Fafner

It all depends on what one calls "evidence" here. My proposal is to distinguish between having evidence for something (which is an objective matter of...

Well yes, having an accurate report doesn't prove by itself that your report is accurate, but having an accurate report is having good evidence for th...

Well, if you have evidence that entails that things are the way the they seem, then I think it's very plausible to call it knowledge. But what if case...

But this analogy doesn't work. If you are in a waking state your experience is strongly correlated with how things are in your environment (otherwise ...

But the first premise doesn't say that in order to know p you have to recognize states of having evidence for p according to some distinguishing featu...

What do you mean by "perceptual evidence"? According to how I understand evidence, something is evidence for p, if its presence entails the existence ...

And how does it logically prove that I don't know that I'm having a veridical experience from the fact that I can't recognize such a feature?

I didn't say anything about being able to distinguish between the two, I only said that if you are awake then you have perceptual evidence which rules...

And what does it mean to "determine"?

And what does it mean to being able to 'distinguish' between the two? I formulated the condition for knowledge in terms of having evidence that favors...

How does it follow? Surely being awake doesn't fall under the umbrella of "dreaming" (because it isn't dreaming).

But how is skeptic supposed to prove that if my experience is veridical then it is lucky? I'm not quite sure what you mean by "luck" here, but at leas...

The problem with the epistemic luck reply is the same. You cannot say that a belief is an instance of epistemic luck as opposed to knowledge without a...

As I said in another comment, I'm not interested in a textual exegeses of Descartes, the argument is only inspired by some things that he says, but it...

But this is not what the skeptical argument says. The whole point is that there is no subjective differences between waking and dreaming states, other...

It doesn't follow, and I've shown this already. Mere inability to distinguish on subjective grounds all non-veridical states from veridical proves abs...

It doesn't contradict what I said in the quote. You just gave another example of a dream state, but my question is, what distinguishes dream states fr...

It all depends on what one means by "knowing that the experience is veridical". My point is that there is something confused in the way the skeptic th...

But my point is that knowing that something is an Arabic script is inseparable from the ability to understand Arabic (that is, you cannot describe som...

This is why I called it a "version" of his argument, and my aim wasn't to correctly represent his actual philosophical views. And in any case, my argu...

In this case the "evidence" that you need is simply to know Arabic (or at least being able to reliably identify Arabic writing). And this is not "seco...

But this is an absurd demand, since it generates a regress. If something is evidence only by virtue of having a second order evidence in its favor, th...

I can agree with this formulation, though it still leaves open the question of how we ought to identify whenever a word/concept is used in the same or...

But what prize? And also notice that in the examples that I described we do not come up with a new meaning, but rely on the 'old meaning' which is ext...

But if any sentence can be made sense of in a suitable context, then what's the point of talking about 'category errors' in the first place? If identi...

I actually believe that there's no such thing as 'category mistakes'. I subscribe to the idea that nonsense arises only when we fail to provide a clea...

Now you are simply appealing to authority. Some famous philosopher said it, therefore it must be true... It seems to me that you've ran out arguments,...

You don't see it, but what you said here actually proves my point. If the world appears to you in a certain way, then it is an objective fact that the...

First thank you for the very detailed and informative reply. And I agree that disjunctivist could possibly respond by giving some sort of contextualis...

Sure, you can assume here anything you want about interpretation, but it doesn't matter because you have (b) as well that grounds its objective status...

So how would you describe the famous fake barn facades case? You are standing in front of a real barn, and therefore you are directly aware of the bar...

Forget what I say, now on second thought I don't think that disjunctivism can actually solve the Gettier problem. Never mind.

If anything, disjunctivism can handle the Gettier cases better than other accounts of justification (if they can handle them at all). Because accordin...

We have only agreed that the truth of sentences depends (in some sense) on subjects and the world, but this doesn't entail anything about knowledge pe...

I already explained this. Something can be true without anyone knowing it (e.g., my example of extraterrestrial life), so plainly true and knowledge a...

It's more than that; Dummett's idea was that there's nothing more to truth than what you can justifiably assert. He was an anti-realist like our frien...

Right. The main idea is that unless we understand sense experience as factive (e.g., you can see that P only if P is the case), then it's hard to see ...

Unless you are a disjunctivist.

In this case your argument is really about knowledge and not truth (which are different topics), so it was false advertisement all along. And also, yo...

What I said doesn't amount to a redundancy theory though. I was just repeating something that Frege himself said, and surely Frege wasn't a 'redundanc...

As far as their truth conditions are concerned, yes. The two sentence are true or false in exactly the same circumstances, so therefore they assert th...

This is because, as Frege already noted, adding 'true' to a sentence doesn't change its meaning, and in fact adds nothing over and above what you get ...

I have a lot to say about this, but it will suffice for now just to note that nothing in what you said (in this quote or in the rest of your post) pro...

Hmmmmm.... This is a good question. In some sense yes, if you analyze the meaning of sentences via truth (that is, truth conditions). But there's a se...

I've changed my mind about some things that I said in my latest reply to you. I want to argue instead for something simpler. I'm ready to grant you yo...

Now I have some doubts about this response for various reasons... And I didn't mean that a triplet of <sentence, language, world> has truth conditions...

It doesn't, it is just to give a name to something, so that anyone could immediately understand what exactly is being discussed (because as I said, ju...

I prefer to deal with the easy cases first...

I agree. If we take Quine's argument seriously, it does complicate the story considerably. In particular, Quine would reject the idea that we can just...

Granted, coherency is usually defined through consistency, but it doesn't show that they are the same thing. It is just a terminological point about c...