You ignored the second part of my comment. Even if human brains can be construed as deterministic systems, that doesn't mean that their functions, let...
I am unsure if this is really what "most people" believe free will is. Sam Harris for sure seems to believe that this is the conception of free will t...
There are both deterministic and indeterministic systems in the world. From a quantum mechanical perspective, most physical systems are indeterministi...
This is precisely what I think is a bit nonsensical. You yourself are not part of the practical situation where you are called to act. That would only...
Yes, I think most compatibilists, because of the metaphysical picture that comes bundled up with the uncritically accepted doctrine of universal deter...
This claim seems to rest on a misconception regarding the way human beings, qua responsible agents, relate to "the universe". The universe simply is e...
Most contemporary compatibilists (I say "most", but I don't actually know of any actual exception) defend a view of compatibilist freedom and responsi...
This sounds more like a hard determinist line than a compatibilist line. The sort of thing that a compatibilist might say -- someone like Daniel Denne...
We can't choose not to breathe but we can chose not to lie or steal, for instance; at any rate, we can chose not to do those things unless we have som...
That's unfortunate. However, if you google the four separate words: "Galen Strawson basic argument "(without quotes), then the top two results are (1)...
I'm not sure why it should be regarded as arrogance to claim your body as your own. (Who else would more rightfully claim ownership over it?) In any c...
Harris simply bites the bullet and acknowledges that he can't claim any responsibility for his own intellectual achievements. He is even handed about ...
That's right, but Harris isn't arguing that the self is an illusion. It's rather the self's sense of her own freedom that is an illusion according to ...
You seem to be connecting, or equating, the very idea of "free will" with libertarian (incompatibilist) free will. This is the ability for agents to s...
Your unconscious mind is a part of who you are, for sure. This includes most of your cognitive habits and abilities as well as the source of most of y...
According to Harris the very foundation of this right -- the possibility of self-determination -- is illusory. This is why he also is pushing an utili...
Incidentally, we had a discussion 10 months ago about this topic and Harris's view also was brought up. Also worth noting, a couple years after Harris...
Harris is painting himself into a corner here. In his analogy, Atlantis stands for the crudest from of "contra-causal" libertarianism, which very few ...
Short from showing that free will isn't an illusion, you can show that Harris's argument are unsound, inconsistent, and also that his conception of fr...
By the way, I just finished reading a nice short paper by Chris Tucker: Agent Causation and the Alleged Impossibility of Rational Free Action. It's ju...
I would rather say that the relevant factors -- in this case: the fact that the agent isn't engaging in the bad habit for the first time in her life b...
Well, you had suggested rather more strongly that barn facades are "particularly problematic" for disjunctivist accounts of the fallibility of knowled...
Thanks for bringing that up. This is a problem that I have thought long and hard about. I have imagined lots of puzzling scenarios where commandos are...
Disjunctivism isn't merely a theory about perception. Disjunctive theories of perception and epistemological disjunctivism are two separate topics, th...
I think it does actually, since it provides a conception of indefeasible warrant that can be substituted to the misguided notion of merely "internal" ...
That's not what "disjunctivism" means in the context of epistemology or philosophical accounts perceptual experience. In the second case, being a disj...
Frankly, although I had to read the OP three times before it was clear to me, I am usure if I could much improve on the formulation without producing ...
The OP's point seems to be, not that every choice is a moral choice, but rather that the issue of the freedom of choice doesn't arise for choices that...
I agree that this a problem that afflicts many traditional libertarian accounts of free will. But I think the main assumption that generates this prob...
This new topic of yours is excellent, as is your introductory post. I'll post a comment later today when I have more time on my hands since it merits ...
We know that because the radiative-convective mechanism underlying this effect is well understood and, indeed, measurable. We can measure the change i...
This paper from WUWT is fairly bad. It simply ignores two fairly well understood and uncontested principles of climate science. First, it fails to men...
The CO2 emission targets recommended by the IPCC, and aimed at by the Paris Agreement, aren't unrealistic. Reasonable policy efforts (aided by technol...
Let me grant you, for the sake of argument, that libertarian free will isn't required. You are still agreeing with my main point in that case. If the ...
Indeed. Not only is it very likely that human activity has been responsible for more than 50% of the warming that occurred since 1950, the central est...
Mirrors reverse chirality. Here is Groucho Marx negotiating a common understanding of chirality with his own mirror image. (They're starting to reach ...
So, in summary, you account of free will is that it's real freedom accompanied with things that obtain. Have you thought about submitting it to a phil...
When we characterize an intentional action we often use a verb phrase that doesn't merely describe the bodily motions of the person who is acting but ...
You don't need to control the intentional action since your being engaged in an intentional action already is your controlling what happens with your ...
Yes, indeed, which is why I am agreeing with you that intending to do something (or forming such an intention) does not require a prior act of intendi...
It does indeed negate the first point, but not because there is no time for a prior intention to influence the action. It is rather because, on my vie...
Are you thinking of substance-sortals, event-types or concepts of natural kinds as reflecting theories? Or are you thinking about something else? Sure...
Yes. The idea is that the formation of an intention amounts to the (practical) rational determination of an orientation of the will. It is akin to the...
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