[quote=SEP entry on Substance (Philosophy); https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/]The philosophical term ‘substance’ corresponds to the Greek ousia, which means ‘being’, transmitted via the Latin substantia, which means ‘something that stands under or grounds things’.
According to the generic sense, therefore, the substances in a given philosophical system are those things that, according to the system, are the foundational or fundamental entities of reality. Thus, for an atomist, atoms are the substances, for they are the basic things from which everything is constructed.
In David Hume’s system, impressions and ideas are the substances, for the same reason. In a slightly different way, Forms are Plato’s substances, for everything derives its existence from Forms. In this sense of ‘substance’ any realist philosophical system acknowledges the existence of substances. [/quote]
Note the original link between substance (philosophy) and being; suggests a notion of 'subject', rather than 'stuff', and is not to be conflated with
Substance (noun) 'a particular kind of matter with uniform properties'.
Following up on @Wayfarer in trying to set the meanings of some of the terms in the debate, these come from Wikipedia:
Substance dualism, or Cartesian dualism, most famously defended by René Descartes, argues that there are two kinds of foundation: mental and physical.[8] This philosophy states that the mental can exist outside of the body, and the body cannot think. Substance dualism is important historically for having given rise to much thought regarding the famous mind–body problem.
Property dualism asserts that an ontological distinction lies in the differences between properties of mind and matter, and that consciousness is ontologically irreducible to neurobiology and physics. It asserts that when matter is organized in the appropriate way (i.e., in the way that living human bodies are organized), mental properties emerge. Hence, it is a sub-branch of emergent materialism. What views properly fall under the property dualism rubric is itself a matter of dispute. There are different versions of property dualism, some of which claim independent categorisation.
Here is Hanover's explanation of property dualism::
there being a single thing and it will be called “matter” I presume, but whatever it might be called does not matter. It is a monistic goo that offers the underlying substance of everything, much like that flat white paint you buy that is then taken to the counter after hours of bickering to have just the right color mixed in. The property dualist explains there are two main colors in the world, not surprisingly called (1) minds and (2) bodies. So you see what has happened is that the substance dualist claims to have two different buckets of goo, yet the property dualist claims to have two different buckets of the same goo, just with different coloring in each.
Hanover hasn't defined substance dualism yet. He doesn't speak of it highly, given that it's his job to defend it. He says it "succeeds where property dualism fails to account for the conceptual coincidence, or interaction, of ideality (mind) and reality (body)." but he also says it's "anachronistic."
As an enlightened follower of Lao Tzu, I am clearly a monist, which isn't on the table, so I don't have a goat in this race. I will say, just because I always say it, both substance dualism and property dualism, and monism for that matter, are metaphysical concepts. As such, they are neither right nor wrong, only more or less useful in a specific situation.
Just as well, because goats are notoriously bad at racing.
This is a misconception. A goat, Zev, won the Kentucky Derby in 1923, admittedly in the slowest time ever of 4 minutes and 7 seconds. Before the 1924 derby, Churchill Downs changed the rules so that only horses could run.
I'd like to see @180 Proof use his former copy writer skills and make a philosophical argument without the use of text formatting, unnecessary ellipses, and emojis. Somehow I get the sense the magic would be lost.
[quote=180Proof]The vastly greater part of (physical) substance "cannot be sensed by our five sense" and yet is not "non-physical" (e.g. dark matter, planck scale events, brains insensible to themselves, etc) [/quote]
The first two of which are plainly scientific concepts, the second arguably meaningless - and yet he then goes on to say:
I'm doing philosophy, not science.
Contradiction? Or not?
And, as for appeals to Wittgenstein, what to make of the seeming 'appeal to the transcendent' at TLP 6.41?
6.41 The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world
everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no
value exists--and if it did exist, it would have no value. If there is any
value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what
happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is
accidental. What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since
if it did it would itself be accidental. It must lie outside the world.
6.42 So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics.
Propositions can express nothing that is higher.
6.421 It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is
transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)
So does that mean there is 'nothing higher', or that there is 'something higher', but that it can't be expressed by propositions? I feel the 'something higher' seems rather dualistic in spirit!
Reply to Wayfarer I suppose that may also be the conclusion Wittgenstein arrives at. But note the similarity with Plato's idea that the Good transcends even the gods.
Reply to Wayfarer I'll read this, thanks. My original take on him was a bit contemptuous maybe. I came to the conclusion that, flawed and piecemeal as his thinking was, he was one of the very few in that analytic clique who understood that to try and break down philosophy into computable pieces (what I call "philosophy for computers" aka analytic philosophy) was an operation that, if successful, would kill the subject.
His TLP was the main reason for my contempt; I actually read it when in my 20's and found it ridiculous. But what I see now is that he too ultimately realized that the TLP was ridiculous. And from that realization onward, he tried to do better than philosophy for computers; i.e. to provoke some actual human thinking among his analytic peers in Oxford and Cambridge and stuff.
So in this little analytic world, he was the only sane one. No wonder they all quote him like the messiah.
There's space and the things in it or things and the space in between; is that 1 or 2?
Yeah, there's spacetime and stuff in it. And there's massive and massless stuff. And electrically charged and not electrically charged stuff. There's vector stuff and scalar stuff. So much stuffs. Why instead we differentiate between stuff and what stuff does is beyond me. I know you can lick the orange, but can you taste its gravity?!? Your move, atheists!
Hanover gives me the impression he doesn't really believe what he's saying but I don't really know him or his opinions well.
Substance dualism succeeds where property dualism fails to account for the conceptual coincidence, or interaction, of ideality (mind) and reality (body).
(Note present tense.)
I contend that substance dualism will (1) offer a better explanation for how our thoughts are composed (as I've already discussed), (2) will offer a better explanation for questions related to free will, (3) will offer a better explanation for how we experience the world (providing an anchor for the infinite regress homunculus problem), (4) will offer a better explanation for our ultimate origins, and (5) will offer a better explanation for our purpose and meaning.
(Note future tense.)
I'm not sure how property dualism has been shown to fail (which ought to be the first argument), but the assertion that substance dualism _will_ (one day, I guess) succeed where property dualism fails seems rather an implicit admission that, as yet, it also has no success.
I'm not sure how property dualism has been shown to fail
Neither property nor substance has succeeded in the sense of putting the question to rest for philosophers or scientists.
I think Hanover is saying that property tends to get overwrought pretty quickly in efforts to force it to make sense.
Substance has the advantage in the sense department in that it's not really trying to Explain Consciousness. It's just summing up the way we normally think about the issue. It reflects without trying to prove anything.
That works, actually. 180 needs to say [I]yea but[/I], not [I]you didn't prove anything [/I].
Hanovers approach doesn't require any exposition beyond pointing to what we all know.
Boy, I'm pretty disappointed with the debate so far. No one has just sat down and stated what their position is and why they think it is a good way of looking at things. Absent that, all their comments just feel like ideas floating in space like grapes in a Jello salad.
So does that mean there is 'nothing higher', or that there is 'something higher', but that it can't be expressed by propositions? I feel the 'something higher' seems rather dualistic in spirit!
In terms of the present discussion, neither form of dualism is about what is higher. Both have something to do with the facts of the world and the representation of facts in language.
Why instead we differentiate between stuff and what stuff does is beyond me.
Is this really an accurate generalization? I've read some of the material provided but this makes some sense. So, the argument is whether the "what stuff does" has a separate existence from stuff itself and not just a function of the arrangement of stuff?
Hanovers approach doesn't require any exposition beyond pointing to what we all know.
Well Hanover's exposition seems largely to be pointing out things we don't know.
It is undisputed that there are (1) minds and (2) bodies. I count two things, which means it is undisputed that dualism is the case.
For instance, it isn't remotely obvious that this is good counting, nor that arbitrarily categorising things is a good basis for metaphysics (although that does seem to sum it up). I suspect what you think of as "what we all know" is probably what others might call "bunkum".
Neither property nor substance has succeeded in the sense of putting the question to rest for philosophers or scientists.
Then I guess Hanover was doomed, since his position is supposed to be that substance dualism succeeds. All I'm seeing atm is: substance dualism is better if you prefer a non-physical mind; property dualism is better if you prefer a physical mind but still like dualisms. They both seem poor options, but the wording of the proposition allows 180proof to win by default in that case. Which is maybe why Hanover isn't taking it all that seriously.
It is undisputed that there are (1) minds and (2) bodies. I count two things, which means it is undisputed that dualism is the case.
For instance, it isn't remotely obvious that this is good counting
It's obvious to your doctor. If you're going to tell your doctor she's wrong, don't come with a thesis that convolutes off into wtf, as property dualism does at this point. And I like property dualism. I wish it the best. I'm just following my own critical thinking here.
I'm open to counter-examples, but mind-body dualists certainly seem to break things down that way. A thought can't be physical, for instance, since it has no volume, no mass, you can't taste it, smell it, or poke it with a stick, things that are true of lots of physical things like spacetime, motion, force, etc. I can't pick up an executing subroutine of a program and spread it on my toast, or, as I said above, taste the gravity of an orange. You need phonons to hear anything but you can't hear a phonon.
The physicalist description of mind is that it's something the brain _does_, so describing it in a way that fits in very well with that doesn't seem like a compelling argument against physicalism. But maybe there's better dualist arguments I haven't heard yet.
I hope not. Most doctors need to handle computers these days. I don't want mine falling to pieces because she thinks hers is either conscious or cannot possibly work. I can say nothing about your doctor except maybe keep an eye out for a better one.
I hope not. Most doctors need to handle computers these days. I don't want mine falling to pieces because she thinks hers is either conscious or cannot possibly work. I can say nothing about your doctor except maybe keep an eye out for a better one.
The physicalist description of mind is that it's something the brain _does_, so describing it in a way that fits in very well with that doesn't seem like a compelling argument against physicalism. But maybe there's better dualist arguments I haven't heard yet.
There's the argument that the mind is something the brain _does_ and vice versa, the brain is something the mind does. The idea that it's a two-way street
There's the argument that the mind is something the brain _does_ and vice versa, the brain is something the mind does. The idea that it's a two-way street
But that's an idealist argument, no? Not dualist. I have fewer conceptual problems with idealism.
I have no idea, not a dualist, all sounds crazy to me. Property pluralism, fine, but that's nothing to do with minds and bodies.
As Searle said, the man on the street is a Cartesian. You're barking up the wrong tree.
What's the draw of property dualism? It takes a tiny bit of philomind to answer that. Last time I talked to 180 he came up pretty short in that area, so I don't expect much
What makes property dualism worth the evil of being open-ended confusion?
— frank
I have no idea
On which:
I'm not arguing against dualism per se, only against SD and thereby not undermining PD at all, especially as the latter is only epistemic whereas the former – your (Descartes') position – is extravagantly ontic. (Occam's, anyone?)
Anyone able to provide some commentary on this? Nothing in Hanover's argument suggests he's attacking an epistemic position and defending an ontological one.
What's the draw of property dualism? It takes a tiny bit of philomind to answer that. Last time I talked to 180 he came up pretty short in that area, so I don't expect much
Ah, so I'm guessing don't hold my breath re: my previous post.
Not to my mind. It is dualist in that it postulates the existence of minds and bodies as two different things, provides a possible reason why bodies might have developed minds through evolution (because minds are needed, they do something that cannot be done without them) and describes a realistic relationship between bodies and minds.
Not to my mind. It is dualist in that it postulates the existence of minds and bodies as two different things, provides a possible reason why bodies might have developed minds through evolution (because minds are needed, they do something that cannot be done without them) and describes a realistic relationship between bodies and minds.
Reply to Kenosha Kid Why not 2 types of stuff. Stuff and the information about stuff. Pretty much how Fedex sees the world. And they seem to navigate it well.
Why yes, science is based on a dualist framework (empiricism + rationalism), so a logical form of scientism or physicalism would include the mind as the central place where science happens.
Mainly because 180 is overemotional and dogmatic,and doesn't engage with any charity.
To be Frank,substance dualism is unassailable and self evident.
There is life and there is matter. They mix but neither can be derived from the other.
Confusion results from suggesting the mind is non physical...Of course mind is physical. Mind is desire,and desire is physical. But not everything physical is inorganic material.
Next time any materialists see a block of steel desire a sandwich call me...
I don't think it's necessary to invent a new material to explain why people think and trees don't in a complex sense. Remove a person's brain and their opinions will follow it. How the brain or tree is arranged is an emergent aspect, but they are both just carbon persisting.
Why not 2 types of stuff. Stuff and the information about stuff.
Information _about_ stuff? Because all information about any system is in the system. Any copies of the system's information are, at best, just that -- copies -- at worst, erroneous, and typically incomplete. This is why simulation theory fails for me: the most efficient way to simulate a universe is to build it.
This goes for the mind too. All the information about the brain is in the brain, but not all in the mind. The weird thing is, rather than make us doubt, this actually convinces us of things that truth be told we should really doubt.
Why yes, science is based on a dualist framework (empiricism + rationalism), so a logical form of scientism or physicalism would include the mind as the central place where science happens.
Does it happen in the mind, though? Yes, I see the results of the experiment or work out the theory. But that's not science yet. I need to get people to agree with it, ideally reproduce it, force me to defend it, in which case I'm dealing directly with objects not minds (although minds are the best explanation for those particular objects' behaviours).
Reply to frank Yeah, I didn't expect you to follow through. Patterns emerge... I am genuinely interested though, should you have a eureka moment.
Does it happen in the mind, though? Yes, I see the results of the experiment or work out the theory. But that's not science yet. I need to get people to agree with it, ideally reproduce it, force me to defend it, in which case I'm dealing directly with objects not minds (although minds are the best explanation for those particular objects' behaviours).
Exactly. The validation you seek is from other minds. Science is fundamentally dualist, it's always about minds understanding matter. And it has been very successful at doing that. It's only philosophers (or scientists who try and play philosophers, sometimes) who try to imagine an alternative, without much success so far.
Information _about_ stuff? Because all information about any system is in the system. Any copies of the system's information are, at best, just that -- copies -- at worst, erroneous, and typically incomplete. This is why simulation theory fails for me: the most efficient way to simulate a universe is to build it.
I'm not a fan of simulation theory because it has a built in infinite regression. But, suppose you wanted to build it; you would have to have some way of informing matter how it is to be arranged. Supposedly we could vaporize an object and the information about what it was remains.
I don't understand it but supposedly the Higgs tells matter what it's mass is supposed to be.
Reply to Kenosha Kid So what? You operate (at least as a default position) under the assumption that other scientists don't lie to you about this, when they say that, e.g. they ran the math again and it doesn't work. You infer that the guy saying that did some actual thinking and reports truthfully about the result of said thinking.
So what? You operate (at least as a default position) under the assumption that other scientists don't lie to you about this, when they say that, e.g. they ran the math again and it doesn't work.
It's not about lying. Scientists operate on the assumption of an objectively real physical universe, not on the assumption of non-physical minds. I'm not disagreeing that minds are important: science is phenomenological, I agree. And there are good reasons to assume that I'm not surrounded by p-zombies or stooges. However that process of knowing other minds is based on my phenomenology and their physicality, not some telepathy. (Come to think of it, how crap are non-physical minds that, free from physical constraints like localism, they depend 100% on physical means to communicate? Anyone who believes in non-physical mind must admit that theirs is dumb :rofl: ) A purely solipsistic science wouldn't be possible, and I have to know others, work with others, learn from others and hopefully one day supersede others through physical means.
There's just no obvious platform for ideal minds outside of solipsism here that I can see.
[quote=Hanover]It is undisputed that there are (1) minds and (2) bodies. I count two things, which means it is undisputed that dualism is the case.[/quote]
It is undisputed that there are (1) ducks and (2) rows. I might count three ducks and they might be three ducks in a row, but only a philosopher would count four things. Count ducks if you will, and count rows too. but do not add ducks to rows and call them all 'things'.
There is life and there is matter. They mix but neither can be derived from the other.
I would contest that. Life is already transcendental vis-à-vis inanimate matter. Life is already a manner of thinking at biochemical level, and this manner of thinking is written down on matter.
Life creates new information, codes and stores it to use it later, chosing carefully which DNA code to play, which hormones or enzyme to pump up or down... It recombines information again and again (mainly through sex, a form of genetic dialogue) and in doing so it creates new information.
Life is one step towards thinking. Stones can't think. They have no need for it. But life is all about information, and it is very creative. So it was bound to lead to actual conscious thinking at some point or another, IMO.
As Searle said, the man on the street is a Cartesian. You're barking up the wrong tree.
What's the draw of property dualism? It takes a tiny bit of philomind to answer that. Last time I talked to 180 he came up pretty short in that area, so I don't expect much
We are all property dualists insofar as we recognize two basic kinds of action or process; the mental and the physical. As @180 Proof says, this is an epistemological, not a metaphysical or ontological, statement since it is referring to our ways of understanding the world.
Substance dualism makes a further claim that the fact that we understand things in these different ways (conceiving of the mental and the physical) indicates the existence or reality of distinct substances. This is pure speculation or reification based on believing in our intuitions.
It is not that one or the other (PD or SD) is the more useful, since PD has already fulfilled the purpose of recognizing that we do in fact understand things in these two different general ways, and SD adds no further use. Since it is a metaphysical icing atop the methodological cake; thus being pure sugar it adds only a little extra flavour, but no additional nutrition (use)..
I don't think it's necessary to invent a new material to explain why people think and trees don't in a complex sense.
The distinct and separate substance of substance dualism are not able to exchange energy, for neither one cannot walk the walk and talk the talk of the other.
The distinct and separate substance of substance dualism are not able to exchange energy, for neither one cannot walk the walk and talk the talk of the other.
Well, if that was the case they wouldn't be found working together. Maybe they aren't interchangeable but some type of exchange ought be taking place.
PoeticUniverseJuly 05, 2021 at 22:45#5619120 likes
Though with property dualism reason loses slightly less, I guess?
(There is only one kind of substance, which is just the abstract grouping together in space of many properties, all of those properties of the same ontological kind, merely dispositions to interact in particular ways with another of that same one kind of substance — which interactions can each equally well be seen as either the physical behaviors of one substance or the phenomenal experiences of the other substance, whence the dualistic appearance).
We are all property dualists insofar as we recognize two basic kinds of action or process; the mental and the physical. As 180 Proof says, this is an epistemological, not a metaphysical or ontological, statement since it is referring to our ways of understanding the world.
This is a logical mistake. In fact, without dualism, there could be no such thing as epistemology. So dualism underpins epistemology and science. It is not itself epistemological or scientific, but metaphysical.
180 claims logical fallacies from hanover yet most of his post is an appeal to authority to spinoza! And strawman and obfuscates hanover by mentioning leibniz and melanbranche.
One wishes 180 could for once use his own words and actually present some ideas of his own to express his case.
One wishes he could actually engage in an actual charitable discussion without handwaiving and repeating his previous posts.
@Hanover
For goodness sake express the fact that mind is desire. And desire is physical. Thus you establish an unassailable position. And put us out of the misery of this dodgy debater.
And yall blamed 3017 when it was obvious he is a very good debater,he just had a terribly uncharitable and poor debater who upended the debate. @3017amen
Non-rational minds, such as the minds of animals, direct intentional behaviour. The rational mind, such as those of humans, is able to grasp meaning, form abstractions, count, speak, and so on. As such it discerns a domain of rational relations, which is the basis of science. But it's a fact that the mind is not itself an object of cognition, in the way that the objects of science are. That's why it's not objectively real - it transcends the subject-object division, which itself is a product of the mind on a subliminal or unconscious level.
The problem with Cartesian dualism is that it suggests res cogitans as something objectively real which 'interacts' with the supposed 'physical'. But it reality, there is nothing that is only physical, nor anything which is only mental, these two always co-arise. Cartesian dualism is an explanatory metaphor, not a scientific model as such. (If you believe there is something purely physical, then you would need to demonstrate what that is, which is in the domain of physics. However as is well known, fundamental physics are bedevilled by just the kinds of problem that is being discussed in this thread.)
Reply to Olivier5 I don't know what you think you're disagreeing with. Epistemology is based on the recognition that our understanding is dualistic; which is what I said.
What sort of material stuff is reason made of, in your view? Or are you arguing vice versa, that all matter is made of reason?
I didn't say anything about material stuff.
But in any case, reason isn't a stuff, it's an activity, that I was poetically personifying, which activity is usually done by brains, which are made mostly of gluons if we're measuring by mass, which are material particles, that confine quarks into the nucleons of the atoms from which are built the complex molecules from which the tissues of the many, many cells of those brains are made.
Or if you want to interpret "reason" as a stuff anyway, I guess that would make it abstract stuff, like mathematical objects and such, the stuff that can be reasoned about; in which case yes, matter is in a sense made of that, inasmuch as matter like the above is a feature of the abstract object that is our concrete universe, where "concrete" here just means "the structure we're a part of".
More precisely, scientists operate on the assumption of an objectively real physical universe, understandable by human minds.
That's probably true more often than not, and not unreasonably so. There's no obvious reason, other than the anthropic principle, that as much of the universe is amenable to human reason as is.
But I for one don't assume that everything is necessarily comprehendible to human minds. In fact I think we're hitting that limit already, as more and more AI is used to make experimental predictions. Rather, we're fortunate that the elementary character of reality is that it obeys comprehendible rules on a statistical level.
More precisely, scientists operate on the assumption of an objectively real physical universe, understandable by human minds.
— Olivier5
That's probably true more often than not,
It's always true, whether they know it or not. A scientist worth his mettle tries to understand the world, or some part of it. If he doesn't do that, he's a lab technician. And if he assumed the world could not be understood by human minds, then he wouldn't try day after day to do so.
Reply to Olivier5 The bit you elided there in the "[...]", "...that I was poetically personifying...", is the answer to your question. Saying "reason loses" is a poetic way of saying that reasoning has not been done well.
I was parodying this movie's tagline, if that's not obvious:
This debate seems to have the same issue that the previous one had, and reaffirms my belief that the general format of these debates should be that each poster has a preprepared opening statement to state and defend their position. Only after these two initial posts should they then respond to one another.
Reply to Noble Dust I agree with this. I don't think quoting should be allowed in these debates. It should flow as an offline debate would. Also standard grammar and punctuation.
@3017amen
Hanover has spiced it up now with his last post.
But i don't have much faith in 180. The man cannot debate without being overemotional and barks like an
excited poodle.
My question is why don't posters and the mod address that 180 collapses the debate?
Surely the rules of the debate have a spirit of decency and commonsense?
180 tends to use political statements instead of philosophical arguments (I know we all have to be careful there, but c'mon man!). Here you go again 180, projecting your own lack of understanding onto other's. I think most have figured him out, including Hanover. For instance, when he has nothing, he projects in this case, his own straw man and non sequitur fallacies to make himself look like he knows something. When Hanover points it out, 180 then pivots to attacking the 'process' and not the substance. Very 101. It's just a smoke screen and an illusionary budding intellect... .
Oh well, nothing new under the sun there. Another disappointment. Hanover did his homework, where 180 so far did not. (Actually, not sure why 180 even agreed to the debate... .) Hanover also calls him out and corrects his misuse of ad hom's. Sorry for the tough love 180, really, you gotta give us something man; not just the usual smoke and mirrors. :razz:
Anyway, be that as it may, Hanover has been more than gracious, and has offered some other interesting arguments that have real import.
1. I liked the notion of Subjective truth. NICE.
2. SD: " It admits to the obvious metaphysical difference between hats and perceptions of hats, and that the latter cannot be experienced except by the subject." YEP.
3 "we each walk around daily with the freedom to choose, something that makes absolutely no sense whatsoever in a physically limited universe.That is to say, SD gives a path for a meaningful free will, entirely lacking in a purely physical world." I loved the notion and/or suggestion of Metaphysical Will ala Schop and others! Or how about this, someone explain the Will period, without positing some dualist metaphysical concept.
Also, this is an interesting supposition below. I would like to see both 180 and Hanover exploring this one a bit (180 hasn't touched it yet). This could prove interesting. In the meantime, someone here provide some insight to its implications:
"And there is a critical distinction between not detected and not detectable, with the latter suggesting that no amount of technology can locate its existence. I get that I can't hear extremely high frequencies, but they are detectable, not just not detected. On the other hand, you will never experience my experience. Ever. That is what makes mental states different from physical states."
How does this relate to independent existence?
For example, 180 supposedly said through Hanover's interpretation of same that: "is that I [Hanover]deny specifically that there are physical properties that are completely incapable of being sensed in some capacity and so measured, including dark matter."
If someone posits the existence of two fundamental substances in order to account for the difference between mind and body, then the burden is on them to show that the difference necessitates that there be two substances.
If someone posits the existence of something the burden is on them. Because they posit it does not mean that it becomes something that others must show to be false unless there is sufficient evidence to show that it is true.
Of course, but it's like committing a logical fallacy to deny the antecedent by offering no justification/explanation for the denial.. One has reciprocity in advancing their own position by whatever logical means is appropriate without such fallacy(s). Is that what you're saying?
Point taken. Nothing is proven. It is more a matter of making an argument persuasive enough to convince someone to accept that there must be two substances.
No need to deny what has not been shown to be something that should be accepted. Suppose I was to say that there are three substances. Does that mean you must show that there are not?
If I was going to deny that [a] supposition, well yes. I mean, if one say's 'no that's not true' and offers no counter argument, then why shouldn't one say 'yes that's true' instead? (Reason usually compels people to believe what they believe.) If they say yes, they say yes for a reason. If they say no, they say no for a reason.
I could be missing the obvious, but is that what you're asking?
The obvious is that in any argument or proof there must be something that ties the conclusion to the premises - the knot being either all right or all wrong
That's not what we're talking about. Stay out of this grown-up talk Tim :razz: .
We're talking about logically fallacies and why people agree or disagree with other's. In other words, some reasoning has to do with some emotional experience one has had... . In your case, emotions are more noteworthy. Kind of like Voluntarism, which is not necessarily a bad thing.
LOL
Reply to Fooloso4 I am not personally in the business of trying to convince others, but more into trying to understand what they say, whether it means anything, whether it is internally coherent, and what I can steal from it for my own use.
But if you are not convinced that there is something in what is said worth stealing you wouldn't.
As I see it, it is not so much a matter of convincing others but of making an argument that is convincing. It seems curious to me if someone were to make an argument they did not intent to make convincingly.
And if he assumed the world could not be understood by human minds, then he wouldn't try day after day to do so.
We're getting off track, but the universe needn't be completely understandable. Understandable theories like thermodynamics, chemistry, etc. turn out to be approximations to theories much harder to comprehend.
see it, it is not so much a matter of convincing others but of making an argument that is convincing. It seems curious to me if someone were to make an argument they did not intent to make convincingly.
I think in large part you answered most of the question. But it is neither always necessary to convince other's of your own truth (Hanover alluded to that in the debate-Subjectivity), but if one were to advance an argument either for or against something, it seems you agree that usually one provides reasons for their belief.
As an aside, I was debating a Dr. friend of mine about political ideology and I argued that if one believes something (and either advances or takes a position one way or another), they have the obligation to at least explain why they believe what they believe regardless of the belief. Of course, that's not the same as trying to change someone's belief about that same thing (political ideologies). At some point, in a formal debate one has to advance their position by similar reciprocity to be convincing. But again, that doesn't mean you're trying to insist that they change their view.
(Their truth is their truth. The question becomes why or how/when , etc... .)
I think this also speaks to some of Hanover's arguments specifically referencing one's own truth.:
[i]Subjectivity and Philosophy:
From the latin “subjectum”.
Its primary sense tells us that there is a term affirm or deny something, in a proposal. More metaphysically, Subject is synonymous with substance be real support for attributes or accidents. It is also the person subject to a sovereign authority in politics, and the knowing mind in the theory of knowledge.
Definitions of Philosophers:
– Schopenhauer
“It’s who knows everything, without being yourself known is the subject. The subject is, therefore, the bedrock of the world, the invariable condition, always implied in any phenomenon, any object, because all that exists is only for the subject.[/i]
As you may know, there are all sorts of other metaphysical theories on this phenomena of self-awareness.
But if you are not convinced that there is something in what is said worth stealing you wouldn't.
As I see it, it is not so much a matter of convincing others but of making an argument that is convincing. It seems curious to me if someone were to make an argument they did not intent to make convincingly.
Agreed. If you write a post, try to make it convincing. But don't assume that anyone will actually be convinced, at least immediately. Even if they are, they will probably not tell you about it.
People don't like to publicly concede a point, in general. They take it as humbling or humiliating. Their first reaction
to a new idea (new to them) is generally to appear to reject it. It doesn't necessarily mean that the idea is actually rejected. Often what happens is that a good idea will "germinate" in an open mind. It will need some time to "grow" in this new ecosystem: the mind newly exposed to it. In my experience, this process takes a minimum if two weeks.
If you need to convince someone of something you think is true, don't yell. Don't push too hard. Just plant a seed, gently and firmly. If the idea is a good one, if it was well expressed, and if the person is not a complete idiot, chances are that it will grow in his or her mind, slowly. Give it some time. And come back to it once in a while. Bis repetitas placent.
Ultimately you might note that the people who initially rejected your idea start to defend it. If that happens, don't tell them "I told you so". Just say: "yes, I think I agree with you."
Ultimately you might note that the people who initially rejected your idea start to defend it.
I have had this happen a number of times, although I think that sometimes they may be unaware of it. They are so busy arguing against you they do not realize they have come around to where you were.
When I post in a public forum such as this one it is not just the person you are responding to that is being addressed. Regardless of how that person may respond others are reading and considering what is said.
Yes of course, the process of adopting a new idea is often subconscious, especially when the conscious person comes with an attitude, a negative a priori that tends to reject any new incoming idea.
I guess what I am saying is: don't treat your ideas as if they belonged to you. They don't. Chances are you adopted them from someone else in the first place, even if you remain unaware of your intellectual debt. Pass them forward the best you can, but respect them more than you respect yourself. Ideas have a strength of their own.
To convince other people, do not try and prevail personally over them. Rather, some of 'your' ideas may convince some people, if you describe them well, without boasting too much.
Reply to Protagoras No individual gluon is alive, but all living things we know of are made of them (and other things -- the focus on gluons specifically was kind of a joke for the physicists in the audience, about where most of the rest-mass of matter comes from), which are at least physical if not material.
Reply to Protagoras Yes, living things are made of matter. But not all matter is living, so yes there is a distinction. Living is a thing that matter can do, but not all matter actually does it.
I think what you actually mean to ask is how life arises from non-life. Organic matter is just carbon-based matter, which is created all across space all the time through the mundane chemical interactions of atoms created through nuclear fusion in stars. The atmosphere of Jupiter has tons of organic chemicals in it, for example.
That non-living organic matter became life when some of those chemical reactions formed cycles (one reaction instigating another instigating another etc... which eventually instigates the first kind again) that produced more of the same kinds of chemicals used in all of those reactions, thus turning more and more matter into the kind of matter that reacts in such cycles. Cycles of reactions that were more efficient produced more of the chemicals involved in themselves, so those kinds of chemicals and thus the cycles of reactions involving them became more widespread over time, and every possibility of improving on the efficiency of such cycles of reactions resulted in those more efficient reactants becoming more and more common.
Eventually we ended up with oceans full of complex self-replicating molecules like RNA and DNA constantly spreading and mutating and competing with each other for the most efficient and so most widespread kind of chemical, and then some of those started producing protective shells of molecules around themselves and those were the first cells of life. The process of replication and mutation continued, and that's what evolution is.
Are you saying that your gluons can think better than mine?
— Olivier5
Nope
What I wonder is where does your distinction between good and bad thinking originates from? If them gluons (or neurotransmitters for that matter) make all the thinking, what makes for good or bad thinking? Bad gluons?
After reading 180's lack of responses, I must say, Golly Geee:
180 tends to use political statements instead of philosophical arguments (I know we all have to be careful there, but c'mon man!). Here you go again 180, projecting your own lack of understanding onto other's. I think most have figured him out, including Hanover. For instance, when he has nothing, he projects in this case, his own straw man and non sequitur fallacies to make himself look like he knows something. When Hanover points it out, 180 then pivots to attacking the 'process' and not the substance. Very 101. It's just a smoke screen and an illusionary budding intellect... .
Oh well, nothing new under the sun there. Another disappointment. Hanover did his homework, where 180 so far did not. (Actually, not sure why 180 even agreed to the debate... .) Hanover also calls him out and corrects his misuse of ad hom's. Sorry for the tough love 180, really, you gotta give us something man; not just the usual smoke and mirrors. :razz:
Anyway, be that as it may, Hanover has been more than gracious, and has offered some other interesting arguments that have real import.
1. I liked the notion of Subjective truth. NICE.
2. SD: " It admits to the obvious metaphysical difference between hats and perceptions of hats, and that the latter cannot be experienced except by the subject." YEP.
3 "we each walk around daily with the freedom to choose, something that makes absolutely no sense whatsoever in a physically limited universe.That is to say, SD gives a path for a meaningful free will, entirely lacking in a purely physical world." I loved the notion and/or suggestion of Metaphysical Will ala Schop and others! Or how about this, someone explain the Will period, without positing some dualist metaphysical concept.
Also, this is an interesting supposition below. I would like to see both 180 and Hanover exploring this one a bit (180 hasn't touched it yet). This could prove interesting. In the meantime, someone here provide some insight to its implications:
"And there is a critical distinction between not detected and not detectable, with the latter suggesting that no amount of technology can locate its existence. I get that I can't hear extremely high frequencies, but they are detectable, not just not detected. On the other hand, you will never experience my experience. Ever. That is what makes mental states different from physical states."
How does this relate to independent existence?
For example, 180 supposedly said through Hanover's interpretation of same that: "is that I [Hanover]deny specifically that there are physical properties that are completely incapable of being sensed in some capacity and so measured, including dark matter."
Is 180 suggesting there is independent existence?
?Protagoras
Great Post!
A lot of good insights.
Be good to see both read this and expand.
What do you mean by independent existence? @3017amen
And all those who say the mind is non physical do themselves no favours.
Of course your desire is physical. Every time you raise your hand that is physical direct will and desire.
Not material but physical. Like breathing.
Why would you bother arguing against a claim that you thought had no merit?
Right. That is my point. Someone who posits substance dualism must first provide an argument with enough merit in order to expect someone else to argue against it. I will leave it up to the members here to decide for themselves whether that has been done.
Pending on the context, the whole concept can take different forms of discourse (cosmology versus metaphysics).. But I think how Hanover & 180 have framed that particular area of discussion, he probably means metaphysics-transcendental idealism (at least that's how I'm interpreting the aforementioned comment from him).
What I wonder is where does your distinction between good and bad thinking originates from? If them gluons (or neurotransmitters for that matter) make all the thinking, what makes for good or bad thinking? Bad gluons?
Better or worse structure and thus function of the really complicated systems built out of them.
Is a better car (a thing better at doing what a car is for) made from better atoms, or are the atoms just arranged in a better way to make a structure that functions in a better way?
Matter that’s better at making more matter of the same kind becomes more common. That process of propagating more of your own kind is life. So forms of matter that are better at living become more common over time. Nothing random about that.
Right. That is my point. Someone who posits substance dualism must first provide an argument with enough merit in order to expect someone else to argue against it. I will leave it up to the members here to decide for themselves whether that has been done.
Right, so if it is the case that the only argument for substance dualism is that we ought to expect reality to accord with the basic ways we understand things, or perhaps better, we should expect the basic ways we understand things to reflect reality, would you consider that an argument with merit, and if so how would you go about arguing against it?
So forms of matter that are better at living become more common over time.
I think this does not follow. Lifeforms always simply adapt or fail to adapt to changing circumstances. Your assertion would have us being better at living than hunter/gatherers, which I think is patently false; if anything I would lean towards the opposite conclusion.
Your assertion would have us being better at living than hunter/gatherers, which I think is patently false
"Forms of matter that are better at living become more common over time" is not equivalent to "over time, matter becomes better at living"; it doesn't mean that life-forms have to get better at living over time, it just means that when life-forms get better at living (in the sense of become better at making more of themselves and keeping more of themselves alive) then over time more and more of those accumulate, possibly at the expense of other life-forms that aren't as good at that.
And if we count our learned cultures as part of ourselves, then yes in that sense modern post-industrial people are better at living than hunter-gatherers, since our populations are larger and our lifespans are longer, often at the expense of peoples who still practice the hunter-gatherer lifestyle.
So you didn't explain you just asserted that life is matter.
You asked for an explanation of how non-living matter can become living, not an argument that that must be what happened. I'm happy to explain the view if you're just not clear what it is, but it doesn't seem like it would be productive to actually argue with you.
Any examples of matter suddenly becoming lifelike?
Who ever said "suddenly"? But matter becoming lifeline in general, sure: somewhere in the range of 4.5 to 3.5 million years ago, on Earth, some matter gradually became more lifelike until things we're happy to call "alive" without qualifications were around.
My subjectivity sure doesn't feel like matter or seperate gluons.
