Are there legitimate Metaphysical Questions
This topic was prompted by another poster: to state it simply are there legitimate metaphysical questions as opposed to problems related to language use? That is, is the long history of metaphysics one in which, by analysis of language use alone, we may dissolve such problems?
I'll attempt to present one circumstance in which I think problems related to language use can dissolve a problem. This may be fiercely debated, but that can't be helped. Take the so called "mind-body" problem. The basic idea is that matter cannot possibly be so constituted so as to have the properties of experience.
We just look at rocks and sand and think to ourselves, this can't possibly think. But I suspect that we are creating a problem by treating the word "matter" as if it were "dead and stupid" by stipulation. "What is mind? Not Matter. What is matter? Never mind."
However if we let go of the idea that the word "matter" must mean "having no experience", then we discover that matter can think, as is the case when it is constituted by a person, realized in the brain. So there is no mind as opposed to matter problem. There are problems when speaking of "mind" and "matter" but not a mind-body problem.
What's a legitimate metaphysical question that cannot be solved by language analysis? I'll pick one that stands out to me, roughly randomly: The problem of identity ascribed to objects or persons.
Suppose John is a normal human being. John will still be John even if he becomes obese, goes into a coma or is even cremated and put in an urn. Clearly a person being in a coma is quite different from him being obese which differs enormously from him being put as ash in an urn. Yet I think it's legitimate to consider all these cases as instances in which we speak about John correctly.
You can pick and choose any problem you wish. All I ask is for two things: 1) what metaphysical problems do you think can be resolved by analyzing our language and 2) which metaphysical questions are actually substantive?
I'll attempt to present one circumstance in which I think problems related to language use can dissolve a problem. This may be fiercely debated, but that can't be helped. Take the so called "mind-body" problem. The basic idea is that matter cannot possibly be so constituted so as to have the properties of experience.
We just look at rocks and sand and think to ourselves, this can't possibly think. But I suspect that we are creating a problem by treating the word "matter" as if it were "dead and stupid" by stipulation. "What is mind? Not Matter. What is matter? Never mind."
However if we let go of the idea that the word "matter" must mean "having no experience", then we discover that matter can think, as is the case when it is constituted by a person, realized in the brain. So there is no mind as opposed to matter problem. There are problems when speaking of "mind" and "matter" but not a mind-body problem.
What's a legitimate metaphysical question that cannot be solved by language analysis? I'll pick one that stands out to me, roughly randomly: The problem of identity ascribed to objects or persons.
Suppose John is a normal human being. John will still be John even if he becomes obese, goes into a coma or is even cremated and put in an urn. Clearly a person being in a coma is quite different from him being obese which differs enormously from him being put as ash in an urn. Yet I think it's legitimate to consider all these cases as instances in which we speak about John correctly.
You can pick and choose any problem you wish. All I ask is for two things: 1) what metaphysical problems do you think can be resolved by analyzing our language and 2) which metaphysical questions are actually substantive?
Comments (130)
That's already a difficult question, with different people taking metaphysics to mean different things.
As I understand it metaphysics is the study of the most general features of the world and it essentially involves experience and language. Experience, obviously, otherwise we'd not be typing anything. And language because we need to express our thoughts in some manner in discussions of this kind.
I'd put my neck out and say that a good deal - but by no means not all - of metaphysics is a priori, that is, we need not go to the world and do empirical experiments about it, though we are not prevented from doing so, of course. So it is largely conceptual.
We just need our concepts and the world. So issues like whether God exists or not don't require much empirical experiments, nor do experiments tell us if the world is fundamentally mental or non-mental. For these we must rely on arguments that articulate our intuitions.
That's my approximation of metaphysics.
I see your point and it is valid to a large extent. Let me see if I can work around the definition issue by offering example of topics which are considered to pertain to metaphysics:
The ground of existence: is it non-mental, mental, neutral and so on.
The nature of the self: do they exist, if so, do they exist apart from the body.
Free will: Do we have it or don't we? Are we determined by causal forces or do we "interrupt" them in an act of freedom
Identity: Do objects have an identity or do we give them identity entirely? If so do we pick out the identity of object by its physical characteristics or by mental continuity?
Causality: Does it exist or should we speak of habits or tendencies in nature?
The nature of reality: Do we access it directly or are we stuck with appearances?
And so on. Honestly, I think it would be best if people take metaphysics to mean whatever they think they understand it to mean when they think of the word, minus New Age interpretations. Because today, I think it is basically impossible to speak of metaphysics without extremely substantial epistemological input.
So the best I can do is to say metaphysics is what we call a certain series of questions that fall under that name. So are the topics I named substantial or are they a problem of us using words incorrectly?
First, a bit of weaselling out of my provocation. It's not so much that there are no metaphysical issues, as that the problems we call metaphysical are characterised by conceptual confusions, and hence the path to dealign with them is in conceptual analysis with an eye to untying the knot of confusion. This to avoid the prejudice that such analysis belittles philosophical issues by treating them as just word puzzles. Yes, it treats them as word puzzles, but our words are directly in touch with what is true and with the world; so drop the just.
This thread must run on multiple levels. At the bottom it might appear to be a thread about the mind-body problem, but it's other purpose is to discuss the right way to do metaphysics. Is that a problem? Can the very same thread be about two different things?
I don't see any issues with that. indeed, that's rather the approach we might take to the mind-body problem. We can talk of various neurones firing in such a way that a signal is sent down one's spine, stimulating the muscles in such a way that they variously contract so that the shoulder and elbow move... and we can talk about deciding to move one's arm, and the arm moving.
And here we have two different ways of talking about the very same thing.
And why not? Once you become aware that it happens, you might find further examples elsewhere. Try it for yourself.
SO the question arrises, yes, OK, but which is it really - neurones or intent?
And that might be the metaphysical knot - the view that one description must have primacy.
And the strategy, the way of doing metaphysics, would be to probe deeply into any alternative solution to see if it does reduce mind to matter, or matter to mind.
So there's a start.
Allied with that, in my opinion, is the necessity of understanding the question in terms of the history of ideas - of the role of the medievals and the transition to modernity, the changes in the background assumptions that underlie it, and so on.
Why?
I was going to offer this blog post by Feser as a neo-Thomist, neo-Scholastic defence of metaphysics.
They both play a role. I think the problem here is to ask how do neurons relate to a willed action of raising my arm. I can hit my shoulder at a particular angle and my arm will raise. I can also move it. I don't doubt that neurons play a very big role here, and a puzzling one at that.
As to what really is going on, is suggested by what you yourself said: it depends on what aspect of the world you want to analyze. Do you want to speak of manifest reality where people raise there arms to hail a cab? Then I think it makes sense to speak of will.
Do you want to talk about how this is realized in the body? Then you can speak of neurons and physiology.
I think that mind is molded matter. So I'd take that question as meaning how does some matter, my arm, reduces to another piece of matter, my mind or vice versa. Unless you have a specific meaning for the word mind which would be different. Then we can talk about that. I think the terms experiential for mind and non-experiential for what we usually call body, is potentially less confusing.
But maybe not.
And you're right, my mistake, I try to avoid using "just" - it's very misleading.
But you go for it, I'll just watch.
So what's that, then? A clear and obvious reality? A reality that is taken for granted, or is at hand, perhaps?
If we drop the word "manifest", what would change? There would presumably still be taxies. I don't see that we need "manifest reality" in order to will one's arm to move to hail a cab. The wording just doesn't obviously help.
Quoting Manuel
But your mind does not have a mass. So it is not a form of matter.
Quoting Manuel
It's a good indicator of something fishy going on.
Quoting Banno
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/544066
Quoting Banno
That reminded me of Daniel Dennet's 'surely':
Quoting Dennett: seven tools for critical thinking
Just saying...
Is there a 'right' way to 'do' metaphysics?
Is there an easy or a hard way...a 'just right' way..
Superficial or deep and wide-ranging...
https://www.wikihow.com/Study-Metaphysics
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/
What kind of metaphysics...
An SEP search - 1290 documents.
Feminist, Arab & Islamic, Chinese, Aristotle...
I have already mentioned it in the thread from which the discussion about this emerged, but I think that it is relevant to your discussion too. I read A J Ayer's book, ' Language, Truth and Logic' recently and it points to the way in which it is not possible to speak of metaphysics in the way in which we talk about the facts about the empirical world. The author does not dismiss a priori knowledge, but does suggest that it is often used in ways which create tautologies.
Ayer argues that metaphysics is about speculation, and that is its limitation. He suggests that he is not trying to say that people should not make speculations, or be discouraged from having certain beliefs, such as believing in God, but that they present difficulties in arguing for them as metaphysical realities because they cannot be spoken of as definite facts. I think that his argument does come into play in the whole process of asking metaphysical questions.
