What does "consciousness" mean
It bothers me when people who start discussions don’t define their terms at the beginning of the thread. For that reason, a few weeks ago I started a discussion on the meaning of “mysticism.” I was really pleased with how it turned out. It helped me get a hand around how to use the concept. What I mostly think is that the word is so ambiguous I won’t use it at all if I can avoid it.
Which brings us to “consciousness” and associated terms. These include:
In particular, I’m interested in talking about the capacity of humans and other animals to be aware of their own mental processes. I find myself being confused about which word to use when I try to describe it. Another related meaning is the part of our mind that directs our thought processes, perhaps speaks to us in words; perhaps is the seat of thought and reason. I want to talk about the “consciousness” people talk about when they discuss “The hard problem of consciousness.” To be clear, I don’t want to talk about the hard problem of consciousness except as needed to understand meanings.
Part of the problem is that the words in my list have other meanings. Examples:
I don’t mind discussing other meanings or shades of meaning, but generally only with the goal of addressing ambiguity.
Here are some definitions of the words I have listed above taken from various web sources:
Consciousness
Self-consciousness - This is a word I tend to use a lot, but I think I’ll stop now. Most of the definitions and synonyms relate to shyness or social anxiety. If it’s a word you like and want to use for this purpose, please speak up.
Awareness - This is word that generally refers to perceptions of the world as a whole rather than our own internal experience. I don’t think it belongs on the list. If you disagree, do it in writing here.
Self-awareness
Sentience
Mind
One thing that jumps out is that these words are defined using other words on the list. It strikes me that none of these definitions may get to the heart of what so many of our discussions are about. If you see it that way, please say so, explain, and give your own definitions. I’ll add some more thoughts in my next post that I’m leaving out because I don’t want this one to be too long.
Anyway, let’s have at it. Again – I don’t want to discuss consciousness, I want to discuss “consciousness.”
Which brings us to “consciousness” and associated terms. These include:
- Consciousness
- Self-consciousness
- Awareness
- Self-awareness
- Sentience
- Mind
In particular, I’m interested in talking about the capacity of humans and other animals to be aware of their own mental processes. I find myself being confused about which word to use when I try to describe it. Another related meaning is the part of our mind that directs our thought processes, perhaps speaks to us in words; perhaps is the seat of thought and reason. I want to talk about the “consciousness” people talk about when they discuss “The hard problem of consciousness.” To be clear, I don’t want to talk about the hard problem of consciousness except as needed to understand meanings.
Part of the problem is that the words in my list have other meanings. Examples:
- When I wake from a coma, I become conscious
- When I stop daydreaming, I become aware
- When I feel shy and embarrassed, I am self-consciousness
I don’t mind discussing other meanings or shades of meaning, but generally only with the goal of addressing ambiguity.
Here are some definitions of the words I have listed above taken from various web sources:
Consciousness
- The fact of awareness by the mind of itself and the world
- Sentience or awareness of internal and external existence
- Everything you experience; the tune stuck in your head, the sweetness of chocolate mousse, the throbbing pain of a toothache, the fierce love for your child and the bitter knowledge that eventually all feelings will end
- What it is like to be _?
Self-consciousness - This is a word I tend to use a lot, but I think I’ll stop now. Most of the definitions and synonyms relate to shyness or social anxiety. If it’s a word you like and want to use for this purpose, please speak up.
Awareness - This is word that generally refers to perceptions of the world as a whole rather than our own internal experience. I don’t think it belongs on the list. If you disagree, do it in writing here.
Self-awareness
- Conscious knowledge of one's own character, feelings, motives, and desires.
- An awareness of one's own personality or individuality
- An awareness of our own values, passions, aspirations, fit with our environment, reactions (including thoughts, feelings, behaviors, strengths, and weaknesses), and impact on others.
Sentience
- Feeling or sensation as distinguished from perception and thought
- Sentience is the capacity to be aware of feelings and sensations
- In modern Western philosophy, sentience is the ability to experience sensations (known in philosophy of mind as “qualia”). In the context of animal welfare, saying that animals are sentient means that they are able to feel pain.
Mind
- The element of a person that enables them to be aware of the world and their experiences, to think, and to feel; the faculty of consciousness and thought
- The element or complex of elements in an individual that feels, perceives, thinks, wills, and especially reasons
- The set of faculties including cognitive aspects such as consciousness, imagination, perception, thinking, intelligence, judgement, language and memory, as well as noncognitive aspects such as emotion and instinct.
One thing that jumps out is that these words are defined using other words on the list. It strikes me that none of these definitions may get to the heart of what so many of our discussions are about. If you see it that way, please say so, explain, and give your own definitions. I’ll add some more thoughts in my next post that I’m leaving out because I don’t want this one to be too long.
Anyway, let’s have at it. Again – I don’t want to discuss consciousness, I want to discuss “consciousness.”
Comments (231)
I think some call this phenomenal consciousness or 'what is it like to be consciousness' per Nagel/Chalmers.
At least read the post if you respond.
I edited my post to include that as one of the definitions.
I think that your definitions are fairly good, but I just wonder how the unconscious and subconscious fit into the picture, because consciousness is not a clear state, but a whole spectrum. It fades in and out during sleep, and can be altered, as occurs during intoxication. I am not really sure that I would clearly wish to come up with an overriding definition of consciousness, because it seems like trying to put it into a category. It seems larger than that, and even though human beings share many aspects of being conscious, we each have a unique stream of consciousness, because it is what our thoughts are composed from.
It's a pretty good list, and very clear. A couple of comments - first, the more general a word is, the harder it is to define. Very specific words - hammer, orange, elephant, night-time - are very easy to define. Very general words - consciousness, love, meaning - are much harder to define, because they're polysemic, that is, they have different meanings in different contexts.
The other, related issue is the domain of discourse in which the words are being used. For example, if you study both psychology and philosophy at an undergrad level (which I did) you will find the conception of mind in 'philosophy of mind' (philosophy) and in 'theories of the unconscious' (psychology) may be very different. They will refer to different sources and explore the subjects from different perspectives. They have different background assumptions and different aims in mind.
The last point, is that I think much of the talk about 'consciousness' has seeped into Western discourse from Eastern sources. In mainstream Western culture before the 19th c there was hardly any awareness of the term. Part of it stems from psychology, which takes consciousness as a part of its curriculum. But I'm sure a lot of the philosophical palaver about consciousness came from, for example, Emerson and Thoreau, who were influenced by Asian mysticism, and the subsequent influx of those schools, especially into America since the late 19th c (e.g. by the World Parliament of Religions, Chicago, 1880's, held in association with the World Fair.) And that means at least some of the discussion about consciousness is freighted with (often implicit) references to Asiatic (Hindu/Buddhist) cultural memes.
Quoting 180 Proof
which I unpack a bit more in that post – just follow the link. Works for me as a stipulative definition for the sake of discussion on these fora.
Good point. I want to add some more about that in another post. I just didn't want my first one to be too long.
Quoting Jack Cummins
I don't disagree, but my post was intended to address a particular need - What do we mean when we talk about the hard problem of consciousness? What do we mean when we talk about rocks being conscious? Actually, that's what inspired me to write about this. There was a discussion that included talk of inanimate objects being conscious. We talk about these things all the time and I'm never sure we're all talking about the same thing. Rather, at least sometimes, I'm sure we aren't all talking about the same thing.
All of the words I listed have other meanings. I tried to pick the definitions I think are relevant to the kinds of discussions we have on the forum. It would be nice if the people starting those discussions would be clear about these kinds of issues. That's not likely to happen. I mostly started this post to clarify in my own mind what I mean when I use these words.
Quoting Wayfarer
As I said, I at least want to come up with a meaning that applies to the "hard problem of consciousness" people talk about. Which domain do you see that as part of? Maybe that's part of the problem - the people doing the talking aren't clear on that themselves.
Quoting Wayfarer
What impact does the source of the meaning, e.g. western or eastern, have on the meanings I'm trying to get at here?
Are you familiar with the original paper, which is here http://consc.net/papers/facing.html
Perhaps it might be useful to talk in terms of what you do or don't agree with or understand about this paper, as that is the one that defined the problem.
Quoting T Clark
In philosophy of mind, it has an impact in the forming of concepts of the nature of consciousness. That's because 'Eastern' types of philosophers, right up to Deepak Chopra, have a particular way of using the word.
I hope you don't mind if I steal the text you linked from @Pantagruel's discussion.
Quoting 180 ProofQuoting Wayfarer
I like this, but I'm not sure if I agree. Or at least I'm not sure this is what other people mean when they say "consciousness."
Quoting from @Pantagruel in that same discussion. I wish I had participated. Maybe I wouldn't need to have started this discussion at all.
Quoting Pantagruel
I'm going to steal one of @Wayfarer's responses from that thread too:
Quoting Wayfarer
Isn't that sentience?
I have read various discussions about it, but I haven't read this. I will.
A novel approach to the subject of mind. You threw me off with that sentence but I suppose it was meant to evoke a zen moment. @Banno should've caught on early, he's a diehard Wittgenstein fan.
If "consciousness", the word, is what the OP wants to analyze then this thread needs to be contextualized in re the so-called linguistic turn philosophy allegedly underwent some time ago in its past. All thanks to Wittgenstein? I'm not sure.
