No it doesn't. That's a conditional. It says only that if p, then p?q. We have p, therefore we have p?q. And Gettier characterizes this conditional as...
Yes. It's really that simple. And because you can't assume that Smith knows the law of addition, Gettier specifies that he does; and because you can't...
No. 1. Your reading of Gettier's original paper is wrong on its face and you're never going to convince anyone. 2. Even if you were right, and there w...
You're on the wrong track, in my view. I have explained why as best I can. The idea I sketched a couple months ago, that justification cannot cross th...
Another example would arise if you are allowed multiple answers. You may strongly believe that the Battle of Hastings was fought in 1166, but if you a...
That was a couple months ago in the "'True' and 'Truth'"" thread, and might be worth revisiting now. P ? Q has four possible models: (1) P=0, Q=0 (2) ...
No, it really hasn't. Smith has a false belief that (f). From it he derives, by valid inference, a true belief that (h). I describe this as an applica...
As far as I can tell, no. If Smith believes that (h), and is justified in his belief that (h), then if (h) is true, which it is, then Smith should kno...
If Smith believes that (h), and is justified in his belief that (h), then if (h) is true, which it is, then Smith should know that (h), which he clear...
I'll have lots more to say in a little while, but first there's this: if you're still talking about all this as adding a step before Smith gets to (h)...
To some extent, you're agreeing with Gettier: the reliance on Smith's belief that Jones owns a Ford is the source of Gettier's claim that Smith's beli...
We're not actually disagreeing. :-) "p ? q" has three semantic components: p, q, and ?. You have to know what they all mean to know what "p ? q" means...
You've mentioned this several times. I see this as knowing the definition of "or". If A or B, then A-or-B. It seems interesting if you throw in "is tr...
As I said before, I think "A because B" is just shorthand for a modus ponens: If B then A; B; therefore A. As it happens, you had included the conditi...
2 is what matters. It's the whole point of Case II. We already have, as a premise, a justified false belief for Smith, namely p, which for some reason...
What point are you making? I've said I object to 4 because it runs two premises together and obscures the main issue. I don't know if it's false, but ...
I heard you the first time. ;-) Let me put it this way: your statement is just shorthand for this one p & p?(p v q). It's not like you can believe "p ...
"Because" is a slippery word though. We can talk loosely about this, and it usually does no harm. I could say something like "p's being true makes p v...
As I said, Smith thinks he's applying modus ponens but he isn't, because p is false.* So yes there is also the false belief that modus ponens is appli...
... and is therefore true. That Smith believes (g), (h), and (i) -- i.e., believes all of them to be true -- is a premise of the argument. What exactl...
In this context: beliefs have propositional content. If that's what you mean, yes. "I believe that ...", "I know that ...", "I suspect that ...", "I h...
I think that's a pretty reasonable way to define propositions, yeah. You can express the same proposition in multiple ways, in multiple languages, and...
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