Dan

No, in practice we both specify what people are or ought to be free to do or be and what restrictions they ought to be free from. Both are sensible wa...

In your last post you said "To "be free to act in some way" is completely meaningless if not oxymoronic. Say we name a specific type of activity, as t...

Yes, I would agree that thinking that lots of different types of freedom should all be protected could easily lead to conflicts which might not be res...

So long as people are being clear about what they mean, equivocation doesn't seem to come into it. I agree that freedom certainly has something to do ...

I'm not really sure what an "objective definition" would even be. The definitions of words are either explicitly stated within specific contexts (such...

Yeah, that doesn't work. First, we don't "start" with the idea of freedom being without any restriction or constraint. We "start" with a lot of differ...

Talking of "kinds" of freedom is not oxymoronic at all. There is a huge literature on different types of freedom, and I think we can reasonably unders...

I'm not really clear on what you are trying to solve. You haven't shown at all that protecting the kind of freedom that I am discussing is incompatibl...

I don't think that's a problem. I don't think we need to protect your freedom to go and stab people in the throat. In fact, I think we should restrict...

I mean, I would also be happy to say that I am protecting freedom to make certain types of choices, if that would be more agreeable to you linguistica...

I agree that it is moral reasoning that is being used to determine what kind of freedom we should protect and what we shouldn't, though I'm not sure t...

Again, I haven't said that such an action would be not free or not rational. What I am suggesting ought to be protected is not moral restraint, and yo...

I mean, that's true if by "freedom" you mean the freedom to do anything at all. I am not interested in protecting that. I am interested in protecting ...

It is an instance of protecting a specific type of freedom, the freedom to make your own choices. I agree that I am not promoting the protection of th...

What I am proposing is that a certain type of freedom should be protected. Not, for example, the freedom to assault others. That sort of freedom shoul...

I am not limiting the meaning of "freedom". I am saying that only a certain type of freedom is being used as the measure of value, specifically the fr...

I am not defining freedom by reference to what is morally relevant. I am defining what is morally relevant by reference to freedom. I'm not begging th...

I would say that threats that don't involve threatening to restricting one's freedom in a morally relevant way are not coercing a person in a morally ...

Only threats that threaten to restrict/violate your freedom would be morally relevant. So "I will shoot you" clearly would, but "I won't be your frien...

No, ideologies, biases, and prejudices do not restrict someone's freedom (generally). Religious faith may do so more often as there is often a threat ...

I don't think that is how habits work at all, but even if we imagine that it is, not realizing an option was available to you (generally) isn't a rest...

I think Amadeus has covered my response to habits fairly well. An option not occurring to you is not a restriction of your freedom. It's just you not ...

I agree that thought is mediating the way which coercion violates someone's freedom, but it is doing that by making the person make a choice between o...

No, the threat really does restrict your freedom. It isn't just a reason to act, it is coercing you to act in a way by threatening your freedom. Choos...

Not at all. Property can only be owned in a morally relevant sense if it can be owned without laws and property. Difficult and impossible are not the ...

I mean, I think I disagree, but I'm also not saying that the choices can't involve other people. What I am claiming is that the measure of moral value...

No, I am saying that only the freedom to make certain kinds of choices is morally valuable. Specifically, the choices over that which belongs to the p...

No, I don't imply that you shouldn't make that choice (though in this case you shouldn't). What I am saying is that your freedom to make that choice i...

No, a habit isn't a restriction of one's freedom. No, the principle I'm claiming is that my car, being my property, is something that belongs to me an...

Because a threat to your freedom is being imposed in one case (you better not steal or else), and in the other case you are just acting in a not very ...

I didn't mean to suggest that you were involving everybody, just everybody affected by the decision in question. In the case of the cure for blindness...

I'm not drawing a sharp distinction between mental and physical constraints, I'm simply pointing out that having a habit isn't a proper constraint in ...

I mean, it's a nice idea. I don't it works, but a nice idea. My first questions are: 1. What about things that people don't generally think of "paying...

Being dishonest doesn't always impair our ability to apply our rationality to choices, though in this case it would, and would be morally similar to s...

People doing the wrong thing due to akrasia, or weakness of will, is not a case of their freedom being restricted, but rather them failing to do the r...

I'm inclined to agree with Hume that rationality is means-ends, rather than normative in the sense of setting rational goals. We want what we want, an...

yes I think perfectly rational agents can plausibly all want and choose different things. This need not be arbitrary, it might be instead related to w...

Typo in previous post. "Could have not done it" should read I could have not done it

I meant morally relevant in the sense that it is restricting the person's freedom. If I had a habit of murdering someone, that would be morally releva...

With the bar set low for "understanding" then most adults, most of the time, should be able to understand their choices. Yes, I agree that people in t...

That is actually a really good illustration of why I resist the term "promote". Whether someone has a bad habit is not morally relevant. This does not...

I'm not really sure tangible proof is the right form of proof for moral absolutism, but I take your point. But I think the only viable options are mor...

no, I am concerned with solving ethics entirely. But having a system that works for ASIs would be a significant benefit of that for sure.

I'm not really sure what it means for a choice to be freer without reference to some restriction of freedom. I agree that it is all freedom, so when d...

as I did mention though, it is better to consider this freedom being protected rather than promoted. So long as the person is able to understand and m...

I think that is an appropriate, useful, and accurate distinction to draw. Good for me vs morally good. Categorical imperative vs hypothetical imperati...

I am asking for a specific answer and willing to pay for it. I think I've been entirely clear about exactly what I'm asking for. If you feel that deal...

I'm not sure what you mean by these criteria that are independent of the freedom derived as a consequence. Could you elaborate on that?

I don't think you are using "freedom" in quite the same way. Also FC doesn't seek to produce the "most freedom" in the way you describe. Also, consequ...

"Better" in the context of a scenario being better or worse than another can be taken to mean less freedom is violated/more is protected. "Worse" in t...