.e. that liberation is in some sense the culmination of, or the transcendence of, the process of evolution, so in that sense has a cosmic significance. But unlike with the Christian dogma, this is not a linear and historical process, beginning at some fixed point and culminating in some fixed event at some particular point in history, but something that arises within the endless cycle of birth-and-death (bearing in mind that even so, its occurrence remains extremely rare.)
The problem is, Christianity nailed its colors to the mast with its linear and historical view. It's one of the reasons (in hindsight the main reason), I left it (although many would say it was because I was too indolent to follow its demands.)
So, with in respect of your point, and this is something I'm sure you would find in Spinoza also, the human is a way in which the Universe comes to realise its own nature. (Mindful of the fact that you won't want to acknowledge anything specifically pietistic about that.)
incidentally you might find this article of interest.
Correct. Even Plato’s descriptions of the “tripartite soul” or Forms are often hopelessly misinterpreted because some readers fail to understand that the descriptions in question refer to realities that are ultimately indescribable, and that language merely serves as a pointer in the direction the mind must take in order to arrive at the reality described.
As Socrates puts it in the Phaedrus:
The problem tends to be compounded by some readers’ attempt to interpret Plato through Aristotle who erroneously interprets Plato’s Forms, for example, through his own categories. Thus “scholars” conclude that Plato’s statements are “ambiguous”, “unclear”, “contradictory” or “confused”.
As observed by Francisco Gonzales and others:
- F. J. Gonzales, “Plato’s Dialectic of Forms”.
And then there are the committed anti-Platonists who deliberately use Aristotle to demonstrate the “inconsistency” and “incoherence” of a “Theory of Forms” that they choose to attribute to Plato but that simply does not exist in the dialogues in the form they claim it does ....
I cannot tell who you are shadow boxing with.
Gonzales saying: "the form cannot be expressed in language" does not appear to support Socrates' effort to distinguish the dialectic from mere argument:
Gonzales also appears to be no friend of Plotinus who links the generation of creatures to contemplation through forms:
“Shadow boxing”? I wasn’t aware that there was anyone to shadow box with. Perhaps you know more than I do.
Quoting Valentinus
I think what Gonzales says with regard to Forms and Aristotle’s interpretation of them is quite clear. And if Socrates says that it would be a matter for utterly superhuman and long discourse to tell what the form of the soul is, and he describes it only by comparing it with a charioteer and winged horses then, presumably, the Forms are even more difficult to describe. Moreover, the point is that the Forms are to be “seen” or “grasped with the eye of the soul”. Language can at the most stimulate the soul’s recollection of the Forms.
Quoting Valentinus
Well, it appears to me that people have the right to be or not to be friend of Plotinus. I don’t agree with everything that Plotinus says either.
I think that what you are getting at in the first part is two-fold. One, do not make the all to common mistake of thinking that argument and philosophy are the same. Second, and this becomes clear when considering the passage from the Phaedrus where Socrates admits he cannot give an account of what the soul really is. Socrates regarded the inability to give an account as an indication that one lacks knowledge, as can be seen for example when he interrogates the poets in the Apology. His main contention with the poets in several of the dialogues is their inability to distinguish a likeness from what it is a likeness of. Any yet here in the Phaedo, instead of saying what the soul is, he presents a likeness. How are we to know that it is a true likeness without knowledge of the thing itself? We are left with a dispute of words.
If what is being talked about is indescribable then the only sensible thing to do is to remain silent. Ironically, those who proclaim indescribable truths are those who have the most to say, although they do become silent when asked how they know about such things as the immortality of the soul and Forms, thinks that cannot be said but only seen. The contradict themselves by retreating and quoting things that are said.
Socrates himself prior to admitting that he cannot give an account of the soul presents an argument for the immortality of the soul:
.
He cannot say what the soul is but argues that the truth is it is immortal. It is a physical argument based on motion. He goes on to say that a living being, compounded of soul and body is mortal. (246c) We are mortal beings. Some may believe stories about things we have no knowledge of, but they are for us images that we cannot measure against a purported reality. Where Plato points to the limits of our knowledge some mistakenly think he is pointing beyond them.
I was the referring to the indefinite identities of the following:
Quoting ApollodorusQuoting Apollodorus
Quoting Apollodorus
I am not having trouble understanding the statement. I don't know who he is boxing with either so I am not in a position to evaluate his argument in the context it was given. But the problem of describing the forms as they really are is one thing. Having that be the reason "that Plato must shift back and forth between treating Forms "as a universal and treating it as an instance" is another. I brought up examples that do not fit with the idea of keeping the two activities in separate places.
Perhaps you can present his argument with more definition.
What a strange idea of "thinking for yourself".
I think "thinking for yourself" is about epistemic autonomy, ie. being autonomous in how one knows/believes one knows things. Like I said already, it's epistemic autonomy that is questionable.
Relative novelty of one's ideas isn't the measure of "thinking for yourself" (although this is how it is often understood in popular discourse).
Thank you for the correction.
That's just it: In order to become religious/spiritual, one has to kick one's intelligence, wisdom, and discernment to the curb, on account that they are inferior, not suitable for religion/spirituality.
A thorough awareness of European cultural history from primary education on and upwards.
Literature used to be taught in a temporal linear manner starting with the ancient Greeks. By college, one is supposed to understand various references to Homer, Ovidius, etc. Also, being at least fluent in Latin and some Greek.
This is made easier when one lives in a place where it takes a short drive and one arrives at an ancient archeological site. I myself live in a town where I have a 5' drive to the remains of an ancient Roman settlement. The locals perform dress-ups and do reenactments of ancient living. Granted, this now is more of a tourist attraction aimed at making money; still, it's built on a tradition of knowing things about the past that took place on this territory.
My post was in response to @Wayfarer's comment regarding Nirvana not being "navigated, understood, comprehended, by conceptual means."
The same is true of metaphysical realities such as Plato's Forms referred to by Gonzales:
In other words, language has obvious limitations when it comes to metaphysical realities that are supposed to be experienced, not talked about. This is why Socrates emphasizes the fact that those higher realities are "like the soul" and can be experienced only when the soul dissociates itself from the physical body and perception-based thought and contemplates the realities "alone by itself." This is the point where the mind's contemplative faculty, the nous, takes over from language and discursive thought, and leads the philosopher to a direct experience of the realities in question.
People who know, do not need the Dialectic. Socrates' rebuke of Glaucon, observing that we can leave that process "unintentionally" and become mere debaters, recognizes a vigilance that each must maintain for themselves. The perception of the sincere desire to know in the interlocutor is impossible unless the quality is alive for oneself. But the ways to check oneself and others is not only a matter of goodwill. Each conversation has its own life. The need to work through issues as they are raised requires different distinctions at different times. We can move closer to the truth by proceeding this way even if we are still ignorant by the measure of what is sought.
Quoting Fooloso4
I think of the different readings of Plato in a smaller circle of comparison. Either the various and quite different approaches seen in the Dialogues were necessary in view of what Plato was attempting or they were episodes of pretense. If he could have written it all down like a system in the fashion of Proclus, the whole process of the Dialogues is a sham.
That view is echoed in Plotinus regarding the contemplation of the One.
He also used the same theory to explain the creation of the physical world in the fashion of the Timaeus.
I don't think he was offering the items à la carte.
Philosophy in antiquity was not learned from books, but from a living teacher. There were philosophy schools and groups formed around a teacher, that were accessible to anyone with an interest, especially in the Greek-speaking parts of Europe and the Mid East.
The way I see it, Plato's works provide a number of general guidelines, not a system of water-tight theories, for the simple reason that any unclear matters would have been clarified in conversation with the teacher of your particular school. It was a living tradition based on personal practice and experience, not an academic endeavor in the modern sense.
In any case, as pointed out by Gonzales and others, Plato must be read within his own framework. If we apply Aristotelian categories and ontology to Plato, then we are reading not Plato but Aristotle's interpretation of him. Even if do take some material from Aristotle, as later Platonists sometimes do, it has to be consistent with Plato's own framework.
Where am I applying Aristotle's categories to Plato? My previous efforts on this thread were attempts to see them differently.
When you say: "Plato must be read within his own framework," is Plotinus excluded from that condition?
Socrates was killed for talking in public about his ideas.
Maybe there was a tradition of training involved that was kept secret. If so, the secret is still hidden from view.
Plato formed an academy, in the ancient sense, if you will.
I don't recognize any of my comments in your reply. Perhaps you are talking to someone else.
I'd say this is far stranger. Firstly what could being autonomous in how one knows/ believes one knows things even mean? Are you suggesting the enlightened sage is or could be epistemically autonomous? You seem to have been disagreeing with my arguments that the enlightened person cannot rationally know that she knows whatever she thinks she knows, no matter how convinced she may be that she does, and yet here you say that epistemic autonomy is questionable. So, I can only guess you must mean something else.
I haven't said that relative novelty of one's ideas is the measure of "thinking for yourself" although having novel ideas might be an example of thinking for oneself.
As I said before in my view thinking for yourself is just thinking what seems to be in best accordance with and evidenced by your own experience, understanding and rational assessment rather than thinking something because some authority told you it was so without providing any empirical evidence or rational argument to back up their assertion.
So, if the purportedly enlightened sage tells you that there is an afterlife, and you say how do you know that and they say 'I just know', or 'I remember my past lives', you would be warranted in being skeptical about such a claim. That would be thinking for yourself. If you accepted the claim, and henceforth believed it yourself because you believed the person was enlightened and must know the truth, that would not be thinking for yourself.
Believing one is epistemically independent of other people.
Ethical and Epistemic Egoism and the Ideal of Autonomy
Epistemic Dependence
Okay for now.
I seriously doubt anyone ever believes things the way you describe here. That's a caricature.
I think that when people believe experts and authorities, this has more to do with social dynamics and, to some extent, belief economy, rather than some "blind trust" or "not thinking for yourself".
Except that I would not ask the sage "How do you know?" anymore. There was a time in the past when I would, but not anymore. And no, this doesn't mean that I now accept their claims. It's that I contextualize the whole matter entirely differently. Namely, I don't see the declarations of a "sage" as being some kind of opening for a discussion and dialogue.
I think there must have been some form of training as this was the whole purpose of a school.
I am talking about what we find in the dialogues.
Some think that dialectic is a method that leads to knowledge of the Forms. But how can someone know this unless they have completed the journey? That it does is something we are told not something we have experienced. It is a matter of opinion. Dialectic leads to knowledge of our ignorance. It leads us to see that philosophical inquiry leads to aporia.
There is a tension in Plato where he both points beyond us and points in the opposite direction to us, to self-knowledge as fundamental. The risk of the former is the neglect of the latter. The former is an activity of the imagination, the latter of truth about oneself. The flights of the former do not encounter resistance, the work of the latter must overcome self-resistance.
Quoting Valentinus
This raises several issues. If the whole is singular it seems reasonable to think there should be a single logos. But we do find these different approaches in the dialogues that address different aspects of the whole. Each, by bringing something to light occludes issues that come to light in another. None, however, either separately or all together, are comprehensive. Any speech of the whole must include us, the speaker. Our inability, the inability of the part, to give a comprehensive account of the whole says something not only about us but about the whole of which we are a part.
The problem of learning what you do not know is discussed in the Meno. I remember a class from long ago when the dialectic was argued by some to be a method of knowledge of the Forms themselves. The wily old professor said: "Well, Parmenides went to great lengths to question the existence of the Forms but, after all that, decided that we have to use them, despite those problems, in order to distinguish this from this and that from that." It doesn't sound like we will be getting tans outside the cave any time soon.
Quoting Fooloso4
The inquiry does lead to aporia. That doesn't mean we must start from zero every time. Debates are like wrestling matches. Whatever worked as a technique in one match is not a starting place for another. The desire for victory is stronger than the love of knowledge. Returning to a conversation that has undergone the rigors of the dialectic in order to form better opinions can be a starting place for a new conversation.
Quoting Fooloso4
I agree with that approach wholeheartedly.
So much so that I am uncertain about what counts as divine or not within it. Thus my previous concerns about comparing different models.
It is very often the case that readers mistake the images Plato creates on the cave wall for their escape from the cave.
Quoting Valentinus
Good point. Dialectic is mutually beneficial. Sooner or later, however, we have to address the claim that we can use hypothesis to free ourselves from hypothesis.
Quoting Valentinus
In the Phaedo Socrates calls Homer divine. In the Iliad Homer call salt divine (9.214)
In addition to the question of what counts as divine with it there is the question of whether there is anything divine outside of the whole. Or if the whole is itself divine.
When people believe experts and authorities in various fields it is because they trust that those expert's expertise has been rigorously tested and demonstrated, and could be retested and redemonstrated if needs be. The same does not apply with sages and gurus. There is no way to rigorously and without bias test their purported expertise, even in principle, let alone practice.
Quoting baker
I actually agree with this. The declarations of a self-styled sage are meant to be followed devotedly by aspirants without question.There is no room for discussion and dialogue in such institutions. I know this because I have participated in several in the past.In one way there's a good reason for this; you are not there to have a philosophical discussion; you are there to learn how to change your consciousness, and I have no argument with that aim at all as such.
But I know what kinds of cultures of gullible mythologizing actually arise around cult leaders and gurus of all kinds; the same kinds of lamentable human dynamics play out everywhere. People happily relinquishing their capacities to think for themselves; listening to the oracular voice of the "master" and believing every word; it's just sad in my view.
:up: Resonates with me at a deep level although I don't fancy myself as capable of contributing to the effort. I hope someone in my lifetime, what's left of it, has that Eureka moment ASAP and then...
:grin: :up:
It's not clear this is the case. Ideally, it should be the case, but I don't think it is, or only rarely. It seems that most people who believe experts and authorities in various fields don't even have a concept of "rigorously testing and demonstrating". Instead, their believing the experts and authorities is, essentially, a fallacious argumentum ab auctoritate.
