Substance Dualism Versus Property Dualism Debate

@Hanover will argue for the affirmative, to be answered in the negative by @180 Proof. @Banno will moderate.

• Posts will be no longer than 500 words.
• If in the moderator's opinion a reply is not provided within 24 hours, at the request of his opponent the recalcitrant will forfeit the debate.
• There shall be no links to previous TPF posts.
• The number of posts is not limited. The debate will end with a final post from each participant, after the moderator is satisfied that both parties agree to finalise proceedings.

Will Hanover finish with a hangover? Will 180 be force to about face? Gentles, let us begin.

Substance dualism, the anachronistic position held by the few true remaining Cartesians, has largely been replaced by property dualism, a position that is largely indistinct from substance dualism, but it uses a few slights of hand to pretend to have made progress. The property dualist’s refusal to accept the substance dualist’s position is due in large part to their godlessness and their irrational hate of Descartes, believing that his great works derailed Western philosophy for the past 400 years. 180 Proof, my esteemed opponent, named on that joyful day of his birth after the main ingredient in hunch punch, accepts the property dualism position. I take the more reasoned approach and refuse to engage in the silly dance of redefining terms in order to avoid the supposed embarrassing notion that I might be talking about something non-physical, even spiritual, and wholly not controlled by the physical world. I am not so limited by the confines of atheism when drafting my viewpoints.

It is undisputed that there are (1) minds and (2) bodies. I count two things, which means it is undisputed that dualism is the case. It is undisputed the two things are meaningfully different in form, but disputed whether they are different in substance. Thus this debate. My hand is before me, but the image of my hand as it appears to me is an entirely different thing. My hand doubtable. That I think I see my hand, indubitable.

What says the property dualist? We must wait and see to be sure, but I expect it will be along the lines of there being a single thing and it will be called “matter” I presume, but whatever it might be called does not matter. It is a monistic goo that offers the underlying substance of everything, much like that flat white paint you buy that is then taken to the counter after hours of bickering to have just the right color mixed in. The property dualist explains there are two main colors in the world, not surprisingly called (1) minds and (2) bodies. So you see what has happened is that the substance dualist claims to have two different buckets of goo, yet the property dualist claims to have two different buckets of the same goo, just with different coloring in each.

You might ask why any of this matters. The answer is two-fold: The monist wishes to avoid the mind/body problem and he wishes to avoid talk of the non-physical, as such is meaningless in a scientific world. On the other hand, the substance dualist wishes to avoid the double talk (note the clever pun, Hanover 1, 180 nil) and admit that any talk about an underlying materialistic unified monistic goo is nonsense in itself. If there be such goo, show me the goo of my thoughts under your microscope. If hats and cups are made of the same substance as are thoughts of hats and cups, put them before me so that I can touch, taste, and smell them.

That is 502 words, so ignore the last 2 if you must.

1

Quoting Hanover

Substance dualism, the anachronistic position held by the few true remaining Cartesians, has largely been replaced by property dualism, a position that is largely indistinct from substance dualism...

On the contrary, these positions are as distinct as "two trees" and "two branches on one tree".

The property dualist’s refusal to accept the substance dualist’s position is due in large part to their godlessness and their irrational hate of Descartes, believing that his great works derailed Western philosophy for the past 400 years.

Ah hominems already? Well, even if not, your historical errors are indisputable. The first major philosopher who had proposed an objection to Substance Dualism, which falls under the umbrella of Property Dualism, was that famously "god-intoxicated" Cartesian thinker Benedictus de Spinoza (vide The Ethics I. "Of God", esp. P1-14), someone who was far from driven by "godless ... irrational hate of Descartes".

It is undisputed that there are (1) minds and (2) bodies. I count two things, which means it is undisputed that dualism is the case. It is undisputed the two things are meaningfully different in form, but disputed whether they are different in substance.

Again, as different as "two trees" are from "two branches on one tree".

What says the property dualist?

At this point, I say only that I await your argument, Hanover, showing that Substance Dualism succeeds where Property Dualism fails.

Quoting 180 Proof

On the contrary, these positions are as distinct as "two trees" and "two branches on one tree".

A most inadequate reply. My position is that of substance dualism, meaning that I contend that mental states (among other things) are composed of the non-physical, a substance that cannot be sensed by our five senses. That is, it is the spirit, a product of the divine, and something that cannot be placed in a particular location. Your position (I must only assume because you have failed to state it) is that the world is composed of a single physical substance, and although I have asked what it is, you have failed to tell me. Instead, you speak like me, metaphorically and poetically (it is but like a tree with branches you say), but my reliance upon such analogy is necessary because I speak of that which cannot be seen, touched, or felt. You, however, cannot speak in analogy, poetry, and metaphor. You stand as the scientist and I am asking to see your substance, which means you need to show it to me.

My point here is that if your monistic substance is of the mundane and not of the spiritual, don't tell me it's "like" a tree. Put me a scoop of your monistic substance in my cereal bowl so that I can see it. Show me your hat and then show me your thought of your hat. Can you not do it? Why? Is the monistic substance you speak of like Bigfoot, elusive and all pictures are grainy, or is it that you're speaking of some nebulous monistic substance that is so ill defined and unknowable that you would be better off calling it non-physical? If that is the case, and I assert it is, the explanatory power of substance dualism prevails because I am at least forthright in my claim that there are mental states of an indescribable composition.

What evidence do you have that each branch you see if from the same tree? Is not your position that of the scientist, the empiricist? Where is my empirical proof? Quoting 180 Proof

Again, as different as "two trees" are from "two branches on one tree".

And again, does your entire position hinge upon a tree analogy and with that you drop your mic and walk away?Quoting 180 Proof

At this point, I say only that I await your argument, Hanover, showing that Substance Dualism succeeds where Property Dualism fails.

It has been set forth previously and here again.