I have a few worries about the challenge and here is one of them:
It looks like a false dichotomy. A metaphysical problem could perhaps be *both* substantive *and* resolvable by analysing our language. At any rate, we should not assume that no problem can possibly be both until we're reasonably confident that it is so.
1) One is "the problem of solipsism". See Witty's "Private Language Argument". Another is "the problem of induction" (i.e. causal relations, causality). See Popper's The Logic of Scientific Discovery.
2) I can only think of What necessarily is not real, or impossible objects/worlds (i.e. membership rule/s for the Null Set)? A question (re: my apophatic conception) of negative ontology.
Quoting Cuthbert
Yes. Problems and questions related to identity and the nature of self come to mind.
I was intrigued to discover that there is a 'Feminist Metaphysics'.
Quoting SEP: Feminist Metaphysics
Value laden concepts need to carefully analysed as to real life implications.
The words we use - to make sense of current reality - often skew the way we think about and treat our selves and others.
So, both substantive questions and language analysis involved but as to any being dissolved or resolved...
It's Sellars distinction. I think it's a good one. Manifest reality deals with mental entities. Science, if our theories are correct, deal with mind-indepdent entities.
Quoting Banno
Hmmm, that's not clear to me. It certainly comes from mass, we just don't know how the mass realizes this feat of experience. I can't well take my mind out of my brain and confirm that it has no mass. It may seem to have no mass, I'm not sure it doesn't.
Then again, you may be correct.
Quoting Banno
Yes. It trivializes something which shouldn't be treated this way.
Agreed. Can’t have an answer consistent with a very specific question, without a proper ground being given for it. Always best to separate the sophists from the dialecticians.
Yes and that approach makes sense. I suppose what's left if empirical evidence is not available, is to rely on the plausibility of the arguments. But we also use intuition here and this depends on our sensibilities as in one may prefer idealism because one thinks the mind creates the world or some other such view.
Quoting 180 Proof
I think I remember parts of that argument. It's interesting, but too technical for me to be able to reply intelligently.
Quoting Amity
Well, I'd like to think reason is neither masculine nor feminine as applied to these types of topics. It gets muddied in political affairs at times. But I had never heard of feminine metaphysics, but I'm not even surprised.
The point of me asking for a person to give an example of a metaphysical problem dissolving through language use and one which does not is simply to see if people are willing to point to one example in which analysis or clear use of words can put a problem to the side tends to show that philosophy of language can be useful.
Sometimes certain people tend to make all problems of philosophy a problem of using a word incorrectly. I think that's taking it way too far. On the other hand, if someone says philosophy of language is useless, then I think that's clearly wrong.
Many of these problems are substantive, but I'd be suspicious if someone said that not a single problem in the long list of these issues is one which was framed incorrectly.
But people have somewhat different ideas as to what constitutes metaphysics...
This is a well-written and thought through post. It's a good idea for a discussion.
On the other hand, I have beaten my ideas on metaphysics to pulp in previous discussions throughout my time on the forumm. The thought of getting involved in a new one gives me the purple flurps. @tim wood and I share some understanding on this issue. I'll let him speak for me.
I was not familiar with this term. I will store it in my library for future use. Thanks.
Sure. No problem. If I had to be repeating my views on this topic for 5 years, I'd be hesitant to repeat myself again. :up:
I prefer to define the term "metaphysics" to describe the subject matter of Aristotle's second volume of his post-iron-age encyclopedia of knowledge -- but not as it was later interpreted by Catholic theologians. Volume 1, now referred to as "The Physics", was describing the material world as known by direct observation of Nature (Science). Then, volume 2, now known as "The Metaphysics", analyzed the immaterial aspects of the world (human nature), as known by rational inference (Philosophy).
But the Catholic Scholastics later interpreted those non-physical features of the natural world as super-natural & spiritual. Hence, the term "Metaphysics" came to be associated with Theology instead of Science. That's why, when I discuss the non-physical realities (Ideality), I spell it with a hyphen "Meta-Physics", to indicate that I'm not talking about Magic, Mysticism, or Religious Doctrines. Basically, it's anything that is not accessible to the 5 senses, but only to the sixth sense of Reason (inference). For example, the Quarks that are supposed to be the building blocks of sub-atomic matter, "have never been observed empirically" (Science), but are inferred theoretically (Philosophy). Hence, I would say that Quarks & other hypothetical particles are meta-physical, They exist in a limbo realm of insubstantial Ideas, beyond the reach of Sensation, but not of Reason.
Therefore, I think all Meta-Physical (theoretical) questions are grist for the philosophical mill. Yet not all of them have any "substantive" effect on the material world, but may have "significant" effects on the human Mind (memes). Metaphysical questions are not resolved by practical experimentation, but only by philosophical argumentation, or mathematical calculation. Which means that, ultimately, they are subjects of belief & faith, not fact. And the arguments will seldom convince believers to change their opinions.
For example, the children at Medjugorje in Bosnia, claimed they "saw" the Virgin Mary. But their parents, at first didn't believe them. Yet, now the site of the "sighting" is a popular destination for millions of faith-driven pilgrims. That is "Metaphysics" in the Catholic sense. On the other hand, investigations into the "substance" of intangible Consciousness have recently become a popular topic for Neuroscientists, as well as New Agers. And that is a valid subject for philosophical research -- including linguistic analysis, even though any "substantive" conclusions will remain subjective, and may be accepted or rejected based on prior beliefs.& attitudes toward Meta-Physics or Metaphysics. :smile:
Quark :
any of a number of subatomic particles carrying a fractional electric charge, postulated as building blocks of the hadrons. Quarks have not been directly observed but theoretical predictions based on their existence have been confirmed experimentally.
Massless Particles :
But an object with zero energy and zero mass is nothing at all. Therefore, if an object with no mass is to physically exist, it can never be at rest. Such is the case with light.
https://wtamu.edu/~cbaird/sq/2014/04/01/light-has-no-mass-so-it-also-has-no-energy-according-to-einstein-but-how-can-sunlight-warm-the-earth-without-energy/
Note -- Other essentially massless particles are neutrinos, gravitons, & gluons. And their physical existence is inferred from theory, not directly observed. Even further down the rabbit-hole are Strings, that may never be empirically provable, and yet mathematicians imagine them as ghostly mathematical objects in a dimension far-far-away from the "real" world.
Philosophy of language useful ?
I had severe mental cramps when I briefly studied that many years ago. Fodor's L.O.T. Language of Thought ! I have avoided it just as much as metaphysics. Until now.
However...I will take this opportunity to explore again, from a different perspective.
Sticking with the Feminist theme, which I think can be broadened to issues of power, and control of minority groups. As related to metaphysical questions and concepts of identity and self in social experience. What our categorisations of reality are based on.
Quoting SEP: Feminist philosophy of language
For me, this kind of discussion is useful to explore contemporary issues. Of practical concern.
I think it also relates to that perpendicular pronoun ...the I that he referred to:
Quoting Banno
Although I thought the I in question was more laid back than that.
Would he prefer a 'we'...
I'm aware this topic enters into the whole realism vs anti-realism debate. I would still be careful in saying that the stuff posited by science is a metaphysical entity. We can of course debate if science is metaphysics or not. One can make a case that part of science is metaphysics, sure. But I wouldn't tell the physicist that I have special knowledge regarding his field.
Quoting Gnomon
I largely agree on your last point here. Matter looks and feels substantial to us, which it is. But at bottom, it isn't. So we have two views on the nature of matter, our common sense conception of regarding tables and chairs and then we have what physics tells us about matter. This brings forth epistemological consideration on top of metaphysical ones.
Quoting Amity
It can be dense. And many aspects of Wittgenstein are difficult too. Nevertheless going back to Thomas Reid, one can see him discussing similar topics as Wittgenstein develops later on, in a pretty straightforward manner.
Also, listening or reading Chomsky's non-technical work and Bertrand Russell on many topics not limited to language, are useful in this regard. For philosophical matters, philosophy of language need not go beyond trying to be careful and clear and to not get stuck on a word or a phrase.
Wittgenstein says this nicely: "A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably." This can be interpreted in many ways, I take it to mean that we should avoid being held captive if we do not proceed with the way we are phrasing and/or thinking about a question.
Quoting Amity
Sure, there's truth in that. In Spanish we have pronouns for objects, which is weird if you think about it. In French too. I don't know how different my experience of the world is in one language vs another.
Quoting SEP: Feminist philosophy of language
Yes, when it comes to power, the issue of gender is clear-er to see.
And we've seen examples of phrases such as "Black Lives Matter" or "#MeToo", which have been quite useful in changing aspects of the society.
