It seems to me that one of the mistakes in the early interpretation of the infamous Libet experiment was a lack of attention to the way in which inten...
That's for sure, but observations and studies always are performed on a restricted range of cases and against an already existing background understan...
Yes, indeed, and in the context of criminal law some of those degrees of responsibility are codified as levels of mens rea. Anthony Kenny wrote a deli...
Yes, that would be a perfectly reasonable explanation why you could be held (or hold yourself, and indeed feel) responsible for sneezing on some occas...
That doesn't help me make sense of your claim that you are feeling responsible for your involuntary bodily motions, whatever their causes might be, ju...
That's a non sequitur if ever there was one. Maybe there would be a charitable way to interpret this in the strict liability sense of responsibility, ...
How could I possibly know? I've *asked* you repeatedly if there is, in your view, something special about it. Did you not notice the question marks? T...
I explained already, several times, but you keep ignoring the point. Either there is something special, in your view, and then I'm simply asking you w...
Of course you did. I then brought up the point about strict liabilities because that was the most charitable way I could think of for interpreting you...
No. I don't think my recognition of the quite trivial distinction between our attitudes towards involuntary bodily movements or unintended consequence...
Off topic: I had greatly enjoyed Williamson's Knowledge and its Limits, OUP (2000). Though rather daunting in places, it doesn't suffer as much from t...
The criterion for 'strictness' of liability is simple enough and just the same in the legal context as it is for my suggested extension to ordinary co...
But the case I had in mind was not scientists essaying to do philosophy, which they are perfectly entitled to do, well or badly, of course (and some a...
Coming to think of it, most attempts to naturalize stuff (e.g. 'naturalize the mind', 'naturalize epistemology', etc.) in analytic philosophy may be b...
Of course each example will reflect my own views since adherents of those programmes aren't going to agree to my offensive pigeon-holing of them. But ...
Yes, I agree that domains of inquiry in philosophy are quite different from scientific paradigms. There are paradigms in philosophy but there isn't mu...
Two of his papers, in particular, reinforce some of the points that you were making. Regarding the role of salience in 'sound' informal reasoning: A S...
I look forward to hear what your ideas are. My view is that pedantry, or the tendency to engage in it, is an intellectual vice that doesn't (usually) ...
I suggested that the concept could straightforwardly be extended to non-legal contexts and provided the examples of accidentally bumping into someone ...
...and a different phenomenology, obviously. But the point is moot if you aren't conceiving of your own alleged sentiment of responsibility when you a...
Whether you are conceiving of them as different ways to apply of the very same concept, or different senses of 'responsibility', is rather beyond the ...
I already provided the example of strict liabilities, a legal concept that can rather straightforwardly be extended to cases of ordinary life, e.g. wh...
No. I didn't "want to change" my initial claim with another claim. You have not been paying attention. From the very start my point was to contrast th...
I would care if you would supply an argument rather than just a bold claim that seems to rest on a conflation. If you won't care to explain in what se...
I hadn't anticipated that you would object to my observation that people hold themselves (and each other) responsible for their voluntary actions in a...
Maybe if you would put a little more thought in your replies, and a little less anger, it wouldn't feel like you were sneezing. But if you would rathe...
Thanks for that again! You always find interesting stuff. A discussion involving Helen Beebee, Simon Blackburn and Galen Strawson ought to be interest...
It seems to me that even if one is an eliminativist, anti-realist or error-theorist regarding personal responsibility for one's own actions, it still ...
It's true that if determinism is true, and agents have no alternative possibilities (abilities) for doing otherwise than what they actually do (or jud...
What is driving There is a good reason actually. It's because (6) is a contradiction that the premise of the argument must be discharged: that is, neg...
The relevance comes from the Kantian 'ought implies can' formula according to which you can't hold responsible someone for having done something that ...
Yes, the problem for libertarian free will that Nozick raises is this passage is the luck objection. I had mentioned this objection as well as the clo...
I just watched both videos and they are quite good. Of course, they're introductory and very condensed, so many more subtle distinctions are glossed o...
Your solution is quite similar to Russell's way to deal with the analogous instance of the Liar Paradox (Russell's paradox) that arose from attempts t...
This is indeed exactly how I understood your position. But you are claiming something else. You are claiming that for something to be logically possib...
When you say that "something" is a logical possibility at time t, this can be interpreted in a specific way that is perfectly intelligible but that is...
Well, this is pretty much what I have been asking you in several recent posts. I have been consistent in my insistence that claims about the logical p...
So, this means that on your view, Professor Station was correct and the logical criticism of the conclusion of the study by the reviewer was misguided...
Of course, this is precisely why I present arguments as to why this claim that you are disagreeing with is reasonable and why your disagreeing with it...
If there is no logic, there is no logical possibility, but there is logic: our logic. And the truth of modal logical claims is not temporally limited ...
No but you are talking from our perspective. When we make claims of logical possibility regarding contemplated scenarios unfolding here or elsewhere, ...
No. The contemplated scenario about the eventuality of life evolving from those initial conditions is both a nomological possibility and a logical pos...
If there is no logic then there is no logical possibility. But it is irrelevant to our claims of logical possibility regarding the past state of the w...
Why is your statement of logical possibility tensed? It makes sense to tense the proposition that the modal operator is operating on since this specif...
There was no logic, no music and no literature. But this has no bearing at all on the question, for instance, whether or not it is logically possible ...
Comments