My own contribution for what it's worth is to provide a short etymological report:
[quote=Google]The English word "conscious" originally derived from the Latin conscius (con- "together" and scio "to know"), but the Latin word did not have the same meaning as the English word—it meant "knowing with", in other words, "having joint or common knowledge with another"[/quote]
Now that we have some idea of the word's origins, the question that pops into my mind is, what would a linguist do next? Your guess is as good as mine.
If I may offer my two cents, the next step would be to analyze the pronunciation of "consciousness" which may involve the particular shape the mouth needs to assume, the movement and contact points of the tongue, the role of the nasal sinuses as echo chambers, etc.
How does all this contribute to understanding the word "consciousness"? For my money, it'll go towards providing insight into Latin and English as languages, one as the source and the other as a spin-off. In short, the OP isn't really about the word "consciousness", nor is it about consciousness, it's actually about language in general and Latin & English in particular. :joke:
Actually, I think that your thread question is fantastic. I was not criticising it, but simply read it when waking up in the middle of the night, so my response may have seemed a bit grungy. The reason why I think your question is so good is that we use the word so often on this site, and I know that I have written threads including the word consciousness. While people are inclined to seek definitions, I am not sure that there are many discussions here about the specific meaning of the term consciousness.
I suppose that I am just see it as an area for exploration rather any restrictive definitions. I know that you say that you have 'a meat and potatoes' philosophy and, as we already discussed in my thread on transformation of consciousness, I have a different position. My own understanding of consciousness incorporates a possible collective unconscious as a source of consciousness, or of levels of consciousness as dimensions. But, I will stop here, because I am going into what is consciousness and I believe that you are looking more specifically at what we mean by the term consciousness, although it is linked because people probably use the word differently.
To me, "awareness" belongs in the list. I note that you’ve used “aware”/“awareness” in defining most of the other terms in the OP’s list. At least for some definitions.
For my part: If one knows oneself to be, for example, content, one knows this because one is aware of so being—i.e., due to an awareness of being content—and not due to perceptions of the world. I will add, nor due to perceptions of one own body (as one might perceive a stomachache): where there are sensory receptors whose data becomes interpreted by the aware being. To be clear, there are no known physiological sensory receptors for discerning the degree or presence of one’s own contentedness. Nevertheless, one is aware of being content when one so is. But it would be odd to say, "one perceives oneself being content".
Other examples can be offered alongside certain emotions and states of being. Awareness of value, of meaning, of concepts (i.e., generalized or abstracted ideas), and of the aesthetic come to mind. The same perceived item could hold different values, meanings, evoke different concepts, and hold different aesthetics to the same person at different times or, else, to different minds—despite being a perceptually identical item. And there are no know sensory receptors for discerning value, meaning, concepts, or beauty. Why one person discerns a sunrise as beautiful when another person doesn’t isn’t a direct product of perception—at least not when scientifically specified—though both will visually perceive an identical sunrise.
But (contentious as what I’ve so far written might be) back to the central point: My take so far is that all interpretations of “consciousness” will encompass awareness. This although certain notions of consciousness will specify only certain forms of awareness and therefore label other forms of awareness as not constituting consciousness proper. Many, for example, will believe that an ameba, despite being aware of its environment, is not conscious of its environment. (Then again, many will claim that great apes are not conscious either.)
So I’m curious, can anyone provide an instance where one is conscious of X without being aware of X?
I think the natural language use and philosophical (as in 'hard problem') use (if there is such a distinction) intersect in, for example, the following reasonably natural exchange between two people at the beach:
They are discussing, I think completely intelligibly, about whether there is something it is like to be x.
Equivalently, to my mind, we can talk about the kinds of things that have experiences, and the kinds of things that don't.
Equivalently, to be aware of something is to be experiencing something, is to be conscious of something.
'Feeling' can be used equivalently, to feel x is to be conscious of x. Even to 'know' something could be used in this way, although that's less common.
'Sentient' can be used this way. To be sentient is just to be conscious, to be capable of experience.
There are other ways these words can be used, but I think all of this language can be used to talk about consciousness in the phenomenal sense. (I personally think it is important to make a distinction between consciousness and consciousness-of-something, as it is, for me, in principle possible to be conscious without being conscious of something, even if that never actually obtains).
Dictionaries typically identify this usage among other usages. Although interestingly, not all do! I think the Cambridge online dictionary misses it out. For example (I have bolded the phenomenal sense intended by the OP):
Banno only identifies one of these definitions (roughly no 3) and says it is 'the best' which is absurd. Dictionaries describe usage, it's a factual business not a normative one. Likewise this thread is concerned with facts of usage and meaning. People mean what they mean. Is Banno saying that people shouldn't use words in ways he doesn't like? That philosophers should stop talking about sense 1 completely? Or is he saying that sense 1 is really best thought of as sense 3? Or what?
At first glance, this can look absurd.
However, a First Aid course involving people training people to look after people, it is a total picture of:
Quoting T Clark
Think about it...
Ok, I just did. You seem to be suggesting that talk of consciousness outside of a this kind of medical sense makes no sense. So to wonder if, say, a tree or a rock is conscious is, by definition, meaningless. Is that right?
Not long or hard enough.
I could.
And so could @Banno if he so desires...
Not so much meaningless as wrong.
Shit or get off the pot.
The word has at least two senses, and neither is wrong.
‘How’s the patient?’ ‘Oh, he’s in a bad way, his bike went over a rock and he hit his head on a tree. He’s lost consciousness.’
‘Oh, too bad. How’s the rock? And the tree?’
Neither of them seem to know who the current Prime Minister is. It's not looking good.
:smile:
You are right. I should stop wasting my time here and get on with something else more productive.
Bye. But @Banno is spot on...
All three are covered by the first aid test.
OK, thanks. I'm not sure that any of them are, not clearly anyway. Possibly how one reads and interprets these is influenced by prior philosophical views.
How'r the rock and tree getting on?
Pretty bad. Tree is responding to light, but not much else. You have to hit the rock pretty hard to get it to respond all at the moment.
I'm afraid that I am having a problem with you wishing to narrow down the idea of consciousness to that of a first aid test. I am not saying that viewpoint isn't important. I have attended first aid training, so of course, it is an essential definition, but a medical one rather than a philosophical one. Thinkers within philosophy and other disciplines may use the term consciousness in differing ways, and surely, thinking about it should not be reduced to one way of seeing it.
Damn, their on to me. Yep, nothing deep.
That's not what he is doing.
Quoting Jack Cummins
It's not about a single definition but about seeing examples of it in practice. The people involved.
The whole human experience.
Quoting Jack Cummins
Indeed.
Quoting Amity
Quoting Banno
Yes. And the other eye/s on...?
...whichever garden path we are being led up.
:smile:
Gods (re: believers). Lies (re: believers). Other minds (ergo 'theory of mind'). My death....
I am not really opposing @Banno, because I can see that the medical idea of consciousness is extremely important. I have worked in hospitals and my working definition of assessing consciousness was the medical one and nothing else. This understanding of consciousness may be the best we have, but I am only saying that I don't think it is helpful to try to exclude all other usages of the term, because some people may be using it differently.
You don't seem to have read or understood my post.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/532572
Nor I.
Best, not only. It's the one that is clearest; the one with which no one will disagree...
Or not.
I wasn't just responding to your post, but the trail of the thread which does seem to be wishing to narrow down the use of the term. I thought that the OP was trying to explore the term rather than come up with the most commonplace definition.
Yes, perhaps we do agree. I can reassure that when I was working in a hospital and assessing patients I did not stand there contemplating what did consciousness mean.
It's a hard question. We can ask what is a heart. Some will say it's an organ that's used to pump blood around the body. That's one thing hearts do, maybe the main thing. But a definition of what a heart is doesn't tell us much about actual hearts.
Maybe consciousness is the same thing. It's something that the brain does. It's unlikely that it's even the "main" thing the brain does, but its one of its more surprising properties. And it's likely the greatest gift we've gotten from nature.
I see why you may want to clarify these terms. I'm not sure how useful it's going to be. The simpler the definition the better. Consciousness can be said to be awareness. Self consciousness means awareness of one's being aware. And so on. But defining a term says little about the phenomenon.
I've rarely known a time when clarifying a term wasn't useful to someone. People often take consciousness for granted - might be useful to kick it around for a bit.
Defining the hard problem of consciousness is interesting because it remains a key matter in discussions of physicalism, god and mysticism.
I think the thread is going well. I don't see any wish to narrow down the use of the term.
Yes, it is an exploration.
From the OP:
Quoting T Clark
I think that @Banno has offered 'The First Aid course' as an example where all aspects of the meaning of 'consciousness' can be explored. That is, if there is the imagination to consider it from another angle...to see the different types and nature of 'consciousness' as arising and working in, through and around people...
It's a fine line between clarifying a concept and being a slave to the definition you've given. As in, if I say consciousness is to be defined as what-it's-like to be something and someone replies "that's no good, you can't be a rock. Also, can you tell me what it's like to be a bat?" Then we simply get stuck in discussing the definition as opposed to the phenomena.
A definition can be helpful but one has to be careful here.
Quoting Tom Storm
Well, I'm going to sound like a broken record but, I think the so called "hard problem" is an example of being wed too strongly to a mistaken notion: that consciousness is the hard problem. There are many hard problems.
As for the other topics, yes I agree, consciousness is important for them.
