A philosopher's insulting compliment

Calling someone insane/crazy is sometimes a casual but still ambiguous compliment when the implied context is shared between two parties.

Example: Alex Honnold is insane/crazy for free climbing El Capitan. This could both convey a sense of awe and envy in some people given the high probability of death if a mistake is made. Death defying feats require courage and skill, things which are generally commendable. A high risk move with incredible pay off, if successful, might be complimented with "crazy" by the average person who would never take such a risk.

Example: Elon Musk's investment in sending humans to Mars is insane/crazy. Maybe commendable, as an achievement, like climbing El Capitan, but also incredibly stupid/wasteful from the point of view of intractable problems at home. Are there good reasons for sending humans to Mars? How would sending them to the moon be any different?

I'd like an example of a crazy/insane philosopher. The heresiarchs of the old days, those who questioned institutional reality (Christian cosmogony) with original hypotheses were possibly insane/corrupt by the standards of the time, but there was great pay off for future generations. Newton was into magic and alchemy.

Emil Cioran seems crazy, insofar a pessimism might arise from an illness (the body inflammed) or from tragedy. How could a serious pessimist like that exist and ought you really call him a philosopher rather than a poet. Or is it a kind of poets play/humor that is detached from his character, an artistic salve/work for the condition he was in.

Quoting Nils Loc

I'd like an example of a crazy/insane philosopher. The heresiarchs of the old days, those who questioned institutional reality (Christian cosmogony) with original hypotheses were possibly insane/corrupt by the standards of the time, but there was great pay off for future generations.

Socrates gadflying in public, totally cray cray.

Quoting praxis

Socrates gadflying in public, totally cray cray.

The internal voice (the Daimonion) that told Socrates no whenever he was about to do something wrong sounds far weirder than his method, which was probably more annoying than crazy. But maybe it's just a creative take on what we call the conscience (though one doesn't audibly hear it). Greek society then, as much as society now, was all kinds of cray cray, given that everybody was running scared about speaking against the gods and slaves and pederasty were a okay.

When in Athens, circa 399 BCE... go watch the chariot races, after watching Soc drink Hemlock.

Quoting Nils Loc

I'd like an example of a crazy/insane philosopher. The heresiarchs of the old days, those who questioned institutional reality (Christian cosmogony) with original hypotheses were possibly insane/corrupt by the standards of the time, but there was great pay off for future generations

I am not sure about having original hypotheses or even if there was great future 'pay-off'.
What I have often wondered about it are the effects of recurring physical illness as well as the mental condition of the thinker/author. Not just about how others judged them at the time but also what and how their real agenda was. Fear of persecution meant that ideas were cloaked.

Quoting Nils Loc

How could a serious pessimist like that exist and ought you really call him a philosopher rather than a poet. Or is it a kind of poets play/humor that is detached from his character, an artistic salve/work for the condition he was in.

Both can be part of the creative thinking process and character.
A philosophical poet or a poetic philosopher. Reading such 'madness' - a new way of thinking or expressing thoughts can be life changing for any individual. Perhaps for future generations...
Even if it were dismissed at the time.

I have read of some who during/after a short period of illness, a delirious fever, had come to a realisation or a solution to the problem they had been struggling with. What are the mechanisms at play here ?
Biochemical imbalance ?

Anyway - the philosophers that sprang to mind were those I have struggled with:
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.
However, others I have read more easily.
Goethe seems to have had a mid-life crisis due to work-related stress and probable depression.
He took off on his Italian Journeys...

There are probably as many crazies in philosophy as the mad genius scientist.
Obsession or passion is not always a bad thing.
It seems I have some kind of a connection with Hume, other than being Scottish.

From: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/545020

What does it feel like to be pouring out such thoughts on a laptop at 02.16hrs ?
Bloody crazy. You know what I mean ?
— Amity

It's not dissimilar to what Hume thought about when he had a psychological breakdown:

"Where am I, or what? From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return? ... I am confounded with all these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable condition imaginable, environed with the deepest darkness, and utterly deprived of the use of every member and faculty.