The mind body problem is not just some people making associations with matter and "unthinking stuff". If that's all there was to it, the problem would have dissolved a long time ago. It is an inquiry into how two seemingly unrelated domains, matter and thought, are related. This is about as unlinguistic a metaphysical question as you can get.
However, questions of identity are in fact a perfect example of a linguistic question posing as metaphysical. Whether John's cremated body "is" or "isn't" the same as the once living one is entirely up to language and convention. Some languages and cultures may say yes, some no. Others may call John different after he had a stroke. There is simply no ontology which dictates the boundaries of words. These boundaries are ultimately human contrivances.
At least, the above is a plausible approach to tackling the problem, and is a good example of a metaphysical problem being attacked as merely linguistic.
My example was bound to be controversial. I don't think I could come up with an uncontroversial example. I think you said it: "seemingly unrelated" - they seem unrelated. It doesn't follow that they are unrelated. Action at a distance looked seemingly unrelated to matter, or so Newton thought when he discovered it.
I should point out, by way of clarification that by saying a problem is linguistic, I don't mean to say that you are using words is a "merely" incorrect manner. The words we use have the content we give them. In this respect, it is thought that "matter" does not appear to have the properties of thinking.
If one takes this to be a property of the thing we refer to when we use the word "matter", then of course problems will arise such that the "mind body problem" arise, phrased in this manner. I think Newton showed - as Chomsky pointed out - that we have no conception of "body" anymore.
So word-use is related to thinking, and this plays a huge role in any question we phrase. But if we change the association of the word, the problem may appear in a new light.
There is a lot of content to this debate which is not a matter of "mere" words, such as the problem of consciousness, or the problem of matter, etc.
Quoting hypericin
Sure. "John" is after all a mental construction which we project on a specific person. In this respect it's an ontology of everyday life, I think, which includes trees, rivers and so forth, but does not include atoms or chlorophyll. These latter components don't appear to us in everyday life absent certain equipment to detect or interact with them.
But it is still an important issue. As in if John has a stroke and doesn't behave or think at all as he used to, we'd say he's a different person. What do we do if the John prior to the stroke committed a crime but his trial is to occur after the stroke?
Should we punish post-stoke John?
Wittgenstein is another one I have trouble with.
However, I do appreciate this quote - very much - and would like to know more about it - source ?
It speaks to me of a way we are held - our minds fettered - by ourselves and not thinking outside our own bubble or experience of life.
A narrowness of sticking to a particular narrative, perhaps not of our own making. And not realising why or the potential consequences/implications.
Acceptance of repeated traditional ideas of what it means to be an X or Y. A reluctance to embrace the new as we evolve or progress. The difficulties of examining who we really are...and what we do about it...change or stay safe...how much freedom do we have...
From previous thread:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/544094
Quoting Banno
Grateful to @Banno for recommendations, as requested by @Tom Storm.
Quoting Tom Storm
The Aeon chucklehead article by Nakul Krishna, edited by Nigel Warburton is an easy read.
This excerpt - shows the benefit of repeating questions to clarify philosophical density:
Quoting Aeon essay on J.L. Austin My bolds.
Thinking about what we mean.
He is difficult for everybody. It's just that some people spend more time with him and likely understand him better. I am not one of those. The good thing about him, on the other hand, is that since his phrases are so open to interpretation, you just defend what you think it means. Even Russell misunderstood some of Wittgenstein.
I believe this is from his Philosophical Investigations (115). I don't recall that passage myself. I first discovered it in the works of Raymond Tallis. I think his Why The Mind is Not a Computer is a good exercise in philosophy of language. You don't need to agree with him on many things, or even most things, to get value out of what he's doing.
But unfortunately, I cannot find it for free online. All I can see is parts of the introduction, which is not where the philosophy of language aspect can be most appreciated...
Quoting Amity
Thanks for the source. :ok:
Sure it's quite useful, but if we go down that road of "what do you mean by X" too deeply, we end up yelling about a tree we're pointing at or about the colour of an apple.
Yes, Banno clearly knows this topic very well.
Actually, the Jimmy Neutron purple flurp was plagiarized. The one I was referring to came from Cracker Jack commercials in the 60s.
DO you lose weight when you go to sleep?
Quoting Manuel
Can you explain this distinction to me? Are mental entities things like desires or beliefs?
I believe so. The more time passes the more calories you lose. I don't see the connection.
Quoting Banno
It's complex in details, or at least Sellar's account of it is not always an example of clarity. From what I gather, the manifest image is the image we construct of the world in our daily life.
The computer you are typing on or the tree you may see outside your window, or the sun rising in the east: that's all manifest reality. It includes such things like getting in a car and driving to work or opening a fridge, etc.
As I understand it, the manifest image is also modified as time goes on. We no longer think that the Earth is the center of the universe nor that poking holes in our heads helps with diseases.
The scientific image is the image of the world as seen in science. In this aspect of the world we study the role that particles play in vision or how heat consists of molecules moving around at a faster rate.
This world is one in which the Earth goes around the sun. And so on with many scientific facts, which are generally hidden from us in our daily lives.
To give an account of mental entities is far too difficult. I can only say very general things. Are desires mental entities? Sometimes I guess, but I suspect most of the time we aren't aware of all our desires.
Beliefs are problematic, they carry religious connotations and even if we use it in a technical manner, I don't think we get entirely away from that aspect of the word.
Having said that, some beliefs can be made explicit, as when I'm asked whether I believe that global warming is a very serious threat or if you ask whether I "believe" that blue is prettier than pink. When it's explicit, its mental.
But at any single instance I have hundreds, if not thousands of beliefs. These can't be all be mental simultaneously, I could not possibly consciously entertain all my beliefs in a single instance.
But I don't know Sellers.
The notion that belief is inseparable from religion strikes me as an intellectual impediment. A belief is simply a statement held to be true.
The concept of a laptop is in your head, but not the object you are typing on, that's in the world.
It carries some connotation related to faith. I don't actually believe that when I get up I'll melt through the floor, I understand that I wont. "Understanding" does not have that connotation, for example, nor does "comprehend".
Or to be more specific, it's so extremely improbable that it isn't worth taking into serious consideration.
Material stuff is matter - hence the name.
Matter has mass. That's effectively the definition of what matter is, in physics.
If mind is matter, and consciousness is mind, then when one is unconscious, one ought be lighter, because one would lack the mass of one's mind.
Is it? What sort of thing is a concept?
One cannot type on a concept-of-laptop; one types on a laptop. If "manifest reality" includes a concept-of-laptop, then it's not the sort of thing we would usually call real, when we talk about reality in comparison to ideas. That is, the concept-of-laptop is not a real laptop, because one cannot type on it.
[quote=Feser]As Aristotelians and Thomists use the term, intellect is that faculty by which we grasp abstract concepts (like the concepts man and mortal), put them together into judgments (like the judgment that all men are mortal), and reason logically from one judgment to another (as when we reason from all men are mortal and Socrates is a man to the conclusion that Socrates is mortal). It is to be distinguished from imagination, the faculty by which we form mental images and from sensation, the faculty by which we perceive the goings on in the external material world and the internal world of the body.[/quote]
Ah, got it. Thanks.
I've been miss-speaking, which is why talking to people like you is good for me. I should use the word "physical stuff" instead of matter. Physical stuff includes things that have no mass. But this still leaves me unclear on something:
I don't know of what evidence could count for the claim that mind has no mass.
Quoting Banno
That's really hard. A concept is something like a kind of categorization we give to objects in the world.
Quoting Banno
I agree. But if you didn't have the concept of a laptop, you wouldn't know you have one in front of you.
I know what it tis to grasp a laptop.
You see, as I've said before, I don't think there is anything more to "the concept of a laptop" than the ability to talk about and use a laptop.
And it would follow that Quoting Manuel is not quite right, since the capacity to talk about and use laptops presupposes laptops to be talked about and used, and laptops are not in heads.
Spot on. Mass and mind do not seem to be related in this way. As if we could measure the mass of your love for your mother.
Talk of mass does not fit talk of mind.
I think that laptops were designed by a person before he had the physical object in the world. So there was no laptop prior to the first one.
Computers are entirely reliant on conceptual analysis - binary data processing, high-level languages, machine code, transistors - developed over many decades and the intellectual efforts of millions of people.
Besides, the point of the post you're commenting on, is differentiating concepts from imagination and sensation, which I say is a useful distinction even for you.
Stated like this, I don't have a problem.
Only one last question on this topic: would you say the mind is made of physical stuff?
Ah, but if you didn't have the concept, what is it that you would be missing?
I suppose it would be the ability to talk about and use the laptop as a laptop.
You might still se it as something to hold up the table leg to stop it wobbling.