Phenomenal experience ("subjectivity") and life aren't the same topic. In my view (as I implied in my first post in this thread), phenomenal experience must be omnipresent, because the alternatives are either that it doesn't exist, or some inexplicable magic happens somewhere, and I have reasons to discount both of those alternatives.
Since life is a functionality and functionality is multiply realizable, many kinds of matter could in principle potentially implement life. I'd hesitate to claim they all could, but I also wouldn't say for sure that not all could.
Complexity is a separate issue from life. Matter doesn't always become more complex. Not even living things always become more complex. When they do, it is because the complexity confers a fitness advantage: the more complex stuff is better able to make more of itself and keep more of itself alive, so over time more of that kind of stuff accumulates, possibly at the expense of other kinds of stuff. There are more possible kinds of complex stuff than simple stuff, so once some kind of complex stuff has beaten all the simpler options, the only possible options for future winners will be more complex stuff.
And organic is also a separate issue from life, as already clarified; but most matter remains non-living because it doesn't yet have the opportunity to live.
So dualists just have a poorly functioning brain? Is that what you are saying?
Not as categorically as you seem to impute, but inasmuch as any error constitutes some failure to function, sure. Dualism can be known false a priori, so incorrectly thinking it is true is to some extent a "malfunction". Nobody's brains are without malfunction, though.
I'm just interested in what "non-physical energy" is currently. I've only ever heard Bartricks say something like that which is how you know it's bullshit. Is there "non-physical mass" by any chance? What about "non-physical momentum"? Note that momentum is also conserved.
And if we count our learned cultures as part of ourselves, then yes in that sense modern post-industrial people are better at living than hunter-gatherers, since our populations are larger and our lifespans are longer, often at the expense of peoples who still practice the hunter-gatherer lifestyle.
Oh well, your idea of what it means to live better is obviously very different from mine.
We report the design, synthesis, and assembly of the 1.08–mega–base pair Mycoplasma mycoides JCVI-syn1.0 genome starting from digitized genome sequence information and its transplantation into a M. capricolum recipient cell to create new M. mycoides cells that are controlled only by the synthetic chromosome. The only DNA in the cells is the designed synthetic DNA sequence, including “watermark” sequences and other designed gene deletions and polymorphisms, and mutations acquired during the building process. The new cells have expected phenotypic properties and are capable of continuous self-replication.
I suppose that's the draw of substance dualism: contrary to a process or an activity, a substance is conserved over time. So substance dualism implies the immortality of the soul, whereas process dualism implies no such thing.
The mind is desire and desire is non material but physical.
What is "material" for you because material and physical are synonymous for me. I don't know what "non material but physical means". And I don't know about "the mind is desire" either. Seems to me way more than that.
And that article full of jargon is proof that scientists turned matter into life?
Yes.
Any actual real life tangible evidence that I don't have to take on trust?
I'm not sure what you're asking for. You want me to visit you and physically present you with the evidence? Because I can't do that, and it's unreasonable to expect me to. All I can do is point you to an internet page that explains that what you're asking about has been done. Whether or not you believe it is your own issue to deal with.
I wonder, do you say the same thing about evolution? That we've landed on the Moon? That the Holocaust happened? That e = mc[sup]2[/sup]?
Reply to Michael The spontaneous appearance of living organisms in some sort of inanimate chemical soup would constitute pretty definitive evidence of abiogenesis, I think. Pending that, it's all theory.
What is "material" for you because material and physical are synonymous for me. I don't know what "non material but physical means". And I don't know about "the mind is desire" either. Seems to me way more than that.
Matter, strictly speaking, is any substance that has rest mass and volume. There are aspects of the physical world that do not have rest mass or volume, e.g. the photon, and so aren't considered matter. And if we consider materialism to be the view that everything that exists is matter and physicalism to be the view that everything that exists is physical then the two are slightly different.
Although for the most part the terms are used interchangeably, so I guess you need to ask what someone specifically means by materialism.
Oh well, your idea of what it means to live better is obviously very different from mine.
You ignore the emphasized phrase "in that sense". We were discussing what it is to be biologically alive, and to be successful at doing that, i.e. to be "good at living", in that particular sense. You sound like you are conflating that with some kind of phenomenological or ethical notion of "living well" ala eudaimonia or such, which is a completely different sense.
Reply to Pfhorrest No, I am not a panpsychist. Panpsychism is a form of idealism; doesn't cut my cake.
You said that dualism can be proven false a priori. Would you mind trying to do so?
Have you considered that, if better or worse brain structures makes for better or worse thinking as you were arguing above, it could well be that your brain structure is deficient, making it unable to properly understand dualism...
You said that dualism can be proven false a priori. Would you mind trying to do so?
I'll sketch the argument for you, at least; I don't feel like spending a lot more time on this discussion.
- Dualism implies some kind of transcendentalism, as in supernaturalism, the existence of something of a kind ontologically different from the sort of stuff that can be empirically observed.
- Claims about such things cannot in principle be tested for falsity, since there's nothing we could tell to differentiate a world where they're true from a world where they're false, and thus they could only possibly be taken on faith, dogmatically.
- Accepting any such dogmatic claims, taking any claim without possibility of question, would leave one's views unchanging even if they're wrong, so if one should happen to start out with wrong views, one would stay with them forever instead of improving upon them.
- Presuming one aims to have correct views, it is thus prudent to leave all views open to question, which consequently demands rejecting any claims about things that cannot be questioned, including all claims about things that make no empirical difference, including all supernatural, transcendental things, like those implied by dualism.
- Dualism implies some kind of transcendentalism, as in supernaturalism, the existence of something of a kind ontologically different from the sort of stuff that can be empirically observed.
That's a strawman. Dualism only implies that he who does the empirical observing recognises said observing to be 1) fundamentally different from the observed thing; and 2) important or even critical to one's knowledge of the observed thing.
If you believe in 1 and 2, then you have a dualist mind set. The rest is strawmen banging heads.
Has "substance" and "property" been defined for this thread and an explanation provided as to why there would be specifically two substances/properties, as opposed to one or a thousand?
How do you define "physical substance" and "non-physical substance"?
I wonder if an answer to this is even needed at this stage. Can the debate be reframed as "is the mind a property of the brain or a separate entity that is causally connected to the brain?" We might not then need to worry (yet) about substance or physical or non-physical.
I wonder if an answer to this is even needed at this stage. Can the debate be reframed as "is the mind a property of the brain or a separate entity that is causally connected to the brain?" We might not then need to worry (yet) about substance or physical or non-physical.
That seems like a pretty different question that then original debate. My position was of "substance" dualism, so how can we avoid the question of what substance is?
Reply to Hanover True, I suppose it could be argued that the mind and brain are distinct but that both are physical, so it would be neither substance nor property dualism.
Right, so if it is the case that the only argument for substance dualism is that we ought to expect reality to accord with the basic ways we understand things ...
First, we should not expect reality to accord with the way we understand things. The way we understand things changes over time. Second, substance dualism is not the basic way we understand things.
Second, substance dualism is not the basic way we understand things.
Indeed, this idea of two different substances is not intuitive at all, it is something that came out of a certain culture. The intuitive idea (to me at least) is that our mind dies when our body dies; reason for which we are all naturally afraid of death.
If our mind was some special inalterable substance, it would be immortal and I think we would know it, we would remember our previous lives for instance. But we don't.
Reply to Protagoras Scientists are no better nor worse than other folks. They are regular folks. Why is everyone treating them either as devils or angels in beyond me.
What if it was someone you trusted and you knew they were being genuine?
If I had personal memories of my previous lives, and if while chatting with others, I would realize that they all (or most of them) had similar memories, then I would accept the immortality of the human mind.
No,my scientist friend had just been questioned deeply and was being truthful. Your bias shows through when you say appeased.
I've explained enough in my posts for you to get what I'm saying. If you can't see it, then perhaps try to be less scientismistic and apply your own perception.
True, I suppose it could be argued that the mind and brain are distinct but that both are physical, so it would be neither substance nor property dualism.
Or that the mind and brain are the same thing but from different views. In this case, we can dispense with the term, "substance", and talk about dualistic views. How is a view different than the thing being viewed? Can a view be viewed? In other words, can the mind view itself? Can a brain view itself? Can an apple?
Reply to Protagoras My faith in science serves me well and helps me a lot, for the very simple reason that it is undistinguishable from my faith in my own reason and senses. Science is but a systematic way of doing basic human thinking that is natural to man. It is our specialty, in the animal kingdom. We are sapiens.
If God created man, He created reason, sapience, and gave it to man. If God created reason, then science is godly. It is the patient exploration of God's eternal laws. Eureka = Hallelujah.
Now, in practice all scientists may not serve God or even Truth (godly or not), conflicts of interest between Truth and Money exist, but they are manageable.
Reply to Protagoras I'm an environmentally concerned, pro-science, atheist social-democrat from France. To my defense, I'm also an old white heterosexual male. Nobody's perfect.
My faith in science serves me well and helps me a lot, for the very simple reason that it is undistinguishable from my faith in my own reason and senses. Science is but a systematic way of doing basic human thinking that is natural to man. It is our specialty, in the animal kingdom. We are sapiens.
If God created man, He created reason, sapience, and gave it to man. If God created reason, then science is godly. It is the patient exploration of God's eternal laws. Eureka = Hallelujah.
I'm an environmentally concerned, pro-science, atheist social-democrat from France. To my defense, I'm also an old white heterosexual male. Nobody's perfect.
Aside from me being black and American, we could be twins. Bonjour!
Glad you liked it. This movie is a classic of the era, graced with one double entente joke per second (almost) and Marilyn's unapologetic sex appeal. Also a bit before my time but not that much.
Reply to Protagoras No not majority rules. More like: if “what of all the people that experienced X” is an argument that X is genuine then the fact that the majority who tried have not experienced X should be a stronger argument that X is not genuine.
I highly doubt you got your scientist friend to say “I don’t know how DNA replication works”. See, all my scientist friends seem to know at least that much. Even many non scientist friends who took biology in high school seem to know that much. So I’d love to have a conversation with this friend of yours and ask exactly what he means by “I don’t know how DNA replication works” considering you can literally look it up.
I've explained enough in my posts for you to get what I'm saying.
When I asked you to explain what “non material but physical” means you told me to “raise your hand and observe” for Christ sake! You think I’ve never raised my hand before? I do so multiple times a day, and so does everyone who disagrees with you. And none of us get what we’re supposed to be noticing.
If you can't see it, then perhaps try to be less scientismistic and apply your own perception.
Curious. Being scientific is precisely about applying your own perception. Having done so, all I perceive is BS, no offense.
“If you can’t agree with me, maybe you should be less biased and agree with me! No I won’t actually try to convince you of anything nor even explain the position you asked me to clarify, maybe if you weren’t so damn biased you’d get it already!”
No not majority rules. More like: if “what of all the people that experienced X” is an argument that X is not a hallucination, then the fact that the majority who tried have not experienced X should be a stronger argument that X is a hallucination.
The great example being The Miracle of the Sun. Miracles tend to be their own method of execution.
First, we should not expect reality to accord with the way we understand things. The way we understand things changes over time. Second, substance dualism is not the basic way we understand things.
That is not a relevant critique of the argument. First, the basic way we understand things (property dualism) does not change over time. Second, the argument does not claim that substance dualism is the basic way we understand things, but that it is reasonable to infer it from the fact that the basic way we understand things (property dualism) does not change over time.
Head out of the scientists ass and in the real world.
You've determined I'm biased beyond repair based purely on the fact that I disagree with you. No reasoning is possible with such a creature. So have a good one.
That's a strawman. Dualism only implies that he who does the empirical observing recognises said observing to be 1) fundamentally different from the observed thing; and 2) important or even critical to one's knowledge of the observed thing.
That's neither substance dualism nor property dualism, which are the things under discussion here. If you want to make up a different thing and call it "dualism", you do you I guess, but that's only going to cause needless confusion with other people using the word in the usual ways.
In any case, it's not clear to me what your point 1 even means. The act of observing is not identical to the object being observed? I think most everyone (besides Berkeleyan subjective idealists) would agree with that; even eliminative materialists would agree with that (the act of observation is a thing the observer's brain is doing, which is not identical to the object being observed).
You couldn't mean that the being doing the observing is constituted of a fundamentally different kind of stuff than the object being observed, because that's substance dualism, which is what you say is a straw man.
Nor could you mean that the mental properties that constitute the state of mind of undergoing an observatory experience are constituted of a fundamentally different kind of stuff than the physical properties of the object being observed (even though those properties are "stuck in" the same underlying kind of substance), because that's property dualism, which has the same problems (against my foregoing argument) as substance dualism, which you say is a straw man.
I think most everyone (besides Berkeleyan subjective idealists) would agree with that; even eliminative materialists would agree with that (the act of observation is a thing the observer's brain is doing, which is not identical to the object being observed).
Indeed, idealist monists such as Berkeley disagree with my point 1, and so do materialist monists in fact (i.e. the eliminative ones), because for them there is no such thing as a symbolic map: everything is just gluons spinning in a flat ontology, without any room for transcendence.
Monists reject the fundamental difference between map and territory because they are monist. I accept it because I am a dualist.
“The underlying, supernatural stuff that makes minds so obviously different than bodies, has sufficient properties with the physical stuff of nature that it can interact with the physical stuff that it does not violate the laws of nature.“
What are the “sufficient properties” shared between a non-physical undetectable “supernatural stuff” and the physical detectable “natural stuff”. Can anyone explain? Because I can’t think how they can begin to share properties as if they did, whatever the non physical substance, it would have physical properties.
A mind with mass is no longer a mind. An intention with momentum is no longer an intention. No?
If I understand him correctly, by "supernatural" Hanover means non-physical:
My definition of the non-physical, counter to yours, is that which is attributed to some force that is in principle beyond scientific understanding. Within that definition would be those emotions, inner thoughts, phenomenological states, and one's full inner life.
And so, emotions, inner thoughts, phenomenological states, and one's full inner life are not natural states but supernatural.
As it is being used by 180 I take it to mean that what it being divided in terms of two different substances is actually a distinction between properties of the same substance.
As it is being used by 180 I take it to mean that what it being divided in terms of two different substances is actually a distinction between properties of the same substance.
Reply to Fooloso4 Thanks. Not sure that works for me... My dualism starts from the duality of form and xyle, information and matter, and see this as more fundamental a divide than just 'properties'.
a flat ontology, without any room for transcendence
I thought you said transcendence was a straw man? If you now agree that dualism is transcendent, see the rest of my earlier argument against transcendence and thus dualism, which you skipped because you objected to the first sentence implying dualism is transcendent.
Monists reject the fundamental difference between map and territory because they are monist
A literal map of a geographic territory and the literal territory itself are both made of the same kind of stuff, and yet there is a difference between them. Why is that not a problem, but a mental "map" can't be made of the same stuff as whatever "territory" it's a "map" of?
Dualism implies some kind of transcendentalism, as in supernaturalism, the existence of something of a kind ontologically different from the sort of stuff that can be empirically observed.
[quote=Howard Pattee, Physics and Metaphysics of Biosemiosis]All signs, symbols, and codes, all languages including formal mathematics are embodied as material physical structures and therefore must obey all the inexorable laws of physics. At the same time, the symbol vehicles like the bases in DNA, voltages representing bits in a computer, the text on this page, and the neuron firings in the brain do not appear to be limited by, or clearly related to, the very laws they must obey. Even the mathematical symbols that express these inexorable physical laws seem to be entirely free of these same laws.[/quote]
There's a form of dualism. You don't see mind, because you are it. Everything you know empirically is presented to you as an object or relation of objects or a force. But the very thing which weaves all that together into a world is mind, which is not amongst those objects.
And so, emotions, inner thoughts, phenomenological states, and one's full inner life are not natural states but supernatural.
I get the drift, but I think the word 'supernatural' is best avoided. As one of our erstwhile posters, Mariner, pointed out, the Latin 'supernatural' is pretty well a synonym for the Greek 'metaphysical'. Positivism will treat them as synonyms, but in other philosophical discourse 'metaphysics' retains at least a patina of respectability. That said, I agree that inner states are not in the domain of naturalism as currently understood, insofar as it is solely concerned with what can be objectively validated, but phenomenology is able to make that distinction without explicit reference to 'the supernatural'.
That's neither substance dualism nor property dualism, which are the things under discussion here. If you want to make up a different thing and call it "dualism", you do you I guess, but that's only going to cause needless confusion with other people using the word in the usual ways.
You don't see mind, because you are it. Everything you know empirically is presented to you as an object or relation of objects or a force. But the very thing which weaves all that together into a world is mind, which is not amongst those objects.
A camera does not film itself; you can't see the camera on film. Does that require that the camera be an ontologically different kind of thing than the things the camera is filming? Or is being a camera and filming just one of the many things that can be done by the same sort of stuff that gets filmed by a camera?
There is of course a difference between filming and being filmed, but that doesn't have to be an ontological difference: the same kind of stuff could both film and be filmed.
A camera can't operate itself, decide what to photograph, and interpret the image. All those are done by the subject, who is not part of the picture.
Sure, but the camera is also not part of the picture, so "not being part of the picture" doesn't have to mean being of an ontologically different kind than the things in the picture, which is the point. The camera doesn't have all the same functionality as a person (operating, deciding, interpreting, etc, as you list), but no argument has been offered as to why that functionality requires any ontological difference, only that not-being-in-the-picture requires such, which the camera example rebuts.
The camera doesn't have all the same functionality as a person (operating, deciding, interpreting, etc, as you list), but no argument has been offered as to why that functionality requires any ontological difference
So you think there's no [s]essential[/s] ontological difference between beings and devices?
no argument has been offered as to why that functionality requires any ontological difference, only that not-being-in-the-picture requires such, which the camera example rebuts.
The other point is, cameras are built and operated by humans. They have no ability to decide or intend, nor is there anything about them that is even analogous to those abilities, which are intrinsic to human beings. How can that not count as an ontological difference?
Reply to Pfhorrest And I didn’t ask, can you can recognise the ontological distinction being made in the passage quoted?
Howard Pattee, Physics and Metaphysics of Biosemiosis:All signs, symbols, and codes, all languages including formal mathematics are embodied as material physical structures and therefore must obey all the inexorable laws of physics. At the same time, the symbol vehicles like the bases in DNA, voltages representing bits in a computer, the text on this page, and the neuron firings in the brain do not appear to be limited by, or clearly related to, the very laws they must obey.
Sure, but the camera is also not part of the picture, so "not being part of the picture" doesn't have to mean being of an ontologically different kind than the things in the picture, which is the point.
But within the analogy, the person taking the photo/video is ontologically different from both the image and the camera.
Reply to Noble Dust So, if you ask the question, how does the intentional domain (let's call it) react with the physical domain, the answer is, through living beings. That is why as soon as life appears, it is already ontologically distinct from inorganic matter. More than, or not even, an arrangement of matter; it is the appearance of the subjective dimension, even if in the very basic form of a single-celled organism.
The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.
Physics is the question of what matter is. Metaphysics is the question of what [s]exists[/s] is real. People of a rational, scientific bent tend to think that the two are coextensive—that everything is physical. Many who think differently are inspired by religion to posit the existence of God and souls; Nagel affirms that he’s an atheist, but he also asserts that there’s an entirely different realm of non-physical stuff that exists—namely, mental stuff. The vast flow of perceptions, ideas, and emotions that arise in each human mind is something that, in his view, actually exists as something other than merely the electrical firings in the brain that gives rise to them—and exists as surely as a brain, a chair, an atom, or a gamma ray.
In other words, even if it were possible to map out the exact pattern of brain waves that give rise to a person’s momentary complex of awareness, that mapping would only explain the physical correlate of these experiences, but it wouldn’t be them.
And why? Because the ingredient that is always lacking in such descriptions, is perspective. The mistake almost everyone is making in this matter, is that the mind or the subject can be understood as something objective, when its reality is actually implicit, it only shows up as perspective. This is why some will continue say you can't show that the mind exists; if they're right in saying that it's because it transcends objective demonstration, not because it's merely non-existent (which is, of course, absurd). And it is precisely that awareness that has dropped out of most analytical philosophy (represented in its most concise form by the eliminative materialists but implicit in many other varieties of materialism.)
I've had a hard time believing that materialists of any stripe are so stupid that they can't realize the perspectivism inherent in their own experience. But the more I read, the older I get, and the more I interact with people, the more I'm starting to believe it.
You don't see mind, because you are it. Everything you know empirically is presented to you as an object or relation of objects or a force. But the very thing which weaves all that together into a world is mind, which is not amongst those objects.
Your argument is that since you can't see the mind, since the mind is what weaves the objects together into a world (and is also you). But then you go on to conclude that: Thus the mind must be ontologically different from the object.
@Pfhorrest's example shows that even though a camera is what puts the photo together, the camera is not ontologically different from the photo or the things getting photographed. Similarly, there is no reason to assume the mind is ontologically different simply because it is what organizes the objects and their relations.
The other point is, cameras are built and operated by humans. They have no ability to decide or intend, nor is there anything about them that is even analogous to those abilities, which are intrinsic to human beings. How can that not count as an ontological difference?
What if we made a bot that seeks out and takes pictures of ducks? Does it become ontologically different then?
But within the analogy, the person taking the photo/video is ontologically different from both the image and the camera.
That's called begging the question. Whether or not minds are material is precisely what's being discussed here, even though that's not what the thread was intended for...
Pfhorrest's example shows that even though a camera is what puts the photo together
No, the mind of the camera-user is what puts the photo together. They do this first and then take the photo. It's a poor metaphor until you acknowledge this.
No, the mind of the camera-user is what puts the photo together. They do this first and then take the photo. It's a shitty metaphor until you acknowledge this.
What? So what if the camera user is blind? Or if the camera is a security camera with no user?
The camera user wasn't mentioned once because they are of no importance here. The point is, although the camera isn't, and can't be in the photo, the camera is not thus ontologically different from the photo or the things getting photographed.
The point is, although the camera isn't, and can't be in the photo, the camera is not thus ontologically different from the photo or the things getting photographed.
If you want to use this metaphor, you have to include the user of the camera. Otherwise the metaphor breaks down, and your entire argument breaks down, because your argument is based on a metaphor that does not include the user of the camera.
include the user of the camera.
:roll: Homunculus fallacy.
There is no such thing as a "homonculus fallacy" that I can see. There is an argument about it but it is poor and obviously false. We do in fact use cameras. Therefore there are camera users.
No, the mind of the camera-user is what puts the photo together. They do this first and then take the photo. It's a poor metaphor until you acknowledge this.
It's not a metaphor if you acknowledge this, it's just the matter under discussion. that's the point @khaled and @Pfhorrest are trying to make.
Wayfarer's sole argument we were given was the fact that...
the very thing which weaves all that together into a world is mind, which is not amongst those objects.
This is also true of a camera taking film.
It's just an extension of the same old posts we've read a thousand times before. "Things are as I present them and if you don't see it there's no point in discussing the matter further."
I have no objection to the position, but why keep posting it on a discussion forum?
Reply to 180 Proof There's no camera filming without some use for it, and therefore no camera without a user. Even the footage of a surveillance camera is watched by some human being once in a while.
Reply to Olivier5 The point is an automated camera doesn't have to be "used" – photos viewed by a person – in order to function, or affect / be affected.
The problem is that you're still using the metaphor. The metaphor gets you from A to B, but you have to cast it off once you reach B. This is the classical mistake of analytic thought.
Reply to 180 Proof It has to be fabricated by someone and then set up by someone. Cameras don't crop up in the landscape haphazardly. They are artificial eyes that humans make and use.
The metaphor gets you from A to B, but you have to cast it off once you reach B. This is the classical mistake of analytic thought.
No metaphor. a camera taking film is not included in the world it films. It's a statement of fact, not a metaphor. It shows that not being included among the objects a device represents does not necessarily render that device of a different substance to the objects it represents.
Nope, supernaturalism was what I objected to. Dualism, at least my garden variety, is a natural, common sensical philosophy. It's not really about demons and fairies.
A literal map of a geographic territory and the literal territory itself are both made of the same kind of stuff, and yet there is a difference between them.
Indeed, this difference is not about the map being magical or supernatural. So what is this difference about?
According to my research, when you respond to me, you're responding to this:
No, the mind of the camera-user is what puts the photo together. They do this first and then take the photo. It's a poor metaphor until you acknowledge this. -Noble Dust
Reply to Noble Dust So what if the camera is part of a bot whose job it is to wander around and take pictures of ducks? Or is an automated security camera? In that case does the camera become ontologically different from the thing being photographed since it is the author of the photos (there are no users)?
I'm not making an argument, I'm saying Isaac's argument is fallacious. It goes something like:
1- The mind is the source of our concepts of "matter", "physical" and all other concepts
2- Therefore the mind is ontologically different from matter, and is not physical
No, the mind of the camera-user is what puts the photo together. They do this first and then take the photo. It's a poor metaphor until you acknowledge this.
That's right. I was pointing out that your objection is misguided because the argument you're objecting to never included a metaphor in the first place.
[quote=Juan Marin, Quantum Mysticism - Gone but not Forgotten; https://phys.org/news/2009-06-quantum-mysticism-forgotten.html]In 1958, Schrödinger, inspired by Schopenhauer from youth, published his lectures Mind and Matter. Here he argued that there is a difference between measuring instruments and human observation: a thermometer’s registration cannot be considered an act of observation, as it contains no meaning in itself. Thus, consciousness is needed to make physical reality meaningful. [/quote]
So now you've resorted to simply pointing out that other people thought something to be the case and if we don't agree then there's no point in discussing it.
I see. My mistake. It's not always easy to tell which authors are mystically endowed with such anagogic knowledge. If they'd only leave their mystic auras switched on all the time like they used to in the old images, but I suppose even seers have to save energy these days.
If I see a response worth responding to, I’ll respond to it.
I know, that was the point of my question. I'm wondering why you post in a discussion forum if the qualification for having a discussion is agreeing with you about the main point under discussion. Surely art or oration would be a better medium for your approach.
Of course. Why would you doubt that? I'd be interested to hear the thought process of someone who holds the belief that "If you don't get it, there's no point in discussing it", who nonetheless thinks a discussion forum is the ideal platform on which to express that view. It seems contradictory to me, but i'm sure it seems consistent in some way to @Wayfarer, hence the question. I'm not going to feign a objective, third-party indifference, it really annoys me. But that doesn't render my interest disingenuous.
Do you respond to each and every post, or do you make choices, like Wayfarer?
No, I don't respond to each and every post, and yes I do make choices like Wayfarer. What has that to do with the very specific question of taking agreement about the matter under discussion to be a prerequisite for discussing that matter?
So you think there's no [s]essential[/s] ontological difference between beings and devices?
Not an ontological difference, no; not a difference in the kind of stuff they're made out of. (I'm ignoring for our purposes here your peculiar use of "beings" as something more specific than "things that exist", since devices of course are things that exist and so "beings" in the usual sense).
The other point is, cameras are built and operated by humans. They have no ability to decide or intend, nor is there anything about them that is even analogous to those abilities, which are intrinsic to human beings. How can that not count as an ontological difference?
Those are important functional differences between humans and cameras, but there's no reason why that functional difference has to entail they're made of different kinds of stuff. There's also a huge functional difference between a rock and a camera, or further still between air and a camera, but there's no debate about them having to be made of stuff that's metaphysically, ontologically dissimilar to accommodate those differences.
And I didn’t ask, can you can recognise the ontological distinction being made in the passage quoted?
That's the distinction between form and substance. The question at hand is whether there are irreconcilably different kinds of substances (i.e. stuff that's not just a different form of some other stuff), or at least irreconcilably different kinds of properties of those substances; not a question of whether there's a difference between something having a form (or function, as above) and being made of a certain kind of stuff.
But within the analogy, the person taking the photo/video is ontologically different from both the image and the camera.
That's the claim in question here. The argument offered in support of it was that an observer isn't present in the stuff they're observing. But a camera isn't present in the images it records, yet it's uncontroversially made of the same kind of stuff, so why can't an observer be made of the same kind of stuff they're observing?
Nope, supernaturalism was what I objected to. Dualism, at least my garden variety, is a natural, common sensical philosophy. It's not really about demons and fairies.
Supernaturalism just is transcendentalism about ontology: the claim that there are aspects of reality that are beyond empirical observation. Demons and fairies as usually conceived, if they existed at all, would be empirically observable and so natural, not supernatural. You're confusing "supernatural" with "paranormal".
Indeed, this difference is not about the map being magical or supernatural.
Then it's not about dualism in the usual philosophical sense under discussion here. If the map and the territory can be made of the same kind of stuff, and have only the ontologically same kind of properties, then the map-territory relation is not a dualist relationship in the usual philosophical sense, and calling that "dualism" is needlessly confusing.
I'm wondering why you post in a discussion forum if the qualification for having a discussion is agreeing with you about the main point under discussion.
Again, it’s not a matter of agreeing or disagreeing, but seeing the point of the argument you’re taking issue with - which you're not. If the contention is that a camera is the equivalent of, or the same as, the human subject I don't see anything to debate, because it's a simple falsehood. Devices and beings are ontologically distinct. You don't murder a camera, and you can't repair a human being. Yesterday it was that the concept of pain was no different to pain. There's a pattern here, isn't there?
A camera does not film itself; you can't see the camera on film. Does that require that the camera be an ontologically different kind of thing than the things the camera is filming?
No it doesn't - but it's also not a valid objection, because it's only indirectly comparable. What I'm saying that we don't see is the way in which the mind, the subject, constructs or creates what we understand as the real world. We constantly interpret what we see to make our worldview. Heck even neuroscientists see that, although they don't always grasp the philosophical implications.
What the ontological (and epistemological) issue is, is that the mind doesn't see the role it plays in this world-construction. Seeing that is which is what critical philosophy is. Most people are naive realists, which sounds a pejorative, but it's really not, it simply means taking the world at face value, not questioning appearances. It's difficult to question the realist perspective but that is what is required.
(I'm ignoring for our purposes here your peculiar use of "beings" as something more specific than "things that exist",
Humans are beings, they are called 'human beings'. If you think that's peculiar, the problem is yours. And I do think that there are philosophical distinctions between the terms 'being', 'reality', and 'existence' - such distinctions are the stuff of metaphysics, which is different to the stuff that you think everything is made from.
Humans are beings, they are called 'human beings'. If you think that's peculiar, the problem is yours.
That's not peculiar at all, but it also makes perfect sense if "being" is taken to mean "thing that exists", rather than... "transcendent subject of experience" or whatever you take it to mean.
Reply to Pfhorrest You're obfuscating a very real, and very fundamental, distinction in philosophy, in fact even in ordinary discourse, between objects, objectivism, objective view, and subjects, subjects of experience, beings. But then, this is a consequence of your philosophical view, which has conditioned you to ignore this distinction.
If Elon Musk does succeed in going to Mars, would he expect to find anything there answering to the description of 'a being'?
Then it's not about dualism in the usual philosophical sense under discussion here. If the map and the territory can be made of the same kind of stuff, and have only the ontologically same kind of properties, then the map-territory relation is not a dualist relationship in the usual philosophical sense, and calling that "dualism" is needlessly confusing.
:100: :up: The map/territory – form/material – distinction is a fold (origami-like ... or wave-on-the-ocean movement) rather than a connecting (of separate - 'ontologically different' - domains).
Again, it’s not a matter of agreeing or disagreeing, but seeing the point of the argument you’re taking issue with - which you're not. If the contention is that a camera is the equivalent of, or the same as, the human subject I don't see anything to debate, because it's a simple falsehood.
Are you just being evangelical here or can you genuinely not see the difference between something seeming to you to be the case and something actually being the case? You write as if you genuinely don't understand the concept of people disagreeing about some particular class of belief.
You write as if you genuinely don't understand the concept of people disagreeing about some particular class of belief.
The two cases in question are: whether a camera is a being, and whether the concept of pain is painful. As regards the latter, I said that the assertion was so unreasonable as not to warrant a response. That is why I resist getting drawn into pointless arguments with you.
Reply to Pfhorrest The other point you haven't addressed is the dualism of symbols on the one hand, and physical matter, on the other. That is an excellent starting point for this analysis, because it shows that your assertion that it's all the 'same stuff' doesn't hold up.
The two cases in question are: whether a camera is a being, and whether the concept of pain is painful. As regards the latter, I said that the assertion was so unreasonable as not to warrant a response.
I see. So just a failure to understand the argument then. I thought it might be something more interesting. Or are you just deliberately straw-manning the opposing position to avoid the difficulty of addressing it?
No one has said anything like "cameras are beings" (in the sense you mean it), and no one has said that the concept of pain is painful.
If you don't understand the counter-arguments you're presented with, you can just seek clarity, you don't have to just throw in the towel.
So when people do not respond to your post, they are at fault
Never mentioned 'fault', nor did I say anything about failure to respond to posts either. I don't know what this wierd line of enquiry of yours is headed toward, but it's becoming increasingly detached from anything actually being said.
When you have a thought, an experience, a sensation, this doesn't occur to you as an object, obviously. If a rock hits you, then the rock is an object, but the pain it causes you is not an object. Isn't that obvious?
— Wayfarer
Not at all. I can model the pain as an activity in neural circuits. It's seems quite clearly like an object to me.
You implied that other people's criteria for not responding to your post may not be as rational as your criteria to not respond to their post. I am just amused at your lack of self-awareness.
You implied that other people's criteria for not responding to your post may not be as rational as your criteria to not respond to their post.
I didn't once make an assertion about what was actually the case regarding rationality of people's criteria. I said quite clearly and deliberately that it seemed that way to me. In fact I made a point of saying that I assumed it would all make sense to Wayfarer, and when you directly asked me if mine was an assumption I answered "of course". I really can't fathom how you've gleaned from all that the idea the I've condemned Wayfarer's approach as irrational and that's an end to it. Were that the case I would have nothing to ask would I?
You're obfuscating a very real, and very fundamental, distinction in philosophy, in fact even in ordinary discourse, between objects, objectivism, objective view, and subjects, subjects of experience, beings. But then, this is a consequence of your philosophical view, which has conditioned you to ignore this distinction.
I completely recognize the object-subject distinction, I just don't think it's a distinction between kinds of stuff but rather roles in an interaction. But more to the point, I just find your use of the words "existence" vs "being" to mean about the same as "object" vs "subject" to be idiosyncratic and not in keeping with the usual way those words are used in philosophy.
If Elon Musk does succeed in going to Mars, would he expect to find anything there answering to the description of 'a being'?
Yes; though I do recognize that in colloquial (non-philosophical) usage in that context it might be taken to mean "creature", a living thing, probably an animal, even an intelligent human-like one perhaps, in which case no. But we're talking philosophy here, not colloquialisms.
That's the distinction between form and substance. The question at hand is whether there are irreconcilably different kinds of substances (i.e. stuff that's not just a different form of some other stuff), or at least irreconcilably different kinds of properties of those substances; not a question of whether there's a difference between something having a form (or function, as above) and being made of a certain kind of stuff.
I just find your use of the words "existence" vs "being" to mean about the same as "object" vs "subject" to be idiosyncratic and not in keeping with the usual way those words are used in philosophy.
If philosophy uses words differently than the every-day use of the words, is philosophy talking about a different world than everyone else when they use those words? If philosphy is an attempt to explain the world and our relationship in it, you would think that we would all be using the same words in the same way - philosophically or not.
You don't murder a camera, and you can't repair a human being.
You don't throw a magnetic field. And you don't measure the intensity and direction of a rock. Does that make rocks and magnetic fields ontologically distinct?
What I'm saying that we don't see is the way in which the mind, the subject, constructs or creates what we understand as the real world. We constantly interpret what we see to make our worldview. Heck even neuroscientists see that, although they don't always grasp the philosophical implications.
And everyone agrees.
What they don't agree with is going from that to saying that the mind is ontologically distinct. It doesn't logically follow.
The other point you haven't addressed is the dualism of symbols on the one hand, and physical matter, on the other.
Even if one admits such a dualism it wouldn't make one a substance dualist. Because symbols are not a substance, or they don't need to be.
A triangle doesn't exist in the same way a rock does. The triangle, is the expression of a certain structure. It is not a new substance. One could propose a "mental substance" that the triangle is made of but again I ask: Why would one need to do that? It doesn't seem to bring any advantages, and brings plenty of problems.
I think it's getting a bit better. It's a shame Hanover picked substance dualism to defend as it's an awfully easy target. Not that 180's done a very good job of tackling it. The simple question "What's your solution to the interaction problem?" could have saved a few pages.
Reply to Protagoras I was actually just thinking how much I'd like to see 180 debating something serious with someone serious. Two magic-stuff-is-real debates with people unable or unwilling to defend the proposition they've volunteered to defend until they've seen 180's attack of the same, descending into "well, define it and then I know what I'm defending" pointlessness. *shrug*
I completely recognize the object-subject distinction, I just don't think it's a distinction between kinds of stuff but rather roles in an interaction.