Depending upon how far this debate goes, bearing in mind the 500 word limitation per post, I contend that substance dualism will (1) offer a better explanation for how our thoughts are composed (as I've already discussed), (2) will offer a better explanation for questions related to free will, (3) will offer a better explanation for how we experience the world (providing an anchor for the infinite regress homunculus problem), (4) will offer a better explanation for our ultimate origins, and (5) will offer a better explanation for our purpose and meaning. My comments previously regarding the godlessness of the property dualist position were not ad homs, they were simply a recognition of the limitations of a system that roots everything in the physical.

2

Quoting Hanover

I contend that mental states (among other things) are composed of the non-physical, a substance that cannot be sensed by our five senses.

The vastly greater part of (physical) substance "cannot be sensed by our five sense" and yet is not "non-physical" (e.g. dark matter, planck scale events, brains insensible to themselves, etc), so what else makes "mental states" "non-physical" in a way that's distinguishable from the physical which our five sense cannot sense?

That is, it is the spirit, a product of the divine, and something that cannot be placed in a particular location.

Like fictions ...

... the explanatory power of substance dualism prevails because ...

...and that "explanation" of (A) how SD functions or (B) how physical substance and non-physical substance causally interract or (C) ... is what exactly —?

Is not your position that of the scientist, the empiricist?

I'm doing philosophy, not science. What are you doing besides flailing? My position is 'SD is conceptually incoherent' begging questions with a Woo-of-the-Interaction Gap (e.g. Malebranche's "occasionalism", Leibniz's "pre-established harmony", etc) and not explaining any matters of fact as you seem to believe metaphysics does.
[quote=L.W., PI 126]Philosophy just puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. — Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain.[/quote]
I'm with Witty. :up:

I contend that substance dualism will (1) offer a better explanation for how our thoughts are composed (as I've already discussed), (2) will offer a better explanation for questions related to free will, (3) will offer a better explanation for how we experience the world (providing an anchor for the infinite regress homunculus problem), (4) will offer a better explanation for our ultimate origins, and (5) will offer a better explanation for our purpose and meaning.

(1) Yet to be offered but, of course, won't "explain" anything anyway as I've (Witty has) pointed out above.
(2) Ditto ... "free will"?
(3) Ditto ... "humunculous problem"?
(4) Ditto ... "ultimate origins"?
(5) Ditto ... "purpose"?

All promises (& semantic danglers) which you cannot keep philosophically. The most we can do, it seems, is give descriptions of the concepts we're discussing / proposing in order to sort out and drop incoherent while continuing to search for coherent conceptions. So show me / us I'm wrong about SD's incoherence, Hanover, and I'll show you why PD is (if my being wrong about SD is the case, even more) coherent.

Quoting 180 Proof

The vastly greater part of (physical) substance "cannot be sensed by our five sense" and yet is not "non-physical" (e.g. dark matter, planck scale events, brains insensible to themselves, etc), so what else makes "mental states" "non-physical" in a way that's distinguishable from the physical which our five sense cannot sense?

In your quest to defeat my distinction between the two substances, you unwittingly argue against your own position. Don't lose sight of the fact that you are a dualist, albeit a property dualist and not a substance dualist. You have claimed there is exactly one type of stuff (i.e. matter) and that that stuff can be divided into exactly two different sub-categories (i.e. mind-matter and body-matter). If here you say that dark matter is another sort of matter that deserves yet another branch on your proverbial tree, then you are arguing for a property triadism (to coin a term, as trinity was already taken). If you know, however, that dark matter is distinct enough from the mind-matter that composes our thoughts, dreams, and fears that you are not prepared to call dark matter mind-matter, then you need to explain why that is so that I can have some understanding of what you mean by your terms.

I do think there is a simple way out of this quandary, but your attempt to throw counter-examples when I offer my basis for distinguishing between mind-substance and body-substance only confuses your definitions as well. One would think our definitions of minds and bodies would essentially be the same in terms of what they attempt to identify, with this debate revolving around what their ultimate composition is.

The simple way out of this quandary is to deny your basic claim as it relates to dark matter, by insisting that it is in fact something that can be perceived. Its effects can obviously be measured and quantified, but to the extent you argue that the dark matter itself is in theory something that can never be directly measured, and that it will for time immemorial be an undetectable hand of God moving things around, then I don't know what basis you have for calling it body-matter and not mind-matter, but you tell me.

You do have a duty of presenting an affirmative case for your position here, and your duty is not only to offer criticisms of mine. So please provide for me your definition of mind-matter. Quoting 180 Proof

I'm doing philosophy, not science. What are you doing besides flailing? My position is 'SD is conceptually incoherent' begging questions with a Woo-of-the-Interaction Gap (e.g. Malebranche's "occasionalism", Leibniz's "pre-established harmony", etc) and not explaining any matters of fact as you seem to believe metaphysics does.
Philosophy just puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. — Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain.
— L.W., PI 126
I'm with Witty. :up:

I will return to your mind/body interaction objections, as I'm running out of space here.

But to continue my main theme of this post, I'll again point out your overly zealous attempt to deconstruct, which leaves you a victim of the destruction as well because you're not paying attention to maintaining your own position. You've gone from being an affirmative property dualist to just being a general critic of whatever comment comes before you. Now you tell me that you're with Witty? Since you're a property dualist, are you offering a thesis that Witty was a property dualist too? If that's not your thesis, then are you now telling me you are not a property dualist? You then say that metaphysics doesn't answer any questions, so then why are you here arguing metaphysics?

3.1

Quoting Hanover

In your quest to defeat my distinction between the two substances, you unwittingly argue against your own position. Don't lose sight of the fact that you are a dualist, albeit a property dualist and not a substance dualist.

Nonsense. My "position" in this context is, as I've said,
Quoting 180 Proof

'SD is conceptually incoherent' begging questions with a Woo-of-the-Interaction Gap (e.g. Malebranche's "occasionalism", Leibniz's "pre-established harmony", etc) ...