Well, I don't know of any cases of disembodied minds, if that's what you are asking -- although there are many folk who claim there are such things, their examples strike me as wishful thinking.
I'd say certainty rather than faith. That serves to step away from the hegemony of religion.
They are also reliant on refined sand. Your point?
Quoting Wayfarer
Seems to me an account of concepts as use does exactly that.
Here we entirely agree. :up:
Quoting Banno
Fair enough.
Quoting Banno
If we didn't have a concept of a laptop, we couldn't come up with it in the first place.
What was the person who was thinking about laptops doing before he/she/they set up to build one?
Sure. There is a history to the concept, going back tot he abacus.
Indeed, this is part of the reason for rejecting the subjective notion of concept; A the concept of laptop is not in your head alone, but in the heads of those around you, as well as embedded in the world in which you live and it's history.
But there are folk who insist that the concept is just a thing in your mind alone. Nothing could be more wrong.
Think carefully about that. The same applies to everything else of which you conceive. If it is true, then we have no explanation for how we might learn anything.
And yet we do learn.
SO it seems something has gone astray.
I have thought about it and I agree with the first part.
Putting aside things like facts in history and the like, I don't think we learn things. Rather they grow in each species: we don't learn puberty, or learn how to see, we grow and are able to see or reach puberty.
I think innate ideas are facts about human beings. How it happens is baffling and I couldn't explain it. But I think it's true.
Quoting Manuel
You did learn to count.
That you should type your replies into refined sand, as it probably wouldn't make a difference.
Someone pointed out some very basic notions of counting, such that 1+1 = 2. But nobody was taught how to count all the numbers we can count. There isn't enough time in this world for that.
One learns counting by doing; pass me three block, tell me how many red ribbons there are; do you have as many lollies as she does...
Learning to count is not learning a thing, but learning a performance. It's not just memorising "1+1=2", it's knowing what to do with 1+1=2, and how to do similar things in other cases: "4-3=1", and you have three more lollies than I do.
The concept -if it is anything - is not a thing in the head, but a capacity to do stuff.
Edit: This is perhaps were @Wayfarer and others go astray, in my opinion. Perhaps Wayfarer tries to build an understanding from a misguided image of subjective stuff in his own head. This notion of mental furniture is as pernicious as it is ubiquitous. Blame Descartes.
Quoting Banno
You need a concept to recognize an object as being X= laptop, tree, etc.
One can know a lot about how to fix an a car, but have no idea how the thing works.
So tell me something, any updates at all regarding more literature on innate ideas?
I'm now going to the pragmatists, but they don't say much about it that I've found. Perhaps obscurely in Peirce, but not much.
Sorry about the mess in replies, there are several posts on different topics with you and I lost the order, hah. I too have gone astray here on subjective states because I think we have them.
I think Wayfarer is correct. But if he doesn't convince you, nor others, I don't think I'd be able to, honestly.
I was going to quote a snippet from Jacques Maritain. Of course, Maritain has an enormous literature, and I'll freely admit barely having skimmed the surface. But he's one of the neo-Thomists I have in mind. The following is from one of his essays making the case for the knowledge of universals. As such, it's a lecture in real metaphysics, in that it analyses the importance of the idea of universals, and then how we are impoverished by the lack of the understanding of the faculty which grasps them.
[quote=Jacques Maritain, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism;https://maritain.nd.edu/jmc/jm0112.htm]
For empiricism there is no essential difference between the intellect and the senses. The fact which obliges a correct theory of knowledge to recognize this essential difference is simply disregarded. What fact? The fact that the human intellect grasps, first in a most indeterminate manner, then more and more distinctly, certain sets of intelligible features -- that is, natures, say, the human nature -- which exist in the real as identical with individuals, with Peter or John for instance, but which are universal in the mind and presented to it as universal objects, positively one (within the mind) and common to an infinity of singular things (in the real).
Thanks to the association of particular images and recollections, a dog reacts in a similar manner to the similar particular impressions his eyes or his nose receive from this thing we call a piece of sugar or this thing we call an intruder; he does not know what is sugar or what is intruder. He plays, he lives in his affective and motor functions, or rather he is put into motion by the similarities which exist between things of the same kind; he does not see the similarity, the common features as such. What is lacking is the flash of intelligibility; he has no ear for the intelligible meaning. He has not the idea or the concept of the thing he knows, that is, from which he receives sensory impressions; his knowledge remains immersed in the subjectivity of his own feelings -- only in man, with the universal idea, does knowledge achieve objectivity. And his field of knowledge is strictly limited: only the universal idea sets free -- in man -- the potential infinity of knowledge.
Such are the basic facts which Empiricism ignores, and in the disregard of which it undertakes to philosophize. The logical implications are: first, a nominalistic theory of ideas, destructive of what ideas are in reality; and second, a sensualist notion of intelligence, destructive of the essential activity of intelligence. In the Empiricist view, intelligence does not see, for only the object or content seen in knowledge is the sense object. In the Empiricist view, intelligence does not see in its ideative function -- there are not, drawn form the senses through the activity of the intellect itself, supra-singular or supra-sensual, universal intelligible natures seen by the intellect in and through the concepts it engenders by illuminating images. Intelligence does not see in its function of judgment -- there are not intuitively grasped, universal intelligible principles (say, the principle of identity, or the principle of causality) in which the necessary connection between two concepts is immediately seen by the intellect. Intelligence does not see in its reasoning function -- there is in the reasoning no transfer of light or intuition, no essentially supra-sensual logical operation which causes the intellect to see the truth of the conclusion by virtue of what is seen in the premises. Everything boils down, in the operations, or rather in the passive mechanisms of intelligence, to a blind concatenation, sorting and refinement of the images, associated representations, habit-produced expectations which are at play in sense-knowledge, under the guidance of affective or practical values and interests. No wonder that in the Empiricist vocabulary, such words as 'evidence', 'the human understanding', 'the human mind', 'reason', 'thought', 'truth', etc., which one cannot help using, have reached a state of meaningless vagueness and confusion that makes philosophers use them as if by virtue of some unphilosophical concession to the common human language, and with a hidden feeling of guilt.[/quote]
As argued, if this were so we would never learn; we would require the concept in order to recognise the concept.
So that's wrong.
Fantastic. Many thanks. I'm going to have to read that essay now. :cheer:
Quoting Banno
I don't see the need for an infinite regress. We just need the concept and then the thing. Not a concept of a concept.
Sure, I could be wrong.
But you said:
Quoting Manuel
...as if you had to have the concept "laptop" before you encountered a laptop or hear anything about it.
You can't see the problem there?
Quoting Banno
The person who first thought of an abacus had to have an idea of what it would be before he finalized it. He may have been playing with pebbles or sticks, but he/she got the idea to create an abacus. There was none prior to that, I'd think.
Yes, it is a massive problem. With very, very little contact with objects (sometimes with no contact at all) , we come up with concepts. It is crazy. I just happen to think it's true. I can't explain it, as I said.
As if the abacus emerged perfect and complete from the mind of one individual. No, it emerged over time, through many iterations, and across more than one mind. It was a process, not a miracle.
The picture holds you enthralled.
Cheers. Thanks for the chat.
Thank you.
You were heading in the right direction. Or at least heading in the same direction I already went.
That's the amazing thing about a priori. Seems to me a lot of people take it for granted, or explain it away. But according to traditional philosophy, it's because the intellect (nous) comes pre-loaded with at least some ideas. Of course that's a no-no for empiricism, strictly Tabula Rasa in their book. But I think Chomsky's Universal Grammar is at least suggestive of something similar.
I'm aware that you know Kant well, other people told me this and I've since verified it. I don't expect agreement in many aspects on these topics, how could I, we all think differently to some extent.
And although we may agree on, say, 80% of the topics covered, it's that 20% or so that we focus on or make a big deal about.
In any case, I'm assuming you want to add something I missed or correct a mistake in my general argument?
Yes.
I think that there is not much difference between science and magic, for example. Sure, someone will say "we understand science", magic doesn't exist.
What's crazier that we can assemble parts of matter to create a laptop or that we can make a card look like it disappeared from thin air?
Not being scientisitc, the point is that I think those that deny the a-priori don't seem to me to be surprised enough about the phenomena of existence. But innatism should not be controversial, the fact that it is shows that empiricism in psychology, in modified form, is still the dominant view.
(Actually I remember well my very first lecture in philosophy of science. The lecturer mentioned an anecdote concerning a group of scholastic monastics arguing about how many teeth horses have. They all scuttled off to check Aristotle in the library, but found this item wasn't there. So they declared it was something that couldn't be known, and utterly bollocksed one of their number who suggested that they go look at an actual horse.)