You cannot "rigorously and without bias test the purported expertise" of scientists either. You don't have the resources, you don't have the data, you don't have the access, and they sure as hell aren't going to do it for you.
There's no guarantee that "thinking for yourself" will make you happy and successful either.
We're contributing to the average. Wisdom is simply an awareness of ones own ignorance. Chances are fairly good plenty of eureka moments have come and gone with no one noticing. I just hope to recognize a good idea when I hear one.
Sure many people simply believe what they read. The point was that people who think for themselves, and are honest enough to realize their own inadequate expertise to make experientially and intellectually informed judgements in specialized fields realize that the best place to put trust is on those whose expertise is demonstrable due to having been rigorously testing during their education and ongoing work in the field. Doesn't mean they are infallible, but expert consensus is the best we have.
Quoting baker
I can't personally do it, obviously. But that is what the peer review system is for. The science community as a whole can be trusted on judgements that they have arrived at a broad consensus on. We can trust them, because within the community of expertise errors should be exposed, at least over time. We should trust the experts, simply because we have nothing else to go on when it comes to making judgements in fields where we have little or no expertise.
What's the alternative? Trust no one?
Quoting baker
Did I ever say it was? Did I say that we all ought to think for ourselves because that will make us happy and successful? All along I've acknowledged that some people don't have the capacity or the desire to think for themselves. They are probably happier and less troubled if they don't.
Such people should keep away from philosophy, because studying that would only lead them to question everything, that is would only lead them to think for themselves; which would make them unhappy if they don't want to do that. On the other hand if someone wants to question everything and think for themselves, they will be obviously happier if they do that, no?
There is a split that goes back at least as far as Plato. On the one hand, Socrates' human wisdom is his knowledge of his ignorance, and, on the other, the philosopher-king who possesses divine wisdom.
Those who read philosophy typically stand on one or the other side of this divine - those for whom philosophy is a matter of inquiry and those for whom philosophy provides answers; those who think for themselves and those who are told what to think and believe.
In a world ruled by opinion, the task of the philosopher is twofold. On the one hand to provide necessary, useful, and salutary opinions, and, on the other, to lead those who are not satisfied with opinion to think for themselves. The road to the latter, however, is by way of the former. All along the way one must ask if this or that is something one knows and how it is that they know it.
The purpose of Plato's academy certainly was about training thinkers. It was a specifically discursive endeavor with the express goal of improving discourse. Perhaps it included an esoteric element of instruction as you described here::
Quoting Apollodorus
But it is difficult to perceive the school that stands at the center of the City as serving an entirely personal experience. The rigor of rational thought practiced in such schools is at odds with your description given here:
Quoting Apollodorus
One thing that puzzles me about this last statement is that it doesn't square with your efforts in other places to see Plato presenting a unified theory of the soul.
It also does not square with the dialogues. The dialogues do not clarify themselves in conversation.
The leap from language and discursive thought to direct experience is the very thing that is ignored. Although such an experience can be imagined, we should not make the mistake of imagining that it is our own experience.
Well, maybe some people are in a perpetual state of puzzlement, which is why they seem so attached to the word "aporia". :smile:
Personally, I prefer to read Plato's dialogues at face value first and then see if anything else may be inferred from them that does not appear to be there on first sight.
For example:
To me, this suggests belief in the soul of the kind that would have been quite widespread in 4th-century BC Greek society. And I see no indication whatsoever that Plato intends the reader to disbelieve that statement.
As regards "theories", we call them that because it has become customary practice, not because Plato himself employed that term.
And because Platonism is a practical system, things like "soul" and "Forms" are to be known or experienced personally, through reason and contemplation. The accounts or arguments relating to them serve as pointers or reminders, which is logical if we consider that the soul is real and that it is supposed to have previous knowledge of the Forms.
In contrast, the assumption that Plato spent all his life writing books, and even founded a school, for no other purpose than to preach ignorance and "aporia", seems rather unfounded and far-fetched to me.
I don't get any images in my mind when I say "preach ignorance and aporia" out loud. It sounds like a kind of surrender; a reason to stop trying to do something. Socrates did not exemplify a retreat from what is difficult to understand. Did Plato set up a school to learn what wasn't known or tell everybody about what he had found out?
It seems like you want to cast the limits of our understanding, that Plato brings to our attention, to be actually some sort of catechism to something else. That is unfounded and far-fetched.
Who do you have in mind when you say 'our own experience'? Why is it not possible for 'us' to have such experiences? What prevents it?
Also while searching for info on him, I found an article on philosophical counselling.
Not at all. On the contrary, it seems like some people choose to deny Plato's statements and replace everything with spurious claims of "ignorance" and "aporia".
What exactly is the purpose of writing a book - actually, lots of books - that teaches that there are some things that we don't know. Don't we know that already???
Besides, my views are supported by the text of the dialogues and by a very long Platonist tradition and to my knowledge they are mainstream. And I haven't seen any evidence here that Plato teaches atheism, skepticism, and nihilism.
If the text says "the soul is immortal" or "the Sun is one of the Gods", on what rational basis can we deny that it says that?
You have gone back to characterizing other peoples' views in place of defending your own.
Why would I need to defend what the text says?
I think it is for the anti-Platonists to show that the text doesn't say what it says.
But you can't do that hence you profess "aporia" and insist that this is all that Plato has to say ....
I never said anything of the kind. You are a Sophist.
Really? What about statements like this one:
Quoting Valentinus
If philosophical inquiry "leads to aporia," then what is the point in philosophical inquiry?
And you are not answering my question. If the text says "the soul turns out to be immortal" or "the Sun is one of the Gods", on what rational basis can we deny that it says this?
Some vestiges of this understanding are visible in 17th century philosophy - 'most 17th century philosophers held that reality comes in degrees—that some things that exist are more or less real than other things that exist. At least part of what dictates a being’s reality, according to these philosophers, is the extent to which its existence is dependent on other things: the less dependent a thing is on other things for its existence, the more real it is.'
There are also vestiges of it in German idealism, which inherited the outlines of these conceptions from medieval theology (per Dermot Moran's writings on Eriugena.) But generally speaking, since the rejection of idealism at the beginning of the 20th century, there is nothing remaining of it in analytical and anglo-american philosophy.
Smith says (and I concur) that scientific materialism - not science itself but the belief-system purportedly based on it - is a degradation of the mainstream philosophical tradition.
But at the same time, whatever philosophy we have, has to be able to accomodate the genuinely novel discoveries of science since the 17th century. So we have to thread the needle between the two extremes of dogmatic belief systems on the one hand, and scientific materialism on the other.
Saying that an inquiry leads to aporia is not equivalent to stating that the purpose of it has been cancelled. So when you say that I am claiming that "I insist that this is all that Plato has to say", that is a limit you have applied to yourself, not an accurate description of my view. The words you put in my mouth are not very interesting.
Saying that an inquiry leads to aporia does not constitute proof that Plato's statements are not in the dialogue or that he preaches atheism, skepticism, and nihilism, does it?
It is not a matter of something preventing it, it is simply that you and I and others here have not had an experience of being dead.
It is quite revealing that you think what Plato is doing is preaching anything at all.
'Dead' is also a metaphorical expression. From an essay on the Catholic philosopher, Josef Pieper:
Quoting Fooloso4
Don't you think it's also revealing that you wish to dissociate Plato from anything religious whatever?
Max Weber wrote of the disenchantment of the world, the cultural rationalization and devaluation of religion apparent in modern society. Your posts reflect that. In saying any of this, I'm not seeking to convert, but I am seeking to draw out some of the cultural dynamics beneath the surface.
As a general principle, yes. However, when the materialists insist on denying that Plato makes antimaterialist statements in his dialogues, then it is unclear how their claims can be accommodated.
I am speaking specifically about such things as the experience of being dead and the transcendent experience of seeing the unchanging Forms.
As I see it, the problem is when what is imagined is taken for what is. Plato distinguishes between truth and imagination, dreams and reality. What do you know of an imaginative domain other than what you imagine it might be?
I think the issue may be described as psychological deficiency if not pathology.
I can understand if some people have an aversion toward religion or spirituality and in particular toward Plato, and I have no problem with that. But when doubt and denial become compulsive then we are dealing with a pathological condition IMHO.
In any event, "aporia" can become a debilitating fixation, it seems, that is as toxic as religious fanaticism - if not worse. :smile:
The double negative combined with the rhetorical question is confusing. Are you saying that saying an inquiry that leads to aporia amounts to atheism, skepticism, and nihilism?
If so, I repeat my previous statement that such a view is at odds with Socrates' willingness to pursue ideas despite such difficulties.
I recommend reading more authors who use the quality of "aporia" as an element of discourse. From Aristotle to Proclus, the term refers to how far one can advance in making distinctions. It is not a cry of meaningless despair at the sight of the abyss.
Correct. This appears to go so far as to deny that in the Republic, for example, Socrates says that the Sun is one of the Gods (something that most Greeks would have agreed with), in spite of the fact that even notorious anti-Platonists like Strauss admit that the Sun is a God and that Plato has a theology involving cosmic Gods like the Sun:
- L Strauss, On Plato's Symposium, pp. 38, 277
As I think has been discussed throughout these threads, in dealing with such matters, there's a mixture of myth, conjecture, suggestion and argument. It's true there's no certainty on the level of discursive reasoning. But what is hinted at, alluded to, is part of the meaning of these texts, also.
I think, possibly, the Platonic forms or ideas are not so remote or mysterious as many are making them out to be. One clue for me is platonism in mathematics. I know that mathematical platonism is not 'the philosophy of Plato', but it provides a way for imagining real abstracts, because in that view, numbers are real, but in a different way to corporeal objects. Naturalism will want to say that these are therefore mental artifacts or constructions. But the counter to that is that they are the same for all who think - they're independent of any particular mind, but can only be seen by the rational faculty. That is nearer to the traditional meaning of 'intelligible'. And I think those ideas have been preserved to some degree in Aristotelian philosophy, which is present in the scholastic tradition.
That's why I'm intrigued by the medieval terminology of 'the rational soul'. I'm intending to do some more reading in that area.
Quoting Fooloso4
I recall one the the authors I read in Buddhist Studies speaking of the 'Pali imaginaire'. This was the imaginative world of the ancient Pali texts of Buddhism. It contained various domains of existence, gods, demons, hells, heavens, and Nirv??a, in addition to the world of ordinary experience. But the use of that term 'imaginaire' does not mean that all of these domains are taken to be 'merely' imaginary. Rather they provide the extended conceptual framework within which the Buddha's discourses take place. The Buddha denies being a god, demon, or even a human - his self-description just is 'Buddha' - awakened one. But that imaginative depiction of the totality of the cosmos was the setting for those discourses.
But in addition to that imaginative realm there is also in Buddhism a precise definition of degrees and kinds of knowledge - jñ?na being one of the terms. That is translated as 'wisdom', although the 'jn-' particle is an etymological cognate with the 'gn-' of gnosticism. In Buddhism, it is understood as a real, practical insight into the principle of dependent origination. It is associated with the jhanas, states of meditative absorption which enables the practitioner to enter higher levels of understanding, to reach states known as 'lokuttara' (transmundane). That is not held to be imaginary in the least, although also not amenable to discursive understanding. The distinction between those kinds of understanding i.e. insight into ??nyat? and discursive understanding, is highly formalised in later Chinese and Japanese forms of Buddhism.
Obviously a very roundabout way of answering your question, but I'm wanting to show that there's a sense in which imagination is more than simply fanciful thought or fictionalism. Imagination opens into other domains of being, not simply conjectural or fanciful. (Interestingly I was just now watching a documentary on Philip K Dick in which he says exactly that.)
But what is the point in "pursuing ideas" if that pursuit leads to "aporia"?
And, having read one dialogue that allegedly leaves the reader in a state of "aporia", why read another dialogue that leaves the reader in the same "aporetic" condition?
What I fail to see is how additional aporia can resolve the initial aporia. Or is the intention to maximize the aporetic state until all reasoning ability has been suspended?
Besides, you are not answering my question. If the text says "the soul turns out to be immortal" or "the Sun is one of the Gods", on what rational basis can we deny that it says this?
As I understand it, such unanswerable questions or conundrums are intrinsic to the Platonic dialogues. Often they are regarded as 'purgative' (i.e. in the Meno) by dismantling a view falsely held.
I think I mentioned before, that I see some similarity between those, and the 'way of unknowing' that is found in later Christian mysticism.
But I'm also aware of the danger of simply asserting as a matter of fact ideas which are in reality conjectural. It's easy to fall into dogmatism that way, which will often amount to claiming to know something that really is only believed. My position is, as I'm not wedded to physicalism, then I'm open to the possibility of higher states of being or higher knowledge, but I can't claim to know them as a matter of fact.
I totally agree with that. Nobody should claim that they have knowledge that they either don't have or is mere belief.
But nor should they claim that other people's personal experience is just imagination.
And they certainly should not deny statements clearly made in the dialogues. For example, if the Republic says "the Sun is one of the Gods in heaven", then it is irrational to insist that it does not say so.
The issue is not whether one believes that the Sun is or is not a God. The issue is whether Socrates in the dialogue makes this statement. If he unquestionably does so, then it is unacceptable to deny it, all the more so when no rational reason or evidence for the denial is provided.
And that is exactly what is required to distinguish knowledge from fanciful speculation. But, as was seen in the Phaedo, argument ends in aporia. So without the experience of being dead we have no knowledge of such things.
Quoting Wayfarer
Many would include Plato himself.
Quoting Wayfarer
The mathematician does not know the mathematical Forms. They are treated as hypothesis.
Quoting Wayfarer
You make my point. Unless we know the original we do not know whether the image is really like what it is an image of.
Quoting Wayfarer
We learn about triangles through images. We learn about number by counting.
Quoting Wayfarer
Again, you make my point. These are not things you know, they are things you are told about.