I'm not arguing against dualism per se, only against SD and thereby not undermining PD at all, especially as the latter is only epistemic whereas the former – your (Descartes') position – is extravagantly ontic. (Occam's, anyone?)

The simple way out of this quandary is to deny your basic claim as it relates to dark matter, by insisting that it is in fact something that can be perceived. Its effects can obviously be measured and quantified, but to the extent you argue that the dark matter itself is in theory something that can never be directly measured ...

Strawman and non sequitur.

Strawman because I used "dark matter" as an example of physical substance that, as you said,
Quoting Hanover

I contend that mental states (among other things) are composed of the non-physical, a substance that cannot be sensed by our five senses

and did not make any claims denying "measured and quantified effects".

And non sequitur because I only referred to "dark matter" as an example among others mentioned, taking issue with your claim distinguishing the "non-physical" from the physical as that which "cannot be sensed by our five senses" and not as a line of reasoning or upon which my argument is based.

You do have a duty of presenting an affirmative case for your position here, and your duty is not only to offer criticisms of mine.

On the contrary, read the proposition at issue and terms of the debate again: I'm here to argue against the proposition, more precisely, against your affirmation of the proposition. Had the proposition been stated as "Substance Dualism or Property Dualism – defend the better alternative conception of ..." then we both would have, as you say, "a duty of presenting an affirmative case". Given the proposition agreed upon, however, my only "duty" is to argue against the proposition such as it is affirmed by you and making only as much of "an affirmative case" as needed to achieve that end. So far, my friend, you're making it easy to casually deconstruct your position seeing as you've been quite derelict in your duty three posts in: no definition of, and argument supporting, the proposition by you yet, Hanover, as we'd agreed.

3.2

Quoting Hanover

So please provide for me your definition of mind-matter.

Again I'll lean on Spinoza (EIP 1-14) – that "godless irrational hater of Descartes" – and in my own words state that "mind-matter" are, in principle, complementary conceptions, or ways of describing, any phenomenon; whichever happens to be appropriate depends upon the probity of the question asked by observing a phenomenon.

For instance, one describes a woman according to her 'mental properties' when one inquires as to her motives or plans and/or according to her 'bodily, or material, properties' when her location or actions are in question. On the other hand, a tree is described according to its 'bodily, or material, properties' in order to judge whether or not its good for climbing or will hold up during a powerful storm; however, describing a tree according to 'mental properties' which are not in evidence, or not expressed (in a recognizable manner recognizable), such as 'whether or not the tree is "bored" just standing(?) in the same spot its entire life?' is, in effect, (merely) anthropomorphic at best.

In the case of the "mind-matter" (i.e. mind-body) conception of a tree, following Spinoza (or subsequently Witty's "The human body is the best picture of the human soul" (PI, II)) the tree as a body is the idea – expression – of its mind (EIIP7, 21-31). As mentioned above, this duality is epistemic rather than ontic like SD, and as such does not share SD's various incoherences and inconsistencies.

I'll again point out your overly zealous attempt to deconstruct, which leaves you a victim of the destruction as well because you're not paying attention to maintaining your own position.

Non sequitur.

Now you tell me that you're with Witty? Since you're a property dualist, are you offering a thesis that Witty was a property dualist too?

Non sequitur.

If that's not your thesis, then are you now telling me you are not a property dualist?

Non sequitur.

You then say that metaphysics doesn't answer any questions, so then why are you here arguing metaphysics?

Strawman. I've pointed out that Metaphysics (e.g. SD) Does Not Explain Matters Of Fact – which science does – and that I'm just philosophizing and relying on empirical, or observational, data only as counter-examples and not arguments themselves.

Quoting 180 Proof

I'm not arguing against dualism per se, only against SD and thereby not undermining PD at all, especially as the latter is only epistemic whereas the former – your (Descartes') position – is extravagantly ontic. (Occam's, anyone?)

You're not arguing against dualism at all, but are arguing in favor of it, in particular property dualism, unless you have now changed your position. And now, as I am to understand, you are arguing against metaphysics generally. Property dualism is most certainly a metaphysical position, positing specifically how the world is composed, namely of one substance with two properties.

I'll show you how it works:



Quoting 180 Proof

On the contrary, read the proposition at issue and terms of the debate again: I'm here to argue against the proposition, more precisely, against your affirmation of the proposition. Had the proposition been stated as "Substance Dualism or Property Dualism – defend the better alternative conception of ..." then we both would have, as you say, "a duty of presenting an affirmative case". Given the proposition agreed upon, however, my only "duty" is to argue against the proposition such as it is affirmed by you and making only as much of "an affirmative case" as needed to achieve that end. So far, my friend, you're making it easy to casually deconstruct your position seeing as you've been quite derelict in your duty three posts in: no definition of, and argument supporting, the proposition by you yet, Hanover, as we'd agreed.

Nothing more interesting than debating what the debate is to be about. If your position is that my obligation is to explain why my view of substance dualism is superior to property dualism, then you can either accept my statement of what I take property dualism to be and not suggest it's a strawman, or you can state what your position is and I can explain why mine is superior.

Here is my view, just in case you're truly at a loss for what I'm arguing:

There are two distinct substances in the world: Mind and matter. My mental states, which I indubitably have, are not accessible to you or anyone but me. They are not made of atoms and molecules as your brain would be. If you scooped out your brain just in the place where you were having those thoughts and showed those neurons to me, I would not experience your pain of having had your brain scooped out. I'd see just a bunch of brain matter on the table. So, reason #1 for SD: It admits to the obvious metaphysical difference between hats and perceptions of hats, and that the latter cannot be experienced except by the subject.

