I'll see if I can explain with a simple example (it has to be simple because I don't know much science): To what temperature do I have to heat this wa...
I don't think you've misunderstood me, but you may have misunderstood physicalism. A theory of consciousness should ideally be able to specify the nec...
We agree! Physicalists, specifically functionalists A robust theory of chemistry will predict which systems are chemical systems. A robust theory of l...
I think I might deny that there is no evidence for physicalism. I'm interested in what people think is evidence for physicalism. EDIT: Confusing typo ...
Yes, that's the hard problem. It's the general question: "How is it exactly that experience is caused by/realised by/is identical with the functions o...
Panpsychists and dualists probably do typically dismiss the possibility of explaining consciousness (in general terms that would constitute an answer ...
One point Hoffman makes very well is that we have made no progress whatever in explaining how it is that a particular neural event is (or causes or re...
/uploads/resized/files/hd/5hp4sw3wpydg9j3k.png Looks like a gem of an article, but I can only see the first page on JSTOR. 1974, well before Chalmers....
He did and he deserves a lot of credit for that. I wish he'd gone panpsychist like Sprigge instead of wheeling God in to look at things when we weren'...
I'm not sure if these questions are rhetorical or not. I'll have go anyway, I'm a sucker for a quiz. 1) You introduced commonsense and science, I was ...
The point is that what you call science does not rule them out, or indeed in. It has nothing to say on the subject of consciousness itself, although t...
I've just realised we may be talking at cross purposes. I've bolded the relevant bit. Eliminativism is exactly the view that nothing is conscious, so ...
The point about zombies is not whether or not you believe in them (nobody except Daniel Dennett does), but whether a functionalist account like yours ...
@"Wayfarer" I should have just said ontological idealism generally instead of specifying Berkeley. Berkeley is just the original ontological idealist....
Sure, but when @"Banno" criticises idealism, he is criticising one kind of idealism, namely solipsism. And he often doesn't say this. I'm not defendin...
@"apokrisis" @"Banno" Apo's approach to bridging the is/ought gap and his approach to the hard problem of consciousness seem very similar if not the s...
Thanks, I'm not sure if I read that debate with @"Landru Guide Us" or not, but your post makes your position clear. I think your position that idealis...
Those three puzzles are more of a problem for solipsism than idealism. But I think you think that idealism readily collapses into solipsism. Is that r...
You missed off the start of the second sentence! Try again. It matters. Nevertheless, I'm not clear what Wayfarer's position is either. Apo has nailed...
It's much easier and more tempting for the strong to be evil. Moral culpability can only attach to the strong. If it attaches to the weak, it is only ...
Nothing, I suggest. What makes you 180 Proof is not consciousness, but your body, history, emotions, etc. Consciousness bears subjectivity, but not ch...
Maybe, but one crow does not look out of the eyes of another, any more than when @"180 Proof" peers into his soul, I feel like an asshole. EDIT: I don...
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