Michael

And as I have already mentioned, the rest of us are interested in further considerations. We want to know if moral truths are expressions of individua...

I'm expecting philosophical considerations to help me determine what "one ought not" means and whether or not moral truths are determined to any exten...

You seem to view the distinction as: 1. Moral non-cognitivism 2. Error theory 3. Moral realism Others view the distinction as: 1. Moral non-cognitivis...

You said that "if the consequence of an argument is unacceptable, it is open to us to reject the argument." So you offer an argument for some morality...

If moral realism is correct then it is perfectly appropriate to ask "what if they're wrong?" So to simply use this example of socially advantageous be...

Unacceptable to who? You and I might disagree over whether or not abortion, eating meat, and the death penalty are unacceptable.

I think you're being overly pedantic here. In the case of chess there was a majority consensus amongst the group authorized to decide the laws. In the...

On what grounds do you justify this assertion? It seems to beg the question. And what happens when two people disagree over whether or not something i...

They are if the ontology of chess is such that the rules are dictated by some relevant authority, which they are. Cavemen didn't just discover the rul...

Are you saying that the rules didn't change? Because they did. That's simply indisputable. I don't understand what's circular about it? The people who...

Well this isn't true. The FIDE rules of chess last changed in January of this year to add a seventy-five move rule. Some moral subjectivists disagree....

This is ambiguous. It may be that our moral beliefs are consistent with socially advantageous strategies designed to foster cooperation, but it doesn'...

But what does this have to do with morality? There can be non-moral obligations. I ought to brush my teeth otherwise they will fall out, but it's not ...

According to moral subjectivism, yes, hence what I said before: 1. It would not be wrong to eat babies if everyone were to say so (subjectivism), or 2...

Moral subjectivists might. They might argue that moral rules are the collectively decided rules of social behaviour (if not simply an individual's own...

"Socially advantageous behaviour is morally right" does not seem to be a tautology. If it's not a tautology then the meaning of "morally right" cannot...

If you don't think the worth of a diamond is a good example then consider the rules of chess. We can change them by collective decision. Can we change...

Note that I said if. I didn't say only if.

Perhaps a more suitable question for the consequentialist is to explain the difference between these worlds: 1. Causing pain has no moral value 2. Cau...

You said that one ought not kick the puppy because it hurts the puppy. How is this to be interpreted as anything other than you ascribing moral value ...

That's an example of non-cognitivism. I provide a different explanation of the difference between objectivity and subjectivity here. It's a complex is...

I don't think that this is accurate. Consider the possible worlds again: 1. No morality but everyone believes that it is immoral to kill babies 2. It ...

I don't, but I can set out an argument to properly lay out the options: If moral sentences are truth-apt then either some moral sentence is true or it...

Yes, but this can be examined in more detail: 1. “One ought not X” is true if everyone says so 2. “One ought not Y” is true even if everyone says othe...

So some moral truths are true even if everyone says otherwise?

I’ll phrase it another way: Some things are true if everyone says so and some things are true even if everyone says otherwise. Which of these is the c...

We can do away with the term and still address the substance of the disagreement. The article I referenced offered an example: 1. The diamond is made ...

Many in this discussion believe that moral statements have a truth value. The main disagreement seems to be precisely on its objectivity. Are they tru...

It's not as simple as that. Moral Anti-Realism Even your quote from a different article continued with "... (although some accounts of moral realism s...

1. Moral propositions are not truth-apt (non-cognitivism) 2. Moral propositions are truth-apt (cognitivism) 2a. All moral propositions are false (erro...

And I have been explaining non-naturalism so now I don’t understand the relevance of your comments.

How so? I don’t see a problem with knowing that I ought to do one thing but choosing to do another because, say, it’s in my self interest.

I’m not sure what it has to do with weakness? I’m questioning the extent to which moral obligations are a sufficient motivator.

You’re arguing that ethical non-naturalism isn’t tenable because it disagrees with your ethical naturalism. That’s not a rebuttal, it’s begging the qu...

For it to be a rebuttal you must prove that moral facts can be explained in non-moral terms. You must prove that "one ought not kick puppies for fun b...

You have claimed that one ought not kick the puppy because it hurts the puppy. The ethical non-naturalist, being a non-naturalist, rejects this connec...

John says that God exists. Jane says that John's claim is fatally flawed because God doesn't exist. Jane says that God doesn't exist. John says that J...

Then you're simply stating your disagreement with ethical non-naturalism (and moral realism). That's fine, but it doesn't constitute a rebuttal of the...

And as I said, that's ethical naturalism. Those kinds of explanations are impossible for ethical non-naturalism. According to ethical non-naturalism, ...

What "deep facts"?

All you seem to be saying here is that moral realism is incorrect. Obviously this is begging the question.

Why is it a flaw? If infinitism is incorrect then there are, necessarily, brute physical facts. If there are brute physical facts then why can't there...

That's ethical naturalism. Ethical non-naturalism, by definition, cannot offer this kind of explanation. If ethical non-naturalism is correct then eit...

The question is one about motivation. Knowing that I ought to do something isn't always enough to convince me to do it. Sometimes I do things I know I...

There are three possible options: 1. There are no moral facts (error theory) 2. There are moral facts that can be explained by non-moral facts (ethica...

You seem to be confusing metaethics with descriptive ethics. Moral facts, as per moral realism, are independent from our moral judgements.

If moral facts are not reducible to non-moral facts (whether physical or mathematical or magical) then they must be brute.

If moral facts are brute facts then there is no explanation.

Yes.

It's either that or infinitism. Brute facts seem more reasonable to me than an infinite regress.