Quoting Wayfarer
There is a difference between the power of imagination and imagining that what is imagained is a "domain of being".
In the first part he is not talking about Plato, he is discussing Cicero's Republic and Laws, as can be seen by looking a few lines before what you quote.
As to the second part, having never read Strauss you are bound to misunderstand what he is saying when you take things out of context. It is only when you read the tenth book of the Laws and follow the argument that you may begin to get a better idea of what his theology and political doctrine regarding the gods might be. Hint: it is a political doctrine regarding the gods being discussed in the context of establishing the laws of the city. In other words a theology (speech about the gods) suited to the city.
He says:
Obviously, "cosmic God" for Socrates (and Plato).
Strauss is discussing Plato's Symposium (that's what the book is about!) where the information regarding Socrates' praying to the Sun is provided by Alcibiades:
And Plato's "theology that consists in a substitution of the gods of the cosmos for the gods of the city" is a theology that substitutes the cosmic Gods, like the Sun, for the Gods of the city. Period.
There is nothing unclear about that at all. Not to normal people, in any case. :smile:
That was exactly what I was thinking myself. "Jn-/gn-" is also cognate with the "kn-" of English "know" which comes from Proto-Indo-European via Germanic and Anglo-Saxon.
The Buddhist concept of dependent origination is related to the Hindu concept of consciousness generating cognition by producing name (nama) and form (rupa) which in turn give rise to sense-perception and the sensible world. And the two concepts come very close to Platonic Forms.
Ancient Greek makes no distinction between "word" and "name". For Plato, a word acquires its meaning by there being an object of which the word is the name. And if there is a word or name for something, there is a corresponding "Form". Hence, "Name" and "Form", exactly as in the Indian concept of nama and rupa.
Quoting Wayfarer
Those with a "mathematical mind" may indeed find it easier to grasp the idea of Forms. Plato's Forms aim, in the first place, to explain the phenomenon of identity in difference, and this requires a certain kind of abstract imagery where mathematics may be helpful.
But the metaphysical aim of the Forms is to lead the mind to their ultimate source which is the Good or the One, the cause of all things that are good. And this can only be consciousness itself. Thus, by inquiring into the Forms, the mind eventually arrives at the point where determinate cognition arises from indeterminate consciousness, and the inquiring mind merges with consciousness in the process of creating cognition and, ultimately, with transcendent consciousness itself.
This is logically the final stage of self-knowledge which coincides with knowledge of ultimate reality where all is One.
He is talking about Socrates as depicted by Cicero. It is right there in the text if only you would look!
2. The incident of Socrates praying to the Sun is discussed in Chapter 12, "Alcibiades", that discusses Alcibiades' speech about Socrates in the Symposium.
3. Strauss quotes Alcibiades' speech about Socrates:
- L Strauss, On Plato's Symposium, p. 276
4. Strauss only mentions Cicero's Republic and Laws to say that the former is a dialogue in winter when people seek the sun, and the latter in summer when they seek the shade, in order to contrast this with Socrates who seeks the sun in summer "when its light is the strongest and in accordance with that he prays to the sun at the end" and "let us not forget that the sun is a cosmic god" to explain why Socrates prayed to the Sun (p. 277), after which he continues discussing the next Symposium passage (220d5-e7).
5. Nothing to do with Cicero whatsoever except to emphasize Socrates' seeking the Sun in the summer, when the Sun is at its brightest, as opposed to what people normally do. Period.
Why would he mention Cicero if only to say what everyone knows and does in summer and winter?
He says:
Have you read them? Do you know the meaning of that theme is in them?
Strauss is pointing to Alcibiades' disregard for Socrates' justice and in its place his admiration of his endurance. (274)
He says:
Do you know what this means? How is seeking the sun in summer in accordance with his prayer to the sun? Do you understand the connection between custom/law (nomos) and prayer? What do you know about the topic of prayer in the dialogues.
There is a great deal more going on in Strauss's lectures on the Symposium then one can know from taking a couple of statements out of context.
Edit: With regard to the cosmic gods versus the gods of the city look at the charges brought against Socrates.
There is also such a thing as lack of imagination.
Yes, but a lack of imagination is not a lack of being.
This is why he quotes the Symposium:
The scene with Socrates praying to the Sun is in Plato's Symposium, not in Cicero's Laws.
Strauss' book is about the Symposium. This is why he also mentions the Forms but only to say that Plato's theory of Ideas "sounds like an absolutely absurd doctrine" without even discussing it.
Which, incidentally, demonstrates that he is as unimaginative and clueless, i.e. psychologically and spiritually deficient, as his followers ....
I'll take this as an admittance that you cannot answer the questions raised and don't understand what Strauss is saying, which is not surprising since you have not actually read him.
You do not understand him and yet you think he demonstrates that he is as unimaginative and clueless. This is an example of why knowledge of your ignorance is so important. Shifting blame from where it belongs to someone else.
Strauss does not discuss Cicero.
In the whole 294-page book, Strauss mentions Cicero only once, when he addresses Socrates' endurance to the heat of summer.
Strauss says:
Strauss discusses Socrates’ praying to the Sun as related by Alcibiades in Plato’s Symposium.
He DOES NOT discuss Cicero at all.
Strauss also says that "Plato substitutes a natural theology for a civil theology".
Ergo, Strauss says that "the Sun is a cosmic God" and that "Plato has a theology consisting in a substitution of the cosmic Gods for the Gods of the city".
Of course I have read Strauss since I am quoting from his book On Plato's Symposium. He is right on certain issues but on others he displays symptoms of psychological deficiency and unscholarly methodology.
And you avoid discussing what Cicero does discuss and how it relates to Strauss' discussion. But of course you cannot discuss it because you know nothing about it.
Quoting Apollodorus
Once again:
Quoting Fooloso4
What is the theme of contemplation in summer as distinguished from winter? What is the connection he is making between Alcibiades story and Cicero?
Quoting Apollodorus
Right, but you fail to understand the significance of this. You do not know what he means when he says that:
He is not saying that Plato believed the sun is a god. The theology of the Laws is not separate his political doctrine in the Laws. Theology was not a matter of personal belief. For the Greeks, and for Strauss as well, the problem of the gods and the problem of the city were part of the same. But the sun is not a god of the city.
In the Apology when Meletus accuses him of declaring the sun a stone (26d) Socrates does not deny it. He points out that Anaxagoras said that, but does not say whether he agreed with him or not. Nowhere does he criticize this. In fact, his criticism of Anaxagoras was not that he did not elevate natural things like the sun to divine status but that natural things cannot be the kind of cause that Socrates sought.
Quoting Apollodorus
Bullshit! You searched for statements by and about Strauss so that you could argue against them, found excerpts online, and quote them out of context.
Quoting Apollodorus
You are projecting again. Your inability to directly respond to questions I raised shows you have not understood him. The only deficiencies here are your own. Your ignorance of your ignorance is a serious stumbling block.
Cicero does not discuss Socrates' praying to the Sun.
Strauss does not discuss Cicero.
Strauss discusses Socrates' praying to the Sun as related by Alcibiades in Plato's Symposium. His whole book is about the Symposium and is called "On Plato's Symposium".
If you believe that Strauss discusses Cicero, then feel free to quote where he does so. But of course you cannot do that because you are making it up.
I have Strauss' book right in front of me. Name any page and I can quote from it any time.
What Strauss does say is this:
Prove that he doesn't say that if you can .... :grin:
p. 1 "This course will be on Plato's political philosophy"
p. 10 "... is higher than desire."
p. 20 "[acknowl-] edges this special obligation."
p.30 "[Tape change]"
p. 40 "[prin-] ciples are not human."
p. 50 "What he says is this:"
p. 60 "labor is man's bisexuality."
p. 70 "[Ro-] mans - and the younger generation"
p. 80 "in particular."
p. 90 "erotic contact,"
p. 100 "hot, bitter to sweet"
p. 110 "[com-] pelled to admit such a fantastic art as divination:"
p. 120 "[Aritoph-] anes will link up the hierarchy of erotes,"
p. 130 "able to treat many ordinary men,"
p. 140 "Aristophanes' Hephaestus doesn't address gods but mortals."
p. 150 "[[undertand-] ing of what is really going on in the Aristophanean comedies."
p. 160 "flowers signifies the beauty of his complexion,"
p. 170 "[quest-] ion: did the knights not have clean shirts with them on their trips?"
p. 180 "this is only a confirmation of what we all felt,"
p. 190 "declaration: This and this only truly ..."
p. 200 "and above all there is something connecting the two realms"
p. 210 "the basis for these gods is destroyed ..."
p. 220 "The case of eros is the subject."
p. 230 "Long after Plato the attempt was made ..."
p. 240 "[dis-] cussion of Phaedrus in the very beginning."
p. 250 "higher that another thing ..."
p. 260 "the sober."
p. 270 "So that was the first attempt."
p. 280 "basis of what we have learned from Diotima?"
p. 288 (final page and line) "If there are no further questions I terminate this session and this course."
Followed by INDEX that starts with "Achilles" and ends with "Zeus".
Once again, he says:
Strangely, you go on to quote this but still this he is not discussing Cicero.
If his point was simply that people normally seek the shade is summer he would not have brought up Cicero.
He brings him up in response to his question:
Can you answer that question?
Strauss' lecture were very popular. They were attended by professors and grad students from various departments including classics, and including those who had read Cicero's Republic and Laws. He is saying something to them that others might not understand. Do not fault him for your lack of understanding.
Quoting Apollodorus
Good to hear that you have finally gotten around to at least obtaining one of his books, but perhaps you can get your money back. Since you do not understand him, it is of no value to you.
Quoting Apollodorus
Prove it to you? I brought it to your attention! https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/581017
Quoting Fooloso4
This discussion started with your claim that:
Quoting Apollodorus
I assume you mean that Strauss admits that the sun is a god and not that Strauss admits that the sun is a god. In either case you have misunderstood him.
He says:
Compare this to the charges brought against Socrates regarding the gods of the city.
If the sun is a god then it is a god without intellect.
Taking things out of content and not thinking things through leads to serious misunderstanding.
Quoting Fooloso4
If you believe that Strauss discusses Cicero, then feel free to quote where he does so. But of course you cannot do that because you are making it up.
Strauss does not discuss Cicero, period. He discusses Socrates' praying to the Sun as related by Alcibiades in Plato's Symposium.
And anyway, Socrates could not have acted according to what Cicero says as he lived centuries before Cicero, another fact that seems to have escaped you! :rofl:
From Dictionary.com:
Strauss comments in order that those who know Cicero's dialogues will consider what the story Alcibiades means. He does not spell it out, but he says enough that those who know will make the connection.
Quoting Apollodorus
First, what is at issue here is not a matter of how Cicero said Socrates acted. Second, it is not Alcibiades who says who how Socrates acted. Strauss points out that what is told is not even by someone who was there to hear what Alcibiades said. The dialogue is a work of fiction. But neither works of history or of fiction are bound by an author being alive at the time he writes about. Third, Cicero often discusses Socrates, referring to the works of Plato and Xenophon. The fact that he was not alive is no more relevant than the fact that we were not alive to discuss Socrates.
There are now several issues that you have ignored in your attempt to discredit me and Strauss. If you would address them you might begin to see that there is so much more here than you are aware of, beginning with what theology is for Plato and how it cannot be understood apart from political considerations.
The issue is not your belief which is totally irrelevant. The issue is your statement to the effect that I “search for statements by and about Strauss so that I can argue against them.”
It was not a “belief” but an emphatic assertion, emphasized by invectives and exclamation mark. And since it turned out to be a blatant lie as I actually have Strauss’ book in front of me, that makes you a liar, does it not?
Even if it was a “belief”, it was a false belief, which illustrates how your Straussian mind operates.
You are also a liar because of the following facts:
First you claimed that Strauss is talking about Socrates as depicted by Cicero.
Then you cited some mysterious “great deal more in Strauss’ lectures on the Symposium”.
Then you cited a mysterious “connection he is making between Alcibiades’ story and Cicero”.
Then you claimed that “Strauss’ lectures were very popular”.
Then you mentioned a mysterious “theme of contemplation in summer”.
And finally, you came up with a novel definition of “discuss” that amounts to an admission that Strauss does not discuss Cicero, which of course he doesn’t. And Cicero does not discuss Socrates’ preference for praying to the Sun in summer.
So, basically, the BS is entirely yours and you are full of it, no offence intended. :smile:
Strauss introduces Cicero in order to make sense of the the theme of the difference between contemplation in the summer and winter. It is a theme in Cicero's own works entitled after Plato's own, Republic and Laws as well as those of Plato.
In his lectures on Cicero Strauss quotes him:
“Socrates was the first who called philosophy down from heaven, and placed it in cities, and even introduced it into the houses, and compelled it to investigate, regarding life, manners and good and bad things. Socrates’ manifold way of disputing, and the variety of subject matters, and the magnitude of mind consecrated this way of disputing to writings and thus produced a variety of dissenting philosophical schools. Out of those schools (the relevant philosophical schools), we, Cicero, have followed that school particularly, or that manner particularly, which we believe Socrates had used (namely, the dialogical) in order to conceal our opinion, in order to liberate others from error, and in order to seek in every disputation what is most similar to the truth (alt, translation: what is most probable).” Tuscan Disputations V. 6.10-11
Socrates concern was not with heavenly things, not the sun or gods or whether the sun is a god, but with the human things, both public and private, which includes what is said about the gods.
"To conceal our opinion" is what is at issue here. Socrates opinion about the gods is concealed because of his concern for the city and philosophy. This is the theme Strauss is pointing to regarding summer and winter. As with Socrates' contemplation during a military campaign, Cicero relates a story of a military campaign in the winter where a few soldiers gather in a meadow for a discussion:
In Cicero's Laws:
Plato's Laws too takes place on an island.