I'm happy for us to look at the language issues about "consciousness" and related words as you have done, but no, the post is not about language in general or Latin and English in particular. It's about a mental phenomenon or phenomena.
I didn't think your post was critical at all. This is the kind of conversation I want to have.
Quoting Jack Cummins
As I noted, this is exactly why I started this thread.
Quoting Jack Cummins
I like talking about all aspects of consciousness. It tests my understanding of the interactions between human understanding and reality. But, as you note, if we drift off target I'm afraid the main goal of this discussion will be lost.
On the other hand, as I mentioned in an earlier response to one of your posts, I think we do need to talk about the subconscious and unconsciousness. My first take is that they are part of our minds but not of our consciousnesses. I'm not sure about that. If you want to discuss that, that would be fine. As I noted before, I will add more on that if I can just catch up on all the comments.
First off, I didn't think your discussion of "awareness" was contentious at all. As I noted in my OP, I did not consider it because I thought it was a general term. You're right, though, you can't be self-aware without being aware. I have no objections to keeping it in the discussion. Do you think it adds to the discussion of "consciousness" in a way that "self-aware" does not?
I used to be an emergency medical technician. When we gave our reports on patients we would say they were "conscious and alert," although we never had to take a rock or tree to the hospital.
I think @Banno was being a smarty-pants. Perhaps I was wrong.
You're right, there are many meanings for "consciousness," but I am trying to focus in on one particular aspect, which I don't think has anything to do with first aid training. I know you understand that.
We can step aside and see ourselves being born into a specific moment in time, into specific set of local customs and meanings, but we can distance ourselves from that specific moment and that specific cultural context. And then at least aim for universality, sub specie aeternitatis. At least to a degree, there is a space for that. I would imagine that for an insect there is no such space, that insects cannot distance themselves from the world, they don't observe themselves experiencing the world.
I agree, but there are some who believe that inanimate objects are conscious. When we get in those kinds of conversations, I just want to make sure everyone is talking about the same phenomenon.
Depends on where the accident is. Here in the US, no one knows who the British Prime Minister is. Is it still Gordon Brown?
I think Banno is being intentionally contrarian.
[quote=George Bush]Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me[/quote]
:lol:
Except that it's not. I've tried to be clear. I want to talk about the meaning of "consciousness" in the sense it is used when one says "the hard problem of consciousness."
Yes, I agree.
But, as you are aware, it's not the one I set out to discuss. It is not relevant to the question at hand.
Yes, there are different meanings of "consciousness," but I think I've been clear. I'm talking about a particular meaning or meanings related to a particular usage, i.e. the discussions we have here on the forum. I'm looking for the language to use in those discussions to make what I am trying to communicate clear to other participants.
[rant] I do get a bit triggered when people don't respect the OP. Otherwise every thread becomes the same free for all for people's opinions on whatever they want to sound off about. A bit of discipline and focus would be really nice. Then each thread would have a proper subject. Banno knows better and is capable of staying on topic, but chooses not to. [/rant]
But this thread is specifically intended to discuss the definition as opposed to the phenomena. That way, theoretically, possibly, one hopes, we can avoid focusing on the definition as opposed to the phenomena in future discussions.
I try to be considerate in my posts and make sure I am discussing the issues raised in the OP. I appreciate it when others do the same for me. Thank you.
And this is why I started this discussion, to help give us common language to discuss this issue.
You're right, experience is a good word in the context of this discussion. Perhaps I should have included it in my list. It helps differentiate between different meanings of "consciousness" and focuses on the type of thing consciousness is. "Consciousness" does not only mean an experience, but that's the aspect of the word I want to examine in this thread.
I think "experience" might be a good word to use. Experience being occurrent mental events or processes, what's happening now as you read these letters. Then there is the experience of thinking about an idea that you may want to articulate.
One can have experience of that little itch one may have on one's arm, or the experience of closing one's eyes. There's then the experience of breathing through your nose and the experience of seeing a blue sky. There's the experience of walking, as one walks, and the experience of frowning. You can focus on the sound you hear and that would be sound experience. There's the experience of looking at numbers, or of talking, or of being angry or sad, etc.
You may think of a specific memory and as that specific memory comes back, it evokes certain images or sounds, this would be experience too as is happens.
So that's what I propose. We use experience in this broad sense to refer to conscious goings-on. Everything else that is not part of experience at this moment (minus other people who one assumes have experience too) would be non-experiential.
I find it useful. Consciousness tends to have a lot of baggage attached. Experience is a bit less ambiguous.
Yes, I agree. The aspect of consciousness I set out to examine is the experience. If I had added that to my list of words in the OP, it might have made it easier for us to keep on target.
Just checked definitions to see how “aware” can have a specialized meaning as you imply. Wiktionary provides two, one of which is “conscious or having knowledge of something”. So I so far don’t follow your examples. Could you be more specific about consciousness sans awareness?
OK. Cool. :grin:
Quoting T Clark
Self-awareness becomes redundant it is specifies an innate distinction between self and other, an innate awareness of selfhood in this sense. An ameba will hold awareness of this distinction, but we do not say it is self-aware. Lesser vertebrates can become unconscious—e.g., due to sedatives—but when conscious we likewise don’t consider them self-aware in the senses defined in the OP. Defining consciousness by self-awareness, as self-awareness was specified in the OP, constrains “consciousness” strictly to critters that can not only conceptualize information but, additionally, can conceptualize information about (and thereby hold abstract knowledge of) their personal innate awareness of their own selfhood via which other is discerned. A conceptualization of self which young enough human children cannot do. So, in equating consciousness to self-awareness, one would be forced to state that human infants hold no consciousness. This being something I’m personally very adverse to doing. If, however, consciousness is equated to awareness, then human infants and lesser animals can all be conscious (again, in contrast to being unconscious). But, in so defining, then unicellular organisms can then be deemed conscious as well, since they hold awareness of things, including of that which is other relative to themselves—and, hence, of themselves relative to that which is other.
All this to me gives good reason to keep “awareness” rather than just “self-awareness” on the table in the discussion of what consciousness is.
Of course. As I wrote in my original reply to the OP, re: one can be aware of being content without perceiving oneself to be content.
Are we not aware of what we know ourselves to be thinking?
Being a vacuum would suck more. :razz:
T Clark!
Not to be glib, but in a word or so, consciousness is a mystery. You know kinda like God, cosmology, mathematics, music, and whole host of other things found in living structures.
In the alternative, you could say that consciousness (the explanation of) is illogical, or outside of, or beyond the usual categories of human thought and/or reason. But then that sounds paradoxical... .
You're probably getting tired of me saying that :joke:
Nice OP dude!
It’s an ambiguous term, says Chalmers. This is before he sprinkled in a little experience, feelings, and quality to make it worse. But it becomes more and more apparent that the “consciousness” he speaks of is the organism itself. So when he says “It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience”, he is descending into tautology.
Except that the whole OP, fascinating as it is, is not clear at all.
The thread title is: 'What does ''consciousness'' mean ?'.
This is a general question. It is a more holistic question. And one that attracts many ways of looking.
Never mind 'consciousness', the meaning of 'meaning' is itself ambiguous.
Quoting T Clark
That is exactly what @Banno kicked off with his cryptic and 'absurd' comment.
Its quirky creativity drew me in until my last response:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/532625
Quoting T Clark
If there is confusion in any thread as to the use of the word 'consciousness', then it is probably best addressed by questioning the author at that specific moment.
'It would be nice if...'
People could be less 'triggered' by and hostile to others who look at issues from a different angle. That there is relevance there, even if it might seem that it doesn't 'respect' the OP.
Quoting T Clark
Quoting T Clark
:smile:
I think you're getting to the heart of it. I actually like "self-awareness" more than "consciousness" to describe the phenomena we're talking about, but "consciousness" is the word used most often by others. People don't talk about the hard problem of self-awareness. I wonder if they did it would help get rid of some of the confusion and disagreement.
Quoting javra
Human infants are clearly sentient. They have experiences. They have attention and awareness. It is my understanding that young infants have to learn the difference between what is part of them and what is outside. Wouldn't that mean they are not conscious, again, in the sense we are talking about it. As for other animals, as you move down it becomes more and more questionable that what we see is consciousness. In what sense do bacteria have experiences. It's not clear to me they are aware.
I don't see that a materialist viewpoint can not be used to address questions of consciousness and self-awareness. We are just machines that manufacture self-awareness. That self-awareness is actually a byproduct we use to achieve our true goal - to manufacturer copies of ourselves.
I don't think it is a mystery. I think most of the confusion comes from a lack of imagination. People can't help but think that consciousness is something special and that we need to identify special sources for it.
I haven't read Chalmer's paper. I need to do that.
What does that mean?
Alternatively, I agree, logically it's as straightforward as consciousness, subconsciousness, and unconsciousness all tangled up in a big gooey ball of warm evolutionary soup :joke:
But seriously, you're really not "special", hence no soup for you !
Rather than address specific comments, I'll just say this - the meanings of consciousness @Banno is talking about are not those I intended to discuss in this thread. Here are the meanings Banno identified:
Again, these meanings are not those this thread were intended to discuss. You say it isn't clear, although no one except Banno and you have had any trouble understanding. Now it should be clear.
https://www.discovermagazine.com/planet-earth/can-plants-feel-pain
But isn't the problem with self-awareness that it goes a step beyond experience ("mere" consciousness)? We cannot know at all, but let me articulate an intuition:
Take an animal, maybe a bat, maybe a lizard. They likely have experience, they are aware of things in the world: prey, food, shelter and the like. I am skeptical that such creatures would have "self awareness" as opposed to awareness.