#2, we each walk around daily with the freedom to choose, something that makes absolutely no sense whatsoever in a physically limited universe. Falling into a hard determinist trap leads to this conversation having no meaning at all, but just in our barking out as we're required. That is to say, SD gives a path for a meaningful free will, entirely lacking in a purely physical world.

Property dualism says the exact same thing as SD except to the extent it says that we never leave the physical world, but instead says that the mental world is composed of a weird form of matter. My response to the PD is that if you're going to make a physical claim about the world in terms of what it consists of, SHOW ME. Show me a scoop of this matter that has the curious qualities you propose. The truth is you can't. You can't show me because it's NOT physical and non-physical entities lack physical properties. If I show you a non-physical thing, I will have just proved it was physical. The fact you can't show me your thoughts is my proof that PD is nonsense.

Quoting 180 Proof

Strawman and non sequitur.

Strawman because I used "dark matter" as an example of physical substance that, as you said,
I contend that mental states (among other things) are composed of the non-physical, a substance that cannot be sensed by our five senses

That would neither be a non sequitur nor a strawman, but your objection would be simply that I failed to grasp your counter-example that supposedly proved that not all physical qualities were able to be sensed. My comment, which you ignored by claiming logical fallacy, is that I deny specifically that there are physical properties that are completely incapable of being sensed in some capacity and so measured, including dark matter. And there is a critical distinction between not detected and not detectable, with the latter suggesting that no amount of technology can locate its existence. I get that I can't hear extremely high frequencies, but they are detectable, not just not detected. On the other hand, you will never experience my experience. Ever. That is what makes mental states different from physical states.

Quoting 180 Proof

In the case of the "mind-matter" (i.e. mind-body) conception of a tree, following Spinoza (or subsequently Witty's "The human body is the best picture of the human soul" (PI, II)) the tree as a body is the idea – expression – of its mind (EIIP7, 21-31). As mentioned above, this duality is epistemic rather than ontic like SD, and as such does not share SD's various incoherences and inconsistencies.

I don't understand what this has to do with our discussion. At best I can make out you're presenting an argument for why we should not concern ourselves with the mental states of an object in order to render a definition of it. Is that your concept of a property dualist, or are we on a tangent discussing why WItty's criticisms of metaphysical debate are correct because you agree that metaphysical debate are unnecessary for a full understanding of the world?

4

I see now it's pointless of me to point out fallacies, misunderstandings (willful or otherwise) or factual errors, so I intend to stick to simple declarative statements for the remainer of our little debate.

Quoting Hanover

Property dualism is most certainly a metaphysical position, positing specifically how the world is composed, namely of one substance with two properties.

As I understand it, PD is an epistemic stance of conceptual (descriptive) complementarity much like 'wave-particle duality' adopted by early quantum physicists and used to interpret contrary observations of photons in the lab. Complementarity descriptions presuppose nothing more than the same ontic – physical object – and is a duality insofar as only two properties, or attributions, [s]of an X are described[/s] are needed to exhaustively describe any physical object.

I'll show you how it works: ...

I see your quaint diagram, Hanover, and raise you an already cited Spinoza in addition to corroborating alternative accounts of PD by Kant, Schopenhauer ... and David Bohm. I won't trouble you with their devilish details on account of word count limits. Your charitable read (and familiarity with one or more of those thinkers) should suffice.

Property dualism says the exact same thing as SD except ...

... PD says what is says in a way that does not introduce the following conceptual problems
• multiple independent substances (re: Spinoza, EIP 1-14)
• interaction (i.e. coordination) between independent substances (e.g. Malebranche's "occasionalism", Leibniz's "pre-established harmony", ... fiat mysteries which only beg the question)
• violations of the causal closure of physical substance (i.e. energy conservation)^

Whatever concept obtains metaphysically is also bound physically (Kant, no?) unless the concept indicates conditions that warrant an exception – violation – of physical bounds. SD, as I understand it thus far, merely posits unwarranted exceptions^ to physical substance. To wit: physical effects either presuppose physical causes or they are random (acausal); otherwise,

• "non-physical" causation of physical effects^

I failed to grasp your counter-example that supposedly proved that not all physical qualities were able to be sensed.

We agree.

I don't understand what this has to do with our discussion.

:sweat:

Your presentation is so broad and vague, it's impossible to respond to. In your post you tell me your position is that of Spinoza, modified by Kant, Schopenhauer, and ... Bohm (the ellipses meaning something). I am on my own to figure it out because you say it'd take you too long. Very well, I respond by referencing Chalmers. He addressed all this. That is a fair, in kind response.

You then offer some names of those who've offered theories attempting to avoid the mind/body problem (Malebranche's "occasionalism", Leibniz's "pre-established harmony"), neither of whom I presented as being in agreement with and I have no idea why they're mentioned here.

And all of this is to say, and can be reduced to the following sentence:

"Hanover, I choose PD over SD because the physical world is a fixed system, to which no energy can be created or lost, and if an external non-physical thing imparts energy upon it, that law is broken."

Is that your argument, casting aside your vague references to every historical thinker who ever spoke remotely on the subject, and casting aside your attempts to jettison metaphysics altogether?

I mean, can I crystallize your comments as telling me that PD succeeds where SD fails due to an inability of SD to explain how mind/body interaction occurs without violating known physical rules?

If so, glad we got here. Are you at some point required to tell me how physics explains mental functions? I think I have identified at least the trouble points in each respective position.

5

Since you remain confused and still flailing, Hanover, below I'll simply copy and paste from my previous post 'the argument for preferring Property Dualism over Substance Dualism because, ceteris paribus, the latter consists of conceptual problems – btw, you've yet to addressed any of them – which the former (as an epistemic alternative) overcomes'. I hope that helps you to stay on track and substantively defend the proposition.

— — — — —
Quoting Hanover

Property dualism says the exact same thing as SD except ...

