Does anyone have any absolute, objective understanding of reality?
CidatJuly 14, 2021 at 19:519950 views161 comments
For example, does anyone continuously hold an absolute truth for how to speak? Does anyone continuously hold an absolute truth for never robbing a bank? Etc.
Reply to Cidat Yes, probably a lot of people. But, the nature of truth in an absolutist sense means we don't always know who or when it's perfectly true.
Absolute, objective, means separated, indipendent, autonomous. How can it be autonomous, since, if we try to consider reality, objectivity, we can’t ignore, among the things we perceive as real, the fact that anything we think about is dependent from our brain?
Reply to Cidat Trouble is that folk often think along these lines and conclude that no one had have any [s]absolute, objective[/s] understanding of reality. They drop the modifiers.
And its the modifiers that cause the problem.
Do you know what language this post uses? Of course you do, It's English.
Do you know absolutely and objectively what language this post uses? What changed when you added those two words? The post is still in English, and you are certain of that because you understand what is written here. Something extraordinary would have gone wrong if I were to insist that this post is in French.
So a simple solution is to leave out "absolute, objective".
But you seem to want something else, since you ask how to ensure you never rob a bank. The obvious way to do that is by never robbing a bank. Does that help?
For example, does anyone continuously hold a truth for how to speak? Does anyone continuously hold a truth for how they can ensure they never rob a bank? Etc.
It might help if you expand on your idea and contextualize it so we can understand better what you are asking. Who is anyone? Us on the forum, or philosophers?
Reply to Cheshire Many probably have landed at absolute truths, but they probably either cannot communicate them or separate them from non-absolutely-true beliefs.
?Cheshire Many probably have landed at absolute truths, but they probably either cannot communicate them or separate them from non-absolutely-true beliefs.
I would tend to agree. As Banno demonstrated there is nothing preventing us from seeing and uttering true statements. However, as theories get more complex and rely on increasing amounts of evidence the chance of error increases leading to what some call approximations to absolute truth. As a result we can hold truth as tentatively true awaiting either increasing confidence as they pass our tests or their falsification and replacement with better approximations.
Regarding the idea of communication I tend to deviate from the belief their is some perfect way to speak. Even if I did produce the perfectly objective phrasing there is no guarantee it will be understood exactly as I meant it. So, the world is real and we have access to it, but in the process plenty of mistakes will be made and others will be uncovered. It seems like our job is to decide the degree of skepticism this rationally implies. Interesting topic.
Reply to Cidat H. sapiens, like all mammals, are born sufferers. Sooner or later every action produces or reduces suffering. Being is gratuitous; beings are gratuitous; therefore, all suffering is fundamentally gratuitous. And yet: To be grateful or not to be grateful? – that is the moment-to-moment question. And also this: What kind of ancestor are you – one who net produces or reduces foreseeable (therefore, preventable) suffering for generations of descendants?
"Absolute truth"? We're not "absolute" entities, so that qualifier is irrelevant. Does this reflect the Human condition, our ineluctable facticity? Yes, without a doubt.
What is added to necessity by saying it is absolute?
Nothing it's redundant if anything. I think we could switch the two and still convey the same point. Which is basically that the option of denying the truth of the matter is irrational. But, the point of raising it is to highlight that there are in fact reasonable ways to qualify a truth and yet the way it's done seems arbitrary.
Simply put, it appears arguing for the validity of necessity for 15 pages could be hypocritical to dismissing the term "absolute" at a glance.
You might not want to toss the word "hypocritical" around with such abandon.
Noted, it was intended to highlight perspective not establish a state of affairs. I'm not threaten by the term, so I get a little casual with it. Quoting Banno
And most assuredly, they are not the same.
I agree. But, I don't think this means absolute doesn't carry any weight at all. If an absolute truth appeared in conflict with a statement I would automatically defer to the absolute truth. Or is that just restating the meaning of necessary. Not trying to evade the point.
I think it depends on what you mean by "truth". Truth tends to change if the relation between the factors that constitute the truth change.
For example, the truth of not robbing a bank may be valid today. But tomorrow, if you desperately need the money, then tomorrow's truth may override today's. And if the day after tomorrow you find yourself in jail, then that truth may override tomorrow's truth, and so on.
I think something similar applies to our understanding of objective reality.
Absolute incorporates a natural tendency to want to qualify truth, because the lack of a perfect source of knowledge implies things are known to varying levels of certainty in a collective sense.Quoting Banno
?Cheshire How does an absolute truth differ from a plain ordinary truth?
Whatever the most extreme level of certainty would be; denotes absolute certainty or truth. Whether the truth of the matter is critical to support a greater construction of implications determines whether it is necessary. So, unnecessary but equally true.
We usually speak of right or wrong, rathe than true of false, actions.
Correct. But that would be in terms of moral value. Whereas the truth of an action would refer to the action taking place. That's why I said it depends on what @Cidat means by "truth".
Whatever the most extreme level of certainty would be; denotes absolute certainty or truth. Whether the truth of the matter is critical to support a greater construction of implications determines whether it is necessary. So, unnecessary but equally true.
Certainty, or truth? They are not the same. To be absolutely certain is presumably to be without doubt, sure.
How does being absolutely true differ from just being true? Truth admits of degrees?
Certainty, or truth? They are not the same. To be absolutely certain is presumably to be without doubt, sure.
How does being absolutely true differ from just being true? Truth admits of degrees?
Wouldn't an absolute truth be the subject of absolute certainty? One can't be certain of __________. So, the absolute nature extends to the subject. But, rightly means what you say it does.
Quite possibly, "absolute truth" is a "continuously held truth", i.e. a truth that is always held to be a truth.
One can hold something to be true that is not true - that is, one can be wrong.
It's probably better to keep "belief" for things we think are true, and "true" for things that are true whether we believe them or not.
So you are setting "absolute truth" up to mean things that are true at every given time, as opposed to things that are true only at given times, and things that are true by necessity?
So you think something could not be absolutely true and yet unknown to us? We believe every absolute truth?
Last bit first.
We maintain that belief in an absolute truth, should one be discovered, can not be rationally questionable. I believe there are unknown statements that could potentially be absolute truths. I believe there are statements we say we know that fall short of being absolute truths for one reason or another. It's mostly just a metaphysical furniture sale.
How does an absolute truth differ from a plain ordinary truth?
I think an absolute truth is a proposition that is true in all possible circumstances, for all possible observers, in all possible times and locations, really, truly, we really really mean it.
I think an absolute truth is a proposition that is true in all possible circumstances, for all possible observers, in all possible times and locations, really, truly, we really really mean it.
So you are setting "absolute truth" up to mean things that are true at every given time, as opposed to things that are true only at given times, and things that are true by necessity?
Well, when we say "absolute" it presumably means more complete or less conditional.
So, if you were to take a hierarchy of truths that are less and less conditional and more and more complete in ascending order, then the "absolute" truth would be at the top.
But then the title also says "absolute, objective understanding of reality".
It seems a bit of a mystery to be honest. Unless he/she means the truth we perceive or hold after having a certain unspecified quantity of Absolute Vodka .... :smile:
We maintain that belief in an absolute truth, should one be discovered, can not be rationally questionable. I believe there are unknown statements that could potentially be absolute truths. I believe there are statements we say we know that fall short of being absolute truths for one reason or another. It's mostly just a metaphysical furniture sale.
Sounds like an affirmation of faith.
I still don't see a difference between an absolute truth and a plain ordinary truth, except that you don't doubt absolute truths; but thats a curious piece of biography, not a conceptual distinction.
So, if you were to take a hierarchy of truths that are less and less conditional and more and more complete in ascending order, then the "absolute" truth would be at the top.
I can make sense of a hierarchy of believe, or of justification. Not so much a hierarchy of truth. Isn't something either true or false?
Not so much a hierarchy of truth. Isn't something either true or false?
You could think of it this way. There is a truth in the sense of a set of, say, scientific or political facts.
Now the uneducated have some knowledge of that truth, the educated have more, and the highly educated have most of it.
But a small elite group of specialists or experts know all of it. The latter group hold the "absolute" truth.
This can also apply in terms of time and space. If a truth is truth over a larger area of time and space than all others then it would qualify as "absolute" in relation to them because it is less conditional upon time and space than other truths (or than other versions of itself).
I can make sense of a hierarchy of believe, or of justification. Not so much a hierarchy of truth. Isn't something either true or false?
In pre-modern philosophy there was an implicit acceptance of a hierarchy or degrees of reality.
[quote=Internet Encyc. of Philosophy, 17th C theories of substance; https://iep.utm.edu/substanc/#H1]In contrast to contemporary philosophers, most 17th century philosophers held that reality comes in degrees—that some things that exist are more or less real than other things that exist. At least part of what dictates a being’s reality, according to these philosophers, is the extent to which its existence is dependent on other things: the less dependent a thing is on other things for its existence, the more real it is. Given that there are only substances and modes, and that modes depend on substances for their existence, it follows that substances are the most real constituents of reality.[/quote]
I think this is a remnant of the belief in the 'great chain of being'. In that world-view, God or the One is the source or ground of being, the one true reality. It is a 'top-down' cosmology, unlike today's, which is mainly 'bottom-up'. Part of what happens in the transition to modernity is the 'flattening' of this view, which is the loss of the sense of there being anything higher or lower. 'Cosmos is all there is', said Carl Sagan, and the cosmos comprises matter-energy. Within that picture, the only absolutes are physical constraints, like the speed of light, or the second law of thermodynamics.
That looks like degrees of knowledge, not of truth.
But truth depends on our knowledge of it. And the OP title says "understanding of reality." So it seems to imply knowledge or perception. Otherwise, how do we know it is there?
?Cheshire Then I think the same question I put to APo, goes to you"
I can make sense of a hierarchy of believe, or of justification. Not so much a hierarchy of truth. Isn't something either true or false?
— Banno
Well, there lies my issue. You called a truth necessary and claim not to understand a hierarchy of truth. Things are modeled and labeled true or false, so in principle they ought to be considered that way. However, things are nuanced and complicated as well so believing the model is accounting for everything is unreasonable. I would agree the variance might be immaterial, so the model stands. But there is more to things than true or false in practice. My question is whether you are affirming it(the hierarchy) with the term necessary or denying it by dismissing the 'absolute' as a meaningful qualifier.
Should we be advocating a return to levels of reality?
That's why I've always been interested in the reality of intelligible objects - like numbers. They are real, in the sense of being the same for all who think, but are not existent in the same sense as material objects. Hence the battles over Platonic realism in mathematics - the empiricists fight tooth and claw against any such idea of Platonic realism, as it indicates that there is a kind or level of reality different to that of naturalism, namely, that of mathematics. (See this article.)There have been and are still Platonist mathematicians, notably Roger Penrose). But integrating that into an overall worldview is a very difficult task indeed.
but there can't be things we know that are not true.
So at what level on the hierarchy of belief are these things we know? How much justification do we need to reach this state of "knowing", where we are 100% sure that our belief can not be false?