Hanover uses a semantic distinction in place of an ontological one: physical means natural and therefore non-physical means supernatural. In place of supernatural we could substitute unnatural and therefore mind and thought are unnatural.
It is not an abstract 'subject' that sees things, but some particular thing that sees things. While it is true that it does not see itself seeing, it does not follow that it stands outside of the world of things as the early Wittgenstein had it, or that seeing is not a physical process that some physical things are capable of.
There is a fundamental distinction between a house that is the object of thought and a house I can live in, but both are things made, both the result of human activity. The "thinking thing" is not some part of me, the thinking thing is me.
What is the difference between the map and the territory, in your opinion?
A map is a compressed copy of the territory: a map stores information about the territory in a smaller amount of space. This can be literally smaller physical space, as in a paper map of a geographic territory, or it can be informational space, as in compressing a file on a computer. In either case the compression can be either lossy, saving space by leaving out irrelevant details, or lossless, saving space by identifying patterns in the underlying territory and representing instances of those patterns symbolically rather than actually repeating the same information over and over again.
If philosophy uses words differently than the every-day use of the words, is philosophy talking about a different world than everyone else when they use those words?
No, just using a slightly different language, a different dialect if you will.
If philosphy is an attempt to explain the world and our relationship in it, you would think that we would all be using the same words in the same way - philosophically or not.
It's not at all unusual for different subsets of a linguistic community to develop slight differences in their use of language. While I can easily think of some exceptions to this, I would suspect that philosophical language usage is typically more conservative, sticking to the older uses of words, while colloquial usage changes more over time due to the accumulation of errors and misunderstandings by less-educated laypeople.
I completely recognize the object-subject distinction, I just don't think it's a distinction between kinds of stuff but rather roles in an interaction
Roles are performed by actors. You wouldn’t describe the interaction between minerals in those terms. You use the word ‘stuff’ as in ‘all the same stuff’ so indiscriminately as to be meaningless. The point about the dualism implied by signs and symbols, is that it comprises the relationship between signs, not the relationship between objects or any kind of 'stuff'.
You wouldn’t describe the interaction between minerals in those terms.
In chemistry we do that all the time: whether something is an acid or base, for instance, is defined by its role in an interaction with another substance.
The point about the dualism implied by signs and symbols, is that it comprises the relationship between signs, not the relationship between objects or any kind of 'stuff'.
Then it's not dualism in the sense under discussion here, and conflating it with that sense only causes unnecessary confusion.
How do you define "physical substance" and "non-physical substance"?
— Hanover
Nature and imagined, respectively.
— 180 Proof
Phenomena, nature, is 'what appears' - but what appears is always subject to judgement and interpretation. That is what 'apperception' is. And those acts do not inhere in nature, but in the observing mind.
In chemistry we do that all the time: whether something is an acid or base, for instance, is defined by its role in an interaction with another substance.
And none of that requires, or involves, the 'roles' of 'subject and object'. Roles require actors, and chemical substances are not actors - well, not unless you want to argue for panpsychism.
The point about the dualism implied by signs and symbols, is that it comprises the relationship between signs, not the relationship between objects or any kind of 'stuff'.
— Wayfarer
Then it's not dualism in the sense under discussion here, and conflating it with that sense only causes unnecessary confusion.
I'm not the one who is confused. Reifying 'substance' as 'stuff', as 'something that exists', as 'mind stuff', or whatever is the problem. There is no 'mind-stuff' as an objective fact - 'mind' is 'what interprets'. But you can't stand outside that, as whatever you think is always the product of it. So not being able to do that, we then externalise it, look for it as something objective, and then ask 'well, where is it?' But it's nowhere to be found. You have to 'turn the eye around' and look at what is looking.
So that quotation from Howard Pattee about the relationship of the symbolic and the physical is much nearer to actual dualism than what is being discussed, which is predicated on the self-contradictory notion of 'mental stuff'. That's where the confusion lies.
Reply to Wayfarer How anthropomorphic of you. Quarks, for instance, do not "appear". More than 99% of nature is very much not "what appears". Stop confusing yourself.
And none of that requires, or involves, the 'roles' of 'subject and object'. Roles require actors, and chemical substances are not actors - well, not unless you want to argue for panpsychism.
I didn't say that those were the roles of subject and object specifically, but they are nevertheless roles in an interaction, in the usual way that chemists talk about that.
I do argue for panpsychism in any case, but that's not the point here.
a map stores information about the territory in a smaller amount of space.
Yes, a map is a symbolic and simplified representation of a territory, made for a certain purpose e.g. facilitating the analysis of, or navigation within the territory.
So the map is made for a specific objective, a certain type of use, a teleology. It implies a goal, or several goals.
These goals drive the kind of simplification applied when building the map. The features of the territory that have no import for the goal are not represented. For instance, roads maps -- designed to facilitate road travel and transportation -- typically do not represent vegetation cover or elevation.
Without such simplification the map would be useless, or more precisely, it would have no advantage compared to the territory. It would also be impossible to build.
Finally, the map is static while the territory is dynamic. The map represents a state of the territory at time t. There are exceptions to this, eg chronograms that map space-time. But the chronogram itself is drawn at time t.
In the case of man-made maps or the regular kind, the map is given some stable material support e.g. written down on paper. What is written down is a symbolic, mind-derived map, a mental map. All man-made maps are mental maps, originally.
Therefore the relationship between map and territory is not symetrical. The "roles" cannot be reversed. There is an fundamental epistemic cut between them. If we were to explore a new planet, and found a map carved on some stone of the nearby terrain, we would conclude that a conscious being carved it.
Now, where does that lead us re. Dualism vs. Monism?
The mind itself can be seen as a geographer, drawing upon a collection of mental maps, constantly updated. Since there is no form without matter, even mental maps (mental symbolic representations of the world) must be coded onto some physical support.
It stands to reason that they are written down on neurons.
This is a dualist perspective in the sense that mental events are recorded onto neurons (and from neurons onto paper or other material support) for later recalling into the mental world. It's mind over matter.
Now my challenge to you is to make sense of the map-territory relationship in monist language.
The mind itself can be seen as a geographer, drawing upon a collection of mental maps, constantly updated.
Or a cartographer rather, yes. Good analogy. We make actual mental maps to navigate. These are models of geography, one of many kinds of models of the world made by the brain which we can think of as maps of a kind (a map of how to behave, for instance).
Reply to Olivier5 But each page is made of the same kind of stuff. There's no ontological distinction between maps of Italy and maps of France. Every mental map, however many different ones there are, are made of the same kind of neurons.
This is just form and substance again. Nobody is denying that there is a difference between those. The disagreement is about whether there’s more than one kind of substance. (Or property thereof).
Property
"In logic and philosophy (especially metaphysics), a property is a characteristic of an object; a red object is said to have the property of redness. The property may be considered a form of object in its own right, able to possess other properties."
Let us take a few classic properties of geographic maps such as scale; projection type; purpose of the map, which drives the simplification process as explained; date of issue and author; place or thing represented.
What's the scale of a rabbit?
What's the purpose of a comet?
What's the projection type of a tomato?
What's the date of issue and the author of a stone?
Physical things have different properties than other physical things, but they’re still all physical properties, so pointing out properties that some things have and others don’t doesn’t establish the need for ontologically different kinds of properties.
Physical things have different properties than other physical things, but they’re still all physical properties, so pointing out properties that some things have and others don’t doesn’t establish the need for ontologically different kinds of properties.
To me, things that are representations of other things (such as maps) have certain properties that relate to their representation aspect, such as scale, which is the ratio (relation) between two things: the size of objects on the map divided by their size in the territory (supposed constant in geographic maps). Things that are NOT representations of other things do not have these properties. What is the materiality of such a thing as the scale of a map?
Beside, a map can be printed on many copies, each of which is a different material thing, but the map itself is one. It's the same map on all copies. A map can be translated into another language, and it will look differently on paper but essentially it remains the same map. So the map is more abstract a form than just the paper form on which it is printed. This abstraction of maps vis-à-vis both the territory and the map's physical support is very difficult to think in a monist logic.
It stands to reason that they are written down on neurons. — Olivier5
You should have a glance at this.
In what way do you think representational drift makes any difference to the robustness of the conclusion that representations are written down on neurons?
Beside, a map can be printed on many copies, each of which is a different material thing, but the map itself is one. It's the same map on all copies.
Only if you beg the question already. The map of my local area in my car is not the same map as the map of my local area on my bookcase. There are differences at the microscopic level even to the arrangement of the symbols. It's only 'the same' because we take the expression 'the same' in common language to mean similar enough for our purposes. Here the purpose is to navigate my local area. It's no different to saying two people have the same hairstyle. We're not saying they literally have every single hair in the same place, just similar enough for our purposes.
So all you have in identifying some unifying theme which is constant between two maps of the same area is a linguistic convention, not an ontological distinction. If it were an ontological distinction it would not be possible for me to claim they were not the same, by pointing out microscopic differences. If I do so, you'd have to say "those differences are not enough", which is a subjective judgement about purposes, not an objective one about what kinds of thing exist and of what substance.
Reply to Isaac Isn’t ‘writing’ itself a form of representation? It has to be metaphor, right? Secondly, that article shows that even for simple stimulus and response, there’s no 1:1 correlation between particular regions of the mouse brain and the response to the stimulus.
The neurons that represented the smell of an apple in May and those that represented the same smell in June were as different from each other as those that represent the smells of apples and grass at any one time.
So I am questioning the idea that neurons ‘represent’ ideas or that ‘ideas’ are ‘written’ on them. There’s something like a mixed metaphor at work here. ‘Writing’ is of course a form of symbolic communication, whereas whatever is conducted between brain cells comprises the exchange of ions and so on. Those don’t directly represent anything, rather, the brain seems to be able to respond with great flexibility while still maintaining the same content.
that article shows that even for simple stimulus and response, there’s no 1:1 correlation between particular regions of the mouse brain and the response to the stimulus.
questioning the idea that neurons ‘represent’ ideas or that ‘ideas’ are ‘written’ on them.
Ideas may be written on paper too, no? If I copy the idea from one page and then destroy the original, have I not preserved the idea? If such a process were carried out a thousand time by robots, the human reading it after the thousandth iteration would be reading the same idea. If the idea were not represented on paper and preserved through the process described, then how could the human reading it gain the idea?
It's no different to saying two people have the same hairstyle. We're not saying they literally have every single hair in the same place, just similar enough for our purposes.
Not really. It's the same map IFF it represents the same thing the same way, e.g. at the same scale, projection, and was authored by the same person at the same time.
It's the same map IFF it represents the same thing the same way, e.g. at the same scale, projection, and was authored by the same person at the same time.
Reply to Isaac Huh? Not at all. It's like a poem. Poems exist. They can be copied on many different support, but they are still the same poem. Two copies of the same map are two copies OF THE SAME MAP.
Ideas may be written on paper too, no? If I copy the idea from one page and then destroy the original, have I not preserved the idea?
Right, but what is preserved is an idea, information, a story. It can be represented in a variety of media and many different languages or systems, including binary code. But the idea stays the same, while the material form is different - which I think is an argument in favour of dualism.
but what is preserved is an idea, information, a story. It can be represented in a variety of media and many different languages or systems, including binary code. But the idea stays the same
See my comment to Oliver above. The idea does not stay the same, only similar enough for our purposes, so there's no unity requiring a separate existence, only a façon de parler.
I am questioning the idea that neurons ‘represent’ ideas or that ‘ideas’ are ‘written’ on them. There’s something like a mixed metaphor at work here. ‘
Ideas must be written down on something to exist, and to have any effect on things. An idea written nowhere, not even in some dude's memory, is not presently in existence or in any way active in this present world.
If your article is correct, which it probably is (and brain plasticity in general is well established), it follows that ideas exist in some 'mental space', and that they are written down on neurons but not written forever, only they are written and rewritten and rewritten, always slightly differently, and (maybe) our ideas evolve as a result of this constant rewriting.
I can assure you that if you present me with the same smell every day for a month, at first I may think :yum: and at the end :vomit:
If your article is correct, which it probably is (and brain plasticity in general is well established), it follows that ideas exist in some 'mental space', and that they are written down on neurons but not written forever, only they are written and rewritten and rewritten, always slightly differently, and (maybe) our ideas evolve as a result of this constant rewriting.
It's not just the act of "writing", but also recalling. From where do we recall our ideas/memories? Our memories are not composed of neurons, but colors, shapes, sounds and feelings. When you recall the visual of a neuron, is not the neuron composed of shapes and colors? So which is more fundamental - neurons or shapes and colors? And are not shapes and colors a type of information?
In what way is that a reply to the argument raised? I still see 7 names similar enough for me to pronounce them the same and bring the same city to mind on reading them. Similar enough for our purposes, but not the same entity.
I cannot unravel a true logical contradiction as it’s been phrased and it’s why the interaction problem remains unsolved for many hundred years. The way out of a definitional contradiction necessarily involves clarification of definitions.
If the distinction is made between physical and mental substances then the interaction problem must be confronted. Has Hanover solved the problem by clarifying definitions?
Yes. 'The same' as in similar enough for our purposes. There's not a unity there requiring a separate ontological existence. The names are clearly dissimilar in many ways too.
To think there is not a difference between a coffee table and your feelings is nonsense.
To think there's not a difference between my coffee table and your coffee table is also nonsense. thankfully, no one is making such a claim so we need not concern ourselves with it.
Coffee tables have a similarity,they are both made from matter.
Feelings are not.
That's just restating your position, not addressing the argument. The issue in question is whether it can be demonstrated that feelings are not matter, that you believe they're not is not in question.
Why would anyone give a fuck what your feelings say? This is a discussion forum. If you've got nothing more to bring to the table than that your feelings say one position is correct and another incorrect then your contribution is worthless. We're discussing, not conducting a poll.
Yes. 'The same' as in similar enough for our purposes. There's not a unity there requiring a separate ontological existence. The names are clearly dissimilar in many ways too.
Why would anyone give a fuck what your feelings say? This is a discussion forum. If you've got nothing more to bring to the table than that your feelings say one position is correct and another incorrect then your contribution is worthless.
:100: This Dunning-Kruger troll is completely incorrigible on this point. S/He won't "feel good" about your reply either.
What's great about having a scientist a neuroscientist here is you get to see the full bigotry and unedited dogma of these guys that are doing all this "research" into the brain...
And the image of the scientist as some unbiased observor collecting the data without any metaphysical assumptions or baggage is destroyed.
Cheers @Isaac ,you have done a great service showing how researchers are human,all too human. You are religious in your beliefs and assumptions!
As if a few expensive scanners and petty research disproves pain,or proves you are a bunch of atoms floating about!
Ideas must be written down on something to exist, and to have any effect on things. An idea written nowhere, not even in some dude's memory, is not presently in existence or in any way active in this present world.
You're trying to locate ideas in the physical world, but I think they're real in a different sense to existent phenomena. They're real as principles, as ideas although not simply the casual thoughts that occupy our minds moment to moment. But the domain of ideas is not dependent on the physical domain, rather they are the organising principles which underlie and inform the physical domain. This of course goes back to the Aristotelian idea of formal cause, which was abandoned by early modern science, although some say it's making a comeback.
The same name can be 'materialized' in many different manners, but it's still the same name.
The key thing here, is 'equals' or 'means' or 'same as' or 'different to'. We see equivalences between many different strings of characters or symbolic forms, which is what makes language possible. What are we seeing, when we say that 'this equals that' or 'this means that'? We take for granted this ability, but really it is at the foundation of rationality, it is an awesome power. We casually accept that this is something that 'evolved', as if that amounts to an explanation for it.
This, of course, touches on the whole question of universals, which I describe as 'the ligatures of reason'. It goes without saying that naturalist philosophy is invariably nominalist, so it never sees the causal connections between reason and being that underlies traditional philosophy.
(I will acknowledge that nobody else here believes these ideas.)
What is the materiality of such a thing as the scale of a map?
What is the "materiality" of my height in meters? They're the same kind of thing. Relational properties aren't metaphysically spooky, they're normal kinds of things that normal physical things have all the time.
Beside, a map can be printed on many copies, each of which is a different material thing, but the map itself is one. It's the same map on all copies. A map can be translated into another language, and it will look differently on paper but essentially it remains the same map. So the map is more abstract a form than just the paper form on which it is printed. This abstraction of maps vis-à-vis both the territory and the map's physical support is very difficult to think in a monist logic.
That's the form-substance distinction again, which as stated already is not something anybody is denying: you can have multiple things of the same form. The question at hand is whether there's more than one kind of underlying substance, such that you can't in principle trans-form one kind of thing to another because those kinds of things have to be made of different stuff, e.g. such that you can't in principle transform a bunch of CO2 and H2O and misc other chemicals into a self-aware thinking person.
Then what use is the term, "physical" if it doesn't distinguish from something else?
Some people suppose that things that aren't physical exist, things that (as above) you can't get by changing the form of some physical stuff. It's only the supposition of some other kind of stuff, that's fundamentally discontinuous with all of the ordinary stuff we're familiar with like that, that calls for the need of a term for that ordinary stuff.
You're trying to locate ideas in the physical world, but I think they're real in a different sense to existent phenomena. They're real as principles, as ideas although not simply the casual thoughts that occupy our minds moment to moment. But the domain of ideas is not dependent on the physical domain, rather they are the organising principles which underlie and inform the physical domain.
But this still wouldn’t make ideas a substance. Do you think a triangle (the idea, not a physical triangle) is a substance? A holder of properties?
If so, what would happen if you removed the “triangle substance” from a dorito?
Incidentally, I agree with the above. What you mean by “organizing principles” is what I meant by “structure” and “pattern”
Pfhorrest put it really well as I was typing this:
That's the form-substance distinction again, which as stated already is not something anybody is denying: you can have multiple things of the same form. The question at hand is whether there's more than one kind of underlying substance
A form/structure/organizing principle is not its own a substance. Or at least, doesn’t need to be.
Do you think a triangle (the idea, not a physical triangle) is a substance? A holder of properties?
[quote=Feser]Consider that when you think about triangularity, as you might when proving a geometrical theorem, it is necessarily perfect triangularity that you are contemplating, not some mere approximation of it. Triangularity as your intellect grasps it is entirely determinate or exact; for example, what you grasp is the notion of a closed plane figure with three perfectly straight sides, rather than that of something which may or may not have straight sides or which may or may not be closed. Of course, your mental image of a triangle might not be exact, but rather indeterminate and fuzzy. But to grasp something with the intellect is not the same as to form a mental image of it. For any mental image of a triangle is necessarily going to be of an isosceles triangle specifically, or of a scalene one, or an equilateral one; but the concept of triangularity that your intellect grasps applies to all triangles alike. Any mental image of a triangle is going to have certain features, such as a particular color, that are no part of the concept of triangularity in general. A mental image is something private and subjective, while the concept of triangularity is objective and grasped by many minds at once.[/quote]
[quote=Bertrand Russell, The World of Universals; https://russell-j.com/07-POP09.HTM] It is largely the very peculiar kind of being that belongs to universals which has led many people to suppose that they are really mental. We can think of a universal, and our thinking then exists in a perfectly ordinary sense, like any other mental act. Suppose, for example, that we are thinking of whiteness. Then in one sense it may be said that whiteness is 'in our mind'. ...In the strict sense, it is not whiteness that is in our mind, but the act of thinking of whiteness. The connected ambiguity in the word 'idea'...also causes confusion here. In one sense of this word, namely the sense in which it denotes the object of an act of thought, whiteness is an 'idea'. Hence, if the ambiguity is not guarded against, we may come to think that whiteness is an 'idea' in the other sense, i.e. an act of thought; and thus we come to think that whiteness is mental. But in so thinking, we rob it of its essential quality of universality. One man's act of thought is necessarily a different thing from another man's; one man's act of thought at one time is necessarily a different thing from the same man's act of thought at another time. Hence, if whiteness were the thought as opposed to its object, no two different men could think of it, and no one man could think of it twice. That which many different thoughts of whiteness have in common is their object, and this object is different from all of them. Thus universals are not thoughts, though when known they are the objects of thoughts.
What you mean by “organizing principles” is what I meant by “structure” and “pattern”
I would agree, with the caveat that these structures and patterns are not material. Rather, they show up as patterns and structures in material forms, but they are logically prior to material form. They are what 'informs' matter. I think in some schools of traditional philosophy, this is known as the 'formal realm', that being the domain of forms, regularities and principles. It was that domain which Plato had intuitive insight into. (I haven't been able to track down the reference to the 'formal realm', however.)
Some people suppose that things that aren't physical exist,
It's more that 'ideas' in the above sense are real, in that they provide the bounding principles for thought, and also for phenomena, in that they manifest as principles. But they're not physical - they exist as bounds, limits, principles, and regularities. That's how I interpret the meaning of universals.
What you interpret as 'what exists', is always that which can be made an object - which is why you think of it as 'stuff'. What I'm referring to here, is the structure of thought, and also the structure of reality. But you won't find that understanding in modern science, because of the influence of nominalism.
That's the form-substance distinction again, which as stated already is not something anybody is denying:
Well then we agree. I see this distinction as fundamentally dualistic. I note that you have not even tried to express the map-territory relation in monist language.
I also note you sport yourself as a panpsychic, which I take as being the dualist view where tables have thoughts (but no sex, for some odd reason).
What are we seeing, when we say that 'this equals that' or 'this means that'? We take for granted this ability, but really it is at the foundation of rationality, it is an awesome power.
I agree. Any comparison between two objects involves abstraction, ie thinking of pure forms (seeing the form as independent of its material substrate). And we certainly have this capacity to think in abstract forms, such as in mathematics. But from there, it does not follow (I think) that pure abstract forms exist elsewhere than as hypotheses in our mind. (which is a form of existence)
Not sure what difference it makes in practice, to hypothetise the existence of pure forms outside of minds. What do you see as the methodological or conceptual advantage? How does it help you think?
I would agree, with the caveat that these structures and patterns are not material.
But they are structures of material stuff. Always. So in the end the number of "kinds of stuff" that exist is still 1.
Sure we can talk of the structures without there being any material thing that takes on that structure (we can talk of triangles even if no triangular objects exist), but even there, all that exists is matter, and forms of matter. Not matter and another substance.
But they're not physical - they exist as bounds, limits, principles, and regularities.
The structures are not material, in the sense that they don't have any mass (triangle, the idea, has no mass, but a dorito has mass). But usually when we talk of the structures of physical stuff we call those "physical" too. Like sound waves. We call sound waves physical, even though a wave is just a pattern of air, and a pattern has no mass.
In any case, the disagreement seems to be on whether or not to call structures physical or non physical. Not actually on what exists. Which is matter and its structures.
But they are structures of material stuff. Always. So in the end the number of "kinds of stuff" that exist is still 1.
Material stuff which could not exist without those forms. So they’re prior to matter, and they’re not physical in nature. They don’t have to exist - things do the hard work of existing - but things depend on them for existence.
Asserting it doesn't constitute an argument. You agreed that the word (binomial) 'New York' is a name. There are seven such words on that page so it follows that there are seven names on that page also. Nowhere is it given that there is one of anything on that page, that's the case you want to make, but instead of arguing for it you keep resorting to simply asserting it.
You agreed that the word (binomial) 'New York's is a name. There are seven such words on that page so it follows that there are seven names on that page also
You are using confused concepts.
"New York" is a place name composed of two words: the word "New" and the word "York".
There are 14 words written on that page, 7 instances of "New" and 7 instances of "York". So there are 7 instances of the name "New York" on the page. Not 7 different names. The city of New York doesn't have one name in Cherif and another in Sans Cherif and another in Gothic and another in Arial. It is one name for one city.
The point is that a single concept such as "New York" can be written several times on a page, in many different ways. Likewise, I suspect that the same concept can be written on neurons in many different ways.
"New York" is a place name composed of two words: the word "New" and the word "York".
That's what a binomial is. I labelled it as such a few posts ago. It's irrelevant to the issue. Had you chosen Boston, we could have simply used 'word'.
there are 7 instances of the name "New York" on the page. Not 7 different names.
You're just asserting again. Do you understand the concept of making a case? I already know what you think, you've made that quite clear already. There's a unity called 'the name'. I want to know why you think that, not just twenty different ways of telling me that you think that.
What you interpret as 'what exists', is always that which can be made an object - which is why you think of it as 'stuff'.
If what you're talking about is not 'what exists', 'objects', 'stuff', etc, then what you're saying is not in disagreement with anything I'm saying. I'm only talking about what kind of things, stuff, objects, etc, exist. There can be forms, patterns, organizations, structures, etc, to those things, objects, that stuff, etc, that exists; and in that sense, those forms, patterns, organizations, structures exist too, but not as different kind of things, objects, or stuff, just as forms, patterns, etc, of that one kind of stuff.
And when you really get down to my own view on things, in an important sense there isn't really any "stuff" at all; there is only form, only structure, and in saying that there's "only one kind of stuff" I'm really saying that all forms and structures are in principle trans-formable into each other; all of the apparent different "kinds of stuff" are just different forms of the same one kind of stuff, at which point there's not really any point in talking about "kinds of stuff" anymore, just about forms. The only point of talking about kinds of stuff is to discuss whether or not (stuff or things or objects or whatever of) one form can be trans-formed into (whatever of) a different form, e.g. can a bunch of quarks and electrons etc get transformed somehow over billions of years into a thinking experiencing human being, or not? If changing the form can't get you from one kind of whatever to another kind of whatever, then it's implied that there's something besides form "underlying", or "sub-standing" if you will, the difference between the whatevers; some sort of different kinds of sub-stance. If there's only one kind of substance, we needn't ever talk about it, as in...
I note that you have not even tried to express the map-territory relation in monist language.
I expressed the map-territory relationship in a way that didn't require talking about different kinds of substances or properties, which is thus completely compatible with ontological monism. There isn't any specifically "monist language": monist language is just ordinary language.
I also note you sport yourself as a panpsychic, which I take as being the dualist view where tables have thoughts
Panpsychism as I formulate it is not dualist in the ontological sense under discussion here. There's not different kinds of stuff or things, nor even different kinds of properties (like mental and material) of the same kind of stuff or things.
There's just two perspectives to take on any thing interacting with any other thing: as the thing being experienced, the object, or as the thing doing the experiencing, the subject; which on my account is identical with the thing doing something (every experiential property of a thing is just a propensity of that thing to do certain behaviors when interacted with in certain ways), or the thing being done-unto (every experience of something else is just that something else doing some behavior to you). Every thing can both do, and be done unto; and so can both be experienced, or experience.
But "experience" in this sense is not thought, belief, or even feeling, perception, or sensation. It's whatever the supposed difference between a real human being and a fully functional replica of a human being who is "not actually conscious" (a philosophical zombie) is supposed to be. Panpsychism like this -- the view that everything always has that je ne sais qua that a philosophical zombie is supposed to lack -- is just the only remaining option after you rule out the options that either (1) no such thing as consciousness in that sense actually exists, and (2) some kind of fundamentally irreducible magic makes it come fully into being for certain things but not at all for others, rather than just taking different forms in some things than others.
I expect you might want to call that a "dualist view", but not every distinction between two facets or aspects or whatever (like form and substance) constitutes a kind of "dualism".
I don't know what "prior" means here. Are we talking about a timeline? I don't think it makes sense to ask when "triangle", the structure, started existing for it to be prior to any triangular object.
Again, we call sound waves physical even though sound waves are a pattern of air and patterns don't have mass. Again, seems to me the disagreement is mainly whether or not to call these structures physical, not actually a disagreement over their nature.
They don’t have to exist - things do the hard work of existing - but things depend on them for existence.
Sure.
So, they don't exist as a substance (holder of properties), and things do the hard work of existing as substances, while conforming to certain structures. I would call that physicalism. Considering it includes one substance (physical stuff) conforming to certain structures (which are not a separate substance)
I expect you might want to call that a "dualist view", but not every distinction between two facets or aspects or whatever (like form and substance) constitutes a kind of "dualism".
Alrighty, tell me what you think then. Are you saying that the city of New York has many different names?
I've already given my account. We commonly say that 'New York' has one name, but it is a façon de parler, what we really have is multidudinous instances all of which are similar enough for our purposes. No additional entities required. I'm an Occham's razor kind of guy when it comes to ontology. I don't like to bring things into existence that don't seem necessary. The words (concepts, forms, ideals...whatever) as written, or in each individual mind seem to necessarily exist. There are seven of them on that page you posted. I don't see why a new entity, the unity 'the name's needs to be reified. It's sufficient that the seven necessary objects are similar.
But "experience" in this sense is not thought, belief, or even feeling, perception, or sensation. It's whatever the supposed difference between a real human being and a fully functional replica of a human being who is "not actually conscious" (a philosophical zombie) is supposed to be.
That is a rather strange definition of "experience", as equal to the difference between a real entity and a fictional one.
How does that definition apply to panpsychic tables? Let me guess:
[I]The table's experience is whatever the supposed difference between a real table and a fully functional replica of a table who is "not actually conscious" (a zombie table) is supposed to be.[/i]
We commonly say that 'New York' has one name, but it is a façon de parler, what we really have is multidudinous instances all of which are similar enough for our purposes.
We commonly say so because if we didn't, if we thought that New York has many different names that all share enough similarity, then our life would be far more complicated. We would have to define the boundaries of that similitude. Because we CAN recognised the same name New York written in seven different fonts on that pic I posted. So we would need another explanation of our recognizing New York than the common sense one (=it's the same mental concepts or "ideal mental forms", e.g. letters / words / name but simply written in different fonts, tweaking the shapes of the graphic symbols in a purely aesthetic manner, for the fun or beauty of it).
Now what would such a rival explanation be? Where would the boundaries of the "New York" similitude lie? What would it take for a scribble on a page to NOT be recognised as meaning "New York"?
We would have to define the boundaries of that similitude.
Why? We don't have to define the boundaries of similitude to understand "stand roughly here", nor do we doubt that high stakes poker is excluded from the definition of 'game' when instructed to "play a 'game' with the children".
We deal quite easily with nouns and names whose definitional boundaries are fuzzy at the edges.
we CAN recognised the same name New York written in seven different fonts on that pic I posted. So we would need another explanation of our recognizing New York than the common sense one
Labelling your own preferred position as 'the common sense one' is a cheap trick. We're talking about ontology here, there's no common sense account at all.
Where would the boundaries of the "New York" similitude lie? What would it take for a scribble on a page to NOT be recognised as meaning "New York"?
Are you suggesting that there exist no ambiguous cases? That there's no scribble I could make where some might read it as saying 'New York' and others might not? We do not need to define the boundaries of similitude. Core cases are used most of the time, edge cases are either ignored or simply remain ambiguous, unresolved. It's not an apocalyptic problem that some scribbles can only be ambiguousmy deciphered.
the common sense one (=it's the same mental concepts or "ideal mental forms", e.g. letters / words / name but simply written in different fonts,
A more complex and complete theory of typefaces and fonts exist, than the "common sense" one. A little detour via Wikipedia will convince you of that:
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Font
In metal typesetting, a font was a particular size, weight and style of a typeface. Each font was a matched set of type, with a piece (a "sort") for each glyph, and a typeface consisting of a range of fonts that shared an overall design.
In modern usage, with the advent of desktop publishing, "font" has come to be used as a synonym for "typeface" although a typical typeface (or 'font family') consists of a number of fonts.
For instance, the typeface "Bauer Bodoni" includes fonts "Regular", "Bold", "Italic" and Italic Bold and each of these exists in a variety of sizes. The term "font" is correctly applied to any one of these alone but may be seen used loosely to refer to the whole typeface. When used in computers, each style is in a separate digital "font file".
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Typeface
"Font family" redirects here.
A typeface is the design of lettering[1] that can include variations in size, weight (e.g. bold), slope (e.g. italic), width (e.g. condensed), and so on. Each of these variations of the typeface is a font.
There are thousands of different typefaces in existence, with new ones being developed constantly.
The art and craft of designing typefaces is called type design. Designers of typefaces are called type designers and are often employed by type foundries. In digital typography, type designers are sometimes also called font developers or font designers.
Every typeface is a collection of glyphs, each of which represents an individual letter, number, punctuation mark, or other symbol. The same glyph may be used for characters from different scripts, e.g. Roman uppercase A looks the same as Cyrillic uppercase ? and Greek uppercase alpha. There are typefaces tailored for special applications, such as cartography, astrology or mathematics.
Nothing in that demonstrates a 'common sense' notion of reifying ideal mental forms, so I'm baffled as to why you went to the trouble. As if anything I wrote suggested I was oblivious to the idea that fonts exist.
Why? We don't have to define the boundaries of similitude to understand "stand roughly here",
Actually we do, if we care to be understood we need to express ourselves clearly, and this means abiding to certain theoretical or practiced rules. What you write must be readable.
Labelling your own preferred position as 'the common sense one' is a cheap trick. We're talking about ontology here, there's no common sense account at all.
I have addressed that in quoting Wikipedia above. There's a full blown typographic theory out there that underpins all modern written communications.
Are you suggesting that there exist no ambiguous cases? That there's no scribble I could make where some might read it as saying 'New York' and others might not?
No. I am suggesting a test to your theory: a test on which it fails. It is not practical, it doesn't tell you how to write New York so that the reader understands New York. We cannot use it to think and express ourselves simply and clearly about typography and writing. Your similitude is empty blah, with no clear pragmatic application in the art of writing.
It is not practical, it doesn't tell you how to write New York so that the reader understands New York. We cannot use it to think and express ourselves simply and clearly about typography and writing.
You've given no account of this failure.
Many fonts can be read as 'N' because they're all similar in ways close enough for the purpose.
That is a rather strange definition of "experience", as equal to the difference between a real entity and a fictional one.
I'm not the one who started talking about that concept; look at Chalmers or Block for blame on that (though it certainly goes back even further than them).
I think the obvious answer to the question "even if you arranged some non-living matter into the exact form and function of a real human being, such that it walked around and talked and lived life like a real human, and even reported on mental states it supposedly had, might there still be something missing that's not accounted for just by the functionality?" is "basically no".
But other people say "yes". Those are the real dualists.
Some people say "I suppose there could be in concept, but there never would be, because..." and then give different reasons:
- either that even real humans don't have that whatever-else, that "phenomenal consciousness" or "first-person experience",
- or that some kind of magic always happens to give that whatever-else to things with the right function, out of nowhere, not built up from other forms of it,
- or else (like me) that that whatever-else is already everywhere, in different forms of course, and all that differs is the form and function of things, nothing ontological or otherwise metaphysical.
How does that definition apply to panpsychic tables?
The table is ontologically and otherwise metaphysically no different from a human being; whatever je ne se qua a real human would have and a philosophical zombie would lack, even tables (and rocks and atoms) already have that. What differs between a table and a human being is their functionality, and consequently the particular form of their experience, which like its behavior is nothing much to speak of for a table.
What is 'N' standing for in this sentence, if not the idea of the one and only letter 'N'?
Depends on the circumstances. Here it might be something I would refer to with the vocalisation something like 'en'. If you put serifs on that printed letter, I would still refer to it with the same vocalisation. If you made it all curly and fancy I may still do so. It would still be similar enough to other printed letters I've heard referred to that way. If, however, you put a fourth line on it to make it look more like M, it would cease to be similar enough. It would look more similar to printed letters I've heard referred to by the vocalisation 'em', so I'd be more likely to use that.
Logically prior, i.e. must be real in order for matter to exist in the first place. In Platonic philosophy, forms don’t begin or cease to exist, which is what makes them transcendent with respect to phenomena; they don't come into and go out of existence, like phenomena do.
Again, we call sound waves physical even though sound waves are a pattern of air and patterns don't have mass.
Sound waves are physical for sure. But what about the probability wave? Are those waves physical? I think not. They're distributions of possibility, of potentials with different degrees of reality [sup]1[/sup].
No, I’m arguing for substance dualism. Physicalism believes that mind is a result of matter, the product of the material brain, whereas dualism believes that mind is the cause as much as the result. This is not necessarily a theistic belief, arguably, theism appropriated ideas of that kind that already were in circulation in their culture.
The only point of talking about kinds of stuff is to discuss whether or not (stuff or things or objects or whatever of) one form can be trans-formed into (whatever of) a different form, e.g. can a bunch of quarks and electrons etc get transformed somehow over billions of years into a thinking experiencing human being, or not? If changing the form can't get you from one kind of whatever to another kind of whatever, then it's implied that there's something besides form "underlying", or "sub-standing" if you will, the difference between the whatevers; some sort of different kinds of sub-stance.
Well, I think there is are ontological differences between minerals, plants, animals, and humans (rational minds) - therefore that there are different substances (in the philosophical sense). That you can’t account for life and mind in terms of physics and chemistry. (I've been encouraged to learn that Ernst Mayr, who is considered a giant of 20th century biology, is likewise not reductionist. He says In The growth of biological thought , that 'the discovery of the genetic code was a breakthrough of the first order. It showed why organisms are fundamentally different from any kind of non-living material. There is nothing in the inanimate world that has a genetic program which stores information with a history of three thousand million years!’)
