As I understand Heidegger the "objective" would be the "vorhanden" or "present at hand"; objects as we examine and analyze then. You seem to be sugges...
I don't think there is any difference when it comes to our day to day experience. Might it make a difference as to what we allow ourselves to experien...
The main reason I would see is that intrinsic properties are conceptual and there is a difficulty involved in trying to understand how something brute...
What about if it is not raining? Again the idea of temporality seems to be missing in the above. I could agree with the idea that if it were the case ...
OK, I'll take a stab. We can say we are modeling a cup because others also see a cup and have their own perceptions (models) of it. We can say we are ...
No, I'm not saying we model the model. The point is that the perception itself is understood as a model, or more accurately a process of modelling, an...
True, but even if it is the brain that generates the VR it still works. Of course our perception of brains would then VRs generated by what we perceiv...
I'm not strictly objecting to anything. I'm just not seeing how it follows from there being unknown truths, that there are unknowable truths. As I poi...
Sure, but your personal feelings are irrelevant as to whether the imagined models (universal mind, God, collective mind or whatever) logically preclud...
Two excerpts from earlier posts in this thread where I have shown that the existence of unknown truths is not a problem for ( at least some prominent ...
I'm still not getting it from that angle but I think this shows that there is at least one unknowable truth: Is the truth of the proposition that ther...
Yes, I agree, but we do know that one of them is true, we just can't know which one without chaging the state of the game. Read again; I wasn't referr...
I was presenting those as the coherently imaginable possibilities. For all we know one of those might be imagining "the way things really are" or some...
Commonality of experience shows that the gestalts or meaningful wholes do not arise arbitrarily, not merely on account of the individual perceiver, ta...
As I see it though the proposition is disjointed because we don't know 1) we are merely stipulating it or imagining it is the case. And there would be...
OK, assuming the knowability principle is itself true, the case doesn't contradict it anyway, because it says that ""the box is empty" is true and we ...
I'm sorry, but I don't see why "1.", if it is true, entails that it is possible to know that it is true. In other words, we don't know whether the kno...
All that makes sense to me. I think there is a sense in which we can say we see the cup and another sense in which we can say that we see a model of t...
I saw this, but I don't see a cogent argument in this: "The problem is that according to the knowability principle, if "the box is empty" is true and ...
Wouldn't it then just be "it might be known that there are truths that are not known" rather than " It might be known that there is a truth that is no...
OK, that seems fine: so it is possible to know there is an unknown truth; that does not mean it is possible to know an unknown truth (which would be a...
I don't see how it follows from the fact that we know (if we do know) there are unknown truths that an unknown truth is knowable; the fact that there ...
What about (1) There are truths that are not known (instantiation from NonO) (2) If there are truths that are not known, then it might be known that t...
I took a unit in predicate calculus at Sydney Uni, and I didn't find it difficult. I didn't find it that interesting either. My point is that, however...
:roll: So what if the conclusion, but apparently not the argument itself can be translated back into plain English? So what if it is "clearer and easi...
Idealism can consist in thinking that so-called external objects are real, but are constituted by virtue of being thought, not merely by your mind or ...
Formal logic is nothing more than a formalization of the logical validity that operates, or doesn't, in plain language usage. If a conclusion is reach...
It's not a trap; if it can't be expressed in plain language then it has no bearing on epistemology (or anything else) since it is in plain language th...
I don't see why the idea that the relation between mind and world is something fundamental would presuppose religion. I have no idea what the connecti...
Right, we are supposing, stipulating that the sentence p is an unknown truth, not knowing it, obviously, so what's the problem, where's the paradox? I...
My understanding of the PLA is that a private language is impossible because in order to determine the meaning of the words it would be composed of (e...
Perhaps "many scholars" is an exaggeration but off the top of my head I can think of Charles Taylor, Hubert Dreyfus and Lee Braver. There are others w...
Rules, meanings and logic are practices and as therefore investigating them is a kind of phenomenology. The TLP would probably not be considered as su...
I have looked into OLP much, but from my limited familiarity with it, it seems to be an investigation into what we mean when we say this or that, and ...
I was thinking more along the lines of, via philosophical (phenomenological) investigation of and reflection on experience, finding things which were ...
I think this is a good question. For me philosophy is descriptive, not explanatory, but explicatory, so I'm more drawn to phenomenology than to metaph...
:up: Note I said "seriously believe"; belief serious enough to count preparing for the life to come as the most important matter in life. It's pretty ...
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