You called a truth necessary and claim not to understand a hierarchy of truth.
You think this implies that a necessary is true in a way somehow different to a contingent truth?
So set out what that difference would be.
Take a look at my About page. I set out there the different uses I make of Truth, Knowledge, belief and Certainty. And that's what needs to be done with the OP - clear up the conceptual stuff therein.
Is the same as "Once we know something, we are 100% sure our belief can not be false" no? That's what I interpreted it as.
You accept a hierarchy of justification. You also propose a state (knowing) where the belief in question cannot be false. So where, on that hierarchy of justification, is that state? How much of what kind of justification do we need to get to that state?
Only because if something we thought we knew turned out to be false, we only thought we knew it.
So given some belief, how can I tell whether or not that belief is knowledge?
It's just weird to me that you define knowledge such that if we know X, then X is definitely true. But then you also say that we can be mistaken about whether or not we know X (it can be the case that we only thought we knew it but in reality we didn't know it). So it seems you just took any doubt and moved it a "step up". Instead of doubting whether or not X is true, now we doubt whether or not "I know X" is true. I don't see the point of that.
I'd rather not detour from the point above for obvious reasons.
But that seems to be the very thing you are claiming.
Things that are necessarily true are not ever not true. Notice that "true" occurs on both sides of the definition? Truth is not being defined here, it is being used.
You might argue for a hierarchy of justifications, from necessarily true down to pretty dubious. But that is a different thing.
Instead of saying knowledge is a belief that cannot be false, just say knowledge is a belief that we have very good reason for believing is not false. Put it on the "justification scale". Because saying that knowledge is a belief that cannot be false doesn't net you any extra certainty when you also admit that you can't tell if a given belief is knowledge or not.
But even if my scheme is whack (since it hasn't been scrutinized very much), you haven't told me what the point is still. Why move doubt "up a level"? What's different between saying that "knowing X means that X must be true, but I can't actually tell when I know X, I just think I know X" and just saying "I can't tell if X is true or not, I just think it's true"
A way to understand the qualification of "necessary" not creating a subcategory of "unnecessary". Or a way that creating the subcategory does not define the creation of a hierarchy of truth. Because, you have claimed there can be no hierarchy. I think you will have to admit there is in fact a hierarchy or necessary carries the same significance as terms you would easily dismiss. Thus winning my genius trophy and solving conclusively all that has or will vex the misadventurers we know as philosophers.
Reply to Cheshire You've lost me. I don't see a hierarchy. Symmetry, maybe...
?p ? ~?~p
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...and derivations thereof.
Are you talking about the justification for assigning necessity or possibility to a proposition? SO your hierarchy has necessary truths at the top, necessary falsehoods at the bottom, and all sorts of contingencies in between?
I don't see what the problem you are trying to solve is.
Are you talking about the justification for assigning necessity or possibility to a proposition? SO your hierarchy has necessary truths at the top, necessary falsehoods at the bottom, and all sorts of contingencies in between?
I don't see what the problem you are trying to solve is.
In my car are a lot of fluids. One of them is necessary for the car to run. I suppose it doesn't mean anyone of them is more or less a fluid. I thought I saw something. Maybe not.
If you had said "knowledge is a belief that is not false" we might have agreement. The difference is that one can believe one knows something, but be mistaken.
If you had said "knowledge is a belief that is not false" we might have agreement. The difference is that one can believe one knows something, but be mistaken.
Yes, and I'm asking what the point of this is. Instead of simply saying "I do not know whether or not X is true/false", you now made it "If I know X that means X is not false, but I do not know whether or not I know X" so in the end, you do not know whether or not X is true/false.
So why define knowledge such that you are not wrong about something that you know, but you can still be wrong about whether or not you know something? It doesn't net you any extra certainty or anything. Just seems weird to me.
Reply to Banno It's one thing for something to be true, but another to know it's true. I can believe I exist, and it may be objectively true, without actually consciously knowing it's true. I define knowledge as conscious mental awareness of truth. Objectively I may experience something, without knowing this experience is actually occurring (according to my definition). Epistemological skeptics believe humans cannot actually know anything, only believe things.
It keeps the definition of knowledge consistent with the JTB model of knowledge. Which is an ideal, like a perfect circle, but useful in teaching and discussing the idea of knowledge.
For example, does anyone continuously hold an absolute truth for how to speak? Does anyone continuously hold an absolute truth for never robbing a bank? Etc.
I believe you are talking about is do people still believe in Immanuel Kant Categorical Imperative or something along those lines.
It is just about a given that the answer is "yes" that many people rely on such thinking, but thinking it such ways is both highly flawed and highly problematic. In a nutshell many of the philosophers and people during the time Kant was alive thought that morality and ethics were not that complicated so they treated it with some like kid gloves when dealing with it. However the issues with ethics/morality ARE NOT simple as Kant and other like him believe them to be and in fact they are what is called a NON-TRIVIAL problem (ie. a problem so complex that is so complex that it might not be able to be solved by humans or possibly not solved at all).
The first philosophy to really grapple the problem with such think (or at least the first one I'm aware of) is Søren Kierkegaard who explained that we have to use "subjective truths" to grapple with our understanding of moral/ethical issues and not reply on what we think are objective truths since there ma not be any objective truths or at least as far that we know of. It is Kierkegaard way of thinking who has guided many of the philosophers who came after him (at least in the subject of moral/ethical issue) and he is considered by some to be the "grandfather" of post-modern philosophy, although such a title many or many not be a good thing.
Reply to khaled Feels like an answer you get in church. At the same time there's enough coherence to maintain it; I guess. Knowledge consists only of things I happen to be correct about. The rest is merely knowledge garnish.
It keeps the definition of knowledge consistent with the JTB model of knowledge.
Indeed it does, but that's not the motive here. Rather its just the observation that saying one knows something that is false is an erroneous use of "know"; that claims such as "I know the word is flat, but it isn't true that the world is flat" are infelicitous.
We talk about stuff we know all the time, but @khaled would have us not do so, replacing knowledge with mere belief. The infelicity remains: "I believe the word is flat, but it isn't true that the world is flat". Knowledge carries more weight than mere belief. The JTB account tries to capture this by adding truth and justification, and although not entirely successful, it does highlight the advantage knowledge has over belief.
There's a reason we have the word "know" and use it sometimes rather than "belief". Mandating that we not do so decreases the power of English.
That's why I've always been interested in the reality of intelligible objects - like numbers.
My theory is that intelligible objects like numbers or like Plato's Ideas are too close to the subject that thinks about them to be perceived as objects.
But if we assume that Plato was committed to a reductivist approach that sought to reduce the number of fundamental principles to the absolute minimum, then he was very close to it. I think it makes sense to say that when consciousness organizes itself in order to generate cognition, it would start with the most basic universals such as number, size, shape, color, distance, etc. which it would use as building blocks of experience.
It's one thing for something to be true, but another to know it's true. I can believe I exist, and it may be objectively true, without actually consciously knowing it's true. I define knowledge as conscious mental awareness of truth. Objectively I may experience something, without knowing this experience is actually occurring (according to my definition). Epistemological skeptics believe humans cannot actually know anything, only believe things.
Good to have you back in the conversation, since it is your OP.
Scepticism has a habit of capturing one's attention. Once one learns to question everything, one can feel that it is impossible to reestablish a firm footing. But there's a funny thing about doubt: one needs a basis in order to start doubting.
My theory is that intelligible objects like numbers or like Plato's Ideas are too close to the subject that thinks about them to be perceived as objects
Yes. I meant that people often conceive of Plato's ideas as some kind of mental "objects" when in fact they are part of the subject. Though not the individual subject but the Cosmic Intellect or "Mind of God".
There's a reason we have the word "know" and use it sometimes rather than "belief". Mandating that we not do so decreases the power of English.
It's surely informative. If I bought a book from you titled knowledge I would anticipate anything I found in it to correspond to the facts, but if you wanted to guarantee it was free from unknown errors; I wouldn't expect to pay extra. Because your definition doesn't account for them to be there, so there removal must be costless.
Reply to dclements The thing about truth is that it doesn't matter who knows it or whether or not it is known "subjectively". Reality even moreso (whether or not a specific aspect of it is subjectively encountered). "Subjectivity" is meant to be kept to oneself ... as its private contents rarely hold up to public examination (e.g. fantasy, faith, idealism, mysticism, woo-of-the-gaps, etc).
I meant that people often conceive of Plato's ideas as some kind of mental "objects" when in fact they are part of the subject.
Ideas transcend the subject-object distinction, in that they’re neither ‘in the word’ nor ‘in the mind’ but are facets of the intelligible nature of reality, structures of thought. Not private or personal thinking but the way the mind operates on a more general, inter-subjective level.
Can science answer many of the questions philosophy asks?
[quote=Peter Hacker;https://dailynous.com/2021/07/16/interview-with-peter-hacker/] No, science cannot answer any philosophical questions. The sciences are (very roughly) intellectual disciplines that pursue the discovery of empirical truths and, where possible, laws of nature in their several domains, and the construction of empirical theories that explain them.
The questions of philosophy are not empirical questions, but conceptual and axiological ones. Scientific truths are to be attained by the employment of our conceptual network, the conceptual scheme articulated in our language (including, of course, the technical language of a given science). But one should not confuse the catch with the net.[/quote]
Through reflection on the nature of knowing - which is the basic task of self-knowledge. That is where philosophy differs profoundly from science. Science always has an object in view, as the above quote says. Philosophy is much nearer to 'now, why do I think that?' It can also be very rigorous, but it's rigorous in a different and even more difficult way than science, because of the intangibility of the subject matter.
Reply to Wayfarer Yes, so I thought, we do not know this is the case. Only that there's a terminal regress to our thinking – a gap which needs to be filled (somehow) by ... :roll:
There's that saying described as 'thinking outside the square'. The idea behind that comes from a puzzle, whereby you need to draw a straight line through a grid of dots without lifting your pencil. It turns out that the only way it can be done is by extending one of the lines beyond the grid of dots - 'outside the square'.
By analogy, this is why we have to be willing to consider metaphysics, which are 'outside the square' of what can be objectively known.
That is in keeping with classical philosophy which always admitted ‘reasonable surmise’ as part of its reckonings. But in much of modern philosophy the naturalist attitude is taken for granted, not seeing how this limits the scope of philosophical conceivability to what is 'inside the square', what can be definitely known by means of sense and science.
Not that thinking ‘outside the square’ is venturing into completely unknown territory, it has been imaginatively mapped and charted by philosophers from many traditions. But I think we have to open to those perspectives to connect the dots, as it were.
One salient fact about your square example is that there is a criteria for success.
It's an analogy. In the analogy, positivism, which you're espousing here, wouldn't allow an extension of the line outside the square, hence success would be impossible.
Ideas transcend the subject-object distinction, in that they’re neither ‘in the word’ nor ‘in the mind’ but are facets of the intelligible nature of reality, structures of thought.