The 'something else' is obviously not something on the table of elements, then. In it's most primitive form, it manifests as homeostasis, the ability to maintain stability, to grow, heal, and reproduce. None of those characteristics are reducible to physics in this view.
"even if you arranged some non-living matter into the exact form and function of a real human being, such that it walked around and talked and lived life like a real human, and even reported on mental states it supposedly had, might there still be something missing that's not accounted for just by the functionality?" is "basically no".
This is done all the time. It's called reproduction, and I have no problem with it. Note the importance of EXACT FORM in the sentence. Form is what life is about. Whether you use these or those molecules of water makes no actual difference, but the form is what 'matters'.
My issue was rather with your definition of experience:
But "experience" in this sense is not thought, belief, or even feeling, perception, or sensation. It's whatever the supposed difference between a real human being and a fully functional replica of a human being who is "not actually conscious" (a philosophical zombie) is supposed to be.
In other words, you define experience as conscious experience... not sure that's more than a tautology, or that it makes much of a difference with "thought, belief, or even feeling, perception, or sensation".
My point is that conscious experience is fundamentally different from just matter or energy, not that it cannot be 'produced' or made to happen in this world.
So this discussion now circles around the ontological status of abstract forms, such as the letter N, conceived as an element of a set called alphabet.
As we all know, the invention of the alphabet or rather its derivation from earlier ideograms (the letter A for instance would derive from a stylized cow head, turned upside down) was a significant achievement in the history of writing, allowing a massive reduction in the number of distinct signs to learn.
If the alphabet does not really really exist, we have a problem.
So what is the ontological status of the alphabet? I would respond as follows: IFF the alphabet is said to exist as an abstract set, it becomes teachable to people and thus, it becomes a reality in their head. This allows them to do all sorts of amazing things like writing on TPF. If on the contrary the alphabet does not really exist as one abstract thing, it cannot be taught and used. I prefer the first hypothesis, personally.
"Your 'A' is not similar enough to the ideal mental form for 'A', try again."
"Your 'A' is not similar enough to all the other 'As', try again."
What's wrong with the second teaching method? What does it fail to achieve by way of learning how to write?
It is less elegant, heavier conceptually, and more complex to teach. Qualitatively, it implies that all recognisable As are equivalent, which is not the case. They are variations on a theme, derivated from the ideal A by adding little bars at the bottom (sheriffs) or thickened strokes (bold) or what not. These variations themselves become easily teachable when seen as variations from some basic shape.
Just teach them the alphabet; it's easier. Whether the alphabet "exists" or not is a not-too-meaningful question. Whether it is a useful concept is the right question. And the answer is yes.
Absolute nonsense. Your approach creates an entirely unnecessary category of existence and then populates it with entities we can neither measure nor see which would require an entirely new branch of physics to govern their interaction with the material world. Mine just says if there's seven words on a page, there's seven words on a page. No hidden stuff, no new physics, no magic.
Your approach creates an entirely unnecessary category of existence
It's about concepts and their usefulness, not about their existence. Once the concepts of letters and numbers have been invented, we'd be fools not to use them.
Sound waves are physical for sure. But what about the probability wave? Are those waves physical?
Definitely, or we wouldn’t study them under “physics”
I think a better example for you would be algorithms. We don’t consider those physical (mostly though we don’t bother to ask the question), even though they’re a set of instructions for a physical computer (or anything) to follow. We’re not entirely consistent it seems to me when it comes to what we call physical.
Physicalism believes that mind is a result of matter, the product of the material brain, whereas dualism believes that mind is the cause as much as the result.
That’s not what either physicalism or dualism means. Physicalism is the belief that all that exists is physical substances. Dualism is the belief that there are 2 separate substances, one mental and one physical. You keep insisting that the mental, is not a substance, so you’re not a substance dualist.
You keep insisting that the mental, is not a substance, so you’re not a substance dualist.
OK, let me put it this way - mind is a substance in the philosophical sense, that is, it has properties (such as knowing) - but it is not something objective. It doesn't exist as an object of experience, but as the subject of experience. Can you see the distinction?
mind is a substance in the philosophical sense, that is, it has properties (such as knowing)
I think I get what you’re saying now. I’d still struggle to call it dualism.
Algorithms are specific forms that the hardware follows. Algorithms are thus not material (don’t have mass). Algorithms also have properties (time complexity, space complexity, etc). Does that make algorithms a new substance? Is there an “algorithm-hardware dualism”?
Reply to khaled Algorithms are close to what I’m getting at. But what about scientific principles? f=ma? e=mc[sup]2[/sup]? Are they physical? I’d say, of course they’re not, they’re principles or observed regularities, discovered by the application of mathematical reason to phenomena.
[quote=Neil Ormerod; https://www.abc.net.au/religion/the-metaphysical-muddle-of-lawrence-krauss-why-science-cant-get-/10100010] There are a whole range of other realities whose reality we can…affirm: interest rates, mortgages, contracts, vows, national constitutions, penal codes and so on. Where do interest rates "exist"? Not in banks, or financial institutions. Are they real when we cannot touch them or see them? We all spend so much time worrying about them - are we worrying about nothing? In fact, I'm sure we all worry much more about interest rates than about the existence or non-existence of the Higgs boson! Similarly, a contract is not just the piece of paper, but the meaning the paper embodies; likewise a national constitution or a penal code. [/quote]
Are they physical? I’d say, of course they’re not, they’re principles or observed regularities, discovered by the application of mathematical reason to phenomena.
In other words, they are the forms that physical stuff seems to follow. In the end what exists is: The physical stuff, in different forms.
You take forms to be a substance, so you’re a dualist. I don’t so I’m a physicalist. In the end, I don’t think we disagree on much other than what counts as a substance.
Good conversation. I feel like we’ve reached some agreement?
You take forms to be a substance, so you’re a dualist. I don’t so I’m a physicalist. In the end, I don’t think we disagree on much other than what counts as a substance.
Substance dualists might consider the disagreement to be more substantial. :grin:
It's about concepts and their usefulness, not about their existence.
Well no, the thread is about dualism. It's literally about their existence. If all you're saying is that it's useful to imagine a single ideal 'A' then...meh. Some people do, some don't. It's horses for courses.
What's absolutely a given is that it's neither necessary, nor foundational and so there's no cause at all to assume some second substance for it to be constituted of.
What's absolutely a given is that it's neither necessary, nor foundational and so there's no cause at all to assume some second substance for it to be constituted of.
Concepts that have been invented do exist, if only in our heads. Their "substance" is not an immediate concern of mine; I'm not even sure the word has a meaning in the context of abstract ideas.
As to whether concepts are foundational, I think they are historically so, not naturally so. The invention of the zero and base 10 counting for instance was purely conceptual, but it greatly facilitated computation.
Everybody does, in actual fact, even those unaware that they do.
Bullshit (in the technical sense). What possible evidence could you bring to bear that everybody uses the concept of an ideal 'A' even if they claim to use alternative methods? You're just flailing. I've given a perfectly reasonable account of how one might learn to read and write the letter 'A' without a mental ideal, you've not given any counter argument, yet here you're simply declaring that everyone does it your way even if they think they don't.
[quote=Lloyd Gerson, Platonism vs Naturalism] Aristotle, in De Anima, argued that thinking in general (which includes knowledge as one kind of thinking) cannot be a property of a body; it cannot, as he put it, 'be blended with a body'. This is because in thinking, the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible. Among other things, this means that you could not think if materialism is true… . Thinking is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally.
….the fact that in thinking, your mind is identical with the form that it thinks, means (for Aristotle and for all Platonists) that since the form 'thought' is detached from matter, 'mind' is immaterial too. [/quote]
Because they speak of it, thus they know the concept of the letter A.
I've never heard anyone in day-to-day language talk about the ideal mental concept of the letter 'A'. Give me an example of the sort of conversation you've had which includes the subject.
Right. Which, as I've just explained, does not require an ideal mental construct. It's just a façon de parler for "is this sufficiently like all the other 'A's". This can be easily demonstrated by asking people to draw the ideal 'A' and finding each will do so slightly differently, thus no universal ideal 'A' could possibly exist. Or you could ask people how they arrived at what all letter 'A's have in common and find they give a range of answers, none of which will cover the full range of letters they're prepared to accept as an A. Or you could look at the history of the letter and find it to be completely at odds with the idea of variations on a pure theme, but rather a series of random gradual changes.
Which, as I've just explained, does not require an ideal mental construct. It's just a façon de parler for "is this sufficiently like all the other 'A's".
"All the other As" means the same thing as "the set of all As" which means the same thing as "the concept of the (singular) letter A". You are just playing conceptual hide and seek with yourself because you are afraid to think in universals.
"All the other As" means the same thing as "the set of all As" which means the same thing as "the concept of the (singular) letter A".
How on earth do you square "the set of all 'A's" meaning the same thing as "the concept of the singular letter A"? For a start one is a set of existent things, the other a concept. One has many members, the other only one. One can be described, the other cannot. One is consistent between individuals, the other is not. One has entirely physical objects, the other none.
They're about as different as it's possible to be.
And why on earth would I be 'afraid' to think in universals? What an odd thing to accuse someone of. What harm might I be predicting could come to me if I were to think in universals?
Everybody does, in actual fact, even those unaware that they do. The human mind thinks in universals.
Butting in, A in this context isn't a universal. It's a category we learn, in this case are taught. We all likely make the mistake of thinking it a universal as a child, but we all learn that it is not.
Categories generally are idiosyncratic. My blue might be slightly different to your blue by virtue of the fact that the range of frequencies I call blue differs to the range you call blue. We might find a boundary colour and disagree as to whether it is blue or green despite the fact that we are staring at the same colour so have that in common. And it isn't just the question of the label to use that we're arguing over: how our brains categorise things affects how we see them. The borderline colour that I call blue will look more blue to me than to you.
My ex-girlfriend wrote lowercase a without it joining at the top such that I read it as a u. Others could clearly see it as an a. Finding a bunch of A in different fonts we're all familiar with isn't going to interrogate much. Finding a bunch of corrupted A might be more telling.
The same tends to be true of universals: in practice they have hazy boundaries, and those boundaries vary across people, so I don't see much a difference here between the two ideas. A category is still a universal if it is to be used effectively in communication. If your 'blue' is to be meaningful to me, there has to be some fairly wide overlap between my category of blue and yours.
What you are saying is that "universals" are not as universal as we may think, their limits are hazy, which is true and indeed an important point in that the verification of universals by interviewing locutors is never perfect. You can always find a guy who disagrees somewhere.
My ex-girlfriend wrote lowercase a without it joining at the top such that I read it as a u. Others could clearly see it as an a. Finding a bunch of A in different fonts we're all familiar with isn't going to interrogate much. Finding a bunch of corrupted A might be more telling.
Yeah. Also context matters. What we're prepared to treat as an A depends on the context it's placed in. Take NASA's logo, for example. The 'A's are just bent lines. We wouldn't accepted that as an A on it's own, but in the context of a logo, we do. We change our treatment of the image depending on the context.
What I've been trying (and failing), to get across in my recent posts is the idea that these things, like universals and even categories, are post hoc constructions. The are subsequent to the actual treatment or not of the image as an A. We first treat it as an A (for a collection of highly contextual reasons, many of which are subconscious), then, on reflection we tell ourselves a simpler story that this acceptance was because of some universal ideal, or category membership. In reality we're often surprised by what we're willing to accept as an A, as reading your ex's writing no doubt shows!
(I've been encouraged to learn that Ernst Mayr, who is considered a giant of 20th century biology, is likewise not reductionist. He says In The growth of biological thought , that 'the discovery of the genetic code was a breakthrough of the first order. It showed why organisms are fundamentally different from any kind of non-living material. There is nothing in the inanimate world that has a genetic program which stores information with a history of three thousand million years!’)
I don't see how that's an anti-reductionist claim. That's a difference in form and consequent function between living and non-living things, which of course there is, that's the most obvious kind of difference between those things. The reductionist view is that if you modeled all of the chemicals involved in DNA arranged in just the right way, you would model everything there is to model about DNA, and nothing would be missing. An anti-reductionist view in turn would be a claim that DNA isn't made of just chemicals arranged in the right way, but that there's something else besides that involved. What is that something else, and why do we need to suppose it exists, or equivalently, what noticeable difference in the world does its existence make?
Form is what life is about. Whether you use these or those molecules of water makes no actual difference, but the form is what 'matters'.
I agree with that, but there are people who don't, and the disagreement between us and them is the subject at hand here. There are people, like Chalmers, who think that even if you had some matter in the exact form of a human, which consequently functions exactly like a human, there's still an open question of whether or not it's "really conscious", even though it does all of the functional stuff like thinking, believing, feeling, perceiving, and sensing. E.g. if you've got a thing that looks just like a human and points its eyes around at things and is able to interact with the world in a normal human way including reporting on the things its eyes see and what it interprets those signals to mean and what states of the world it takes to be the case on account of all that... people like Chalmers say that there's still a question as to whether such a thing really experiences anything, or if it just behaves as if it does.
My kind of panpsychism is the view that whatever metaphysical difference there may be between just behaving as if you have experiences and actually having experiences, that metaphysical quality (which Chalmers et al call "phenomenal consciousness") is already present everywhere, so all you have to do is get some matter into the right form and thus function and it already has whatever else is metaphysically needed to experience things the way a human does. It's that form and thus function that's actually important; the metaphysical capacity to "experience things" in some sense transcending that functionality is a trivial quality that's already everywhere and so can't distinguish between anything.
people like Chalmers say that there's still a question as to whether such a thing really experiences anything, or if it just behaves as if it does.
And other people worry about the sex of angels...
I got news for Chalmers. Philosophical zombies cannot possibly exist. The mind is not facultative, it is a necessary element of a functional biological human being, which MIGHT BE precisely why it exists in every single human being we've come across so far... And when human beings go into coma, they often die.
that metaphysical quality (which Chalmers et al call "phenomenal consciousness") is already present everywhere, so all you have to do to get some matter into the right form and thus function and it already has whatever else is metaphysically needed to experience things the way a human does.
I would say that the right form and thus function IS what determines phenomenal consciousness, and that the mystery is: what kind of form generates consciousness and what kind of form doesn't?
The reductionist view is that if you modeled all of the chemicals involved in DNA arranged in just the right way, you would model everything there is to model about DNA, and nothing would be missing. An anti-reductionist view in turn would be a claim that DNA isn't made of just chemicals arranged in the right way, but that there's something else besides that involved. What is that something else, and why do we need to suppose it exists, or equivalently, what noticeable difference in the world does its existence make?
Memory, like the quote said. As Mayr says, DNA basically preserves the whole history of evolution in a single DNA molecule. There’s nothing corresponding to that in inorganic matter. That faculty leads to the ability to maintain homeostasis, heal, grow, reproduce, and evolve, and to act intentionally, which no inorganic matter does.
what noticeable difference in the world does its existence make?
The presence of living things, which as far as science can discern, after having scanned the universe for decades looking for it, is an exceptionally rare phenomenon, even if you take it for granted.
There are people, like Chalmers, who think that even if you had some matter in the exact form of a human, which consequently functions exactly like a human, there's still an open question of whether or not it's "really conscious", even though it does all of the functional stuff like thinking,
[quote=René Descartes, Discourse on Method ] if there were such machines with the organs and shape of a monkey or of some other non-rational animal, we would have no way of discovering that they are not the same as these animals. But if there were machines that resembled our bodies and if they imitated our actions as much as is morally possible, we would always have two very certain means for recognizing that, none the less, they are not genuinely human. The first is that they would never be able to use speech, or other signs composed by themselves, as we do to express our thoughts to others. For one could easily conceive of a machine that is made in such a way that it utters words, and even that it would utter some words in response to physical actions that cause a change in its organs—for example, if someone touched it in a particular place, it would ask what one wishes to say to it, or if it were touched somewhere else, it would cry out that it was being hurt, and so on. But it could not arrange words in different ways to reply to the meaning of everything that is said in its presence, as even the most unintelligent human beings can do. The second means is that, even if they did many things as well as or, possibly, better than anyone of us, they would infallibly fail in others. Thus one would discover that they did not act on the basis of knowledge, but merely as a result of the disposition of their organs. For whereas reason is a universal instrument that can be used in all kinds of situations, these organs need a specific disposition for every particular action.[/quote]
Memory, like the quote said. As Mayr says, DNA basically preserves the whole history of evolution in a single DNA molecule. There’s nothing corresponding to that in inorganic matter.
An inorganic security camera can sit around for ages keeping a record of the things that happened in front of it.
I expect you'll object that a human built that camera for that purpose, but that's irrelevant to reductionism. Is there some nonphysical aspect to the camera itself that enables it to keep such records, or is it just physical matter in the right form to perform that function? How that matter got into that form is a separate question.
René Descartes, Discourse on Method:it could not arrange words in different ways to reply to the meaning of everything that is said in its presence, as even the most unintelligent human beings can do
[...]
even if they did many things as well as or, possibly, better than anyone of us, they would infallibly fail in others
So he asserts, without argument besides "it's unimaginable".
In any case, it's beside the point, because Chalmers et al are talking about whether, even if you could completely replicate the behavior of a human in the way Descartes asserts you couldn't, that would be enough to say for sure that the thing is definitely conscious in the way a human is.
Reply to PfhorrestIf you think that a device like a camera is an analogy for DNA or for human intelligence, then there's no point discussing it, as it just seems obviously inept, as far as I'm concerned. ‘DNA stores information - so does a camera!’ ‘Humans see things - cameras photograph them! What’s the difference?’ I give up.
I've never heard anyone in day-to-day language talk about the ideal mental concept of the letter 'A'.
I'm actually with Olivier for once on this one. Maybe 'A' isn't a good example. What about "triangle". We clearly talk about the "ideal triangle" all the time in math, not any particular triangle. We even talk about shapes that don't exist, like a tesseract (4D equivalent of a cube). We can come up with properties relating to the ideal triangle, though no triangle that ever exists will be the ideal triangle. And we spend a whole lot of time and effort studying the properties of these forms.
Same can be said for "square" or "polynomial function" or "algorithm". Literally all of mathematics and computer science discusses these forms which are not material (in that they have no mass).
What about "triangle". We clearly talk about the "ideal triangle" all the time in math, not any particular triangle.
Oliver is currently 'talking about' the ideal 'A', so we clearly need a bit more than merely talking about X as if it existed for us to conclude that X exists, yes?
We can come up with properties relating to the ideal triangle, though no triangle that ever exists will be the ideal triangle.
We can come up with imaginary triangles, yes. I'm not seeing how this proves that they are the 'ideal' triangle against which all shapes are compared to determine the correct name.
___
Maybe it would help if you could tell me some properties of this ideal triangle.
Oliver is currently 'talking about' the ideal 'A', so we clearly need a bit more than merely talking about X as if it existed for us to conclude that X exists, yes?
My name isn't actually "Oliver". It is "Olivier", which is the correct French spelling. In my opinion, that correct French spelling does exist, somehow, as does the correct English spelling "Oliver", as does the mistake of confusing one for the other. But maybe that's just me.
If correct spellings do not actually exist, thin wahatp thi fruck?
I do apologise. What disgraceful Anglocentrism on my part. Were we not only recently in this thread talking about how mental models filter what we see? I wasn't looking for the second 'i' so I didn't see it.
In my opinion, that correct French spelling does exist, somehow, as does the correct English spelling "Oliver". If correct spellings do not actually exist, thln whqp thi fruck?
As I've already outlined several times now, I can compare those words to the words I've learnt and see if they're sufficiently similar for my purposes. i don't require an ideal 'correct' word. As it stands, they actually are, since I know what you mean.
You actually do need to know how to write e.g. "polysaccharides" correctly in order to be understood as saying "polysaccharides". If you write it as "pauleessakorrydz", nobody will understand what you mean.
Of course if you want just to produce art and poetry, that's another matter. "Pauleessakorrydz" has a certain beauty, as far as meaningless collections of letters go...
You actually do need to know how to write e.g. "polysaccharides" correctly in order to be understood as saying "polysaccharides". If you write it as "pauleessakorrydz", nobody will understand what you mean.
Indeed. So I can compare my attempt to my memory of all the other attempts I've seen and correct it until it looks similar enough to get by.
You don't need a memory of all the other attempts; you just need to know the one and only correct spelling of "polysaccharides".
I didn't enumerate the other attempts needed. If my fellow student back at college told me the 'correct' spelling was 'polysacarides', how would I ever learn it wasn't?
Your computer spell check would normally tell you. Otherwise there are resources called dictionaries
Are you suggesting that dictionaries are non-physical? They seem pretty physical to me. In fact they seem like they might contain exactly one of the real life physical words I might compare my attempt to in order to get it more likely to be accepted.
Reply to Isaac Dictionaries are physical objects, with a certain mass.
If you open one of them, and look inside, you will find pages, which are physical things too.
If you look at one page, you will find some scribblings on it; the scribblings too are physical. One could quantify the amount of ink used for instance.
If you have learnt your alphabet (a set of signs, i.e. non physical but conceptual) and are conversant in the language used, you may be able to decipher the meaning of some of the scribblings. Such meaning is conceptual rather than physical. The word "rose" might be written somewhere in the dictionary, but you won't find an actual rose in it.
And yes, it include a model of each word's correct spelling in terms of the one exact order of letters to be used, not some vague, ill-defined similitude.
And yes, it include a model of each word's correct spelling in terms of the one exact order of letters to be used, not some vague, ill-defined similitude.
OK, so talk me through the process. The people writing the dictionary access this non-physical universal concept-spelling.
a) why do they have access to it yet I have to look it up in a dictionary?
b) why does this non-physical universal change sometimes - like connexion became connection?
Reply to Isaac
H';lkjdf 'kjvrq oijhsRGvw NDF KLcw opihjasetrrg óq23 serAFT'PA3 SDPOawkjjc? w435nmg24[-0vf5hj fd3q2=089fcq3 ser=r4tfm nw40 f0-s45 y=qwc- 9uybe5yh!!!
(edit: for those who do not happen to speak Isaac's similitude-based, approximately spelt and unconceivable language, the above means by-and-large : "if we jettison the idea of correct spelling, we might regret it some day" -- though it rolls down the tongue much better in the original!)
What you are saying is that "universals" are not as universal as we may think, their limits are hazy, which is true and indeed an important point in that the verification of universals by interviewing locators is never perfect. You can always find a guy who disagrees somewhere.
Yes, but more than this: we define demarcations of categories individually. Homogeneity of environment, pedagogy, similar objects of experience, and feedback help to make our models similar, while differences in experience and minor differences in hardware will ensure that no two models are identical. It's like DNA... yours is yours, individual enough to convict you of a crime, but similar enough to mine to make us the same kind of object.
Maybe it would help if you could tell me some properties of this ideal triangle.
It has 3 vertices connected by 3 edges and all of them are perfectly straight. Nothing material fits that description. Yet the description itself is very important and is the subject of a lot of study.
The form of a triangle exists. It's not a new substance. But it exists.
so we clearly need a bit more than merely talking about X as if it existed for us to conclude that X exists, yes?
Are you proposing that the idea of a triangle doesn't exist, and only real physical triangles exist?
What about "tesseract"? Does the idea of a tesseract exist? Or what about vector spaces with more than 3 dimensions? Does the idea of a vector space with more than 3 dimensions exist? If no, what are all these scientists and mathematicians talking about when they talk about shapes in 4D, 5D, etc?
I'm not seeing how this proves that they are the 'ideal' triangle against which all shapes are compared to determine the correct name.
You can tell the difference between a triangle and a square right? How do you do that except by comparing with some ideal triangle/square?
And I would bet money you'd be able to tell the difference between a triangle and square without having ever seen a triangular or square object, just from the descriptions of a triangle and square as long as you know what "Vertex" and "Edge" mean. How do you explain the ability to do that, without referring to the idea of a triangle and square?
I agree that much too much is made of "universals", that they are not as universal as they seem, and they only need to be sufficiently universal, or somewhat homogenous across individuals, not perfectly equal, like in your example of human DNA.
If we take a mathematical example, I think we can agree that the number Pi (singular) is not "physical" in the sense that it is not an individual thing out there that people can see or take in their hand, and that the number Pi is therefore an idea. But we can also agree that it is a very precisely defined idea that leaves very little room, if any, for personal interpretation. There is likely very little difference between what you conceive as Pi and what I conceive as Pi. Nevertheless, there will always be one guy or another out there who has a different conception, e.g. who thinks that Pi is equal to 3, or that it's a rational number.
Therefore the term "universal" is not really correct, even for Pi. I guess the word "concept" is better here, as it expresses the possibility of a personal or personalized concept, whereas a "universal" cannot logically be "personal".
This said, there still needs to be enough commonality between your meaning and my meaning of a given word for us to understand one another.
It has 3 vertices connected by 3 edges and all of them are perfectly straight.
So it's being on a plane is not a property of your ideal triangle? Would a non-euclidean object with those properties still be a triangle? What about shapes matching that description but in non-standard topologies? Because it's my understanding that each of those questions had to be answered by a small group of people as they arose. They could not simply derive the answers by comparing their new objects to some ideal form, they had to just make a choice. The answer didn't pre-exist as a form.
So are we mis-naming the things we commonly call triangles? Or is what you're imagining not a triangle? If both the object you're imaging and the objects like my neckerchief are correctly called triangles the what is it that sets yours apart? On what grounds do you assign the object you're imagining special status among all the objects correctly named triangles?
Are you proposing that the idea of a triangle doesn't exist, and only real physical triangles exist?
I'm proposing that your idea of triangles exists (in several forms), as does mine. There's no 'The' idea of triangles. There's only yours, mine, everyone else's. Ideas similar enough for our purposes, kept that way by talking and practices. Same for tesseracts.
You can tell the difference between a triangle and a square right? How do you do that except by comparing with some ideal triangle/square?
I compare with my ideas of triangles/squares, different ones depending on the context. All, no doubt very similar to your ideas, since we share a culture, language community, biology etc.
But not the idea of a triangle/square since I've no evidence there is such a thing and plenty of evidence from developmental psychology that we use our own personal models to identity objects, not ethereal universal ones.
There is likely very little difference between what you conceive as Pi and what I conceive as Pi. Nevertheless, there will always be one guy or another out there who has a different conception, e.g. who thinks that Pi is equal to 3, or that it's a rational number.
Therefore the term "universal" is not really correct, even for Pi. I guess the word "concept" is better here, as it expresses the possibility of a personal or personalized concept, whereas a "universal" cannot logically be "personal".
Which is precisely what I've been saying (and you've been arguing against) all along. Same's true of triangles, spellings, numbers, letters and every other damn thing you've raised these last God knows how many posts in opposition to my making this exact point.
Reply to Isaac Indeed you made a similar argument and I did recognise the limits of the term "universal" but that does not imply that no such thing exists as concepts or ideas and their abstract meaning... It just means that concepts, while being "universal enough" within the folks speaking a given language for the language to work, do not need to have exactly the same meaning across that population. Slight variations may apply to their boundaries, that's all.
You must still think in terms of the meaning of letters, words, and sentences if you care to understand language. And this meaning is not to be found in the letters or in the words themselves (which are arbitrary symbols). This meaning is often not about any individual thing, but about sets of things (e.g. "I don't like cats"), and relations between sets of things (e.g. "Dogs often don't like cats"). Thinking involves spotting and constructing generalities.
Take the example of the number Pi, defined as the constant obtained by dividing the circumference of any circle by its diameter. The number Pi is a concept, an abstraction, and it is different from the many ways one can in practice write down "Pi".
Does the number Pi exist? I don't know, not even sure the question has a meaning other than the trivial: "some people conceive of the number Pi".
Can we compute Pi? Not exactly.
Is it useful? Certainly yes, Pi is a very useful concept, in spite of its value being forever an estimate.
This is all fair enough, but the matter at hand is the existence of non-physical objects. The key factor here is that nominalism allows for each of these concepts to be exactly the neurons on which they are coded in each individual's brain. A different entity in each brain, just very, very similar to each other example. To require a non-physical stuff you need a true universal, something which cannot reside in each individual's brain because it is mind independent, so identical in each instance that it is one entity (law of identity), which means it cannot reside in each person's brain (otherwise each instance would have a different location and so be a separate thing).
If what you're arguing for is concepts which are very, very similar yet still reside in each individual's brain, then there's no argument for non-physical matter and so no necessity for dualism. I have not and would not deny the existence of concepts. Contrast that with someone like Wayfarer who actually thinks there's an existent form for numbers etc outside of the individual minds for whom it is a concept - a proper dualist.
I have not and would not deny the existence of concepts.
Okay then. Concepts have some ontological status, we agree, at least as "subjective approximations of absolutes residing in people's mind".
I like to define a concept as a set. There are fuzzy sets/concepts and neat ones. A well defined concept is a well defined set. But there is always a residue of ambiguity in human concepts. Witty said it best: concepts have fuzzy boundaries. Which is why they are often difficult to define precisely: they are not precise objects but categories of objects with many borderline cases.
Mathematical concepts are a bit better defined. Pi is a concept that any averagely intelligent student is expected to grasp in a rather precise, operational manner. They might ask: What's the circumference of the trigonometric circle? If she answers "a little more than 6", it's technically correct but not mathematically satisfying. The answer can be exact (2*Pi) so it needs to be exact. The concept of Pi is mathematically precise.
Of course, nobody will ask her: where does Pi reside: in the pure realm of eternal mathematics, in physical circles, or in your head? My answer to that question would be: why choose? Can't it be in all three?
If concepts are "subjective approximations of absolutes residing in people's mind", doesn't it follow that the absolutes which concepts approximate, these absolutes also exist, at least as "limits" or "directions" or "horizons" of human thought?
Once you start to learn trigonometry, you have to agree that 1) there exists the concept of circle (as a concept in people's minds); 2) physical circles exists, that approximate the concept; 3) the human mind can forge additional concepts that are useful for thinking about circles and measuring them, such as the number Pi; 4) etc. etc... It may be okay to remember all these caveats ("in people's minds") for whatever metaphysical reason, but it is heavy. Very soon, you find yourself speaking of Pi as if it was a real number...
Pun aside, it is more convenient theoretically to forgo the realist caveats, or just suspend them temporarily while learning trigonometry. Just assume numbers exist, Pi exists, and perfect circles exist. It may take a leap of faith, but it's worth it as it makes for easier, less encumbered learning. And what do you got to lose anyway? If they poke fun at you for "reifying Pi", send them to me.
If we take a mathematical example, I think we can agree that the number Pi (singular) is not "physical" in the sense that it is not an individual thing out there that people can see or take in their hand, and that the number Pi is therefore an idea. But we can also agree that it is a very precisely defined idea that leaves very little room, if any, for personal interpretation.
Insofar as it translates from linear things like radii to radial things like circle circumferences, pi is pretty important to us, but it's just another real number, one of a category of things we can talk about, in particular an irrational number, something we had to talk about not because the idea revealed itself to the chosen, and certainly not because it is a priori (as a species we've gone most of our existence without any concept of it, something I'm sure that rationalists would opportunistically take as a win for their team), but because of music and astronomy, the study of physical things.
The interest in geometry comes ultimately from defining categories of things in the real world. Circles are all around us, from observations of the Sun and the Moon, to the invention of the wheel which predates Euclid, Archimedes and Pythagoras by millennia. None are perfect, but their _average_ is. Dealing with the category of circles, taking perfection -- the average shape of a circular thing irl -- as a symbol of any referent (generalisation), was a way of making predictions about physical objects and processes (how long does my bike tyre need to be if my wheel radius is R?). Taking this category, or its symbol, to be more fundamental than the real things seems back-to-front to me. It would be like defining all the hues if blue as some imperfection of the more or less arbitrary category of blue.
Dealing with the category of circles, taking perfection -- the average shape of a circular thing irl -- as a symbol of any referent (generalisation), was a way of making predictions about physical objects and processes
Which is a good thing, right?
(setting aside that circles have a precise conceptual definition, not based on an average of approximate circles)
(setting aside that circles have a precise conceptual definition, not based on an average of approximate circles)
The former doesn't contradict that our experiences of real, imperfect, circular things is prior to our concepts of circles. A perfect circle is precisely what every near-perfect circle we ever see has in common.
our experiences of real, imperfect, circular things is prior to our concepts of circles.
Yes, existence precedes essence. But even if essences (of concepts) are arrived at by successive approximations and refinements of mental and sense experience, it doesn't make them less interesting to precise and refine...
In that sense I agree that precise concepts are not fundamental to our experience. They are derived from it, but in my mind precise concepts are nevertheless useful, and to the degree that they are useful, they aquire reality, if only as useful hypotheses.
In that sense I agree that precise concepts are not fundamental to our experience. They are derived from it, but in my mind precise concepts are nevertheless useful, and to the degree that they are useful, they aquire reality, if only as useful hypotheses.
Agreed, they are real. Really modelled in your real brain.
The key factor here is that nominalism allows for each of these concepts to be exactly the neurons on which they are coded in each individual's brain. A different entity in each brain, just very, very similar to each other example.
That cannot be the case. As has already been shown, neural activity shows no such regularities or patterns that can be discerned when the brain is exposed even to a simple stimulus. You're arguing for brain-mind identity, but there is nothing like 'logic' in brains, or 'syntax', or 'symbols', or anything of the kind. Rather, the brain is able to capture such ideas, because of intelligence, whose job it is to identify differences and to represent with abstractions, and so on.
To require a non-physical stuff you need a true universal, something which cannot reside in each individual's brain because it is mind independent, so identical in each instance that it is one entity (law of identity), which means it cannot reside in each person's brain (otherwise each instance would have a different location and so be a separate thing).
Which is just what universals are.
[quote=Feser]Consider that when you think about triangularity, as you might when proving a geometrical theorem, it is necessarily perfect triangularity that you are contemplating, not some mere approximation of it. Triangularity as your intellect grasps it is entirely determinate or exact; for example, what you grasp is the notion of a closed plane figure with three perfectly straight sides, rather than that of something which may or may not have straight sides or which may or may not be closed. Of course, your mental image of a triangle might not be exact, but rather indeterminate and fuzzy. But to grasp something with the intellect is not the same as to form a mental image of it. For any mental image of a triangle is necessarily going to be of an isosceles triangle specifically, or of a scalene one, or an equilateral one; but the concept of triangularity that your intellect grasps applies to all triangles alike. Any mental image of a triangle is going to have certain features, such as a particular color, that are no part of the concept of triangularity in general. A mental image is something private and subjective, while the concept of triangularity is objective and grasped by many minds at once.[/quote]
[quote=Bertrand Russell, The World of Universals; https://russell-j.com/07-POP09.HTM] It is largely the very peculiar kind of being that belongs to universals which has led many people to suppose that they are really mental. We can think of a universal, and our thinking then exists in a perfectly ordinary sense, like any other mental act. Suppose, for example, that we are thinking of whiteness. Then in one sense it may be said that whiteness is 'in our mind'. ...In the strict sense, it is not whiteness that is in our mind, but the act of thinking of whiteness. The connected ambiguity in the word 'idea'...also causes confusion here. In one sense of this word, namely the sense in which it denotes the object of an act of thought, whiteness is an 'idea'. Hence, if the ambiguity is not guarded against, we may come to think that whiteness is an 'idea' in the other sense, i.e. an act of thought; and thus we come to think that whiteness is mental. But in so thinking, we rob it of its essential quality of universality. One man's act of thought is necessarily a different thing from another man's; one man's act of thought at one time is necessarily a different thing from the same man's act of thought at another time. Hence, if whiteness were the thought as opposed to its object, no two different men could think of it, and no one man could think of it twice. That which many different thoughts of whiteness have in common is their object, and this object is different from all of them. Thus universals are not thoughts, though when known they are the objects of thoughts.
What you are saying is that "universals" are not as universal as we may think, their limits are hazy, which is true and indeed an important point in that the verification of universals by interviewing locutors is never perfect. You can always find a guy who disagrees somewhere.
Yes, but more than this: we define demarcations of categories individually. Homogeneity of environment, pedagogy, similar objects of experience, and feedback help to make our models similar, while differences in experience and minor differences in hardware will ensure that no two models are identical. It's like DNA... yours is yours, individual enough to convict you of a crime, but similar enough to mine to make us the same kind of object.
I agree that much too much is made of "universals", that they are not as universal as they seem, and they only need to be sufficiently universal, or somewhat homogenous across individuals, not perfectly equal, like in your example of human DNA.
They could not simply derive the answers by comparing their new objects to some ideal form
False, that’s exactly how they found the answer. They had the ideal form, and checked if a non Euclidean “triangle” can have its proprieties. It can’t. Then they checked if non standard topologies can. They can’t. Etc.
It’s the same thing you do when asked when a square is a triangle or not. You compare the properties of what you’re looking at to the properties of a triangle. You find they don’t match.