Another good lecture on all of this is Lloyd Gerson, Platonism vs Naturalism. You can find the pdf here and even a Youtube video of him delivering it as a lecture here. Gerson is regarded as one of the pre-eminent authorities on Plato and Aristotle.
There's much more to reality that highlighting one aspect alone. Granted, physics is quite amazing and if not the, then its among the most important ideas we've discovered as a species. Having said that, to say that the mental isn't something real - meaning existing, is so irrational, it's hard to even comment about it.
Yes we can say this is a consequence of empiricist thinking and the like, but Locke and Hume would've never dreamed of denying experience. In many aspects, they were quite sophisticated, even if the view they took on the mind was mistaken.
I agree that some ideas are real. How this cashes out more precisely is extremely difficult to elucidate, because it seems to me that we cannot do metaphysics without very important epistemological input.
Why should we be able to ask these questions, discuss them and on rare occasion answer them, as happens sometimes in science, is amazing. It doesn't even have survival value, as far as I can see.
Aristotle is someone I've yet to work on. Thanks for the source, much appreciated. :up:
Coming to metaphysics, I'll focus on existence because both it's the core idea of metaphyics and I'm just beginning to get acquainted with it.
To the extent that I'm aware there seems to be a huge controversy on the issue of what kinda things exist and what kinda things don't. Some claim that abstract objects like numbers exist and others disagree. The debate on the existence of numbers is an authentic one iff the word "exist" is used consistently i.e. the word must be semantically constant (same meaning); otherwise, it's just another case of two sides talking past each other.
The question then is, does "exist" mean the same thing in the two sentences below,
1. Stones exist
2. Numbers exist or don't exist
In the exchange of arguments between mathematical realists and their opponents (mathematical antirealists), I noticed that when the former claims that numbers exist, they don't mean it in the same sense that stones exist but when the latter rejects the claim that numbers exist they mean it in the sense that stones exist. A textbook case of fallacy of equivocation - ambiguity in the meaning of "exist" is to blame.
N.B. This is just a very superficial analysis of the role language plays in generating, perpetuating, and further complicating philosophical confusion. Perhaps if one digs a little deeper than I have here, the confusion may resolve into crystal clarity either because language and philosophy are connected in a profoundly interesting way or because there is no such relationship and philosophers can get back to what they were doing before the question arose with one less thing to worry about.
Reply to this from @Banno:
Quoting Banno
Re: ignoring as a response choice. It is not one I chose. Indeed, the very opposite. I posted further responses which appear to have been ignored by yourself but not by @Manuel.
To ignore or not to ignore ? What, who or why ?
What does the act of ignoring signify ?
It is a nothing or something response.
A non-verbal speech-act, a positive communicative act...
How do we determine how 'ignoring' is to be interpreted ?
Possibly by context - previous experience or knowledge of the person.
How to react to someone's suggestion that if you don't like, ignore it...
It is hardly ever a case of 'simply' - ignoring has a bit more complexity.
It can have an effect on a person's self-respect. Depending.
That is sometimes what the ignorer wishes.
The silent treatment - words unspoken - can mean so much, or not.
On a forum, it is easy to miss a post, not to participate in an issue, or not communicate with a person for various reasons. Sometimes an apparent 'ignoring' is not worth losing any sleep over. Other times it can be worth pursuing.
My response to the questions raised by yourself and @Manuel was a positive one.
I engaged even though, or because, I had little to no knowledge in the issues.
And wanted to find out more.
I chose not to ignore. But you knew that.
Nahhhh. You “took up arms in a sea of troubles” so up to you to suffer the “slings and arrows of outrageous fortune”.
Still, it would seem you had your dialectical legs kicked out from under you from the very beginning, for not establishing the legitimacy of the domain, prior to inquiring about the possibility of legitimate questions arising from it. And because of that, as soon as laptops and sundry post hoc ergo propter hoc foolishness writ large in language philosophy entered the field, the war was lost.
The whole idea of this thread was prompted by a suggestion made by Banno. He seemed to be implying that a lot of these questions are due to a confusion in language: free will, mind and the like are problems which can be seen correctly or dissolved once you properly analyze the propositions and words used.
So if someone's approach is philosophy of language, then I'll engage with the topic in a manner in which a person thinks it makes sense to talk about these issues. However there was bound to be some disagreement quite soon given the nature of different personal dispositions.
You are correct that I did not manage to specify the field in question in a sufficiently clear manner such that it can be seen as legitimate. Then again, besides mentioning some of the topics that go into the field called "metaphysics", I don't know how else to formulate the topic.
You did specify the field, in your response to . But all that does is presuppose that to which the field belongs, but says nothing about what that entails.
Quoting Manuel
The historical precedent for formulation of anything, always begins by proving the possibility of it. If successful, its possibility is always followed by proving its necessity.
Exacting criteria, to be sure, but hey.......you brought it up, so the onus is on you.
Good luck!!!
I think that metaphysics is about the world and relies on experience. I think its task it provide a general framework on how to think about the world: how it makes sense to divide it up and think about its many aspects. This unorthodox view on the field means that some of the traditional question of metaphysics, that of identity or of the nature of the self and others are more correctly thought of as epistemic questions as these pertain more to our understanding than it does the world.
Then again, this distinction may be misleading, as almost everything we analyze about the world is analyzed by us, and not some Martian.
If we don't do metaphysics, meaning analyze the various aspects of the world, we end up with bad metaphysics: everything is only particles or fields. But that doesn't reflect our living in the world or the complexity involved in our interactions with it.
In any case, so as to not take up more space here if not to reply to something, I'll post a very good article on metaphysics and how one could think about it in contemporary times.
The project is called "Innocent Realism" by Susan Haack:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/305505412_THE_WORLD_ACCORDING_TO_INNOCENT_REALISM_THE_ONE_AND_THE_MANY_THE_REAL_AND_THE_IMAGINARY_THE_NATURAL_AND_THE_SOCIAL_2016
It was not the intent of my post to imply that Philosophers have "special knowledge" that Scientists don't. Just the opposite : I was noting that when scientists theorize and speculate about topics with no empirical evidence, they are crossing over into the purview of Philosophy. Experimental scientists are doing highly specialized & technical work. But when Theoretical scientists, such as Einstein, use their imagination to "see" things that are not visible to the senses, they are actually practicing Philosophy, Someone once asked Einstein where his lab was, and he held-up a pencil.
There's nothing "special" or "technical" about imagination, except that some choose to focus their imagination on questions that were heretofore inaccessible to the physical tools of Science. For example, when Maxwell proposed the existence of an invisible and counterintuitive "field", to explain the weirdness of electromagnetism, he was practicing Philosophical Meta-physics. Today, we are accustomed to the concept of "fields", even though we have never seen one. What we observe are the effects of the field on certain kinds of matter, such as iron filings. We "see" those fields with the inner "eye" of imagination.
For many years, most scientists believed that studying Consciousness, was a silly philosophical pursuit, and not worthy of the time for serious scientists. That's because, they viewed Mind-stuff as Metaphysical, not physical -- hence not Real. But today, plenty of Neurologists and Physicists are beginning to take Consciousness seriously. They are not practicing "anti-realism", but merely expanding our definition of what's real. :nerd:
Quoting Manuel
Yes. Quantum physics opened a can-of-worms for Materialists. They expected to find hard little Atoms at the foundation of reality. Instead, they found fuzzy mathematical Probabilities. Quantum theories defy commonsense, but seem to work well with mathematical logic. Maybe that's why Mathematicians are more likely to accept Metaphysics as a serious occupation, because they are acutely aware that the objects of their calculations do not exist in the Real Material world, but only as Ideas in the immaterial Mind. :cool:
Mathematical Metaphysics :
Platonism about mathematics (or mathematical platonism) is the metaphysical view that there are abstract mathematical objects whose existence is independent of us and our language, thought, and practices.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism-mathematics/
Peirce divided metaphysics into (1) ontology or general metaphysics, (2) psychical or religious metaphysics, and (3) physical metaphysics.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Outline_of_metaphysics
Note -- Quantum Physics probably falls into the category of Physical Metaphysics
Meta-Physics :
4. Physics refers to the things we perceive with the eye of the body. Meta-physics refers to the things we conceive with the eye of the mind. Meta-physics includes the properties, and qualities, and functions that make a thing what it is. Matter is just the clay from which a thing is made. Meta-physics is the design (form, purpose); physics is the product (shape, action). The act of creation brings an ideal design into actual existence. The design concept is the “formal” cause of the thing designed.
http://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page14.html
Analysis of language is indeed a legitimate topic for philosophy. But if that language is too specific & reductive, we soon lose the general & holistic meaning of the words. I just came across this quote, which seems to reveal the Achilles Heel of the "linguistic turn" in Postmodern philosophy. :smile:
"Yet again, the detailed technical discussions about the theoretical concepts threaten to become postmodern narratives, where meaning, clarity, and understanding is at stake."