Taking this to be a line outside the box... How might we understand this? Is it supposed to be true? What difference does saying this make to what we ought to do?
Ideas transcend the subject-object distinction, in that they’re neither ‘in the word’ nor ‘in the mind’ but are facets of the intelligible nature of reality, structures of thought.
— Wayfarer
How might we understand this? Is it supposed to be true? What difference does saying this make to what we ought to do?
What is the criteria for success?
I know it is a sweeping statement, but I take it to be important to the study of philosophy.
The appeal to 'objectivity' is characteristic of modern philosophy, within which it provides the criterion of what is measurably so, what which is true independent of opinion. But objectivity has its limits, specifically, it is limited to what is measurable and quantifiable. So that is why it suggests something like 'verificationism', which in turn suggest positivism. How can it not? All I'm doing in saying that, is making explicit an assumption. I'm not accusing anyone of anything. But positivism, in at least a vague sense, is probably the default position for a large number of contributors here. I see it cited, often unknowingly, on a daily basis, in appeals to science in support of some philosophical proposition.
So the first paragraph harks back to 'the forms', which are only known to a rational intelligence, but are not the property of a particular mind. They're not your ideas or mine, but the common property of rational minds in general (for which, see the Wikipedia entry on nous.) As I said in my first post, this is the significance of mathematical platonism. But such ideas are also found in neo-thomism. Of course, that means they will be rejected because of their association with religion, specifically, Catholicism. Outside the square, see? 'The square' being liberal individualism and scientific naturalism.
In any case, appeals to transcendental arguments are not unique to Thomist and religious philosophy, as they're also central to Kant, but I know that introducing Kant to a thread makes for a very complicated argument. Suffice to say, the classical 'appeal to the transcendent' found in all philosophy up until the advent of modernism, provides a sense of a larger criterion for truth than 'objectivity'.
I can make sense of a hierarchy of believe, or of justification. Not so much a hierarchy of truth. Isn't something either true or false?
I think hierarchy of understanding vs truth. Truth is binary and can't be understood, while understanding can be more or less...understood, but isn't true.
The appeal to 'objectivity' is characteristic of modern philosophy...
But you and I know better.
I'll vote for mathematics as a construction rather than Platonism, since I have no clear notion of what a form might be. Cubes and the number three exist in a way not entirely dissimilar to mortgages and property.
By your definition of “is not wrong about” (which is the same as “cannot be wrong about”) no I don’t. It could be the case that the google translate plugin I have had been translating French this whole time without me noticing for example.
I know the thread is in English in the sense that I have very good reason for believing it is.
We talk about stuff we know all the time, but khaled would have us not do so
Well no, I’d change what “know” means instead of proposing that what we know cannot be false by definition. I asked you what the point of that move was countless times now and you haven’t answered. It doesn’t give any extra certainty, it doesn’t even sound better (not to me anyways).
Belief is what matters. I see no point in proposing the existence of knowledge you can’t be wrong about, with the side effect of not being able to confirm when you have it. It grants no new certainty. And your claims about knowledge are still doubtable as ever.
Again, what’s the difference between “If I know X I cannot be wrong about X, but I can’t actually tell whether or not I know X” and “I can’t tell whether or not X is true”. The loop de loop seems pointless.
There's a reason we have the word "know" and use it sometimes rather than "belief".
The reason being that “know” implies more certainty. It’s a quantitative not a qualitative difference. For instance: “England is gonna lose, I just know it”. Obviously the speaker cannot see the future, so they don’t “know” it by your definition. The word is used just to express a higher level of certainty than “I believe England will lose”.
Might leave it at that. It kinda sums up the differences in our opinions neatly. Come back to me when you can see the distinction I've made.
Is an approximation knowledge? If its understood to not quite be true, but informative enough to be useful. Can't call it a belief, because it isn't believed to be the actual if it is a known approximation. Also, can't call it true if it is a known approximation. It is very justified though, considering it's the basis for every load bearing structure built to a code. But, under your definition it isn't "justified" as in the justified to be the truth. Much like the roof over your head, if you didn't know whether or not it would collapse you wouldn't be sitting where you are at the moment. I recommend always looking for cracks in that bit of knowledge.
Ideas transcend the subject-object distinction, in that they’re neither ‘in the word’ nor ‘in the mind’ but are facets of the intelligible nature of reality, structures of thought. Not private or personal thinking but the way the mind operates on a more general, inter-subjective level.
I think one way of looking at it is as a hierarchy of awareness or experience:
1. Consciousness (individual) perceives physical objects in sensory perception.
2. Consciousness (individual) conceives of objects or thoughts mentally.
3. Consciousness (cosmic) is aware of the world as its own emanation.
4. Consciousness (cosmic) is aware of itself.
The Ideas or Forms could exist in a latent state at level (4) after which they are activated in order to emanate the world.
So you can know something, and be wrong? But I thought you can’t know things that are false (from your about page)
Under this system you can know true things and mislabel false things as known. But, nothing mislabeled is known; only incorrectly claimed to be known. The definition is self-consistent it just doesn't really describe the human experience from the perspective of the knower. It's the definition of knowledge from the perspective of God basically. Which is a good bit of irony.
Under this system you can know true things and mislabel false things as known.
So what's so different between this and a system where "knowledge" expresses a high degree of justification?
If what you know is true by definition, but you cannot know whether or not you know something (since you can always just be mislabeling), no extra certainty has been added.
Might as well just say that what you know is NOT true by definition, and that knowledge just means having a high degree of justification.
I'm not disagreeing with Banno I just wanna know why he defines things that way. What benefit does it bring?
I'm not disagreeing with Banno I just wanna know why he defines things that way. What benefit does it bring?
I'd conjecture it's the result of a flawed assumption that foundationalism is a workable model for reality. If knowledge was actually built from the ground up one true premise at a time it might be that way. But, it's not and the definition never changed. He's just repeating the technically "correct" answer for a couple thousand years definition from what I gather. It is arguably what people want when they seek knowledge. It's just not quite what they get.
All I have done is to set out the consequences of answering "no" to that question.
I don't see the consequences as being any different from answering "yes". That's what I keep asking you about. What is the problem with "yes" that makes you say "no"?
Reply to khaled I've answered that, but you don't accept the answer.
Would you agree that there is a distinction to be made between the question "Do you know things that are false?" and "Do you think you know things that are false"?
I would agree that there are things that we think we know, but about which we are mistaken. But it is just poor expression to say you know something that is false.
A very large number of problems have their beginnings in folk failing to differentiate clearly between knowledge, truth and belief.
We can stipulate negative interest rates or announce a jubilee cancellation of all mortgage debt or cancel the validity of a currency at will. But we can't make the sum of a negative and an equal positive number come to anything but zero. There seems to be a tough, brutish, inflexible factishness about arithmetic that is not there in property or money or similar constructions.
Though I suppose we can see what happens if Euclid's 5th postulate is treated as false and then discover a whole new area of maths. But.... Well, I don't know.
Do you know things that are false?
All I have done is to set out the consequences of answering "no" to that question.
Knowledge is the product of humans
All human products are subject to human error
Knowledge is subject to human error
Anything subject to error contains parts that are true and parts that are false.
Similar to mathematics, the system is set up to produce only true answers. But, believing the output is always true or without error wouldn't be reasonable because of the source of the work.
The act or state of knowing doesn't change based on whether what is known corresponds to the facts. The I think I thought I knew is a slight of hand to maintain an idealistic version of knowledge. Which is why you don't always believe people when they claim to know things.
A very large number of problems have their beginnings in folk failing to differentiate clearly between knowledge, truth and belief.
What's an example of a problem that occurs when one defines knowledge as a very high degree of justification? That's what I've been asking from the start!
What's an example of a problem that occurs when one defines knowledge as a very high degree of justification?
Technically, you end up with an infinite regress always trying to justify the thing that justified. While we're at it. Knowledge can exist in a book with the author dead and no one alive even aware of it. So, go ahead and toss out belief too.
Reply to Banno I finally thought of a new way to assail this beast of yours. We each have conflicting theories of knowledge and we each have examples of knowledge that we use as analogs when discussing it. It stands to reason that if one of us has an incorrect theory; then the example we use will not actually be knowledge but instead serve as evidence that merely suits our description.
Which is a better example of knowledge? General relativity or "the fact you are reading this"
Which one implies useful inquiry and what is merely the description of sub-conscious process?
Actual knowledge isn't manifest; rather it is produced through an inquiry and/or observations of trials.
If I went into a job interview and they asked me; What do you have knowledge of? Would I tell them the color of the shirt they are wearing; no it is ad-hoc to the degree of absurd.
Your bedrock position is on the use of the term and your example is not one. The example you provide of undeniable knowledge disproves that JTB naturally constructs knowledge; as we know it. The definition is so restrictive that it limits examples of knowledge to near obvious to plainly obvious things. Knowledge as it's used in common practice is not the set of obvious things. Knowledge is not a goat.
Technically, you end up with an infinite regress always trying to justify the thing that justified.
Seems at most like a problem Banno’s system always shares.
“I know that it’s going to rain tomorrow”
“No you don't, you just think you know it, prove you’re not just mislabeling”
“I know that I know it’s going to rain tomorrow”
“No you don't, you just think you know it, prove you’re not mislabeling”
…..
And you don’t end up with infinite regress if you decided beforehand what constitutes good justification.
And you don’t end up with infinite regress if you decided beforehand what constitutes good justification.
I acknowledge your example is linguistically coherent, but generally we talk about justifying from a deductive point of view. What you are describing is induction and comes along with it's own bag of broken glass. Or if you rather, knowledge of the future isn't really a reasonable example for knowledge in the context of philosophical discussion. You are more than welcome to pursue it if you see otherwise, but it looks like the hard way.
You are correct it is a problem regarding Banno's defense of the JTB framework; in my bold assessment.
While I'm at it; what if all of space was made of tiny circles that expand and contract in the presence of matter causing gravity?
It might turn out that 1+2 does not equal 3? Or that the Bishop does not stay on its original colour? Or even that the earth is not roughly spherical?
Then I don't agree. These are things we know. And I think you misunderstand the perspective I am taking here. Sure, you can make up any definition fo "know" that you like. Quoting Cheshire
The act or state of knowing doesn't change based on whether what is known corresponds to the facts.
So on your version you can know things that are not true. Fine. Time to shake my head and walk away.
But in much of modern philosophy the naturalist attitude is taken for granted, not seeing how this limits the scope of philosophical conceivability to what is 'inside the square', what can be definitely known by means of sense and science.
It's not the scope of conceivability, but the scope of determinate knowability which is limited. You don't want to admit that the scope of determinate knowability is limited to what can be known by means of sense and science (and you left out logic), and that metaphysics is merely an imaginative activity akin to poetry. That metaphysics is an imaginative activity that cannot yield determinate knowledge doesn't devalue it in the slightest in my opinion, just as it doesn't devalue poetry; in fact that is rather what it gives it value.