There is a connection made in both Plato's and Cicero's Laws between law (nomos, authoritative custom) and obscurity. As Strauss points out, the first word of Plato's Laws is "God". The laws that found a city must deal with the gods, but the gods of the city are not the cosmic gods. What Socrates says about the gods, that is, his theology, is determined by what he thinks is best for the city. But the participants in Plato's Laws are from different cities, and so, the problem of which gods is of central importance. A cosmic god who is impartial is the answer.
A few other points:
The theme of the active versus the contemplative life. In both Alcibiades story and Cicero's there is a contemplative pause within a setting of military action. Socrates prayer to the sun is not theological , not a matter of what is said, but of something done with the Ionians but not the Athenians watching.
Strauss points out that the Symposium is the only Platonic dialogue explicitly devoted to a god. It is, he adds, "of course", a Socratic dialogue. Eros was generally regarded as a god, but Socrates denies that Eros is a god. The reason has to do with eros' connection to the human.
What is going on here is not evidence that Socrates or Plato believed in a cosmic god. What is at issue is, as Cicero correctly points out, philosophy brought down from the heavens to the city, a concern with human rather than heavenly things, or, rather, a concern for heavenly things in so far as they were related to human things, for example, justice rather than piety.
Are you familiar with Alain de Botton?
His Consolations of Philosophy was quite famous.
Not under the Socratic method.
Inherent in the Socratic method is the inequality of the teacher and the student, and the student's submission to the teacher.
But then again, it's possible to be so open-minded that one's brain falls out.
Perhaps not deliberately. This is also how the practice of koans works. Namely, contemplating a koan is supposed to bring one's mind to a halt, from whence on one can "see things as they really are".
Quoting Apollodorus
But there is still an issue of power. Defining what is real for another person is an act of power.
It's not possible to do away with issues of power in interpersonal interactions of any kind, not even in philosophy.
No. But desist from making many judgments to begin with.
Obviously, this wil make one unpopular in certain circles where having a lot of definitive opinions is required. But realistically, there are rather few things that one actually needs to have a definitive opinion about.
Because philosophers are known for being such a happy bunch!
Although dialectic is depicted in the Republic as a way out of hypothesis of the Forms to knowledge of the Forms, Socrates famously says that he knows that he does not know. He did not gain knowledge of the Forms through dialectic.
You are at it again, aren't you?
Cicero’s Laws that Strauss refers to as being “in summer where they seek the shade,” mentions Socrates exactly three times:
The Republic, which Strauss refers to as being “a dialogue in winter, where they seek the sun,” mentions Socrates six times, at 1.15, 1.16, 2.3, 2.22, 2.51, 3.5.
There is no connection whatsoever between the above instances and Alcibiades’ account of Socrates praying to the Sun in summer as discussed by Strauss in his Symposium lectures.
The island scene in Laws 2.1-2, is in summer, where they seek the shade, as stated by Strauss, which is why he contrasts this with Socrates’ seeking the Sun in summer. For Socrates, the light of the Sun (who is a God) symbolizes the light of knowledge and truth as he states in Plato’s Republic:
Therefore the Sun in Plato is a deity as stated by Strauss, and so is the Good. The Sun is the supreme God in the realm of sensibles and its creator, the Good or the One, is the supreme deity in the intelligible world. This is the core of Plato's theology.
As Strauss himself admits in Introductory Remarks:
To recap. First, Socrates cannot have any connection with Cicero, for the simple reason that he lived centuries before Cicero.
Second, Strauss does not connect Socrates’ praying to the Sun in Plato’s Symposium with Atticus and Marcus’ contemplating in summer in Cicero’s Laws. He contrasts the former with the latter as Socrates contemplates in the sun whereas Atticus and Marcus contemplate in the shade:
Third, even if Strauss did make some connection between Alcibiades’ account of Socrates praying to the Sun to some other scene in Plato, he torpedoes his own connection by claiming (without adducing any evidence) that Alcibiades’ story is fiction.
If you claim that (1) A is connected to B and (2) A never took place (i.e., A doesn’t exist), then you have nothing to connect to B, and therefore no connection!
But I admit that Strauss does appear to have the occasional schizoaffective or delusional episode induced, no doubt, by his compulsive Maimonidean esotericism (as do some of his disciples) ….. :grin:
Quoting baker
No kidding.
Your petty small mindedness is something that neither Plato or anyone else can fix for you, so live in the bliss of your ignorance of your ignorance. Perhaps one day you will come to know yourself well enough to recognize how impoverished both your understanding and attitude are. If it is ever to happen the former will follow from the latter.
I don't disagree: I try to avoid making judgements, and having opinions, about as many things as possible. Most of the time when I have an opinion it is the opinion that we are not warranted in having an opinion. But when it comes to a potentially life or death decision such as whether to be vaccinated or not in a pandemic, I think a judgement to form the basis for action is called for. And in such a situation one really has nothing better to go by than the current medical advice.
Quoting baker
Are you claiming that they are known to be an unhappy bunch? Can you cite a list of examples that will make up the majority of philosophers? Or is that just a caricature based on a few notable malcontents?
Power is a problem only when it is misused. This is why it is important for all philosophers, beginners and experienced, to place themselves in the proper power context vis-a-vis one another.
This is why, traditionally, the cultivation of virtues is a preparatory stage to philosophy proper.
I would amend this statement by striking from it the consecutive words, “the city and”. Socrates considered philosophy the highest way of life, and natural; he did not, however, consider the city natural, nor did he believe there was any natural consonance between the philosopher and the city. Indeed the city and the philosopher are natural enemies; the latter founded on convention, the former born to dissolve that convention in order to get at the truth.
The reason Socrates conceals his true beliefs about the gods is because he wishes to avoid persecution by the city. This is the source of his irony. He wants that his hearers believe he believes as they do, while subtly expressing doubt through his questioning, to elicit those of his audience who might rise above the conventional opinion of the citizenry.
I agree. Socrates has respect for the conventional. His civic piety requires a demonstration of piety toward the gods.
Quoting Leghorn
This is the other side of it. When one follows the arguments, his theology, what he said about gods, leads to questioning the gods. He does this, in part, by seeming to defend the gods. If the gods are good then they cannot do what the poets say they do. Talk of the gods is displaced by talk of the just, noble, and good.
Socrates' examination of the just, noble, and good exposes a tension between convention and philosophy. The assumption of the city is that the conventional is the good. The city is hostile to philosophy because it regards it as a threat to its conventions.
In the Republic and elsewhere Socrates argues that philosophy is not a threat but the greatest good for the city. On the one hand, with justice understood as minding your own business, the just city protects the self-interests of the philosopher. On the other, although the city may be hostile to philosophy, the philosopher is not hostile to the city. She recognizes the need to protect philosophy from the city, but also recognizes an obligation to it.
I do think Socrates works laterally in many exchanges to question a convention rather than declare something wrong outright. I am not sure of how cleanly the boundary between the realm of the city from the pursuit of philosophy is drawn. I don't think Socrates is hiding anything or avoiding persecution when he explains why he won't go into exile:
The view of the city during attempts to persuade her of "what is really right" is different from attempts to see the city as itself. The staging of the Republic as taking place outside of Athens seems to point toward a tension between the two places but not that one cancels the other.
He is certainly not avoiding persecution by not going into exile, which would have been a way of avoiding it. But can we say Socrates is not hiding something? Consider to whom he speaks here, Crito, the sort of man devoted to his country and its laws, certainly not a philosopher:
To such a one he cannot say, “Look, I love to question young men about their notions of justice and courage and moderation and the like—I’ve been doing it all my life, and it has been all I lived to do. But I’ve lived here in Athens all my life, and I’m an old man now, on the threshold of Hades: what great addition of my peculiar pleasure to a long life lived so pleasurably could I expect to get in exile?
“On the other hand, by displaying devotion to my country and its laws, I might gain favor in the eyes of posterity, and my life might be immortalized in the writings of one of my disciples, as Achilles’ was in Homer’s, thereby bestowing on me the only true immortality a man can have: the sort he can’t enjoy—and perhaps even helping philosophy survive by making it more palatable to aristocratic youth, the sort most likely to influence the regime’s opinions.”
Socrates knows full well that the laws don’t speak the truth!—but this appeal will work with a man like Crito.
Quoting Valentinus
But it was Socrates’ direct experience of Athens being wrong that undoubtedly taught him first-hand about the irrationality of the polis. I refer to the putting to death of the generals after the naval battle at Arginusae. Socrates’ vote was the only one in the council acquitting the generals. He alone, free of the theocratic terror that gripped the other councilmen, realized that more lives would have been lost by attempting to recover the bodies, that it is sometimes impractical to assuage the gods...
...more importantly he learned that, according to the polis, you must always assuage the gods.
That's the big question. If he is hiding something, what exactly is it that he is hiding?
And, if he is not afraid of prosecution, why hide anything?
The city doesn’t protect the interests of the philosopher, whether it be just or unjust. Leaving aside the latter, even in Plato’s Republic, the ideal and just city, the philosophers are not allowed freedom as private men, “minding their own business” to pursue “the things under the earth and in the heavens”, but must be dragged back into the darkness of the cave to rule a merely temporal entity. Does that sound to you like a true philosopher’s business?
Quoting Fooloso4
The city is hostile to the philosopher precisely because the philosopher is hostile to the city—not in the way of ordinary lawbreakers, but implicitly, by calling the city’s dearest beliefs into question.
It is characteristic of modern thought that there must be a solution to every problem. Socrates and Plato knew much better: there are inherent problems we can ameliorate—but never eradicate...and some of these are imbedded in the nature of mankind. One of these is the tension b/w the philosopher and civil society: you can accommodate, but never entirely reconcile the two.
The response to this tension is what characterizes and explains the history of Western philosophy. The difference b/w ancient and modern philosophy is the difference b/w persuading aristocrats to accept philosophy, and forcing rulers to so do, and what made this difference was the advent of what we now call technology: modern philosophy, armed with the new practical science that not only explains all natural phenomena, but, more importantly, uses that knowledge to benefit mankind at large, could appeal to the hoi polloi above the heads of the nobles and tyrants and force the latter to leave science alone to pursue its objects in peace—
—except now an entirely different relationship b/w philosopher and civil society had come into being: the philosopher was a benefactor of mankind—just as he is in Plato’s Republic: as ruler! In The Republic he is forced to rule; in the modern dispensation, he chooses to. Swift’s Flying Island is conceived of, and nuclear weapons fall into the hands of both Roosevelt and Khrushchev...
...there was a time when an Archimedes, out of disdain for their practicality, destroyed the manuscripts of his that described the engines of war he fashioned in Syracuse to repel the invading Roman army. This was proof of his disinterested philosophical nature. Now, as I suppose, a scientist’s papers would receive short shrift unless they benefitted man through potential application of technology. This fact, I say, compromises the purity of the philosopher’s natural quest, what he was born to do: is he a benefactor of mankind, or a seeker of the truth? Are these two separate goals reconcilable?
Viewing him as a martyr makes sense of his trial and death sentence.
Sure. The question remains, though, what exactly is he hiding? And if he is hiding things, how can we rely on what he is saying?
There are numerous instances in the dialogues where he appears to be praying, or is supposed to attend the worship of some deity or other. Is he pretending or being ironic in all cases?
If someone is so sure that things are exactly as they should be and that nothing happens without God's will -- then what exactly is going on??
Good point. However, some seem to believe that he was an anti-religious martyr, something like a "militant atheist" under a theocratic system.
Personally, I do not think this is supported by the careful examination of the evidence. The charge against Socrates was (1) politically motivated and (2) it was not that he was an atheist but that he disrespected the Athenian Gods and introduced "new deities".
This is consistent with the mainstream scholarly view that Plato introduces a new theology based on cosmic Gods such as the Sun as a substitute for the traditional Olympic Gods (Zeus, Hera, et al.), as admitted even by anti-Platonists like Strauss.
As I noted earlier, both Plato's Laws and Cicero's Laws, as opposed to their Republic which takes place in the light of the sun, take place in the shade. As Strauss says succinctly:
Why is obscurity necessary for the Laws and not for the Republic? The answer has something to do with the fact that the Republic is a city in speech, it is theoretical, but the Laws has to do with the founding of an actual city. This is related to the theologico-political problem. On the one hand, political action requires concealment. On the other, what might be called "legal theology" or theology enacted in the laws requires that it be shaded from the light of truth. Men are lawmakers but they make it appear as though the authority for what they do lies with the gods. Nomos in the sense of custom must be honored, but as law it attempts to stand above what is customary.
Euthyphro is a distorted image of the lawmaker. Piety is for him the measure of the law. Socrates, in praying to the gods, does what is customary. But Socrates' actions are guided by his views of the just, noble, and good not by piety.
They still spend most of their time in philosophy and return to the cave out of necessity. (540b)
Quoting Leghorn
If the philosopher does this for the benefit of the city is this still a hostile act or a benevolent one? But here Plato puts his thumb on the scale. In the Republic the philosopher is not one who inquires but one who knows what is best for the city. The philosopher in the Republic has knowledge of the good. But, of course, this is not a true image of the philosopher. Plato makes the philosopher appear to be more beneficial to the city than he might be. Were Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle hostile to the city? Did their activities cause more harm than good? Those who wished to conserve the old ways might think they did, but if the old is not the good then it is not so clear that what they did was not for the good of the city.
I agree that Socrates is hiding many things, that was what I was referring to when saying the place where he tries to persuade is different from where he looks at that activity from the outside, as it were.
What I read to be sincere in the passage was how his devotion to the city gave him the right to criticize and attempt to change it. He suffers the cruelty and ignorance of the city and his acceptance gives him the right to confront its decisions and standards. In that sense, the city belongs to him to whatever extent the city claims he belongs to it.
This obligation to what brought him into the world sees filial duty and that of the citizen together in the Crito dialogue. In the Republic, the relationship between those elements is brought into question. Can it be said that the obligation itself has been surpassed?
