PL Olcott

Formalized as: x ? True if and only if p where the symbol 'p' represents the whole sentence x https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf adapted to be...

You seem to be consistently denying easily verified facts. One thing that we do definitely do know about Tarski's use of the "antinomy of the liar" in...

In any case we can simply cut-to-the-chase and carefully examine every single subtle detail of Tarski's use of the "antinomy of the liar" in his Undef...

That is not the part I am not conceding. I am saying no matter what anything says anywhere else THAT WAS A BIG MISTAKE

He did start with this Liar paradox. He said so. Also this is how he encoded his Liar Paradox x ? True if and only if p where the symbol 'p' represent...

So lets get back to Tarski. He did anchor his proof in the Liar Paradox and he says so. Try and show all of the details of otherwise. I do not concede...

I have never seen any use of the term {epistemological antinomy} that did not mean self-contradictory.

It seems that you are trying to take the words figuratively. That does not work. Try and see how the literal meaning can be dismissed.

There is no context in which those words of Gödel are not a terrible mistake.

antinomy seems to mean that by itself.

My only source for the meaning was the compositional meaning of the two separate terms.

Gödel is terribly wrong about this, these words are dead false: His proof is an "undecidability proof" and he just proved that made a big mistake with...

Look is up in the proof yourself. Its one page 40 One cannot correctly use epistemological antinomies in undecidability proofs, they are not truth bea...

I have not said anything like that. Here is what I said:

ON A FAMILY OF PARADOXES https://pages.nyu.edu/dorr/hempel/PriorTranslation.pdf I just read the overview that was posted here. Pretty succinct.

That does not matter. That quote proved that he did not have the very basic understanding that epistemological antinomies (AKA self-contradictory expr...

...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof... (Gödel 1931:43-44) My whole point in the post is that ...

OK then try to explain how this sentence is a truth bearer: "This sentence is not true."

I either have to explain it in technical terms that you don't understand or explain it in plain English where too much important meanings slip through...

Any cycle in the directed graph of the evaluation sequence of any expression conclusively proves that this expression is not a truth-bearer thus must ...

A truth-bearer is an expression of language X that can be possibly evaluated to a Boolean value. What the logicians call an undecidable expression X t...

Hence conclusively proving that ? cannot bear the truth value of true or the truth value of false. That does not make True(L, ?) inconsistent. When Tr...

In plain English: "? is not true." What is ? not true about? ? is not true about being not true. What is ? not true about being not true about? ? is n...

Not every truth has a truthmaker II PETER MILNE https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/document?repid=rep1&type=pdf&doi=e5f9578348844874f5d2542dcaff8d481e01648...

I want to mostly Gödel and focus on how a True(L,x) predicate would actually apply to the properly formalize Liar Paradox. LP := ~True(L, LP) <Tarski ...

He doesn't actually show that and if he didn't hide his work we could see that he doesn't really show that. He doesn't even claim that, yet what he do...

We can see that when we formalize the Liar Paradox correctly LP := ~True(L, LP) and not the clumsy way that Tarski formalized it : x ? True if and onl...

Did you notice that I changed the subject to Tarski? Tarski does the same thing as Gödel yet shows his work.

There has never actually been any need for this enrichment, it has always been expressible in a single formal system with a single formal language as ...

It is much simpler to see what Tarski did, Gödel hid the missing inference steps behind Gödel numbers and diagonalization. This is Tarski's formalized...

When we have all of the truth facts of the world or even all the true facts about logic, math and computation then it is easy to see that epistemologi...

If there are no sequence of truth preserving operations from the verbal semantic meaning of expression x {true on the basis of its meaning} to x or ~x...

Yes and non truth-bearers are screened out. Truthbearer(L,x) ? (True(L,x) ? True(L,~x)) False ? True(L,~x)) Yes. https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ent...

I am referring to the finite set of finite strings that encode the actual general knowledge true facts of the world. I refer to general knowledge beca...

We simply correctly encode all of the true facts of the world. When the discussion devolves into "facts according to who" I lose interest because the ...

In other words you seem to believe that "a cat is probably an animal" and "a cat is probably not a fifteen story office building". I disagree.

Yes it is the case that only humans have a complex language, however, apes have learned a symbolic language known as Yerkish. https://en.wikipedia.org...

Facts are sentences that are defined as true. Cats <are> Animals is defined as true. The otherwise totally meaningless sequence of letters of "cats" a...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science) of Rudolf Carnap / Richard Montague {meaning postulates} that stipulate relations between...

Expressions that are {true on the basis of meaning} are ONLY (a) A set of finite string semantic meanings that form an accurate model of the general k...

{All cats are animals} {All animals are living things} therefore {All cats are living things} The principle of explosion is not truth preserving. {All...

If we merely encoded all of the rules of algorithms, logic, and programming in a single formal system then when when no sequence of truth preserving o...

That is not the point. The set of verified facts of the world is defined to exist, it is merely not written down all in one place yet. LLM AI models m...

It is simply all of the details of every fact of the world. General knowledge is a finite set of axioms.

Expressions that are {true on the basis of meaning} are ONLY (a) A set of finite string semantic meanings that form an accurate model of the general k...

General knowledge can be expressed in a finite set of finite strings. Specific knowledge of everything is unmanageably large and infinite.

I have spent two decades on this. It <is> a truth predicate that would work because Truthbearer(L,x) ? (True(L,x) ? True(L,~x)) screens out epistemolo...

It is far too much to unpack all oat once. I don't say: "This sentence is a lie", I refer to the strengthened Liar Paradox: "This sentence is not true...

Not at all every declarative sentence is {True, False} or incorrect. Prolog does not simply assume that every statement is True or False, thus can scr...

All bivalent systems of predicate logic only have (by definition of bivalent) two Boolean values of True or False with nothing in between. What you ha...