Yes, it’s telling. That you don’t know he talks about the thing-in-itself in another section, describing it as the real, albeit known object of sensib...
The point doesn’t stand; I specifically said I gave no quotes on the distinction. The claim I referenced has to do with the phenomena/representation d...
All my quotes are right out of CPR 1787. I use...if you MUST know....Miekeljohn online for C&P, backup by both Guyer, Cambridge 1998, and Kemp Smith, ...
Hmmmm......here’s ridiculous: the claim, or even the intimation, that because noumena and the thing in itself are both unknowable to or by means of th...
No. Phenomena and representation are different qualifications of the same thing, that being the external object. Representations are general things kn...
Correct. Representations for us, re: the human cognitive system. That does not say anything whatsoever about the object itself. But they are real phys...
“....We cannot think any object except by means of the categories; we cannot cognize any thought except by means of intuitions corresponding to these ...
“...If we find those who are engaged in metaphysical pursuits, unable to come to an understanding as to the method which they ought to follow; if we f...
Oh. Well.......can’t argue with that logic. ———————— True, but that doesn’t say phenomena are representations. If it did, it would be tautological, re...
This is correct, another way to say all experience is of phenomena. Good thing I didn’t say pure rational activity is an experience, and went so far a...
I changed my mind; regardless of whether we call it a property or predicate, opinion can assign a property, but it might not be logical in itself, or ...
From the Kantian epistemological thesis, yes, it is a mistake: we as subjects have representations of the outside world, but they are not phenomena. T...
Thoughts, strictly speaking, are the one thing that does NOT have subject/object dualism proper. In pure subjective privacy, the sole constituency of ...
Readily accessible from the realization “existence” is a category, yet “being” is not. The first is irreducible, the second reducible to the first. So...
The first may be true, but the second does not necessarily follow from it. If I don’t know the current state of philosophy, the reading of long-dead p...
We’re not asking about justifications; we asking about the facts. There is a theorem, there is a proof, so the justifications for the why of their rea...
True enough, but irrelevant. Interest is judged by what is, not by what might not have been. It would be irrational to hold an interest in falsified t...
So you’re saying Fermat didn’t reason to his theorem and Wiles didn’t reason to his proof? How would you account for either the theorem or the proof, ...
I like that one.... .....not so much that one. Assignment of a property to an object is indeed the activity of a subject, but I don’t think it is mere...
If there is at least one long-dead philosopher who would hold with his claims given what is known today, then if he was interesting then, he would see...
Sometimes, perhaps. Dark matter was conceived pending a possible misunderstanding of observation or mathematical prediction. Nevertheless, it is prett...
Absolutely. I’ve harped on this forever.......reason cannot explain itself without being used to explain itself. No one is going to take seriously any...
Let the free-for-all begin!!!! The established standard on reason, understood as the primary activity of the conscious mind, gives no origin or identi...
Yes, agreed, but reductionism mandates that for the simplest objects, or complex objects perfectly congruent, the particularity of identity reduces to...
A reasonable assumption, yes. Then came drawings, geographical markers, all sorts of visual aids. Generally though, I think conversants engaged in som...
I was. Except consciousness, which inescapable under any conditions of human action whatsoever, depending on what one thinks consciousness to be, of c...
You say: I say: The most we could say is that our experiences are merely representations of the world. But no amount of representation makes the exper...
No doubt, and is the ground for refutation of Hume’s human action by mere habit, or, which is the same thing, convention. I can tie my shoe via mere i...
A perfect example of the problem: reason thinks it can see itself, knows it makes mistakes, so informs as to how to prevent them. It’s all a mere chim...
Good post, and not all that long. Much appreciated. Yes, agreed, but that presupposes we each have the antecedent experience of brown dogs enabling ou...
Cool. I’d add that the subject/object notion isn’t even used in the internal, everyday occupation of the brain. The image of tying a shoe is much more...
I suggest we are hardwire for reason; from reason comes philosophy. Experience may mediate, but reason is always the adjudicator, for the adoption or ...
Nahhhhh.....nothing as exotic like that. The notion of subject/object is me thinking as subject in relation to the world as object, not the world as s...
Explain away if you’re so inclined; no argument from me.......promise. Yes, I favor idealism of a certain sort, along other disciplines. But that does...
So you’re saying our identities are distinct because we have different properties, as in, your height is this and my height is that. Your mass is this...
Because no metaphysical proposition can be shown to be valid without empirical justification. ——————— Then you should be able to tell me about a real ...
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