Okay.
Although the images are vertical - ascent, higher, the importance of lateral exchange should not be ignored. It is often a matter of a shift in focus or attention.
Quoting Valentinus
This raises all sorts of questions. A distinction must be made between the philosopher in the Republic and actual philosophers. But this raises the question of who the philosopher is in distinction from those who call themselves or are called by others philosophers. Both actual philosophers and actual cities exist in the realm of opinion. The city regards itself as wise, but does not make the distinction between knowledge and opinion. The philosopher's knowledge of ignorance is not simply a matter of knowing he is ignorant but knowledge of what it means to think, choose, and acting in the face of his ignorance.
If the city is the cave and responsible for our opinions, is the city responsible for the philosopher? Or is philosophy something that arises contrary to the city? Is the education of the philosopher dependent on or independent of the city?
The problem is not that anyone can read what is written, but the author is not there to respond to misunderstandings and misrepresentations. In the Seventh Letter Plato says:
It is not that there is some secret teaching hidden in the dialogues meant only for initiates into the mysteries. It is, rather, that there are matters that those too attached to their beliefs would be hostile to, things that are not understand by men who are not of worth and cannot deal with matters of worth.
But Plato did write, and it would be wrong to assume he did not say anything of worth in his writings. He devised ways of keeping things from readers who are not suited to read them while making them available to those capable of interpretation and following the arguments wherever they lead. So we find statements and claims that give the impression that he or Socrates thinks or believes one thing or another only to find that he says something else elsewhere in the same or another dialogue. Even the impression that is Plato or Socrates and the problem of whether it is one or the other or both is the result of an act of concealment.
I reread the Apology not long ago, and if I remember correctly, during his trial, Socrates WAS charged with atheism...some of you who can retrieve the passage more quickly than I can at this late hour might help me out here.
As far as “politically motivated” goes, are you referring to “corrupting the youth”, the formal charge, or to something different? As far as I know, corrupting the youth in this context is really the same thing as teaching gods different from those of the city.
Regarding the motivation of his accusers, Socrates says:
So, it appears that Anytus, Meletus and others had some grudge against him.
Regarding the charges against Socrates, "corrupting the youth" was one of them and "introducing new Gods" would amount to "corrupting the youth".
However, my comment referred to Socrates being taken to court for "making new Gods" and "not believing in the old ones" which seems different from "atheism" in the sense of "believing that there is no God"
In the Euthyphro Socrates says:
And in the Apology:
The issue is how do we reconcile Socrates' "making new Gods", "believing in new spiritual beings", and the various instances in the dialogues where he appears to be praying and/or worshiping some deity, with the view that he was an "atheist"?
Those were the two formal charges. But Meletus goes further: at 26c-d (Thomas G. West’s translation), Socrates asks him:
“...Or do you assert that I myself do not believe in gods at all and that I teach this to others?”
[MELETUS] This is what I say, that you do not believe in gods at all.
[SOCRATES] Wondrous Meletus, why do you say this? Do I not even believe, then, that sun and moon are gods, as other human beings do?
[MELETUS] No, by Zeus, judges, since he declares that the sun is stone and the moon is earth.
Socrates then goes on to make fun of Meletus, “as if he were to say, ‘Socrates does injustice by not believing in gods, but believing in gods’”, for Meletus’ formal indictment was (24b), “Socrates does injustice by corrupting the young, and by not believing in the gods in whom the city believes, but in other daimonia that are novel.”
Quoting Apollodorus
It is a difficult question, requiring intimate familiarity—which I do not possess—with not only Plato’s works, not only Xenophon’s in addition, but also the greatest interpretations of Socrates down through the tradition. It would also require the ability to interpret Socrates’ life through those works:
Quoting Fooloso4
It would be easy for a modern educated liberal student of him to be unable to believe that Socrates actually believed in gods— and it would be difficult for a theist not to be heartened by Socrates’ prayers and worship. To the former I would point out all these signs of Socrates’ piety; to the latter, I would point out that we cannot know what is really going on in the mind of a man who prays silently.
Well said.
That observation returns us to the beginning of the OP and the proposal of a continuity of meaning from Plato down through the last of the Neoplatonists. However one stands upon the issue, the latter are unmistakably theist in their language and read Plato as a unified cosmogony. Augustine took hold of the package and remodeled it for the purpose of explicating Christian doctrine.
In the context of those conditions, being able to read Plato without assuming it was a theological text is a relatively recent development.
But we have no signs of Socrates' piety. We have the stories of Plato and Xenophon who wrote in light of the trial and prosecution of Socrates. There was good reason to portray Socrates as pious in both the conventional and an unconventional way.
It is not without significance that Plato brings Anaxagoras into the trial. It is not just Socrates but philosophy that is on trial. It should be noted that Socrates neither affirms nor denies that the sun is a rock and not a god.
All too often it is unreflectively assumed that talk of god or gods is about the same thing. Although Plato wrote a dialogue that asked what piety is, there is no dialogue that asks what a god or a deity or a divinity or daimonion or the divine is.
When the question of whether or not Socrates was an atheist is raised we need to ask just what specifically it is that one thinks is being denied or affirmed. Did he believe in the gods of the city? Did he believe in one or more of the gods recognized as gods today?
What is the relationship between gods and Forms? What is the relationship between theology and religion? Between gods and religion?
The problem was raised regarding how Socrates is seen in light of current views. We must also consider how he was and is seen under the influence of Platonism and Christian Platonism where it is unquestionably assumed that he did believe in gods as they did. But we must also look back prior to Platonism. The pre-Socratic philosophers, sophists, and those educated by them were not bound by such assumptions. In other words, appeal to the views of modern, educated liberal students on the one hand, and Platonists on the other solves nothing. They are not the only options.
What both might overlook but we should not is that questions about gods could not be raised without regard for politics and public opinion without great risk.
What signs of Socrates’ piety would you accept as proof then of his belief or disbelief in god? confession from his own lips? But those lips have been silenced for millennia...well, only literally: we have the “stories” of Plato and Xenophon about him—which may be better than having him in praesentia before us, as I’ve been told—for I doubt that either Socrates confessed his atheism to Plato or Xenophon, his most prized pupils, or that they asked him whether he believed in god or not.
Quoting Fooloso4
The only way I’m familiar with from the dialogues of Plato is the latter...unless you mean the descriptions of him praying to the goddess, etc. I wonder: did he ever exclaim, as did his many interlocutors, in any of the dialogues, “by Zeus!”, or, “by Hera!”, or any of the other stock exclamatory theistic formulae? That would be an interesting topic of research.
Quoting Fooloso4
But, if I recall correctly, Socrates in that passage attempts to distance himself from that natural philosopher, saying that Anaxagoras’ works can be so cheaply bought that the young can purchase them and learn these ideas without having to bother Socrates to learn them, “especially since they are so strange” that he would never espouse them.
But this passage is fraught with irony. Firstly, Socrates never charged anyone a fee for his audience (though a “tip” might have been accepted) and therefore, to learn these ideas might have been even cheaper through him. Secondly, the charge Socrates brings of “strangeness” to Anaxagoras’ ideas is ironic, since so many of his own ideas are strange.
Both Plato and Xenophon defend Socrates in a way that he does not defend himself in their accounts of the trial. What we read of his piety should be seen in light of their rhetoric. In the Euthyphro Socrates places the just above piety to the gods. In Plato's Apology he demonstrates his obedience to the god by doubting what the oracle said and trying to show it was wrong. His daimonion is problematic because it is a personal deity, which is quite different from the gods of the city as well as gods of the cosmos.
Quoting Leghorn
He correctly points to Anaxagoras as the source of that claim, but he does not distance himself from it. He neither confirms nor denies.
Quoting Leghorn
As are many others as well. The whole question of the gods is fraught with irony.
Correct. In fact, in the Phaedo (98b) Socrates relates how he started his true philosophical career by renouncing Anaxagoras' materialism.
Had he been an atheist all those years, he would have been taken to court much sooner. But he was taken to court very late in life and only after falling out with Anytus and others (Meno 95a).
I think on the whole the arguments for Socrates being an atheist are very weak and unconvincing.
More generally, what we must not overlook is that religious beliefs were quite common among ancient philosophers, and it seems unwarranted to assume that they all were secret atheists.
He did not renounce it, he declared it insufficient for his purpose to understand the causes of things.
I think he found Anaxagoras unsatisfactory and disappointing.
In any case, I don't see Socrates taking a huge interest in Anaxagorean materialism, and unlike Anaxagoras, he did not deny the divinity of Sun and Moon.
And I see no evidence that he preached atheism.
Whoa there, fellow reader of the Dialogues.
I did not mean to argue whether Socrates was an atheist or not.
You referred to a bit of text as amounting to something. I took issue with the reading.
If the difference is not a difference in your mind, just ignore it.
O Morosophos, do you assert that distancing yourself from something is the same thing as denying it? Does not Socrates in that passage ridicule Anaxagoras’ notions as so strange that no reasonable person would assign them to him? Is this not distancing himself from Anaxagoras and his ideas?
Nevertheless I agree with you that he doesn’t come out and boldly proclaim that the sun is not a rock, and the moon not earth, and I believe this fact indicates he may have believed something similar to what Anaxagoras taught.
Quoting Fooloso4
This statement leaves me very perplexed, since we only know Socrates’ defense of himself from Plato’s and Xenophon’s accounts of it.
Quoting Apollodorus
So I learn from @Fooloso4 that Socrates neither confirms nor denies the divinity of the sun and moon, and I learn from @Apollodorus that he does not deny that same divinity—seems like you guys have at least half of something in common—unless you, O Morosophos, further agree that Socrates never denied the divinity of Sun and Moon. In which case, y’all would be in total agreement!...
...but I suspect that even if y’all agreed that Socrates neither denied nor confirmed those celestial beings to be gods, you would disagree as to how this fact is to be INTERPRETED...and that is the crux of the problem. I suspect Socrates and Plato wanted it to be that way: ambiguous and open to interpretation.
Your suspicion possibly points in the right direction.
However, my own suspicion would be that Socrates does not only not deny the divinity of Sun and Moon, but positively acknowledges them as “Gods in heaven” as in the Republic (Rep. 508a) and in the Timaeus where the heavenly bodies are said to be divine, in fact, the whole Cosmos is an ensouled, living being:
Could it be that Plato became so popular precisely because he was not an atheist and that his views resonated with those of the majority of philosophy students?
Quoting Leghorn
As it happens, Socrates does use theistic expressions like "by Zeus" (Cratylus 423c; Rep. 345b) and "if God wills" (Phaedo 69d) quite frequently.
They are not always translated literally, but if you look at the Greek text, you will often find "nai/ma Dia", "yes/no by Zeus/God", etc.
As to whether the sun was a rock, he neither affirms nor denies it. As to whether Anaxagoras' Mind is a cause, he found it problematic. Anaxagoras' explanation did not show how Mind order each thing in a way that is best. (Phaedo 97b-d)
Quoting Leghorn
The passage from the Phaedo is a prelude to Socrates "second sailing", which he calls his safe answer, the hypothesis of Forms. He shifts from Mind to his own mind.(99d-100a) He arranges things according to kind. That it is best that they be this way, either as a way of understanding things or as things are, is something he does not show. As to the relationship between a Form and a thing of that Form he says he cannot insist on the nature of that relationship. (100e). Later he recognizes the need to reintroduce physical causes. He calls the safe answer, his hypothesis of the Forms ignorant. (105b-c)
Quoting Leghorn
Right. That is why I said, in their accounts of the trial. We do not know what he actually said, but we do know that both Plato and Xenophon defended him in their works after their Apologies.
Quoting Leghorn
I think both would agree that whatever Socrates might have believed about the gods is secondary to the truth about the gods. To even raise the question is an impiety. To who or what do we turn to learn the truth about the gods? Do we believe the poets and their stories of the gods acting unjustly? Do we turn to reasoned argument? In that case the authority of reason stands above the gods, for it is reason that determines their truth.
There is, however, no such dialogue.
But these are Timaeus’, not Socrates’ words.
Quoting Apollodorus
I suspect the reason is more likely this: “But why, then, do some enjoy spending so much time with me? You have heard, men of Athens; I told you the whole truth. It is because they enjoy hearing men examined who suppose they are wise, but are not. For it is not unpleasant.”—Apology 33b-c, West translation.
Quoting Apollodorus
Yes he does, just like we, whether atheists or believers, exclaim, “Oh God!”, or, “Jesus!”, or, “God willing...”, or, “Lordy mercy!”, etc.
Quoting Fooloso4
Quoting Fooloso4
But your statement is unsubstantiated: since we do not know what Socrates actually said, how can you say that Plato and Xenophon didn’t faithfully portray his defense? Does Plato’s portrayal contradict Xenophon’s?
It is the Platonic perspective with which Socrates' statements are in agreement. Why would he spend hours in the Phaedo trying to convince people of the immortality of the soul and divine judgement in the after life, if he is an atheist?
Similarly, in Gorgias he says that he is convinced of divine judgement after death and urges all men to join him in this belief in order to save themselves in the other world (Gorgias 526e). He repeats this in the Republic (621c), etc.
I am referring to their Socratic apologies compared to their Socratic dialogues, Socrates in a public, legal forum versus Socrates in private conversation.
Quoting Leghorn
There are differences.
Why would he suggest it is possible that death is like a dreamless sleep in the Apology? I quote from West’s translation at 40c. Socrates speaks:
“Let us also think in the following way how great a hope there is that it [death] is good. Now being dead is either of two things. For either it is like being nothing and the dead man has no perception of anything, or else, in accordance with the things said, it happens to be a sort of change and migration of the soul from the place here to another place.”
There are a couple things that stick out to me in this statement. The first is that Socrates confines the possibilities of what death is to just two things, which correspond to the atheistic and theistic versions: there are no third nor fourth, etc, options available. Why does belief in god(s) require the immortality of soul? Because we wouldn’t believe in them unless we were granted the same immortality they enjoy?