... PD says what is says in a way that does not introduce the following conceptual problems
• multiple independent substances (re: Spinoza, EIP 1-14)
• interaction (i.e. coordination) between independent substances (e.g. Malebranche's "occasionalism", Leibniz's "pre-established harmony", ... fiat mysteries which only beg the question)
• violations of the causal closure of physical substance (i.e. energy conservation)^

Whatever concept obtains metaphysically is also bound physically (Kant, no?) unless the concept indicates conditions that warrant an exception – violation – of physical bounds. SD, as I understand it thus far, merely posits unwarranted exceptions^ to physical substance. To wit: physical effects either presuppose physical causes or they are random (acausal); otherwise,

• "non-physical" causation of physical effects^ :roll:

We set up a debate where we were going to debate how SD prevailed over PD. You interpreted that as meaning I was to tell you how SD prevailed without any input from you as to what PD entailed. At no point have you actually told me what your view of PD is, but instead I read dense posts from you that I know to be regurgitations and paraphrasings of various Wiki articles on the subject, where everything and anything related to the mind/body were thrown before me.

As best I can tell, you greatly favor Spinoza, a monist who holds that the world is composed of one substance, and that substance is God, and that substance can have various properties. A most generous read of Spinoza would allow me to substitute "God" for matter, but that would require that I substract out his very theistic approach, but I still could not in any event place him as a property dualist. He does not say that his primordial substance can take on only two major forms: (1) bodies, and (2) mental states. Your placement of Spinoza as a property dualist is just simply wrong. But this isn't a debate about the merits of Spinoza. It's a debate about the merits of PD versus SD.

Regardless, without any assistance from you, I went to great lengths to clarify the meaningful points of the debate, acknowledging that SD's challenge is in explaining how the physical laws of our universe are preserved under a mind/body interactionism. I also pointed out that the PD's challenge is in explaining how they can claim mental states are composed of something with unique physical properties, yet they can offer no explanation for how that arises, what that is, or explain why they can't put it under a microscope for observation..

This effort to frame the debate around its obvious points was made just to keep this debate active, something you seem uninterested in. The proper reply to your last post where you just cut and pasted a prior post is for me to cut and paste my last reply. So consider that done.

6

Quoting Hanover

You interpreted that as meaning I was to tell you how SD prevailed without any input from you as to what PD entailed.

Beside examples of PD's account of a "woman" and a "tree" (2nd para.), my input was given:
Quoting 180 Proof

As I understand it, PD is an epistemic stance of conceptual (descriptive) complementarity much like 'wave-particle duality' adopted by early quantum physicists and used to interpret contrary observations of photons in the lab. Complementarity descriptions presuppose nothing more than the same ontic – physical object – and is a duality insofar as only two properties, or attributions, ... are needed to exhaustively describe any physical object.

Tell me (us) what's wrong with this description.

Calling PD an epistemic stance is a corruption of terms. Property dualism directly references properties, and properties (assuming we're all realists here, believing that there are external objects in the world), references the physical attributes of an object. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Property_(philosophy). Or, for a more academic site, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties/#DisTer. Note the very first sentence of that article states, "Properties are those entities that can be predicated of things..." A property is referred to as an "entity." It is a thing and an object. Your attempt to claim an object is of a different "property" because it is known in a different way (i.e. there is an epistemic difference) is not a concern of the property dualist. If the entire universe is composed of matter and all things are blue except that monkeys are green, then we have a property dualism scenario. The world is monistic (only composed of matter), yet we have two types of properties attached to that matter: green and blue.

On the other hand, if the entire world is composed of matter, and we can see the entire world with our naked eye, yet we can only see monkeys with microscopes, we don't have a PD scenario because some things are known one way and some things another unless our ability to know the two is caused by a metaphysical distinction between the two. And there's the rub. If mental states are only distinguishable from body states due to the different way they are known, but there's nothing metaphysically different from the two, then we don't have a PD scenario. Epistemology references what's in your thoughts, not what's in the object.

In terms of your wave particle duality example, it is an interesting question due to the logical implications it would entail upon this conversation if you were correct that epistemic differences could result in a property dualism (which, for the reasons above, they cannot), That is, if you were correct that the universe is an epistemic duality in that we know minds one way and objects another, then when it comes to wave particles specifically, they would be dualistically known: (1) as an object and (2) as a mental state. However, since wave particles are known in duality of ways (as you have submitted) within our universe, they would be known (1) mentally as particles, (2) mentally as waves, (3) objectively as particles, and (4) objectively as waves. That is to say, if you find me an example of a particular object within your dualistic epistemological universe that also can be known in two non-overlapping ways, you end up with an exponential epistemology.

All of this is to say that PD and ED (which is epistemological dualism, although it might stand for something else as well) are very different things, and even the ED you espouse isn't an ED, but pluralistic and not a duality.

7

Reply to Hanover

Redefine terms to your heart's content, Hanover; I've qualified my uses in previous posts according to my understanding – how I use "property" and "dualism" – in this context. Feel free to bark at shadows instead of at me – what I'm actually saying – if that amuses you.

NB: Property Dualism is an umbrella term for notions such as dual-aspectism (i.e. Spinozist parallelism), emergent materialism, non-reductive physicalism, epiphenomenalism, etc, all of which are monist ontologies.

Meanwhile, I await you to address the major problems with Substance Dualism I've listed previously, particularly this one (since, apparently, philosophy is not your strong suit thus far):
Quoting 180 Proof

"non-physical" causation of physical effects

Describe how this works (e.g. mental substance controls physical substance – your mind controls your body – given that physical substance is causally closed, that is, limited to physical causes, which are inconsistent with "non-physical substance").

After tremendous effort we are to learn you're not a PD, but an identity theorist, holding that mental states are physical states with all the same properties, just that they're known differently, as if someone ever thought that hats and your thoughts of hats were known the same way. We are left with your refusal to respond not to my redefinitions, but to specifically quoted definitions from reliable sources.