Most fortunately it happens, that since Reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, Nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all these chimeras. I dine, I play a game of backgammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends. And when, after three or four hours' amusement, I would return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strained, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther.”

There ya' go, Hume is No.4 on the list:
https://www.brainz.org/10-philosophers-who-were-mentally-disturbed/

10.Kierkegaard
5. Socrates
I. Top of the class >>>>

>>>> Nietzsche !

Quoting Nils Loc

The internal voice (the Daimonion) that told Socrates no whenever he was about to do something wrong sounds far weirder than his method, which was probably more annoying than crazy. But maybe it's just a creative take on what we call the conscience (though one doesn't audibly hear it).

When I first heard about Socrates' daimonion - an internal 'divine' voice - which guided him away from undertaking activities which might harm him, I wondered:

About whether it was intuition - that 'gut' feeling.
If he heard other voices which weren't discussed. Did he have auditory hallucinations - was he schizoid?
Why did he - or Plato - pay and draw attention to only that 'voice'.
What about the ones which would guide him to the good. The wise voice - perhaps based in passion for philosophy. As per the recent thread 'Plato's Phaedo', started by @Fooloso4
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/540733

Quoting Fooloso4

In the center of the dialogue Phaedo said that they had been “healed” of their distress and readiness to abandon argument. (89a) In other words, Socrates saved them from misologic,about which he said "there is no greater evil than hating arguments". (89d)

There is one other mention of illness. In the beginning when we are told that Plato was ill. We are not told the nature of the illness that kept him away, but we know he recovered. Perhaps he too was cured of misologic. Rather than giving up on philosophy he went on to make the “greatest music”. Misologic is at the center of the problem, framed by Plato’s illness and the offer to Asclepius. And perhaps conquering the greatest evil is in the end a good reason to regard this as a comedy rather than a tragedy.

Perhaps, Plato could be on the mad list ? What kind of an illness or great passion did he 'suffer' from ?

A divine voice directed me to Plato's Phaedrus where he or Socrates had something to say on madness :
'And we made four divisions of the divine madness, ascribing them to four gods, saying that prophecy was inspired by Apollo, the mystic madness by Dionysus, the poetic by the Muses, and the madness of love, inspired by Aphrodite and Eros, we said was the best. (265b)'.

Another voice :
Quoting Daniel Werner: Plato on Madness and Philosophy

Socrates’ great speech in the Phaedrus —the so-called ‘palinode’—begins with the somewhat shocking claim that ‘the greatest goods’ come from madness. Understood within the dramatic frame of the dialogue, the meaning of this claim is clear enough: the previous two speeches had argued that a beloved who is being wooed ought to prefer a non-lover to a lover, on the grounds that the ‘mad’ lover has no control over himself and is incapable of acting toward what is best.

Yet such a view directly contradicts the fact that Eros—being a god—can-not be the cause of anything bad; hence, Socrates must now recant his earlier disparagement of ????? [ manía ] and instead extol the virtues of madness. The palinode would then seem to be an elaboration and defense of this revaluation of madness.
In particular, the palinode seems to suggest that, in the best of circumstances, the madness of eros not only to an intense and beneficial interpersonal relationship but also to the highest kind of philosophical cognition. The apparent conclusion here is that there is a close relationship between philosophy and madness.

But just what is the nature of this relationship? Indeed, while the praise of madness might very well make sense as part of the dialogical-dramatic movement of the Phaedrus, it becomes problematic when set against the moral psychology of such dialogues as the Republic.
After all, the latter’s strong arguments in favor of rational self-control would seem to lead to an unequivocal rejection of any sort of ‘madness’ in the soul, and would hardly countenance madness as a part of philosophy. So is Plato seriously suggesting in the Phaedrus that the philosopher is ‘mad’? And if so, in what sense?

