That must be an intentional misread. The meaning of "could" in that sentence has nothing to do with our propositional attitude, but whether or not som...
Sure. The issue is whether or not certainty as a propositional attitude is justified. If there's a 10% chance that something will happen, is it reason...
If I've flipped a coin then it might be true that it landed heads up but it won't be certain that it landed heads up. As I said before, certainty in t...
Let's say I flip a fair coin and randomly select a card from an ordinary deck. I tell you truthfully that either the coin landed heads up or that the ...
Because I drew a distinction between me being certain and it being certain. I am certain that I will win the lottery tomorrow. That's about my attitud...
The hard problem was coined by Chalmers in Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness: There's no problem of explaining how physical processes "give ri...
It's not just a propositional attitude. If I remove 13 hearts from an ordinary deck of cards then it is certain that I won't find another, even if I b...
I think the hard problem is only a problem if you subscribe to substance or property dualism. If you reject the notion of there being something like q...
Well, we can certainly agree that truth is distinct from certainty, given that the main disagreement is over whether or not we can be certain of anyth...
That's not what I claim. It's not what the materialist claims either. There is matter that isn't consciousness. What I've said is that, according to t...
Why? Does the materialist need to explain how some matter is identical to brain activity and others aren't, and how it persists? Does he need to expla...
Yes, but the materialist will argue that there's more to the world than just the brain. There is matter in the world that has nothing to do with consc...
Except that's not what it is at all, as I've said above. They might believe that the mind is identical to some material thing (e.g. brain activity), b...
No I haven't. I've said that materialists can be identity theorists. Contrary to bahman's repeated claims, materialism doesn't require epiphenomenalis...
Identity theory might not be right, but it doesn't then follow that materialists cannot be identity theorists. If materialism allows for identity theo...
So you say. But given that there is a rich history of the competing monisms of materialism, idealism and neutral monism, I'm going to need more than j...
I'm not saying that identity theory doesn't have any problems. I'm saying that materialism doesn't entail epiphenomenalism, and so to attack materiali...
Your criticism doesn't make any sense. The identity theorist argues that consciousness is identical to certain brain processes, and you respond by say...
You mean "how does this persistence of certain brain processes come about"? What do you mean by that, and why wouldn't the materialist be able to expl...
I'm not sure how you read that into it. But I'm really not sure what to else to say but that identity theory isn't epiphenomenalism, and is something ...
I'm saying that that is what some materialists will claim. See The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Contrary to your repeated claims, materialism doesn't e...
Then the best explanation is that the algorithm used by the person who made it doesn't accurately show the complexities of the test-taker's philosophi...
MU, and I assume also Magnus, are using "doubt" to mean "lack of certainty", and it seems reasonable to lack certainty if something isn't certain. If ...
Also, they refused to enforce Russia sanctions, despite a near-unanimously supported bill, soon after the Russian spy chief met with intelligence offi...
The brain state is the physical process. That brain state causally influences the world, most notably the central nervous system. All of this can be s...
I don't know anything about Daoism, so I can't really comment. But at least with the monisms I'm familiar with there's an alleged difference between s...
The materialist won't say that consciousness "materialises" out of a state. They will say that consciousness is that state. The distinction between "c...
The study referenced in the article doesn't actually show that. It shows that we're better at learning when we're conscious, not that we're better at ...
I know what I'm trying to say. The materialist may argue that consciousness is identical to a particular arrangement and behaviour of matter (e.g. the...
I have no idea what you mean. There's a bunch of physical matter in a particular state, i.e. arranged in a particular way and behaving a certain way. ...
And the materialist who equates consciousness with brain states (for example) will say that consciousness (brain states) causes things. So there's no ...
Why? Can't they say that consciousness is real, just physical in nature? Besides, the above seems rather self-defeating. Are illusions physical, or ar...
I didn't say it is. I said if it is. I don't know how one would go about showing that one is more reasonable than the other. Perhaps parsimony? A rela...
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