Does it matter? He believes it to be true, he has evidence that it's true, and it's true. Just as with me and the proposition "London is the capital c...
He has evidence of p, and p ? q follows from p, and so he has evidence of p ? q. Should I believe the following? London is the capital city of England...
It tells you that Smith believes p ? q, by his own admission. Trying to argue that Smith doesn't believe p ? q doesn't make sense. You might as well t...
We're told that S has evidence of p, that S knows that p ? q follows from p, and so that S has evidence of p ? q. We're also told that S, recognising ...
That's not relevant to the issue of epistemic closure. The principle simply states that if one knows that p and if one knows that p entails q then one...
You mean <snip the bit that proves creativesoul wrong>? I haven't said they are, so again this is a straw man. I'm not going to continue discussing wi...
I don't think that they need some kind of justification. I think that a realist interpretation of such claims needs some kind of justification. I acce...
I'm not saying they do, so this is a straw man. I'm saying that if he believes that Mary will pay me because Jones owns a Ford then he believes that M...
The fact that there are two parts to Smith's belief. 1) Mary will give him £10, and 2) she will do this because Jones owns a Ford. If someone were to ...
Smith believes that Mary will give him £10. Smith has a true belief. He's correct in his belief that Mary will give him £10, but incorrect in his beli...
What about my example of Mary giving Smith £10? 1. Mary tells Smith that she will give him £10 if Jones owns a Ford or if Brown is in Barcelona 2. Smi...
As a general rule, the government should do what the electorate asks it to do. Governments are established "by the people, for the people". But then, ...
Well, I suppose at the very least it would only need to be as big as the combined size of all brains on Earth. But then we might be able to improve on...
Presumably consciousness depends on the right material. Pen and paper isn't sufficiently like brain matter to seem a reasonable source of consciousnes...
They say nothing about doubt or knowledge. They only say that it's more likely that we're simulations or Boltzmann brains. Doubt may follow from recog...
That's what Boltzmann does: "The number of self-aware brains that spontaneously and randomly form out of the chaos, complete with memories of a life l...
Sure, but we can see that we don't. So we can rule out that possibility. That then leaves us with a consistent BB or no BB, with the former more likel...
Sure, but then there are vastly more Boltzmann brain scenarios that are consistent than there are non-Boltzmann brain scenarios (or at least that the ...
A posthuman stage is one that is capable of running high-fidelity ancestor simulations. So there are three options: 1. we never get to that stage, 2. ...
An example of the Gettier problem. And I've set it out quite clearly: 1. Mary tells Smith that she will give him £10 if Jones owns a Ford or if Brown ...
You're hopelessly confused, @"creativesoul", so let's try a simpler example. 1. Mary tells Smith that she will give him £10 if Jones owns a Ford or if...
It's exactly what you're saying. You're saying that Smith doesn't believe that "Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is true, despite the fact ...
According to what you have said, yes. Or would you like to go back on this: "My point has been that if different things interact with each other, then...
Then physicalism and idealism are identical. They both just assert "all things interact with each other". They'd also be false, given that some things...
1. The claim "only mental phenomena exists" doesn't entail the claim "only my mental phenomena exists", and so idealism doesn't entail solipsism. 2. I...
He also has a true belief. "Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is true if Brown is in Barcelona. Brown is in Barcelona, therefore "Jones owns...
What I'm taking issue with is the claim "everything is physical" or "everything is mental". The point is that it isn't even clear what it means to be ...
Time and space. Or something else. Regardless, one can claim that only mental phenomena exists without claiming that only my mental phenomena exists. ...
Yes. Except I wouldn't use the "either ... or ..." terminology as that implies an exclusive or, which isn't actually entailed by Jones owning a Ford. ...
The fundamental issue I take with your account is that it sets up a bizarre situation where: 1. I know that "Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelon...
Like this? “Look, having nuclear — my uncle was a great professor and scientist and engineer, Dr. John Trump at MIT; good genes, very good genes, OK, ...
Then what if Smith has strong evidence to suggest that it's water, but in fact it's vodka? He has a justified true belief that "the glass contains wat...
A false belief isn't nonsense. It's just false. If you have a cat and I believe that you don't have a cat then the principle of explosion doesn't come...
I think what you're doing is conflating Smith's argument and Gettier's argument. Smith's argument is: 1. p 2. p ? p ? q 3. p ? q He recognises it as v...
The bit in bold is the bit that doesn't make sense: (p ? q) ? (¬p ? q) ? q It's not that at all. It's: B(p ? q) ? (¬p ? q) There's no false premise. S...
The third step makes no sense in context. You should have it as this, where B(r) is "Smith believes r": 1. B(p) 2. B(p ? q) 3. ¬p 4. q 5. ¬p ? q 6. B(...
It might be worth actually looking into pluralistic idealism. It's really quite simple. One can claim that only mental phenomena exists without claimi...
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