At least two responses are possible. First, there is what we might call the ‘literalist’ reading: the notion that, yes, the philosopher is literally mad, in the sense that he lacks complete rational self-control or self-awareness, and hence there are times when losing one’s mind or reason is a good thing.
Second—and diametrically opposed to the literalist reading—there is what we might call the ‘ironic’ reading: the notion that the philosopher is not ‘mad’ or ‘un-self-controlled’ in any way, and that any apparent suggestion to the contrary is made purely for rhetorical, dialogical, or ironic reasons.

What I wish to argue here is that—as is so often the case with Plato’s dialogues—the most plausible interpretation of the Phaedrus lies somewhere in between these two extremes.
To see that this is the case, we must be clear about how Plato is defining‘ madness’ in the first place. The speeches of the Phaedrus initially present us with two distinct types of madness: a human type involving an internal state of psychic disharmony, and a divine type involving possession by a god...

The madness of 'philosophers' - having fun in the Lounge :cool:
Thanks @Tiberiusmoon for starting the discussion, inspiring some...

Reply to Amity yw :D

Daniel Werner: Plato on Madness and Philosophy:Yet such a view directly contradicts the fact that Eros—being a god—can-not be the cause of anything bad; hence, Socrates must now recant his earlier disparagement of ????? [ manía ] and instead extol the virtues of madness.

This is the kind of fact one must profess as a matter of convention, less you risk getting in trouble like Socrates did. How does one square this in the face of the mythical shenanigans of the gods who appear to be just powerful, unfathomable and mad versions of humans, susceptible to same instinctual frailties/ecstasies, like becoming jealous, seeking revenge, while using mortals as their means. If the gods had a hand in the accidental tragedies of mortals why hold the view that Eros (the madness of love) cannot be the cause of anything bad?

First rule of scary as shit gods... don't gainsay them for fear of reprisal. They might shoot you with a love arrow while at the same time deny you the object of your love. Talk about evil.

Quoting Amity

I am not sure about having original hypotheses or even if there was great future 'pay-off'.

Iconoclasts! The movers and the shakers, any of those, can be condemned by the current era conservatives to uphold the status quo as a matter of faith or power. If the wench doesn't drown, she's a witch, and therefore must be burned at the stake.

Quoting Nils Loc

I am not sure about having original hypotheses or even if there was great future 'pay-off'.
— Amity

Iconoclasts! The movers and the shakers, any of those, can be condemned by the current era conservatives to uphold the status quo as a matter of faith or power.

Quoting Wiki - Iconoclasm

Iconoclasm (from Greek: ?????, eik?n, 'figure, icon' + ????, klá?, 'to break')[i] is the social belief in the importance of the destruction of icons and other images or monuments, most frequently for religious or political reasons. People who engage in or support iconoclasm are called iconoclasts, a term that has come to be figuratively applied to any individual who challenges "cherished beliefs or venerated institutions on the grounds that they are erroneous or pernicious."[4]

A social belief or radical philosophy ?

Recently, some ?philosophical/political thinkers have resorted to action. It speaks louder than words.
Here is just one example: attacking historical figures who held unacceptable racist views.

The domino effect of the toppling of statues:

1. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/jun/04/toppled-edward-colston-statue-display-bristol-blm-protests-exhibition

The statue of the slave trader Edward Colston has gone on display in Bristol, almost a year to the day since it was dragged from its plinth by Black Lives Matter protesters and thrown into Bristol harbour.
Daubed with red and blue graffiti, and damaged so it can longer stand upright, the 19th-century bronze memorial has been displayed at the M Shed museum. Visitors will see it lying supine on a wooden stand alongside placards from the protest on 7 June 2020 and a timeline of events.

History in the making and on display.

2. Hume: https://philosophynow.org/issues/83/David_Hume_at_300

Quoting Howard Darmstadter

David Hume at 300
Howard Darmstadter looks at the life and legacy of the incendiary tercentenarian.
In 1734, David Hume, a bookish 23-year-old Scotsman, abandoned conventional career options and went off to France to Think Things Over. Living frugally and devoting himself to study and writing, he returned after three years with a hefty manuscript under his arm. Published in three volumes in 1739 –40 as A Treatise of Human Nature, it attracted little attention. Reflecting on the event near the end of his life, Hume joked that it “fell still-born from the press.”

