We can think about the way things could have been. Anything thinkable can exist. Possible worlds (= the ways things could have been) are thinkable. Th...
Your attack on Lewisian modal realism has no specific content. You're just saying it is useless. You're just saying it is insignificant. I don't think...
Very few philosophers accept modal realism, not because it is useless, but because it is extreme. Many philosophers endorse that modal realism contrib...
I think it's enough that you never read Lewis really. You proved that you don't understand Lewis. Lewis is the philosopher who can say about you: The ...
'Everything is possible' means 'everything has its counterparts'. Have you ever read his counterpart theory? I think that your accusation is not justi...
David Lewis is famous for several things in metaphysics: counterfactual theory of causation, Humean supervenience, possible world realism, reformed an...
Anselm and Kierkegaard are omissions. This site does not allow to edit the options in the poll. I was surprised that Kant is ahead of Aquinas in philo...
Indirect realists say that what we perceive are sense-data of objects. Direct realists say that what we perceive are real objects themselves. This fol...
Davidson said that Humean impressions are not epistemological contents. This follows that perceptual contents need linguistic contents to be epistemol...
Rigid designators are about the criticism of the theory of descriptions. "Aristotle is the author of Metaphysics" is contingent. Aristotle could not h...
The logical form of "all dogs are animals" would be as follows: For every x, if Fx, then Gx The truth condition of "all dogs are animals" would be: Fo...
I was reading Delia Graff Fara's 'Descriptions as Predicates'. She distinguishes logical forms from truth conditions. What she said as truth condition...
The truth condition of "all dogs are animals" would be as follows: "All dogs are animals" is true if and only if for every x, if x is a dog, then x is...
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