Yes! Anyway, I believe that strictly carried through empirical idealism leads either to an Advaita-like system (there is only one Reality) or to a Mad...
Ok, thanks! But, in fact, it does, right? Before I was born, for instance, the empirical world that I am now cognizing didn't really exist. If there w...
Well, appearances are not negated but they must be recognized as 'mere appearances'. So, the 'mountain' seems to be an entity but, in fact, it isn't. ...
I disagree, unless you think that existence involves intelligibility (which is something that classical metaphysics asserts but I'm not sure physicali...
Ok, thanks for the clarification. But note, that, however one can still say that we have been proven wrong in our assumptions many times, even by scie...
Well, I believe that it's simply becuase for you it is a fact that needs no explanation. So, you don't see a problem (perhaps I am the one that sees a...
Yes, I would say that this is a possibility and perhaps it is the most consistent one if one accepts epistemic idealism. The 'in itself' is 'beyond co...
Naturalism generally explicitly denies anything 'supernatural' (there is nothing outside the 'universe' or the 'multiverse'). Unless it is something l...
Not sure if you understood Bradley's argument and similar. The point is: can you conceive a world that has absolutely no relation to 'sentient experie...
No, actually, I meant that from a Kantian perspective it's just difficult to explain, without assuming the intelligibility of the 'external world' (in...
Ok. The problem for me, however, is to explain from a purely physicalist point of view why there are these 'structures' in the first place. Not just t...
Imagine 'how the world looks like' without any kind of sensations. Here's a quote I found from F.H. Bradley (who BTW wasn't a Berkeleyan idealist but ...
More or less. My point is that in order to even think to follow and catch a ball, you need some interpretative mental faculties. Same goes for some ba...
Note, however, that there is IMO a problem with Kant's and similar views. So, intelligibility of the world is 'brought into' by the organizing activit...
Well, I guess that one can even say that in order to even think to make a measurement you have to assume that the 'world' is intelligible in terms of ...
If I am understanding your question correctly, that 'modern materialism' would be the thesis that fundamental reality is 'physical', 'natural' etc. My...
Viceversa, I just don't understand why many physicalists are so sure that using the term 'physical' is appropriate for the 'structure'/'order'. To me ...
And yet, on the other hand, probably even in order to 'see' the trajectory, you need to have already some kind of interpretative structure. So which c...
I did some googling and it does seem that you are right, in fact. It does seem that physicalism is used to denote some positions that are not about on...
As I said in my previous post, if one speaks about 'evolution' and 'evolutionary advantage' as an explanation and, indeed, if one thinks that explanat...
My point is that the 'story' you're telling presupposes intelligibility in order to be 'right'. If you admit that the physical world - at least in som...
I would also add that the mathematics that is used in physics is becoming via via more abstract and general principles like symmetries tend to become ...
Good points. Curiously enough, if I had to pick a term based on etimology I would go with 'materialism'. The reference to 'mother nature' is just too ...
Just a quick terminological point. I believe that 'physicalism' and 'naturalism' are treated as synonyms. But, I would say that 'materialism' also can...
I agree with you here. If we also give credence to the basic belief of the intelligibility of the world would imply that we assume that the world has ...
Well, I believe that physicalism posits that the 'physical' is fundamental. It all depends, after all, on what we mean by 'physical'. If we 'stretch' ...
No, but they either have to 'derive' them from purely physical things. I think that many physicalists are emergentists. The problem with that view is ...
Don't you think, however, that you are assuming that this 'natural' world is intelligible, though? That is, your model, actually presupposes the valid...
I agree that physicalism is reactive but it's like a 'half-made reaction' when one wants to have his cake and eat it too. That is, one wants to retain...
Ah, I think I understood your point now. But note that neither solipsism nor physicalism can explain why mathematical truths aren't contingent. Furthe...
Well, the problem here is that 'bachelor' means 'unmarried man' if I am not mistaken, so here we seem to have a tautology. '2+2=4', however, IMO isn't...
It doesn't seem a 'contradiction', but I am actually not sure. I am not sure about your point, though. Propositions (or even models, theories, philoso...
@"noAxioms", @"Relativist", @"Apustimelogist", @"Wayfarer" I actually believe that, often, physicalists equivocate the meaning of 'physical', in order...
Thanks for the words and for the answer. I'll actually leave you the last word for now, as I would repaeat myself in my answer and I doubt that it wil...
Agreed! The problem with Aristotle's view is IMHO that at least some abstract concepts do seem completely independent from their particulars. Mathemat...
Well, it depends on the idealist, after all. Some idealists would contend that mathematical truths are concepts. But maybe there is an eternal and nec...
Yes, that's a possible view and I sort of agree with it. But note that this raises the question: would those principles still 'exist' if they are not ...
I believe that the problem with this discussion is that its scope is becoming too large. Originally, it was a discussion about a question of how to re...
Yes, that's the problem with platonism. If mathematical (and other types of) abastract concepts and truths abide in a separate realm from the physical...
Well, platonism asserts that the mathematical truths are objectively real, so you aren't wrong. The problem is, however, that if mathematical truths a...
I believe that formalists and, in general, mathematical anti-realists would say that "2+2=5" would not be correct because it would be coherent with th...
Ok, I'll try to check. Yes, sometimes it's just seem hard to change direction even in this life. I can agree with that. But sometimes, religious liter...
Do you think that '2+2 = 4' is a mind-independent truth? I actually think it is. But I can't be sure of it. That's why I lean toward some form of mate...
Well, I believe that some universalists would argue that that passage on Judas means that it would be better if was aborted. Not sure I am find it con...
Up to a certian point, I'll agree. From a pragmatic perspective, in fact, realism is probably preferable than 'idealism', if by the latter we mean tha...
The problem with Wittgenstein's tractatus is that if the 'ending' (TLP 6.53-6.54) are taken at face value, Wittgenstein at the end argued that no meta...
Ok. Ok, I get that. I see, thanks for the clarification. I see what you mean. As I said, however, it's difficult to harmonize what the Bible seems to ...
No, I was thinking also about what the Friend measured after he exited the box. Rovelli actually brilliantly paraphrased his views like this: "More pr...
IMHO philosophical realists assume that we can describe the 'mind-independent world'. For instance, Galieleo and Descartes assumed that while the 'sec...
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