We are also left with a further degenerated debate, characterized by your personal frustrations and ad homs.

In any event, should we accept your ED as the position you take (and not PD), the screaming metaphysical question remains unanswered. That question is "Why?" As in why are mental states known differently from objects? What is it unique about the composition of one that makes it knowable only via a different means and why are there exactly two different epistemological methods in the world? Haven't you already told me we know minds one way, regular objects another, and dark matter another? Are you an epitstimic pluralist or dualist?

As to your question, the SD position is preserved over the causally closed objection if one rejects presumptions of essentialism when defining energy. That is to say, if the non-physical energy of SD be compatible with physical energy, no physical violation occurs upon interaction. This is not an energy monism, as I don't suggest there is an essential element in both forms of energy, but I do assert there is sufficient distinction in the energies to properly define the distinction as substantial, i.e. one of substance, and not one of property (as I have very clearly defined the term). This power/energy is the force behind our will.

8

Quoting Hanover

As to your question, the SD position is preserved over the causally closed objection if one rejects presumptions of essentialism when defining energy.

What?

That is to say, if the non-physical energy of SD be compatible with physical energy, no physical violation occurs upon interaction.

Describe how "non-physical energy" is distinguishable from "non-physical substance".

1. That the compatibility of the non physical substance with the physical substance does not require that they be essentially the same, avoiding the argument that I'm advocating a single substance and therefore monism.

2. Energy and substance here are interchangeable.

How do you define "physical substance" and "non-physical substance"?

9

Quoting Hanover

1. That the compatibility of the non physical substance with the physical substance does not require that they be essentially the same,
[ ... ]

Why doesn't it?

Also, explain how "non-physical substance" gets around physical laws of energy conservation and inertia insofar as it, as you believe, affects physical substance (i.e. mind causes bodily effects).

2. Energy and substance here are interchangeable.

Okay.

How do you define "physical substance" and "non-physical substance"?

Nature and imagined, respectively.

I had a question go unanswered, which was whether you were an epistemic dualist or pluralist? I'm trying to figure out if you think there are exactly two types of things in the world and those things are distinguishable in how they are known. We all agree that I can know the hat on your head and the hat in your imagination in two very different ways, but are there other objects that also have distinguishable epistemic methods to understand them, like dark matter versus regular matter, for example?

Quoting 180 Proof

How do you define "physical substance" and "non-physical substance"?
Nature and imagined, respectively.

Central to this debate are our definitions of "substance" and of "property," because those are the words that distinguish our respective positions. You have just defined "physical" as everything as far as I can see, where if I were to drag God herself from the heaven above, you would proclaim her physical and natural, as how else could you see and interact with her. If I am correct, my claim there is a non-physical realm is a contradiction (i.e. there is an existent non-existent realm) and your claim is a tautology (all that exists is all that exists).

I do note critically that you don't define "physical" as that which is composed of atoms, molecules, quarks, strings, or particles, but just as that which is. I do note, however, that you insist that the physical be only that which can interact with the physical, holding to an essentialism at least in that regard.

I dispute your essentialism and disagree with your rigid definition of "physical," I contend that there can be two substances, meaning fundamental underlying structures, that do interact, and that meet your definition of "physical," yet they do not meet mine. My definitions of non-physical and physical (unsurprisingly) do not match yours, and how could they? You've defined the non-physical as figments of one's imagination and a fiction and physical as everything else. My definition of the non-physical, counter to yours, is that which is attributed to some force that is in principle beyond scientific understanding. Within that definition would be those emotions, inner thoughts, phenomenological states, and one's full inner life. This substance, whatever it be, is of a different enough constitution, unmeasurable, unobservable, and entirely private to be categorized as a different substance. I contend that interactionism, the laws of nature, including conservation of energy and such, are but properties of physical stuff and also properties of non-physical stuff.

10

Quoting Hanover

I had a question go unanswered, which was whether you were an epistemic dualist or pluralist?

Neither. For the sake of this debate, I'm only defending PD in opposition to SD. The latter unparsimoniously "multiplies entities without necessity" (à la Ptolymaic epicycles or occult final causes) and the former is all that's required to exhaustively describe, or conceptualize, any phenomenon.

This substance, whatever it be, is of a different enough constitution, unmeasurable, unobservable, and entirely private to be categorized as a different substance.

And then in the very next sentence you, in effect, contradict yourself, Hanover ...

I contend that interactionism, the laws of nature, including conservation of energy and such, are but properties of physical stuff and also properties of non-physical stuff.

You "contend" this but without sufficient warrant that there's even a "different" there there let alone that "different" substances "interact" and yet remain "different". C'mon, man: to merely "contend" it's so doesn't exorcise 'your SD' of its incoherence & inconsistencies.

Keeping this very simple, there are two critical parts to property dualism: (1) property and (2) dualism. Your position doesn't involve either. As to #1, you explained that the difference between minds and bodies is how they are known (i.e. epistemic differences), offering no response to my claim (with citations) that a "property" is a quality an object possesses, not a quality a second party perceiver possesses. As to #2, you've now just said your position isn't dualism, finally claiming that while the world is composed of minds that are known one way and certain bodies known another, there well could be (and it seems are) certain other types of bodies that are known a third way, maybe a fourth, and so on.

PD, under this description, neither relates to properties nor is it dualistic. SD succeeds where PD fails in that PD is a vague misnomer, words with no meaning that allow the holder of the claim to assert they mean whatever comes to mind to dispute an alternative claim.. While it appears from its name to provide an understanding of properties, it doesn't. In fact, it has nothing to do with properties. It claims to be dualistic, but under examination, it has nothing to do with dualism. It is not a metaphysical theory at all, but just a general placeholder for any argument that combats another.

And this is to say your interpretation of this debate where we were to debate how "Substance dualism succeeds where property dualism fails, ignores the italicized part. I can see no difference from your interpretation of this debate if the debate were to be for me to show how SD succeeds period, without any reference to PD.

