Michael

Well, if ¬X is evidence of ¬Y then is X not evidence of Y? And this is the problem of induction, isn't it? We use an incomplete sample to make univers...

I don't understand this at all. If I define a bachelor as an unmarried man then I will understand the claim "I am not a bachelor" as the claim "I am n...

I don't know if they understand the mental to be self-organising and closed for causation. But that's not relevant to my question. Again, given that y...

How is it incoherent? If they agree with your claim that everything is self-organising and closed for causation then they agree with the proposition e...

This is why I try not to debate with you. Most of the time it seems like you're trolling. I'm going to end this before it gets any further.

So you don't agree that "if something is a raven then it is black" means the same thing as "if something isn't black then it isn't a raven"?

So you understand but don't agree that logically equivalent statements mean the same thing?

I quoted the part that said that they were logically equivalent. I assumed (naively, apparently) that you understood what that meant.

The part where it states that the statements are logically equivalent. As explained here, "Two sentences can be equivalent in a sense much stronger th...

You seem to be saying that contraposition doesn't have anything to do with the meaning of the statements. I'm showing you that you're wrong. Via contr...

Read up on contraposition. Here's a simple summary:

We're not ignoring the semantic content of the statements. That they're logically equivalent is that they have the same semantic content.

I'm pretty sure it's axiomatic. If statements X and Y are logically equivalent then they have the same truth value in every model. Therefore if some A...

The relevance is that if you don't understand the dualist's claim "the mind isn't physical" to mean "the mind isn't both self-organising and closed fo...

They're logically equivalent because of the law of contraposition, and evidence for one is evidence for the other because they're logically equivalent...

I don't know what you mean by this question. How would you make sense of the causal connection between one physical thing and another? If you define t...

This proposed dichotomy between the mind and the world is a false one. Rather the dichotomy is between the mind and the physical, with both making up ...

Are you suggesting then that the dualist claims that the mental is either not self-organising or not closed for causality?

Are you defining "physical" as "not-transcendental or supernatural"? Then what does it mean to be transcendental or supernatural?

I liked Cambodia. Nice place.

That doesn't really work either. If the physical is mind-independent stuff then the mind isn't physical by definition.

So you can't be a physicalist and an instrumentalist?

Heh, just watched an episode of The Simpsons that's airing on Sky1: Coincidence or no?

Self-flagellation?

The second premise is false. The first premise is true whenever both "pigs can fly" and "the moon is made of cheese" is true. Given that it's a materi...

Arguments aren't true or false; they're valid or invalid, and the above is valid. Chalmers' first premise isn't a biconditional. It might be that cons...

But the point of the paradox is that this isn't the end of it. Green apples are evidence that as far as I know all things that aren't black aren't rav...

Then green apples support the claim "as far as I know, all ravens are black".

If that were the case then much of science would have to be dismissed. From a finite number of observations we infer general rules of nature that are ...

And green apples are also evidence that all ravens are white.

No. Green apples are evidence that support this claim. They're not black and not ravens.

And it's still the case that (1) is true iff (2) is true. Therefore evidence that supports the truth of (2) also supports the truth of (1).

They're logically equivalent. Therefore evidence that supports the truth of one ipso facto supports the truth of the other. You can't say that you hav...

If they're logically equivalent then how can something support (2) in terms of matters of fact (whatever that means) but not (1)?

I don't think it's that simple. What counts as "the stuff of physics"? If you just mean whatever is currently posited by scientific models then how do...

I don't know much about the details, but isn't it hypocritical of May to condemn Trump's stance on refugees whilst pushing a hard Brexit that allows h...

Is that because qualia is uniquely causally efficacious? Or is qualia a necessary product of the types of physical states that are required to cause s...

The fact that you've just asserted it and haven't provided any evidence to support it.

That the second premise isn't supported.

Not necessarily. Presumably there's some sort of falsifiable evidence that hasn't yet been falsified which acts as a fundamental premise?

And what's the evidence for this?

What's the evidence for 2)?

Interesting article.

It's not clear what you mean by us being pawns. Am I a pawn of gravity? Am I unwittingly (or wittingly) being made to move towards the Earth's core? I...

Doesn't matter for what? I don't understand your question. It is a simple fact that "every human-appearing non-conscious thing is conscious" is a cont...

Yes. His conclusion is "every human-appearing non-conscious thing is conscious".

I'm saying that the conclusion is a contradiction, given that a p-zombie is defined as not being conscious. Therefore one of his premises must be fals...

I took a survey on free will and responsibility and one of the questions was "how responsible are you for losing a game of chess?". That one had me st...

Why should they be more accentuated in the one than in the other?

Sylvia Walby describes it concretely as: The state: women are unlikely to have formal power and representation The household: women are more likely to...