What is added by self-awareness that is absent in experience? The apparent fact that one is aware that it is oneself that is having the experience, not another person nor another creature.
Like almost any other aspect of nature, experience is very multifaceted and rich. I think that you are correct in that what's causing most of these discussions is self awareness: "I know that I am staring at a screen", "I know that WWII ended in 1945", "I know that song".
If I can't separate experience from me, how could it arise as a question?
Well, yes, an infant would not hold abstracted ideas regarding their innate awareness of self via which other is discerned. And if that is how one chooses to understand what "consciousness" refers to then infants hold no consciousness.
This specified notion of consciousness is to me however very biased toward cognitively healthy adult humans as holding a metaphysically unique status. Something that goes against the grain with me. E.g.: an adult with extreme forms of mental retardation would then also hold no consciousness.
For one thing, I believe there are gradations of awareness; even when one focuses on consciousness as self-awareness, there are gradations of this among adult humans and over time in any individual adult human. On average, contemplation of the self gives greater self-awareness than does watching a movie. These gradations would hold to minimal extents even for infants. Despite an infant not having language to specify concepts of self, it does hold innate and nonverbal notions of "mine", as in what we linguistically address as my thirst, my pleasure or pain, my affinity to familiar voices, and so forth--this even if its associating these personal states of self to stimuli takes time. And, in so doing, I offer that an infant holds an ingrained awareness of self, hence a degree of self-awareness without which it (the infant) would literally perish. But if language use is considered an all-important item for consciousness, any such perspective would be mute. (side note: interesting how in English infants, lesser animals, and divine beings such as angels are termed "it" rather than "he/she", the latter being reserved only for those with whom one can linguistically converse. This isn't so, at the very least, in the Romanian language.)
Maybe more to the point, if an infant can be unconscious it would be wrong to uphold that it is not (i.e., un-) conscious when it is not unconscious. On a technical level, so affirming to me seems to be a logical contradiction.
Also, if consciousness is the holding of abstracted ideas regarding one's innate awareness of self via which other is discerned, what can be said to engage in this abstracting prior to the abstraction taking hold? I'm thinking that consciousness engages in such abstracting to begin with, but I'm open to different views.
There has been a fair amount of work in recent years on what has been called a pre-reflective form of minimal self-awareness. Dan Zahavi has made this his central focus, but there is growing concensus that all experience presupposes some primitive sense of self. Infants have been shown to differentiate self from others.
His work is very interesting.
It makes sense, but a primitive sense of self would seem to be weaker (by definition) than a robust sense of self, as is the case of people. I think that what matters in the case of experience is being able to separate the knower from the known, in a way that one can even pose these questions.
Otherwise, although there may be a very primitive self idea, I don't see how awareness itself becomes a problem for such creatures, as opposed to a matter of survival.
But I could be way off...
We know that we have some kind of knowledge, and this fact is puzzling, why do we have this thing, experience? I doubt animals get near that, as it would also require language and much else, which is not to deny in the least the amazing capacities animals have in there own right.
I don’t agree with Zahavi’s version of a pre-reflective self-awareness. He calls it ‘for-meness’ and deems it a self-identify of self , an ongoing feeling that accompanies all my intentional experiences. So I sense the coldness of the refrigerator and I ask sense how it feels for me. To me the issue of a sense of self isn’t a pure self-identity separate from but accompanying all my experiences of objects. I think it has to do with the relative integrity and internal coherence of my moment to moment changes in experience. In other words , self is a structural feature of the relation between my anticipative projecting and the objects that occur into that anticipation.
I think this is relevant not just for humans but other animals too. It deals with the issue of functional autonomy of a self-organizing system. A functionally autonomous cognizer is governed by internal norms which pre-select how it perceives its environment. I think the at normative projecting gives the experienced its sense of a relative self identity over time.
Well, I think they actually are; but given that it is your thread and you are so adamant, i'll let it go for now.
I've considerable sympathy for the method you wish to use, it being not dissimilar to that of J. L. Austin.
So I'll make a different contribution, perhaps as partial recompense, by referring to https://www.etymonline.com/
"to know with".
We get a similar analysis, of course, for conscience (n.):
So the term carried with it a mutuality.
Consciousness is not private.
Sure. But do you think that in, for example, seeing your hand and recognizing it as such, as belonging to you would be somewhat similar in the case of an animal with one of its limbs? The recognizing the limb as a part of you?
I don't know. But I intuit a difference. I admit, it could be way off.
Quoting Joshs
Perhaps. The issue for this thread would be, do you think animals recognize experience as an issue for them or would they take it as a given that is nothing that raises "reflection" in such an animal?
“...this traditional hypothesis which takes
the infant’s experience to be initially impersonal and anonymous has been rejected
unequivocally by dominant positions in contemporary developmental psychology. On the basis of numerous experimental data it is now assumed that the infant already from birth begins to experience itself, and that it never passes through a period of total self/other nondifferentiation. As both Stern, Neisser and Butterworth have argued, there is no symbiotic-like phase, and thereexists no systematic and pervasive confusion between the child’s experience of self and other, nor between the child’s experience of the other and of the world.” Dan Zahavi
What does that mean?
Something like we don't have our own thoughts, feelings and sensations if they're not expressible to other people?
I’m not sure if ‘recognizing experience as an issue’ is a thing. That is , some special capacity of thought above and beyond good old fashion reflection. I do think higher animals reflect, so I don’t think however you want to characterize what it is people
do when they reflect on experience as their own belongs to some special capacity only humans posses. We’ve been down this anthrocentric road before. It wasn’t long ago that supposedly only humans had emotions, language, culture, cognition or tool use.
We now are beginning to learn that other animals have all kinds of complex cognitive abilities, including self-recognition and empathy.
Yeah, no doubt there's a lot to learn about animals.
I have some big doubts, even if I grant your point about anthropomorphism. I think there are aspects of human beings which belong to us alone such as creativity, language (human language is unique compared to animals communication), aesthetics, etc.
But on some aspects such as ethics, perception and intelligence, we may be less special than we think.
In any case point registered.
Interesting website.
This refers to the word 'conscious'. Why did you choose 'to know with' rather than ' to be thoroughly aware' ?
So, to add on the - ness of it all, from the same website:
- ness
word-forming element denoting action, quality, or state, attached to an adjective or past participle to form an abstract noun, from Old English -nes(s), from Proto-Germanic *in-assu- (cognates: Old Saxon -nissi, Middle Dutch -nisse, Dutch -nis, Old High German -nissa, German -nis, Gothic -inassus), from *-in-, originally belonging to the noun stem, + *-assu-, abstract noun suffix, probably from the same root as Latin -tudo (see -tude).
From this, 'consciousness' :
'an action, quality or state' related to:
'knowing with, mutually or thoroughly'
or
'being aware with, mutually or thoroughly'
or
'being privy to'
I am not sure if this helps in any way.
It raises more questions...
What is it we are aware with or of ?
In any case, it reminds me why with regards to 'consciousness' and brain states, I think neuroscience is more useful than this kind of philosophical dancing in the dark.
Fascinating as it all is...
In order to bring out the aspect of mutuality, mentioned in the text.
The example from first aid shows that consciousness is something we see in others. I think it inherently interactive - mutual. The tendency in some is to treat it as a private phenomena, with talk of "what it is like...", qualia and such. The entomology shows this to be a recent rendering.
and
So awareness is a word more suited to private issues.
I think we see it others because we recognize it in ourselves. If we didn't we wouldn't be able to recognize it in others. The idea is that person is like-me, because s/he is doing things I would do if I were in that situation.
In any case, I agree with Russell when he argues that our most intimate acquaintance with things consist of our own percepts followed by the percepts of other people and finally to theories of the world, in that order. In short, I don't think that communication is essential to private life.
But the etymology you present is quite interesting. The word "consciousness", according to Udo Thiel, was first given philosophical use by Ralph Cudworth. He clearly thought we had private experience. But that's besides the point.
I think it is also something we see in ourselves; 'thoroughly' would bring out this aspect.
The First Aid course example was broad. It included all the aspects.
At a minimum 3 people are involved: the trainer, the trainee and the person being treated. Knowledge, awareness and experience - a holistic view.
The meanings as outlined in the OP can be seen in each individual and their interaction.
It sometimes seem to me that trying to parse the idea of consciousness is like trying to understand what Spinoza meant by God.
Like any word, we learn to use it by using it; we develop an understanding of its use by making use of it.
It's not as if a baby knows what consciousness is, and learns to use the word to refer to what they already have in mind. Rather, they learn what consciousness is as they learn to use the word.
Edit: That bit seems important, so I'm bolding it, so as it gets noticed.
We use consciousness before saying anything. Learning consciousness is akin to saying that we learn how to grow legs or learn how to digest food.
A child may be living with non-human animals and will be conscious, though doubtless it will be somewhat restricted compared to human being than speaks.
One thing is understanding, another is having. Or so it seems to me.
It's quite late here, so if you don't mind, we can continue whenever you want. Maybe I learn more about consciousness, no doubt. :cool:
And yet, it's a certainty :grimace:
Oooo I have a problem with that.