The second thing that impresses my mind is the insertion of the phrase, “...in accordance with the things said...,” for it is just this, the things that are said, that Socrates has been contradicting all his life. At 40d-e he continues...
“And if in fact there is no perception [after death], but it is like a sleep in which the sleeper has no dream at all, death would be a wondrous gain. For I suppose that if someone had to select that night in which he slept so soundly that he did not even dream and had to compare the other nights and days of his own life with that night, and then had to say on consideration how many days and nights in his own life he has lived better and more pleasantly than that night, then I suppose that even the Great King [of Persia] himself, not to mention some private man, would discover that they are easy to count in comparison with the other days and nights. So if death is something like this, I at least say it is a gain. For all time appears in this way indeed to be nothing more than one night.”
What strikes me in this passage is that Socrates favorably compares the one eternal night of perceptionless sleep to—not just the many nights full of dream, and thus perception, we experience while alive, but also to the DAYS, in which we are awake. Even the King of Persia, the popularly considered happiest man, would prefer it! Life is but a nightmare in which you row, row, row your boat—not gently down the stream, but strenuously up against a contrary one. You suffer unhappiness during your waking hours, then have bad dreams while asleep, waking only to repeat the process—who wouldn’t prefer an eternal night of dreamlessness to this?
But Socrates appears to us to have lived a happy life—however much he was harassed by Xanthippe, or prosecuted for impiety, or criticized by Cleitophon, etc. So the above argument, though his own, doesn’t seem to apply to himself. For he is not speaking to himself, but rather to those who voted for his acquittal. He himself, we presume, would want to go on living the blessed life we suppose he lived—yet he chose death. He continues (40e-41c):
“On the other hand, if death is like a journey from here to another place, and if the things that are said are true...,”—cf “in accordance with the things said,” above: he continues to stress that the second alternative, that death is a journey to another place, is something merely spoken of—“that in fact all the dead are there, then what greater good could there be than this, judges? For if one who arrives in Hades, released from those here who claim to be judges, will find those who are judges in truth—the very ones who are said to give judgement there...,”—here again he points out that these things are only reported, not necessarily factual—“Minos and Rhadamanthys, and Aeacus, and Triptolemus, and those of the other demigods who turned out to be just in their own lives—would this journey be a paltry one?”
Suffice it to say that Socrates continues on to list other renowned men he would be more than glad to converse with in Hades. But this one statement, at 41b, sticks out: “And certainly the greatest thing is that I would pass my time examining and searching out among those there—just as I do those here—who among them is wise, and who supposes he is, but is not.” (!) Didn’t he just say he looked forward to finding the true judges there? Now he is saying he will examine them too, just as he did the mortal judges on earth, to see if they are wise, not assuming, as the many do, that they are actually wise!
What daring! What hubris!—to examine the greatest of all time in the afterlife—That is our humble Socrates.
I see what you mean and I certainly don’t disagree. :smile:
However, expressions like "in accordance with the things said" may well be just a manner of speech.
Also, there may be a difference between the way Socrates presents his case to the court and the things he says privately to people who are close to him.
I think his statements in the Phaedo shouldn't be ignored. Would he spend the last hours of his life convincing others of things he himself doesn’t believe in?
I do agree that the impression one gets of Plato is that sometimes he simply wants to get people to think and other times he has some message to convey. But if he does have a message, it does not seem to be atheism. Questioning and examining beliefs, yes, because that is his (or Socrates') particular way. But this does not amount to outright rejection or denial.
At any rate, I know of no serious scholars who are taking the stance that Plato is an atheist. Nor is there any independent credible tradition that claims this to be the case. I could be wrong though.
That is an interesting question. It reflects how our use of the division "atheist versus theist" is a species of the "modern educated liberal student " you referred to before. In the Laws, starting from 885b, Plato argues that the legislation of piety requires declaring that the soul was created prior to all other things as the explanation for natural causes. This entangles the distinction between what is natural from what is artificial in terms quite different foreign from our modern discourse. We take the recourse to adequate means to seek natural causes for granted. Plato did not have recourse to such a nifty tool.
The way we treat theism/atheism as an inseparable pair may frame our desire for immortality as the reason we talk of the gods.
It does not help address these questions from Fooloso4:
Quoting Fooloso4
How do you think that put-down contributes to the thread?
Quoting Leghorn
In other words, only the dead can judge the truth of death, but they are dead and, if death is like a dreamless sleep, then they cannot judge either. So how are we to judge whether the truth is in accordance with things said? Once again, Socrates points to our ignorance. The things said, are just that, things said. We cannot advance from the things said to the truth of what is said. Once again, we are led to aporia.
A few points should be noted. First, they are making laws. The law itself is not natural. The city itself is not natural. Second, in the Timaeus neither the world soul nor the human soul was created first. As things made they are not eternal. Timaeus' speech was to be made for the purpose of seeing the Republic at war, that is, in action. A task that is left incomplete.
The craftsman, "the poet and father" (28e) is himself the work of Timaeus' poetry. The craftsman says he is "craftsman and father" of the gods who make gods. (41a) The craftsman of the craftsman, Timaeus, is the craftsman of the gods. But Timaeus himself is the work Plato and his poetry.
The law is arbitrary and and does not fit with the Timaeus or the limits of understanding the natural world as expressed by Socrates in a number of dialogues.
The use of the statement as a justification for outlawing impiety is interesting because it defends the existence of gods by demanding a certain view of the natural world rather than citing how angry gods will get if not worshiped properly.
Quoting TheMadFool
So a (small) contribution provoking more clarity of purposes, no?
Also this: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/574601
This is related to the problem of the uncompleted task of the Timaeus, explaining how cosmogony leads to the city.
Quoting Valentinus
I take it you mean this:
The concern here seems to be twofold, first, the implications of the scientific view rather than the truth of it. This is the problem Socrates points to with Anaxagoras. Second, a proper account of the gods, theology, must take into account the human good. This is what Leo Strauss refers to as the theologico-political problem.
Yes, that passage is the start of the argument against the "scientists." But before the explanation of what should be accepted as "natural" is given, the matter is connected to the role of convention:
Quoting Plato, Laws 890,translated by R.G. Bury
The matter of nature versus convention is being directly connected to a discussion of who is above the law. That certainly did not come up when I studied the behavior of fruit flies. It involves other issues than a person believing or not believing in a divine agent. The next statement from the Athenian brings in a tiny bit of Socratic persuasion while considering proper punishment for the crime:
The Dialogues challenge us to ask how much to accept or question convention while seeking the actual Good rather than poor copies of it. The distance between that openness to discover what is not known and this argument for the gods upon the basis of service is large.
I spoke too broadly when saying the account of soul in the Laws did not fit the story of the Timaeus. It is an edited version of some details to serve a rhetorical purpose. Regarding how to view "materialism" versus "form" there is this observation:
It sounds like what we have sorted out as materialist or not in our modern lexicon is not a deal breaker to accepting the divine for Plato.
I have read this text before. Are you offering it as an argument in the context of the discussion underway?
By the divine do you mean the intelligible soul?
The Athenian says:
Whether or not it does is an open question. In Anaxagoras' account Nous orders all things but he holds that the sun and moon are rocks. Why does the Athenian propose that the sun is driven by its own soul? Is there some concern with autonomy? Some problem with a separate Mind that imposes order? Is this related to the political order and the imposition of laws?
No, the only thing disrespectfulness will get is negative.
I was referring to the way the "scientists" are viewed as being against the existence of the gods because of the power that arrogates to themselves at the expense of duty to the city.The observation was directed toward how we are using the terms of "atheist versus theist" in my reply to Leghorn saying:
Quoting Leghorn
The way we use the terms to affirm or deny what is believed by an individual to be true is going to have trouble in a land where the line between Olympian Gods and a rational Creator has not been clearly drawn. This goes back to me agreeing with you that Plato is not a unitary model but adding the caveat that what counts as a model of the divine will become more difficult to identify.
Quoting Fooloso4
As regards to there being a problem with a separate mind imposing order, the Athenian's argument does resemble Aristotle's' approach of reasoning backwards to the Prime Mover. We don't get to look over his shoulder while he is making stuff the way we can in Timaeus' Craftsman's shop. On the other hand, Aristotle cannot have been a supporter of legislating upon the pursuit of natural causes seeing as how he did exactly that for a long time.
Pardon me if I don't respond to any responses for a while. I am giving my laptop to somebody else for a few weeks. I need to explore other regions of the soul.
"Scientists" is an infelicitous translation, Pangle has "men considered wise by young people". (890) This explains why the poets are included. Things are complicated by this:
Surely the ancients include the poets Hesiod and Homer. Should they be included in those:
Quoting Plato, Laws 890,translated by R.G. Bury
or excluded because they are among the ancients? To put it differently, does the fault lie with atheists? They after all were the primary source of stories about the gods.
Quoting Valentinus
If I understand you correctly, I agree. In the Apology Socrates points to different ways in which the term atheist is used as an accusation. In addition, I don't think belief in gods requires the immortality of the soul. In fact, a common distinction was made between mortal men and immortal gods.
Quoting Valentinus
This is part of what Socrates was ensnared in. A rational Creator is not the gods of the city. It is an innovation. The accusation of atheism would in one sense of the term be accurate.
Quoting Valentinus
Two comments: First, it is generally the Biblical God who is identified with will, with the Greeks emphasizing intellect. Second, there are some theologians, both ancient and modern, who either eschew any such description (negative or apophatic theology) or reject and kind of personification or anthropomorphism (Tillich, the ground of being).
Quoting Valentinus
Be well.
By “a manner of speech” are you referring to a formulaic expression, like, “Let me be (very, perfectly) clear,” or “At the end of the day,” or “It was (good, useful, helpful, etc.) until it wasn’t,” or “These are not partisan issues,” or any of the other stock phrases that are so popular now? These sorts of phrases have little variability and wide application. Let’s compare Socrates’ phrases in the Apology from 40c through 41c, to see if they resemble these sorts of “manners of speech”, for I have found as many as four of them there that stress the fact that the popular accounts of the afterlife are merely “things said”. I quote them in the order in which they occur:
1) “in accordance with the things said”, (kata ta legomena); 2) “and if the things that are said are true”, (kai [ei] alethe esti ta legomena); 3) “the very ones who are said to give judgement there”, (oiper kai legontai ekei dikazein); 4) “at least if the things that are said are in fact true”, (eiper ge ta legomena alethe estin).
Of these four phrases, three have one word in common, ta legomena (“the things said”), and two of those share the additional words, alethe esti (“are true”). The third numbered phrase, however, is radically different, having in common with ta legomena only the same verb in a different form, legontai (“are said”).
I think this linguistic analysis is sufficient to prove that these phrases of Socrates’ in this passage are not identical mere “manners of speech” or variations of stock formulae. The only thing they have in common is the passive verb legesthai, “to be said”, and even it is in different forms. Add to this the fact that in this relatively short passage, a description of the afterlife, Socrates as many as four times reminds us that these are things only said, implying that they are not necessarily so.
Consider in contrast the passage where he describes the alternative: where there is no afterlife, only a dreamless sleep (40d-e). In that passage he never says anything like, “if these things that are said are indeed true”, as he does repeatedly in his account of the afterlife. Why not? Obviously because no such things are ever said—though they be certainly considered in the secret soul of every private human being.
The most obvious thing to the soul of man is that death marks the end of his life and consciousness. He sees not only all the animals die and rot, but even his own kind. This idea, that he will one day cease to be, is not tolerable for a human being. One of my fellow churchgoers once told me, “Everyone wants to go to heaven, but nobody wants to die to get there”.
But everyone must agree that there was an infinity of time before he was born in which he didn’t exist! Shouldn’t there then be, in correspondence with the afterlife, a “before-life”, in which the eternal soul lived before it was born into its earthly consciousness? Yet we have no memory of this before-life. If something is eternal, doesn’t it exist for ALL time? Does it make sense that there are things that come into being, but don’t pass away? Isn’t it in the nature of things that come into being that they must also pass away? On the other hand, doesn’t it make sense that the things that don’t pass away were always in existence?
I think that, for most of us, our mortal lives are tolerable only to the extent we can have hope in the promise of immortality offered by our gods and our religious beliefs in an afterlife. For a few, however, the only hope in happiness down here on this earth (for we can’t bring ourselves to believe that things that come into being can last forever), is to strive to grasp the things that are truly immortal, that is, the things that are eternal, that neither come into being (are born), nor perish (pass away), while we are still alive.
“But I think the vulgar notion of the immortality of soul leads us to consideration of a truer representative of human immortality.”
“What would that representative be, Leghorn?”
“Why, the men who have done great deeds or written great books. Aren’t Shakespeare’s or Plato’s or Milton’s, or many other men and their works said to be immortal?”
“Yes, that’s true.”
“Well, are they considered immortal for any reason other than that they influenced men’s souls long after their own death?”
“Yes, exactly for that reason.”
“And do you think they could have exerted this influence had they not tapped into the truly eternal things, the things whose consideration both make a man happy in his mortal life, and ensure that he will be remembered long after his death?”
Quoting 180 Proof
180 Proof & Athena. I'm alright. Thank you for your concern. Good day.
Not necessarily. He is discussing things that are being said. He (almost) always starts with the current popular view of a particular topic. How else could he refer to things said than by using the verb legomai?
Quoting Leghorn
But he does not say "death", "dissolution", or "disappearance". If there is dreamless sleep, there must still be someone who sleeps. And someone who sleeps can wake up as explained in the Phaedo. One state gives rise to its opposite: being awake gives rise to being asleep and being asleep gives rise to being awake, etc. (71c ff.).
Quoting Leghorn
However, absence of memory is not evidence of non-existence.
