OK, but that title is such as it is only because the T-schema is conventionally understood to be a deflationary account of truth. I am mainly concerne...
I am not addressing truth, though, but merely correspondence. I am simply saying that 'snow is white' corresponds to snow being white or else it is se...
Yes, it seems self-evident that claims correspond or fail to correspond to the way the world is, and that even false claims (as opposed to nonsense) c...
Thanks for both of your responses. It appears to me that you have answered the wrong question, though. You have answered or referred to the question a...
You said that you can't refute someone saying they lack belief in God just as you can't refute their saying that they lack pain. So, if the analogy is...
Thanks Moliere, that clarifies one point for me, although I am still not sure how idealism and physicalism are themselves anything other than differen...
Thanks for your great responses, Pierre. Unfortunately I am pressed for time at the moment; I will try to respond further as soon as possible, particu...
According to the way you have framed it, wouldn't the analogy to " there is no such thing as pain" be "there is no such thing as belief in God" and no...
I don't disagree that language is plausibly thought to be necessary for "full-blown conceptual abilities"; Damasio also acknowledges this with his not...
I tend to agree that at least some animals share our ability to understand sameness and difference. This "understanding" though would be something alo...
Thanks for your erudite response Pierre, it elaborates the issue in ways that I find myself in complete agreement with, except...I am not sure about t...
Yes, you're right; I probably should have written "Can what we say about our experiences correspond to those experiences". Yeah I am pretty familiar w...
I'm still not getting it Moliere; do you mean to say that the conceptual scheme: idealism' can be translated into the conceptual scheme: 'physicalism'...
Perhaps it is a confusing, even poor, choice of terminology. I did not intend to suggest that the logical content of experience is itself a phenomenon...
You are using a narrow definition of logic as propositional or predicate logic; so apparently we are talking about different things. In any case the p...
If there were no logical relation between your experiences and what you say about them, then you would not actually be saying anything about them, wou...
Correspondence, as I see it is a purely logical relation between what I say and what I experience or what I would experience. So if I say "it is raini...
I think the only viable understanding of truth (in the propositional not in the 'truth as aletheia' sense ) we have is that truth corresponds to, or i...
This is interesting WW, I haven't investigated Hadot at all, But from what you say there is some commonality with both Hegel and Heidegger; the former...
I don't see this Moliere, because physicalism is the ontological position that asserts that physical matter is the only real substance or ultimate exi...
Yes, I agree, I don't generally find Landru to be one who is genuinely interested in discussion with anyone that is coming from a different set of pre...
Before science became as institutionalized in the academy and integrally linked with technology as it is today many of the great paradigmatic scientif...
I agree that grand theories should not be taken too seriously, but it might be fun creating one yourself or attempting to understand one that has been...
I have been arguing for the value of an individual life, whether it is worth living, being based on the feeling that the individual has of whether the...
For every sophisticated argument supporting any position there is (potentially, at least) always a more sophisticated argument supporting its antithes...
I can see a relation to be confused about between an ass (we spell it 'arse') and an elbow, given they are both body parts, but none at all between an...
Didn't you mean " my asshole from a hole in the ground"? >:). Sorry, gross and uncalled for I know, but in the context it just kind of jumped out at m...
I don't disagree with your first sentence, after all I did also write this in the same post: I think the idea that life is generally ( read 'always') ...
Existentially or phenomenologically speaking, a person's life is worth living if the person feels overall good enough about it not to either end it or...
If you think the feeling cannot exist without being described then you are, quite simply, wrong. Phenomenology and modern neuroscience both bear this ...
This problem exists as much with particulars; for example where does the object we can all see exist? By this I mean not 'where in relation to the oth...
What I meant was that the notion of a conceptual scheme seems to be compatible with idealism, anti-realism and realism; that is it seems to be compati...
Sapientia has already answered this misunderstanding in a way that should clear up your ongoing confusion, but just in case...yes, I am claiming that ...
It would perhaps be more correct to say that the structure of reality gains access to us, and gives rise to perception, although even to say that seem...
I think you would interpret anything that disagrees with you as a "vehement response". I don't think I have vehemently responded except to what I have...
I would say the examined life is richer, but only for those who get off on examining their lives. I think most philosophically unreflective people, if...
I agree that philosophy in its ethical dimension is more a matter of dissolving problems than solving them. Of course, there is no "endgame" in philos...
I think you're right Willow, Berkeley's position is more or less equivalent to direct realism insofar as the things perceived are understood by him to...
I would say the analogy is that physical objects, just like irrational numbers, are not completely determinate; but this does not stop them being disc...
I had thought that is the very point Quine is making; that conceptual schemes are not ontologically neutral. Or are you wanting to say that the very n...
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