Perhaps we are conscious before saying anything...
Consciousness isn't used; it is what uses...
Edit: Or "We use 'consciousness'..." Quotative, so as to indicate that what we use is the word...
Do you have a source for this? A link?
The following are all available free here:
https://ku-dk.academia.edu/DanZahavi
Zhavi: We in Me or Me in We? Collective Intentionality and Selfhood. March 2021 Journal of
Social Ontology
Zahavi: Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective.2005
Zahavi: ‘Is the Self a Social Construct’, Inquiry, Vol. 52, No. 6, 551–573,
Zahavi Consciousness and (minimal) selfhood: Getting clearer on for-me-ness and mineness
U. Kriegel (ed.): The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness.
Oxford University Press, 2019
Thanks. I'll take a look.
I think perhaps the notion of knowing or being aware with rather than of is being overlooked here. Being aware of refers to using consciousness, but being aware with refers to what uses.
It seems to me that the meaning of ‘conscious’ or ‘consciousness’ originally referred to the qualitative idea or faculty of awareness.
But consciousness is recognised by empirical evidence or observations, and more recently defined as a perceived/known capacity or potential - in self and in others. We commonly refer in these instances to an awareness of certain aspects in experience or what is evident, rather than to the faculty itself.
We use the terms ‘conscious’ and ‘consciousness’ in reference to all three levels, and we struggle in our discussions because our prediction of consciousness based on observations doesn’t always align with reality. A human being is ‘conscious’ in the sense that we recognise the faculty, but we each have a limited ‘consciousness’ in that our capacity for awareness is developed (or limited) by the complexity of our experience. Plus, we are not always recognisably ‘conscious’ in the sense that we can be observed as evidently aware from moment to moment, which takes nothing away from either our current capacity or overall faculty of awareness.
We know that organisms are further limited in their capacity for awareness by their physical and cognitive evolutionary development, and we have recognised this through empirical evidence or observations. And although a rock clearly has no capacity for awareness, there is nevertheless some empirical evidence of awareness occurring at a molecular level. All of this relates to the unconsolidated idea or faculty of being aware meant by ‘consciousness’, but is limited by any definition of ‘conscious’ as an arbitrarily consolidated minimum value in one’s perceived capacity for awareness.
I’m just thinking out loud here, and it may not make a lot of sense - but if we try to bring this back to @T Clark’s discussion of the ‘experience’ aspect of consciousness, then perhaps the important point becomes how we understand this shift from awareness with to awareness of.
Btw, I kind of doubt we would have "a true goal" here, surely there are biological and evolutionary impulses, but why would they constitute "a true goal"?
Don't point at an interesting looking tree because the spirit within might follow you home...
Perhaps so.
The Contents of the SEP article on 'Consciousness' starts with 1. History of the issue.
This links back to what @Banno discussed re the etymology of 'conscious' and 'conscience'.
Here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/532902
Quoting SEP article by Robert Van Gulick
It continues with, and expands on types, here:
2. Concepts of Consciousness
2.1 Creature Consciousness
2.2 State consciousness
2.3 Consciousness as an entity
3. Problems of Consciousness
The Questions of Consciousness are explained individually but are inter-related.
The What, How and Why.
The Descriptive, the Explanatory, the Functional.
Quoting As above
Sections 4,5 and 6 expand on the 3 Questions.
From 4:
Quoting As above
I don't follow. Can you explain a bit?
T Clark!
Happy Saturday!
Is consciousness logical?
I read the paper. I'm not sure if I would change anything I've said based on what I read, but I do have some thoughts. First - Chalmers is talking about consciousness as an experience, which I did not emphasize in my OP or subsequent posts. @Manuel and @hwyl called me out on that. For Chalmers, the hard problem is experience - what it feels like.
Chalmers also listed what he called the easy problems of consciousness, generally those which can be solved even if they haven't been so far. I thought they were interesting and possibly helpful in our discussion. Here they are:
This is worth some thought. I must admit I'm not much interested in the experience of consciousness from a scientific or philosophical perspective. It doesn't seem that important to me. For me, consciousness is a behavior. We know it the way we know other human and animal behaviors - by observing it, including what the person says about it when that is available. There really is only one experience of consciousness in my universe - mine. Yes, yes. of course I believe other people experience it too, but that's because I've observed their behavior. This list from Chalmers identifies at least some of the behaviors related to consciousness that we can observe. He acknowledges that.
Thanks for pushing me to read the paper.
Yes, this is at the heart of things for me, although I don't think that's true for some other people. If, as you noted before, experience is the important factor, how far down the ladder of neurological complexity does it go? If we go down far enough, it just becomes sentience. I think dogs probably experience things. Have you ever seen a dog dream? Do all mammals? Fish? I don't know. Ants? I guess not but I'm not sure.
Joshs has pointed out that my view of infant awareness may be a bit naive:
Quoting Joshs
Quoting javra
Joshs provided a link to Zahavi's papers. Here it is again
Quoting Joshs
I'm going to take a look and see how it changes my thinking.
I was mostly just trying to stop the bicker-battle.
Quoting Banno
Quoting Banno
I think you're the first one in this thread to bring up the fact that consciousness is social. In a recent response I noted that the only way we know that other people have the experience of consciousness is by observing their behavior. That's not the same thing though.
All I know is that things are getting more complicated as this thread goes on. Which I guess isn't necessarily a bad thing. I'm really enjoying this.
Quoting Possibility
I agree with the first statement. I'm trying to work out how to handle the subject of the second. I want to say that the experience is not central, since we mostly know consciousness or awareness by observing behavior. As I noted in an earlier post, there really is only one experience in my universe - mine. Anything else is inference. Maybe even anthropomorphism. Or maybe T Clarkpomorphism.
You're right, we can't know. We can only work with our intuitions. I assume our intuitions about dogs and monkeys are more or less correct. It may even be richer than what we may think. "Below" that, as it were, I don't trust my intuitions anymore. It looks unlikely that animals have an issue with experience, but they may.
In this instance I think we just have to approach the subject as we do in real life, the way we treat cats or dogs as opposed to butterflies or lizards. I don't see any alternative for the time being. Maybe sometime in the future we may learn something more than changes this.
I believe part of this - I don't think there is any mystery of consciousness. Consciousness is a behavior. I don't think that means that consciousness and mind don't exist. The experience is interesting and important, but I think it's more philosophy than science. Do I really believe that? ..... Yes, I think I do.
Subconsciousness:
Unconsciousness:
They seem pretty similar, although the subconscious appears, in general, to be closer to the surface.
The subconscious or unconscious, whichever term we want to use, is important to my understanding of mind and human action. For me, much of human motivation and action comes from a place which is not available to my normal experience of myself. It comes into my awareness from somewhere else. I have described it as a spring where feelings and actions bubble to the surface from below, inside.
I don't want to sidetrack things with this, but I wanted to at least get it down on paper so to speak. No need for this to go any further unless people want to. If there is any further discussion, I'd like to keep it to the main thrust of this thread.
How does one define behavior, as change in space-time of an observed object? Is there a notion of behavior joe that cannot be defined in terms of movement of an object in space? Is change of the sense of a meaning a behavior?
The only difficulty which I have with your definitions are that they are a bit too precise and rigid. I understand that consciousness is a understood in different ways, ranging from the medical to far reaching ones, like Bucke's 'Cosmic Consciousness'.Even though you are wishing to establish a way of seeing it more clearly as a concept, I think that you may have made it too neat and tidy, with no blurry or hazy borders at all. We probably would not be able to agree fully on a definition at all on the forum. This is because trying to do so cannot be separated entirely from the questions about the nature of consciousness, which is one of the most central recurrent problems, or themes, within philosophy.
Good question. Maybe "behavior" is the wrong word. I guess I mean any observable or measurable act or response that can be used to infer an internal state. Speech, conscious action, reflexive action, autonomic response, PET scan observation, and lots more.
Doesn’t this destroy the subjectivity of consciousness, the very essence of awareness? From cognitive science there are suggestions for a ‘mutual enlightenment’, between 1st person subjective , second person intersubjective and third person empirical methods.
http://www.neurohumanitiestudies.eu/archivio/gallagher97.pdf
Evan Thompson wants to go back and forth between phenomenology , mindfulness practices and cognitive
neuroscience, believing that none of these by themselves will fully explain consciousness.
When I start out with a definition, I try to use the common, everyday way a word is used perhaps adding scientific or philosophical shading. In order to do that, I usually take two definitions from on-line dictionaries and one from Wikipedia. You're right, that process tends to leave out some of the nuance. That's what the follow up discussion is for.
Quoting Jack Cummins
I agree completely. I never expected that we would really resolve a definition or even definitions. I just wanted to get the choices out on the table. At least, next time I get involved in a discussion, I'll have an idea of what I'm trying to say. I'll also know some questions to ask about what others are trying to say.
This has been a very satisfying discussion for me and I hope for others.
I think that subjectivity is the so-called hard problem. I don't see it as a problem. There is only one subjective experience in my universe - mine. Everyone else's is just an inference from observations and analogy. Looking at my own experience, I don't see it as particularly mysterious. It's just what happens when I talk about myself to myself and then talk about talking to myself to myself ....
