goremand

I am a functionalist about mental properties, so talking about "digust" or "experience" is fine but "qualia" is a good way to lose me completely. I do...

This is more of a conceptual distinction, I think what you call an "experience" I would call a "reaction" that is distinct from the smell as such. The...

What would be the problem with just saying the fly, dog or human has a different reaction to the same smell?

For me philosophy is just an intrinsically compelling activity, I've never concerned myself with its "value" or "importance".

Did you forget to write something in between these two paragraphs? Based on what you do write I'm not sure what position you're arguing against, surel...

While we may agree in denouncing illusionism, we clearly have different reasons for doing so. Like I said earlier, there are two tenets to illusionism...

No, a lie is not an illusion. Not everything that misleads is an illusion, anything can be misleading in theory, even the truth. I don't think it's un...

Leaving aside how negative or positive thinking affects our judgement, I would have to say your idea of an illusion seems too broad. Not everything th...

I'd like to hear what your idea of an illusion is for you to conclude that "negative thinking" is illusory. Is positive thinking somehow more real tha...

That is how I use the word, yes.

I am skeptical of phenomenal properties, so if it were up to me I would strip that out of the definition, thus "salvaging" the word. Consciousness als...

I think we've talked about this already, but I don't like that definition at all. Bundling phenomenological properties into the definition kills the w...

I know, but it seems that from your perspective denial of the reality of consciousness leads to illusionism. Did I at least get that right?

I agree, but how would you differentiate them in this case? What specifically did evolution do to trick you into believing you are conscious?

But how would that "truthful image" even be distinguishable from one that involves the so-called illusion?

Being conscious and having a concept of selfhood is very different, I'd say many or most animals have consciousness, I mean it makes sense to say "the...

The difference is, these categories do not inform me about color. I already have that understanding from some other source, in other words I already h...

This seems circular to me, on one hand the categories "inform us" of the particulars of good and bad, on the other the categories are empty ("there is...

Being open-minded is a red flag? Why is that? Usually I find dogmatism to be a red flag. Not really, you can talk to chatGTP and it will deny having a...

"I cannot be wrong", that sounds extremely dogmatic. Sure, why not? At least it is worth considering.

You are, given a physicalist view of human beings. Insisting that you are not is just question-begging. Would you call everything which lacks phenomen...

You could turn that around and say that given a physicalist understanding of human beings, the alien would conclude that you are a p-zombie, and it wo...

This I would call making a virtue out of necessity, that you refuse to provide justification has nothing to do with who is deserving of it or not, and...

What about those of us who are not here necessarily to figure out how to act on a personal level, but wish to discuss the theoretical underpinnings of...

But why must it end there? This seems like fleeing from battle while declaring your victory. Admitting that your belief is just an arbitrary dogma get...

You mean, how did we invent writing and other means of information exchange? Do you believe that without qualia, the invention and use of writing beco...

To me "experience" is just a functional concept or abstraction. So no, there is no "surplus". And me saying this is just restating what I have already...

No problem, don't worry. I think only in your case is it rationalization, the way I see it you are pulling yourself up by the bootstraps. You are rati...

First off, you make it sound like I'm claiming I'm a "robot" and you're a real boy. I don't think you and me are any different really, I've made the d...

If I am rational, it is not because I "ought" to be or some such, but because it is in my nature, just like it is in my nature to walk, breathe, eat e...

So if I lacked autonomy I would just believe whatever you said? Are you implying that anything that lacks autonomy instead becomes perfectly obedient ...

Ok well, I think we just have different conceptions of rationality. Maybe I believe no-one is rational in your sense of the term. So what? I don't und...

You're right, sorry. Basically I just wanted to make clear I distance myself from epiphenomenalism (qualia as real, but causally impotent), so there i...

Well I cannot speak for the thoughts and feelings of "one" but I see no contradiction whatsoever between being a product of my environment and being r...

Knee-jerk incredulousness is a common response, but I generally find there is not much of substance to back up the sentiment. Which is to say I don't ...

Sure, and then I'd probably pull the hand back and start screaming, as that is the usual functional response. The functionalist account is in no way l...

Well it's really just a tangential point, I will rephrase the question so we get back on track: why do you believe that pain has a qualitative compone...

Yes it does, technically. If thunder is an act of god, by definition, then if god does not exist then no one can hear thunder. The "thunder" we would ...

This is a performative contradiction, if you say "I feel pain" then you must think you feel pain. Perhaps you meant "I don't just think, I know I feel...

No, not as defined by you. This what I meant by "laying claim to words" earlier, you have claimed the word "blueness" and "pain", and now I look stupi...

I don't really understand how this is an answer. Why do you believe in "conscious experience", blueness, pain etc.? Why believe there is anything "unn...

I don't believe that qualia/phenomenal properties do exist, so I obviously can't answer this question. I believe the position you're describing is cal...

No I'm sorry, this got misunderstood. When I said I wasn't speaking for you that is literally all I meant, that I wasn't speaking on your behalf and t...

If you take those to involve a qualitative element, then yes. Why believe that? Like I told you I prefer functionalist definitions of taste and vision...

As far as I can tell Nagel never argued for anything in What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, all he did was articulate an assumption. It seems to me the text...

For evidence, I think the realist would say "Phenomelogical properties appear to exist, so they probably do exist", and the Illusionist would say "Phe...

I believe this is not quite correct, I agree every illusion has a counterpart, "the thing that looks like itself", the thing that does not deceive, bu...

I don't need to "explain away their appearance", the mechanisms of color vision and pain are not a great mystery and not what results in the Hard Prob...

Not really, unless an "inner experience" is taken to involve phenomenal properties by definition. I don't think I ever spoke of "interpretive illusion...