James Glattfelder, mathematician
--- referring to pro & con arguments about the mathematical & metaphysical theory of Consciousness, known as "Integrated Information Theory" (IIT)
Sure. I'd imagine that if we were miniscule creatures we could see these fields, that's what I imagine a commitment to some kind of realism entails, which is not inconsistent with some strands of idealism. All this depends on the meaning of each word and for what domain this idea is applied: I can be an idealist about tree and rivers, but think that particles aren't entirely dependent on me, though the way we apprehend them does depend on us.
Quoting Gnomon
That's sounds legitimate to me.
Quoting Gnomon
Though Peirce kept coming back to his categories of firstness, secondness and thirdness. He was a genius of the highest order, no doubt about it. But his ontological project expressed in these terms are quite obscure, or rather, I don't "get" why he needs these three categories as opposed to two. He stresses the simplicity of them, I don't see it yet.
Quoting Gnomon
Perhaps. It would need epistemology too. The distinction between what we see and what we see in our minds eye is not that straightforward to me. Though I see were you are coming from, in the case of math for example.
Quoting Gnomon
Absolutely. It becomes talk about talk, instead of talk about the world or what we take to be the world.
That's also look legitimate to me, perhaps even central.
Quine I believe does not like this solution, but we can speak of "real" and "existent" as separate but related concepts. Existence refers to things in the world, real to almost anything. Thus there are real fictional characters, such as Frodo but he doesn't exist in the world. But there can be fake fictional Characters such as Fred, who I just made up and is not in any novel.
On this view, one suggested by Haack, real is to be contrasted with fictional.
Existence is thus slimmed down somewhat, but continues to be very complicated.
[quote=180 Proof's Prolegomena for the Fourfold Root of Insufficient Reason]0. The Real – the ineluctable, encompassing horizon (that exhausts – exceeds – categories, concepts, symbolic systems (e.g. randomness, void)). See nonbeing, nonduality, nonlocality.
1. Reality – the ground, including logical / phase-spaces (i.e. reason), encompassed. See being, multiplicity.
2. Existence – maze-paths along the ground (i.e. transformations through logical / phase-space) ... ever-approaching but never arriving at the horizon. See dasein, event, locality.
3. Fiction – untaken, circular or virtual paths. See illusion-duality (i.e. risk/uncertainty), agency-misery.[/quote]
Soon in fine bookstores everywhere. :smirk:
It's not real, it's a fake.
It's not real, it's a forgery.
It's not real, it's a toy.
It's not real, it's a hologram.
It's not real, it's a mirage.
"Real' gains traction only in a particular contrast.
A metaphysical speculation that attempts to use the word without such a particular context fails to gain traction.
Hmmm. Sounds like a process philosophy of sorts.
I'd be interested in looking at that book. :cool:
Quoting Banno
That looks likely.
Then by definition illusions are fake.
What would you do with fiction then? Just leave it at fiction?
Not Whiteheadian (or Bergsonian) in the least as far as I can tell. I take Spinoza, Zapffe, Wittgenstein, Cioran, Jaspers, Camus, Haack, Rosset, Meillassoux-Brassier ... as modern influences. :wink:
I have no problems with 3 of the 4 categorizations you've given. The first one, or "0" is the one that I'm unclear of, which one of those mentioned would approximate your conception of what's real?
:up:
But only probabilities can be given, with respect to the objects of physics. And as for ‘X’, that is a symbol, whose reality is only fixed by convention.
Identity seems to rely on differentiation. How do we differentiate one thing from another? Take the example you used: John is a human being; how is John differentiated from the environment and from others? Like all humans, animals, trees and other objects, John is visually and tactilely bounded by his external surface; which in John's case is his skin. John also looks more or less the same through all the changes he will undergo from birth to death, and identical from one moment to the next.
Becoming obese will expand the surface of his skin and change its configurations; but John will probably still be recognizable as John. Being in a coma may change his appearance somewhat, but he will still be recognizable as John, as that unique individual different from all others (unless he has an identical twin in which case we may have to rely on John or his twin to do the identifying). If John is terribly burned or otherwise disfigured he may become unrecognizable, but measurements or DNA testing could still establish his unique identity. John's ashes are not really John, but are just John's ashes; the remains of his body after cremation.
This all seems very clear and unproblematic to me so I want to ask where do you think the problem of identity lies?
I think that we recognize objects via something called "psychic continuity", similar I suppose to object permanence. That is, we have some conception of John, such that it would be true that he can go through several radical changes and still be John.
But a blow to the head may alter his personality and way of behaving in such a manner that although the name of that person is still "John", he is not the "John" we have in mind, when we usually talk about him. His DNA will be the same, but a radical change in behavior will cause us to consider them for all intent and purposes a different person.
Or take the story in which a witch turns a prince into a frog. We still know he's the prince, even if he's a different species. And similar stories. It doesn't matter much what the physical configuration of the person is, it matters that we conceive of them as being John (or Mary), etc.
Sure, but we know that it was John who received the blow to the head, so we still think, and speak, of him as being himself in that sense. In another sense, or way of speaking, he is no longer himself, but those different senses do not constitute any contradiction.
The fictional notion that a Prince might be transformed into a frog is another (modal) way of thinking and speaking again; I think it comes down to naming, and it leads to the idea of rigid designators and possible worlds in modern analytic philosophy.
Are you familiar with Kripke? Although I don't wholly agree with his idea of rigid designation (if it is taken to supercede the idea of definite description, since it seems to me that to know what or who we are referring to, we are necessarily reliant on definite descriptions, even if those descriptions are inaccurate) there is, I think, much to be said for the idea.
Sure. I wasn't intending to imply a contradiction. I suppose it's a bit of paradox if you will.
Yes, I'm familiar with Kripke to an extent. I do think rigid designators are true in science if our scientific theories are correct, that is the name we use for the entities postulated match, or form a correspondence. So if I say that Alpha Centauri is 4.36 light years away, the name and the numbers of that statement apply to the world.
Outside of science, I don't think this is the case. That is we can use words to refer, but it's not necessary, we use words all the time without referring to specific things in the world.
At least that's how I think of the topic.
I'm not sure I'd even see it as a paradox, but just as different ways of thinking.
Quoting Manuel
I'm not that sure what you mean here. Do you mean that we often speak in generalities? If proper nouns or names, like John, refer to particular things, then nouns or general terms like 'tree' 'cat' 'mountain' and so on refer to particular kinds of things. So, I don't see why those kinds of names can't be understood as rigid designators of particular kinds in a way analogous to how proper names are seen as rigid designators of particular entities.
True.
What also matters is 'What does it feel like to be 'John, Mary, etc' ?
Following Nagel and his 'What is it like to be a bat ?'.
We can ask:
'What does it feel like to be a...'
...woman, man, laptop, AI robot...?
How do we know the reality...
or best ways to think of and what it means to be human or not-quite-human ?
How can we ever know that it is true when people talk of their 'Love' ?
How can linguistic analysis help; can philosophy of language help resolve these kinds of questions ?
We can look up a dictionary for definitions - is that enough to know the meaning of the feeling ?
I've just finished reading Kazuo Ishiguro's 'Klara and the Sun'.
Set in a futuristic world it explores questions related to the sentience of a non-human, Klara.
This is an AF, an 'artificial' friend...not a 'real' one ? What is it to be a Friend ?
How does one 'become' a friend ?
Other issues - the types of love, Klara's belief about the power of the Sun to heal, the feelings and consequences of being in a different class. Amongst the humans - the 'lifted' apparently being superior to those not.
Compare what it is to be 'gifted'. A natural or 'real' talent v artificial or 'unreal' perfection.
Isn't everything real in some way or another, even in fiction which might just become a future reality.
Linguistic analysis can't resolve this kind of a question - I don't think that is what it is about.
It helps in other ways to drill down on some philosophical density as in Austin's previous example.
Thanks to @Banno for recommending the article:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/544398
Quoting Aeon essay on J.L. Austin
What does it feel like to be pouring out such thoughts on a laptop at 02.16hrs ?
Bloody crazy. You know what I mean ?
That's probably more accurate to what happens.
Quoting Janus
I don't think names refer. Nor do words actually. People refer, it's an act that people do. Sometimes people use words to refer, like me referring to the keyboard I'm using to type out these words.
I mean sure, you can say that we speak in generalities many times, if not most of the time. Look at most conversations, both written and spoken. How often do we refer to specific things? Not that it very rare, it's just that referring is a small part of everything else involved in language.