When we say "I do not remember living before", we are merely referring to "I" as this particular person as we know it in this life which naturally did not exist prior to being born. It does not mean that the pure, disembodied "I", the nous, did not exist.
On the contrary, whenever we say "I do not remember", the existence of the "I" is always presupposed. For, without it, we would be unable to say anything. But, since we are saying something, it must be admitted that there is a subject who says it.
It is that conscious subject who does not remember existing as this current person. And by the very fact that it is in a position to remember not existing in the current form, it demonstrates its previous existence.
Whether or not they are so is not addressed. This stands in stark contrast to Socrates standard practice of questioning what is said. It is left as one of two possibilities. The other is that :
Quoting Leghorn
The possibility that it is like being nothing is raised prior to what accords with things said. In the Phaedo, where Socrates attempts to charm away their childish fears of death (77e) this possibility is not raised at all. All the arguments are designed to demonstrate the immortality of the soul, but, of course, they fail.
As long as one assumes that Socrates' efforts are simply to discover the truth of things, the truth of his efforts will not be discovered.
Quoting Leghorn
His efforts are, in part, to persuade, to give his listeners hope that death is good, but if it turns out that the things said are true, then it is good only for the souls of those who are good. And yet, what might be good for their soul is not necessarily what is good for them. Socrates the man is not a disembodied soul.
That’s exactly my point! Any resemblance to a common “manner of speech” all of those four phrases have would have to be based on the fact they share the verb legesthai, which, as you say, is a necessary ingredient in a phrase asserting that something “is said”. Therefore, these phrases were not mere manners of speech, as you suggested.
Quoting Apollodorus
...and he (almost) always goes beyond it, often contradicting it. How does the fact that he is relating the vulgar view of the Greek afterlife explain why he so frequently reminds his listeners that the things he says are only things said? Do you suppose his audience, the Greek citizens who voted for his acquittal, need such constant reminding? Most likely they didn’t. They made up the more liberal element of the citizenry, the men more likely themselves to question the theological traditions of the regime, to see them as mere myths and to be more tolerant of a questioning Socrates.
Quoting Apollodorus
But he does say this, as the ultimate sentence in his description of death as “the dreamless sleep” (40e): “For all time appears in this way indeed to be nothing more than one night.” (kai gar oudev pleiwv o pas chronos phainetai outw de einai e mia vuks). In other words, this dreamless night lasts for all time. There is no waking from it. It seems to be but one night precisely because it lasts forever.
Quoting Apollodorus
It is not that it remembers not existing, but rather that it doesn’t remember existing. There is a difference. If I remember not eating, I believe I didn’t eat, because I have a memory of not having eaten. If, however, I don’t remember eating, I am in a state of uncertainty: maybe I ate, maybe I didn’t. I need more evidence than my poor memory.
But that extra evidence is easily supplied by reason: everyone knows he was born on a certain day and in a certain year back to which his memory does not even stretch, and he knows that before he was born, he was a sperm and egg on the verge of uniting. How did an immutable nous find its brief temporal home in the chance coincidence of two merely earthly bodies?
However, it isn't my point. I simply gave “manner of speech” as an example. The central issue is that he uses the verb legomai, “to be said”, to refer to things said. Hence my question (which you did not answer), “How else can he refer to things said without saying ‘it is said’ or something to that effect?”
Quoting Leghorn
I don’t think he does though. “It is said” or “according to things said”, etc., is simply a statement of fact. He does not say “Please remember these are just things said”.
Quoting Leghorn
1. He says “appears,” phainetai.
2. Where there is sleep there is a sleeper.
3. He gives “dreamless sleep” as just one possibility, the other possibility being “a change and migration of the soul from this to another place” (Apol. 40c).
4. Elsewhere he urges all men to accept his account of divine judgement after death:
5. Similarly, he now ends his speech to members of the jury by reminding them of the “truth” that God does not neglect a good man either in life or after death:
Quoting Leghorn
If the soul is immortal and existed before, of course it cannot remember being the current person who did not exist prior to being born. But it may well have prenatal memory of itself as pure nous. It may also have latent memory of Forms, etc. This is what Socrates' Theory of Recollection is about which he expounds after the trial in the Phaedo!
My apologies. I thought you were saying that Socrates’ repetition of phrases meaning that these were “things said” only indicated a certain idiom of speech that could normally be expected in any sort of discourse in the dialogues about a matter that was merely spoken of...but let me ask you, O Apollodorus: as an example of what, exactly, did you give “manner of speech”? That has me confused.
Quoting Apollodorus
He essentially says “Please remember that these are just things said,” by repeating so often the different phrases that remind us of it. He is not speaking thusly to everyone who voted for his acquittal; only to those few who notice that, by repetition, he is reminding them of the spuriousness of the traditional tales of the afterlife.
Quoting Apollodorus
Do you have prenatal memory of yourself existing as pure vous? I don’t either, and I’ve never met anyone who did. My earliest memory is of pissing in the kitchen trash can thinking I was in the bathroom.
As for memory of forms (eidwn) before birth, those too must certainly be hidden (latent) from me, for I have none of them. I learned about them, like everyone else I suppose, by growing up trying to understand the world before my eyes, in the first place, and by reading books that I thought might teach me about them, in the second.
Example of things other than "reminders".
Quoting Leghorn
But you are not answering my question (which I have asked about three or four times): How does one speak of things said without using phrases like “as they say”, “according to things said”, etc.
Quoting Leghorn
If, as Socrates says, the soul pre-exists the current life, prenatal memories may be stimulated through philosophical inquiry and contemplation. Any one recollection can lead to general recall of knowledge we once actively had. Incidentally, there is a similar teaching in Buddhism and Hinduism. In any case, we are talking about Socrates’ Theory of Recollection as given in the Meno and repeated in the Phaedo (after the trial and his speech to the jury), not about you and me.
I think he is addressing both those who recognize or will come to understand that these are things said rather than things known, and those who will believe they are things known because they are things said.
The latter is a salutary teaching. Believing it is true promotes justice in the soul and the city. Those who are philosophical by nature, however, desire the truth. But, as Socrates points out in the Republic:
That these are things said and not the truth is a truth suitable only to those who are of the best natures and have been properly educated through an education that includes such salutary tales.
The possibility that "death is like being nothing" presents both an ethical and existential problem. Plato deals with the first in the Republic where Socrates argues that justice is a matter of the health of the soul rather than a calculus of rewards and punishments. He deals with the second in the Phaedo, where Socrates attempts to charm away childish fears of death. (77e) In doing this he appeals to "things said" as well as his own myths. But none of these myths say what will happen to Socrates or you or me. They take the part as the whole.
Do you mean that Socrates’ frequent—I almost said “reminders”—repetitions of different phrases meaning that what was being said was only spoken of might be characterized by other phrases or words? Instead of “reminders”, might we call them “admonitions”? how about, “accidents”, or “glosses”, or “incidental comments”, or “insignificant utterances”, etc. You can call them a host of things, but if you agree they are there in the text in the frequency in which they are extant, you can’t merely dismiss them without cause.
Quoting Apollodorus
Well, you could say something like, “In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. And the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters,” etc. I suppose you would have to read a long time thence before ever encountering a phrase like, “as they say”, though all these sayings be characterized by that phrase.
Quoting Apollodorus
Well, Mr. Apollodorus, I am certainly interested in what Socrates has to say about all this, but if what he says doesn’t jibe with my experience, I don’t have him around to ask about it. So if you say he tells me that I have a prenatal memory, the only one I have to question is you.
Well, if you ask me, when I relate what is being said, I normally use phrases like "They say that ..." etc. and I know of no other way of putting it in everyday language. "They say that", "as they say", etc. simply indicates that something is being affirmed. It by no means signifies that what is being said is a mere "story".
Hence my question to you (which I have asked multiple times):
Quoting Apollodorus
This, for some unknown reason, you have declined to say.
Quoting Leghorn
Sure. However, as I am merely relaying what Socrates states in the dialogues, I can only advise you to read the dialogues. :smile:
Quoting Apollodorus
Well, I DID attempt to answer this question in my previous post, but you obviously either didn’t notice I was answering, or just ignored it. So, I will attempt again, and I think I can respond to both these, your objection and question, in a single demonstration.
Let’s consider again the places in that passage (Apology, 40e-41c) where Socrates reminds us that the things he is relating are “spoken of”. The first is at 40e: “On the other hand, if death is like a journey from here to another place, and if the things that are said are true, that in fact all the dead are there,...” etc. Now, let’s consider if this phrase of Socrates’, “and if the things that are said are true,” is either necessary or expected in the context of this sentence. For I would assume—and correct me if I’m wrong—that if it is neither necessary nor expected, that it must be either extraordinary, or superfluous, or otherwise demanding of our attention.
How are we to answer this question? Well, one way might be to remove the phrase and see if it affects the sentence in any significant way: “On the other hand, if death is like a journey from here to another place,...[and] in fact all the dead are there,...” etc. Here, in order to make the elided sentence work, we have to drop “that” and add “and”—a mere procedural formality, I assume you would agree. Considering this new abbreviated sentence, what can we say about it? Is it now insufficient to convey the original meaning? I have my own opinion; I leave it to you to formulate your own.
Having treated the question of necessity, we still have that of expectedness to deal with: is “and if the things that are said are true” expected in this context? How are we to answer that? The only way to answer this question is to compare the passage at hand to similar passages elsewhere that deal with similar things in the same way—and we have such a passage close at hand, to be precise, at 28c-d, where Socrates speaks of “the demigods who met their end at Troy”. Let me reproduce that passage for our benefit out of West’s translation— a trusty one indeed, for it is an avowedly literal one. Socrates again speaks:
“For according to your speech, those of the demigods who met their end at Troy would be paltry, especially the son of Thetis [Achilles]. Rather than endure anything shameful, he despised danger so much that when his mother (a goddess) spoke to him as he was eager to kill Hector—something like this, as I suppose: ‘Son, if you avenge the murder of your comrade Patroclus and kill Hector, you yourself will die; for straightaway,’ she says, ‘after Hector, your fate is ready at hand.’—he, upon hearing this, belittled death and danger, fearing much more to live as a bad man and not to avenge his friends. ‘Straightaway,’ he says, ‘may I die, after I inflict a penalty on the doer of injustice, so that I do not stay here ridiculous beside the curved ships, a burden on the land.’”
I say this passage is similar to the first in that it deals with similar things in the same way as the first passage. The similar things are exactly the ones we’ve been talking about, “the things said,” the popular Athenian accounts of the gods, demigods or afterlife. The similarity in the way they are spoken of is that they are all spoken to either real or hypothetical men of Athens, and for purposes of admonition or instruction.
As to the difference between these two passages then, there is something that strikes me as particularly germane to our debate. Shall I say it? No. I would rather you tell me—if you are able and, especially, if you are willing.
To encourage you, if you answer my implicit question, you will have found my answer to your explicit one, the one you have so often asked of me. In addition, you will have discovered my response to your objection that there is nothing significant about Socrates having stated that such-and-such things are ones said.
Well, I WAS going to say that your “answer” looks like Straussian hermeneutics to me but I resisted the temptation .... :smile:
But let’s try to simplify this. If I lived in 4th century BC Athens, where belief in afterlife was the prevalent position, and wanted to discuss the postmortem possibilities of (1) dreamless sleep (or “nothingness”) and (2) migration of the soul to another place, I would phrase it exactly as Socrates does. Wouldn’t you?
And, as already stated, we cannot ignore Socrates’ concluding remarks to the effect that God does not neglect a good man:
IMO, this encapsulates Socrates’ belief in divine justice as expressed in Gorgias (526e), Republic (621c), Phaedo, etc.
I wouldn’t boast about resisting a temptation which I did not resist. I am scarcely at all familiar with “Straussian hermeneutics,” for I have barely read the man. The interpretation I have presented you with is my own, and I am disappointed that you not only didn’t respond to its particular points, but denigrated it as coming from a source you apparently despise, which isn’t even its source.
I think I have implicitly answered your most pressing question, as to how else one can relate things that are said without using phrases like, “it is said,” or “as they say,” etc. Sometimes things are so obvious that it is otiose to try to explain them. It’s like having to explain a joke.
Quoting Apollodorus
We don’t have to go back in time at all, O Apollodorus, to find a place like this. We are living in it now. You will not find one media spokesperson, on tv or radio, not one interviewer or interviewee, who doesn’t either agree with or fail to contradict statements like, “I know he is looking down on us now and smiling,” or, “now she is at last happy, reunited with her late husband whom she loved so much,” or, “he is in a better place,” etc.
A well-meaning acquaintance of hers recently told my sister—a staunch liberal and atheist—after the death of her husband, who died after a long debilitating illness, whose loss she yet grieves, that he was in a better place. My sister replied, “Well why don’t you kill yourself and go there and see how good it is!”—needless to say, my sister is in no position where she fears losing either status or a job.
Quoting Apollodorus
I only wish I could phrase things exactly as Socrates does, and I suppose many of the greatest philosophers who came after him wished the same thing. I suppose, after I had been convicted of impiety and sentenced to death, I would have crapped my pants and peeed all over myself. I suppose I would have wailed and sniveled and carried on much like an animal.
But if I had composed myself enough to speak to those who voted for my acquittal, I suppose I would have cried out something like this: “Why weren’t there more of you? more of the lenient sort who are not so stricken with fear of transgressing the divine laws? You all know that my only transgression has been asking innocent questions to fellow citizens in public places. I never meant to overturn the laws of the state. I just wanted to find out the truth about things for myself!” In other words, I would have ended up instead complaining to to those who voted for my conviction.
I would not have been the Socrates that Crito found, soundly sleeping on the eve of his execution.
There are many accounts of Socrates, O Apollodorus. I have not even read all of them, much less studied them all. But I have read and somewhat studied some of his interpreters, and that knowledge—or opinion—added to my own, is what I have to work with.