Though I suppose we can see what happens if Euclid's 5th postulate is treated as false and then discover a whole new area of maths. But.... Well, I don't know.
Was this in reply to my mortgage comment? Curious, isn't it, that maths seems to be both discovered and constructed.
Cubes and the number three exist in a way not entirely dissimilar to mortgages and property.
[quote=Neil Ormerod, The Metaphysical Muddle of Lawrence Krauss; https://www.abc.net.au/religion/the-metaphysical-muddle-of-lawrence-krauss-why-science-cant-get-/10100010]There are a whole range of other realities whose reality we can now affirm: interest rates, mortgages, contracts, vows, national constitutions, penal codes and so on. Where do interest rates "exist"? Not in banks, or financial institutions. Are they real when we cannot touch them or see them? We all spend so much time worrying about them - are we worrying about nothing? In fact, I'm sure we all worry much more about interest rates than about the existence or non-existence of the Higgs boson! Similarly, a contract is not just the piece of paper, but the meaning the paper embodies; likewise a national constitution or a penal code.
Once we break the stranglehold on our thinking by our animal extroversion*, we can affirm the reality of our whole world of human meanings and values, of institutions, nations, finance and law, of human relationships and so on, without the necessity of seeing them as "just" something else lower down the chain of being yet to be determined.[/quote]
* 'Animal extroversion' is an expression associated with Bernard Lonergan, arising from the conviction that the real is 'already out there now', absent any reflection on the nature of knowing. The review that this quote is taken from is germane to the topic.
here are a whole range of other realities whose reality we can now affirm: interest rates, mortgages, contracts, vows, national constitutions, penal codes and so on.
All of which are dependent for their existence on humanity. As to what exists independently of humans. humans and animals share an environment which is not dependent on humans, except insofar as they have changed the environment into the form it currently takes. The environment is not dependent on humans for its sheer existence, though; a fact which is amply demonstrated by the fossil record.
Reply to Banno If you are going to make comments about other people, I think it is a good idea to do so directly to their face, otherwise it is slander. I wont sue this time, but you are on notice. :cool:
I think I made my point in regards to objective reality.
And "objective reality" presupposes ...
[quote=Ibn Sina]Anyone who denies the law of non-contradiction should be beaten and burned until he admits that to be beaten is not the same as not to be beaten, and to be burned is not the same as not to be burned.[/quote]
It might turn out that 1+2 does not equal 3? Or that the Bishop does not stay on its original colour? Or even that the earth is not roughly spherical?
I don't think that's an accurate use of "might"; the number of times those ideas have not been falsified suggest they are unlikely to be an example of error that results from being subject to human error. Quoting Banno
Then I don't agree. These are things we know. And I think you misunderstand the perspective I am taking here. Sure, you can make up any definition for "know" that you like.
I did not sense a consensus building in this regard. I'm very familiar with the perspective and why it's maintained. Well, here we agree. It seems to be the case people have "made up" a definition and failed to improve it.Quoting Banno
So on your version you can know things that are not true. Fine. Time to shake my head and walk away.
Correction, in my version we must know things that are false, because it hinges on the existence of unknown errors. It is je ne sais quoi, "necessary"? I would prefer to sally forth, but as you see fit.
Every measurement that has ever been taken since the beginning of measuring things has inherent error. If we can know things imperfectly, then it follows that part of what is known is false. Then, there is the problem of change. Suppose something is known by the classical definition and then it changes. Does something in the mind make this adjustment to maintain a mystical correspondence? Knowledge is either so limited by it's own definition that we can barely know anything or knowledge is imperfect like everything else humans ever did or will do.
Every measurement that has ever been taken since the beginning of measuring things has inherent error.
it may make better sense to see the process as one of dropping or replacing or reforming whole systems of measurement that were perfectly (absolutely) stable games in their own terms, and with their own margins for error.
it may make better sense to see the process as one of dropping or replacing or reforming whole systems of measurement that were perfectly (absolutely) stable games in their own terms, and with their own margins for error.
Granted, if we were having a discussion on measurement there is a more nuanced position that would be appropriate. I was attempting to demonstrate that even in the case of direct empirical contact we return without perfect data; as to imply that cases that are more inferential certainly carry a higher degree of plausible deviation in correspondence to the facts. If it holds true in the best possible case for the contrary then it is likely true in a typical case. I agree though it is an awkward way of using measurement error and arguably misleading.
Every measurement that has ever been taken since the beginning of measuring things has inherent error. If we can know things imperfectly, then it follows that part of what is known is false. Then, there is the problem of change. Suppose something is known by the classical definition and then it changes. Does something in the mind make this adjustment to maintain a mystical correspondence? Knowledge is either so limited by it's own definition that we can barely know anything or knowledge is imperfect like everything else humans ever did or will do.
There's a compounding of issues in that post that detracts markedly from any benefit that might accrue from writing a reply.
To take the measurement example alone, lesson one in physics is dealing with errors. The bench is 10±0.9m long; the rock has a mass of 0.6±0.1kg, and so on. The error is part of what we know about the bench and the rock.
And that's the point of the approach I would promote: accurate and thoughtful use of language.
To take the measurement example alone, lesson one in physics is dealing with errors. The bench is 10±0.9m long; the rock has a mass of 0.6±0.1kg, and so on. The error is part of what we know about the bench and the rock.
Precisely, the error in this context is a known error. It is like you say incorporated into our knowledge along with the rest of the information. Because we know it, we account for it and avoid mistakes in our knowledge.
What do we do about the unknown errors? They are incorporated in the same fashion, but unaccounted for and yet knowledge is some how maintained as true throughout as if they were known. It doesn't sound reasonable to assume known and unknown errors result in the same quality of knowledge. Nor, is it reasonable to imagine knowledge of this sort is some mislabeled outlier.
Good relativism is also about recognising that the absolutism only holds relative to the game, which can co-exist happily with other games.
Games can merge, of course, and then the relativity becomes complicated and might require loss of absolutism here and there.
Science is all about merging and reconciling and reformulating..
So, you looked over the post and said; you know what would really clear up the confusion here. A rice heap paradox. I maintain the suspension of disbelief that one day a coherent thing will be said about language gaming.
No, over the thread. Just pointing out that absolutism has a non-cosmic variety, from which point of view correctness is absolutely achieved, and your notion of 'inherent error' is unnecessarily cosmic.
Ignore @Banno's dramatics. The problem is only a mundane linguistic one. We say "I know the capital of France is Paris", we also say "I thought I knew what the capital of France was, but I didn't".
Normal uses of the past tense conserve meaning in context. So if 'I know' were to mean something like {I'm 99% confident}, then "I knew" would mean something like {I was 99% confident}. But if you substitute those expressions into the common sentences above, they don't work. We get "I thought I was 99% confident what the capital of France was, but I wasn't". But that's not true. We were 99% confident at the time, we're just not now. So equating 'know' with confidence doesn't match our normal use, in those contexts.
In my opinion, the normal use is best matched by assuming we're referring to a correspondence theory of truth. It's more similar to "I thought I was in love but I wasn't", we're describing our state of mind, only here we're describing the degree to which it matches/matched reality. "I know X" means that the picture I have of X matches the way X really is. So 'I knew' means the picture I had of X matched the way X really was. Substitute those meanings into our tricky sentences and they are safely conserved between tenses.
Of course, whether we're right to have a picture-based correspondence theory of truth is another matter... but it seems to be what we're talking about with the word 'know' in those particular contexts.
'A physicist', said Neils Bohr, 'is just an atom's way of looking at itself'.
Can one atom look at itself, or can only a group of atoms look at themselves?
From one view we are people. From another we are atoms. Is the varying size scale something real that exists independent of perception, or is it a product of different types of perceptions? If the latter, is it perceptions all the way down? If the former, then is there really a fundamental size, like atoms, or does it depend on one's perception?
If there is no fundamental size and fundamental is in the eye of the beholder, then we are just as much people as we are atoms looking at itself.
No, over the thread. Just pointing out that absolutism has a non-cosmic variety, from which point of view correctness is absolutely achieved, and your notion of 'inherent error' is unnecessarily cosmic.
I don't have any reservations about achieving absolutely correct knowledge. The inherent error was more of a red herring; which arguably worked. Yes, we know plenty of things in fullest sense of the term.
I misread a book on cats once in such a way that I thought it said the sounds they make imitate human language. I took it in a specific sense to mean a cat in Italy or a cat in England would meow in such a way that the speech of the owner carried over into a cat accent. I told this with great interest to my former lady who repeated it to her entire family. The laughter that followed is one of my fondest memories. I have known things that were false, what is to make me believe that can no longer be the case?
I can of course answer my question with the likely; I never really knew it, it was an imaginary experience like knowing the contents of a dream. But, this implies there is another special type of knowing where the world some how involves itself in our minds. It's easily demonstrated by observing obvious things that could almost never suffer from interpretation. But, those are never things a person would claim to know outside of an ad-hoc demonstration of knowing things. Actual knowing often suffers imperfect references and conjecture with degrees of approximation that would never suggest the whole of knowledge is true.
Knowledge ought to be true if it's claimed to be known. I can acknowledge that much I guess.
So 'I knew' means the picture I had of X matched the way X really was. Substitute those meanings into our tricky sentences and they are safely conserved between tenses.
No they aren’t? If you’re wrong about something.
So for instance “I know England is gonna win tomorrow”. England loses. Now I say, “I thought I knew England was gonna win tomorrow, but I didn’t”. Now the first sentence is not conserved. The picture I had of the outcome of the match did not match the outcome of the match.
This is why I prefer a degree of confidence model. Since we say things like “England is gonna win tomorrow, I just know it” all the time. And in those instances we use know to express a degree of confidence.
I hadn’t thought of sentences like: “I thought I knew England was gonna win tomorrow, but I didn’t” because I never hear anyone say that. When they want to express the idea that they were wrong they usually just say “I thought England was gonna win, but they didn’t”.
It seems we’re not entirely consistent in our usage. Sometimes we seem to be using a correspondence definition. Sometimes we seem to be using a degree of confidence definition.
Reply to khaled I'm largely in agreement with your criticisms, but the phrase "I just know it" is an idiom. It's nonsensical to take it literally; with the exception of inductive certainty. Like, I know the sun will rise tomorrow because of the arrangement of the solar system and rotation of the planet.
So for instance “I know England is gonna win tomorrow”. England loses. Now I say, “I thought I knew England was gonna win tomorrow, but I didn’t”. Now the first sentence is not conserved.
I meant the the meaning of the word was conserved, not the truth of the entire proposition.
“I know England is gonna win tomorrow” is a claim - that my picture of England winning tomorrow matches the reality of tomorrow.
“I thought I knew England was gonna win tomorrow, but I didn’t” retains the meaning of 'knew' (where by 'meaning' here I just mean to be synonymous). It still means 'my picture of England winning tomorrow matches the reality of tomorrow.' - if I replace it, the sentence retains its meaning.