Quoting Amity
It's not dissimilar to what Hume thought about when he had a psychological breakdown:
"Where am I, or what? From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return? ... I am confounded with all these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable condition imaginable, environed with the deepest darkness, and utterly deprived of the use of every member and faculty.
Most fortunately it happens, that since Reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, Nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all these chimeras. I dine, I play a game of backgammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends. And when, after three or four hours' amusement, I would return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strained, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther.”
I think philosophy of language helps to clarify our thinking to others and most importantly, to ourselves. This in itself can be tremendously useful. Beyond that it surely can't resolve the question you pose, I don't think.
When we say words like "love", "hate", "joy", etc. we assume other people "like-me" will take that word and the meanings attached to it and interpret it in a way that approximates what I'm feeling. But we cannot know the other person will feel the way we actually feel. We simply cannot be precise enough to describe our emotions in many occasions.
So absolutely, philosophy of language has clear limits. I (believe) I know what you mean. :)
I think saying that it is people, not names, that refer is again, not a contradiction, but just a different way of speaking. People refer to things, to be sure, and one way they do it is by speaking; and speaking is referring by means of words. They also refer to kinds of things when they speak in generalities, and again I don't see why that should not be thought of as referring too.
The word 'John' by itself does not refer to any particular person, but it could be said to refer to all those who are so called. When the name is spoken with intent to refer to a particular person, then I think it is fair to say that it is the name that refers, or designates, or signifies; all of which amount to the same thing.
I'm not saying it's a contradiction. I think it's a fact that it's people who refer, not words themselves. I think we might be caught in a semantic quibble here.
What do you have in mind when you speak of "referring"?
I take reference in philosophy, a technical term, to mean a relation between the word uttered and a thing in the world.
The key for me, so far as my understanding of reference goes, is that the word I'm using must relate to something in the world. I don't think there has to be something in the world of which the word I'm using must "signal out" as it were.
I can speak of dragons or Planet 1234. There are no dragons in the world and there is no Planet 1234 anywhere, I just made it up. So I don't see a necessary word-object relation.
However, if you mean that by reference you have in mind an intended meaning or something like that. With this, I don't have any problems.
I think that words, at least nouns, do refer, denote, signify real or imagined things. So 'tree' refers to the conceived kind tree and 'dragon' refers to the mythical or imagined kind dragon. That is to say they are understood to so refer, so I am not suggesting any magical 'arrow' of reference beyond that. If they were not understood to so refer, we would not be able to communicate.
We can communicate with our gestures, our clothing, our way of walking, our facial expressions, our tone, etc.
We can also communicate with paintings, music, architecture, sculptures, etc.
No words are needed.
Most times yes, sure. I think there are specific circumstances that a song or a movie will communicate with you even more deeply than words ever could. At least that's been my experience on certain occasions.
The way you spoke of reference in your post prior to this one, is not one I have much issues with. So I think we're OK. :up:
I made a boo-boo. The corrected version is posted below for your consideration,
Quoting TheMadFool
My take on this matter of real, existence, unreal, nonexistence, fact, fiction is that what most philosophers think, assume, infer are mistakes in usage and application of words, products of alleged wooly thinking might infact point to something deeper. So, for instance, when somene and I chat about some "fictional" character such as Hercule Poirot, we do it with the same type and degree of emotions, gravity, interest, as we would if Hercule Poirot were a "real" person. At the moment we converse about Poirot, the lines between "fact" and "fiction" are blurred or even vanish. This, to most philosophers and psychiatrists, would be treated as confusion or delusional respectively. The question is, are they correct?
Quoting TheMadFool
Interesting thoughts and question.
I think most philosophers and psychiatrists ( unless quite mad themselves ) would know the difference between conversing about Poirot as a character - an illusion created by an author - and a delusion.
The only confusion or troublesome aspects would be when the character takes over your life in some extreme way. I think this is similar to those who follow soaps/films and identify the actor portraying e.g. a serial killer as actually being one.
The fact is that non/identification with a character is part and parcel of our own development when reading. This reality allows us to see from a different perspective, and so on...
This differs from academic literary criticism where - apparently - it was/is a taboo to talk about characters as if they are real. I am not sure this is correct:
Quoting The Point mag: Literary criticism and the existential turn
I think the act of reading - like listening to music - like doing philosophy - is or can be an immediately satisfying first-hand experience. Unlike the step back - the distance - where a critical analysis takes place. Both are valuable...but yes, it can get a bit 'mad' at times.
Quoting Guardian: Fictional characters - Experiential crossings
Gotta go now. Just hoping that my gardener doesn't think he is a 'Hannibal' of the Anthony Hopkins type.
"What's that you got in your hands - it looks sharp..." :scream:
"Not really" :naughty:
Not sure. A brain that has encoded information about its mother is obviously different from one that has not, a different configuration of neurons. This configuration is part of the state of the brain. Different states either have different energies (non-degenerate) or the same energies (degenerate). For small systems, it's not difficult to discern between different states in principle unless they are degenerate, and even then there's a means to break that degeneracy and figure out which state is _was_ (at least partly) in.
The brain isn't a small system but it's not obvious that the difference between the brain with a concept of its mother (some particular and ideosyncratic configuration) and without is undetectable *in principle*, even if it's technologically and ethical infeasible to do so.
Quoting Jack Cummins
That's interesting (as is this whole thread). I think I agree with this. I'm probably biased against metaphysics and theology in part because of the reaction of acolytes of both to science: belief, intuition, preference and upbringing appear to be trying to compete with fact. Or, to put it another way, metaphysics studies the realm outside of physics rather than the realm outside of physical science's reach. I'm maybe guilty of the above too, not taking metaphysics sufficiently seriously because, at its best, it is not generally falsifiable or otherwise amenable to empirical testing.
That said, I'm also a bit biased against it because it tends to pose meaningless questions or questions with implicit unjustifiable assumptions, such as most of the examples given by the OP. (E.g. "Is reality fundamentally mental?" or the free will question, or the continuity of identity question which remains a question about language.)
It's an interesting question. I suppose you'd have to take into consideration the fact that fictional characters are created based on traits that real people have. And novels, for instance, allow you to get into someone else's head for a while, so you live a similar experience to the characters you are reading. But I don't think the difference between fact and fiction is nearly as strong as is sometimes believed.
There's also the curious aspects of many myths. I assume such stories are told more or less accurately, but as hundreds if not thousands of years go on, aspects of the story become exaggerated to the point were there maybe very little if anything is such myths, which is a true description of events. I have in mind national myths and ancient folklore and the like.
The defining context for "metaphysical speculation" is the contrast between Subjective and Objective Reality. Those who label metaphysical topics as "illusion, fake, forgery, toy, hologram, mirage" tend to devalue non-empirical subjective concepts, even though our subjective worldview is all we ever know for sure. Everything else is "physical speculation", based on "appearances". Hence, objective truth is essentially the majority opinion of experts in any field. We know that something exists independently of subjective minds, by popular vote. Most of us don't see ghosts, so they are merely metaphysical, and not real. Don't you agree? :smile:
Does objective reality exist? :
[i]Subjective reality means that something is actual depending on the mind.
Objective reality means that something is actual (so it exists) independent of the mind.[/i]
https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Does_objective_reality_exist%3F
So You Think Humans Can’t Know Objective Reality :
[i]Our beliefs are based on appearances but are supposed to be about something — reality — that transcends appearances. . . .
Something in us will always influence the resulting picture.[/i]
https://medium.com/the-understanding-project/so-you-think-humans-cant-know-objective-reality-e609346c2682
Nothing to do with Dennett's "Quining Qualia"
Chinese Whispers [No offense intended, Chinese people]
This is probably off-topic and there's a risk that your thread might be derailed but, since you seem to be interested, I'll offer a hypothesis regarding so-called myths and the impression that people have about them being hyperbole.
To the extent that I'm aware, the theory of evolution, vis-à-vis genetics, claims that genotypic and thus phenotypic variation in a species is greater in ancestral populations than in their descendants. In other words, considering myths seem to be about exaggerated abilities (giants, deformities, superstrength, superintelligence, etc. superpowers), there's a small but non-zero probability that such mythological beings were real people, flesh and blood although possessed of exceptional abilities. Over time, populations tend to become homogeneous and I suspect some of the superpowers got diluted and/or lost.
Also, there's an assumption that we make which is that homo sapiens thousands of years ago were more or less like us. This could be wrong. What if people back then were smaller, shorter, weaker, etc. than we are now? If this were true, any one of us, even weaklings [say Steve Rogers before he takes the serum] would be comparatively superhuman.
