Metaphysician Undercover

No, it's not because the name is not the object. Consider that even if the name is not the object, but meaning was found in a direct correspondence be...

But the point is that the name is more than just a label affixed to the object. The name maintains meaning when the object is destroyed. So the "parad...

That's a good question, and I'm sure it deserves a very complex answer. But I think the answer is unknown so you probably won't get much of an answer ...

Dualism avoids panpsychism.

But this doesn't really answer the question. How would you define "physicalism" such that the entirety of reality would not be subject to being unders...

On what terms would you define "physicalism" then? If all reality is "physical", as is how I understand physicalism, then why wouldn't "physics" be th...

I don't think I agree with this. The nature of a "paradigm" must be other than a physical object which plays the role of a sample. Look at what follow...

But isn't the second sense a faulty, or even false conception of the future? We can't conceptualize the future by describing it as what is now. The fu...

Many physicalists argue that reality can be explained by physics, and if physics cannot explain the totality of reality at the present time, it will i...

I think that "paradigm" in Wittgenstein's use, refers specifically to examples, or samples of use, rather than an example like the chart of coloured s...

So what's going on at 51 when he says the following? This is in the context of describing the language game of (48) in which there is a pattern of col...

Don't these two statements directly contradict each other? In the first, you are saying that the thing described is fully exhausted by the physical de...

It isn't fully exhausted by the physical description though, that's the point. Survival of a living being, and the activities of living beings are not...

Actually I'm having great difficulty understanding Wittgenstein's use of "paradigm". At first I thought it was similar to "grammar", but the use of th...

How would we know that, by referring to some paradigm? ".

Why would you not call this prior state an intentional state as well? Under your preferred definition, "aboutness", the "natural deficit" which develo...

I described that in my preceding posts. As I said, the definition provided is quite incoherent. Considering that light exists as particles, that defin...

We still have the unresolved problem of ostensive definition though. We have no clear way of knowing what "kind" of role is being represented by the n...

I would say that the future is manifested within us as anticipation. I would like to see a separation between "experience" and "future". I believe it ...

I know, I just wanted to add my two cents.

It's a difficult and long process which requires ardently, and arduously, analyzing all the different aspects of time. We can begin with the most simp...

The problem with "to specify a desire", or "to specify an intention", is as Tim woods alludes to above. Intentions and desires are derived from, and b...

There's a very real problem with that assumption of "more in accordance with reality". Reality is vast and complex. Some viewpoints focus on this, oth...

I'm invisible, or maybe my viewpoint is incomprehensible. There's a real problem with this paragraph, and that is that once we uncover the deficiencie...

There is no succinct "religious theory of time" just like there is no succinct "scientific theory of time". But the religious perspectives are far mor...

The problem with this perspective is that the religious traditions give us a much more comprehensive and realistic understanding of the nature of time...

There is no referent of "One Metre" at 50 because Wittgenstein here attempts to remove it from any context in any language-game. It is removed from th...

Isn't there a new moment of time created at each instant as time passes?

We've made 50, let's move on. At 51 Wittgenstein asks what does it mean for an element to correspond with a sign. And, what does it mean to be mistake...

I think we ought to recognize the difference between an abstract concept (universal), and an imagination, an image of a particular within the mind. Th...

"Sound" refers to a sensation. How could a sensation be external to a sensing body? I don't recall any such explanation, only a confused bit of nonsen...

Here's the point I'm making. "Human beings use the object as a means of representation" is the proper description. "The object is a means of represent...

The fact that the "standard" changes by human intervention is the first indication that Wittgenstein's description of a "standard" here is not realist...

Well then I have no idea of what you're talking about because I have no idea of what you mean by "objective sounds". You seem to have a very short mem...

There is a normative claim being made here by Wittgenstein though, and that's the whole point. He's not referring to a stick, or a bar, or any such ob...

Right, but when you say "the song Kashmir is music", you are talking about ideas. I didn't say "particulars", I said "a particular". No one uses "matt...

In the latter part of 50 Wittgenstein discusses "the means of representation". The metre stick represents "metre". The colour samples represent the di...

I know, you said this already. But this doesn't account for how you can say that the song Kashmir is music. If each of these ideas "the song Kashmir",...

I would not define a term like that, because it has too many different uses in different contexts. I might define it for use in a particular context, ...

And so, it's relevant.

Can't be ... too ironic. Though you might be onto something there, truth always proves to be stranger than fiction.

Repeat as required. But that's a repetition. Twice within a short section of the book I've fallen into a very similar misunderstanding. It's most like...

But TS claims that all universals are really particulars, therefore the law of identity is applicable against TS's claims. I said we sense particular ...

This is what you said. Clearly you were talking about two distinct abstract concepts here, "the song Kashmir", and "music". As distinct, particular co...

Thanks I'll check it out.

I'm reading a pdf file online, Anscombe 3rd ed.. It's probably not rendered quite right, or I'm not understanding how the "marginal note" refers to th...

I would not define "real" in a way so as to exclude relations from being real, such that only absolutes are real. I think that this would depend on yo...

Thanks John Doe, I prefer an explanation over StreelightX's derision. The last quote is actually 38 rather than 35. I see that Wittgenstein's use of "...

You have mentioned grammar. You have claimed that #47 is about grammar, and explained, "questions about uses of words". I do not think that Witty has ...

Therefore, it is not by accident that Witty has not mentioned grammar so far in this text. He knows all about grammar but he intentionally has not bro...