If someone’s idea of a triangle includes that it is comprised of 4 vertices, don’t we have justification to tell them they’re wrong? From where do we get that justification?
All, no doubt very similar to your ideas, since we share a culture, language community, biology etc.
So there is a unified shared idea of a triangle? That’s what I’m saying.
And no “very similar” is not enough. When speaking of geometry, it has to be exact. Or you’ll fail your math test. And if it’s NOT exact we have justification to call that person wrong. Meaning there is some universal standard we all abide by.
There is a reason math is called the universal language.
and plenty of evidence from developmental psychology that we use our own personal models to identity objects, not ethereal universal ones.
What you’re debating is the source of the idea of triangle. Either it’s just a shared social thing, or it somehow predated society, and all we did was discover it. I’m leaning towards the latter, but in any case you do admit there is a unified idea of “triangle” that we all (basically) share.
So why can’t the same be said of New York? Or “A”?
As has already been shown, neural activity shows no such regularities or patterns that can be discerned when the brain is exposed even to a simple stimulus.
It's notable how often you reach for the "you don't understand the philosophy" argument when disagreeing with those who've not read the same texts as you, in a field entirely composed of armchair speculation, yet you seem quite happy to paraphrase the results from a paper in neuroscience as if you understood it without a hint of humility.
I don't know what you think the Schoonover-Fink paper concludes, but it is not that concepts are not carried on neurons. If you want to understand representational drift I suggest you start with Tim O'Leary's work, such as this paper here https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/31569062/ where he explains some of the mechanisms.
To require a non-physical stuff you need a true universal, something which cannot reside in each individual's brain because it is mind independent, so identical in each instance that it is one entity (law of identity), which means it cannot reside in each person's brain (otherwise each instance would have a different location and so be a separate thing). — Isaac
Which is just what universals are.
That'd be why I described them. And, as I've been discussing with Olivier, there's absolutely no necessity, or warrant to think such things exist.
False, that’s exactly how they found the answer. They had the ideal form, and checked if a non Euclidean “triangle” can have its proprieties. It can’t. Then they checked if non standard topologies can. They can’t. Etc.
But non-eucledian triangles are still called triangles. As are triangles in non-standard topologies. See https://www.cs.unm.edu/~joel/NonEuclid/area.html for example, or here https://math.stackexchange.com/questions/1035931/properties-of-triangles-in-non-euclidean-geometries where some mathematicians are quite comfortably discussing the properties of 'triangles' in non-eucledian space without being misunderstood.
So are we mis-naming the things we commonly call triangles? — Isaac
Technically yes.
Then how are we understood? And prior to the formal definition, in whose mind was the 'correct' use when no one on earth knew it, but many were using the term (or it's translation) in everyday language? What's more, on whose authority is 'correct' judged? We'd normally turn to a dictionary, perhaps, in matters of conflict, but mine has...
Merriam Webster:Definition of triangle
1 : a polygon having three sides
...which is not the same as yours.
While we're on the subject, I presume everyone in the world is also misusing the word 'straight', because they keep applying it to things which aren't 'really' straight?
My dictionary has...
Definition of straight
(Entry 1 of 4)
1a : free from curves, bends, angles, or irregularities
and then proceeds to give the example of "straight hair or straight timber". Neither of which are completely free of all curves, bends, angles, or irregularities at any scale.
So are you suggesting that even the world's dictionaries have it wrong?
There's only yours, mine, everyone else's. — Isaac
If someone’s idea of a triangle includes that it is comprised of 4 vertices, don’t we have justification to tell them they’re wrong? From where do we get that justification?
It's not similar enough for their current purpose to the definitions the rest of their language community are using.
“very similar” is not enough. When speaking of geometry, it has to be exact.
We've already established that your definition is not the same as the one being used in the maths papers I cited. Nor, in fact are their definitions exactly the same as each other. Nor is either exactly the same as the dictionary's, and again - each maths textbook will have slightly differing definitions. They just all have key things in common, but are not "exactly the same" as per the law of identity, which would be required to posit a single entity.
you seem quite happy to paraphrase the results from a paper in neuroscience as if you understood it without a hint of humility.
Fair point. I will read some more. Certainly will absolutely acknowledge no expertise in that field.
But the question I have is, don't you think the claim that ideas are 'represented in' or 'inscribed on' neurons is rather confused? Because it seems to me, amateur that I am, that both 'representation' and 'inscription' refer to semiotics or semantics. How could a physical state or disposition of elements 'represent' anything, in that sense? Do you see what I'm questioning?
in any case you do admit there is a unified idea of “triangle” that we all (basically) share.
So why can’t the same be said of New York? Or “A”?
Good development. So there exist what we could call "near universals", concepts that we all or nearly all agree about, like Euclidian triangles.
Even Euclidian geometry as a whole is a "near-universal" in that we still haven't met a human being whose default mental GIS was non-euclidian. We all model space as perfectly Euclidian, intuitively.
don't you think the claim that ideas are 'represented in' or 'inscribed on' neurons is rather confused? Because it seems to me, amateur that I am, that both 'representation' and 'inscription' refer to semiotics or semantics. How could a physical state or disposition of elements 'represent' anything, in that sense? Do you see what I'm questioning?
What we're in the business of doing when we have 'ideas' is the modelling of the hidden states we assume are causal in respect to our sensations. Triangles, letter 'A's, some multiple of similar objects, a city... these are all postulates, models of the causes of the sensations we receive. The same is true of thoughts. Thoughts are all recalled post hoc. The concept you have in your conscious mind of 'a triangle' is not the one your brain actually used to bring the word 'triangle' to mind on seeing the object. We can prove this by observing people with damage to the Hippocampus who can reliably identify objects (like triangles) but cannot bring to mind the definition of one, or people with damage to one or more subsections within the prefrontal cortex who can distinguish triangles from squares but cannot count the sides.
So if the concept you have in mind is demonstrably post hoc relative the the actual mechanism your brain uses to identify triangles, then it must either be coincidental (possible), or it must be itself a model of the that process, an inference of what's going on (the hidden states) in the subconscious mind, that yields the sensation (interoception) - 'triangle'.
You receive sensations (including interocepted physiological states), you behave in response to them, you model the cause of that whole relation. The mistake is in reifying the model to the actual.
So when I talk about what 'ideas' really are, I mean to refer to a model of their hidden states. What causes the sensation that I'm possessed of an 'idea'. My model for that is that of neurons being in certain configurations and having reached threshold levels of activation. Just like if you felt wetness on your skin, your model for the hidden causes might be one of rain, weather systems, air pressure gradients etc.
I could even, should I so wish, develop a model of this model. What would cause the sensation that there is such a model. And so on...
So yes, I do get what you're questioning - at least I think so. But I don't agree with your choice to reify the model when it is clear to me that models are, by definition, within their own Markov blanket, and so have hidden states. It is, by my model, those hidden states which deserve (if anything does) to be reified.
in any case you do admit there is a unified idea of “triangle” that we all (basically) share.
So why can’t the same be said of New York? Or “A”? — khaled
Good development. So there exist what we could call "near universals", concepts that we all or nearly all agree about, like Euclidian triangles.
I don't see anyone yet disagreeing with this. The disagreement is over the existence of actual universals, not over things which are nearly, or quite like universals. The distinction is absolutely crucial for the argument at hand because the law of identity would have us hold that only where the concepts are identical in every way can they be said to be one entity, identical with itself. Otherwise we're talking about several entities, all very, very, very similar. No matter how many 'very's I put in there, it will not be enough to qualify as identical and so not one unity requiring it's own existence.
As you've said, it may well be convenient to talk about it as such, but only within context. If, when teaching maths, the teacher refers to the 'near universal' concept of a triangle as if it were an actual universal, that is most certainly convenient for both her and her pupils, but when we're discussing something like the physicality of the mind, that contextual convenience does not just carry over by default. The context has changed, it may no longer be convenient to use the façon de parler in this new context. In fact, I think it's quite clear that it isn't, because we already run into substantial problems with laws of physics (how these entities interact), neuroscience (how to explain the studies showing a disconnect between stated 'ideal forms' and the capability to interact correctly with, for example, geometric objects). I'd say it's demonstrated already that it is no longer useful in this context, in fact it's getting very much in the way.
What we're in the business of doing when we have 'ideas' is the modelling of the hidden states we assume are causal in respect to our sensations. Triangles, letter 'A's, some multiple of similar objects, a city... these are all postulates, models of the causes of the sensations we receive. The same is true of thoughts. Thoughts are all recalled post hoc
But isn’t this a problem for science? I mean, science of all types must assume the basic rules of inference to even begin to hazard what such and such neural data means. And science has been doing that with respect to a vast range of subjects for hundreds of years. So there must be some a priori principles to even propose such a theory.
that yields the sensation (interoception) - 'triangle'.
You think geometric objects such as triangles are defineable as ‘sensations’? What about blind geometers? What kinds of ‘sensations’ would they have?
I think you’re equivocating sensations and reason. When you understand a logical principle, or algorithm, say, to make a prediction, or solve some arcane mathematical conjecture - how can this be possibly be categorised as a ‘sensation’?
But isn’t this a problem for science? I mean, science of all types must assume the basic rules of inference to even begin to hazard what such and such neural data means. And science has been doing that with respect to a vast range of subjects for hundreds of years. So there must be some a priori principles to even propose such a theory.
Why would that be a problem for science? I use my a priori methods of inference to model these a priori methods of inference as being neural networks. I'm not seeing the problem.
When you understand a logical principle, or algorithm, say, to make a prediction, or solve some arcane mathematical conjecture - how can this be possibly be categorised as a ‘sensation’?
I thought I'd just explained that. 'Understanding' a thing is a post hoc model of the actual link between sensation and response. We can prove this by lesion experiments, as I've described. So one senses, by interoception, that one is possessed of an idea. You may be limited by thinking of senses as being just the five we're taught about in primary school. This is just a simplification for children. There's scores of 'senses'.
So if the concept you have in mind is demonstrably post hoc relative the the actual mechanism your brain uses to identify triangles, then it must either be coincidental (possible), or it must be itself a model of the that process, an inference of what's going on (the hidden states) in the subconscious mind, that yields the sensation (interoception) - 'triangle'.
You've reminded me of another concept that Kahneman talks about, WYSIATI: what you see is all there is. Despite it being patently obvious that babies don't come pre-loaded with a glossary of ideas for which to identify physical objects (hence the amount of time and money we spend teaching them and buying them brightly coloured toys of different shapes to investigate), we tend to ignore what's absent from us, however important. He talks about this in regard to System 2's refusal to credit System 1 with anything at all, but our insistence on treating educated adults as if they come shrink-wrapped and fully formed is particularly apparent in philosophy from the ancient Greeks to the Rationalists of the Enlightenment.
The disagreement is over the existence of actual universals, not over things which are nearly, or quite like universals. The distinction is absolutely crucial for the argument at hand because the law of identity would have us hold that only where the concepts are identical in every way can they be said to be one entity, identical with itself. Otherwise we're talking about several entities, all very, very, very similar. No matter how many 'very's I put in there, it will not be enough to qualify as identical and so not one unity requiring it's own existence.
When asked what passes for an A you answered: "anything that has enough resemblance to other As".
Let us agree then that anything that has sufficient resemblance to universals is a universal, for all reasonable purposes.
when we're discussing something like the physicality of the mind, that contextual convenience does not just carry over by default. The context has changed, it may no longer be convenient to use the façon de parler in this new context.... in fact it's getting very much in the way.
I doubt it, seriously. Science as a whole is but a façon de parler that happens to be useful... I think your quest here is not knowledge-driven. Rather, it is a self-defeating metaphysical crusade against concepts, i.e. against yourself. Like all naïve materialists, you are sawing the conceptual branch on which you sit.
our insistence on treating educated adults as if they come shrink-wrapped and fully formed is particularly apparent in philosophy from the ancient Greeks to the Rationalists of the Enlightenment.
Yes, absolutely. And it permeates even through to psychology. You'd be shocked (or perhaps not) at the extreme resistance to experiential models of external-world theories in child development. Some of my wife's work was in that field and although well-accepted now, it was like wading through treacle getting it even considered.
Let us agree then that anything that has sufficient resemblance to universals is a universal, for all reasonable purposes.
Well then we'd have multiple, slightly differing universals, a definitional contradiction. Why are you insisting on redefining 'universal' to make the concept exist? Why not just discard it? When it became clear that phlogiston was not required, we didn't redefine it to make it true, we just discarded it.
The IEP has a pretty clear definition of 'universals'. It's clear that even you agree that nothing matching that description exists. Why are you so invested in rescuing the concept. Hundreds of philosophers are nominalist, there's a long history, why redefine universalism to resemble nominalism, why not just call it nominalism in the first place?
Well then we'd have multiple, slightly differing universals, a definitional contradiction.
That seeming contradiction did not bother you that much when you explained at length why it is possible to have multiple, slightly different As. So you are ready to be a bit charitable with your concept of A but not with your concept of universal.
No, not at all. I've demonstrated above that there is no such idea. Just several ideas which share common features.
Sure. The goal of my comment wasn't to defend the universality of certain ideas, but the existence of ideas. A largely similar idea of "New York" exists. And that idea is not material. Though not a separate substance either.
Reply to Kenosha Kid All we do, intellectually, is move back and forth from observation, to inter-subjective validation, to concepts and communicable narratives using those concepts. One can try to discard this as "a tune already played", but this little tune is us, from the cradle to the grave, so one would only be discarding oneself...
Reply to Kenosha Kid Isaac has a history of not understanding what I say very well, so it would not come as a surprise if he did misunderstand me once again.
Triangles, letter 'A's, some multiple of similar objects, a city... these are all postulates, models of the causes of the sensations we receive. The same is true of thoughts. Thoughts are all recalled post hoc. ....
So when I talk about what 'ideas' really are, I mean to refer to a model of their hidden states. What causes the sensation that I'm possessed of an 'idea'. My model for that is that of neurons being in certain configurations and having reached threshold levels of activation
So, this 'hidden states model' is not applicable to scientific reasoning? By what criterion do you distinguish scientiific judgements from the ordinary neural activities which you say comprise mental life, and are based on a model of the mind's hidden states?
When you understand a logical principle, or algorithm, say, to make a prediction, or solve some arcane mathematical conjecture - how can this be possibly be categorised as a ‘sensation’?
— Wayfarer
I thought I'd just explained that. 'Understanding' a thing is a post hoc model of the actual link between sensation and response. We can prove this by lesion experiments, as I've described. So one senses, by interoception, that one is possessed of an idea. You may be limited by thinking of senses as being just the five we're taught about in primary school. This is just a simplification for children. There's scores of 'senses'.
Any examples of what these additional senses are, over and above the five we're taught at school?
I can give one example off the top of my head, though it's probably not useful to Isaac's point: proprioception, our internal sensation of where our bodies are in space. It's how you can (unless you're too drunk) touch your opposite index fingers together with your eyes closed: you have a mental model of where in space your body is as you move, informed by feedback from your joints etc.
Now that the debate is over and this thread has little to do with the debate, I've moved this discussion to a thread I named "What is Philosophy?" because I couldn't arrive at a better title. I'll be happy to change it to whatever you'd like though.
Comments (520)
According to the generic sense, therefore, the substances in a given philosophical system are those things that, according to the system, are the foundational or fundamental entities of reality. Thus, for an atomist, atoms are the substances, for they are the basic things from which everything is constructed.
In David Hume’s system, impressions and ideas are the substances, for the same reason. In a slightly different way, Forms are Plato’s substances, for everything derives its existence from Forms. In this sense of ‘substance’ any realist philosophical system acknowledges the existence of substances. [/quote]
Note the original link between substance (philosophy) and being; suggests a notion of 'subject', rather than 'stuff', and is not to be conflated with
Substance (noun) 'a particular kind of matter with uniform properties'.
I don't think so. The meaning is pretty intuitive. Ground, not subject.
Substance dualism, or Cartesian dualism, most famously defended by René Descartes, argues that there are two kinds of foundation: mental and physical.[8] This philosophy states that the mental can exist outside of the body, and the body cannot think. Substance dualism is important historically for having given rise to much thought regarding the famous mind–body problem.
Property dualism asserts that an ontological distinction lies in the differences between properties of mind and matter, and that consciousness is ontologically irreducible to neurobiology and physics. It asserts that when matter is organized in the appropriate way (i.e., in the way that living human bodies are organized), mental properties emerge. Hence, it is a sub-branch of emergent materialism. What views properly fall under the property dualism rubric is itself a matter of dispute. There are different versions of property dualism, some of which claim independent categorisation.
Here is Hanover's explanation of property dualism::
there being a single thing and it will be called “matter” I presume, but whatever it might be called does not matter. It is a monistic goo that offers the underlying substance of everything, much like that flat white paint you buy that is then taken to the counter after hours of bickering to have just the right color mixed in. The property dualist explains there are two main colors in the world, not surprisingly called (1) minds and (2) bodies. So you see what has happened is that the substance dualist claims to have two different buckets of goo, yet the property dualist claims to have two different buckets of the same goo, just with different coloring in each.
Hanover hasn't defined substance dualism yet. He doesn't speak of it highly, given that it's his job to defend it. He says it "succeeds where property dualism fails to account for the conceptual coincidence, or interaction, of ideality (mind) and reality (body)." but he also says it's "anachronistic."
As an enlightened follower of Lao Tzu, I am clearly a monist, which isn't on the table, so I don't have a goat in this race. I will say, just because I always say it, both substance dualism and property dualism, and monism for that matter, are metaphysical concepts. As such, they are neither right nor wrong, only more or less useful in a specific situation.
This is a misconception. A goat, Zev, won the Kentucky Derby in 1923, admittedly in the slowest time ever of 4 minutes and 7 seconds. Before the 1924 derby, Churchill Downs changed the rules so that only horses could run.
As moderator, I'm obliged to point out errors of fact.
Zev was a horse.
But as everything is a goat, I'll let this pass.
[quote=180Proof]The vastly greater part of (physical) substance "cannot be sensed by our five sense" and yet is not "non-physical" (e.g. dark matter, planck scale events, brains insensible to themselves, etc) [/quote]
The first two of which are plainly scientific concepts, the second arguably meaningless - and yet he then goes on to say:
Contradiction? Or not?
And, as for appeals to Wittgenstein, what to make of the seeming 'appeal to the transcendent' at TLP 6.41?
So does that mean there is 'nothing higher', or that there is 'something higher', but that it can't be expressed by propositions? I feel the 'something higher' seems rather dualistic in spirit!
I am starting to appreciate Wittgenstein.
An article by his biographer Wittgenstein’s Forgotten Lesson
His TLP was the main reason for my contempt; I actually read it when in my 20's and found it ridiculous. But what I see now is that he too ultimately realized that the TLP was ridiculous. And from that realization onward, he tried to do better than philosophy for computers; i.e. to provoke some actual human thinking among his analytic peers in Oxford and Cambridge and stuff.
So in this little analytic world, he was the only sane one. No wonder they all quote him like the messiah.
As 180 would do. :up:
I have come across this but never knew it was a published article. A really insightful pastiche.
But no subject.
mind-body problem probly
Yeah, there's spacetime and stuff in it. And there's massive and massless stuff. And electrically charged and not electrically charged stuff. There's vector stuff and scalar stuff. So much stuffs. Why instead we differentiate between stuff and what stuff does is beyond me. I know you can lick the orange, but can you taste its gravity?!? Your move, atheists!
Hanover gives me the impression he doesn't really believe what he's saying but I don't really know him or his opinions well.
(Note present tense.)
(Note future tense.)
I'm not sure how property dualism has been shown to fail (which ought to be the first argument), but the assertion that substance dualism _will_ (one day, I guess) succeed where property dualism fails seems rather an implicit admission that, as yet, it also has no success.
Neither property nor substance has succeeded in the sense of putting the question to rest for philosophers or scientists.
I think Hanover is saying that property tends to get overwrought pretty quickly in efforts to force it to make sense.
Substance has the advantage in the sense department in that it's not really trying to Explain Consciousness. It's just summing up the way we normally think about the issue. It reflects without trying to prove anything.
That works, actually. 180 needs to say [I]yea but[/I], not [I]you didn't prove anything [/I].
Hanovers approach doesn't require any exposition beyond pointing to what we all know.
And yet "The sense of the world must lie outside the world," is a metaphysical statement.
In terms of the present discussion, neither form of dualism is about what is higher. Both have something to do with the facts of the world and the representation of facts in language.
Well Hanover's exposition seems largely to be pointing out things we don't know.
For instance, it isn't remotely obvious that this is good counting, nor that arbitrarily categorising things is a good basis for metaphysics (although that does seem to sum it up). I suspect what you think of as "what we all know" is probably what others might call "bunkum".
Quoting frank
Then I guess Hanover was doomed, since his position is supposed to be that substance dualism succeeds. All I'm seeing atm is: substance dualism is better if you prefer a non-physical mind; property dualism is better if you prefer a physical mind but still like dualisms. They both seem poor options, but the wording of the proposition allows 180proof to win by default in that case. Which is maybe why Hanover isn't taking it all that seriously.
Well, I can't have that! I'll actually try to respond to the concerns here within the context of the debate. It's good feedback.
It's obvious to your doctor. If you're going to tell your doctor she's wrong, don't come with a thesis that convolutes off into wtf, as property dualism does at this point. And I like property dualism. I wish it the best. I'm just following my own critical thinking here.
Quoting Kenosha Kid
Succeeds at what? I thought it was just: which one is a better bet for the busy consumer?
Quoting Cheshire
I'm open to counter-examples, but mind-body dualists certainly seem to break things down that way. A thought can't be physical, for instance, since it has no volume, no mass, you can't taste it, smell it, or poke it with a stick, things that are true of lots of physical things like spacetime, motion, force, etc. I can't pick up an executing subroutine of a program and spread it on my toast, or, as I said above, taste the gravity of an orange. You need phonons to hear anything but you can't hear a phonon.
The physicalist description of mind is that it's something the brain _does_, so describing it in a way that fits in very well with that doesn't seem like a compelling argument against physicalism. But maybe there's better dualist arguments I haven't heard yet.
I hope not. Most doctors need to handle computers these days. I don't want mine falling to pieces because she thinks hers is either conscious or cannot possibly work. I can say nothing about your doctor except maybe keep an eye out for a better one.
Quoting frank
The proposition is in the OP of the debate thread.
wut
Same sort of thing as a body. Quartz clock, registers, blah blah blah. Why?
Because neurons, synapses, blah blah blah.
There's the argument that the mind is something the brain _does_ and vice versa, the brain is something the mind does. The idea that it's a two-way street
I think I'm going to fast for the rest of the day after reading that.
And if there was any science to show that, you could go in that direction. There isn't.
What makes property dualism worth the evil of being open-ended confusion? Think about the yea-buts. There are some biggies.
But that's an idealist argument, no? Not dualist. I have fewer conceptual problems with idealism.
Quoting frank
Well there is, of course. But regardless, what you're saying here is that dualism is founded entirely on ignorance. I agree.
Quoting frank
I have no idea, not a dualist, all sounds crazy to me. Property pluralism, fine, but that's nothing to do with minds and bodies.
As Searle said, the man on the street is a Cartesian. You're barking up the wrong tree.
What's the draw of property dualism? It takes a tiny bit of philomind to answer that. Last time I talked to 180 he came up pretty short in that area, so I don't expect much
On which:
Anyone able to provide some commentary on this? Nothing in Hanover's argument suggests he's attacking an epistemic position and defending an ontological one.
I guess if this was The Vox Pop Forum, that might be worth a damn :rofl:
Quoting frank
Ah, so I'm guessing don't hold my breath re: my previous post.
Not to my mind. It is dualist in that it postulates the existence of minds and bodies as two different things, provides a possible reason why bodies might have developed minds through evolution (because minds are needed, they do something that cannot be done without them) and describes a realistic relationship between bodies and minds.
What's a vox pop?
Now that sounds like physicalist :groan:
Quoting frank
Vox populi
Sigh.
Why yes, science is based on a dualist framework (empiricism + rationalism), so a logical form of scientism or physicalism would include the mind as the central place where science happens.
Mainly because 180 is overemotional and dogmatic,and doesn't engage with any charity.
To be Frank,substance dualism is unassailable and self evident.
There is life and there is matter. They mix but neither can be derived from the other.
Confusion results from suggesting the mind is non physical...Of course mind is physical. Mind is desire,and desire is physical. But not everything physical is inorganic material.
Next time any materialists see a block of steel desire a sandwich call me...
Information _about_ stuff? Because all information about any system is in the system. Any copies of the system's information are, at best, just that -- copies -- at worst, erroneous, and typically incomplete. This is why simulation theory fails for me: the most efficient way to simulate a universe is to build it.
This goes for the mind too. All the information about the brain is in the brain, but not all in the mind. The weird thing is, rather than make us doubt, this actually convinces us of things that truth be told we should really doubt.
Quoting Olivier5
Does it happen in the mind, though? Yes, I see the results of the experiment or work out the theory. But that's not science yet. I need to get people to agree with it, ideally reproduce it, force me to defend it, in which case I'm dealing directly with objects not minds (although minds are the best explanation for those particular objects' behaviours).
Yeah, I didn't expect you to follow through. Patterns emerge... I am genuinely interested though, should you have a eureka moment.
Exactly. The validation you seek is from other minds. Science is fundamentally dualist, it's always about minds understanding matter. And it has been very successful at doing that. It's only philosophers (or scientists who try and play philosophers, sometimes) who try to imagine an alternative, without much success so far.
But I don't have access to other minds. I have access to their physical effects.
I'm not a fan of simulation theory because it has a built in infinite regression. But, suppose you wanted to build it; you would have to have some way of informing matter how it is to be arranged. Supposedly we could vaporize an object and the information about what it was remains.
I don't understand it but supposedly the Higgs tells matter what it's mass is supposed to be.
It's not about lying. Scientists operate on the assumption of an objectively real physical universe, not on the assumption of non-physical minds. I'm not disagreeing that minds are important: science is phenomenological, I agree. And there are good reasons to assume that I'm not surrounded by p-zombies or stooges. However that process of knowing other minds is based on my phenomenology and their physicality, not some telepathy. (Come to think of it, how crap are non-physical minds that, free from physical constraints like localism, they depend 100% on physical means to communicate? Anyone who believes in non-physical mind must admit that theirs is dumb :rofl: ) A purely solipsistic science wouldn't be possible, and I have to know others, work with others, learn from others and hopefully one day supersede others through physical means.
There's just no obvious platform for ideal minds outside of solipsism here that I can see.
It is undisputed that there are (1) ducks and (2) rows. I might count three ducks and they might be three ducks in a row, but only a philosopher would count four things. Count ducks if you will, and count rows too. but do not add ducks to rows and call them all 'things'.
I would contest that. Life is already transcendental vis-à-vis inanimate matter. Life is already a manner of thinking at biochemical level, and this manner of thinking is written down on matter.
Life creates new information, codes and stores it to use it later, chosing carefully which DNA code to play, which hormones or enzyme to pump up or down... It recombines information again and again (mainly through sex, a form of genetic dialogue) and in doing so it creates new information.
Life is one step towards thinking. Stones can't think. They have no need for it. But life is all about information, and it is very creative. So it was bound to lead to actual conscious thinking at some point or another, IMO.
You are assuming wrongfully that life comes from matter.
You are making an unnecessary distinction between life and concious thinking. Life is concious thinking.
More precisely, scientists operate on the assumption of an objectively real physical universe, understandable by human minds.
No, certainly not "matter". To me it comes from the fact that in our indeterministic world, anything that can happen will happen.
Glad to hear that!
I would say life is axiomatic. It is a given. And has always existed.
We are all property dualists insofar as we recognize two basic kinds of action or process; the mental and the physical. As @180 Proof says, this is an epistemological, not a metaphysical or ontological, statement since it is referring to our ways of understanding the world.
Substance dualism makes a further claim that the fact that we understand things in these different ways (conceiving of the mental and the physical) indicates the existence or reality of distinct substances. This is pure speculation or reification based on believing in our intuitions.
It is not that one or the other (PD or SD) is the more useful, since PD has already fulfilled the purpose of recognizing that we do in fact understand things in these two different general ways, and SD adds no further use. Since it is a metaphysical icing atop the methodological cake; thus being pure sugar it adds only a little extra flavour, but no additional nutrition (use)..
So what drove it be possible?
Possibility is not life. Possibility does not desire.
Life is the first principle.
The distinct and separate substance of substance dualism are not able to exchange energy, for neither one cannot walk the walk and talk the talk of the other.
Well, if that was the case they wouldn't be found working together. Maybe they aren't interchangeable but some type of exchange ought be taking place.
Yes, and it should have read 'can' instead of 'cannot' or 'either' instead of 'neither'.
So, substance dualism is dead.
Though with property dualism reason loses slightly less, I guess?
(There is only one kind of substance, which is just the abstract grouping together in space of many properties, all of those properties of the same ontological kind, merely dispositions to interact in particular ways with another of that same one kind of substance — which interactions can each equally well be seen as either the physical behaviors of one substance or the phenomenal experiences of the other substance, whence the dualistic appearance).
What sort of material stuff is reason made of, in your view? Or are you arguing vice versa, that all matter is made of reason?
This is a logical mistake. In fact, without dualism, there could be no such thing as epistemology. So dualism underpins epistemology and science. It is not itself epistemological or scientific, but metaphysical.
One wishes 180 could for once use his own words and actually present some ideas of his own to express his case.
One wishes he could actually engage in an actual charitable discussion without handwaiving and repeating his previous posts.
@Hanover
For goodness sake express the fact that mind is desire. And desire is physical. Thus you establish an unassailable position. And put us out of the misery of this dodgy debater.
And yall blamed 3017 when it was obvious he is a very good debater,he just had a terribly uncharitable and poor debater who upended the debate.
@3017amen
The problem with Cartesian dualism is that it suggests res cogitans as something objectively real which 'interacts' with the supposed 'physical'. But it reality, there is nothing that is only physical, nor anything which is only mental, these two always co-arise. Cartesian dualism is an explanatory metaphor, not a scientific model as such. (If you believe there is something purely physical, then you would need to demonstrate what that is, which is in the domain of physics. However as is well known, fundamental physics are bedevilled by just the kinds of problem that is being discussed in this thread.)
I didn't say anything about material stuff.
But in any case, reason isn't a stuff, it's an activity, that I was poetically personifying, which activity is usually done by brains, which are made mostly of gluons if we're measuring by mass, which are material particles, that confine quarks into the nucleons of the atoms from which are built the complex molecules from which the tissues of the many, many cells of those brains are made.
Or if you want to interpret "reason" as a stuff anyway, I guess that would make it abstract stuff, like mathematical objects and such, the stuff that can be reasoned about; in which case yes, matter is in a sense made of that, inasmuch as matter like the above is a feature of the abstract object that is our concrete universe, where "concrete" here just means "the structure we're a part of".
That's probably true more often than not, and not unreasonably so. There's no obvious reason, other than the anthropic principle, that as much of the universe is amenable to human reason as is.
But I for one don't assume that everything is necessarily comprehendible to human minds. In fact I think we're hitting that limit already, as more and more AI is used to make experimental predictions. Rather, we're fortunate that the elementary character of reality is that it obeys comprehendible rules on a statistical level.
Quoting Pfhorrest
Quoting Pfhorrest
How can an activity lose anything?
It's always true, whether they know it or not. A scientist worth his mettle tries to understand the world, or some part of it. If he doesn't do that, he's a lab technician. And if he assumed the world could not be understood by human minds, then he wouldn't try day after day to do so.
Actions speak louder than words, they say.
I was parodying this movie's tagline, if that's not obvious:
If reasoning is an activity of gluons, that'd be their fault, not ours.
Are gluons living or material?
Yep. It was disappointing to say the least. I asked 180 for a rematch...we'll see. Though I'm not sure there is much bite to his bark :razz:
Anyway, I'll have to get into this new one w/Hanover...seems intriguing... .
Hanover has spiced it up now with his last post.
But i don't have much faith in 180. The man cannot debate without being overemotional and barks like an
excited poodle.
My question is why don't posters and the mod address that 180 collapses the debate?
Surely the rules of the debate have a spirit of decency and commonsense?
I see @bert1 knows what's going on! :up:
After reading 180's lack of responses, I must say, Golly Geee:
180 tends to use political statements instead of philosophical arguments (I know we all have to be careful there, but c'mon man!). Here you go again 180, projecting your own lack of understanding onto other's. I think most have figured him out, including Hanover. For instance, when he has nothing, he projects in this case, his own straw man and non sequitur fallacies to make himself look like he knows something. When Hanover points it out, 180 then pivots to attacking the 'process' and not the substance. Very 101. It's just a smoke screen and an illusionary budding intellect... .
Oh well, nothing new under the sun there. Another disappointment. Hanover did his homework, where 180 so far did not. (Actually, not sure why 180 even agreed to the debate... .) Hanover also calls him out and corrects his misuse of ad hom's. Sorry for the tough love 180, really, you gotta give us something man; not just the usual smoke and mirrors. :razz:
Anyway, be that as it may, Hanover has been more than gracious, and has offered some other interesting arguments that have real import.
1. I liked the notion of Subjective truth. NICE.
2. SD: " It admits to the obvious metaphysical difference between hats and perceptions of hats, and that the latter cannot be experienced except by the subject." YEP.
3 "we each walk around daily with the freedom to choose, something that makes absolutely no sense whatsoever in a physically limited universe.That is to say, SD gives a path for a meaningful free will, entirely lacking in a purely physical world." I loved the notion and/or suggestion of Metaphysical Will ala Schop and others! Or how about this, someone explain the Will period, without positing some dualist metaphysical concept.
Also, this is an interesting supposition below. I would like to see both 180 and Hanover exploring this one a bit (180 hasn't touched it yet). This could prove interesting. In the meantime, someone here provide some insight to its implications:
"And there is a critical distinction between not detected and not detectable, with the latter suggesting that no amount of technology can locate its existence. I get that I can't hear extremely high frequencies, but they are detectable, not just not detected. On the other hand, you will never experience my experience. Ever. That is what makes mental states different from physical states."
How does this relate to independent existence?
For example, 180 supposedly said through Hanover's interpretation of same that: "is that I [Hanover]deny specifically that there are physical properties that are completely incapable of being sensed in some capacity and so measured, including dark matter."
Is 180 suggesting there is independent existence?
Gosh, it definitely seems so...let's hope for the best, plan for the worst :razz:
Dude, don't attack the process (like Trump)…. you're losing (again), just man-up!
Otherwise, tell us you didn't agree to the debate rules??
LOL
Indeed, it's reciprocity.
If someone posits the existence of something the burden is on them. Because they posit it does not mean that it becomes something that others must show to be false unless there is sufficient evidence to show that it is true.
Of course, but it's like committing a logical fallacy to deny the antecedent by offering no justification/explanation for the denial.. One has reciprocity in advancing their own position by whatever logical means is appropriate without such fallacy(s). Is that what you're saying?
Point taken. Nothing is proven. It is more a matter of making an argument persuasive enough to convince someone to accept that there must be two substances.
No need to deny what has not been shown to be something that should be accepted. Suppose I was to say that there are three substances. Does that mean you must show that there are not?
If I was going to deny that [a] supposition, well yes. I mean, if one say's 'no that's not true' and offers no counter argument, then why shouldn't one say 'yes that's true' instead? (Reason usually compels people to believe what they believe.) If they say yes, they say yes for a reason. If they say no, they say no for a reason.
I could be missing the obvious, but is that what you're asking?
That's not what we're talking about. Stay out of this grown-up talk Tim :razz: .
We're talking about logically fallacies and why people agree or disagree with other's. In other words, some reasoning has to do with some emotional experience one has had... . In your case, emotions are more noteworthy. Kind of like Voluntarism, which is not necessarily a bad thing.
LOL
I am asking why you think it is necessary to argue against a claim for which there is not good reason to think it might be true
But if you are not convinced that there is something in what is said worth stealing you wouldn't.
As I see it, it is not so much a matter of convincing others but of making an argument that is convincing. It seems curious to me if someone were to make an argument they did not intent to make convincingly.
We're getting off track, but the universe needn't be completely understandable. Understandable theories like thermodynamics, chemistry, etc. turn out to be approximations to theories much harder to comprehend.
Quoting Fooloso4
I think in large part you answered most of the question. But it is neither always necessary to convince other's of your own truth (Hanover alluded to that in the debate-Subjectivity), but if one were to advance an argument either for or against something, it seems you agree that usually one provides reasons for their belief.
As an aside, I was debating a Dr. friend of mine about political ideology and I argued that if one believes something (and either advances or takes a position one way or another), they have the obligation to at least explain why they believe what they believe regardless of the belief. Of course, that's not the same as trying to change someone's belief about that same thing (political ideologies). At some point, in a formal debate one has to advance their position by similar reciprocity to be convincing. But again, that doesn't mean you're trying to insist that they change their view.
(Their truth is their truth. The question becomes why or how/when , etc... .)