Another possibility is things might've been more than a little bit different back in the days of Hercules. What if gravity were weaker? A person would be able to leap great heights [Neil Armstrong on the moon], lift immense objects, do things now quite impossible. Of course, this would apply to everybody but just a slight difference in muscle mass could mean the difference between lifting a gigantic boulder and a humble rock.
Continuing along the same trajectory, heroes of the past could've been aliens from a more massive planet. Their bodies adapted to greater gravity would be capable of feats of strength no human could match [Neil Armstrong on the moon].
It's relative and it also depends on variations in the laws of nature.
Just sayin'
A fresh, unprejudiced perspective is supposed to be healthy, right? :grin:
I mean if you can incorporate this topic to Susan's Haack's "Innocent Realism", then the thread can stay of topic as it concerns the nature of reality and how it sometimes appears in parts. Thus a story may contain parts of it that are true - events that actually happened in the world, with events that did not happen, which would make it fictitious. And there may be exaggerations and so on.
I doubt that in such short periods of time, which for our history as a species is nothing, would show noticeable changes in gravity or any other fundamental force of nature. At least I haven't seen any evidence for it.
As for the other options, maybe. But given the fact that we can distort stories quite severely in a day, myths going back thousands of years are prone to be extremely exaggerated. I'm not saying that they couldn't contain some elements of truth in it, but the further back you go, the harder it is to believe in aspects of stories which by today's would be impossible.
So again, if you can keep the topic within a metaphysical framework, that is, covering one of the many aspects of metaphysics, then this can be discussed. But if that's not possible given what you want to expand on, then going to another thread would be better.
I was reading some of your replies, quite interesting. You work in/with quantum physics?
If you go through some of Russell's works such as The Analysis of Matter or An Outline of Philosophy, I think you could find some connections to metaphysics with sound scientific basis.
Precisely. The underlying assumption that leads to us thinking that stories of days past are myths i.e. are hyperbole/meiosis is that how it's now is how it was in in re factors relevant to actions/events that we suspect are exaggerations/understatements. On the face of it, this assumption might seem rather benign with respect to truth in that it doesn't distort veritas but then one only needs to compare the present (2021) with the past (say 3000 BC) to realize how wrong it is to think/assume that nothing relevant to the argument that stories/tales from long ago are simply myths can change.
Take the mutli-purpose, now ubiquitous cell phone complete with all the support infrastructure it needs, go back in time to 3000 BC [Pharoanic Egypt]. Wouldn't you, who did that, become a legendary sorceror, a hero even if you play your cards right? Your story, if it survives the test of time, would be treated as a myth in 2021 but you of all know it's the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. In short, to dismiss tales/stories from the ancient era as nothing but myths [veridically suspect] amounts to ignoring some possibilities, like the cell phone scenario above, that might very well have been true. I guess at some point those who study/read stories/tales of yore simply can't deal with the multitude of extremely complex possible scenarios that could be true and take the easy way out - just treat these narratives as myths, problem solved! Thus, in my humble opinion, we would be doing ourselves a great favor by reminding ourselves that the word "myth" is a synonym for "it was just too complex".
It must be mentioned that the above cell phone scenario is meant to just give you an idea of how what reality means can undergo radical modification depending on technology demonstration across different ages/time periods with the aid of time travel machines
There's another, far more interesting way with which myths can be...er...explained. Change in metaphysics itself i.e. change in fundamental substances, and the laws of nature (have I left anything out?) could greatly alter the landscape of the possible, impossible, probable, and improbable.
I mentioned that if gravity were weaker, superhuman feats would be child's play and if one factors in differences in muscle mass between individuals, a Hercules ("myth") is plausible.
How do myths, viewed with an open mind as I did above, matter to metaphysics?
There's no good reason at all to think the metaphysics of the past is identical to the metaphysics of the present or that the metaphysics of the present will remain constant as we enter a future age. After all, what we think are myths could have been, under my interpretation, facts; it's just that our present metaphysics doesn't support the storie/tales of our distant ancestors but the metaphysics back then might have.
So, for instance, consider the matter of human souls. Souls might've been real and there might've been plenty of evidence for them thousands of years ago. Over millennia, the metaphysics might've altered in such a way that souls became nonviable entities and disappeared [species have gone extinct when the environment transformed and became hostile to them (fossils)]. Thus, what was true in the past is false in the present.
As you will have realized by now, my objective is to raise doubts about the well-hidden assumption that the metaphysics of the world doesn't change. If the laws of nature, the fundamental substances, the fabric of reality can alter, and there seems to be no good reason why not, we have to radically change our approach to metaphysics, this change in perspective can be summed up as anything's possible! or if you prefer the negative formulation, nothing's impossible!.
I'll grab those, thanks :) In the meantime, anything in particular you had in mind (while I'm being a tad kinder to metaphysics than usual)?
In general that the "new physics", as it was when Russell wrote about these topics, renders the ideas of objects as not being tenable. He thought we should think of the world as being composed of "events". This "new physics" was also the final nail in the coffin of our idea of impenetrable matter, and "has become as ghostly as anything in a spiritualist séance."
This combined with his view on how little we know about psychology prompts him to say that we don't know if "the physical world is, or is not, different in intrinsic character from the world of mind".
That's a general outline. I assume that some of what he says is outdated, but he did interesting work.
Quoting TheMadFool
I mean, many myths are about how the world was made by Gods. Whether Amaterasu in Japan or Brahma in India, so sure these are complex. But these contain little factual truth.
On the other hand, Haack mentions the Legend of King Arthur. Some parts of that are based in history others not. But I tend to be of the mind that everything is quite complex. And absolutely taking cell phones back to the past would've been akin to magic or miracle.
Quoting TheMadFool
I'd only modify that but saying souls were approximations of what they thought was true. Now we much more accurate approximations, but we can translate the word "soul" in Plato or Descartes intelligibly in many instances.
Quoting TheMadFool
Clearly, it must if when we are trying to articulate metaphysics, we use the concepts and ideas of our time. And these must change, if our knowledge has changed. So it's likely that metaphysics is constantly changing itself. So we must rediscover or restate what it is, every so often. Peter Strawson argued for something like this in Individuals.
Thanks Manuel. I am sympathetic to the above. Less so to:
Quoting Manuel
Scientific progress rarely throws ideas in the bin. Science is self-correcting, which means that old ideas about matter (among other things) are iteratively adjusted on the basis of new findings. Traditional ideas of matter are still accounted for, however they are not fundamental. The laws of physics explain why your tabletop is hard, rigid, doesn't change its shape, doesn't allow your cup to pass through it. These are old ideas of matter, but while the theories about them change, our predicted everyday experiences don't.
I see a lot of discussion on here about the nature of the material world in modern physics. Traditional ideas had to be reworked here and the notion of the material world doesn't really help anymore. The rigidity of your tabletop is largely due to the property of electric charge: that's the important bit for discussing the material properties of your table. But in terms of celestial dynamics, charge isn't very important at all, rather mass is what's paramount. While most particles that have mass have charge, not all do (e.g. neutrinos), and on a more elementary level, other properties are far more important than mass.
For this reason, physicists tend to talk about the physical world rather than the material world. All of these headscratchers disappear when one moves from categories refined for describing everyday experience to categories refined for describing the universe generally at any scale.
In this sense, the notion of the material *world* (but not materials) has been dropped, but the concepts that notion is associated with have not. The everyday usefulness of the material world would be ambiguous to a modern physicist: the first thing they'd have to ask is what you mean? Are you asking about the properties of condensed matter, or the properties of the cosmos, or the properties of particles, if so all particles or just massive ones, or just charged ones? Do you care about the structure of atomic nuclei? The physical world is unambiguous: this covers all particles in the standard model, all universal constants, and spacetime, i.e. all the objects and parameters of quantum mechanics and general relativity.
Quoting Manuel
I'd have to read it, but this stinks of bias. I've never seen a logical argument for the primacy of mental content from physical considerations, and strikes me as driven by a preference for, rather than an understanding of, what the universe is fundamentally like. From what I do know of Russell, that seems unlikely.
Thanks again for the synopsis. My reading list is large!
Sure. I am not sure that I phrased the last part quite well. Russell was not giving primacy to the mind, I think he was highlighting our general ignorance of it. This is were he developed his idea of "neutral monism", which states that the world is neither mental nor physical as we understand these terms.
Thanks for your reply, it was quite comprehensive. :up:
Anyway, the stuff about events sounds very in line with my own way of thinking. I wrote (and will shortly update) a trilogy of threads on determinism and quantum mechanics with some counterfactual examples that demonstrated my view to some extent: that events, particularly creation and annihilation events, are what matters; classical ideas of trajectories are underdefined for good reasons. I will fast track some Russell reading asap!
Ah cool, keep me updated on that, it will be interesting to read.