I did provide a distinction for you between minds and bodies, and that is that bodies are composed of natural stuff (accepting your definition) and minds are composed of supernatural stuff (which is a valid definition in light of your definition of physical). As I distinguish your "natural" stuff from my "supernatural" stuff, I take the former to be all that you can see, hear, touch, taste, and perceive in some measurable way. It is a quality of the thing that makes it such, an ontic distinction in the thing. The underlying, supernatural stuff that makes minds so obviously different than bodies, has sufficient properties with the physical stuff of nature that it can interact with the physical stuff that it does not violate the laws of nature. The substance difference between minds and bodies does not hinge upon the one not being able to interact with the other. The ability to interact is a property distinction, not one of substance. Demanding that any entity that adheres to the law of conservation of energy is definitionally physical demands an unacceptable essentialism. PD fails in its unnecessary recategorization of terms by buying into the idea that adherence to physical laws is what makes an entity physical, when it simply is a property.

11

This is all you got, or all I've gotten from what you've given (without showing you the discourtesy of putting words in your mouth as you've shown me so far):
Quoting Hanover

This substance, whatever it be, is of a different enough constitution, unmeasurable, unobservable, and entirely private to be categorized as a different substance. I contend that interactionism, the laws of nature, including conservation of energy and such, are but properties of physical stuff and also properties of non-physical stuff.

PLUS
Quoting Hanover

I did provide a distinction for you between minds and bodies, and that is that bodies are composed of natural stuff (accepting your definition) and minds are composed of supernatural stuff [ ... ]

EQUALS ...

Res ipsa loquitur. :shade:

Well, in sum:

Property Dualism, as I understand it, assumes that 'phenomena' are conceived of according the questions (expectations) applied to them, and therefore proposes that only two 'categories of questions' are required to exhaustively describe and conceive of an given phenomenon: questions of mind (mental property) and questions body (re: physical property), each applied to the same phenomenon, that is to say, any phenomenon; however, with grounds to question being whether of not "mind" and/or "body" are evident. In the phenomenal world, body is always evident (whether present or absent) but mind, while always subjectively self-evident (for the sake of this discussion), is either evident or not evident. By "evident" I simply mean encountered by the philosopher

And that's it. Complementary descriptions produced by complementary questions, one at a time or simultaneously, resulting in a parallex of conceptual views – descriptions – of the same object which neither presupposes "separate substances" nor entails ad hoc workaround "fixes" for conceptual incoherences and inconsistenties entailed by the fiat of "two substances", natural "body" (physical) and SUPERNATURAL "mind" (non-physical) somehow :roll: "interacting" through an effin' "pineal gland"(?) :sweat: ... Btw, my preferred version of PD (leaving 17th century aporias behind for a moment), as mentioned previously, is emergent materialism; the devilish details of which are compatible with contemporary developments in cognitive neuroscience (e.g. Looking for Spinoza, A. Damasio, The Ego Tunnel, T. Metzinger, et al).

Now that you've introduced the SUPERNATURAL into this debate, Hanover – I guess to ratchet-up the ??? of "mind, mental, non-physical" over the profanely physical – and thereby pushed defeasible reasoning, (classical) logic and evidence-based epistemology off our little magic bus, are all you left with is (something like) 'SD succeeds where PD fails (which hasn't been shown to fail) because SD incorporates Wonders / Miracles which PD is too superficial, or reductive, to incorporate in its conceptions of phenomena'? If not, tell me (us) what I'm (we're) missing – give the real coup de gras – and put this undead 17th century equine out of our misery. Or concede.

I just fed my dog. Give me the 2 complementary explanations of that so I can know what you're talking about.

Are you now advocating emergent materialism or just identifying its existence?

12

Quoting Hanover

Are you now advocating emergent materialism or just identifying its existence?

I am now "advocating" what I've advocated all along in my previous posts. Run with that as best you can (watch out for the brick walls though!)

Oh, this:

I just fed my dog. Give me the 2 complementary [s]explanations[/s] of that ...

Mental: "I just fed my dog."
Physical: You told me.

Quoting 180 Proof

this:
I just fed my dog. Give me the 2 complementary explanations of that ...
Mental: "I just fed my dog."
Physical: You told me.

That makes no sense. When you struck out "explanations," you removed the subject from the sentence rendering it meaningless. When you put "I just fed my dog" in quotes, that indicates a statement. When you say I told you, you are again referencing the statement. I see no difference between the two.

13

Quoting Hanover

I see no difference between the two.

Well, I can't help you with that. As I've said already, run with it as best you can. That's what I've had to do with your posts, Hanover, as none of your confused replies substantively address the issues I've raised with SD. We're not here to persuade each other, after all, but to inform our audience and let them decide which of us has made the more persuasive case. So continue on with your case for SD on the basis of the SUPERNATURAL. :meh:

You wrote a sentence without a subject and you're asking me to just run with it. Interesting. Maybe I'll dispense with pesky verbs. That like a good idea?

Yes, if we have substance dualism, that means there is (1) physical and (2) non-physical. If you define "physical" as natural (which you have), then non-physical necessarily become super-natural, or beyond natural. That's just how definitions work.

Your response is an emoji, I guess meaning you think ot's silly. OK, 180 thinks SD is silly, just look at his facial expression. Good argument.

I respond with a sleepy emoji, as in, you've stopped talking and I'm bored. Is this how the world ends? With a whimper?

14

Quoting Hanover

Yes, if we have substance dualism, that means there is (1) physical and (2) non-physical. If you define "physical" as natural (which you have), then non-physical necessarily become super-natural, or beyond natural. That's just how definitions work.

Yeah, you do yourself no favors contrasting "natural" with SUPERNATURAL. I was a tad bit more courteous when I replied ....
Quoting 180 Proof

How do you define "physical substance" and "non-physical substance"?
— Hanover

Nature and imagined, respectively.