Yes, but is this subjective experience not at the same time an objective experience? What I mean is this: I can think of myself in relation or opposition to other people. That’s a developed notion of self.But Husserl says, what if we bracket off our knowledge of ourselves as a human among other humans. Instead, imagine that other people, ourselves included, are reduced to unidentified phenomena. In that situation, what is left of your subjectivity as ‘yours’? Husserl says that there is still an ‘I’ but as mere center of activity. But one can still speak of a ‘ mine ness’ to experience, because all of my intnetional experiences of objects are correlated and assimilated to my previous experience in terms of
dimensions of similarity and difference. I guess what I’m saying is that you can construct and explain the basis of a whole world of nature, science and culture on the basis of what appears to a unique subjectivity. But this subjectivity , by virtue of being exposed every minute to changes in the objects it intends , is born anew in every new experience. So your very own unique subjectivity is always a slightly different subjectivity over time, The subject is changed by its objects.
Once you realize that the ‘you’ who experiences is always a slightly different ‘you’ , you can recognize other persons as having their own constantly changing subjectivity. If your own subjectivity is not a pure in-itself because of
its constant contamination from its world , then the barrier between your own subjectivity and that of other people no longer seems so impermeable.
I think that it has been a very useful discussion because consciousness is used so frequently on the forum and we all come from our own understanding of the idea, pand such different angles. I have found it really useful to read in this way.Of course, I think it would be far too much for you to put this all together in one thread. It would probably end up at creating a volume like Hegel's
'Phenomenology of Mind'. Besides, if the nature of consciousness was summed up in one thread, it would perhaps mean that the scope for it to be explored in many more might be lost..
The content of your own experience, too, is constructed from inference, as is the ‘you’ who experiences. What we can be certain of is the faculty of consciousness - awareness with. Anything else is inference.
Quoting Joshs
:up:
It's a powerful intuition.
Then we have this thing, this simultaneously abstract and concrete aspect to us, experience, which appears to be completely different from "solid" rocks and rivers. But we now know, relatively recently actually, that deep down, these solid things we see are inherently much stranger than we could have ever guessed. We no longer think of particles even, but of waves and ultimately, fields.
Once we take this into account, this strange thing experience, is comparatively less strange to assimilate relative to everything else.
But it took thousands of years to discover these strange aspects of matter. So our intuitions lead us astray...
Consciousness is reflexive.
I'd like to believe that. It would make my philosophical and psychological position on this question easier to defend. The problem is that I do recognize my own personal experience. There's a movie playing in my head with sound and a script. I'm also here talking to myself about what is going on and what I think about what is going on and what I think about my experience of what is going on.
... we must be mistaken... so, how?
Sure.
It's also intentional.
These tables and chairs and river, what makes them up, deep down is not solid concrete stuff.
Sure. And these particles, waves and fields, what they are, in sum, is tables, chairs and river, about which you have the powerful intuition of non-subjectivity, which seems to want to generalise to apply to fleshy animals, even against the opposing intuition. There is a choice of basis, then, for further investigation. Generalise, or not. Mono or duo.
Terms like “consciousness” aren’t normally a problem because the meaning is understood from the context.
But if we insist on having a definition it can be deduced from the sources.
It looks like the original meaning was “knowledge with” and by extension “self-knowledge” ("knowledge with/of oneself"), “self-awareness”, “consciousness”.
Greek: ?????????? suneidesis < sun + eidesis
Latin: conscius < con + scio
Sanskrit: ?????? samvid < sam + vid
So, the simplest definition in modern language would be something like “self-aware intelligence” or, more precisely, "that which is aware of itself as itself".
Having said that, you may be able to agree on a definition for the purposes of this thread or forum but you won't be able to enforce it worldwide, so that part of the problem will be very hard if not impossible to solve.
I understand what you mean but it is an inherent limit of language. We all use the same terms but due to “personality” and “individual identity and experience” the terms will always vary in what we each associate them with and understand.
A simple example is the term “colour” means something different to a professional artist than it does to ophthalmologist because they are both exposed to different training and education surrounding the word.
I think if we try to define every term unanimously we end the fluid nature of language. Think of an infinite regress of qualifying: if I qualify a term in my own words then I must qualify the words I used to qualify the initial one, then I have to qualify the ones that qualify the ones that I used to qualify the first ad infinitum.
To give you my true interpretation of the word there would be no difference between your awareness and level of knowledge and experience and mine we would be psychological twins. Identical in perspective.
The irony of such a case is language between us would become pointless. We would not be able to learn anything new from each other because in essence it would be like “talking to oneself”.
The functionality of language depends on us partially/imperfectly communicating exactly what we mean and thereby becoming aware of discrepancies which are informative.
As for the term “consciousness” I think it’s one of those hyper-vagueries - words that are so broad and ill defined that it would take an endless dimension of information to understand them sufficiently. Other hyper-vagueries would be to define words like “imagination” “you” “I” “abstraction” “everything” “energy” “information”.
We can give them brief and accurate surface level descriptions but of limited informative value. You can’t define “everything” without inadvertently referring to the term “everything” or common synonyms: totality, universal, entire, absolute etc.
Similarly I cannot refer to the term “consciousness” with anything but the content of consciousness. It’s self- referential and therefore can never be objective.
Yes, those are the options we have.
I still think that monism and property dualism are essentially the most often pursued views. I don't know many people who believe in substance dualism, aside from theologists.
And maybe a few people here and there. But it's a difficult view to articulate, it seems to me.
It's moot.
No.
It means there is only one kind of thing to study: different instantiations of physical stuff.
We don't study ghosts, Gods or angels...
Except by any other name...
I don't however claim to be a great authority. Nevertheless I have something to say about definitions, and it's this: in order to know whether you have come up with a correct definition, you must already know what the term means.
Correct. And it must be consistent with how the word has been used for centuries. That's why I said:
" It looks like the original meaning was “knowledge with” and by extension “self-knowledge” ("knowledge with/of oneself"), “self-awareness”, “consciousness”.
Greek: ?????????? suneidesis < sun + eidesis
Latin: conscius < con + scio
Sanskrit: ?????? samvid < sam + vid
So, the simplest definition in modern language would be something like “self-aware intelligence” or, more precisely, "that which is aware of itself as itself". "
And, pace 180 Degrees, I don't think "awareness of self-awareness = consciousness" is right: I think that is a higher level of consciousness. I think "consciousness = feeling" would be better.
If an entity can feel something, it's conscious.
He draws on his experience with patients who lacked any cerebral cortex, observing that they are nevertheless able to experience emotions. He notes that while the absence of cerebral cortex allows "feeling" to exist, the removal of only a few cc's of the brain stem causes irrevocable unconsciousness.
His take is that "emotion" is primary, and is located in the brain stem, a more "primitive" part of the brain. We've been looking in the wrong place.
That sounds most interesting, thanks.
I will listen later. In the meantime, I discovered that he offers a free online course:
https://www.futurelearn.com/courses/what-is-a-mind
'Professor Mark Solms, Chair of Neuropsychology at the University of Cape Town, will adopt a multidisciplinary approach.
He will bring in perspectives from a range of disciplines, to explore four specific aspects of the mind- subjectivity, intentionality, consciousness and agency. Together, these will help us think about the fundamental questions: what it is to be a mind, why we have a mind and what it feels like to have a mind.'
-------
A bit off track...but interesting to consider I think...
Apparently, Solms has been criticised as to his dream theory.
'Neuropsychologist and psychoanalyst Mark Solms (1997) made a major contribution to dream research through his clinico-anatomical studies, which reveal the outlines of the neural network that underlies dreaming. However, in more recent work he misunderstands the history of the rapid eye movement (REM)/non-REM (NREM) controversy in a Freudian-serving way and ignores the considerable systematic empirical evidence that contradicts the key claims of the Freudian dream theory he is trying to revive.'
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/533602
I don't know about there being a single correct definition but yes, I think it clear that you must have an idea of what it is you want to pin down...
Does that mean that some kind of background research or thinking should be done first.
That being the case, it is not always possible to define terms before you start an exploratory thread ?
So, people should not be unduly concerned or constrained.
Dialogue can lead to a better understanding...hopefully.
:cool:
John Searle says that, like many other terms, consciousness is best defined ostensively, that is, by pointing to examples.
That makes complete sense to me.
Quoting Daemon
Again, thanks for that. Exactly the way I was thinking - so it must be right :wink:
Interesting that you ‘recognise’ experience as a movie playing in your head. You do realise that this is a construction and not a recognition as such. So is talking to yourself about what is going on - it’s a probabilistic construction using the logic and qualities of language as an approximation.
It is clear to me from discussions on the thread that this isn't true. Actually, it's a broader topic than just this particular word. Discussions on the forum and elsewhere suffer from the fact that definitions are not agreed on at the beginning. If you read the rest of the thread I think you'll see this is true for "consciousness."
I don't think anyone posting on this thread disagrees with this. If they do, I hope they'll speak up.
The term still implies "awareness" and above all "self-awareness". What has changed?
Agreed, ambiguity is an inherent characteristic of language. That just means we have to try harder to agree in advance what words mean. Failure to do that is bad philosophy or, in a broader context, bad communications.
Quoting Benj96
This thread isn't about word definitions in general, it's about word definitions for use in philosophical discussions here on the thread. If an artist and an ophthalmologist want to have a discussion about color (note correct Amurcan spelling), they should make sure they're talking about the same thing.
