Andrew M

Is Kant's definition of truth, "the accordance of the cognition with its object”, much different to Aristotle's definition "To say of what is that it ...

Well, you've raised it to a fine art! The issue, as I see it, is that observational data and evidence should inform our philosophy. When there's a con...

It's poor philosophy to reject well-established facts about the world. Not at all. The object language is in quotes (let's call it Greenglish), while ...

I said that snow was white 200,000 years ago, as scientists would tell us. That's common knowledge - if you disagree, perhaps you could provide a scie...

Maybe - the quoted part on the LHS is the name of the sentence on the RHS. Yes, but naming it doesn't affect what it is. 200,000 years ago, snow wasn'...

Yeah, kids these days with their logic and stuff...

@"Banno" As Michael noted, Tarski didn't think of the T-sentence as being a definition of truth and, I'd add, neither was his actual definition of tru...

Though he was, at least, clear and unequivocal that the sentence, "Tarski is a correspondence theorist" is true iff Tarski is a correspondence theoris...

Yes, that seems to be the case. They are based on fairly technical discussions of what constitutes correspondence, with a good review here (Truth, Cor...

The sentences are equivalent in the sense that they are satisfied by the same object(s). Whereas redundancy is a philosophical view about usage. Yes, ...

Per the RHS sentence, we can either use it (to express something about the world) or mention it (in order to express something about the sentence itse...

:up:

For sure. With the wolf example, I was distinguishing between the scenarios of the boy hearing a rustle in the bushes versus seeing the wolf. If the b...

Consider what it would take to be certain that your housemate was a bachelor. If it's never possible, then that's a Cartesian standard, not an ordinar...

Yes. In the case of the wolf example, the boy can be asked, "How do you know there's a wolf?" Then we can form our own judgment on the evidence. Yes. ...

I agree. Alice can know the phone number qua a ten-digit number. But if when asked she says, "I think it's <number>", then that raises a question as t...

:up: That would be Cartesian certainty. But in ordinary language, we have at least two or three other uses: (1) Alice was certain that she left her ca...

Yes. I would say knowledge entails certainty. That is, when one comes to know that John is a bachelor, the alternative possibility is ruled out. From ...

I think that is false. I do. We don't doubt what we know.

By recognizing that it's due to identity ignorance. Which is to say, Alice knows that the number 2 is even, but not that the number written on the hid...

:up: OK, so there is a number written on a piece of paper hidden in a box. That number is either 1 or 2. a) The number in the box might be odd. This p...

Do you think that the number 2 might be (or could be) odd? They mean the same thing to me. But I (and I suspect most people) would interpret them as a...

Yes. No, I'm saying that it is false that "the blue ball might be red", just as it is false that "The number 2 might be odd". There's a difference bet...

Either of those two senses are fine. But "My true belief could be false" is a conceptual claim. Compare "John could be married" to "Bachelor John coul...

The first option is fine when understood as an expression of uncertainty as in, "I believe it is raining but I'm not certain". But not in the sense of...

I think on ordinary usage, b) is also false. If I know it's raining outside then I can't be wrong that it's raining outside. Knowledge entails truth. ...

I'd say not. I readily agree with Hacker in the text I quoted whereas the SEP Primitivism section misses the mark despite there being apparent points ...

Hacker shouldn't be construed as defending either direct or indirect realism. He's instead using and analysing terms like direct, indirect, see, perce...

"I was wet and weary and had half a mind to curl up on the mossy hillside and wait for the rescue helicopter." - Globe and Mail (2003) :up:

Knowledge refers to the correct interpretations. One can incorrectly interpret something (like the planetary orbits or the weather), but one can't inc...

Will do!

Clearly an absurd conclusion. Thus the Great Goat is edible. Which raises the important dilemma of whether all goats partake of the Great Goat, or jus...

There isn't an epistemic difference (i.e., either way, one is correct or mistaken about whether it is raining). However there is a semantic difference...

That isn't what Fitch says. If the unknown truth is that "there is chicken in the fridge", then it becomes a known truth when you look in the fridge. ...

We don't. But "every possible observation" is not the standard for making knowledge claims or forming beliefs. Good evidence is. If good counter-evide...

Logically speaking, you can't have your chicken and eat it too. To be clear, the difference with that to the knowability paradox is that "p & ~p" is a...

Logic says that we're all vegetarians now... Yes, very similar. Interestingly, from SEP:

Indeed, and that's the point. When we discover that a former knowledge claim was mistaken, we retroactively downgrade its status from knowledge to bel...

:up: Thanks for saying so, and for working it through. :up:

The normative standard for making knowledge claims isn't Cartesian certainty, it's evidential. The truth condition for knowledge is part of ordinary u...

I'm not sure how that answers the question above. The point is that the statement above is a counterexample to various antirealist theories.

Can't know what isn't so. From Fitch's proof: Noting that knowledge evolves over time doesn't help those theories that depend on the knowability princ...

"p & ~Kp" is sometimes true. There have been plenty of examples in this thread. That's right. But "<>K(p & ~Kp)" (which is never true) is a different ...

It means to know that something is true, e.g., that it is raining (say, as a consequence of looking out the window). Mathematical certainty isn't requ...

The knowability principle is like the proposition that all swans are white. When someone discovered that some swans were black, then that refuted the ...

No, that's just changing the subject. There are unknowable truths regardless of whether there's a proof about them. That a proposition is true is expr...

It doesn't. That information is part of the context. The statement doesn't mention it. It also doesn't mention a host of other things, such as whether...

Sure, just don't mention it's unknown. So instead of "p & ~Kp", that would be "p". With the milk example, that would be "there's milk in the fridge". ...

:up: No, whether a statement is unknowable or not is conditional on the content of the statement. As @"Michael" points out, unknown truths that don't ...

:up: Yes. While you're down the rabbit hole, be sure to check out the quantum superposition version: |milk in the fridge> + |no milk in the fridge>. :...