“I thought my picture of England winning tomorrow matched the reality of tomorrow, but it didn’t”.
It seems we’re not entirely consistent in our usage. Sometimes we seem to be using a correspondence definition. Sometimes we seem to be using a degree of confidence definition.
Yes, I think that's true (by which I mean I'm quite confident - 'True' suffers from the same problem!).
Something exists, is an absolute truth. It's not refutable because the refutation would prove it true.
Alkis PiskasAugust 11, 2021 at 16:49#5786220 likes
Reply to Cidat
Reply to answer of your topic: Does anyone have any absolute, objective understanding of reality?
I can bring up a lot of reasons why and prove that there is no objective or absolute reality or truth. This is a "light" one: If there were a unique and absolute reality (about anything) who would be able to tell?
I write down a number and ask people to tell me what it is. No guessing, no tricks, no cheating; actually knowing. It is impossible for anyone except myself to know, is it? But even if someone knows and says what the number is, it is only myself again that I could tell if he is correct or not, isn't it?
So, only the creator of something knows exactly, absolutely and with certainly what this something is. And if this something is the whole physical universe, this creator would be called, e.g. a "god". But this is a totally different topic ...
Do you know absolutely and objectively what language this post uses
Saying that someone knows something absolutely and/or objectively has no meaning, since if someone knows something he just knows it. Even if he thinks he knows it but in fact he doesn't, i.e. he is mistaken, he is still certain that he knows it.
Do you know what language this post uses? Of course you do, It's English.
The fact that the language used in this post and even the English language itself are not absolute and/or objective things. They don't exist somewhere "out there", outside our minds. There's no sign or indication whatsoever in the universe about the above fact or the language itself. English, like the other about 7,000 languages (as it is believed) that are spoken in the world are created by Man. And if you know and I know that we are communicating in English, it is because we agree that the language we are communicating in is English. But even if English were created by the universe, we, as humans, must first give it a name, "English", then still recognize it as such and also agree that it is that exact language. That would be not much different than a rock that has been created by nature!
Common reality, agreed upon reality is not absolute reality. Even if all the people on Earth agree upon something, that something will be common, agreed upon reality, not an absolute reality.
An absolute reality would be something that exists or occurs "out there", independently of the human perception and knowledge. But then, and this was my point: "Who would be able to tell?"
So, our reality is bound by what we can perceive. (It also contains a lot of other things but this is another topic!)
As in other similar matters too, I find extremely important the Wording. We must be very careful with the right Wording of these questions.
Therefore we must distinguish realities. Are we talking about the absolute universal reality-truth that connects everything so perfectly chaotic? Or are we talking about human reality - truth?
So if we just put the right wording in these matters, answers become really easy sometimes.
If we talk about the first case :No we can't. At least not yet.
If we talk about the second: Yeah of course we can, but STILL not every bit of it. We are still missing parts even from our limited human reality.
Well that's what I think at least.
In your first paragraph and in your conclusion you agree with me that words such as "absolute" and "objective" have little if any place in the discussion. For the remainder of you post you make use of them, supposedly to show that "reality is bound by what we can perceive". That's close, but not quite right. Reality is bound by what we can say.
You bring up just a statment as a "correction", without being able to argue why what I am saying is wrong or what you are saying is correct. Your link doesn't explain what you are stating here, either.
Anyway, even if accept your "dogmatic" statement as such, I can say this: in order that we can speak about something, we must first have perceived it (or known or thought about it). Perception always comes first. Now, if you can't refute this, it means that my statement is correct. And since you like Wittgenstein, "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent". (Figuratively speaking, of course! :smile:)
Comments (161)
And its the modifiers that cause the problem.
Do you know what language this post uses? Of course you do, It's English.
Do you know absolutely and objectively what language this post uses? What changed when you added those two words? The post is still in English, and you are certain of that because you understand what is written here. Something extraordinary would have gone wrong if I were to insist that this post is in French.
So a simple solution is to leave out "absolute, objective".
But you seem to want something else, since you ask how to ensure you never rob a bank. The obvious way to do that is by never robbing a bank. Does that help?
It might help if you expand on your idea and contextualize it so we can understand better what you are asking. Who is anyone? Us on the forum, or philosophers?
:wink:
I would tend to agree. As Banno demonstrated there is nothing preventing us from seeing and uttering true statements. However, as theories get more complex and rely on increasing amounts of evidence the chance of error increases leading to what some call approximations to absolute truth. As a result we can hold truth as tentatively true awaiting either increasing confidence as they pass our tests or their falsification and replacement with better approximations.
Regarding the idea of communication I tend to deviate from the belief their is some perfect way to speak. Even if I did produce the perfectly objective phrasing there is no guarantee it will be understood exactly as I meant it. So, the world is real and we have access to it, but in the process plenty of mistakes will be made and others will be uncovered. It seems like our job is to decide the degree of skepticism this rationally implies. Interesting topic.
Unless you are discussing the LNC. As a necessary truth is certainly absolute and objective; no?
"Absolute truth"? We're not "absolute" entities, so that qualifier is irrelevant. Does this reflect the Human condition, our ineluctable facticity? Yes, without a doubt.
What is added to necessity by saying it is absolute?
What does it mean to say a logical truth is objective?
Quoting Banno
Nothing it's redundant if anything. I think we could switch the two and still convey the same point. Which is basically that the option of denying the truth of the matter is irrational. But, the point of raising it is to highlight that there are in fact reasonable ways to qualify a truth and yet the way it's done seems arbitrary.
Simply put, it appears arguing for the validity of necessity for 15 pages could be hypocritical to dismissing the term "absolute" at a glance.
But necessary has a clear use, and a branch of logic to go with it.
Absolute, at best is a philosophical anachronism.
And most assuredly, they are not the same.
You might not want to toss the word "hypocritical" around with such abandon.
Quoting Banno
I agree. But, I don't think this means absolute doesn't carry any weight at all. If an absolute truth appeared in conflict with a statement I would automatically defer to the absolute truth. Or is that just restating the meaning of necessary. Not trying to evade the point.
Not to be too cute, but if I refute the existence of an absolute, objective reality, does that mean my understanding is absolute and objective?
I think it depends on what you mean by "truth". Truth tends to change if the relation between the factors that constitute the truth change.
For example, the truth of not robbing a bank may be valid today. But tomorrow, if you desperately need the money, then tomorrow's truth may override today's. And if the day after tomorrow you find yourself in jail, then that truth may override tomorrow's truth, and so on.
I think something similar applies to our understanding of objective reality.
Truth usually ranges over proposition. Odd to have it range over actions. We usually speak of right or wrong, rathe than true of false, actions.
Whatever the most extreme level of certainty would be; denotes absolute certainty or truth. Whether the truth of the matter is critical to support a greater construction of implications determines whether it is necessary. So, unnecessary but equally true.
Correct. But that would be in terms of moral value. Whereas the truth of an action would refer to the action taking place. That's why I said it depends on what @Cidat means by "truth".
Quite possibly, "absolute truth" is a "continuously held truth", i.e. a truth that is always held to be a truth.
The question is, how long do we need to hold that truth for it to become "absolute"?
Certainty, or truth? They are not the same. To be absolutely certain is presumably to be without doubt, sure.
How does being absolutely true differ from just being true? Truth admits of degrees?
Wouldn't an absolute truth be the subject of absolute certainty? One can't be certain of __________. So, the absolute nature extends to the subject. But, rightly means what you say it does.
One can hold something to be true that is not true - that is, one can be wrong.
It's probably better to keep "belief" for things we think are true, and "true" for things that are true whether we believe them or not.
So you are setting "absolute truth" up to mean things that are true at every given time, as opposed to things that are true only at given times, and things that are true by necessity?
So you think something could not be absolutely true and yet unknown to us? We believe every absolute truth?
We maintain that belief in an absolute truth, should one be discovered, can not be rationally questionable. I believe there are unknown statements that could potentially be absolute truths. I believe there are statements we say we know that fall short of being absolute truths for one reason or another. It's mostly just a metaphysical furniture sale.
I think an absolute truth is a proposition that is true in all possible circumstances, for all possible observers, in all possible times and locations, really, truly, we really really mean it.
No, absolutely not...objectively speaking...
We can be certain there is no certainty! :lol:
Given everything is relative, and relational, in an ongoing evolutionary process. Even mathematics incurs Gödel's incompleteness.
A necessary truth, then.
Well, when we say "absolute" it presumably means more complete or less conditional.
So, if you were to take a hierarchy of truths that are less and less conditional and more and more complete in ascending order, then the "absolute" truth would be at the top.
But then the title also says "absolute, objective understanding of reality".
It seems a bit of a mystery to be honest. Unless he/she means the truth we perceive or hold after having a certain unspecified quantity of Absolute Vodka .... :smile:
Sounds like an affirmation of faith.
I still don't see a difference between an absolute truth and a plain ordinary truth, except that you don't doubt absolute truths; but thats a curious piece of biography, not a conceptual distinction.
I can make sense of a hierarchy of believe, or of justification. Not so much a hierarchy of truth. Isn't something either true or false?
I qualified certainty to mean a public matter so that;
Quoting Banno
Doesn't reduce my position to a matter of personal tastes. So, if it's going to be dismissed, then it should be for a different reason.
You could think of it this way. There is a truth in the sense of a set of, say, scientific or political facts.
Now the uneducated have some knowledge of that truth, the educated have more, and the highly educated have most of it.
But a small elite group of specialists or experts know all of it. The latter group hold the "absolute" truth.
This can also apply in terms of time and space. If a truth is truth over a larger area of time and space than all others then it would qualify as "absolute" in relation to them because it is less conditional upon time and space than other truths (or than other versions of itself).
In pre-modern philosophy there was an implicit acceptance of a hierarchy or degrees of reality.
[quote=Internet Encyc. of Philosophy, 17th C theories of substance; https://iep.utm.edu/substanc/#H1]In contrast to contemporary philosophers, most 17th century philosophers held that reality comes in degrees—that some things that exist are more or less real than other things that exist. At least part of what dictates a being’s reality, according to these philosophers, is the extent to which its existence is dependent on other things: the less dependent a thing is on other things for its existence, the more real it is. Given that there are only substances and modes, and that modes depend on substances for their existence, it follows that substances are the most real constituents of reality.[/quote]
I think this is a remnant of the belief in the 'great chain of being'. In that world-view, God or the One is the source or ground of being, the one true reality. It is a 'top-down' cosmology, unlike today's, which is mainly 'bottom-up'. Part of what happens in the transition to modernity is the 'flattening' of this view, which is the loss of the sense of there being anything higher or lower. 'Cosmos is all there is', said Carl Sagan, and the cosmos comprises matter-energy. Within that picture, the only absolutes are physical constraints, like the speed of light, or the second law of thermodynamics.
That looks like degrees of knowledge, not of truth.
