I don't think it makes sense to say that entities, thought of as being utterly pre-conceptual existents, underwrite anything. If you want to say that ...
If trees are indeed publicly available, as they certainly seem to be, then, sure they are " publicly available prior to our being able to talk like th...
No aggravation caused, so no need for apology, Banno. :) Yes, I agree that the independent existence of things may plausibly be thought to be part of ...
When objects begin to be noticed by a child, I imagine it has no idea about those objects being publicly available. Of course we can say that the idea...
No, they don't create a tree; they infer the independent existence of the tree; which is only logically proper. The point is that the independent exis...
I don't believe it's all that complex; everyone who just unreflectively assumes that the entities available to their experience are also available to ...
I'm looking at the tree that appears to me. What I am looking at cannot "underwrite" anything other than the fact that I experience seeing it. What "u...
What are you talking about? I didn't say it was; so again, what are you talking about? You seem to be intent on misunderstanding me. And again I haven...
Now you are equivocating. When I said we don't directly experience looking at an entity that also appears to others; I didn't intend to assert that th...
So, give an account of your "third sense". If I understand how to use the words 'appearance' and 'tree' then I know enough to be able to say that the ...
Of course we are looking at the tree. We cannot look at our experience; our experience is the looking. If I look at a tree and if I call it a tree, th...
No, when I look at the tree I see what appears to me. I directly experience its appearing to me, I do not directly experience its appearing to others;...
No, one sense refers to the tangible thing that appears to me, and the other sense refers to the idea of an identical object, that may be thought to b...
No, there is only one tree. There are not ten trees, but ten seeings or appearances of the tree. But there are two senses of the word 'tree' in play h...
The "only" was only to emphasize that every appearance of the tree is an individual appearance. And I have already stated a couple of times, if I am n...
How is being seen by all the individuals actually (as opposed to merely logically) different than being seen by each individual that sees it? Say the ...
Sure, it can be conceived as either a singularity or a multiplicity. As the tree we think of it as an identity; but it is also a sum of parts that are...
As I do yours. We each read these philosophers differently, and I am not wanting to say there is one correct way to read them. So, I am just telling y...
No, I'm not saying we do. But the point is that the tree only appears to each individual, and it does so differently. And yet the tree is nonetheless ...
Of course logically there is only one tree. But the point is that it appears to each of us individually; and that is its living appearance. There is n...
I don't agree that the subject is the world for Wittgenstein. He says in the Tracatatus: "The subject does not belong to the world, but it is a limit ...
I don't read Hegel as asserting that being is a "pure thing"; rather it is no-thing. This is Hegel's preemption of Heidegger's ontological difference....
The problem is that ur-stuff cannot be any particular stuff, because if it were it would already possess some particular form, and so then could not b...
Through us the world is for us, (where 'world' is taken to denote 'the collection of things and their relations); the world is always already external...
But the philosophical idea of a thinking substance has never been the idea of a thinking substance, where substance is thought of as in "chemical subs...
Isn't there a tree-for-me and a tree-for-us, the first experienced in life, and the second a formalized externality? The former subjective and the lat...
I can't see this. If you mean to say that the meaning of 'res cogitans' is often interpreted by philosophers (and really who else bothers to interpret...
As I understand it, the philosophical understanding of 'substance' has never been allied to its common understanding as "stuff", so it's not at all cl...
I think it's more the case that the scientist cannot help describing nature in terms that make her (see!) sound purposive. This is especially the case...
Yes, science will never be able to explain "first person" experience in "first person" terms, but then it doesn't, and cannot ever, given its methodol...
What does a mental image look like? As I already said we don't experience imagining, dreaming, remembering or hallucinating as "seeing mental images",...
When I face the tree I see the tree. the fact that I can dream or imagine I am facing and seeing a tree would not seem to have any bearing on how we u...
Right! I am convinced that people never choose their overarching 'life' beliefs on the basis of so-called pure rationality; and this is because there ...
If you think of it like this: the world is everything that doesn't matter, and life is everything that does, then the salient question becomes 'what d...
The burden is on you to show how the fact that computers have been created by humans is relevant to your argument that information is not physical. Co...
It just occurred to me that the sentry and the receiver of the sentry's signals could both be computers. (I'm not sure if anyone else has already brou...
Thanks for calling upon me to think some more. At the moment I will only attempt to deal with this snippet, as time is still in short supply. Here for...
You've written rather a lot, and unfortunately I don't have time for more than a short response. However, i think the salient point is that I don't th...
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