I think resemblance is a sensation. I sense x to resemble y. There is a resemblance sensation experienced when I sense or think about x and y. And by ...
Imagine an air traffic controller looking at flashes of light on a circular screen and lots of numbers. Is the air traffic controller perceiving the p...
Er, you're the one throwing stones and I'm the wave. You can see that by noting that I said some things about desert and you didn't, you just I was a ...
I asked you if you think that causes and normative reason are one and the same. Your answer, so far as I can discern it in that muddle, is 'no'. That'...
Good one Oscar. Look, you're derailing this thread. It's on moral desert. I said some things about moral desert - true things. Such as that it is alwa...
Yes, they 'can' do (as I said and you didn't bother to read). Now answer my questions: do you think that causes and normative reasons are one and the ...
So, you think normative reasons are causes and causes are normative reasons? Or did you not know what you were saying (clue: it's that one). It would ...
No discussion with you goes anywhere. I'm using you. Address the OP. You haven't done that. If there are normative reasons, then we have reason to bel...
I don't know what you mean by that (and nor do you). It's doobidoobidoo talk. Stop it. When I make a distinction, resist the temptation to articulate ...
I conclude that God is Reason. I don't claim it. I conclude it. Er, no it doesn't. You explain why you think it does. It doesn't. Reason - who is a pe...
I said that the word 'reason' is ambiguous. I don't think you understand what that means. I'll just tell you - it means it has more than one distinct ...
You don't seem to be able to read. The distinction was between normative reasons and causes. And you have said above 'I understand the distinction bet...
No, those are causes, not normative reasons. You are confused because the word reason can also be used as a synonym for cause or explanation. The reas...
No, you Hugh, 'sound' is what a valid argument is when its premises are true. And unsound is what it is when one is false. Ignorant Hughs tend to use ...
You keep changing your claims. Soundness is a property of arguments, not premises. You mean 'false', not unsound. Now you're saying that 2 is false. B...
As I expected, you are unable to focus on the question. My question was whether a professional thinker is likely to be a shallow thinker. And the answ...
What do you mean by the fact value distinction? I think most philosophers - now and throughout history - would not draw it. Here's another distinction...
And you're very much a Hugh. Yeah, Hugh, you need to stop trying to think - it isn't working. It's not 'my' God, it's 'God'. And it does not follow fr...
I mean that someone who thinks an argument of this form - if p, then q; p; therefore q- is invalid is someone whose powers of rational discernment are...
Er, and how on earth is Berkeley not doing that? Again, try and refute him without assuming a materialist worldview. If you can't, then all you're doi...
But the point is that you are attacking a strawman, as physical laws are recognized to be descriptive, not prescriptive. Insofar as some see in them e...
First, to lose innocence one needs free will and sufficient reason responsiveness. As the latter develops much later all the harms suffered in childho...
The view that it is wrong to procreate is not the view that no one procreate. It is normative: a view about how ought to behave, not a view about how ...
Extreme unending agony. Under those circumstances it seems the lesser of two evils and thus rational. So it must be a very great harm if that's what i...
It is common to distinguish between descriptive laws and prescriptive laws. A descriptive law attempts to describe how something behaves. And such a d...
Moral reasons are among the kinds of normative reason that there can be. So, philosophers call 'reasons to do things' 'normative reasons', so they are...
If I am motivated to torture john and have no motivation not to, ought I do so? Clearly not. So what we ought to do and what we are motivated to do ar...
No, not motivations. Reasons to do things. Our motivations are often the basis upon which we have a reason to do something, but the reason to do somet...
What? So you seriously think you should start with a worldview and then proceed to reject views that conflict with it? Okay. Jeez, you people haven't ...
Nothing follows from that. Now, I laid out an argument for you, didn't I? Here it is: And then you say this AGAIN: No, fishy, I didn't. Again and agai...
I don't see that. For it to be reasonable to expect a certain outcome is not the same as thinking the outcome is deserved. Given how the clouds look I...
Comments