The Religious Skeptic
Hume had become a religious skeptic in his teens, and remained so until he died. The manuscript for the Treatise originally contained a chapter, ‘Of Miracles’, which argued that “no testimony for any kind of miracle has ever amounted to a probability, much less to a proof.” [Again, see this issue.] Hume was prevailed upon to remove the chapter from the Treatise, but he included it in the first Enquiry. Hume’s initial hesitation is understandable: as recently as 1696, a young man had been executed in Edinburgh for blasphemy. Scotland last hanged a witch when Hume was seventeen.

Hume soon rallied, going on to enjoy a long and successful career as an historian and political essayist (the accomplishments for which he was best known in his lifetime) and as an important contributor to the infant science of economics.

Hume approached his own death with a cheerful calm that bordered on disinterest. A few months before his death, he composed a brief autobiography in which he described his situation:

“In spring 1775, I was struck with a disorder in my bowels, which at first gave me no alarm, but has since, as I apprehend it, become mortal and incurable. I now reckon upon a speedy dissolution. I have suffered very little pain from my disorder; and what is more strange, have, notwithstanding the great decline of my person, never suffered a moment’s abatement of my spirits; insomuch, that were I to name a period of my life which I should most choose to pass over again, I might be tempted to point to this later period. … It is difficult to be more detached from life than I am at present.”

David Hume, My Own Life, penultimate paragraph

I am not sure that he would be all that upset at the suggested removal of his statue or his name from academic buildings. His statue is of Hume portrayed as an ancient Greek philosopher.
No red and blue graffiti as far as I can tell - perhaps whiteness deposited by a passing pigeon.

Quoting 130 David Hume Quotes

“But the life of a man is of no greater importance to the universe than that of an oyster.”

It does make you wonder as to the legacy of a philosopher...if all that people remember are the negative aspects.

https://dailynous.com/2020/07/03/honor-hume-buildings-statues/

From the start of the new academic year the David Hume Tower will be known as 40 George Square…

Quoting Justin Weinberg: Should We Continue to Honor Hume

The interim decision has been taken because of the sensitivities around asking students to use a building named after the 18th century philosopher whose comments on matters of race, though not uncommon at the time, rightly cause distress today...

Some have also urged the removal of the statue of David Hume from Edinburgh’s Royal Mile. The statue was erected in 1997 and is a popular attraction (and not just among traveling philosophers).

Quoting Nils Loc

If the wench doesn't drown, she's a witch, and therefore must be burned at the stake.

Scotland last hanged a witch when Hume was seventeen.
Kinda puts things into perspective as to the times he lived in and the beliefs he challenged.
At risk to himself.

Reply to Amity

Great articles, excerpts and quotes. I especially like Hume quotes and one would wonder if any comparable expression of relief by social activity or from nature for mental disturbance was given by Nietzsche. I'm not sure serenity, contentment or happiness is at all compatible with whatever Nietzsche was advocating with such phrases as "Will to Power" and "The Overman."

It would've never occurred to me to call contemporary statue tippers iconoclasts but it fits with the original spirit of the term quite well.

Dying for one's beliefs as a choice, as is the case with the dramatic trial of Socrates, is interesting. The extremity of such an act in the face of death might be absurd/irrational/mad to many. If one could imagine an alternative history where Socrates gave up his work (the public practice of Elenchus) to remain alive, would he remain the so called "father of Western philosophy". It's kind of a great mythic/legendary opening to the movement of Western philosophy. But he was kind of old, so maybe there wasn't much at stake. Maybe he was tired of feeling his bones rubbing together.

Costica Bradatan, NYT Opinionator: Philosophy as the Art of Dying:There is a point beyond which philosophy, if it is not to lose face, must turn into something else: performance. It has to pass a test in a foreign land, a territory that’s not its own. For the ultimate testing of our philosophy takes place not in the sphere of strictly rational procedures (writing, teaching, lecturing), but elsewhere: in the fierce confrontation with death of the animal that we are.

