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Ontological Commitment

Shawn July 11, 2021 at 18:39 1950 views 8 comments
What is the difference between the ontological commitment that language enables by stipulating certain beings like Pegasus or nouns like Alaska?

How is this separate from epistemology when talking about Pegasus as a literary figure or Alaska as a region described by a map?

What are your ideas about the difference between stating factually that an entity exist through observation of empirical observations in nature rather than a stipulated literary fact about its existence, such as Pegasus and Alaska?

Comments (8)

Shawn July 11, 2021 at 18:56 #565073
And additionally, does the difference between the ontological commitment we make for Alaska or Pegasus only boil down to senses?

How is that true?
MikeListeral July 11, 2021 at 19:42 #565103
the human mind is so small that is forced to reduce reality down to abstract models, stories, maps, logics, etc....

the mind takes only the data that is required for our use and excludes the rest

this is what maps and stores and math etc... is. its an abstract reduction that is useable

words can point do actual sense data or to abstract mental things. as we communicate with other similar beings (humans) who share the same sense datas and or abstractions.

sense objects vs mental objects within total conscious reality




Shawn July 12, 2021 at 01:51 #565388
What do you think, @Banno?
Banno July 12, 2021 at 01:56 #565391
What more does “Pegasus exists” or “Alaska exists” mean than “This has a place in what I have to say”?


Shawn July 12, 2021 at 02:00 #565395
Reply to Banno

What do you mean by that?
180 Proof July 12, 2021 at 04:39 #565491
Quoting Shawn
What are your ideas about the difference between stating factually that an entity exist through observation of empirical observations in nature rather than a stipulated literary fact about its existence, such as Pegasus and Alaska?

Meinong's Jungle – subsistent objects and existent objects, respectively.
Shawn July 12, 2021 at 18:52 #565791
Reply to Banno

Sorry, but I'm still confused about what you mean by "this has a place".
Shawn July 12, 2021 at 19:01 #565796
I'd like to postulate that it seems to be true that when it comes down to ontological ascriptions in formal languages, with a 1 to 1 relation, then isn't it necessarily true that this is a correspondence theory of truth?

Whereas in natural languages, it seems that coherentism is more apt to assume as true?