But truth depends on our knowledge of it. And the OP title says "understanding of reality." So it seems to imply knowledge or perception. Otherwise, how do we know it is there?
Well, there lies my issue. You called a truth necessary and claim not to understand a hierarchy of truth. Things are modeled and labeled true or false, so in principle they ought to be considered that way. However, things are nuanced and complicated as well so believing the model is accounting for everything is unreasonable. I would agree the variance might be immaterial, so the model stands. But there is more to things than true or false in practice. My question is whether you are affirming it(the hierarchy) with the term necessary or denying it by dismissing the 'absolute' as a meaningful qualifier.
That's why I've always been interested in the reality of intelligible objects - like numbers. They are real, in the sense of being the same for all who think, but are not existent in the same sense as material objects. Hence the battles over Platonic realism in mathematics - the empiricists fight tooth and claw against any such idea of Platonic realism, as it indicates that there is a kind or level of reality different to that of naturalism, namely, that of mathematics. (See this article.)There have been and are still Platonist mathematicians, notably Roger Penrose). But integrating that into an overall worldview is a very difficult task indeed.
Oooo I don't think so. Quite the reverse. There can be true things we don't know. but there can't be things we know that are not true.
Quoting Banno
Quoting Banno
So at what level on the hierarchy of belief are these things we know? How much justification do we need to reach this state of "knowing", where we are 100% sure that our belief can not be false?
You think this implies that a necessary is true in a way somehow different to a contingent truth?
So set out what that difference would be.
Take a look at my About page. I set out there the different uses I make of Truth, Knowledge, belief and Certainty. And that's what needs to be done with the OP - clear up the conceptual stuff therein.
Is the same as "Once we know something, we are 100% sure our belief can not be false" no? That's what I interpreted it as.
You accept a hierarchy of justification. You also propose a state (knowing) where the belief in question cannot be false. So where, on that hierarchy of justification, is that state? How much of what kind of justification do we need to get to that state?
Of course not.
Quoting khaled
Only because if something we thought we knew turned out to be false, we only thought we knew it.
Quoting Banno
So given some belief, how can I tell whether or not that belief is knowledge?
It's just weird to me that you define knowledge such that if we know X, then X is definitely true. But then you also say that we can be mistaken about whether or not we know X (it can be the case that we only thought we knew it but in reality we didn't know it). So it seems you just took any doubt and moved it a "step up". Instead of doubting whether or not X is true, now we doubt whether or not "I know X" is true. I don't see the point of that.
I think the two are incompatible. One either calls some truths necessary or denies a hierarchy of truth.
I'm not sure about.
Quoting Banno
I'd rather not detour from the point above for obvious reasons.
How do you know that you know?
SO do you have a different scheme?
But that seems to be the very thing you are claiming.
Things that are necessarily true are not ever not true. Notice that "true" occurs on both sides of the definition? Truth is not being defined here, it is being used.
You might argue for a hierarchy of justifications, from necessarily true down to pretty dubious. But that is a different thing.
Kant did ... ;)
By your definition, I don't. At no point am I certain that my belief cannot be false.
Then again, by your definition, you don't either:
Quoting Banno
So you can be wrong about whether or not you know something. And you haven't given a method for telling the two apart.
Quoting Banno
Instead of saying knowledge is a belief that cannot be false, just say knowledge is a belief that we have very good reason for believing is not false. Put it on the "justification scale". Because saying that knowledge is a belief that cannot be false doesn't net you any extra certainty when you also admit that you can't tell if a given belief is knowledge or not.
But even if my scheme is whack (since it hasn't been scrutinized very much), you haven't told me what the point is still. Why move doubt "up a level"? What's different between saying that "knowing X means that X must be true, but I can't actually tell when I know X, I just think I know X" and just saying "I can't tell if X is true or not, I just think it's true"
I didn't say that. I said Quoting Banno
A way to understand the qualification of "necessary" not creating a subcategory of "unnecessary". Or a way that creating the subcategory does not define the creation of a hierarchy of truth. Because, you have claimed there can be no hierarchy. I think you will have to admit there is in fact a hierarchy or necessary carries the same significance as terms you would easily dismiss. Thus winning my genius trophy and solving conclusively all that has or will vex the misadventurers we know as philosophers.
These are categories of modality, not of truth.
Is this in the only known system of modality that isn't an implicit hierarchy?
?p ? ~?~p
?p ? ~?~p
...and derivations thereof.
Are you talking about the justification for assigning necessity or possibility to a proposition? SO your hierarchy has necessary truths at the top, necessary falsehoods at the bottom, and all sorts of contingencies in between?
I don't see what the problem you are trying to solve is.
That understanding is that reality is the only real thing.
In my car are a lot of fluids. One of them is necessary for the car to run. I suppose it doesn't mean anyone of them is more or less a fluid. I thought I saw something. Maybe not.
What’s the difference between this and:
Quoting khaled
Quoting Banno
Quoting khaled
If you had said "knowledge is a belief that is not false" we might have agreement. The difference is that one can believe one knows something, but be mistaken.
Yes, and I'm asking what the point of this is. Instead of simply saying "I do not know whether or not X is true/false", you now made it "If I know X that means X is not false, but I do not know whether or not I know X" so in the end, you do not know whether or not X is true/false.
So why define knowledge such that you are not wrong about something that you know, but you can still be wrong about whether or not you know something? It doesn't net you any extra certainty or anything. Just seems weird to me.
I'm not wrong about anything I know.
But you can't tell whether you know anything or you just think you know it.
So in the end you still can't tell whether you're right or wrong. So what's the point of the loop de loop?
It keeps the definition of knowledge consistent with the JTB model of knowledge. Which is an ideal, like a perfect circle, but useful in teaching and discussing the idea of knowledge.
How do you know?
I believe you are talking about is do people still believe in Immanuel Kant Categorical Imperative or something along those lines.
https://www.britannica.com/topic/categorical-imperative
It is just about a given that the answer is "yes" that many people rely on such thinking, but thinking it such ways is both highly flawed and highly problematic. In a nutshell many of the philosophers and people during the time Kant was alive thought that morality and ethics were not that complicated so they treated it with some like kid gloves when dealing with it. However the issues with ethics/morality ARE NOT simple as Kant and other like him believe them to be and in fact they are what is called a NON-TRIVIAL problem (ie. a problem so complex that is so complex that it might not be able to be solved by humans or possibly not solved at all).
The first philosophy to really grapple the problem with such think (or at least the first one I'm aware of) is Søren Kierkegaard who explained that we have to use "subjective truths" to grapple with our understanding of moral/ethical issues and not reply on what we think are objective truths since there ma not be any objective truths or at least as far that we know of. It is Kierkegaard way of thinking who has guided many of the philosophers who came after him (at least in the subject of moral/ethical issue) and he is considered by some to be the "grandfather" of post-modern philosophy, although such a title many or many not be a good thing.
[quote="Banno;567809"]because if something we thought we knew turned out to be false, we only thought we knew it.[/quote
And the earth goes around the sun, but one of them wasn't always so obvious.
Quoting Cheshire
Indeed it does, but that's not the motive here. Rather its just the observation that saying one knows something that is false is an erroneous use of "know"; that claims such as "I know the word is flat, but it isn't true that the world is flat" are infelicitous.
We talk about stuff we know all the time, but @khaled would have us not do so, replacing knowledge with mere belief. The infelicity remains: "I believe the word is flat, but it isn't true that the world is flat". Knowledge carries more weight than mere belief. The JTB account tries to capture this by adding truth and justification, and although not entirely successful, it does highlight the advantage knowledge has over belief.
There's a reason we have the word "know" and use it sometimes rather than "belief". Mandating that we not do so decreases the power of English.
My theory is that intelligible objects like numbers or like Plato's Ideas are too close to the subject that thinks about them to be perceived as objects.
But if we assume that Plato was committed to a reductivist approach that sought to reduce the number of fundamental principles to the absolute minimum, then he was very close to it. I think it makes sense to say that when consciousness organizes itself in order to generate cognition, it would start with the most basic universals such as number, size, shape, color, distance, etc. which it would use as building blocks of experience.
Good to have you back in the conversation, since it is your OP.
Scepticism has a habit of capturing one's attention. Once one learns to question everything, one can feel that it is impossible to reestablish a firm footing. But there's a funny thing about doubt: one needs a basis in order to start doubting.
But consider this image:
'Object' is perhaps a metaphorical expression in this context, as in 'object of thought'. Read Augustine on Intelligible Objects.
Yes. I meant that people often conceive of Plato's ideas as some kind of mental "objects" when in fact they are part of the subject. Though not the individual subject but the Cosmic Intellect or "Mind of God".
Ideas transcend the subject-object distinction, in that they’re neither ‘in the word’ nor ‘in the mind’ but are facets of the intelligible nature of reality, structures of thought. Not private or personal thinking but the way the mind operates on a more general, inter-subjective level.
[quote=Peter Hacker;https://dailynous.com/2021/07/16/interview-with-peter-hacker/] No, science cannot answer any philosophical questions. The sciences are (very roughly) intellectual disciplines that pursue the discovery of empirical truths and, where possible, laws of nature in their several domains, and the construction of empirical theories that explain them.
The questions of philosophy are not empirical questions, but conceptual and axiological ones. Scientific truths are to be attained by the employment of our conceptual network, the conceptual scheme articulated in our language (including, of course, the technical language of a given science). But one should not confuse the catch with the net.[/quote]
Quoting 180 Proof
Through reflection on the nature of knowing - which is the basic task of self-knowledge. That is where philosophy differs profoundly from science. Science always has an object in view, as the above quote says. Philosophy is much nearer to 'now, why do I think that?' It can also be very rigorous, but it's rigorous in a different and even more difficult way than science, because of the intangibility of the subject matter.
By analogy, this is why we have to be willing to consider metaphysics, which are 'outside the square' of what can be objectively known.
That is in keeping with classical philosophy which always admitted ‘reasonable surmise’ as part of its reckonings. But in much of modern philosophy the naturalist attitude is taken for granted, not seeing how this limits the scope of philosophical conceivability to what is 'inside the square', what can be definitely known by means of sense and science.
Not that thinking ‘outside the square’ is venturing into completely unknown territory, it has been imaginatively mapped and charted by philosophers from many traditions. But I think we have to open to those perspectives to connect the dots, as it were.
What is woo, anyway? Whence the term? I googled it and got
Or this.
Quoting Wayfarer
Oh, indeed. Apparently Woo is a philosophical street gang from New York.
Not I. Not openly, anyway.
It's an analogy. In the analogy, positivism, which you're espousing here, wouldn't allow an extension of the line outside the square, hence success would be impossible.
How rude.
The point is that not just any line outside the square will do. So which will you choose, and why?
Quoting Wayfarer
Taking this to be a line outside the box... How might we understand this? Is it supposed to be true? What difference does saying this make to what we ought to do?
What is the criteria for success?
I know it is a sweeping statement, but I take it to be important to the study of philosophy.