Philosophy as an Art of Dying by Costica Bradatan

Quoting Nils Loc

I'm not sure serenity, contentment or happiness is at all compatible with whatever Nietzsche was advocating with such phrases as "Will to Power" and "The Overman."

I don't know. Nietzsche's writings are beyond me. However, I suppose happiness like beauty can be in the eye of the beholder ? Interpretations of his works will no doubt included a mix of the subjective and objective.

Quoting Nils Loc

It would've never occurred to me to call contemporary statue tippers iconoclasts but it fits with the original spirit of the term quite well.

Yes, it does seem more like mob rule but somebody, somewhere has to set the ball in motion.
Is # tag activism better than philosophy as a way to raise, debate and change socio-political issues ?

Quoting Hashtag activism

They [Hashtags ] can be seen as a way to help or start a revolution by increasing the number of supporters from across the world who have not been in contact with the issue.[7] It allows people to discuss and comment around one hashtag. Hashtag activism is a way to expand the usage of communication and make it democratic in a way that everyone has a way to express their opinions.[7] Especially it provides an important platform for historically disenfranchised populations, enabling them to communicate, mobilize and advocate on topics less visible in mainstream media.

Quoting Nils Loc

If one could imagine an alternative history where Socrates gave up his work (the public practice of Elenchus) to remain alive, would he remain the so called "father of Western philosophy". It's kind of a great mythic/legendary opening to the movement of Western philosophy

I don't suppose I am alone in having imagined it. Nothing quite like a bit of (relatively) easy martyrdom.
At least Plato and Aristotle, the other 'fathers of Western philosophy', didn't meet such a fate.

Quoting Nils Loc

There is a point beyond which philosophy, if it is not to lose face, must turn into something else: performance. It has to pass a test in a foreign land, a territory that’s not its own. For the ultimate testing of our philosophy takes place not in the sphere of strictly rational procedures (writing, teaching, lecturing), but elsewhere: in the fierce confrontation with death of the animal that we are.
— Costica Bradatan, NYT Opinionator: Philosophy as the Art of Dying

Philosophy as an Art of Dying by Costica Bradatan

'Performance' - 'In the fierce confrontation of the animal we are'.
I like that. But my interpretation could be way out. And the link didn't work.

Philosophy where action or movement is both part and outcome of the critical thinking process.
But that is still a 'rational procedure' is it not ?
Being aware that our natural instincts underlie any rationality or superficial semblance of civilisation.
We can't kill them off - only manage to a certain extent.

It reminds me of the recent reading of 'Plato's Phaedo'.

Fooloso4:'...Other people may well be unaware that all who actually engage in philosophy aright are practising nothing other than dying and being dead (64a)'

What are we to make of this startling and puzzling claim?

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/534860

Philosophy:
'...It has to pass a test in a foreign land, a territory that’s not its own...' - Bradatan.

That reminded me of different cultures and the previous discussion re 'iconoclasts' and the tearing down of statues. A 'killing' if you like, perhaps more emotionally based - a violence against past or current culture and beliefs.
Perhaps another term could be 'iconoblasts' ?
I will never forget the blasting of the ancient Buddha sculptures by the Taliban in Afghanistan, 2001.

Humans being human ? The good, the bad and the ugly. Mad, bad and dangerous...?
Just like philosophy.

Reply to Tiberiusmoon
Anything you care to add ? :chin:

Quoting Amity

Being aware that our natural instincts underlie any rationality or superficial semblance of civilisation.
We can't kill them off - only manage to a certain extent.

There is a link to this in a way we learn, being aware of our instincts, emotions, fallacies or biases and controlling them through critical/logical thinking gives us an approach to problem solving in a rational manner.
As such it is important to learn how/why we make mistakes from a different perspective in order to filter out as many mistakes as we can from our own or other people's knowledge.
It is this study of learning or philosophical practice that I use as part of my philosophy.

If your able to detach yourself from your own perspective and observe that perspective in a unbised way you can evaluate your own arguments in a way that is like playing chess with yourself.