Yes, it is different because insensate nature acts deterministically, while free-will creatures do not. Still, the new purpose also instantiates final...
No, I am deducing attributes from the little that the proof shows us about the end of the line. We know that it is, In Aristotle's proof, the ultimate...
It is quite true that, when there is a final cause, it is, as the Scholastics insist, the cause of causes. If I chose to build a house, all of the oth...
That is the stance that behaviorists took. It shows the limits imposed on natural science by its Fundamental Abstraction. I discussed the FA in detail...
Obviously, Carlo Rovelli is not very familiar with Aristotle. Aristotle explicitly states that not everything that happens, happens for an end. Rather...
Not if you are logical. To be the end of the line of explanation, something must be self-explaining. That means that what it is entails that it is. Co...
Each formulation projects the same fact set into a different conceptual subspace. As these conceptualizations do not contradict each other, there is n...
There is a difference between the epistemological and ontological orders. We need make no assumption that God exists in order to understand that agent...
You are welcome. I don't think that the idea that agents act for ends requires that they only act for one end. Also, I think part being a free agent i...
As the unmoved mover, uncaused cause, ultimate meta-law, etc., philosophically, God is the-end-of-the-line of explanation. To be the-end-of-the-line, ...
This is the well-known generate and test strategy of AI, which I discuss in my paper. The problem is that physics tells us that there are no random pr...
You are still confused about the nature of teleology. First, teleology does not assume the existence of God, though it can be used as evidence for the...
Yes. To be precise, the principle is that no signal can travel faster than the speed of light in a vacuum. The term "speed of light" means speed of li...
No, it does not. The concept of teleology is that agents act for ends. It does not presuppose any specific mechanisms (say classical or modern physics...
This is like responding to Goedel's proof that arithmetic cannot be proven consistent by means formalizable in arithmetic, by saying we have not forma...
I think you do have to be very skeptical indeed to deny that some things are done for the sake of other things. Trump shut down the government for the...
We are speaking of existence in a metaphysical, not an intentional or fictional context. Yes, "existence" can be applied analogically in non-metaphysi...
Taking my lead from Plato in the Sophist, I understand "to exist" as convertible with "to be able to act.". If "pure concepts of understanding" do not...
The more general question is why have any explanations at all? Aristotle is on the right track in beginning his Metaphysics by observing that "All hum...
This question seems to assume what I deny, i,e, that mechanical explanations are opposed to teleological explanations. So, in employing teleological r...
If there were "pure concepts of understanding," then synthesizing them with what is sensed before we are aware of it would leave us confused as to wha...
Of course it is. That is why we have general relativity. Newton's theory assumes instantaneous action at a distance, because it has two masses attract...
In the sense that both are equally true, they are as "good." But, being equally true does not mean that they provide us with the same information. So,...
Yes. The application of Ockham's razor would only apply if mechanism and teleology were alternate, incompatible views. One of my main points is that t...
OK. I misunderstood what you were saying. To me there is data, and the data might show that there is intentionality in the neurons, and there is theor...
I am not sure what, operationally, it would mean to find intentional reality "in the neurons." If intentions are to be effective, if I am actually abl...
No, my claim is that the Hard Problem is a chimera based on the fallacious assumption that intentional reality can be reduced to a material phenomenon...
I've read you post several times and am at a loss. As I intend "ultimately a posteriori," it means that the principles in question are learned from ex...
As I tried to explain in my last response, the kind of "emergence" viscosity and surface tension and surface tension illustrate is not the kind of "em...
Thank you for your comments. My background, while fairly broad, is quite limited with respect to contemporary European philosophy. I do think that eac...
I agree that there is question begging here, but it occurs when you equate, without supporting argument, "the pure" with "a priori" concepts. We know ...
Yes, but I was also trying to say how insights based on the nature of being may appear to be a priori. I was not trying to define "empiricism" at all....
Aquinas took the position on existence long before Sartre was a twinkle. I don't see Material and Intentional as on the same order of abstraction as E...
I wanted to add that the reason sensible representations cannot make themselves known is that they are not operation in the intentional theater. Sensi...
As we have no reason to think that babies understand counting, the understanding of counting found in older children comes to be. The coming to be of ...
Please excuse the delay, I've had some sort of a tiring "bug." Exactly. You might think of an object's notes of intelligibility as things that can be ...
We learn by abstraction from experience. What the child learns in the first instance is sequence of words ("one," "two," "three," etc.) In the second ...
Yes, I think it is an error to see sensory (purely physical) and intellectual representations as separate. They are the same physical state considered...
Since we have to teach children to count by counting specific kinds of things, I see no reason to think that there is any a priori component to counti...
I agree that these physical states are not efficient causes of thought; however, as bearing intelligibility, they can inform awareness and so may be s...
Excuse me, I misunderstood you. First, because counting is an intellectual operation, while seeing is a physical operation,. Second, because counting ...
If you mean that they are irreducible to neural processes, alone, I agree. But, if you mean that they are unrelated to neurophysical processes, I cann...
We agree: they are correlated. I cannot agree that they are unintelligible in terms of each other. If they were, we would not recognize that they are ...
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