There are objects in the world and there are "objects" in the mind Assume in the world is something that has a set of properties: being in a flat plan...
A person can maintain their identity as the same thing yet at the same time have different properties. But how can an object maintain its identity as ...
Yes. I'm not saying that I have Dissociative Identity Disorder, but there are two distinct RussellA's. There is the RussellA that exists in the world ...
I agree that Kripke has put forward his case that true identity statements are necessary before introducing the examples of names, heat and my pain. H...
How can that be ? In logic, the law of identity states that each thing is identical with itself. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz expressed it as "Everything...
The law of identity There is something in front of me. It has many properties: being made of wood, brown in colour, being in a lecture room, being 1.5...
Often, the cause of an effect is given the same name as the effect Yes, I can experience a sensation in my mind such as pain. My pain as an effect in ...
Yes, human judgement must come into it. Suppose this lectern is made of wood and is in the lecture theatre Kripke has made the judgement that being ma...
How do we determine that two rigid designators refer to the same thing. Kripke wrote: "To state the view succinctly: we use both the terms ‘heat’ and ...
Kripke said “Heat is the motion of molecules”, which is incorrect. Heat is the energy transferred between objects due to a temperature difference betw...
Yes, Kripke first makes his case that if an identity statement is true, then the identity statement is necessary, and only later introduces the exampl...
Yes, it is a concept that exists in the mind and not the world, such as pleasure, pain, government, democracy. But as a concept, it does have great de...
If heat is not energy, this throws a spanner in the works in Kripke's argument for a posteriori necessity. "Heat" has meaning as a measurement. Heat i...
Could I be thrown off a philosophy forum for talking about the scientific nature of heat In order to avoid being thrown off the thread for talking abo...
You had me worried for a moment. True, no second body is necessary for thermal radiation, in that the Sun has no "awareness" that the thermal radiatio...
I wrote "heat is not energy". The consequence is that Kripke's statement “Heat is the motion of molecules.” is not true. 1) Heat is the transfer of th...
Justfication three that "heat is the motion of molecules" cannot literally be true. Relevant, as Kripke uses "heat is the motion of molecules" as evid...
The law of identity I don't disagree that if A = A then A = ?A. As you say "Hence, it is not that "Kripke seems to want to prove something like the la...
The example of the thermometer may be a key into Kripke's necessary a posteriori. We may know an effect without needing to know its cause I observe th...
True. My new understanding is: From the SEP Rigid Designators, Kripke addresses the objection that we cannot talk about someone without first having s...
In this world, Hesperus exists. If Hesperus didn't exist in this world, it could exist in a possible world. If Hesperus didn't exist in this world, in...
Kripke wrote page 174: "All of this talk seems to me to have taken the metaphor of possible worlds much too seriously in some way." ==================...
Yes, much of language is like that, ambiguous, in that rarely in practice if someone says "object A is object B" do they say in what sense they are us...
I agree. Objects such as lecterns cannot exist in the world independently of their properties, as objects in the world are no more than the set of the...
I more or less agree, but my long-term project is to show that language is fundamentally metaphorical. "Time is a thief" is a metaphor in that time is...
Heat and the motion of molecules independent of any observer Kripke wrote: "First, imagine it inhabited by no creatures at all: then there is no one t...
My next post will be about heat and the motion of molecules. One could easily become paranoid about being thrown off TPF for not sticking to the OP. R...
I know The Red Sox will win their next game, I know The Eiffel Tower is in Paris and I know that I am looking at the colour red. The word "know" is be...
Kripke asks on page 177: "Is everything that is necessary knowable a priori or known a priori?". He writes page on 178: "So we certainly do not know, ...
I agree that "Hesperus" will continue to exist in language as a rigid designator even if all the properties of Hesperus disappeared from the world. I ...
Kripke wrote: "To state finally what I think, as opposed to what seems to be the case, or what others think, I think that in both cases, the case of n...
Necessity is being used in two different ways, between objects and between an object and its property. Necessity between objects - between a lectern a...
No, Leibniz's Law states that if two objects have all the same properties, they are in fact one and the same. My question is, why does Kripke need to ...
Taking x and y as proper names, whereby x is John, y is Tweezer. From (4), if John equals Tweezer, then it is necessary that John equals Tweezer. But ...
I am trying to understand the relevance of (1) and (4) on page 163, which is central to the article. Kripke writes for any objects x and y: (1) If x i...
I agree that analytic propositions are necessarily true, independent of any empirical knowledge. For example, "all bodies are extended", as the notion...
I am surprised you say "hence necessarily true, that Phosphorus is Hesperus", as you also quoted Kant from the Critique of Pure Reason: "Secondly, an ...
Ruth Barcan Marcus argued that if x is y, then x is necessarily y. Although Barcan treats Hesperus as a proper name, a simple tag devoid of any furthe...
I don't understand the logic of (1) Kripke wrote: "for any objects x and y, if x is identical to y, then if x has a certain property F, so does y" The...
Proper names refer to descriptions. I wrote: "As the fact that John is in Paris is not part of the description of John's identity, John could equally ...
That John does some plumbing work is not part of his identity, in that neither is holidaying in Paris for ten days part of his identity. Russell says ...
An object such as Phosphorus is a set of properties: brightest natural object in sky, visible by naked eye during day, has no rings, etc. It depends w...
Silly me, to think I posted a comment before reading the article. Kripke starts off by writing that it is often taken for granted that contingent stat...
As Kripke mentions Kant's "synthetic a priori judgements" in the second sentence of his chapter, and as @Banno includes the same term in his OP, the m...
The confusion is not about possible world semantics, the confusion is about the mixing up of metaphoric and literal meaning. There is no confusion as ...
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