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OK. My reasoning is based on what we would reason about the phenomenon of "life." As far as I know, the efforts at creating artificial life are all bi...

You're quite right; as I said, we don't yet know any of the important facts that would allow us to decide this. I haven't assumed anything. I've said ...

It's hard to know what sort of answer is wanted here. I could reply, "Easily. When I read a biography, my mental imaginings of the subject of the biog...

Good, I think we're on the same page. A correspondence theory ought to work independently of the ontological status of various "worlds"; that was why ...

We don't yet know. My hunch is that it's going to be a version of the same thing that makes a biological creature alive, and a computer not. And yes, ...

So, to review the set-up here: The question is whether a standard correspondence theory has to invoke a match between statements in a language and fac...

Any word yet on casting for L&L? I heard Tom Cruise was in the running to play Science. Or was it Metaphysics . . .

I have a lot of questions about p-zombies too, but we don't need them in this instance. Any number of computer-generated entities can do all the thing...

This is Jha et al’s argument, more or less. Math only appears to be causal when we state the problem in terms that remove, or demote to “background co...

This is good. I would amend it slightly: Jha et al are asking the very question about whether logical principles can be more than contingently causal....

Interestingly, you've made similar arguments to those of @"Philosophim" about "effective" truths, and my response to him, just above, is similar to th...

What a cromulent response! :smile: This just pushes the question back a level -- why is it effective? Now of course the picture you're painting is a p...

Well, perhaps, but how can "accuracy" be a factor at all? What would make something an "accurate representation," to use your phrase, and of what is i...

Is this meant to be Tarski's view? Surely he didn't talk about what was the case in the world -- only about the correct relations between language and...

This is a great description of what mental imaging is like, and accords completely with my own experience. But then what do you mean when you say: Doe...

I appreciate your taking the time to lay all this out for me. Could I ask you to take this to a simpler level, and describe to me what you think happe...

I understand. Do you think there are mathematical truths that are independent of what is the case in the world? Plain old theorems, in other words?

OK, but you can see that even this weakened version represents an entirely different order of explanation than: 1. Real life effectiveness 2. Fulfills...

I find all this somewhat plausible in the case of images that arise from perception of the world, and are meant to "stand for" or "picture" or "repres...

You'd written this: So I assumed you regarded d=0.5?g?t2 as a mathematical truth. Without some interpretation, some assigning of the symbols, it says ...

We agree that subjectivity could be a dualist illusion. (I don't think it is, but I'm happy to assume it for purposes of argument.) But if it is, we s...

For me, a mental image strongly resembles a visible object. So I can only conclude that you're already analyzing "mental image" reductively to refer t...

Are you sure we should call something like d=0.5?g?t2 a mathematical truth? I thought it was only true on some interpretation; as it stands, it has no...

How about this? For "object" in the "23 objects" question, let's say "chickens." We wish to divide 23 living chickens evenly among 3 people; we discov...

OK. So no one of your factors would be something like "This set of concepts more accurately reflects the ontological structure of the world"? You'd re...

Cool comparison, I hadn’t thought of it! I don’t think I agree with your interpretation, though. You recall that Quine’s target was meaning-synonymy a...

Good, this is helpful. I'm not using "experience" to refer to what the experience is about (the cat). But nor am I quite using it to refer to a "feeli...

I realize I've been using the term "privileged structure" without much explanation, as if everyone is familiar with Theodore Sider. Let me expand a li...

I did read the summary. Is this the passage you're referring to (concerning "privileged structure" or the like)?: "Applicable knowledge is when a form...

I think I could add "the illusion of" in front of every reference to "subjectivity" and it wouldn't alter the problem. If I understand you, you believ...

I see what you're saying. Let me try to work up an example that is less controversially stipulative. As for the analytic/synthetic distinction, I'm no...

Yes, that all seems right to me. The question you were raising, though, was about particular "matches with reality" that, in addition to being logical...

I was hoping that, by working together on a version that didn't use subjective words, the reason would become clear. But OK, I'll be didactic: Descrip...

It is indeed a sensible answer, but doesn't explain what appears to be the modally necessary character of the abstractions, and their role in explanat...

These two responses show a similar approach to the problem, which I think is mistaken. We shouldn’t be conceiving of the “Distinctively Logical Explan...

I think this is Jha et al.'s thesis, pretty much. It's the world's (causal) regularities that permit math to function as part of an explanation. A dif...

I have the same hunch. Ever read The Emperor's New Mind by Roger Penrose?

I know, the right language is hard to find. What I think we want to describe is the subjective event that occurs when, say, I think of a purple cow. T...

Yes, and in fairness, a good evolutionary explanation wants to respect these constraints. It wants to show us how both mind and the world evolved to r...

I think we have to leave a pretty large area of "the world" open to hermeneutic interpretation rather than empirical/analytic inquiry, but as long as ...

Yes, that's why the constraint of "whole and unbroken" matters. But that doesn't make Q2 a linguistic problem, since we've stipulated what an "object"...

Oh, it left a big impression! He's an elegant, insightful writer. But I think he's wrong on every important point. This is too major a question to tuc...

I'm sorry, I wasn't clear. I didn't mean simply omit the terms! I meant rewrite the thesis but avoid using those terms. Give a description you believe...

Could you refer us to which post? And perhaps quote some key passages here, so we can respond? Thanks.

I see what you mean, but we can construct an infinite number of worlds with different abstract entities highlighted (see "grue and bleen", Sider, p. 1...

Does the "pan" part of pancomputationalism provide a response to Jha et al.'s objection? That is, are the background assumptions which Jha et al. call...

OK, I think that's right. It's appealing as an answer, no doubt. What troubles me about the evolutionary explanation is that the "arrow" seems to go f...

Yes, and thanks for the summary. Is it clear to you that either Hume or Kant has the better explanation here? Are Jha et al. Kantians? (Note, too, tha...

Well, try revising your original description (beginning "Moreover, conscious states . . .") but leave out the terms "observer" and "experience." Let's...

Fairly likely, at least. The problem isn't the lack of a complete description. Rather, it's how we can even talk about all this without importing (as ...