I think this also speaks to some of Hanover's arguments specifically referencing one's own truth.:
[i]Subjectivity and Philosophy:
From the latin “subjectum”.
Its primary sense tells us that there is a term affirm or deny something, in a proposal. More metaphysically, Subject is synonymous with substance be real support for attributes or accidents. It is also the person subject to a sovereign authority in politics, and the knowing mind in the theory of knowledge.
Definitions of Philosophers:
– Schopenhauer
“It’s who knows everything, without being yourself known is the subject. The subject is, therefore, the bedrock of the world, the invariable condition, always implied in any phenomenon, any object, because all that exists is only for the subject.[/i]
As you may know, there are all sorts of other metaphysical theories on this phenomena of self-awareness.
Start a thread and call it Reasons and Causes. Include either philosophy or cognitive science quotes or whatever is appropriate. Just a thought.
Agreed. If you write a post, try to make it convincing. But don't assume that anyone will actually be convinced, at least immediately. Even if they are, they will probably not tell you about it.
People don't like to publicly concede a point, in general. They take it as humbling or humiliating. Their first reaction
to a new idea (new to them) is generally to appear to reject it. It doesn't necessarily mean that the idea is actually rejected. Often what happens is that a good idea will "germinate" in an open mind. It will need some time to "grow" in this new ecosystem: the mind newly exposed to it. In my experience, this process takes a minimum if two weeks.
If you need to convince someone of something you think is true, don't yell. Don't push too hard. Just plant a seed, gently and firmly. If the idea is a good one, if it was well expressed, and if the person is not a complete idiot, chances are that it will grow in his or her mind, slowly. Give it some time. And come back to it once in a while. Bis repetitas placent.
Ultimately you might note that the people who initially rejected your idea start to defend it. If that happens, don't tell them "I told you so". Just say: "yes, I think I agree with you."
I have had this happen a number of times, although I think that sometimes they may be unaware of it. They are so busy arguing against you they do not realize they have come around to where you were.
When I post in a public forum such as this one it is not just the person you are responding to that is being addressed. Regardless of how that person may respond others are reading and considering what is said.
Yes of course, the process of adopting a new idea is often subconscious, especially when the conscious person comes with an attitude, a negative a priori that tends to reject any new incoming idea.
I guess what I am saying is: don't treat your ideas as if they belonged to you. They don't. Chances are you adopted them from someone else in the first place, even if you remain unaware of your intellectual debt. Pass them forward the best you can, but respect them more than you respect yourself. Ideas have a strength of their own.
To convince other people, do not try and prevail personally over them. Rather, some of 'your' ideas may convince some people, if you describe them well, without boasting too much.
(this said, I am often the first one to boast )
Quoting Olivier5
Nope.
So your saying living things are made of matter?
Is there a distinction between matter and life to you?
But this is just materialism.
How does matter go from inorganic to organic?
Which came first,the inorganic or life?
Physicalism, but sure, close enough.
Quoting Protagoras
I think what you actually mean to ask is how life arises from non-life. Organic matter is just carbon-based matter, which is created all across space all the time through the mundane chemical interactions of atoms created through nuclear fusion in stars. The atmosphere of Jupiter has tons of organic chemicals in it, for example.
That non-living organic matter became life when some of those chemical reactions formed cycles (one reaction instigating another instigating another etc... which eventually instigates the first kind again) that produced more of the same kinds of chemicals used in all of those reactions, thus turning more and more matter into the kind of matter that reacts in such cycles. Cycles of reactions that were more efficient produced more of the chemicals involved in themselves, so those kinds of chemicals and thus the cycles of reactions involving them became more widespread over time, and every possibility of improving on the efficiency of such cycles of reactions resulted in those more efficient reactants becoming more and more common.
Eventually we ended up with oceans full of complex self-replicating molecules like RNA and DNA constantly spreading and mutating and competing with each other for the most efficient and so most widespread kind of chemical, and then some of those started producing protective shells of molecules around themselves and those were the first cells of life. The process of replication and mutation continued, and that's what evolution is.
What I wonder is where does your distinction between good and bad thinking originates from? If them gluons (or neurotransmitters for that matter) make all the thinking, what makes for good or bad thinking? Bad gluons?
So life just started randomly from dead matter?
Sounds like a fairy story.
Great Post!
A lot of good insights.
Be good to see both read this and expand.
What do you mean by independent existence? @3017amen
@Hanover
@180 Proof
Be good if your discussion expanded on these points.
You don't, unless you think there is good reason to think it might not be true.
This is not philosophy,it's science based materialism.
Spinoza is spinning in his grave!
Of course your desire is physical. Every time you raise your hand that is physical direct will and desire.
Not material but physical. Like breathing.
In that case there would be good reason to argue against countless claims regardless of whether they have any merit or not.
Right. That is my point. Someone who posits substance dualism must first provide an argument with enough merit in order to expect someone else to argue against it. I will leave it up to the members here to decide for themselves whether that has been done.
Pending on the context, the whole concept can take different forms of discourse (cosmology versus metaphysics).. But I think how Hanover & 180 have framed that particular area of discussion, he probably means metaphysics-transcendental idealism (at least that's how I'm interpreting the aforementioned comment from him).
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transcendental_idealism#:~:text=Transcendental%20idealism%20is%20a%20philosophical,Kant%20in%20the%2018th%20century.&text=Kant%20argues%20that%20the%20conscious,the%20conditions%20of%20our%20sensibility.
I believe at some point in the discussion, if it continues, that metaphysical notion of existence if you will, will likely rear its head :grin:
Better or worse structure and thus function of the really complicated systems built out of them.
Is a better car (a thing better at doing what a car is for) made from better atoms, or are the atoms just arranged in a better way to make a structure that functions in a better way?
Quoting Protagoras
Whoever said random?
Matter that’s better at making more matter of the same kind becomes more common. That process of propagating more of your own kind is life. So forms of matter that are better at living become more common over time. Nothing random about that.
Right, so if it is the case that the only argument for substance dualism is that we ought to expect reality to accord with the basic ways we understand things, or perhaps better, we should expect the basic ways we understand things to reflect reality, would you consider that an argument with merit, and if so how would you go about arguing against it?
But you haven't explained how matter turns to life.
I think this does not follow. Lifeforms always simply adapt or fail to adapt to changing circumstances. Your assertion would have us being better at living than hunter/gatherers, which I think is patently false; if anything I would lean towards the opposite conclusion.
Life is matter, and I explained already how that matter takes on the form of life.
Quoting Janus
"Forms of matter that are better at living become more common over time" is not equivalent to "over time, matter becomes better at living"; it doesn't mean that life-forms have to get better at living over time, it just means that when life-forms get better at living (in the sense of become better at making more of themselves and keeping more of themselves alive) then over time more and more of those accumulate, possibly at the expense of other life-forms that aren't as good at that.
And if we count our learned cultures as part of ourselves, then yes in that sense modern post-industrial people are better at living than hunter-gatherers, since our populations are larger and our lifespans are longer, often at the expense of peoples who still practice the hunter-gatherer lifestyle.
When he does, I hope we're all invited to the Nobel ceremony.
So you didn't explain you just asserted that life is matter.
Any examples of matter suddenly becoming lifelike?
Any lab mixing of chemicals suddenly sprouting life?
My subjectivity sure doesn't feel like matter or seperate gluons.
Does all matter have the potential for life?
What drives matter to become more complex?
And why does most matter remain inorganic?
Exactly. Scientists have had a lot of time to really explain or show this,but they just resort to asserting it as true.
A real sleight of hand from science.
Ok so bad thinking comes from bad thinking structures. You presumably have your own brain in mind.
So dualists just have a poorly functioning brain? Is that what you are saying?
It could be the opposite though: monists could have some brain damage or deficiency making them unable to understand the world correctly... :-)
You asked for an explanation of how non-living matter can become living, not an argument that that must be what happened. I'm happy to explain the view if you're just not clear what it is, but it doesn't seem like it would be productive to actually argue with you.
Quoting Protagoras
Who ever said "suddenly"? But matter becoming lifeline in general, sure: somewhere in the range of 4.5 to 3.5 million years ago, on Earth, some matter gradually became more lifelike until things we're happy to call "alive" without qualifications were around.
Quoting Protagoras
Phenomenal experience ("subjectivity") and life aren't the same topic. In my view (as I implied in my first post in this thread), phenomenal experience must be omnipresent, because the alternatives are either that it doesn't exist, or some inexplicable magic happens somewhere, and I have reasons to discount both of those alternatives.
Quoting Protagoras
Since life is a functionality and functionality is multiply realizable, many kinds of matter could in principle potentially implement life. I'd hesitate to claim they all could, but I also wouldn't say for sure that not all could.
Quoting Protagoras
Complexity is a separate issue from life. Matter doesn't always become more complex. Not even living things always become more complex. When they do, it is because the complexity confers a fitness advantage: the more complex stuff is better able to make more of itself and keep more of itself alive, so over time more of that kind of stuff accumulates, possibly at the expense of other kinds of stuff. There are more possible kinds of complex stuff than simple stuff, so once some kind of complex stuff has beaten all the simpler options, the only possible options for future winners will be more complex stuff.
And organic is also a separate issue from life, as already clarified; but most matter remains non-living because it doesn't yet have the opportunity to live.
Quoting Olivier5
Not as categorically as you seem to impute, but inasmuch as any error constitutes some failure to function, sure. Dualism can be known false a priori, so incorrectly thinking it is true is to some extent a "malfunction". Nobody's brains are without malfunction, though.
How would your brain know that?
I understand your views.
As I said it's all speculation designed to bolster a materialist view.
It contradicts phenomenal experience and facts.
And precisely how do you know that this process is over millions of years and started with matter?
I agree with dualism.
But this is where those explaining dualism and the mind body situation mess up. Every energy is physical.
The mind is desire and desire is non material but physical.
Oh well, your idea of what it means to live better is obviously very different from mine.
Yes.
Creation of a Bacterial Cell Controlled by a Chemically Synthesized Genome
I suppose that's the draw of substance dualism: contrary to a process or an activity, a substance is conserved over time. So substance dualism implies the immortality of the soul, whereas process dualism implies no such thing.
And that article full of jargon is proof that scientists turned matter into life?
Any actual real life tangible evidence that I don't have to take on trust?
Yes. Do the experiment. The method statement is quite clear.
Wheres the proof?
You think an experiment designed by Elitist scientism advocates Is something I wish to replicate!
Just as valid as asking the priest for some fairy dust or tips on how to levitate.
I heard yogis claim to levitate. The method statement is quite clear.
Try it. If it doesn't work its because you didn't replicate the method!!! Take it on trust!
The jargon is individually very basic. You can look each piece up and it won't take you very long.
You not wanting to understand it that doesn't disqualify it as proof.
Or alternatively you can simply look up "Synthetic creation of bacteria" and you'll find many more articles with much less jargon.
Quoting Protagoras
What is "material" for you because material and physical are synonymous for me. I don't know what "non material but physical means". And I don't know about "the mind is desire" either. Seems to me way more than that.
Yes.
I'm not sure what you're asking for. You want me to visit you and physically present you with the evidence? Because I can't do that, and it's unreasonable to expect me to. All I can do is point you to an internet page that explains that what you're asking about has been done. Whether or not you believe it is your own issue to deal with.
I wonder, do you say the same thing about evolution? That we've landed on the Moon? That the Holocaust happened? That e = mc[sup]2[/sup]?
Matter, strictly speaking, is any substance that has rest mass and volume. There are aspects of the physical world that do not have rest mass or volume, e.g. the photon, and so aren't considered matter. And if we consider materialism to be the view that everything that exists is matter and physicalism to be the view that everything that exists is physical then the two are slightly different.
Although for the most part the terms are used interchangeably, so I guess you need to ask what someone specifically means by materialism.
Are you asking for an argument against dualism in particular, or an account of how brains can know anything in general?
In any case, am I misremembering that you were also a panpsychist much like me? Am I confusing you with somebody else?
You ignore the emphasized phrase "in that sense". We were discussing what it is to be biologically alive, and to be successful at doing that, i.e. to be "good at living", in that particular sense. You sound like you are conflating that with some kind of phenomenological or ethical notion of "living well" ala eudaimonia or such, which is a completely different sense.
You said that dualism can be proven false a priori. Would you mind trying to do so?
Have you considered that, if better or worse brain structures makes for better or worse thinking as you were arguing above, it could well be that your brain structure is deficient, making it unable to properly understand dualism...
My friend is an experienced scientist who works in biotech.
We have had long talks on these issues and he explained the jargon.
He finally admitted he couldn't square how life actually started from matter,or how DNA replicates.
If you want to know what non material but physical is raise your hand and observe.
Extraordinary claims like that require very strong evidence. I can't take that on trust.
As @Olivier5 has said wouldn't that research constitute definitive evidence of abiogenesis?
Are you also aware that scientific research has a replication problem?
The sociology of scientific research and the sensationalism of scientific papers is also a fact.
Remember cold fusion and the hadron collider replicating the big bang?
And no I don't accept theories just because guys in white suits claims so.
I'll sketch the argument for you, at least; I don't feel like spending a lot more time on this discussion.
- Dualism implies some kind of transcendentalism, as in supernaturalism, the existence of something of a kind ontologically different from the sort of stuff that can be empirically observed.
- Claims about such things cannot in principle be tested for falsity, since there's nothing we could tell to differentiate a world where they're true from a world where they're false, and thus they could only possibly be taken on faith, dogmatically.
- Accepting any such dogmatic claims, taking any claim without possibility of question, would leave one's views unchanging even if they're wrong, so if one should happen to start out with wrong views, one would stay with them forever instead of improving upon them.
- Presuming one aims to have correct views, it is thus prudent to leave all views open to question, which consequently demands rejecting any claims about things that cannot be questioned, including all claims about things that make no empirical difference, including all supernatural, transcendental things, like those implied by dualism.
That's a strawman. Dualism only implies that he who does the empirical observing recognises said observing to be 1) fundamentally different from the observed thing; and 2) important or even critical to one's knowledge of the observed thing.
If you believe in 1 and 2, then you have a dualist mind set. The rest is strawmen banging heads.
I wonder if an answer to this is even needed at this stage. Can the debate be reframed as "is the mind a property of the brain or a separate entity that is causally connected to the brain?" We might not then need to worry (yet) about substance or physical or non-physical.
That seems like a pretty different question that then original debate. My position was of "substance" dualism, so how can we avoid the question of what substance is?
First, we should not expect reality to accord with the way we understand things. The way we understand things changes over time. Second, substance dualism is not the basic way we understand things.
Indeed, this idea of two different substances is not intuitive at all, it is something that came out of a certain culture. The intuitive idea (to me at least) is that our mind dies when our body dies; reason for which we are all naturally afraid of death.
If our mind was some special inalterable substance, it would be immortal and I think we would know it, we would remember our previous lives for instance. But we don't.
But if somebody did feel or remember previous lives would you accept that?
As have and do scientists. Lying is prolific in scientific research. Its like propoganda or a sales pitch.
What if it was someone you trusted and you knew they were being genuine?
Quoting Protagoras
If I had personal memories of my previous lives, and if while chatting with others, I would realize that they all (or most of them) had similar memories, then I would accept the immortality of the human mind.
One witness is too few. She could be mistaken.
Yes,scientist are regular folks. But they work in an industry run by monied interests.
The more money and stakes involved in an industry the more deception.
What of all the numerous meditators and religious people who experience this?
Who doesn't? You gotta serve somebody.
What of the majority that don’t?
Quoting Protagoras
Your scientist friend doesn’t know how DNA replicates? I doubt it. I bet he’s just appeasing you.
Quoting Protagoras
Ok. Done. Still don’t know. Now can you actually explain your position?
The self employed and those who work with integrity don't serve money or deception.
So in effect your saying we must bow to monied interests even though they have an agenda?
So majority rules?
No,my scientist friend had just been questioned deeply and was being truthful. Your bias shows through when you say appeased.
I've explained enough in my posts for you to get what I'm saying. If you can't see it, then perhaps try to be less scientismistic and apply your own perception.
Or that the mind and brain are the same thing but from different views. In this case, we can dispense with the term, "substance", and talk about dualistic views. How is a view different than the thing being viewed? Can a view be viewed? In other words, can the mind view itself? Can a brain view itself? Can an apple?
Well I'm a lot more nuanced than your above logic.
Bad would be someone who served a monied agenda and said or did nothing but took the money.
If your pro science,I commiserate you on your faith in science. But it doesn't mean your bad.
If God created man, He created reason, sapience, and gave it to man. If God created reason, then science is godly. It is the patient exploration of God's eternal laws. Eureka = Hallelujah.
Now, in practice all scientists may not serve God or even Truth (godly or not), conflicts of interest between Truth and Money exist, but they are manageable.
Well,seeing as science is based in the main on materialism and making money and weaponry then you are conflating thinking with academic science.
They are not the same.
I reject all political parties. I'm an anarchist.
Welcome to TPF.
Thank you.
Well,we can Still get along...Hopefully!
:100: :fire: Deus, sive natura.
Quoting Olivier5
Aside from me being black and American, we could be twins. Bonjour!
What is the scene?
Haven't seen that film.
A bit before my time!
Yes, Spinoza but also the Catholic humanists.
Quoting 180 Proof
My soulmate! :-)
That was funny! Well played monsieur!
:lol:
I highly doubt you got your scientist friend to say “I don’t know how DNA replication works”. See, all my scientist friends seem to know at least that much. Even many non scientist friends who took biology in high school seem to know that much. So I’d love to have a conversation with this friend of yours and ask exactly what he means by “I don’t know how DNA replication works” considering you can literally look it up.
Quoting Protagoras
When I asked you to explain what “non material but physical” means you told me to “raise your hand and observe” for Christ sake! You think I’ve never raised my hand before? I do so multiple times a day, and so does everyone who disagrees with you. And none of us get what we’re supposed to be noticing.
Quoting Protagoras
Curious. Being scientific is precisely about applying your own perception. Having done so, all I perceive is BS, no offense.
“If you can’t agree with me, maybe you should be less biased and agree with me! No I won’t actually try to convince you of anything nor even explain the position you asked me to clarify, maybe if you weren’t so damn biased you’d get it already!”
The great example being The Miracle of the Sun. Miracles tend to be their own method of execution.
Dog shit post.
Head out of the scientists ass and in the real world.
If you don't get it you don't. I won't waste my time with this level of scientism and and pseudo logic.
That is not a relevant critique of the argument. First, the basic way we understand things (property dualism) does not change over time. Second, the argument does not claim that substance dualism is the basic way we understand things, but that it is reasonable to infer it from the fact that the basic way we understand things (property dualism) does not change over time.
Coming from you? That's just confirmation I'm doing something right.
Quoting Protagoras
You've determined I'm biased beyond repair based purely on the fact that I disagree with you. No reasoning is possible with such a creature. So have a good one.
Childish response.
That's neither substance dualism nor property dualism, which are the things under discussion here. If you want to make up a different thing and call it "dualism", you do you I guess, but that's only going to cause needless confusion with other people using the word in the usual ways.
In any case, it's not clear to me what your point 1 even means. The act of observing is not identical to the object being observed? I think most everyone (besides Berkeleyan subjective idealists) would agree with that; even eliminative materialists would agree with that (the act of observation is a thing the observer's brain is doing, which is not identical to the object being observed).
You couldn't mean that the being doing the observing is constituted of a fundamentally different kind of stuff than the object being observed, because that's substance dualism, which is what you say is a straw man.
Nor could you mean that the mental properties that constitute the state of mind of undergoing an observatory experience are constituted of a fundamentally different kind of stuff than the physical properties of the object being observed (even though those properties are "stuck in" the same underlying kind of substance), because that's property dualism, which has the same problems (against my foregoing argument) as substance dualism, which you say is a straw man.
It means knowledge about X is different from X. The map is not the territory.
Quoting Pfhorrest
Indeed, idealist monists such as Berkeley disagree with my point 1, and so do materialist monists in fact (i.e. the eliminative ones), because for them there is no such thing as a symbolic map: everything is just gluons spinning in a flat ontology, without any room for transcendence.
Monists reject the fundamental difference between map and territory because they are monist. I accept it because I am a dualist.
What are the “sufficient properties” shared between a non-physical undetectable “supernatural stuff” and the physical detectable “natural stuff”. Can anyone explain? Because I can’t think how they can begin to share properties as if they did, whatever the non physical substance, it would have physical properties.
A mind with mass is no longer a mind. An intention with momentum is no longer an intention. No?
And so, emotions, inner thoughts, phenomenological states, and one's full inner life are not natural states but supernatural.
As it is being used by 180 I take it to mean that what it being divided in terms of two different substances is actually a distinction between properties of the same substance.
That is very far from common sense, which considers emotions and thoughts as perfectly natural.
Quoting Fooloso4
Thanks. Not sure that works for me... My dualism starts from the duality of form and xyle, information and matter, and see this as more fundamental a divide than just 'properties'.
I think so as well. Perhaps he will defend the claim.
I thought you said transcendence was a straw man? If you now agree that dualism is transcendent, see the rest of my earlier argument against transcendence and thus dualism, which you skipped because you objected to the first sentence implying dualism is transcendent.
Quoting Olivier5
A literal map of a geographic territory and the literal territory itself are both made of the same kind of stuff, and yet there is a difference between them. Why is that not a problem, but a mental "map" can't be made of the same stuff as whatever "territory" it's a "map" of?
[quote=Howard Pattee, Physics and Metaphysics of Biosemiosis]All signs, symbols, and codes, all languages including formal mathematics are embodied as material physical structures and therefore must obey all the inexorable laws of physics. At the same time, the symbol vehicles like the bases in DNA, voltages representing bits in a computer, the text on this page, and the neuron firings in the brain do not appear to be limited by, or clearly related to, the very laws they must obey. Even the mathematical symbols that express these inexorable physical laws seem to be entirely free of these same laws.[/quote]
There's a form of dualism. You don't see mind, because you are it. Everything you know empirically is presented to you as an object or relation of objects or a force. But the very thing which weaves all that together into a world is mind, which is not amongst those objects.
I get the drift, but I think the word 'supernatural' is best avoided. As one of our erstwhile posters, Mariner, pointed out, the Latin 'supernatural' is pretty well a synonym for the Greek 'metaphysical'. Positivism will treat them as synonyms, but in other philosophical discourse 'metaphysics' retains at least a patina of respectability. That said, I agree that inner states are not in the domain of naturalism as currently understood, insofar as it is solely concerned with what can be objectively validated, but phenomenology is able to make that distinction without explicit reference to 'the supernatural'.
Quoting Pfhorrest
Quoting Wayfarer
A camera does not film itself; you can't see the camera on film. Does that require that the camera be an ontologically different kind of thing than the things the camera is filming? Or is being a camera and filming just one of the many things that can be done by the same sort of stuff that gets filmed by a camera?
There is of course a difference between filming and being filmed, but that doesn't have to be an ontological difference: the same kind of stuff could both film and be filmed.
A camera can't operate itself, decide what to photograph, and interpret the image. All those are done by the subject, who is not part of the picture.
Sure, but the camera is also not part of the picture, so "not being part of the picture" doesn't have to mean being of an ontologically different kind than the things in the picture, which is the point. The camera doesn't have all the same functionality as a person (operating, deciding, interpreting, etc, as you list), but no argument has been offered as to why that functionality requires any ontological difference, only that not-being-in-the-picture requires such, which the camera example rebuts.
So you think there's no [s]essential[/s] ontological difference between beings and devices?
The other point is, cameras are built and operated by humans. They have no ability to decide or intend, nor is there anything about them that is even analogous to those abilities, which are intrinsic to human beings. How can that not count as an ontological difference?
But within the analogy, the person taking the photo/video is ontologically different from both the image and the camera.
Some supporting quotations:
Quoting Thomas Nagel, The Core of Mind & Cosmos
Quoting Richard Brody, Thoughts are Real
And why? Because the ingredient that is always lacking in such descriptions, is perspective. The mistake almost everyone is making in this matter, is that the mind or the subject can be understood as something objective, when its reality is actually implicit, it only shows up as perspective. This is why some will continue say you can't show that the mind exists; if they're right in saying that it's because it transcends objective demonstration, not because it's merely non-existent (which is, of course, absurd). And it is precisely that awareness that has dropped out of most analytical philosophy (represented in its most concise form by the eliminative materialists but implicit in many other varieties of materialism.)
As @180 Proof would say, :up:
I wonder to what extent your interlocutors skim-read your very precent, extensive quotes, and dismiss them. Not your fault if they do.
I've had a hard time believing that materialists of any stripe are so stupid that they can't realize the perspectivism inherent in their own experience. But the more I read, the older I get, and the more I interact with people, the more I'm starting to believe it.
I love the byline, and I respect David Bentley Hart (oh wait, these two things are related). :up:
Quoting Wayfarer
Your argument is that since you can't see the mind, since the mind is what weaves the objects together into a world (and is also you). But then you go on to conclude that: Thus the mind must be ontologically different from the object.
@Pfhorrest's example shows that even though a camera is what puts the photo together, the camera is not ontologically different from the photo or the things getting photographed. Similarly, there is no reason to assume the mind is ontologically different simply because it is what organizes the objects and their relations.
Quoting Pfhorrest
Quoting Wayfarer
What if we made a bot that seeks out and takes pictures of ducks? Does it become ontologically different then?
That's called begging the question. Whether or not minds are material is precisely what's being discussed here, even though that's not what the thread was intended for...
Within the analogy.
No, the mind of the camera-user is what puts the photo together. They do this first and then take the photo. It's a poor metaphor until you acknowledge this.
What? So what if the camera user is blind? Or if the camera is a security camera with no user?
The camera user wasn't mentioned once because they are of no importance here. The point is, although the camera isn't, and can't be in the photo, the camera is not thus ontologically different from the photo or the things getting photographed.
If you want to use this metaphor, you have to include the user of the camera. Otherwise the metaphor breaks down, and your entire argument breaks down, because your argument is based on a metaphor that does not include the user of the camera.
:roll: Homunculus fallacy.
Quoting Noble Dust
(non-Pro tip: when you say this (love the convoluted text formatting here
I just fed my dog. Give me the 2 complementary explanations of that so I can know what you're talking about.
Stop there. Now @180 Proof is forced to ADDRESS [s]things[/s] "the argument" on his own terms.
There is no such thing as a "homonculus fallacy" that I can see. There is an argument about it but it is poor and obviously false. We do in fact use cameras. Therefore there are camera users.
So there is the user of the camera, the camera, and the image. Correct?
:rofl:
:rofl:
It's not a metaphor if you acknowledge this, it's just the matter under discussion. that's the point @khaled and @Pfhorrest are trying to make.
Wayfarer's sole argument we were given was the fact that...
Quoting Wayfarer
This is also true of a camera taking film.
It's just an extension of the same old posts we've read a thousand times before. "Things are as I present them and if you don't see it there's no point in discussing the matter further."
I have no objection to the position, but why keep posting it on a discussion forum?
The problem is that you're still using the metaphor. The metaphor gets you from A to B, but you have to cast it off once you reach B. This is the classical mistake of analytic thought.
Correct.
No metaphor. a camera taking film is not included in the world it films. It's a statement of fact, not a metaphor. It shows that not being included among the objects a device represents does not necessarily render that device of a different substance to the objects it represents.
Nope, supernaturalism was what I objected to. Dualism, at least my garden variety, is a natural, common sensical philosophy. It's not really about demons and fairies.
Yes they do.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eye#Overview
Again, you're begging the question by already assuming the two types of camera are of different stuff.
No, the camera is a metaphor in this discussion. Read back if you need to.
Indeed, this difference is not about the map being magical or supernatural. So what is this difference about?
I'm responding to this...
Quoting Wayfarer
Quoting Pfhorrest
No metaphors involved. Just statements about the way the world is and the ontological consequences.
According to my research, when you respond to me, you're responding to this:
No, the mind of the camera-user is what puts the photo together. They do this first and then take the photo. It's a poor metaphor until you acknowledge this. -Noble Dust
Quoting Noble Dust
And what is my argument that breaks down exactly?
I'm not making an argument, I'm saying Isaac's argument is fallacious. It goes something like:
1- The mind is the source of our concepts of "matter", "physical" and all other concepts
2- Therefore the mind is ontologically different from matter, and is not physical
2 doesn't follow.
That's right. I was pointing out that your objection is misguided because the argument you're objecting to never included a metaphor in the first place.
Quoting Olivier5
Yes, folk philosophy (like folk psychology) and naive at best.
Who said the user was a bot or an automated security camera? Those are programs programmed by human beings.
Quoting khaled
I have no idea, it just breaks down if you consider the camera to be the final viewpoint in the stupid metaphor.
Right. Good talk.
Quoting 180 Proof
Actually, fuck you for your misappropriation of what I said.
So now you've resorted to simply pointing out that other people thought something to be the case and if we don't agree then there's no point in discussing it.
It's a change I suppose...
So now you suddenly dismiss an authoritative source?
Authoritative? In what way?
Mystically.
I see. My mistake. It's not always easy to tell which authors are mystically endowed with such anagogic knowledge. If they'd only leave their mystic auras switched on all the time like they used to in the old images, but I suppose even seers have to save energy these days.
Beginners have far-sight.
I know, that was the point of my question. I'm wondering why you post in a discussion forum if the qualification for having a discussion is agreeing with you about the main point under discussion. Surely art or oration would be a better medium for your approach.
Yeah. It was the overlap in this particular case which interested me.
Oh sure it did :rofl:
Of course. Why would you doubt that? I'd be interested to hear the thought process of someone who holds the belief that "If you don't get it, there's no point in discussing it", who nonetheless thinks a discussion forum is the ideal platform on which to express that view. It seems contradictory to me, but i'm sure it seems consistent in some way to @Wayfarer, hence the question. I'm not going to feign a objective, third-party indifference, it really annoys me. But that doesn't render my interest disingenuous.
Woah, "Sunday's final" as in a massive free for all? Sounds American I've ever heard it.
I'd be interested to hear from someone with that view as well.
Of course.
Do you respond to each and every post, or do you make choices, like Wayfarer?
An assumption is not the same as a wild guess, and nowhere have I assumed motives, it's motives I'm enquiring about.
Quoting Olivier5
No, I don't respond to each and every post, and yes I do make choices like Wayfarer. What has that to do with the very specific question of taking agreement about the matter under discussion to be a prerequisite for discussing that matter?
What strategy? I don't see how my deciding which posts to respond to by any criteria makes all criteria equally rational.
Not an ontological difference, no; not a difference in the kind of stuff they're made out of. (I'm ignoring for our purposes here your peculiar use of "beings" as something more specific than "things that exist", since devices of course are things that exist and so "beings" in the usual sense).
Quoting Wayfarer
Those are important functional differences between humans and cameras, but there's no reason why that functional difference has to entail they're made of different kinds of stuff. There's also a huge functional difference between a rock and a camera, or further still between air and a camera, but there's no debate about them having to be made of stuff that's metaphysically, ontologically dissimilar to accommodate those differences.
Quoting Wayfarer
That's the distinction between form and substance. The question at hand is whether there are irreconcilably different kinds of substances (i.e. stuff that's not just a different form of some other stuff), or at least irreconcilably different kinds of properties of those substances; not a question of whether there's a difference between something having a form (or function, as above) and being made of a certain kind of stuff.
Quoting Noble Dust
That's the claim in question here. The argument offered in support of it was that an observer isn't present in the stuff they're observing. But a camera isn't present in the images it records, yet it's uncontroversially made of the same kind of stuff, so why can't an observer be made of the same kind of stuff they're observing?
:up:
Quoting Olivier5
Supernaturalism just is transcendentalism about ontology: the claim that there are aspects of reality that are beyond empirical observation. Demons and fairies as usually conceived, if they existed at all, would be empirically observable and so natural, not supernatural. You're confusing "supernatural" with "paranormal".
Quoting Olivier5
Then it's not about dualism in the usual philosophical sense under discussion here. If the map and the territory can be made of the same kind of stuff, and have only the ontologically same kind of properties, then the map-territory relation is not a dualist relationship in the usual philosophical sense, and calling that "dualism" is needlessly confusing.
Again, it’s not a matter of agreeing or disagreeing, but seeing the point of the argument you’re taking issue with - which you're not. If the contention is that a camera is the equivalent of, or the same as, the human subject I don't see anything to debate, because it's a simple falsehood. Devices and beings are ontologically distinct. You don't murder a camera, and you can't repair a human being. Yesterday it was that the concept of pain was no different to pain. There's a pattern here, isn't there?
Go back to the first mention of the camera:
Quoting Pfhorrest
No it doesn't - but it's also not a valid objection, because it's only indirectly comparable. What I'm saying that we don't see is the way in which the mind, the subject, constructs or creates what we understand as the real world. We constantly interpret what we see to make our worldview. Heck even neuroscientists see that, although they don't always grasp the philosophical implications.
What the ontological (and epistemological) issue is, is that the mind doesn't see the role it plays in this world-construction. Seeing that is which is what critical philosophy is. Most people are naive realists, which sounds a pejorative, but it's really not, it simply means taking the world at face value, not questioning appearances. It's difficult to question the realist perspective but that is what is required.
Quoting Pfhorrest
Humans are beings, they are called 'human beings'. If you think that's peculiar, the problem is yours. And I do think that there are philosophical distinctions between the terms 'being', 'reality', and 'existence' - such distinctions are the stuff of metaphysics, which is different to the stuff that you think everything is made from.
That's not peculiar at all, but it also makes perfect sense if "being" is taken to mean "thing that exists", rather than... "transcendent subject of experience" or whatever you take it to mean.
If Elon Musk does succeed in going to Mars, would he expect to find anything there answering to the description of 'a being'?
:100: :up: The map/territory – form/material – distinction is a fold (origami-like ... or wave-on-the-ocean movement) rather than a connecting (of separate - 'ontologically different' - domains).
Are you just being evangelical here or can you genuinely not see the difference between something seeming to you to be the case and something actually being the case? You write as if you genuinely don't understand the concept of people disagreeing about some particular class of belief.
The two cases in question are: whether a camera is a being, and whether the concept of pain is painful. As regards the latter, I said that the assertion was so unreasonable as not to warrant a response. That is why I resist getting drawn into pointless arguments with you.
The other point you haven't addressed is the dualism of symbols on the one hand, and physical matter, on the other. That is an excellent starting point for this analysis, because it shows that your assertion that it's all the 'same stuff' doesn't hold up.
Motive questioning again...
So when people do not respond to your post, they are at fault, but when you don't respond to their posts, you are not at fault at all. Okay.
I see. So just a failure to understand the argument then. I thought it might be something more interesting. Or are you just deliberately straw-manning the opposing position to avoid the difficulty of addressing it?
No one has said anything like "cameras are beings" (in the sense you mean it), and no one has said that the concept of pain is painful.
If you don't understand the counter-arguments you're presented with, you can just seek clarity, you don't have to just throw in the towel.
Never mentioned 'fault', nor did I say anything about failure to respond to posts either. I don't know what this wierd line of enquiry of yours is headed toward, but it's becoming increasingly detached from anything actually being said.
Quoting Isaac
Quoting Isaac
Quoting Isaac
Quoting Isaac
You implied that other people's criteria for not responding to your post may not be as rational as your criteria to not respond to their post. I am just amused at your lack of self-awareness.
I didn't once make an assertion about what was actually the case regarding rationality of people's criteria. I said quite clearly and deliberately that it seemed that way to me. In fact I made a point of saying that I assumed it would all make sense to Wayfarer, and when you directly asked me if mine was an assumption I answered "of course". I really can't fathom how you've gleaned from all that the idea the I've condemned Wayfarer's approach as irrational and that's an end to it. Were that the case I would have nothing to ask would I?
I completely recognize the object-subject distinction, I just don't think it's a distinction between kinds of stuff but rather roles in an interaction. But more to the point, I just find your use of the words "existence" vs "being" to mean about the same as "object" vs "subject" to be idiosyncratic and not in keeping with the usual way those words are used in philosophy.
Quoting Wayfarer
Yes; though I do recognize that in colloquial (non-philosophical) usage in that context it might be taken to mean "creature", a living thing, probably an animal, even an intelligent human-like one perhaps, in which case no. But we're talking philosophy here, not colloquialisms.
Quoting Wayfarer
That was the main thing I was addressing in the post that mentioned your odd use of "being", which I guess distracted you from the rest:
Quoting Pfhorrest
Well, don't fathom it then. You can't understand everything, and this is a tangent anyway.
There are many different uses of the term.
What is the difference between the map and the territory, in your opinion?
No one was prepared for a denial of the advent of medicine. Curveball!
If philosophy uses words differently than the every-day use of the words, is philosophy talking about a different world than everyone else when they use those words? If philosphy is an attempt to explain the world and our relationship in it, you would think that we would all be using the same words in the same way - philosophically or not.
Rather, that is the point in question.