Quoting Benj96
Ok, so it's impossible to discuss consciousness. And yet we discuss it here on the forum endlessly. Part of the reason the discussions are endless is that people don't agree on the definition they're using at the beginning.
By "substance dualism" do you mean that matter and consciousness are fundamentally different substances? If so, that is a common belief. Chalmers in the paper on the hard problem is explicit about that.
Agreed, but for the purposes of a philosophical discussion, or any specific discussion, it is more important that we agree on a definition than that the definition is precisely correct.
I disagree. I has to be consistent with the word's common usage now and it's particular usage in a particular context and a particular conversation.
I think @Possibility would disagree with this.
Well, that much I've noticed already to be honest. I was talking about everyday language in general. When we say things like "I become conscious", "I become aware", "I am self-conscious", etc. it is normally understood what is meant even if there is no precise definition for it in our mind.
Obviously, when more technical language is used, then a definition of the terms discussed should be agreed upon, otherwise meaningful discussion becomes difficult if not impossible. But then you would have to redefine it with every new discussion.
In any case, I still believe that consciousness is related to "awareness" and especially "self-awareness" which is also one of the dictionary definitions for it. So, it isn't all that different from how the word was used in the past.
That's what this whole thread is about.
In that case, you would need to redefine the term with every new discussion.
I don't disagree and I generally don't think there is a hard problem of consciousness, but I can't deny seeing the movie in my head. You calling that a "construction" doesn't change the fact that the movie feels like something. Some people think the experience must have a fundamentally different cause than the brain processing
I thought Chalmers was more of a property dualist. Which is a weaker view than substance dualism.
Yes, you can say "fundamentally different", but I had in mind metaphysically different, meaning a completely separate or distinct aspect of nature. I think we have good reasons to believe that experience is physical.
The problem with substance dualism, as I understand it, is that of interaction: how can two completely different aspects or features of nature interact?
With property dualism, this doesn't need to arise. One can speak of those aspects of nature that are experiential and those aspects of nature that are non-experiential. Of course, this can be endlessly debated.
I don't think that's true. Although failure to agree on definitions is a particular problem here on the forum, it is also a broader problem for discussions in general. As a civil engineer, I have to be very careful about what words I choose to use. Someday we can talk about the differences between the terms "hazardous waste," "hazardous material," and "hazardous substance." People can get in big trouble if they don't understand the difference.
Have you read the OP? Maybe you should.
You don't have to redefine it, just agree on what definition you are going to use.
Clearly this is true. Thanks for the information.
Are you suggesting that we agree on a set of definitions and then agree on one of them whenever we choose to discuss anything that involves "consciousness"?
No. The purpose of this thread is not necessarily to agree on definitions. It's to get them all out on the table so we can use and discuss them more intelligently in our other discussions. I'm actually a bit more confused than I was at the beginning. Or maybe it's more accurate to say I didn't know how confused I was back then.
I don't know if you've read any of my OPs in the past. What I try to do is be very specific about what the terms I plan to use mean in the context I plan to use them and provide justification. I generally willing to discuss different meanings and terms, but the final decision is mine. Then I try to enforce that meaning throughout the discussion. Oh, the wonderful power of the original poster.
lol I see. Unfortunately, I only read this OP because I found the topic of interest. How far do you think this thread has progressed in the right direction?
Quoting Amity
Also, useful to read TPF Guidelines on 'How to Write an OP':
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/7110/how-to-write-an-op/p1
I've found it very interesting and helpful and I've had fun. Others have indicated that they feel the same way. That's all I ever ask.
Ironically, perhaps, you've used a somewhat non-standard definition for "ostensively." You've addressed any possible misunderstanding by specifically identifying the meaning you are using. That is exactly the process I am describing when I say:
Quoting T Clark
Sounds good to me.
Yes, there is something - this is what I mean about the difference between talking about consciousness with (faculty) and consciousness of (capacity or content). We can talk about an electron in terms of what it does and any evidence of such, but not what it is. Likewise with energy. We’ve come to accept that this is what we mean by the terms, even if it’s only an aspect (our current perspective) of what the terms really mean.
Consciousness is objectively indeterminate as anything other than a faculty, a possibility or idea. That’s not to say it doesn’t exist, but that its capacity and its contents are variable. When you define consciousness as, say, the experience of a movie running in your head, you’re referring to your capacity to construct what feels like a movie running in your head (complete with soundtrack and script) from what consciousness is.
To say that this experience or consciousness is ‘caused’ by the brain processing is like saying that heat or energy is ‘caused’ by friction. Yes, but not really. Potential energy exists even if no friction occurs. And energy exists as a possibility even if no one intentionally manifests heat potential by arranging matter so that friction can occur. Likewise, consciousness is a faculty that exists even when we’re unaware of, or unable to fully manifest, its capacity. I’m inclined to believe that your consciousness consists of more than a movie running in your head, but that you construct this experience using language as your best approximation of information processed by the brain - that you’re aware of.
I’m also inclined to believe that while the brain processing information seems essential to human consciousness, it is not essential to consciousness, and does not explain it anymore than friction explains what energy is.
This doesn’t really help us to define consciousness, except to recognise the context of what we’re doing when we define it. What we can say about consciousness will always be an aspect of consciousness, limited by our own capacity to experience, and to reconstruct that experience from language.
Everything you've written makes sense to me. I don't know enough to be able to say whether or not it's correct, but it's the kind of answer I would expect to be right. I hope that makes sense. As I said, I don't buy the whole hard problem thing, but I can understand why people feel that way.
I think @Possibility would disagree with this.[/i]
I'd like to know more about this @T Clark @Possibility.
. Consciousness is your nature; mind is just the circumference created by the society around you, the culture, your education.
. Mind means the conditioning. You can have a Hindu mind, but you cannot have a Hindu consciousness. You can have a Christian mind, but you can't have a Christian consciousness. Consciousness is one; it is not divisible. Minds are many because societies are many; cultures, religions are many. Each culture, each society, creates a different mind. Mind is a social by-product. And unless this mind dissolves, you cannot go within; you cannot know what is really your nature, what is authentically your existence, your consciousness.
. The effort to move into meditation is a struggle against the mind. Mind is never meditative, it is never silent, so to say 'a silent mind' is meaningless, absurd. It is just like saying 'a healthy disease'. It makes no sense. How can there be a disease that is healthy? Disease is disease, and health is the absence of disease.
. There is nothing like a silent mind. When silence is there, there is no mind. When mind is there, there is no silence. Mind, as such, is the disturbance, the disease. Meditation is the state of no-mind. Not of a silent mind, not of a healthy mind, not of a concentrated mind, no. Meditation is the state of no-mind: no society within you, no conditioning within you. Just you, with your pure consciousness.
. In Zen they say: Find out your original face. The face that you are using is not original; it is cultivated. It is not your face; it is just a facade, just a device. You have many faces, each moment you change your face. You go on changing it. The changing has become so automatic by now that you don't even observe it, you don't notice it.
. When you meet your servant you have a different face from when you meet your boss. If your servant is sitting on your left side and your boss is sitting on your right, you have two faces. The left face is for the servant and the right face is for the boss. You are two persons simultaneously. How can you have the same face for your servant? Your one eye has a certain quality, a certain look. Your other eye has a different quality, a different look. It is meant for the boss and the other one is meant for the servant. This has become so automatic, so mechanical, so robot like that you go on changing your faces, you have multi-faces, and not a single one is the original.
. In Zen they say: Find out your original face, the face you had before you were born, or the face you will have when you are dead. What is that original face? That original face is your consciousness. All your other faces come from your mind.
. Remember well that you don't have one mind; you have multi-minds. Forget the concept that everyone has one mind. You don't have, you have many minds: a crowd, a multiplicity; you are poly-psychic. In the morning you have one mind, in the afternoon a different mind and in the evening still a different mind. Every single moment you have a different mind.
. Mind is a flux: river like, flowing, changing. Consciousness is eternal, one. It is not different in the morning and different in the evening. It is not different when you are born and different when you die. It is one and the same, eternal. Mind is a flux. A child has a childish mind, an old man has an old mind; but a child or an old man have the same consciousness, which is neither childish nor old. It cannot be.
. Mind moves in time and consciousness lives in timelessness. They are not one. But we are identified with the mind. We go on saying, insisting, 'My mind. I think this way. This is my thought. This is my ideology.' Because of this identification with the mind, you miss that which you really are.
. Dissolve these links with the mind. Remember that your minds are not your own. They have been given to you by others: your parents, your society, your university. They have been given to you. Throw them away. Remain with the simple consciousness that you are ¯ pure consciousness, innocent. This is how one moves from the mind to meditation. This is how one moves away from society, from the without to the within. This is how one moves from the man-made world, the maya, to the universal truth, the existence.
. I do not move by arguments ... arguments are futile friend ...
. That which is ... is ... was ... and it will ever be ... regardless your so-called philosophical arguments ...
. I'll stop ... if you philosophize me ... how does the sugar tastes. Do it, so I don't have to prove it ...
OK. That is one mind talking, even if it is from the source of consciousness.
For me, 'real nature' includes the brain and mind as tools which enable awareness of the world; the experiences, thoughts and feelings.
This kind of consciousness involves sentient elements, some label 'qualia'. The subjective feel of what it is like to be 'human'.
Quoting Anand-Haqq
The mind can certainly disturb and it can be the source of ill health. However, it is not a disease in itself.