The appeal to 'objectivity' is characteristic of modern philosophy, within which it provides the criterion of what is measurably so, what which is true independent of opinion. But objectivity has its limits, specifically, it is limited to what is measurable and quantifiable. So that is why it suggests something like 'verificationism', which in turn suggest positivism. How can it not? All I'm doing in saying that, is making explicit an assumption. I'm not accusing anyone of anything. But positivism, in at least a vague sense, is probably the default position for a large number of contributors here. I see it cited, often unknowingly, on a daily basis, in appeals to science in support of some philosophical proposition.
So the first paragraph harks back to 'the forms', which are only known to a rational intelligence, but are not the property of a particular mind. They're not your ideas or mine, but the common property of rational minds in general (for which, see the Wikipedia entry on nous.) As I said in my first post, this is the significance of mathematical platonism. But such ideas are also found in neo-thomism. Of course, that means they will be rejected because of their association with religion, specifically, Catholicism. Outside the square, see? 'The square' being liberal individualism and scientific naturalism.
In any case, appeals to transcendental arguments are not unique to Thomist and religious philosophy, as they're also central to Kant, but I know that introducing Kant to a thread makes for a very complicated argument. Suffice to say, the classical 'appeal to the transcendent' found in all philosophy up until the advent of modernism, provides a sense of a larger criterion for truth than 'objectivity'.
I think hierarchy of understanding vs truth. Truth is binary and can't be understood, while understanding can be more or less...understood, but isn't true.
But you and I know better.
I'll vote for mathematics as a construction rather than Platonism, since I have no clear notion of what a form might be. Cubes and the number three exist in a way not entirely dissimilar to mortgages and property.
But we are wandering.
Quoting Banno
By your definition of “is not wrong about” (which is the same as “cannot be wrong about”) no I don’t. It could be the case that the google translate plugin I have had been translating French this whole time without me noticing for example.
I know the thread is in English in the sense that I have very good reason for believing it is.
Quoting Banno
Well no, I’d change what “know” means instead of proposing that what we know cannot be false by definition. I asked you what the point of that move was countless times now and you haven’t answered. It doesn’t give any extra certainty, it doesn’t even sound better (not to me anyways).
Quoting Banno
Belief is what matters. I see no point in proposing the existence of knowledge you can’t be wrong about, with the side effect of not being able to confirm when you have it. It grants no new certainty. And your claims about knowledge are still doubtable as ever.
Again, what’s the difference between “If I know X I cannot be wrong about X, but I can’t actually tell whether or not I know X” and “I can’t tell whether or not X is true”. The loop de loop seems pointless.
Quoting Banno
The reason being that “know” implies more certainty. It’s a quantitative not a qualitative difference. For instance: “England is gonna lose, I just know it”. Obviously the speaker cannot see the future, so they don’t “know” it by your definition. The word is used just to express a higher level of certainty than “I believe England will lose”.
Quoting Banno
When did anyone say that?
Quoting khaled
No, it isn't. It might be wrong, but as things stand it isn't. So it doesn't follow that it cannot be wrong.
Might leave it at that. It kinda sums up the differences in our opinions neatly. Come back to me when you can see the distinction I've made.
Is an approximation knowledge? If its understood to not quite be true, but informative enough to be useful. Can't call it a belief, because it isn't believed to be the actual if it is a known approximation. Also, can't call it true if it is a known approximation. It is very justified though, considering it's the basis for every load bearing structure built to a code. But, under your definition it isn't "justified" as in the justified to be the truth. Much like the roof over your head, if you didn't know whether or not it would collapse you wouldn't be sitting where you are at the moment. I recommend always looking for cracks in that bit of knowledge.
I think one way of looking at it is as a hierarchy of awareness or experience:
1. Consciousness (individual) perceives physical objects in sensory perception.
2. Consciousness (individual) conceives of objects or thoughts mentally.
3. Consciousness (cosmic) is aware of the world as its own emanation.
4. Consciousness (cosmic) is aware of itself.
The Ideas or Forms could exist in a latent state at level (4) after which they are activated in order to emanate the world.
So you can know something, and be wrong? But I thought you can’t know things that are false (from your about page)
I don’t get what you’re saying. Just seems self contradictory.
Under this system you can know true things and mislabel false things as known. But, nothing mislabeled is known; only incorrectly claimed to be known. The definition is self-consistent it just doesn't really describe the human experience from the perspective of the knower. It's the definition of knowledge from the perspective of God basically. Which is a good bit of irony.
So what's so different between this and a system where "knowledge" expresses a high degree of justification?
If what you know is true by definition, but you cannot know whether or not you know something (since you can always just be mislabeling), no extra certainty has been added.
Might as well just say that what you know is NOT true by definition, and that knowledge just means having a high degree of justification.
I'm not disagreeing with Banno I just wanna know why he defines things that way. What benefit does it bring?
I'd conjecture it's the result of a flawed assumption that foundationalism is a workable model for reality. If knowledge was actually built from the ground up one true premise at a time it might be that way. But, it's not and the definition never changed. He's just repeating the technically "correct" answer for a couple thousand years definition from what I gather. It is arguably what people want when they seek knowledge. It's just not quite what they get.
Do you know things that are false?
All I have done is to set out the consequences of answering "no" to that question.
Probably.
Quoting Banno
I don't see the consequences as being any different from answering "yes". That's what I keep asking you about. What is the problem with "yes" that makes you say "no"?
Would you agree that there is a distinction to be made between the question "Do you know things that are false?" and "Do you think you know things that are false"?
I would agree that there are things that we think we know, but about which we are mistaken. But it is just poor expression to say you know something that is false.
A very large number of problems have their beginnings in folk failing to differentiate clearly between knowledge, truth and belief.
Knowledge is the product of humans
All human products are subject to human error
Knowledge is subject to human error
Anything subject to error contains parts that are true and parts that are false.
Similar to mathematics, the system is set up to produce only true answers. But, believing the output is always true or without error wouldn't be reasonable because of the source of the work.
The act or state of knowing doesn't change based on whether what is known corresponds to the facts. The I think I thought I knew is a slight of hand to maintain an idealistic version of knowledge. Which is why you don't always believe people when they claim to know things.
That's where I disagree.
It seems poor expression to me to say that one doesn't know things that are false by definition.
Quoting Banno
What's an example of a problem that occurs when one defines knowledge as a very high degree of justification? That's what I've been asking from the start!
Technically, you end up with an infinite regress always trying to justify the thing that justified. While we're at it. Knowledge can exist in a book with the author dead and no one alive even aware of it. So, go ahead and toss out belief too.
I finally thought of a new way to assail this beast of yours. We each have conflicting theories of knowledge and we each have examples of knowledge that we use as analogs when discussing it. It stands to reason that if one of us has an incorrect theory; then the example we use will not actually be knowledge but instead serve as evidence that merely suits our description.
Which is a better example of knowledge? General relativity or "the fact you are reading this"
Which one implies useful inquiry and what is merely the description of sub-conscious process?
Actual knowledge isn't manifest; rather it is produced through an inquiry and/or observations of trials.
If I went into a job interview and they asked me; What do you have knowledge of? Would I tell them the color of the shirt they are wearing; no it is ad-hoc to the degree of absurd.
Your bedrock position is on the use of the term and your example is not one. The example you provide of undeniable knowledge disproves that JTB naturally constructs knowledge; as we know it. The definition is so restrictive that it limits examples of knowledge to near obvious to plainly obvious things. Knowledge as it's used in common practice is not the set of obvious things. Knowledge is not a goat.
Seems at most like a problem Banno’s system always shares.
“I know that it’s going to rain tomorrow”
“No you don't, you just think you know it, prove you’re not just mislabeling”
“I know that I know it’s going to rain tomorrow”
“No you don't, you just think you know it, prove you’re not mislabeling”
…..
And you don’t end up with infinite regress if you decided beforehand what constitutes good justification.
I acknowledge your example is linguistically coherent, but generally we talk about justifying from a deductive point of view. What you are describing is induction and comes along with it's own bag of broken glass. Or if you rather, knowledge of the future isn't really a reasonable example for knowledge in the context of philosophical discussion. You are more than welcome to pursue it if you see otherwise, but it looks like the hard way.
You are correct it is a problem regarding Banno's defense of the JTB framework; in my bold assessment.
While I'm at it; what if all of space was made of tiny circles that expand and contract in the presence of matter causing gravity?
It might turn out that 1+2 does not equal 3? Or that the Bishop does not stay on its original colour? Or even that the earth is not roughly spherical?
Then I don't agree. These are things we know. And I think you misunderstand the perspective I am taking here. Sure, you can make up any definition fo "know" that you like. Quoting Cheshire
So on your version you can know things that are not true. Fine. Time to shake my head and walk away.
...talking about poor expression.
It's not the scope of conceivability, but the scope of determinate knowability which is limited. You don't want to admit that the scope of determinate knowability is limited to what can be known by means of sense and science (and you left out logic), and that metaphysics is merely an imaginative activity akin to poetry. That metaphysics is an imaginative activity that cannot yield determinate knowledge doesn't devalue it in the slightest in my opinion, just as it doesn't devalue poetry; in fact that is rather what it gives it value.
Was this in reply to my mortgage comment? Curious, isn't it, that maths seems to be both discovered and constructed.
An example?
That's just page one.
[quote=Neil Ormerod, The Metaphysical Muddle of Lawrence Krauss; https://www.abc.net.au/religion/the-metaphysical-muddle-of-lawrence-krauss-why-science-cant-get-/10100010]There are a whole range of other realities whose reality we can now affirm: interest rates, mortgages, contracts, vows, national constitutions, penal codes and so on. Where do interest rates "exist"? Not in banks, or financial institutions. Are they real when we cannot touch them or see them? We all spend so much time worrying about them - are we worrying about nothing? In fact, I'm sure we all worry much more about interest rates than about the existence or non-existence of the Higgs boson! Similarly, a contract is not just the piece of paper, but the meaning the paper embodies; likewise a national constitution or a penal code.
Once we break the stranglehold on our thinking by our animal extroversion*, we can affirm the reality of our whole world of human meanings and values, of institutions, nations, finance and law, of human relationships and so on, without the necessity of seeing them as "just" something else lower down the chain of being yet to be determined.[/quote]
* 'Animal extroversion' is an expression associated with Bernard Lonergan, arising from the conviction that the real is 'already out there now', absent any reflection on the nature of knowing. The review that this quote is taken from is germane to the topic.
All of which are dependent for their existence on humanity. As to what exists independently of humans. humans and animals share an environment which is not dependent on humans, except insofar as they have changed the environment into the form it currently takes. The environment is not dependent on humans for its sheer existence, though; a fact which is amply demonstrated by the fossil record.
'A physicist', said Neils Bohr, 'is just an atom's way of looking at itself'.
The relevance escapes me.
Quoting Pop
Even you don't take your view seriously:
Quoting Pop
And "objective reality" presupposes ...