Quoting Wayfarer
You don't throw a magnetic field. And you don't measure the intensity and direction of a rock. Does that make rocks and magnetic fields ontologically distinct?
Quoting Wayfarer
And everyone agrees.
What they don't agree with is going from that to saying that the mind is ontologically distinct. It doesn't logically follow.
Quoting Wayfarer
Even if one admits such a dualism it wouldn't make one a substance dualist. Because symbols are not a substance, or they don't need to be.
A triangle doesn't exist in the same way a rock does. The triangle, is the expression of a certain structure. It is not a new substance. One could propose a "mental substance" that the triangle is made of but again I ask: Why would one need to do that? It doesn't seem to bring any advantages, and brings plenty of problems.
The pattern is willful, petulant misunderstanding.
That sounds like you're assigning a motive...
180 at the moment is incapable of debating anything.
Leaving aside his overemotional anxiety and his ad hom,the man doesn't want to address points without strawmanning nor clarify what he's saying.
Which is much needed because his writing "style" and manner of explaining is terrible.
Same thing he did with 3017amen. The man is too gun shy to fully engage.
Put hanover in with someone decent please!
It was,until the last couple of posts.
Yep,I agree with the rest of your post.
:up:
See,if you debate and you think the other sides point is magic or woo,then what's the point of a real discussion?
Its then a polemic and with bad debaters it gets all hair splitting and crappy,and goes nowhere.
Hanover at least has some emotional stability and tries to be charitable.
180 is just awful.
For the other side to try and convince you otherwise. That's a debate.
How many debates have you seen where someone's mind was changed?
And to be a decent debate there should be a bit of charity and understanding.
This ain't a mgregor porier press conference!
That's not the point. The point is to try, and let the observers make their conclusions.
Quoting Protagoras
Bullshit!
It is not an abstract 'subject' that sees things, but some particular thing that sees things. While it is true that it does not see itself seeing, it does not follow that it stands outside of the world of things as the early Wittgenstein had it, or that seeing is not a physical process that some physical things are capable of.
There is a fundamental distinction between a house that is the object of thought and a house I can live in, but both are things made, both the result of human activity. The "thinking thing" is not some part of me, the thinking thing is me.
It is the point. The fact you can't name debates where one side changed is instructive on the mindset of the debates.
All this supposed follow the data,claiming open mindedness and being "logical" is mainly disingenuous posturing.
And bullshit to you as Well punchy!
A map is a compressed copy of the territory: a map stores information about the territory in a smaller amount of space. This can be literally smaller physical space, as in a paper map of a geographic territory, or it can be informational space, as in compressing a file on a computer. In either case the compression can be either lossy, saving space by leaving out irrelevant details, or lossless, saving space by identifying patterns in the underlying territory and representing instances of those patterns symbolically rather than actually repeating the same information over and over again.
Quoting Harry Hindu
No, just using a slightly different language, a different dialect if you will.
Quoting Harry Hindu
It's not at all unusual for different subsets of a linguistic community to develop slight differences in their use of language. While I can easily think of some exceptions to this, I would suspect that philosophical language usage is typically more conservative, sticking to the older uses of words, while colloquial usage changes more over time due to the accumulation of errors and misunderstandings by less-educated laypeople.
Roles are performed by actors. You wouldn’t describe the interaction between minerals in those terms. You use the word ‘stuff’ as in ‘all the same stuff’ so indiscriminately as to be meaningless. The point about the dualism implied by signs and symbols, is that it comprises the relationship between signs, not the relationship between objects or any kind of 'stuff'.
In chemistry we do that all the time: whether something is an acid or base, for instance, is defined by its role in an interaction with another substance.
Quoting Wayfarer
Then it's not dualism in the sense under discussion here, and conflating it with that sense only causes unnecessary confusion.
Phenomena, nature, is 'what appears' - but what appears is always subject to judgement and interpretation. That is what 'apperception' is. And those acts do not inhere in nature, but in the observing mind.
Quoting Pfhorrest
And none of that requires, or involves, the 'roles' of 'subject and object'. Roles require actors, and chemical substances are not actors - well, not unless you want to argue for panpsychism.
Quoting Pfhorrest
I'm not the one who is confused. Reifying 'substance' as 'stuff', as 'something that exists', as 'mind stuff', or whatever is the problem. There is no 'mind-stuff' as an objective fact - 'mind' is 'what interprets'. But you can't stand outside that, as whatever you think is always the product of it. So not being able to do that, we then externalise it, look for it as something objective, and then ask 'well, where is it?' But it's nowhere to be found. You have to 'turn the eye around' and look at what is looking.
So that quotation from Howard Pattee about the relationship of the symbolic and the physical is much nearer to actual dualism than what is being discussed, which is predicated on the self-contradictory notion of 'mental stuff'. That's where the confusion lies.
I didn't say that those were the roles of subject and object specifically, but they are nevertheless roles in an interaction, in the usual way that chemists talk about that.
I do argue for panpsychism in any case, but that's not the point here.
FInal arguments, folks
Mine, already given.
Yes, a map is a symbolic and simplified representation of a territory, made for a certain purpose e.g. facilitating the analysis of, or navigation within the territory.
So the map is made for a specific objective, a certain type of use, a teleology. It implies a goal, or several goals.
These goals drive the kind of simplification applied when building the map. The features of the territory that have no import for the goal are not represented. For instance, roads maps -- designed to facilitate road travel and transportation -- typically do not represent vegetation cover or elevation.
Without such simplification the map would be useless, or more precisely, it would have no advantage compared to the territory. It would also be impossible to build.
Finally, the map is static while the territory is dynamic. The map represents a state of the territory at time t. There are exceptions to this, eg chronograms that map space-time. But the chronogram itself is drawn at time t.
In the case of man-made maps or the regular kind, the map is given some stable material support e.g. written down on paper. What is written down is a symbolic, mind-derived map, a mental map. All man-made maps are mental maps, originally.
Therefore the relationship between map and territory is not symetrical. The "roles" cannot be reversed. There is an fundamental epistemic cut between them. If we were to explore a new planet, and found a map carved on some stone of the nearby terrain, we would conclude that a conscious being carved it.
Now, where does that lead us re. Dualism vs. Monism?
The mind itself can be seen as a geographer, drawing upon a collection of mental maps, constantly updated. Since there is no form without matter, even mental maps (mental symbolic representations of the world) must be coded onto some physical support.
It stands to reason that they are written down on neurons.
This is a dualist perspective in the sense that mental events are recorded onto neurons (and from neurons onto paper or other material support) for later recalling into the mental world. It's mind over matter.
Now my challenge to you is to make sense of the map-territory relationship in monist language.
You've seen an actual map, right? Is it a different kind of stuff than paper and ink combined?
Quoting Olivier5
Or a cartographer rather, yes. Good analogy. We make actual mental maps to navigate. These are models of geography, one of many kinds of models of the world made by the brain which we can think of as maps of a kind (a map of how to behave, for instance).
As you say:
Quoting Olivier5
so the map itself isn't a different kind of stuff.
Property
"In logic and philosophy (especially metaphysics), a property is a characteristic of an object; a red object is said to have the property of redness. The property may be considered a form of object in its own right, able to possess other properties."
Let us take a few classic properties of geographic maps such as scale; projection type; purpose of the map, which drives the simplification process as explained; date of issue and author; place or thing represented.
What's the scale of a rabbit?
What's the purpose of a comet?
What's the projection type of a tomato?
What's the date of issue and the author of a stone?
What does a star represent?
Physical things have different properties than other physical things, but they’re still all physical properties, so pointing out properties that some things have and others don’t doesn’t establish the need for ontologically different kinds of properties.
They're still debating?
You should have a glance at this.
Neutral in English, feminine in French.
Quoting Pfhorrest
To me, things that are representations of other things (such as maps) have certain properties that relate to their representation aspect, such as scale, which is the ratio (relation) between two things: the size of objects on the map divided by their size in the territory (supposed constant in geographic maps). Things that are NOT representations of other things do not have these properties. What is the materiality of such a thing as the scale of a map?
Beside, a map can be printed on many copies, each of which is a different material thing, but the map itself is one. It's the same map on all copies. A map can be translated into another language, and it will look differently on paper but essentially it remains the same map. So the map is more abstract a form than just the paper form on which it is printed. This abstraction of maps vis-à-vis both the territory and the map's physical support is very difficult to think in a monist logic.
Then what use is the term, "physical" if it doesn't distinguish from something else?
Quoting Pfhorrest
Well, that all depends on how we define, "property".
In what way do you think representational drift makes any difference to the robustness of the conclusion that representations are written down on neurons?
Only if you beg the question already. The map of my local area in my car is not the same map as the map of my local area on my bookcase. There are differences at the microscopic level even to the arrangement of the symbols. It's only 'the same' because we take the expression 'the same' in common language to mean similar enough for our purposes. Here the purpose is to navigate my local area. It's no different to saying two people have the same hairstyle. We're not saying they literally have every single hair in the same place, just similar enough for our purposes.
So all you have in identifying some unifying theme which is constant between two maps of the same area is a linguistic convention, not an ontological distinction. If it were an ontological distinction it would not be possible for me to claim they were not the same, by pointing out microscopic differences. If I do so, you'd have to say "those differences are not enough", which is a subjective judgement about purposes, not an objective one about what kinds of thing exist and of what substance.
So I am questioning the idea that neurons ‘represent’ ideas or that ‘ideas’ are ‘written’ on them. There’s something like a mixed metaphor at work here. ‘Writing’ is of course a form of symbolic communication, whereas whatever is conducted between brain cells comprises the exchange of ions and so on. Those don’t directly represent anything, rather, the brain seems to be able to respond with great flexibility while still maintaining the same content.
How does this conclusion lead you to...
Quoting Wayfarer
Ideas may be written on paper too, no? If I copy the idea from one page and then destroy the original, have I not preserved the idea? If such a process were carried out a thousand time by robots, the human reading it after the thousandth iteration would be reading the same idea. If the idea were not represented on paper and preserved through the process described, then how could the human reading it gain the idea?
Not really. It's the same map IFF it represents the same thing the same way, e.g. at the same scale, projection, and was authored by the same person at the same time.
So no two maps are the same then?
Right, but what is preserved is an idea, information, a story. It can be represented in a variety of media and many different languages or systems, including binary code. But the idea stays the same, while the material form is different - which I think is an argument in favour of dualism.
See my comment to Oliver above. The idea does not stay the same, only similar enough for our purposes, so there's no unity requiring a separate existence, only a façon de parler.
Ideas must be written down on something to exist, and to have any effect on things. An idea written nowhere, not even in some dude's memory, is not presently in existence or in any way active in this present world.
If your article is correct, which it probably is (and brain plasticity in general is well established), it follows that ideas exist in some 'mental space', and that they are written down on neurons but not written forever, only they are written and rewritten and rewritten, always slightly differently, and (maybe) our ideas evolve as a result of this constant rewriting.
I can assure you that if you present me with the same smell every day for a month, at first I may think :yum: and at the end :vomit:
An image of our brain:
It's not just the act of "writing", but also recalling. From where do we recall our ideas/memories? Our memories are not composed of neurons, but colors, shapes, sounds and feelings. When you recall the visual of a neuron, is not the neuron composed of shapes and colors? So which is more fundamental - neurons or shapes and colors? And are not shapes and colors a type of information?
In what way is that a reply to the argument raised? I still see 7 names similar enough for me to pronounce them the same and bring the same city to mind on reading them. Similar enough for our purposes, but not the same entity.
If the distinction is made between physical and mental substances then the interaction problem must be confronted. Has Hanover solved the problem by clarifying definitions?
Yes. 'The same' as in similar enough for our purposes. There's not a unity there requiring a separate ontological existence. The names are clearly dissimilar in many ways too.
To think there's not a difference between my coffee table and your coffee table is also nonsense. thankfully, no one is making such a claim so we need not concern ourselves with it.
Nonsense. Materialists are saying feelings are Matter.
Yep. As are both our coffee tables, and yet one is different from the other.
Nope. Coffee tables have a similarity,they are both made from matter.
Feelings are not.
That's just restating your position, not addressing the argument. The issue in question is whether it can be demonstrated that feelings are not matter, that you believe they're not is not in question.
Nope. You can never prove feelings are matter.
My feelings say they are not matter.
Why would anyone give a fuck what your feelings say? This is a discussion forum. If you've got nothing more to bring to the table than that your feelings say one position is correct and another incorrect then your contribution is worthless. We're discussing, not conducting a poll.
Feelings are subjectivity you fool.
If your in pain should you ignore it?
You ignorant bigot.
Quoting Isaac
:100: This Dunning-Kruger troll is completely incorrigible on this point. S/He won't "feel good" about your reply either.
Are you suggesting all seven of those names are the same in every way? I can see some substantial differences.
No doubt we'll have a sagacious aphorism to that effect any minute.
And the image of the scientist as some unbiased observor collecting the data without any metaphysical assumptions or baggage is destroyed.
Cheers @Isaac ,you have done a great service showing how researchers are human,all too human. You are religious in your beliefs and assumptions!
As if a few expensive scanners and petty research disproves pain,or proves you are a bunch of atoms floating about!
The differences you see are not in the name "New York" itself, which is one name, but in the many different ways to write it down.
It's a dialogue between mind and matter, a two-way street.
I count seven.
You're trying to locate ideas in the physical world, but I think they're real in a different sense to existent phenomena. They're real as principles, as ideas although not simply the casual thoughts that occupy our minds moment to moment. But the domain of ideas is not dependent on the physical domain, rather they are the organising principles which underlie and inform the physical domain. This of course goes back to the Aristotelian idea of formal cause, which was abandoned by early modern science, although some say it's making a comeback.
Quoting Olivier5
The key thing here, is 'equals' or 'means' or 'same as' or 'different to'. We see equivalences between many different strings of characters or symbolic forms, which is what makes language possible. What are we seeing, when we say that 'this equals that' or 'this means that'? We take for granted this ability, but really it is at the foundation of rationality, it is an awesome power. We casually accept that this is something that 'evolved', as if that amounts to an explanation for it.
This, of course, touches on the whole question of universals, which I describe as 'the ligatures of reason'. It goes without saying that naturalist philosophy is invariably nominalist, so it never sees the causal connections between reason and being that underlies traditional philosophy.
(I will acknowledge that nobody else here believes these ideas.)
That's the grammatical gender of the words for "table" in those languages, not the gender-as-in-not-quite-sex of the actual table.
Quoting Olivier5
What is the "materiality" of my height in meters? They're the same kind of thing. Relational properties aren't metaphysically spooky, they're normal kinds of things that normal physical things have all the time.
Quoting Olivier5
That's the form-substance distinction again, which as stated already is not something anybody is denying: you can have multiple things of the same form. The question at hand is whether there's more than one kind of underlying substance, such that you can't in principle trans-form one kind of thing to another because those kinds of things have to be made of different stuff, e.g. such that you can't in principle transform a bunch of CO2 and H2O and misc other chemicals into a self-aware thinking person.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Some people suppose that things that aren't physical exist, things that (as above) you can't get by changing the form of some physical stuff. It's only the supposition of some other kind of stuff, that's fundamentally discontinuous with all of the ordinary stuff we're familiar with like that, that calls for the need of a term for that ordinary stuff.
But this still wouldn’t make ideas a substance. Do you think a triangle (the idea, not a physical triangle) is a substance? A holder of properties?
If so, what would happen if you removed the “triangle substance” from a dorito?
Incidentally, I agree with the above. What you mean by “organizing principles” is what I meant by “structure” and “pattern”
Pfhorrest put it really well as I was typing this:
Quoting Pfhorrest
A form/structure/organizing principle is not its own a substance. Or at least, doesn’t need to be.
Quoting Wayfarer
Sight is an awesome power. It is also evolved. I don’t see why patter recognition or reasoning would be any different.
You still don’t show that you understand the meaning of ‘substance’ in philosophy. You’re thinking of ‘substance’ in the everyday usage.
[quote=Feser]Consider that when you think about triangularity, as you might when proving a geometrical theorem, it is necessarily perfect triangularity that you are contemplating, not some mere approximation of it. Triangularity as your intellect grasps it is entirely determinate or exact; for example, what you grasp is the notion of a closed plane figure with three perfectly straight sides, rather than that of something which may or may not have straight sides or which may or may not be closed. Of course, your mental image of a triangle might not be exact, but rather indeterminate and fuzzy. But to grasp something with the intellect is not the same as to form a mental image of it. For any mental image of a triangle is necessarily going to be of an isosceles triangle specifically, or of a scalene one, or an equilateral one; but the concept of triangularity that your intellect grasps applies to all triangles alike. Any mental image of a triangle is going to have certain features, such as a particular color, that are no part of the concept of triangularity in general. A mental image is something private and subjective, while the concept of triangularity is objective and grasped by many minds at once.[/quote]
[quote=Bertrand Russell, The World of Universals; https://russell-j.com/07-POP09.HTM] It is largely the very peculiar kind of being that belongs to universals which has led many people to suppose that they are really mental. We can think of a universal, and our thinking then exists in a perfectly ordinary sense, like any other mental act. Suppose, for example, that we are thinking of whiteness. Then in one sense it may be said that whiteness is 'in our mind'. ...In the strict sense, it is not whiteness that is in our mind, but the act of thinking of whiteness. The connected ambiguity in the word 'idea'...also causes confusion here. In one sense of this word, namely the sense in which it denotes the object of an act of thought, whiteness is an 'idea'. Hence, if the ambiguity is not guarded against, we may come to think that whiteness is an 'idea' in the other sense, i.e. an act of thought; and thus we come to think that whiteness is mental. But in so thinking, we rob it of its essential quality of universality. One man's act of thought is necessarily a different thing from another man's; one man's act of thought at one time is necessarily a different thing from the same man's act of thought at another time. Hence, if whiteness were the thought as opposed to its object, no two different men could think of it, and no one man could think of it twice. That which many different thoughts of whiteness have in common is their object, and this object is different from all of them. Thus universals are not thoughts, though when known they are the objects of thoughts.
One, I think. Are cities non-physical now too?
One city, one name: New York. This unique name (aka concept) can be written down in an infinite number of different ways.
I would agree, with the caveat that these structures and patterns are not material. Rather, they show up as patterns and structures in material forms, but they are logically prior to material form. They are what 'informs' matter. I think in some schools of traditional philosophy, this is known as the 'formal realm', that being the domain of forms, regularities and principles. It was that domain which Plato had intuitive insight into. (I haven't been able to track down the reference to the 'formal realm', however.)
Quoting Pfhorrest
It's more that 'ideas' in the above sense are real, in that they provide the bounding principles for thought, and also for phenomena, in that they manifest as principles. But they're not physical - they exist as bounds, limits, principles, and regularities. That's how I interpret the meaning of universals.
What you interpret as 'what exists', is always that which can be made an object - which is why you think of it as 'stuff'. What I'm referring to here, is the structure of thought, and also the structure of reality. But you won't find that understanding in modern science, because of the influence of nominalism.
Well then we agree. I see this distinction as fundamentally dualistic. I note that you have not even tried to express the map-territory relation in monist language.
I also note you sport yourself as a panpsychic, which I take as being the dualist view where tables have thoughts (but no sex, for some odd reason).
I agree. Any comparison between two objects involves abstraction, ie thinking of pure forms (seeing the form as independent of its material substrate). And we certainly have this capacity to think in abstract forms, such as in mathematics. But from there, it does not follow (I think) that pure abstract forms exist elsewhere than as hypotheses in our mind. (which is a form of existence)
Not sure what difference it makes in practice, to hypothetise the existence of pure forms outside of minds. What do you see as the methodological or conceptual advantage? How does it help you think?
What type of word is 'New York'?
But they are structures of material stuff. Always. So in the end the number of "kinds of stuff" that exist is still 1.
Sure we can talk of the structures without there being any material thing that takes on that structure (we can talk of triangles even if no triangular objects exist), but even there, all that exists is matter, and forms of matter. Not matter and another substance.
Quoting Wayfarer
The structures are not material, in the sense that they don't have any mass (triangle, the idea, has no mass, but a dorito has mass). But usually when we talk of the structures of physical stuff we call those "physical" too. Like sound waves. We call sound waves physical, even though a wave is just a pattern of air, and a pattern has no mass.
In any case, the disagreement seems to be on whether or not to call structures physical or non physical. Not actually on what exists. Which is matter and its structures.
And how many words are there on that page (binomials, in fact - it would have been easier had you chosen Boston)?
Material stuff which could not exist without those forms. So they’re prior to matter, and they’re not physical in nature. They don’t have to exist - things do the hard work of existing - but things depend on them for existence.
If I call: "Isaac! Isaac!" I haven't called two persons, or two different names, just one name repeated twice.
Asserting it doesn't constitute an argument. You agreed that the word (binomial) 'New York' is a name. There are seven such words on that page so it follows that there are seven names on that page also. Nowhere is it given that there is one of anything on that page, that's the case you want to make, but instead of arguing for it you keep resorting to simply asserting it.
You are using confused concepts.
"New York" is a place name composed of two words: the word "New" and the word "York".
There are 14 words written on that page, 7 instances of "New" and 7 instances of "York". So there are 7 instances of the name "New York" on the page. Not 7 different names. The city of New York doesn't have one name in Cherif and another in Sans Cherif and another in Gothic and another in Arial. It is one name for one city.
The point is that a single concept such as "New York" can be written several times on a page, in many different ways. Likewise, I suspect that the same concept can be written on neurons in many different ways.
That's what a binomial is. I labelled it as such a few posts ago. It's irrelevant to the issue. Had you chosen Boston, we could have simply used 'word'.
Quoting Olivier5
You're just asserting again. Do you understand the concept of making a case? I already know what you think, you've made that quite clear already. There's a unity called 'the name'. I want to know why you think that, not just twenty different ways of telling me that you think that.
If what you're talking about is not 'what exists', 'objects', 'stuff', etc, then what you're saying is not in disagreement with anything I'm saying. I'm only talking about what kind of things, stuff, objects, etc, exist. There can be forms, patterns, organizations, structures, etc, to those things, objects, that stuff, etc, that exists; and in that sense, those forms, patterns, organizations, structures exist too, but not as different kind of things, objects, or stuff, just as forms, patterns, etc, of that one kind of stuff.
And when you really get down to my own view on things, in an important sense there isn't really any "stuff" at all; there is only form, only structure, and in saying that there's "only one kind of stuff" I'm really saying that all forms and structures are in principle trans-formable into each other; all of the apparent different "kinds of stuff" are just different forms of the same one kind of stuff, at which point there's not really any point in talking about "kinds of stuff" anymore, just about forms. The only point of talking about kinds of stuff is to discuss whether or not (stuff or things or objects or whatever of) one form can be trans-formed into (whatever of) a different form, e.g. can a bunch of quarks and electrons etc get transformed somehow over billions of years into a thinking experiencing human being, or not? If changing the form can't get you from one kind of whatever to another kind of whatever, then it's implied that there's something besides form "underlying", or "sub-standing" if you will, the difference between the whatevers; some sort of different kinds of sub-stance. If there's only one kind of substance, we needn't ever talk about it, as in...
Quoting Olivier5
I expressed the map-territory relationship in a way that didn't require talking about different kinds of substances or properties, which is thus completely compatible with ontological monism. There isn't any specifically "monist language": monist language is just ordinary language.
Quoting Olivier5
Panpsychism as I formulate it is not dualist in the ontological sense under discussion here. There's not different kinds of stuff or things, nor even different kinds of properties (like mental and material) of the same kind of stuff or things.
There's just two perspectives to take on any thing interacting with any other thing: as the thing being experienced, the object, or as the thing doing the experiencing, the subject; which on my account is identical with the thing doing something (every experiential property of a thing is just a propensity of that thing to do certain behaviors when interacted with in certain ways), or the thing being done-unto (every experience of something else is just that something else doing some behavior to you). Every thing can both do, and be done unto; and so can both be experienced, or experience.
But "experience" in this sense is not thought, belief, or even feeling, perception, or sensation. It's whatever the supposed difference between a real human being and a fully functional replica of a human being who is "not actually conscious" (a philosophical zombie) is supposed to be. Panpsychism like this -- the view that everything always has that je ne sais qua that a philosophical zombie is supposed to lack -- is just the only remaining option after you rule out the options that either (1) no such thing as consciousness in that sense actually exists, and (2) some kind of fundamentally irreducible magic makes it come fully into being for certain things but not at all for others, rather than just taking different forms in some things than others.
I expect you might want to call that a "dualist view", but not every distinction between two facets or aspects or whatever (like form and substance) constitutes a kind of "dualism".
Alrighty, tell me what you think then. Are you saying that the city of New York has many different names?
Sure.
Quoting Wayfarer
I don't know what "prior" means here. Are we talking about a timeline? I don't think it makes sense to ask when "triangle", the structure, started existing for it to be prior to any triangular object.
Quoting Wayfarer
Again, we call sound waves physical even though sound waves are a pattern of air and patterns don't have mass. Again, seems to me the disagreement is mainly whether or not to call these structures physical, not actually a disagreement over their nature.
Quoting Wayfarer
Sure.
So, they don't exist as a substance (holder of properties), and things do the hard work of existing as substances, while conforming to certain structures. I would call that physicalism. Considering it includes one substance (physical stuff) conforming to certain structures (which are not a separate substance)
:up:
I've already given my account. We commonly say that 'New York' has one name, but it is a façon de parler, what we really have is multidudinous instances all of which are similar enough for our purposes. No additional entities required. I'm an Occham's razor kind of guy when it comes to ontology. I don't like to bring things into existence that don't seem necessary. The words (concepts, forms, ideals...whatever) as written, or in each individual mind seem to necessarily exist. There are seven of them on that page you posted. I don't see why a new entity, the unity 'the name's needs to be reified. It's sufficient that the seven necessary objects are similar.
That is a rather strange definition of "experience", as equal to the difference between a real entity and a fictional one.
How does that definition apply to panpsychic tables? Let me guess:
[I]The table's experience is whatever the supposed difference between a real table and a fully functional replica of a table who is "not actually conscious" (a zombie table) is supposed to be.[/i]
Now that makes a lot of sense...
We commonly say so because if we didn't, if we thought that New York has many different names that all share enough similarity, then our life would be far more complicated. We would have to define the boundaries of that similitude. Because we CAN recognised the same name New York written in seven different fonts on that pic I posted. So we would need another explanation of our recognizing New York than the common sense one (=it's the same mental concepts or "ideal mental forms", e.g. letters / words / name but simply written in different fonts, tweaking the shapes of the graphic symbols in a purely aesthetic manner, for the fun or beauty of it).
Now what would such a rival explanation be? Where would the boundaries of the "New York" similitude lie? What would it take for a scribble on a page to NOT be recognised as meaning "New York"?
Why?
Quoting Olivier5
Why? We don't have to define the boundaries of similitude to understand "stand roughly here", nor do we doubt that high stakes poker is excluded from the definition of 'game' when instructed to "play a 'game' with the children".
We deal quite easily with nouns and names whose definitional boundaries are fuzzy at the edges.
Quoting Olivier5
Labelling your own preferred position as 'the common sense one' is a cheap trick. We're talking about ontology here, there's no common sense account at all.
Quoting Olivier5
Are you suggesting that there exist no ambiguous cases? That there's no scribble I could make where some might read it as saying 'New York' and others might not? We do not need to define the boundaries of similitude. Core cases are used most of the time, edge cases are either ignored or simply remain ambiguous, unresolved. It's not an apocalyptic problem that some scribbles can only be ambiguousmy deciphered.
A more complex and complete theory of typefaces and fonts exist, than the "common sense" one. A little detour via Wikipedia will convince you of that:
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Font
In metal typesetting, a font was a particular size, weight and style of a typeface. Each font was a matched set of type, with a piece (a "sort") for each glyph, and a typeface consisting of a range of fonts that shared an overall design.
In modern usage, with the advent of desktop publishing, "font" has come to be used as a synonym for "typeface" although a typical typeface (or 'font family') consists of a number of fonts.
For instance, the typeface "Bauer Bodoni" includes fonts "Regular", "Bold", "Italic" and Italic Bold and each of these exists in a variety of sizes. The term "font" is correctly applied to any one of these alone but may be seen used loosely to refer to the whole typeface. When used in computers, each style is in a separate digital "font file".
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Typeface
"Font family" redirects here.
A typeface is the design of lettering[1] that can include variations in size, weight (e.g. bold), slope (e.g. italic), width (e.g. condensed), and so on. Each of these variations of the typeface is a font.
There are thousands of different typefaces in existence, with new ones being developed constantly.
The art and craft of designing typefaces is called type design. Designers of typefaces are called type designers and are often employed by type foundries. In digital typography, type designers are sometimes also called font developers or font designers.
Every typeface is a collection of glyphs, each of which represents an individual letter, number, punctuation mark, or other symbol. The same glyph may be used for characters from different scripts, e.g. Roman uppercase A looks the same as Cyrillic uppercase ? and Greek uppercase alpha. There are typefaces tailored for special applications, such as cartography, astrology or mathematics.
Nothing in that demonstrates a 'common sense' notion of reifying ideal mental forms, so I'm baffled as to why you went to the trouble. As if anything I wrote suggested I was oblivious to the idea that fonts exist.
Actually we do, if we care to be understood we need to express ourselves clearly, and this means abiding to certain theoretical or practiced rules. What you write must be readable.
Quoting Isaac
I have addressed that in quoting Wikipedia above. There's a full blown typographic theory out there that underpins all modern written communications.
Quoting Isaac
No. I am suggesting a test to your theory: a test on which it fails. It is not practical, it doesn't tell you how to write New York so that the reader understands New York. We cannot use it to think and express ourselves simply and clearly about typography and writing. Your similitude is empty blah, with no clear pragmatic application in the art of writing.
You've not answered the challenge that similitude gives sufficient clarity to be understood.
Quoting Olivier5
So? Nothing in there mentions anything about reifying ideal forms.
Quoting Olivier5
You've given no account of this failure.
Many fonts can be read as 'N' because they're all similar in ways close enough for the purpose.
In what way does that fail to explain fonts?
You have not said what similitude means. It's a rather vague concept. W is similar to M but they are not the same letter.
Quoting Isaac
What is 'N' standing for in this sentence, if not the idea of the one and only letter 'N'?
I do really appreciate it, as I've been feeling rather unappreciated elsewhere in philosophy and life lately.
Quoting Olivier5
I'm not the one who started talking about that concept; look at Chalmers or Block for blame on that (though it certainly goes back even further than them).
I think the obvious answer to the question "even if you arranged some non-living matter into the exact form and function of a real human being, such that it walked around and talked and lived life like a real human, and even reported on mental states it supposedly had, might there still be something missing that's not accounted for just by the functionality?" is "basically no".
But other people say "yes". Those are the real dualists.
Some people say "I suppose there could be in concept, but there never would be, because..." and then give different reasons:
- either that even real humans don't have that whatever-else, that "phenomenal consciousness" or "first-person experience",
- or that some kind of magic always happens to give that whatever-else to things with the right function, out of nowhere, not built up from other forms of it,
- or else (like me) that that whatever-else is already everywhere, in different forms of course, and all that differs is the form and function of things, nothing ontological or otherwise metaphysical.
Quoting Olivier5
The table is ontologically and otherwise metaphysically no different from a human being; whatever je ne se qua a real human would have and a philosophical zombie would lack, even tables (and rocks and atoms) already have that. What differs between a table and a human being is their functionality, and consequently the particular form of their experience, which like its behavior is nothing much to speak of for a table.
The degree to which one entity shares properties with another.
Quoting Olivier5
Yes. W is not similar enough to M.
Quoting Olivier5
Depends on the circumstances. Here it might be something I would refer to with the vocalisation something like 'en'. If you put serifs on that printed letter, I would still refer to it with the same vocalisation. If you made it all curly and fancy I may still do so. It would still be similar enough to other printed letters I've heard referred to that way. If, however, you put a fourth line on it to make it look more like M, it would cease to be similar enough. It would look more similar to printed letters I've heard referred to by the vocalisation 'em', so I'd be more likely to use that.
Logically prior, i.e. must be real in order for matter to exist in the first place. In Platonic philosophy, forms don’t begin or cease to exist, which is what makes them transcendent with respect to phenomena; they don't come into and go out of existence, like phenomena do.
Quoting khaled
Sound waves are physical for sure. But what about the probability wave? Are those waves physical? I think not. They're distributions of possibility, of potentials with different degrees of reality [sup]1[/sup].
Quoting khaled
No, I’m arguing for substance dualism. Physicalism believes that mind is a result of matter, the product of the material brain, whereas dualism believes that mind is the cause as much as the result. This is not necessarily a theistic belief, arguably, theism appropriated ideas of that kind that already were in circulation in their culture.
Quoting Pfhorrest
Well, I think there is are ontological differences between minerals, plants, animals, and humans (rational minds) - therefore that there are different substances (in the philosophical sense). That you can’t account for life and mind in terms of physics and chemistry. (I've been encouraged to learn that Ernst Mayr, who is considered a giant of 20th century biology, is likewise not reductionist. He says In The growth of biological thought , that 'the discovery of the genetic code was a breakthrough of the first order. It showed why organisms are fundamentally different from any kind of non-living material. There is nothing in the inanimate world that has a genetic program which stores information with a history of three thousand million years!’)
The 'something else' is obviously not something on the table of elements, then. In it's most primitive form, it manifests as homeostasis, the ability to maintain stability, to grow, heal, and reproduce. None of those characteristics are reducible to physics in this view.
You can refer to it in many different ways, of course.
This is done all the time. It's called reproduction, and I have no problem with it. Note the importance of EXACT FORM in the sentence. Form is what life is about. Whether you use these or those molecules of water makes no actual difference, but the form is what 'matters'.
My issue was rather with your definition of experience:
Quoting Pfhorrest
In other words, you define experience as conscious experience... not sure that's more than a tautology, or that it makes much of a difference with "thought, belief, or even feeling, perception, or sensation".
My point is that conscious experience is fundamentally different from just matter or energy, not that it cannot be 'produced' or made to happen in this world.
As we all know, the invention of the alphabet or rather its derivation from earlier ideograms (the letter A for instance would derive from a stylized cow head, turned upside down) was a significant achievement in the history of writing, allowing a massive reduction in the number of distinct signs to learn.
If the alphabet does not really really exist, we have a problem.
So what is the ontological status of the alphabet? I would respond as follows: IFF the alphabet is said to exist as an abstract set, it becomes teachable to people and thus, it becomes a reality in their head. This allows them to do all sorts of amazing things like writing on TPF. If on the contrary the alphabet does not really exist as one abstract thing, it cannot be taught and used. I prefer the first hypothesis, personally.
"Your 'A' is not similar enough to the ideal mental form for 'A', try again."
"Your 'A' is not similar enough to all the other 'As', try again."
What's wrong with the second teaching method? What does it fail to achieve by way of learning how to write?
It is less elegant, heavier conceptually, and more complex to teach. Qualitatively, it implies that all recognisable As are equivalent, which is not the case. They are variations on a theme, derivated from the ideal A by adding little bars at the bottom (sheriffs) or thickened strokes (bold) or what not. These variations themselves become easily teachable when seen as variations from some basic shape.
Just teach them the alphabet; it's easier. Whether the alphabet "exists" or not is a not-too-meaningful question. Whether it is a useful concept is the right question. And the answer is yes.
Subjective.
Quoting Olivier5
Absolute nonsense. Your approach creates an entirely unnecessary category of existence and then populates it with entities we can neither measure nor see which would require an entirely new branch of physics to govern their interaction with the material world. Mine just says if there's seven words on a page, there's seven words on a page. No hidden stuff, no new physics, no magic.
Quoting Olivier5
What's easier to show, some other 'As' or the nebulous mental concept of an 'A'?
Quoting Olivier5
They absolutely are not. This is just historically false.
Quoting Olivier5
Both approaches teach the alphabet.
It's about concepts and their usefulness, not about their existence. Once the concepts of letters and numbers have been invented, we'd be fools not to use them.
Definitely, or we wouldn’t study them under “physics”
I think a better example for you would be algorithms. We don’t consider those physical (mostly though we don’t bother to ask the question), even though they’re a set of instructions for a physical computer (or anything) to follow. We’re not entirely consistent it seems to me when it comes to what we call physical.
Quoting Wayfarer
Except you think there is one substance not two. Different forms of one substance.
Quoting Wayfarer
That’s not what either physicalism or dualism means. Physicalism is the belief that all that exists is physical substances. Dualism is the belief that there are 2 separate substances, one mental and one physical. You keep insisting that the mental, is not a substance, so you’re not a substance dualist.
Not 'entirely'? It's a moving target, it changes all the time. All it comes down to is a pledge of allegiance to science.
Quoting khaled
OK, let me put it this way - mind is a substance in the philosophical sense, that is, it has properties (such as knowing) - but it is not something objective. It doesn't exist as an object of experience, but as the subject of experience. Can you see the distinction?
What I meant was that sometimes we call forms of physical things “physical” (waves) and sometimes we don’t (algorithms).
