Yes, my previous criticism was directed more towards the confusing use of notation with respect to expectation values. It is clearer to condition expe...
I think you're conflating two different expectations. I think your post should read : Let y be the value of the chosen envelope and z be the value of ...
MacTaggart's remarks concerning the A and B series are relevant here. The premises of the SB paradox are tenseless and so refer only to the B series ,...
Her "mental state" M refers to her epistemic state upon waking. In the context of repeated trials, it would include her knowledge of previous trials. ...
In my view : Subjective Idealism and solipsism aren't ideas, but a tautological understanding that the meaning of all propositions is ultimately reduc...
Here's another analysis that only refers to credences , i.e subjective probabilities referring to the mental state of a believing agent - as opposed t...
Since you're an R user, you might find it interesting to define a model in RStan, using different choices for the prior P(S) for the smallest amount S...
Unless additional premises are included in the problem, I cannot tell the difference between how I phrased the question and your phrasing of the quest...
Yes, we're in full agreement. By "non-informative" I was referring to the distributional conditions of both uniformity of probability mass and of infi...
Have you ever tried experimenting with psychedelics? You might be suffering from a biologically rare type of depression that isn't treatable by usual ...
It depends on what interpretation of probability you are appealing to. For those of us who reject Laplace's principle of indifference, the answer is t...
I'll agree for sake of argument . I think the problem is how we are fitting our shared understanding of the problem to probability calculus. In my pre...
That is flat out contradicted by the switching argument. Furthermore, without the premise of knowing the value of one of the envelopes, the paradox di...
The paradox doesn't apply in that scenario, since the values of both envelopes are given. To my understanding , the paradox requires, 1) Knowledge of ...
The switching argument begs to differ : " 1. Denote by A the amount in the player's selected envelope." The argument's computed expectation value of (...
Thanks. The premises of the Sleeping Beauty, at least in some popular incarnations of the problem, specify an experimental design, but they don't spec...
Always start by writing down the probability of everything : Variables : C = Tossed coin (Binary variable in {head, tail} ) D = Awoken Day (Binary var...
Again, that's an additional subjective premise that isn't objectively implied by the 'physics' of the two-envelope premise. Nevertheless we can assume...
That expression is used to represent the same set of initial assumptions, but is less explicit with regards to its premises, such as the fact that som...
I would say that is a potential cause of the paradox, but isn't the paradox itself. The paradox is the fact that the switching argument consists of a ...
Relative to your use of probabilities, how do you distinguish knowing that an outcome has probability 1/2 from not knowing the likelihood of an outcom...
In my view , epistemic probabilities are derived from causal knowledge or assumptions on the basis abductive reasoning and repeated trials. One cannot...
By "meaningful probabilities" i am referring to epistemically meaningful probabilities that quantify how the real world is expected to behave on the b...
Our conclusions might agree. I am saying that only the statements 1,3 4 and 5 are valid in the "switching argument". For any prior probability distrib...
An optimal decision doesn't exist on the basis of the information provided, because the premises fail to specify a well-posed problem : Let P ( r | x ...
Deflationism, that rejects representational accounts of semantics , shares much in common with subjective idealism and logical positivism that both co...
Putting it cynically, your proposition and methodology of divine revelation isn't qualitatively different to the thoughts of the average physicist, wh...
We can take the hard-problem in it's broadest sense, as asking what grounds the existence of first-personal phenomenological criteria that are used to...
By definition, there does not exist empirical criteria for asserting self-unconsciousness in the present. So the proposition "I am presently unconscio...
Consider what it would mean to say that there is no experiential dimension. Unless that possibility is conceivable, then the hard problem isn't concei...
You are asking basic questions that concern the topic of "Denotational Semantics", which use partially ordered sets (more specifically, Scott Domains)...
In mathematics, one has to distinguish intensional definitions from extensional interpretations. The former refers to analytic tautologies of an assum...
The premise of a shared reality is incompatible with the premise of non-representational perceptual access for all. For if I judge my own perception o...
Constructively speaking, there's nothing wrong with your identification of real numbers with "infinite" paths, i.e. the non-wellfounded sets known as ...
That concepts are norms isn't the same as saying that concepts are public. These are two distinct semantic claims. I have only had a precursory glance...
Whenever I understand myself to be seeing the "same" object as a someone else, I am not making a literal comparison of mine and their experiences, nor...
Given that society rarely agrees upon anything and constantly changes its mind, not to mention the ever-changing customs of isolated Robinson Crusoes ...
Putting aside what privacy means, there are two very distinct ways of interpreting that claim. A. Private Language is False. This is a semantic claim ...
That's odd, because my attacks on conventionalism are precisely an attack on representationalism, including the idea that conventions tell us about wh...
But do people really share the same belief objects whether agreeing or disagreeing about the truth of a proposition? For how can linguistic convention...
Ultimately, epistemic agreements and disagreements rest upon assumptions as to what speakers means by their words: Doesn't it strike you as odd, the a...
Are you implying that a public language must be decipherable? What about encryption? When the public cannot agree on a linguistic convention, as is so...
Video games occasionally have procedurally generated worlds that are generated dynamically on-the-fly in response to the player's actions. These games...
Wasn't Spinoza an idealist in all but name? At the very least, isn't his metaphysics compatible with "being is perception"? I don't see how matter as ...
Well yes, one might take it to be analytically true that a prediction is future-referring, meaning that skepticism regarding the future-contingency of...
So in your view, what makes a proposition future-contingent? Suppose that a person looks at the sky and says A. "There are ominous dark-clouds in the ...
Well, certainly I can accept that the word "future" has sense to you, as it does to me, but one can dispute that the word has reference beyond the imm...
I can only interpret you as referring to something, in relation to an understanding of what your referring consists of. If my experience is private in...
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