It can be seen as a tool whereby we attend to and process the world; we observe, assess, evaluate with a view to action based on best evidence available. That includes decision-making. Which path to follow.
But it's even more than that...
Quoting Anand-Haqq
No. I am one physical person with a brain and mind. My eyes might have different qualities.
But it is the quality of mind that matters. I note and respect differences. It is true that we can change our 'face' according to circumstance and context - that is done for all kinds of reasons. Call it a survival instinct or being flexible, taking others needs into account...as well as our own.
Quoting Anand-Haqq
Who or what is it that tells you to 'Remember well that...'
I consider it to be a case of one mind, different 'selves' or 'voices'.
That one mind can and does change. That is its nature.
Adapting to the environment and different experiences.
Quoting Anand-Haqq
Who is this 'we' you talk of ?
That is a generalisation, not always applicable to individuals.
Some don't have a single ideology, they have a 'way of thinking'. This can involve looking at life holistically. Also being sceptical of what they are being told e.g. 'Remember well that...'.
Quoting Anand-Haqq
No. I will pass on dissolving links with the mind. Without it, I could not respond.
Again, one mind, different 'selves' or 'voices'. Not about to be discarded.
I can exist and move between any internal and the external world quite happily.
Thanks for your thoughts. Worth considering if only to clarify my own :cool:
In one sense, your post is an argument in that you are setting out statements as to what mind means to you.
These efforts to locate ‘emotion’ in a more ‘primitive’ part of the brain may be outdated - recent research in neuroscience and psychology shows ‘emotion’ to be a whole brain process linked to the construction of concepts and language development. There is, however, an aspect of this process - referred to as ‘affect’ - that is nevertheless considered a fundamental correlate of consciousness.
It’s important to point out, though, that what is referred to here as ‘core affect’ or feeling is NOT ‘emotion’. The article quoted above gives some relevant details, and argues that “emotion is just one class of affective feeling”. It is also pointed out late in the article (in section 6.2. ‘Core affect as a fundamental feature of conscious experience’) that “affective circuitry offers the only path by which sensory information from the outside world reaches the brainstem and basal forebrain” - which sort of ties in to what Solm is saying.
But any conclusion that ‘emotion is primary, and is located in the brain stem’ seems to me a misinterpretation of the research. I would argue that it isn’t ‘emotion’ that is primary, but affect.
Perhaps I should have said "affect" rather than "emotion". I was speaking quite loosely and I did put "emotion" in scare quotes.
Would you be happy with "affect is primary and is located in the brain stem"?
Happy Monday!
In the spirit of using some sense of logic, if the [your] premise is that consciousness is not 'special' or that there is no 'mystery' associated with same, it seems then we have a default of sorts back to logic and reason in order to determine why that is so.
If we try to put logic to the meaning of consciousness, more often than not, we naturally default to whether consciousness can be explained meaningfully. And as such, we ask if it can be explained logically.
Do you feel consciousness can be explained logically? Is it outside the domains of formal logic or the usual categories of human thought (much like other things/phenomena in life)? Does it violate rules such as bivalence, excluded middle, and other a priori axiomatic methods? If your answer is that consciousness can be explained logically, then your foregoing supposition that it's not special holds. But, unfortunately, I don't think it does (unless you can support your claim). It's as if you're repeating some false paradigm that says 'there's no mystery in life; my self-awareness is not unique'.
But that's ok, perhaps a completely different approach (maybe more fun), may simply be in the form of the so-called limitations of language, to capture this meaning of consciousness. For instance, if we parse the actual meaning of meaning, we find some interesting definitions to play with:
[i]The word "flight" has two different meanings: a plane journey, and the act of running away.
It's sometimes very difficult to draw a clear distinction between the meanings of different words.
Intended to communicate something that is not directly expressed.
In linguistics, meaning is what the source or sender expresses, communicates, or conveys in their message to the observer or receiver, and what the receiver infers from the current context.
Synonym: A reason or justification given for an action or belief.[/i]
Generally, if one were to parse consciousness and its meaning, one definition could be that it's polysemous in nature. Meaning (pardon the pun), because not only do we have the phenomena associated with the conscious, subconscious and the unconscious mind (all working together in an illogical mix), we have philosophical ambiguities connected with an individual's perception of truth (Subjectivity). Different people experience the same text, and come away with different statements of fact about that text’s meaning. Humans all react to the same world-text, but we all live in our own simulation of how that world “factually” exists.
And so some would argue that meaning itself, is neither objective nor subjective, deterministic nor relativistic; meaning is contingent. In that simple context, consciousness means that one simply enjoys the opportunity to experience meaningfulness.
Not really. Affect is probabilistically located at best - it refers to a core ingredient of all mental states that is “at once, tied to a person’s interoceptive sensations from the body and exteroceptive sensations from the world”. Affective circuitry is in the brain stem, but it’s also ‘located’ in a number of other areas of the brain, and is characterised by degeneracy. I suggest you read the article.
Indeed. See also @Wayfarer right at the beginning
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/532466
Responses:
Quoting T Clark
From: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/532484
[quote="Wayfarer;532486" ]I at least want to come up with a meaning that applies to the "hard problem of consciousness" people talk about.
— T Clark
Are you familiar with the original paper, which is here http://consc.net/papers/facing.html
Perhaps it might be useful to talk in terms of what you do or don't agree with or understand about this paper, as that is the one that defined the problem.[/quote]
From: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/532486
Follow up:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/533243
Ending with:
Quoting T Clark
Followed by an interesting discussion re behaviour with @Joshs
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/533311
What does probabilistically (located) mean in this context?
I did not find this:
Quoting Daemon
in any of the dictionaries I looked in. I'm reasonably well-read but I had never heard the word used in that way. I wouldn't have been able to figure out what you meant from context. I think that is true of most people on the forum and in the world in general.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
An ostensive definition conveys the meaning of a term by pointing out examples. This type of definition is often used where the term is difficult to define verbally, either because the words will not be understood (as with children and new speakers of a language) or because of the nature of the term (such as colors or sensations). It is usually accompanied with a gesture pointing to the object serving as an example, and for this reason is also often referred to as "definition by pointing".
An ostensive definition assumes the questioner has sufficient understanding to recognize the type of information being given. Ludwig Wittgenstein writes:
So one might say: the ostensive definition explains the use—the meaning—of the word when the overall role of the word in language is clear. Thus if I know that someone means to explain a colour-word to me the ostensive definition "That is called 'sepia' " will help me to understand the word.... One has already to know (or be able to do) something in order to be capable of asking a thing's name. But what does one have to know?[1]
The limitations of ostensive definition are exploited in a famous argument from the Philosophical Investigations (which deal primarily with the philosophy of language), the private language argument, in which Wittgenstein asks if it is possible to have a private language that no one else can understand.[2]
John Passmore states that the term was first defined by the British logician William Ernest Johnson (1858–1931):
"His neologisms, as rarely happens, have won wide acceptance: such phrases as "ostensive definition", such contrasts as those between ... "determinates" and "determinables", "continuants" and "occurrents", are now familiar in philosophical literature" (Passmore 1966, p. 344).
Do you feel that an apple can be explained logically? Consciousness is a phenomenon, it's behavior.
Quoting 3017amen
I really don't know what you're trying to say. I think we've laid out good ways to talk about consciousness in this thread. What else is needed?
I never doubted you had used the word correctly. That doesn't change the fact that this usage is not one most people are familiar with. Instead of "non-standard" I should have said "unfamiliar." That doesn't change the substance of what I was saying.
This distracts from the point @Daemon was making*
It was clear to me from the context.
*John Searle says that, like many other terms, consciousness is best defined ostensively, that is, by pointing to examples.
I meant to ask @Daemon if he could provide the source.
T Clark!
I'm not following 'the logic' on that. Maybe you could ask that question in another way. In other words, are you trying to equate consciousness with an apple? If so, then I suppose your supposition holds that it (consciousness) is not special nor is it a mystery. But, of course, using logic, that would be false. Does that sound right?
Quoting T Clark
Gosh, that's a loaded question. I agree your thread 'laid out good ways to talk about consciousness'. It's a fascinating subject no doubt. The thread doesn't explain it though.... . So in a way, we're kinda back to the so-called logic of conscious existence, for which there seems to be mystery...
As I think I've made clear, the purpose of this thread is not to explain consciousness.
:up:
I wasn't commenting on the content of what @Daemon said. I used it as a positive example of why it is important for us to make sure people understand the meaning of the words we use.
Quoting Amity
It was clear to you because he gave the definition, which was my point.
Agreed.
That is my point. The substance of the post was a useful contribution to the way consciousness is defined. Why not make a response to that ?
Quoting T Clark
I understood that albeit in a roundabout way.
Quoting T Clark
[s]Yes[/s] Actually - No. I first guessed at meaning of 'ostensively' as I read. Then the 'that is...' confirmed it. It wasn't an obvious definition of 'ostensively'.
So why then did you appear not to 'get it' ?
Quoting T Clark
So, what did or do you think, if anything, of Searle's view as put forward ?
Unfortunate - because referencing sources is good practice.
It helps to substantiate and readers can decide if it is a correct interpretation of a view.
However, I can follow it up. Appreciate your contribution.
I think I'm done here in any case. Enjoy :smile:
I think Damon and I have resolved any misunderstanding there was.