Quoting Wayfarer
I think I get what you’re saying now. I’d still struggle to call it dualism.
Algorithms are specific forms that the hardware follows. Algorithms are thus not material (don’t have mass). Algorithms also have properties (time complexity, space complexity, etc). Does that make algorithms a new substance? Is there an “algorithm-hardware dualism”?
[quote=Neil Ormerod; https://www.abc.net.au/religion/the-metaphysical-muddle-of-lawrence-krauss-why-science-cant-get-/10100010] There are a whole range of other realities whose reality we can…affirm: interest rates, mortgages, contracts, vows, national constitutions, penal codes and so on. Where do interest rates "exist"? Not in banks, or financial institutions. Are they real when we cannot touch them or see them? We all spend so much time worrying about them - are we worrying about nothing? In fact, I'm sure we all worry much more about interest rates than about the existence or non-existence of the Higgs boson! Similarly, a contract is not just the piece of paper, but the meaning the paper embodies; likewise a national constitution or a penal code. [/quote]
In other words, they are the forms that physical stuff seems to follow. In the end what exists is: The physical stuff, in different forms.
You take forms to be a substance, so you’re a dualist. I don’t so I’m a physicalist. In the end, I don’t think we disagree on much other than what counts as a substance.
Good conversation. I feel like we’ve reached some agreement?
Substance dualists might consider the disagreement to be more substantial. :grin:
Well no, the thread is about dualism. It's literally about their existence. If all you're saying is that it's useful to imagine a single ideal 'A' then...meh. Some people do, some don't. It's horses for courses.
What's absolutely a given is that it's neither necessary, nor foundational and so there's no cause at all to assume some second substance for it to be constituted of.
Everybody does, in actual fact, even those unaware that they do. The human mind thinks in universals.
Quoting Isaac
Concepts that have been invented do exist, if only in our heads. Their "substance" is not an immediate concern of mine; I'm not even sure the word has a meaning in the context of abstract ideas.
As to whether concepts are foundational, I think they are historically so, not naturally so. The invention of the zero and base 10 counting for instance was purely conceptual, but it greatly facilitated computation.
Bullshit (in the technical sense). What possible evidence could you bring to bear that everybody uses the concept of an ideal 'A' even if they claim to use alternative methods? You're just flailing. I've given a perfectly reasonable account of how one might learn to read and write the letter 'A' without a mental ideal, you've not given any counter argument, yet here you're simply declaring that everyone does it your way even if they think they don't.
….the fact that in thinking, your mind is identical with the form that it thinks, means (for Aristotle and for all Platonists) that since the form 'thought' is detached from matter, 'mind' is immaterial too. [/quote]
Because they speak of it, thus they know the concept of the letter A. You are lying to yourself.
I've never heard anyone in day-to-day language talk about the ideal mental concept of the letter 'A'. Give me an example of the sort of conversation you've had which includes the subject.
Right. Which, as I've just explained, does not require an ideal mental construct. It's just a façon de parler for "is this sufficiently like all the other 'A's". This can be easily demonstrated by asking people to draw the ideal 'A' and finding each will do so slightly differently, thus no universal ideal 'A' could possibly exist. Or you could ask people how they arrived at what all letter 'A's have in common and find they give a range of answers, none of which will cover the full range of letters they're prepared to accept as an A. Or you could look at the history of the letter and find it to be completely at odds with the idea of variations on a pure theme, but rather a series of random gradual changes.
"All the other As" means the same thing as "the set of all As" which means the same thing as "the concept of the (singular) letter A". You are just playing conceptual hide and seek with yourself because you are afraid to think in universals.
How on earth do you square "the set of all 'A's" meaning the same thing as "the concept of the singular letter A"? For a start one is a set of existent things, the other a concept. One has many members, the other only one. One can be described, the other cannot. One is consistent between individuals, the other is not. One has entirely physical objects, the other none.
They're about as different as it's possible to be.
And why on earth would I be 'afraid' to think in universals? What an odd thing to accuse someone of. What harm might I be predicting could come to me if I were to think in universals?
A set is a concept, by definition.
Quoting Isaac
Losing face on a message board.
I'm talking about the contents, not the set itself.
Butting in, A in this context isn't a universal. It's a category we learn, in this case are taught. We all likely make the mistake of thinking it a universal as a child, but we all learn that it is not.
Categories generally are idiosyncratic. My blue might be slightly different to your blue by virtue of the fact that the range of frequencies I call blue differs to the range you call blue. We might find a boundary colour and disagree as to whether it is blue or green despite the fact that we are staring at the same colour so have that in common. And it isn't just the question of the label to use that we're arguing over: how our brains categorise things affects how we see them. The borderline colour that I call blue will look more blue to me than to you.
My ex-girlfriend wrote lowercase a without it joining at the top such that I read it as a u. Others could clearly see it as an a. Finding a bunch of A in different fonts we're all familiar with isn't going to interrogate much. Finding a bunch of corrupted A might be more telling.
The contents of the set {all the As} are actual 'A's.
The content of the set {the concept of the singular letter A} is itself a concept.
One is a conceptual collection of actual objects, the other is a conceptual collection of conceptual objects (with only one member).
The same tends to be true of universals: in practice they have hazy boundaries, and those boundaries vary across people, so I don't see much a difference here between the two ideas. A category is still a universal if it is to be used effectively in communication. If your 'blue' is to be meaningful to me, there has to be some fairly wide overlap between my category of blue and yours.
What you are saying is that "universals" are not as universal as we may think, their limits are hazy, which is true and indeed an important point in that the verification of universals by interviewing locutors is never perfect. You can always find a guy who disagrees somewhere.
Yeah. Also context matters. What we're prepared to treat as an A depends on the context it's placed in. Take NASA's logo, for example. The 'A's are just bent lines. We wouldn't accepted that as an A on it's own, but in the context of a logo, we do. We change our treatment of the image depending on the context.
What I've been trying (and failing), to get across in my recent posts is the idea that these things, like universals and even categories, are post hoc constructions. The are subsequent to the actual treatment or not of the image as an A. We first treat it as an A (for a collection of highly contextual reasons, many of which are subconscious), then, on reflection we tell ourselves a simpler story that this acceptance was because of some universal ideal, or category membership. In reality we're often surprised by what we're willing to accept as an A, as reading your ex's writing no doubt shows!
The content of the set defined by {the concept of the singular letter A} is made of all conceivable glyphs that could qualify as an A.
Then they're not universals are they?
Quoting IEP - Universals
I don't see how that's an anti-reductionist claim. That's a difference in form and consequent function between living and non-living things, which of course there is, that's the most obvious kind of difference between those things. The reductionist view is that if you modeled all of the chemicals involved in DNA arranged in just the right way, you would model everything there is to model about DNA, and nothing would be missing. An anti-reductionist view in turn would be a claim that DNA isn't made of just chemicals arranged in the right way, but that there's something else besides that involved. What is that something else, and why do we need to suppose it exists, or equivalently, what noticeable difference in the world does its existence make?
Quoting Olivier5
I agree with that, but there are people who don't, and the disagreement between us and them is the subject at hand here. There are people, like Chalmers, who think that even if you had some matter in the exact form of a human, which consequently functions exactly like a human, there's still an open question of whether or not it's "really conscious", even though it does all of the functional stuff like thinking, believing, feeling, perceiving, and sensing. E.g. if you've got a thing that looks just like a human and points its eyes around at things and is able to interact with the world in a normal human way including reporting on the things its eyes see and what it interprets those signals to mean and what states of the world it takes to be the case on account of all that... people like Chalmers say that there's still a question as to whether such a thing really experiences anything, or if it just behaves as if it does.
My kind of panpsychism is the view that whatever metaphysical difference there may be between just behaving as if you have experiences and actually having experiences, that metaphysical quality (which Chalmers et al call "phenomenal consciousness") is already present everywhere, so all you have to do is get some matter into the right form and thus function and it already has whatever else is metaphysically needed to experience things the way a human does. It's that form and thus function that's actually important; the metaphysical capacity to "experience things" in some sense transcending that functionality is a trivial quality that's already everywhere and so can't distinguish between anything.
And other people worry about the sex of angels...
I got news for Chalmers. Philosophical zombies cannot possibly exist. The mind is not facultative, it is a necessary element of a functional biological human being, which MIGHT BE precisely why it exists in every single human being we've come across so far... And when human beings go into coma, they often die.
Quoting Pfhorrest
I would say that the right form and thus function IS what determines phenomenal consciousness, and that the mystery is: what kind of form generates consciousness and what kind of form doesn't?
Memory, like the quote said. As Mayr says, DNA basically preserves the whole history of evolution in a single DNA molecule. There’s nothing corresponding to that in inorganic matter. That faculty leads to the ability to maintain homeostasis, heal, grow, reproduce, and evolve, and to act intentionally, which no inorganic matter does.
Quoting Pfhorrest
The presence of living things, which as far as science can discern, after having scanned the universe for decades looking for it, is an exceptionally rare phenomenon, even if you take it for granted.
[quote=René Descartes, Discourse on Method ] if there were such machines with the organs and shape of a monkey or of some other non-rational animal, we would have no way of discovering that they are not the same as these animals. But if there were machines that resembled our bodies and if they imitated our actions as much as is morally possible, we would always have two very certain means for recognizing that, none the less, they are not genuinely human. The first is that they would never be able to use speech, or other signs composed by themselves, as we do to express our thoughts to others. For one could easily conceive of a machine that is made in such a way that it utters words, and even that it would utter some words in response to physical actions that cause a change in its organs—for example, if someone touched it in a particular place, it would ask what one wishes to say to it, or if it were touched somewhere else, it would cry out that it was being hurt, and so on. But it could not arrange words in different ways to reply to the meaning of everything that is said in its presence, as even the most unintelligent human beings can do. The second means is that, even if they did many things as well as or, possibly, better than anyone of us, they would infallibly fail in others. Thus one would discover that they did not act on the basis of knowledge, but merely as a result of the disposition of their organs. For whereas reason is a universal instrument that can be used in all kinds of situations, these organs need a specific disposition for every particular action.[/quote]
Published in 1637, and true to this day.
An inorganic security camera can sit around for ages keeping a record of the things that happened in front of it.
I expect you'll object that a human built that camera for that purpose, but that's irrelevant to reductionism. Is there some nonphysical aspect to the camera itself that enables it to keep such records, or is it just physical matter in the right form to perform that function? How that matter got into that form is a separate question.
So he asserts, without argument besides "it's unimaginable".
In any case, it's beside the point, because Chalmers et al are talking about whether, even if you could completely replicate the behavior of a human in the way Descartes asserts you couldn't, that would be enough to say for sure that the thing is definitely conscious in the way a human is.
I'm actually with Olivier for once on this one. Maybe 'A' isn't a good example. What about "triangle". We clearly talk about the "ideal triangle" all the time in math, not any particular triangle. We even talk about shapes that don't exist, like a tesseract (4D equivalent of a cube). We can come up with properties relating to the ideal triangle, though no triangle that ever exists will be the ideal triangle. And we spend a whole lot of time and effort studying the properties of these forms.
Same can be said for "square" or "polynomial function" or "algorithm". Literally all of mathematics and computer science discusses these forms which are not material (in that they have no mass).
You are probably right that for scientists, it is best to use examples from mathematics.
Oliver is currently 'talking about' the ideal 'A', so we clearly need a bit more than merely talking about X as if it existed for us to conclude that X exists, yes?
Quoting khaled
We can come up with imaginary triangles, yes. I'm not seeing how this proves that they are the 'ideal' triangle against which all shapes are compared to determine the correct name.
___
Maybe it would help if you could tell me some properties of this ideal triangle.
My name isn't actually "Oliver". It is "Olivier", which is the correct French spelling. In my opinion, that correct French spelling does exist, somehow, as does the correct English spelling "Oliver", as does the mistake of confusing one for the other. But maybe that's just me.
If correct spellings do not actually exist, thin wahatp thi fruck?
I do apologise. What disgraceful Anglocentrism on my part. Were we not only recently in this thread talking about how mental models filter what we see? I wasn't looking for the second 'i' so I didn't see it.
Quoting Olivier5
As I've already outlined several times now, I can compare those words to the words I've learnt and see if they're sufficiently similar for my purposes. i don't require an ideal 'correct' word. As it stands, they actually are, since I know what you mean.
You actually do need to know how to write e.g. "polysaccharides" correctly in order to be understood as saying "polysaccharides". If you write it as "pauleessakorrydz", nobody will understand what you mean.
Of course if you want just to produce art and poetry, that's another matter. "Pauleessakorrydz" has a certain beauty, as far as meaningless collections of letters go...
Indeed. So I can compare my attempt to my memory of all the other attempts I've seen and correct it until it looks similar enough to get by.
I didn't enumerate the other attempts needed. If my fellow student back at college told me the 'correct' spelling was 'polysacarides', how would I ever learn it wasn't?
Are you suggesting that dictionaries are non-physical? They seem pretty physical to me. In fact they seem like they might contain exactly one of the real life physical words I might compare my attempt to in order to get it more likely to be accepted.
If you open one of them, and look inside, you will find pages, which are physical things too.
If you look at one page, you will find some scribblings on it; the scribblings too are physical. One could quantify the amount of ink used for instance.
If you have learnt your alphabet (a set of signs, i.e. non physical but conceptual) and are conversant in the language used, you may be able to decipher the meaning of some of the scribblings. Such meaning is conceptual rather than physical. The word "rose" might be written somewhere in the dictionary, but you won't find an actual rose in it.
And yes, it include a model of each word's correct spelling in terms of the one exact order of letters to be used, not some vague, ill-defined similitude.
OK, so talk me through the process. The people writing the dictionary access this non-physical universal concept-spelling.
a) why do they have access to it yet I have to look it up in a dictionary?
b) why does this non-physical universal change sometimes - like connexion became connection?
H';lkjdf 'kjvrq oijhsRGvw NDF KLcw opihjasetrrg óq23 serAFT'PA3 SDPOawkjjc? w435nmg24[-0vf5hj fd3q2=089fcq3 ser=r4tfm nw40 f0-s45 y=qwc- 9uybe5yh!!!
(edit: for those who do not happen to speak Isaac's similitude-based, approximately spelt and unconceivable language, the above means by-and-large : "if we jettison the idea of correct spelling, we might regret it some day" -- though it rolls down the tongue much better in the original!)
By definition they _aren't_ idiosyncratic.
Quoting Olivier5
Yes, but more than this: we define demarcations of categories individually. Homogeneity of environment, pedagogy, similar objects of experience, and feedback help to make our models similar, while differences in experience and minor differences in hardware will ensure that no two models are identical. It's like DNA... yours is yours, individual enough to convict you of a crime, but similar enough to mine to make us the same kind of object.
It has 3 vertices connected by 3 edges and all of them are perfectly straight. Nothing material fits that description. Yet the description itself is very important and is the subject of a lot of study.
The form of a triangle exists. It's not a new substance. But it exists.
Quoting Isaac
Are you proposing that the idea of a triangle doesn't exist, and only real physical triangles exist?
What about "tesseract"? Does the idea of a tesseract exist? Or what about vector spaces with more than 3 dimensions? Does the idea of a vector space with more than 3 dimensions exist? If no, what are all these scientists and mathematicians talking about when they talk about shapes in 4D, 5D, etc?
Quoting Isaac
In other words, the idea of "triangle" exists. What else is an imaginary triangle other than the idea of "triangle"?
Quoting Isaac
You can tell the difference between a triangle and a square right? How do you do that except by comparing with some ideal triangle/square?
And I would bet money you'd be able to tell the difference between a triangle and square without having ever seen a triangular or square object, just from the descriptions of a triangle and square as long as you know what "Vertex" and "Edge" mean. How do you explain the ability to do that, without referring to the idea of a triangle and square?
I agree that much too much is made of "universals", that they are not as universal as they seem, and they only need to be sufficiently universal, or somewhat homogenous across individuals, not perfectly equal, like in your example of human DNA.
If we take a mathematical example, I think we can agree that the number Pi (singular) is not "physical" in the sense that it is not an individual thing out there that people can see or take in their hand, and that the number Pi is therefore an idea. But we can also agree that it is a very precisely defined idea that leaves very little room, if any, for personal interpretation. There is likely very little difference between what you conceive as Pi and what I conceive as Pi. Nevertheless, there will always be one guy or another out there who has a different conception, e.g. who thinks that Pi is equal to 3, or that it's a rational number.
Therefore the term "universal" is not really correct, even for Pi. I guess the word "concept" is better here, as it expresses the possibility of a personal or personalized concept, whereas a "universal" cannot logically be "personal".
This said, there still needs to be enough commonality between your meaning and my meaning of a given word for us to understand one another.
So it's being on a plane is not a property of your ideal triangle? Would a non-euclidean object with those properties still be a triangle? What about shapes matching that description but in non-standard topologies? Because it's my understanding that each of those questions had to be answered by a small group of people as they arose. They could not simply derive the answers by comparing their new objects to some ideal form, they had to just make a choice. The answer didn't pre-exist as a form.
Quoting khaled
So are we mis-naming the things we commonly call triangles? Or is what you're imagining not a triangle? If both the object you're imaging and the objects like my neckerchief are correctly called triangles the what is it that sets yours apart? On what grounds do you assign the object you're imagining special status among all the objects correctly named triangles?
Quoting khaled
I'm proposing that your idea of triangles exists (in several forms), as does mine. There's no 'The' idea of triangles. There's only yours, mine, everyone else's. Ideas similar enough for our purposes, kept that way by talking and practices. Same for tesseracts.
Quoting khaled
I compare with my ideas of triangles/squares, different ones depending on the context. All, no doubt very similar to your ideas, since we share a culture, language community, biology etc.
But not the idea of a triangle/square since I've no evidence there is such a thing and plenty of evidence from developmental psychology that we use our own personal models to identity objects, not ethereal universal ones.
So...
Quoting Isaac
...then
Then, you need to think in terms of meaning, not just glyphs.
I have no idea what you mean by this.
You said...
Quoting Olivier5
Which is precisely what I've been saying (and you've been arguing against) all along. Same's true of triangles, spellings, numbers, letters and every other damn thing you've raised these last God knows how many posts in opposition to my making this exact point.
You must still think in terms of the meaning of letters, words, and sentences if you care to understand language. And this meaning is not to be found in the letters or in the words themselves (which are arbitrary symbols). This meaning is often not about any individual thing, but about sets of things (e.g. "I don't like cats"), and relations between sets of things (e.g. "Dogs often don't like cats"). Thinking involves spotting and constructing generalities.
Take the example of the number Pi, defined as the constant obtained by dividing the circumference of any circle by its diameter. The number Pi is a concept, an abstraction, and it is different from the many ways one can in practice write down "Pi".
Does the number Pi exist? I don't know, not even sure the question has a meaning other than the trivial: "some people conceive of the number Pi".
Can we compute Pi? Not exactly.
Is it useful? Certainly yes, Pi is a very useful concept, in spite of its value being forever an estimate.
This is all fair enough, but the matter at hand is the existence of non-physical objects. The key factor here is that nominalism allows for each of these concepts to be exactly the neurons on which they are coded in each individual's brain. A different entity in each brain, just very, very similar to each other example. To require a non-physical stuff you need a true universal, something which cannot reside in each individual's brain because it is mind independent, so identical in each instance that it is one entity (law of identity), which means it cannot reside in each person's brain (otherwise each instance would have a different location and so be a separate thing).
If what you're arguing for is concepts which are very, very similar yet still reside in each individual's brain, then there's no argument for non-physical matter and so no necessity for dualism. I have not and would not deny the existence of concepts. Contrast that with someone like Wayfarer who actually thinks there's an existent form for numbers etc outside of the individual minds for whom it is a concept - a proper dualist.
Okay then. Concepts have some ontological status, we agree, at least as "subjective approximations of absolutes residing in people's mind".
I like to define a concept as a set. There are fuzzy sets/concepts and neat ones. A well defined concept is a well defined set. But there is always a residue of ambiguity in human concepts. Witty said it best: concepts have fuzzy boundaries. Which is why they are often difficult to define precisely: they are not precise objects but categories of objects with many borderline cases.
Mathematical concepts are a bit better defined. Pi is a concept that any averagely intelligent student is expected to grasp in a rather precise, operational manner. They might ask: What's the circumference of the trigonometric circle? If she answers "a little more than 6", it's technically correct but not mathematically satisfying. The answer can be exact (2*Pi) so it needs to be exact. The concept of Pi is mathematically precise.
Of course, nobody will ask her: where does Pi reside: in the pure realm of eternal mathematics, in physical circles, or in your head? My answer to that question would be: why choose? Can't it be in all three?
If concepts are "subjective approximations of absolutes residing in people's mind", doesn't it follow that the absolutes which concepts approximate, these absolutes also exist, at least as "limits" or "directions" or "horizons" of human thought?
Once you start to learn trigonometry, you have to agree that 1) there exists the concept of circle (as a concept in people's minds); 2) physical circles exists, that approximate the concept; 3) the human mind can forge additional concepts that are useful for thinking about circles and measuring them, such as the number Pi; 4) etc. etc... It may be okay to remember all these caveats ("in people's minds") for whatever metaphysical reason, but it is heavy. Very soon, you find yourself speaking of Pi as if it was a real number...
Pun aside, it is more convenient theoretically to forgo the realist caveats, or just suspend them temporarily while learning trigonometry. Just assume numbers exist, Pi exists, and perfect circles exist. It may take a leap of faith, but it's worth it as it makes for easier, less encumbered learning. And what do you got to lose anyway? If they poke fun at you for "reifying Pi", send them to me.
As you said: une façon de parler, mais utile!
Insofar as it translates from linear things like radii to radial things like circle circumferences, pi is pretty important to us, but it's just another real number, one of a category of things we can talk about, in particular an irrational number, something we had to talk about not because the idea revealed itself to the chosen, and certainly not because it is a priori (as a species we've gone most of our existence without any concept of it, something I'm sure that rationalists would opportunistically take as a win for their team), but because of music and astronomy, the study of physical things.
The interest in geometry comes ultimately from defining categories of things in the real world. Circles are all around us, from observations of the Sun and the Moon, to the invention of the wheel which predates Euclid, Archimedes and Pythagoras by millennia. None are perfect, but their _average_ is. Dealing with the category of circles, taking perfection -- the average shape of a circular thing irl -- as a symbol of any referent (generalisation), was a way of making predictions about physical objects and processes (how long does my bike tyre need to be if my wheel radius is R?). Taking this category, or its symbol, to be more fundamental than the real things seems back-to-front to me. It would be like defining all the hues if blue as some imperfection of the more or less arbitrary category of blue.
Which is a good thing, right?
(setting aside that circles have a precise conceptual definition, not based on an average of approximate circles)
The former doesn't contradict that our experiences of real, imperfect, circular things is prior to our concepts of circles. A perfect circle is precisely what every near-perfect circle we ever see has in common.
Yes, existence precedes essence. But even if essences (of concepts) are arrived at by successive approximations and refinements of mental and sense experience, it doesn't make them less interesting to precise and refine...
In that sense I agree that precise concepts are not fundamental to our experience. They are derived from it, but in my mind precise concepts are nevertheless useful, and to the degree that they are useful, they aquire reality, if only as useful hypotheses.
Oh, of course.
Quoting Olivier5
Agreed, they are real. Really modelled in your real brain.
That cannot be the case. As has already been shown, neural activity shows no such regularities or patterns that can be discerned when the brain is exposed even to a simple stimulus. You're arguing for brain-mind identity, but there is nothing like 'logic' in brains, or 'syntax', or 'symbols', or anything of the kind. Rather, the brain is able to capture such ideas, because of intelligence, whose job it is to identify differences and to represent with abstractions, and so on.
Quoting Isaac
Which is just what universals are.
[quote=Feser]Consider that when you think about triangularity, as you might when proving a geometrical theorem, it is necessarily perfect triangularity that you are contemplating, not some mere approximation of it. Triangularity as your intellect grasps it is entirely determinate or exact; for example, what you grasp is the notion of a closed plane figure with three perfectly straight sides, rather than that of something which may or may not have straight sides or which may or may not be closed. Of course, your mental image of a triangle might not be exact, but rather indeterminate and fuzzy. But to grasp something with the intellect is not the same as to form a mental image of it. For any mental image of a triangle is necessarily going to be of an isosceles triangle specifically, or of a scalene one, or an equilateral one; but the concept of triangularity that your intellect grasps applies to all triangles alike. Any mental image of a triangle is going to have certain features, such as a particular color, that are no part of the concept of triangularity in general. A mental image is something private and subjective, while the concept of triangularity is objective and grasped by many minds at once.[/quote]
[quote=Bertrand Russell, The World of Universals; https://russell-j.com/07-POP09.HTM] It is largely the very peculiar kind of being that belongs to universals which has led many people to suppose that they are really mental. We can think of a universal, and our thinking then exists in a perfectly ordinary sense, like any other mental act. Suppose, for example, that we are thinking of whiteness. Then in one sense it may be said that whiteness is 'in our mind'. ...In the strict sense, it is not whiteness that is in our mind, but the act of thinking of whiteness. The connected ambiguity in the word 'idea'...also causes confusion here. In one sense of this word, namely the sense in which it denotes the object of an act of thought, whiteness is an 'idea'. Hence, if the ambiguity is not guarded against, we may come to think that whiteness is an 'idea' in the other sense, i.e. an act of thought; and thus we come to think that whiteness is mental. But in so thinking, we rob it of its essential quality of universality. One man's act of thought is necessarily a different thing from another man's; one man's act of thought at one time is necessarily a different thing from the same man's act of thought at another time. Hence, if whiteness were the thought as opposed to its object, no two different men could think of it, and no one man could think of it twice. That which many different thoughts of whiteness have in common is their object, and this object is different from all of them. Thus universals are not thoughts, though when known they are the objects of thoughts.
Not only in mine, that's the hick. There's a certain universal dimension to concepts. Language depends on it.
Quoting Olivier5
Didn't we just play this tune though?
Quoting Olivier5
Quoting Kenosha Kid
Quoting Olivier5
Sure. This tune are us, essentially.
If you think about it, being on a plane is implied in the definition. Any three points are always on a plane.
Quoting Isaac
If it’s non Euclidean it wouldn’t have straight edges.
Quoting Isaac
If it’s not on a standard topology it wouldn’t have straight edges.
Quoting Isaac
False, that’s exactly how they found the answer. They had the ideal form, and checked if a non Euclidean “triangle” can have its proprieties. It can’t. Then they checked if non standard topologies can. They can’t. Etc.
It’s the same thing you do when asked when a square is a triangle or not. You compare the properties of what you’re looking at to the properties of a triangle. You find they don’t match.
Quoting Isaac
Technically yes.
Quoting Isaac
If someone’s idea of a triangle includes that it is comprised of 4 vertices, don’t we have justification to tell them they’re wrong? From where do we get that justification?
Quoting Isaac
So there is a unified shared idea of a triangle? That’s what I’m saying.
And no “very similar” is not enough. When speaking of geometry, it has to be exact. Or you’ll fail your math test. And if it’s NOT exact we have justification to call that person wrong. Meaning there is some universal standard we all abide by.
There is a reason math is called the universal language.
Quoting Isaac
What you’re debating is the source of the idea of triangle. Either it’s just a shared social thing, or it somehow predated society, and all we did was discover it. I’m leaning towards the latter, but in any case you do admit there is a unified idea of “triangle” that we all (basically) share.
So why can’t the same be said of New York? Or “A”?
It's notable how often you reach for the "you don't understand the philosophy" argument when disagreeing with those who've not read the same texts as you, in a field entirely composed of armchair speculation, yet you seem quite happy to paraphrase the results from a paper in neuroscience as if you understood it without a hint of humility.
I don't know what you think the Schoonover-Fink paper concludes, but it is not that concepts are not carried on neurons. If you want to understand representational drift I suggest you start with Tim O'Leary's work, such as this paper here https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/31569062/ where he explains some of the mechanisms.
Quoting Wayfarer
That'd be why I described them. And, as I've been discussing with Olivier, there's absolutely no necessity, or warrant to think such things exist.
Right. and yet your definition stipulated straight edges.
Quoting khaled
As above.
Quoting khaled
But non-eucledian triangles are still called triangles. As are triangles in non-standard topologies. See https://www.cs.unm.edu/~joel/NonEuclid/area.html for example, or here https://math.stackexchange.com/questions/1035931/properties-of-triangles-in-non-euclidean-geometries where some mathematicians are quite comfortably discussing the properties of 'triangles' in non-eucledian space without being misunderstood.
Quoting khaled
Then how are we understood? And prior to the formal definition, in whose mind was the 'correct' use when no one on earth knew it, but many were using the term (or it's translation) in everyday language? What's more, on whose authority is 'correct' judged? We'd normally turn to a dictionary, perhaps, in matters of conflict, but mine has...
...which is not the same as yours.
While we're on the subject, I presume everyone in the world is also misusing the word 'straight', because they keep applying it to things which aren't 'really' straight?
My dictionary has...
and then proceeds to give the example of "straight hair or straight timber". Neither of which are completely free of all curves, bends, angles, or irregularities at any scale.
So are you suggesting that even the world's dictionaries have it wrong?
Quoting khaled
It's not similar enough for their current purpose to the definitions the rest of their language community are using.
Quoting khaled
We've already established that your definition is not the same as the one being used in the maths papers I cited. Nor, in fact are their definitions exactly the same as each other. Nor is either exactly the same as the dictionary's, and again - each maths textbook will have slightly differing definitions. They just all have key things in common, but are not "exactly the same" as per the law of identity, which would be required to posit a single entity.
Quoting khaled
No, not at all. I've demonstrated above that there is no such idea. Just several ideas which share common features.
Fair point. I will read some more. Certainly will absolutely acknowledge no expertise in that field.
But the question I have is, don't you think the claim that ideas are 'represented in' or 'inscribed on' neurons is rather confused? Because it seems to me, amateur that I am, that both 'representation' and 'inscription' refer to semiotics or semantics. How could a physical state or disposition of elements 'represent' anything, in that sense? Do you see what I'm questioning?
Good development. So there exist what we could call "near universals", concepts that we all or nearly all agree about, like Euclidian triangles.
Even Euclidian geometry as a whole is a "near-universal" in that we still haven't met a human being whose default mental GIS was non-euclidian. We all model space as perfectly Euclidian, intuitively.
Encore!
What we're in the business of doing when we have 'ideas' is the modelling of the hidden states we assume are causal in respect to our sensations. Triangles, letter 'A's, some multiple of similar objects, a city... these are all postulates, models of the causes of the sensations we receive. The same is true of thoughts. Thoughts are all recalled post hoc. The concept you have in your conscious mind of 'a triangle' is not the one your brain actually used to bring the word 'triangle' to mind on seeing the object. We can prove this by observing people with damage to the Hippocampus who can reliably identify objects (like triangles) but cannot bring to mind the definition of one, or people with damage to one or more subsections within the prefrontal cortex who can distinguish triangles from squares but cannot count the sides.
So if the concept you have in mind is demonstrably post hoc relative the the actual mechanism your brain uses to identify triangles, then it must either be coincidental (possible), or it must be itself a model of the that process, an inference of what's going on (the hidden states) in the subconscious mind, that yields the sensation (interoception) - 'triangle'.
You receive sensations (including interocepted physiological states), you behave in response to them, you model the cause of that whole relation. The mistake is in reifying the model to the actual.
So when I talk about what 'ideas' really are, I mean to refer to a model of their hidden states. What causes the sensation that I'm possessed of an 'idea'. My model for that is that of neurons being in certain configurations and having reached threshold levels of activation. Just like if you felt wetness on your skin, your model for the hidden causes might be one of rain, weather systems, air pressure gradients etc.
I could even, should I so wish, develop a model of this model. What would cause the sensation that there is such a model. And so on...
So yes, I do get what you're questioning - at least I think so. But I don't agree with your choice to reify the model when it is clear to me that models are, by definition, within their own Markov blanket, and so have hidden states. It is, by my model, those hidden states which deserve (if anything does) to be reified.
I don't see anyone yet disagreeing with this. The disagreement is over the existence of actual universals, not over things which are nearly, or quite like universals. The distinction is absolutely crucial for the argument at hand because the law of identity would have us hold that only where the concepts are identical in every way can they be said to be one entity, identical with itself. Otherwise we're talking about several entities, all very, very, very similar. No matter how many 'very's I put in there, it will not be enough to qualify as identical and so not one unity requiring it's own existence.
As you've said, it may well be convenient to talk about it as such, but only within context. If, when teaching maths, the teacher refers to the 'near universal' concept of a triangle as if it were an actual universal, that is most certainly convenient for both her and her pupils, but when we're discussing something like the physicality of the mind, that contextual convenience does not just carry over by default. The context has changed, it may no longer be convenient to use the façon de parler in this new context. In fact, I think it's quite clear that it isn't, because we already run into substantial problems with laws of physics (how these entities interact), neuroscience (how to explain the studies showing a disconnect between stated 'ideal forms' and the capability to interact correctly with, for example, geometric objects). I'd say it's demonstrated already that it is no longer useful in this context, in fact it's getting very much in the way.
But isn’t this a problem for science? I mean, science of all types must assume the basic rules of inference to even begin to hazard what such and such neural data means. And science has been doing that with respect to a vast range of subjects for hundreds of years. So there must be some a priori principles to even propose such a theory.
Quoting Isaac
You think geometric objects such as triangles are defineable as ‘sensations’? What about blind geometers? What kinds of ‘sensations’ would they have?
I think you’re equivocating sensations and reason. When you understand a logical principle, or algorithm, say, to make a prediction, or solve some arcane mathematical conjecture - how can this be possibly be categorised as a ‘sensation’?
Why would that be a problem for science? I use my a priori methods of inference to model these a priori methods of inference as being neural networks. I'm not seeing the problem.
Quoting Wayfarer
I thought I'd just explained that. 'Understanding' a thing is a post hoc model of the actual link between sensation and response. We can prove this by lesion experiments, as I've described. So one senses, by interoception, that one is possessed of an idea. You may be limited by thinking of senses as being just the five we're taught about in primary school. This is just a simplification for children. There's scores of 'senses'.
You've reminded me of another concept that Kahneman talks about, WYSIATI: what you see is all there is. Despite it being patently obvious that babies don't come pre-loaded with a glossary of ideas for which to identify physical objects (hence the amount of time and money we spend teaching them and buying them brightly coloured toys of different shapes to investigate), we tend to ignore what's absent from us, however important. He talks about this in regard to System 2's refusal to credit System 1 with anything at all, but our insistence on treating educated adults as if they come shrink-wrapped and fully formed is particularly apparent in philosophy from the ancient Greeks to the Rationalists of the Enlightenment.
When asked what passes for an A you answered: "anything that has enough resemblance to other As".
Let us agree then that anything that has sufficient resemblance to universals is a universal, for all reasonable purposes.
Quoting Isaac
I doubt it, seriously. Science as a whole is but a façon de parler that happens to be useful... I think your quest here is not knowledge-driven. Rather, it is a self-defeating metaphysical crusade against concepts, i.e. against yourself. Like all naïve materialists, you are sawing the conceptual branch on which you sit.
Yes, absolutely. And it permeates even through to psychology. You'd be shocked (or perhaps not) at the extreme resistance to experiential models of external-world theories in child development. Some of my wife's work was in that field and although well-accepted now, it was like wading through treacle getting it even considered.
Well then we'd have multiple, slightly differing universals, a definitional contradiction. Why are you insisting on redefining 'universal' to make the concept exist? Why not just discard it? When it became clear that phlogiston was not required, we didn't redefine it to make it true, we just discarded it.
The IEP has a pretty clear definition of 'universals'. It's clear that even you agree that nothing matching that description exists. Why are you so invested in rescuing the concept. Hundreds of philosophers are nominalist, there's a long history, why redefine universalism to resemble nominalism, why not just call it nominalism in the first place?
That seeming contradiction did not bother you that much when you explained at length why it is possible to have multiple, slightly different As. So you are ready to be a bit charitable with your concept of A but not with your concept of universal.
Quoting Isaac
Because I believe we can do far better than nominalism.
I think Isaac's point is that you are doing nominalism, you're just calling it idealism.
Oh. Didn't know that.
Quoting Isaac
Fair enough.
Quoting Isaac
Sure. The goal of my comment wasn't to defend the universality of certain ideas, but the existence of ideas. A largely similar idea of "New York" exists. And that idea is not material. Though not a separate substance either.
But nevertheless,
Quoting Isaac
So, this 'hidden states model' is not applicable to scientific reasoning? By what criterion do you distinguish scientiific judgements from the ordinary neural activities which you say comprise mental life, and are based on a model of the mind's hidden states?
It does seem to me that:
Quoting Olivier5
Any examples of what these additional senses are, over and above the five we're taught at school?
Isaac mentioned "interoception". I would add "introspection" as a major one. There are others (e.g. the sense of balance).