... in the vein of, y'know, 'imaginary numbers' (or even Meinong's Jungle), but instead you prefer medieval woo as a stand-in for "non-physical substance" ... so go figure. Okay, well, try to keep running on/away with that stake through the chest of your undead argument from my lively, still kicking and, above all else, fully rational (with a small "R") counter.

Exhausted by their efforts, our pairing of pugnacious pugilists have only enough energy for a single summation.

Each will now present one final post. Hanover, then 180.

Procedurally, this debate degenerated into nonsense, due to a lack of a good faith effort by my opponent to debate. He never presented any meaningful position, alluding at various points to Wittgenstein, Spinoza, emergentism, and to a slew of other positions and thinkers. Under any debate scenario, one must actually present a position, even if it’s a negation of their opponent’s. Take a look at . https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structure_of_policy_debate for what a meaningful debate process might look like. We didn’t formalize such a process here, but I made the incorrect assumption that good faith would be adhered to where there would some semblance of a debate, as opposed to vague, broad, and ambiguous snipes with no meaningful follow up analysis and defensive refusals to be forthcoming. Formatting changes to sentences don’t make cogent points in themselves and emojis don’t constitute responses in a debate any more than might an actual laugh, grimace, or yawn. Additionally, the decision I go first in closing arguments was an incorrect one as I had the burden of proof, but be that as it may.

Love, hate, regret, happiness and the like are not reducible to brain states. No microscope will ever see them. Property dualism holds that the reason they are not so reducible is because they are of a form of matter that is different from rocks and trees. PD doesn’t explain how matter differs when it comes to mental states. It just asserts there is some underlying substance that is consistent with the two entities that enables physical interaction. My opponent argued largely epistemology, not metaphysics, and referred to all sorts of other positions, never explaining why his undefined PD was superior to SD.

I contend SD holds closely the same as PD, except it avoids the slight of hand and simply says that these two things, minds and bodies, are distinct enough to satisfy the definition of differing substances and holds that the similarities in these substances is sufficient enough to allow for interaction without violation of physical law. How we name the two substances, natural/super-natural (or however) is irrelevant, although my naming does comport with the vernacular.

Under any rule of debate, an unresponded to contention is deemed admitted, and while “substance” and “property” were critical distinctions in this debate, and cited in detail, my opponent never responded.

If the question we were all waiting to be answered was “how can a substance with no physical similarity as a physical one interact with a physical one if we define “physical” as that which can’t interact except with the physical” then I expect you’re disappointed. I cannot unravel a true logical contradiction as it’s been phrased and it’s why the interaction problem remains unsolved for many hundred years. The way out of a definitional contradiction necessarily involves clarification of definitions. My opponent, with much prodding, never defined “physical” meaningfully, much less non-physical.

Without rehashing all else I discussed, I’ll just link to my prior post where I fully summarized my position : here

15

Before closing this debate, I'd like to thank our audience for their patience, also the esteemed Hanover for engaging me (even though neither of us seems satisfied with the other's debate performance), and our moderator, Banno, for putting up with us.

So what's 'the problem' Substance Dualism succeeds at solving that Property Dualism purportedly fails to solve?

Hanover's only shown that SD proposes a solution in search of a problem and that the logical problems this faux-solution raises make explicit that SD doesn't, in fact, solve anything. What am I talking about? "Free will". Hanover and I have only circled this unstated premise of the debate proposition: 'SD succeeds at accounting for "free will" where PD fails to do so'. This is nonsense, of course, as Hanover's SUPERNATURAL defense exposes.

Physical substance (res extensa) is mechanistic-deterministic and alone doesn't allow for "free will", which then entails an absence of justification for holding persons responsible for immoral conduct, crimes against legal authorities/the church, or "sins against God". Descartes proposes a "second substance" that's non-physical and not mechanistic-deterministic (res cogitans) which allows for "free will" – metaphysical "free will" – that interacts with physical substance ("mind in control of body"). Hanover, I think, rightly terms this asymmetric arrangement – body (physical) doesn't cause/control mind (non-physical)! – SUPERnatural. And, it's then believed, with "free will" proposed as issuing from a second substance (res cogitans), that moral "blame", juridical "punishment", & theological "damnation" of human transgressions are justified. However, the metaphysics of two substances interacting is conceptually incoherent & logical inconsistent, which Hanover's failed to address or explain away except to call it "SUPERNATURAL" (magic); SD doesn't demonstrate "metaphysical free will" and, therefore, fails to justify what doesn't even need "metaphysical" justification.

Property Dualism does better. Why?

(1) PD consists of complementary conceptions of, or ways of describing, the same object or agent,

(2) that is, describing evident "mental" & "physical" properties which are not, like SD, separate/independent entities that SOMEHOW cause/control one another while ALSO SOMEHOW remaining separate/independent and,

(3) therefore, presupposes only one metaphysical substance that's independent of external forces (causally closed, energy conserved).

What about "free will"?

Free action is the actual problem; namely, to the degree a person's actions aren't coerced by ineluctable conditions or other persons' actions, they're free actions and s/he is wholly, or predominantly, responsible for their (proximate) adverse consequences. PD proposes an epistemic method for exhaustively conceptualizing, or describing, each object or agent based on the "physical" or "mental" or "physical-mental" properties in evidence (as queried by the philosopher), which is both metaphysically parsimonious and cognitively discernible.

In sum: PD succeeds at providing exhaustive conceptions (descriptions) of objects or agents by which responsibility based on actions free-of-coercion can be accounted for whereas SD fails even to account for the pseudo-problem of "free will" due to SD's several metaphysical, logical & physical confusions, which Hanover's all but confirmed by deferring to the "SUPERNATURAL".

(489 words.)

Well, there we have if, folks. Let that be an end to it.


But perhaps not...