This I am sure of: that Socrates is to philosophy what Jesus is to theology. These are the two chief figures in the tradition of our understanding of things. To these two must we ultimately refer when answering questions about the nature of things. We must compare and contrast, I say, the differences and similarities between their thoughts and lives in order to understand the difference between a life based on reason as opposed to one based on revelation. There are both similarities and differences...
...and one of the differences is the way they endured death: Jesus prayed to God to relieve him of the necessity of having to undergo his sacrifice: “Take this cup from me,” he said, “if it be according to your will.” Socrates, on the other hand, though begrudgingly, accepted his fate without appeal to a god for salvation.
Before drinking the hemlock he ironically requests to pour a libation! (117b)
I don't think this is entirely accurate.
Socrates does actually pray to the Gods before drinking the hemlock:
I just don't think your interpretation sounds very convincing. Obviously, it isn’t your fault, it’s just that the evidence seems insufficient to establish that Socrates is an atheist.
But I do appreciate your effort.
It should not go without notice that the man who administers the poison is recognized by Socrates as:
The only one recognized as having any knowledge of death is someone who knows about putting him to death.
You quoted my words, and they are before your eyes, and yet you seem not to be able to make out the last two: “for salvation”.
Quoting Apollodorus
Don’t I deserve then to learn from you where exactly it fails to convince? And I am not speaking of the large question, whether Socrates was an atheist, but the small one, whether he would ordinarily be expected to employ all those phrases reminding us that the popular Greek account of the afterlife consists of “things said”. I have been arguing that he would not be so expected. You appear to have given up attempting to refute my evidence. Does that mean we have come to a tacit agreement on that small point?
Quoting Fooloso4
I don’t see, O Morosophos, how it follows that his soul would no longer be Socrates’ after this “change and migration” of it. Do you take that phrase (Apology, 40c) to mean that the soul changes its form or essence after death?
In the Phaedo he says that the soul of a man might be that of an ass in the next life, or an ant, or other animal. (82a-b) This of course raises problems for the myth of recollection. I've been reminded that I'm an ass, but do not recollect being that kind of animal in a previous life. It would be remarkable if an ass had knowledge of the Forms!
Again, reincarnation was an ubiquitious belief of the ancient Indo-European cultures. Pythagoreans certainly accepted it, and it was arguably accepted by Plato, hence the myths concerning recollections from previous lives. For various reasons, this mythology was suppressed in the early Christian era, around 400 AD by one of the Church councils. Thereafter it only survived in underground circles such as Catharism (and is generally the object of intense hostility whenever mentioned on this forum.)
Of course in the East it developed along entirely different lines, in the Buddhist world it is widely accepted that beings are reborn in one of the 'six realms' according to their karma (although the intricacies of Buddhist soteriology are rather difficult to understand, as there is no 'being who transmigrates', only a series of causal factors that give rise in repeated rebirths, the 'citta-santana' or mind-stream.)
Socrates does pray to the Gods, does he not? And he believes in “salvation” (soteria) or “release” (lysis) of the soul by God or through righteous conduct (Rep. 621c; Phaedo 67a).
Quoting Leghorn
I’m afraid there is little chance of any such agreement. His statements containing phrases like “as they say” do not in the least sound like “reminders” to me. They are simply statements of fact and do not constitute evidence of secret messages to atheist supporters in the jury (or among readers of Plato’s dialogues).
And anyway (just out of curiosity), if you are not arguing that Socrates is an atheist, what is it that you hope to achieve?
Correct. Myths are often interpreted as the basis of beliefs, but the reality is that more often than not it is the other way round: myths serve the purpose of illustrating existing beliefs.
IMO this certainly seems to be the case in Socrates and Plato.
Yes, it can and has been argued. The fact that it was a ubiquitous belief might be a good reason for why it appears in some of the dialogues, but it is a bad reason for assuming he therefore accepted it. It is "in accordance with things said". Things said are the basis for Socratic inquiry. Of course, such inquiry must fail to arrive at a definitive answer. Death may be nothing. That it is something must be without sufficient evidence. None of us recollect being dead.
I think the idea that Socrates would no longer be Socrates has little basis.
It is true that according to Socrates some souls are “likely to pass into the bodies of asses and other beasts of that sort” but this refers to “those who have indulged in gluttony and violence and drunkenness, and have taken no pains to avoid them” (Phaedo 81e).
Clearly, it would not apply to Socrates who, by his own standards, has led an exemplary life.
On the contrary, those who (like Socrates) love learning and have pursued philosophy and have departed in a perfectly pure condition, join the race of the Gods (82b-c).
So since Socrates 1) prays to the gods, and 2) believes in salvation, it follows that he prayed to a god for salvation after his conviction? Is that what you are saying? For what I said, in contrasting him and Jesus, was that the latter did, according to the Gospels, explicitly ask God for deliverance from his fate, while the former never did such a thing in regard to his own.
Quoting Apollodorus
It is a good thing you are a curious creature, O Apollodorus, for without the faculty of curiosity, how will we ever have a hope of learning anything? I hope you do agree at least with that. You might say, “just out of curiosity”, in order to denigrate that passion, but, as I said, if we are not curious to know anything, how will we ever learn?
As for myself, while reading that passage from the Apology, at 40e-41c, I happened to notice that Socrates kept reminding me that the things he was relating were ambiguously true. Of course this was, however, in the context of a contrast of these things with one other alternative: that death is like an eternal dreamless sleep. Socrates was telling me, it seemed to me, that death is either like this, or like that, giving me no other alternative than these two.
But it must be acknowledged that Socrates was not necessarily speaking to me—some unknown reader in the future—but rather to those who voted for his acquittal. So I must, then, place myself in their place if I am to understand his rhetoric.
Certainly they are disappointed in the verdict, and sympathetic with the condemned man. Maybe some are even outraged. What do such men want to hear from him? Outrages against the verdict? quarrels and carryings-on? Some, perhaps, would have delighted in those things, deeply sympathizing with him.
What they got instead was a reasoned explication of what befalls a man after death, and a proof that no ill can come to him in the life after, whichever way it be. But one possibility is more favorable to Socrates than the other, and gets longer shrift in the dialogue. I mean the possibility that life after death is spent among the dead in Hades. For, if the things that are said are true, when Socrates dies he will be able to conduct an afterlife that is, in his stated opinion, superior to the one he led while alive, while, if the things that are not said are true instead, that death is like an eternal dreamless sleep, then he will only be relieved of evils.
And on what, exactly, is his preference for the former alternative based? His argument seems to be based on the fact that, if he go to Hades and find all of the dead there, their collectivity will be superior to the narrowness of what he experienced as a temporal being on earth. For in the blip of time we are alive on this earth, how many superior contemporaneous beings do you think you might chance upon; whereas, if you are given free rein of heaven itself, where everyone who has ever lived dwells, I suppose you would even meet with about the best souls that could ever be?
But what is more, he will retain there, in the afterlife in Hades, the same eternal power of dialectic he possessed on this corruptible earth, and be able to question the true judges there, the ones so reputed to have been, about justice. I don’t suppose he would say to Palamedes or Aiax anything like, “Hey, the same thing happened to me! Let me tell you about it..,” but would rather question these two, whether their penalties were justified or not.
More than that, he would be able to question personally—in what we call “real time”— the ppl considered the greatest judges of all time, about justice, and decide for himself whether they spoke the truth or a lie. Remember, if you will: Socrates’ concern with justice was not how it personally effected anyone, as a temporal being, with corrupting passions and the sort—but what it was as an idea or form.
Well, it was you who brought Jesus into it. Personally, I prefer to read Socrates (or Plato) on his own terms. Salvation may mean different things to different readers. For Socrates salvation or liberation (soteria, lysis) means a release (1) from a life of ignorance, (2) from the prospect of being found wanting by the divine tribunal in the afterlife, and (3) from the cycle of death and rebirth.
If this is his conception of salvation, then it seems reasonable to assume that this is at the back of his mind when he prays to the Gods that his transition from this to the other world may be attended by good fortune.
In fact, he himself says: “But I see clearly that to die and be released was better for me” (Apol. 41d). Clearly, he sees his death as a release (apallage). And he is confirmed in this by his daimonion, the inner divine voice that is his lifelong guide.
Quoting Leghorn
The possibility of life after death seems to be more consistent with Socrates’ views given in the dialogues. This is precisely why he gives the other option first, because he intends to focus on the second possibility, the possibility of life after death, which is in line with his beliefs and teachings.
In fact, my personal impression is that Socrates’ views of afterlife are very close to those of the Orphic tradition as may be seen from the myth of Er in the Republic, the account of afterlife in the Phaedo, etc. The true purpose of his elenctic procedure is to get his interlocutors to hold those beliefs only that (according to Socrates) have been shown through rational argument to be the most reasonable or plausible.
Your reminder that Socrates is not asking for a different life after death than the one he is having while alive does suggest he does not expect to be wandering around outside the cave of the Republic after his death.
The point of view reminds me of Unomuno in The Tragic Sense of Life in Men and Nations where the desire for immortality is continuing to do the groovy things one was doing rather than turn the experience into anything else.
How, dear fellow, can you read Plato, a most subtile and opaque writer, on his own terms, when you cannot even read me, a most crass and transparent one, on mine? Let me remind you, once again, what I said:
Quoting Leghorn
Your consideration in reading the above should not be what Socrates’ or Plato’s idea of salvation or swteria or lysis is, but what Leghorn’s is; for it is Leghorn, not Plato, neither Socrates, who said that.
Perhaps adding to your confusion is an ignorance of the story about Jesus, how he prayed in the Garden of Gethsemane on the eve of his crucifixion—I don’t know, of course, I’m just speculating. But if this is so, you can find the story in the three synoptic Gospels, Mark 14:26,32-42, Matt. 26:30,36-46, and Luke “22:39-46. To sum up the part that pertains to my statement, Jesus goes apart from his disciples and prays in private to God, asking Him to “take this cup from me” (I paraphrase: each of the three accounts says the same thing in a slightly different way).
Now I suppose that different readers have disagreed as to the meaning of Jesus’ words in these parallel passages, but it is clear to me from the context that he was asking God to deliver him from the necessity of being sentenced to death and having to pay the penalty, of being crucified.
Now, having educated yourself, if indeed you were ignorant about Jesus’ appeal “to God to relieve him of the necessity of having to undergo his sacrifice,” do you still believe that in the rest of my statement, what has to do with Socrates’ attitude toward his own indictment, when I said “salvation” I meant Plato’s notions of salvation or swteria or lysis? From the context of my entire statement, what do you think I meant by
Quoting Leghorn?
Have some scholars interpreted the metaphor of being led out of the darkness and opinion of the cave into the light of the natural sun as a migration after death into heaven or Hades? I am not familiar with that.
Quoting Valentinus
I am not familiar with that work or author, Mr. Valentinus. Is he someone worth reading?
I am not aware of any account that puts the matter in that way. Some Neoplatonists say Plato is teaching a personal transformation while one is alive. How well you prepare the soul will relate to its future possibilities. If you get out of the cave while alive, you have options others do not. Proclus has his version of this idea. "Platonism", in that vernacular, is a theology. One better get ready for the next stage.
Your observation about how Socrates wants to live after death does not fit with such an explanation: not because it disproves it but because it is without reference to it.
Unomuno makes a similar observation regarding the Catholic version of immortality. He gets the idea being proposed. He doesn't care if he cannot continue being who he is exactly as he is as a result.
Well, I disagree. Personally, I don't care about Jesus when I read Plato.
The discussion was about Socrates, not Jesus. If you want to talk about salvation in the context of Socrates then we are going to discuss it as seen by Socrates, not Jesus.
On the other hand, if it is Jesus you wish to discuss, then I think this would be best done separately.
If not, you always have @Valentinus and Foolo (or "Morosophos" as I think you prefer to call him) to discuss things with :smile:
I believe the reference is to the Spanish philosopher Miguel de Unamuno:
Miguel de Unamuno - Wikipedia
Not my favorite author and not exactly ancient. But you can never know. You might find him to your liking.
Socrates condemns:
He is referring to Hesiod's myth about Cronus and Uranus. He continues:
The problem is, how do we know if they are true? The muses tell Hesiod that they speak lies like the truth. (Theogony 27) Socrates says:
What do they know of the true nature of gods? Where are the models to be found? The muses? The poets? Or are they to make them themselves?
But the truth is not Socrates' foremost concern. If the story of Cronus is true, it is something that only a few should known. The truth should be hidden and in place of the "biggest lies", they should be told noble lies.
Socrates states what is at issue:
"Chance stories by chance teachers", in other words, "according to things said".
Myths shape the soul. The obverse of Socrates' avoidance of the politics of the city is his active engagement with the politics of the soul. It is not just those who are chronologically children who benefit from the myths.The souls of children of all ages might still be shaped by stories of the gods and rewards and punishment.
He is very much worth reading if you are interested in how the conditions of modern man relate to a desire for life as expressed through religious experience. The range of his scholarship is breathtaking and is an education even when one does not agree with him.
In chapter 10, Unamuno says:
In the matter of longing for immortality, Unamuno does not like options he has been given. His work is an argument against the God he wishes to draw closer to. He refuses to go gently into the night.
In that respect, Unamuno's complaint differs greatly from Socrates' desire to keep living the same way as he had been doing. Socrates calmly swaggers toward the turnstiles, tipping his waiter on the way out.
His libation of hemlock? The master as servant to the servant? (Phaedo 63a)
Or, what might be the same thing, one hard-working Athenian saluting the virtue of another.
You lost me here.
Socrates defended himself as a citizen of Athens, striving to do the best he could for its sake. In the Republic, the City is only possible because of different citizens doing and making what others cannot. Respect for that inter-dependency is respect for the people actually doing it; including, in this case, the one assigned to kill him.
I see. The one who administers the poison is just in so far as he is doing his job. On the model of the Republic, one man one job. Minding his own business.