[quote=Ibn Sina]Anyone who denies the law of non-contradiction should be beaten and burned until he admits that to be beaten is not the same as not to be beaten, and to be burned is not the same as not to be burned.[/quote]
Making a threat of that sort was once an automatic ban.
You are on notice.
I don't think that's an accurate use of "might"; the number of times those ideas have not been falsified suggest they are unlikely to be an example of error that results from being subject to human error.
Quoting Banno
I did not sense a consensus building in this regard. I'm very familiar with the perspective and why it's maintained. Well, here we agree. It seems to be the case people have "made up" a definition and failed to improve it.Quoting BannoCorrection, in my version we must know things that are false, because it hinges on the existence of unknown errors. It is je ne sais quoi, "necessary"? I would prefer to sally forth, but as you see fit.
(...shakes head and walks away)
Every measurement that has ever been taken since the beginning of measuring things has inherent error. If we can know things imperfectly, then it follows that part of what is known is false. Then, there is the problem of change. Suppose something is known by the classical definition and then it changes. Does something in the mind make this adjustment to maintain a mystical correspondence? Knowledge is either so limited by it's own definition that we can barely know anything or knowledge is imperfect like everything else humans ever did or will do.
Quoting bongo fury
requires a benignly absolutist grasp that answering in the affirmative isn't playing the game of English usage of 'heap'.
The good absolutist (and you would think, any competent speaker) will say,
Quoting bongo fury
Likewise with,
or
... although these don't naturally or easily create sorites sequences.
Good relativism is recognising that within a language game there is often a choice between this and not-this. For example,
Quoting bongo fury
deserves something like
Good relativism is also about recognising that the absolutism only holds relative to the game, which can co-exist happily with other games.
Games can merge, of course, and then the relativity becomes complicated and might require loss of absolutism here and there.
Science is all about merging, and reconciling and reformulating, so while it's natural to think that
Quoting Cheshire
it may make better sense to see the process as one of dropping or replacing or reforming whole systems of measurement that were perfectly (absolutely) stable games in their own terms, and with their own margins for error.
Granted, if we were having a discussion on measurement there is a more nuanced position that would be appropriate. I was attempting to demonstrate that even in the case of direct empirical contact we return without perfect data; as to imply that cases that are more inferential certainly carry a higher degree of plausible deviation in correspondence to the facts. If it holds true in the best possible case for the contrary then it is likely true in a typical case. I agree though it is an awkward way of using measurement error and arguably misleading.
There's a compounding of issues in that post that detracts markedly from any benefit that might accrue from writing a reply.
To take the measurement example alone, lesson one in physics is dealing with errors. The bench is 10±0.9m long; the rock has a mass of 0.6±0.1kg, and so on. The error is part of what we know about the bench and the rock.
And that's the point of the approach I would promote: accurate and thoughtful use of language.
The quote or the relevance...? :wink:
Everything as it should be, then.
Precisely, the error in this context is a known error. It is like you say incorporated into our knowledge along with the rest of the information. Because we know it, we account for it and avoid mistakes in our knowledge.
What do we do about the unknown errors? They are incorporated in the same fashion, but unaccounted for and yet knowledge is some how maintained as true throughout as if they were known. It doesn't sound reasonable to assume known and unknown errors result in the same quality of knowledge. Nor, is it reasonable to imagine knowledge of this sort is some mislabeled outlier.
Quoting Banno
I would call it an improvement. Generally, the matter has been tossed out based on having been wrongly concluded.
Quoting Banno
I'll reserve thoughtful for sentimental topics; accurate to the human experience or the preferred definition?
Quoting bongo fury
Quoting bongo fury
So, you looked over the post and said; you know what would really clear up the confusion here. A rice heap paradox. I maintain the suspension of disbelief that one day a coherent thing will be said about language gaming.
No, over the thread. Just pointing out that absolutism has a non-cosmic variety, from which point of view correctness is absolutely achieved, and your notion of 'inherent error' is unnecessarily cosmic.
Ignore @Banno's dramatics. The problem is only a mundane linguistic one. We say "I know the capital of France is Paris", we also say "I thought I knew what the capital of France was, but I didn't".
Normal uses of the past tense conserve meaning in context. So if 'I know' were to mean something like {I'm 99% confident}, then "I knew" would mean something like {I was 99% confident}. But if you substitute those expressions into the common sentences above, they don't work. We get "I thought I was 99% confident what the capital of France was, but I wasn't". But that's not true. We were 99% confident at the time, we're just not now. So equating 'know' with confidence doesn't match our normal use, in those contexts.
In my opinion, the normal use is best matched by assuming we're referring to a correspondence theory of truth. It's more similar to "I thought I was in love but I wasn't", we're describing our state of mind, only here we're describing the degree to which it matches/matched reality. "I know X" means that the picture I have of X matches the way X really is. So 'I knew' means the picture I had of X matched the way X really was. Substitute those meanings into our tricky sentences and they are safely conserved between tenses.
Of course, whether we're right to have a picture-based correspondence theory of truth is another matter... but it seems to be what we're talking about with the word 'know' in those particular contexts.
Can one atom look at itself, or can only a group of atoms look at themselves?
From one view we are people. From another we are atoms. Is the varying size scale something real that exists independent of perception, or is it a product of different types of perceptions? If the latter, is it perceptions all the way down? If the former, then is there really a fundamental size, like atoms, or does it depend on one's perception?
If there is no fundamental size and fundamental is in the eye of the beholder, then we are just as much people as we are atoms looking at itself.
I misread a book on cats once in such a way that I thought it said the sounds they make imitate human language. I took it in a specific sense to mean a cat in Italy or a cat in England would meow in such a way that the speech of the owner carried over into a cat accent. I told this with great interest to my former lady who repeated it to her entire family. The laughter that followed is one of my fondest memories. I have known things that were false, what is to make me believe that can no longer be the case?
I can of course answer my question with the likely; I never really knew it, it was an imaginary experience like knowing the contents of a dream. But, this implies there is another special type of knowing where the world some how involves itself in our minds. It's easily demonstrated by observing obvious things that could almost never suffer from interpretation. But, those are never things a person would claim to know outside of an ad-hoc demonstration of knowing things. Actual knowing often suffers imperfect references and conjecture with degrees of approximation that would never suggest the whole of knowledge is true.
Knowledge ought to be true if it's claimed to be known. I can acknowledge that much I guess.
No they aren’t? If you’re wrong about something.
So for instance “I know England is gonna win tomorrow”. England loses. Now I say, “I thought I knew England was gonna win tomorrow, but I didn’t”. Now the first sentence is not conserved. The picture I had of the outcome of the match did not match the outcome of the match.
This is why I prefer a degree of confidence model. Since we say things like “England is gonna win tomorrow, I just know it” all the time. And in those instances we use know to express a degree of confidence.
I hadn’t thought of sentences like: “I thought I knew England was gonna win tomorrow, but I didn’t” because I never hear anyone say that. When they want to express the idea that they were wrong they usually just say “I thought England was gonna win, but they didn’t”.
It seems we’re not entirely consistent in our usage. Sometimes we seem to be using a correspondence definition. Sometimes we seem to be using a degree of confidence definition.
I meant the the meaning of the word was conserved, not the truth of the entire proposition.
“I know England is gonna win tomorrow” is a claim - that my picture of England winning tomorrow matches the reality of tomorrow.
“I thought I knew England was gonna win tomorrow, but I didn’t” retains the meaning of 'knew' (where by 'meaning' here I just mean to be synonymous). It still means 'my picture of England winning tomorrow matches the reality of tomorrow.' - if I replace it, the sentence retains its meaning.
“I thought my picture of England winning tomorrow matched the reality of tomorrow, but it didn’t”.
Quoting khaled
Yes, I think that's true (by which I mean I'm quite confident - 'True' suffers from the same problem!).
Something exists, is an absolute truth. It's not refutable because the refutation would prove it true.
Reply to answer of your topic: Does anyone have any absolute, objective understanding of reality?
I can bring up a lot of reasons why and prove that there is no objective or absolute reality or truth. This is a "light" one:
If there were a unique and absolute reality (about anything) who would be able to tell?
I write down a number and ask people to tell me what it is. No guessing, no tricks, no cheating; actually knowing. It is impossible for anyone except myself to know, is it? But even if someone knows and says what the number is, it is only myself again that I could tell if he is correct or not, isn't it?
So, only the creator of something knows exactly, absolutely and with certainly what this something is. And if this something is the whole physical universe, this creator would be called, e.g. a "god". But this is a totally different topic ...
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/567097
Saying that someone knows something absolutely and/or objectively has no meaning, since if someone knows something he just knows it. Even if he thinks he knows it but in fact he doesn't, i.e. he is mistaken, he is still certain that he knows it.
Quoting Banno
The fact that the language used in this post and even the English language itself are not absolute and/or objective things. They don't exist somewhere "out there", outside our minds. There's no sign or indication whatsoever in the universe about the above fact or the language itself. English, like the other about 7,000 languages (as it is believed) that are spoken in the world are created by Man. And if you know and I know that we are communicating in English, it is because we agree that the language we are communicating in is English. But even if English were created by the universe, we, as humans, must first give it a name, "English", then still recognize it as such and also agree that it is that exact language. That would be not much different than a rock that has been created by nature!
Common reality, agreed upon reality is not absolute reality. Even if all the people on Earth agree upon something, that something will be common, agreed upon reality, not an absolute reality.
An absolute reality would be something that exists or occurs "out there", independently of the human perception and knowledge. But then, and this was my point: "Who would be able to tell?"
So, our reality is bound by what we can perceive. (It also contains a lot of other things but this is another topic!)
Quoting Banno
I agree! :smile:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/578896
As in other similar matters too, I find extremely important the Wording. We must be very careful with the right Wording of these questions.
Therefore we must distinguish realities. Are we talking about the absolute universal reality-truth that connects everything so perfectly chaotic? Or are we talking about human reality - truth?
So if we just put the right wording in these matters, answers become really easy sometimes.
If we talk about the first case :No we can't. At least not yet.
If we talk about the second: Yeah of course we can, but STILL not every bit of it. We are still missing parts even from our limited human reality.
Well that's what I think at least.
In your first paragraph and in your conclusion you agree with me that words such as "absolute" and "objective" have little if any place in the discussion. For the remainder of you post you make use of them, supposedly to show that "reality is bound by what we can perceive". That's close, but not quite right. Reality is bound by what we can say.
See Examining Wittgenstein's statement,
You bring up just a statment as a "correction", without being able to argue why what I am saying is wrong or what you are saying is correct. Your link doesn't explain what you are stating here, either.
Anyway, even if accept your "dogmatic" statement as such, I can say this: in order that we can speak about something, we must first have perceived it (or known or thought about it). Perception always comes first. Now, if you can't refute this, it means that my statement is correct. And since you like Wittgenstein, "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent". (Figuratively speaking, of course! :smile:)